func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static bool Run(OpKernelContext* ctx, const Tensor& input,
const Tensor& filter, int batch, int input_rows,
int input_cols, int in_depth, int filter_rows,
int filter_cols, int pad_rows, int pad_cols, int out_rows,
int out_cols, int out_depth, int dilation_rows,
int dilation_cols, int stride_rows, int stride_cols,
Tensor* output, TensorFormat data_format) {
auto num_threads =
ctx->device()->tensorflow_cpu_worker_threads()->num_threads;
// See libxsmm_dnn.h for this struct definition.
libxsmm_dnn_conv_desc desc;
desc.N = batch;
desc.C = in_depth;
desc.H = input_rows;
desc.W = input_cols;
desc.K = out_depth;
desc.R = filter_rows;
desc.S = filter_cols;
desc.u = stride_rows;
desc.v = stride_cols;
desc.pad_h = pad_rows;
desc.pad_w = pad_cols;
desc.pad_h_in = 0;
desc.pad_w_in = 0;
desc.pad_h_out = 0;
desc.pad_w_out = 0;
desc.threads = num_threads;
desc.algo = LIBXSMM_DNN_CONV_ALGO_DIRECT;
desc.buffer_format = LIBXSMM_DNN_TENSOR_FORMAT_NHWC;
desc.filter_format = LIBXSMM_DNN_TENSOR_FORMAT_LIBXSMM;
desc.fuse_ops = LIBXSMM_DNN_CONV_FUSE_NONE;
desc.options = LIBXSMM_DNN_CONV_OPTION_OVERWRITE;
desc.datatype_out = LIBXSMM_DNN_DATATYPE_F32;
desc.datatype_in = LIBXSMM_DNN_DATATYPE_F32;
if (dilation_rows != 1 || dilation_cols != 1 ||
!CanUseXsmmConv2D(desc, data_format)) {
return false;
}
auto input_ptr = input.template flat<float>().data();
auto filter_ptr = filter.template flat<float>().data();
auto output_ptr = output->template flat<float>().data();
bool success = functor::XsmmFwdConv2D<CPUDevice, float>()(
ctx, desc, input_ptr, filter_ptr, output_ptr);
return success;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
tensorflow
|
b12aa1d44352de21d1a6faaf04172d8c2508b42b
| 259,864,576,458,161,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
Fix one more FPE.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 369346568
Change-Id: I840fd575962adc879713a4c9cc59e6da3331caa7
|
bool GrpcStreamClientHandler::onReceiveMessageRaw(Buffer::InstancePtr&& response) {
context->onGrpcReceive(token, std::move(response));
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
envoy
|
8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153
| 337,185,503,123,442,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
|
int oidc_base64url_decode(apr_pool_t *pool, char **dst, const char *src) {
if (src == NULL) {
return -1;
}
char *dec = apr_pstrdup(pool, src);
int i = 0;
while (dec[i] != '\0') {
if (dec[i] == '-')
dec[i] = '+';
if (dec[i] == '_')
dec[i] = '/';
if (dec[i] == ',')
dec[i] = '=';
i++;
}
switch (strlen(dec) % 4) {
case 0:
break;
case 2:
dec = apr_pstrcat(pool, dec, "==", NULL);
break;
case 3:
dec = apr_pstrcat(pool, dec, "=", NULL);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
int dlen = apr_base64_decode_len(dec);
*dst = apr_palloc(pool, dlen);
return apr_base64_decode(*dst, dec);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-79"
] |
mod_auth_openidc
|
55ea0a085290cd2c8cdfdd960a230cbc38ba8b56
| 95,435,245,909,849,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
Add a function to escape Javascript characters
|
static void vmx_start_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 preemption_timeout = get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vmx_preemption_timer_value;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz == 0)
return;
/* Make sure short timeouts reliably trigger an immediate vmexit.
* hrtimer_start does not guarantee this. */
if (preemption_timeout <= 1) {
vmx_preemption_timer_fn(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer);
return;
}
preemption_timeout <<= VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE;
preemption_timeout *= 1000000;
do_div(preemption_timeout, vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz);
hrtimer_start(&vmx->nested.preemption_timer,
ns_to_ktime(preemption_timeout), HRTIMER_MODE_REL);
}
| 0 |
[] |
kvm
|
a642fc305053cc1c6e47e4f4df327895747ab485
| 30,880,173,797,813,087,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int file_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
jas_stream_fileobj_t *fileobj = JAS_CAST(jas_stream_fileobj_t *, obj);
return write(fileobj->fd, buf, cnt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
jasper
|
3c55b399c36ef46befcb21e4ebc4799367f89684
| 282,686,680,831,918,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.
|
void uECC_vli_mod_sqrt(uECC_word_t *a, uECC_Curve curve) {
curve->mod_sqrt(a, curve);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
micro-ecc
|
1b5f5cea5145c96dd8791b9b2c41424fc74c2172
| 137,321,636,968,819,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix for #168
|
bool is_sameXYC(const CImg<t>& img) const {
return is_sameXYC(img._width,img._height,img._spectrum);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 254,537,816,847,044,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
Cues::~Cues() {
if (cue_entries_) {
for (int32_t i = 0; i < cue_entries_size_; ++i) {
CuePoint* const cue = cue_entries_[i];
delete cue;
}
delete[] cue_entries_;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
| 179,053,017,284,700,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
|
parse_exp(Node** np, OnigToken* tok, int term,
UChar** src, UChar* end, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r, len, group = 0;
Node* qn;
Node** targetp;
*np = NULL;
if (tok->type == (enum TokenSyms )term)
goto end_of_token;
switch (tok->type) {
case TK_ALT:
case TK_EOT:
end_of_token:
*np = node_new_empty();
return tok->type;
break;
case TK_SUBEXP_OPEN:
r = parse_enclose(np, tok, TK_SUBEXP_CLOSE, src, end, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
if (r == 1) group = 1;
else if (r == 2) { /* option only */
Node* target;
OnigOptionType prev = env->option;
env->option = NENCLOSE(*np)->option;
r = fetch_token(tok, src, end, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
r = parse_subexp(&target, tok, term, src, end, env);
env->option = prev;
if (r < 0) {
onig_node_free(target);
return r;
}
NENCLOSE(*np)->target = target;
return tok->type;
}
break;
case TK_SUBEXP_CLOSE:
if (! IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_ALLOW_UNMATCHED_CLOSE_SUBEXP))
return ONIGERR_UNMATCHED_CLOSE_PARENTHESIS;
if (tok->escaped) goto tk_raw_byte;
else goto tk_byte;
break;
case TK_LINEBREAK:
r = node_linebreak(np, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
break;
case TK_EXTENDED_GRAPHEME_CLUSTER:
r = node_extended_grapheme_cluster(np, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
break;
case TK_KEEP:
*np = onig_node_new_anchor(ANCHOR_KEEP);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
break;
case TK_STRING:
tk_byte:
{
*np = node_new_str(tok->backp, *src);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
string_loop:
while (1) {
r = fetch_token(tok, src, end, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
if (r == TK_STRING) {
r = onig_node_str_cat(*np, tok->backp, *src);
}
#ifndef NUMBERED_CHAR_IS_NOT_CASE_AMBIG
else if (r == TK_CODE_POINT) {
r = node_str_cat_codepoint(*np, env->enc, tok->u.code);
}
#endif
else {
break;
}
if (r < 0) return r;
}
string_end:
targetp = np;
goto repeat;
}
break;
case TK_RAW_BYTE:
tk_raw_byte:
{
*np = node_new_str_raw_char((UChar )tok->u.c);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
len = 1;
while (1) {
if (len >= ONIGENC_MBC_MINLEN(env->enc)) {
if (len == enclen(env->enc, NSTR(*np)->s, NSTR(*np)->end)) {
r = fetch_token(tok, src, end, env);
NSTRING_CLEAR_RAW(*np);
goto string_end;
}
}
r = fetch_token(tok, src, end, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
if (r != TK_RAW_BYTE) {
/* Don't use this, it is wrong for little endian encodings. */
#ifdef USE_PAD_TO_SHORT_BYTE_CHAR
int rem;
if (len < ONIGENC_MBC_MINLEN(env->enc)) {
rem = ONIGENC_MBC_MINLEN(env->enc) - len;
(void )node_str_head_pad(NSTR(*np), rem, (UChar )0);
if (len + rem == enclen(env->enc, NSTR(*np)->s)) {
NSTRING_CLEAR_RAW(*np);
goto string_end;
}
}
#endif
return ONIGERR_TOO_SHORT_MULTI_BYTE_STRING;
}
r = node_str_cat_char(*np, (UChar )tok->u.c);
if (r < 0) return r;
len++;
}
}
break;
case TK_CODE_POINT:
{
*np = node_new_empty();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
r = node_str_cat_codepoint(*np, env->enc, tok->u.code);
if (r != 0) return r;
#ifdef NUMBERED_CHAR_IS_NOT_CASE_AMBIG
NSTRING_SET_RAW(*np);
#else
goto string_loop;
#endif
}
break;
case TK_QUOTE_OPEN:
{
OnigCodePoint end_op[2];
UChar *qstart, *qend, *nextp;
end_op[0] = (OnigCodePoint )MC_ESC(env->syntax);
end_op[1] = (OnigCodePoint )'E';
qstart = *src;
qend = find_str_position(end_op, 2, qstart, end, &nextp, env->enc);
if (IS_NULL(qend)) {
nextp = qend = end;
}
*np = node_new_str(qstart, qend);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
*src = nextp;
}
break;
case TK_CHAR_TYPE:
{
switch (tok->u.prop.ctype) {
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_WORD:
*np = node_new_ctype(tok->u.prop.ctype, tok->u.prop.not,
IS_ASCII_RANGE(env->option));
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
break;
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_SPACE:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_DIGIT:
case ONIGENC_CTYPE_XDIGIT:
{
CClassNode* cc;
#ifdef USE_SHARED_CCLASS_TABLE
const OnigCodePoint *mbr;
OnigCodePoint sb_out;
r = ONIGENC_GET_CTYPE_CODE_RANGE(env->enc, tok->u.prop.ctype,
&sb_out, &mbr);
if (r == 0 &&
! IS_ASCII_RANGE(env->option) &&
ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_NUM(mbr)
>= THRESHOLD_RANGE_NUM_FOR_SHARE_CCLASS) {
type_cclass_key key;
type_cclass_key* new_key;
key.enc = env->enc;
key.not = tok->u.prop.not;
key.type = tok->u.prop.ctype;
THREAD_ATOMIC_START;
if (IS_NULL(OnigTypeCClassTable)) {
OnigTypeCClassTable
= onig_st_init_table_with_size(&type_type_cclass_hash, 10);
if (IS_NULL(OnigTypeCClassTable)) {
THREAD_ATOMIC_END;
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
}
else {
if (onig_st_lookup(OnigTypeCClassTable, (st_data_t )&key,
(st_data_t* )np)) {
THREAD_ATOMIC_END;
break;
}
}
*np = node_new_cclass_by_codepoint_range(tok->u.prop.not,
sb_out, mbr);
if (IS_NULL(*np)) {
THREAD_ATOMIC_END;
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
cc = NCCLASS(*np);
NCCLASS_SET_SHARE(cc);
new_key = (type_cclass_key* )xmalloc(sizeof(type_cclass_key));
xmemcpy(new_key, &key, sizeof(type_cclass_key));
onig_st_add_direct(OnigTypeCClassTable, (st_data_t )new_key,
(st_data_t )*np);
THREAD_ATOMIC_END;
}
else {
#endif
*np = node_new_cclass();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
cc = NCCLASS(*np);
r = add_ctype_to_cc(cc, tok->u.prop.ctype, 0,
IS_ASCII_RANGE(env->option), env);
if (r != 0) return r;
if (tok->u.prop.not != 0) NCCLASS_SET_NOT(cc);
#ifdef USE_SHARED_CCLASS_TABLE
}
#endif
}
break;
default:
return ONIGERR_PARSER_BUG;
break;
}
}
break;
case TK_CHAR_PROPERTY:
r = parse_char_property(np, tok, src, end, env);
if (r != 0) return r;
break;
case TK_CC_OPEN:
{
Node *asc_node;
CClassNode* cc;
OnigCodePoint code;
r = parse_char_class(np, &asc_node, tok, src, end, env);
if (r != 0) {
onig_node_free(asc_node);
return r;
}
cc = NCCLASS(*np);
if (is_onechar_cclass(cc, &code)) {
onig_node_free(*np);
onig_node_free(asc_node);
*np = node_new_empty();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
r = node_str_cat_codepoint(*np, env->enc, code);
if (r != 0) return r;
goto string_loop;
}
if (IS_IGNORECASE(env->option)) {
r = cclass_case_fold(np, cc, NCCLASS(asc_node), env);
if (r != 0) {
onig_node_free(asc_node);
return r;
}
}
onig_node_free(asc_node);
}
break;
case TK_ANYCHAR:
*np = node_new_anychar();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
break;
case TK_ANYCHAR_ANYTIME:
*np = node_new_anychar();
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
qn = node_new_quantifier(0, REPEAT_INFINITE, 0);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(qn);
NQTFR(qn)->target = *np;
*np = qn;
break;
case TK_BACKREF:
len = tok->u.backref.num;
*np = node_new_backref(len,
(len > 1 ? tok->u.backref.refs : &(tok->u.backref.ref1)),
tok->u.backref.by_name,
#ifdef USE_BACKREF_WITH_LEVEL
tok->u.backref.exist_level,
tok->u.backref.level,
#endif
env);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
break;
#ifdef USE_SUBEXP_CALL
case TK_CALL:
{
int gnum = tok->u.call.gnum;
if (gnum < 0 || tok->u.call.rel != 0) {
if (gnum > 0) gnum--;
gnum = BACKREF_REL_TO_ABS(gnum, env);
if (gnum <= 0)
return ONIGERR_INVALID_BACKREF;
}
*np = node_new_call(tok->u.call.name, tok->u.call.name_end, gnum);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
env->num_call++;
}
break;
#endif
case TK_ANCHOR:
*np = onig_node_new_anchor(tok->u.anchor.subtype);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(*np);
NANCHOR(*np)->ascii_range = tok->u.anchor.ascii_range;
break;
case TK_OP_REPEAT:
case TK_INTERVAL:
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_CONTEXT_INDEP_REPEAT_OPS)) {
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_CONTEXT_INVALID_REPEAT_OPS))
return ONIGERR_TARGET_OF_REPEAT_OPERATOR_NOT_SPECIFIED;
else
*np = node_new_empty();
}
else {
goto tk_byte;
}
break;
default:
return ONIGERR_PARSER_BUG;
break;
}
{
targetp = np;
re_entry:
r = fetch_token(tok, src, end, env);
if (r < 0) return r;
repeat:
if (r == TK_OP_REPEAT || r == TK_INTERVAL) {
if (is_invalid_quantifier_target(*targetp))
return ONIGERR_TARGET_OF_REPEAT_OPERATOR_INVALID;
qn = node_new_quantifier(tok->u.repeat.lower, tok->u.repeat.upper,
(r == TK_INTERVAL ? 1 : 0));
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(qn);
NQTFR(qn)->greedy = tok->u.repeat.greedy;
r = set_quantifier(qn, *targetp, group, env);
if (r < 0) {
onig_node_free(qn);
return r;
}
if (tok->u.repeat.possessive != 0) {
Node* en;
en = node_new_enclose(ENCLOSE_STOP_BACKTRACK);
if (IS_NULL(en)) {
onig_node_free(qn);
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
NENCLOSE(en)->target = qn;
qn = en;
}
if (r == 0) {
*targetp = qn;
}
else if (r == 1) {
onig_node_free(qn);
}
else if (r == 2) { /* split case: /abc+/ */
Node *tmp;
*targetp = node_new_list(*targetp, NULL);
if (IS_NULL(*targetp)) {
onig_node_free(qn);
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
tmp = NCDR(*targetp) = node_new_list(qn, NULL);
if (IS_NULL(tmp)) {
onig_node_free(qn);
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
targetp = &(NCAR(tmp));
}
goto re_entry;
}
}
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
Onigmo
|
29e7e6aedebafd5efbbd90655c8e0d495035d7b4
| 326,381,358,781,526,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 422 |
bug: Fix out of bounds read
Add boundary check before PFETCH.
Based on the following commits on https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma ,
but not the same.
* 68c395576813b3f9812427f94d272bcffaca316c
* dc0a23eb16961f98d2a5a2128d18bd4602058a10
* 5186c7c706a7f280110e6a0b060f87d0f7d790ce
* 562bf4825b301693180c674994bf708b28b00592
* 162cf9124ba3bfaa21d53ebc506f3d9354bfa99b
|
static inline void tcp_disable_early_retrans(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
tp->do_early_retrans = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
bb1fceca22492109be12640d49f5ea5a544c6bb4
| 29,509,076,243,074,077,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue()
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Fixes: 6859d49475d4 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
unsigned long oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
long points;
long adj;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, memcg, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Do not even consider tasks which are explicitly marked oom
* unkillable or have been already oom reaped or the are in
* the middle of vfork
*/
adj = (long)p->signal->oom_score_adj;
if (adj == OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN ||
test_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &p->mm->flags) ||
in_vfork(p)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS) +
mm_pgtables_bytes(p->mm) / PAGE_SIZE;
task_unlock(p);
/* Normalize to oom_score_adj units */
adj *= totalpages / 1000;
points += adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task regardless of the root bonus and
* oom_score_adj (oom_score_adj can't be OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN here).
*/
return points > 0 ? points : 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
27ae357fa82be5ab73b2ef8d39dcb8ca2563483a
| 199,023,408,461,909,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
mm, oom: fix concurrent munlock and oom reaper unmap, v3
Since exit_mmap() is done without the protection of mm->mmap_sem, it is
possible for the oom reaper to concurrently operate on an mm until
MMF_OOM_SKIP is set.
This allows munlock_vma_pages_all() to concurrently run while the oom
reaper is operating on a vma. Since munlock_vma_pages_range() depends
on clearing VM_LOCKED from vm_flags before actually doing the munlock to
determine if any other vmas are locking the same memory, the check for
VM_LOCKED in the oom reaper is racy.
This is especially noticeable on architectures such as powerpc where
clearing a huge pmd requires serialize_against_pte_lookup(). If the pmd
is zapped by the oom reaper during follow_page_mask() after the check
for pmd_none() is bypassed, this ends up deferencing a NULL ptl or a
kernel oops.
Fix this by manually freeing all possible memory from the mm before
doing the munlock and then setting MMF_OOM_SKIP. The oom reaper can not
run on the mm anymore so the munlock is safe to do in exit_mmap(). It
also matches the logic that the oom reaper currently uses for
determining when to set MMF_OOM_SKIP itself, so there's no new risk of
excessive oom killing.
This issue fixes CVE-2018-1000200.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 212925802454 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently")
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [4.14+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline int ipmi_si_is_busy(struct timespec64 *ts)
{
return ts->tv_nsec != -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4
| 280,890,375,581,082,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
if (iRet != RS_RET_OK) {
free(s_httpserv);
s_httpserv = NULL;
LogError(0, NO_ERRCODE, "imhttp: error %d trying to activate configuration", iRet);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rsyslog
|
89955b0bcb1ff105e1374aad7e0e993faa6a038f
| 95,958,074,670,899,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
net bugfix: potential buffer overrun
|
static void tracked_request_begin(BdrvTrackedRequest *req,
BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t offset,
unsigned int bytes, bool is_write)
{
*req = (BdrvTrackedRequest){
.bs = bs,
.offset = offset,
.bytes = bytes,
.is_write = is_write,
.co = qemu_coroutine_self(),
.serialising = false,
.overlap_offset = offset,
.overlap_bytes = bytes,
};
qemu_co_queue_init(&req->wait_queue);
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&bs->tracked_requests, req, list);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
qemu
|
8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b
| 62,531,732,553,486,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
block: Limit request size (CVE-2014-0143)
Limiting the size of a single request to INT_MAX not only fixes a
direct integer overflow in bdrv_check_request() (which would only
trigger bad behaviour with ridiculously huge images, as in close to
2^64 bytes), but can also prevent overflows in all block drivers.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
|
TPM2B_IV_Marshal(TPM2B_IV *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
UINT16 written = 0;
written += TPM2B_Marshal(&source->b, buffer, size);
return written;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libtpms
|
3ef9b26cb9f28bd64d738bff9505a20d4eb56acd
| 213,700,473,171,388,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
tpm2: Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal for sanity checks
Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal and assert on it checking
the size of the data intended to be marshaled versus the maximum
buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
|
void sqlite3StartTable(
Parse *pParse, /* Parser context */
Token *pName1, /* First part of the name of the table or view */
Token *pName2, /* Second part of the name of the table or view */
int isTemp, /* True if this is a TEMP table */
int isView, /* True if this is a VIEW */
int isVirtual, /* True if this is a VIRTUAL table */
int noErr /* Do nothing if table already exists */
){
Table *pTable;
char *zName = 0; /* The name of the new table */
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
Vdbe *v;
int iDb; /* Database number to create the table in */
Token *pName; /* Unqualified name of the table to create */
if( db->init.busy && db->init.newTnum==1 ){
/* Special case: Parsing the sqlite_master or sqlite_temp_master schema */
iDb = db->init.iDb;
zName = sqlite3DbStrDup(db, SCHEMA_TABLE(iDb));
pName = pName1;
}else{
/* The common case */
iDb = sqlite3TwoPartName(pParse, pName1, pName2, &pName);
if( iDb<0 ) return;
if( !OMIT_TEMPDB && isTemp && pName2->n>0 && iDb!=1 ){
/* If creating a temp table, the name may not be qualified. Unless
** the database name is "temp" anyway. */
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "temporary table name must be unqualified");
return;
}
if( !OMIT_TEMPDB && isTemp ) iDb = 1;
zName = sqlite3NameFromToken(db, pName);
if( IN_RENAME_OBJECT ){
sqlite3RenameTokenMap(pParse, (void*)zName, pName);
}
}
pParse->sNameToken = *pName;
if( zName==0 ) return;
if( sqlite3CheckObjectName(pParse, zName, isView?"view":"table", zName) ){
goto begin_table_error;
}
if( db->init.iDb==1 ) isTemp = 1;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTHORIZATION
assert( isTemp==0 || isTemp==1 );
assert( isView==0 || isView==1 );
{
static const u8 aCode[] = {
SQLITE_CREATE_TABLE,
SQLITE_CREATE_TEMP_TABLE,
SQLITE_CREATE_VIEW,
SQLITE_CREATE_TEMP_VIEW
};
char *zDb = db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName;
if( sqlite3AuthCheck(pParse, SQLITE_INSERT, SCHEMA_TABLE(isTemp), 0, zDb) ){
goto begin_table_error;
}
if( !isVirtual && sqlite3AuthCheck(pParse, (int)aCode[isTemp+2*isView],
zName, 0, zDb) ){
goto begin_table_error;
}
}
#endif
/* Make sure the new table name does not collide with an existing
** index or table name in the same database. Issue an error message if
** it does. The exception is if the statement being parsed was passed
** to an sqlite3_declare_vtab() call. In that case only the column names
** and types will be used, so there is no need to test for namespace
** collisions.
*/
if( !IN_SPECIAL_PARSE ){
char *zDb = db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName;
if( SQLITE_OK!=sqlite3ReadSchema(pParse) ){
goto begin_table_error;
}
pTable = sqlite3FindTable(db, zName, zDb);
if( pTable ){
if( !noErr ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "table %T already exists", pName);
}else{
assert( !db->init.busy || CORRUPT_DB );
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iDb);
}
goto begin_table_error;
}
if( sqlite3FindIndex(db, zName, zDb)!=0 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "there is already an index named %s", zName);
goto begin_table_error;
}
}
pTable = sqlite3DbMallocZero(db, sizeof(Table));
if( pTable==0 ){
assert( db->mallocFailed );
pParse->rc = SQLITE_NOMEM_BKPT;
pParse->nErr++;
goto begin_table_error;
}
pTable->zName = zName;
pTable->iPKey = -1;
pTable->pSchema = db->aDb[iDb].pSchema;
pTable->nTabRef = 1;
#ifdef SQLITE_DEFAULT_ROWEST
pTable->nRowLogEst = sqlite3LogEst(SQLITE_DEFAULT_ROWEST);
#else
pTable->nRowLogEst = 200; assert( 200==sqlite3LogEst(1048576) );
#endif
assert( pParse->pNewTable==0 );
pParse->pNewTable = pTable;
/* If this is the magic sqlite_sequence table used by autoincrement,
** then record a pointer to this table in the main database structure
** so that INSERT can find the table easily.
*/
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOINCREMENT
if( !pParse->nested && strcmp(zName, "sqlite_sequence")==0 ){
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
pTable->pSchema->pSeqTab = pTable;
}
#endif
/* Begin generating the code that will insert the table record into
** the SQLITE_MASTER table. Note in particular that we must go ahead
** and allocate the record number for the table entry now. Before any
** PRIMARY KEY or UNIQUE keywords are parsed. Those keywords will cause
** indices to be created and the table record must come before the
** indices. Hence, the record number for the table must be allocated
** now.
*/
if( !db->init.busy && (v = sqlite3GetVdbe(pParse))!=0 ){
int addr1;
int fileFormat;
int reg1, reg2, reg3;
/* nullRow[] is an OP_Record encoding of a row containing 5 NULLs */
static const char nullRow[] = { 6, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
sqlite3BeginWriteOperation(pParse, 1, iDb);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_VIRTUALTABLE
if( isVirtual ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_VBegin);
}
#endif
/* If the file format and encoding in the database have not been set,
** set them now.
*/
reg1 = pParse->regRowid = ++pParse->nMem;
reg2 = pParse->regRoot = ++pParse->nMem;
reg3 = ++pParse->nMem;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_ReadCookie, iDb, reg3, BTREE_FILE_FORMAT);
sqlite3VdbeUsesBtree(v, iDb);
addr1 = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_If, reg3); VdbeCoverage(v);
fileFormat = (db->flags & SQLITE_LegacyFileFmt)!=0 ?
1 : SQLITE_MAX_FILE_FORMAT;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_SetCookie, iDb, BTREE_FILE_FORMAT, fileFormat);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_SetCookie, iDb, BTREE_TEXT_ENCODING, ENC(db));
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addr1);
/* This just creates a place-holder record in the sqlite_master table.
** The record created does not contain anything yet. It will be replaced
** by the real entry in code generated at sqlite3EndTable().
**
** The rowid for the new entry is left in register pParse->regRowid.
** The root page number of the new table is left in reg pParse->regRoot.
** The rowid and root page number values are needed by the code that
** sqlite3EndTable will generate.
*/
#if !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_VIEW) || !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_VIRTUALTABLE)
if( isView || isVirtual ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, 0, reg2);
}else
#endif
{
pParse->addrCrTab =
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_CreateBtree, iDb, reg2, BTREE_INTKEY);
}
sqlite3OpenMasterTable(pParse, iDb);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_NewRowid, 0, reg1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_Blob, 6, reg3, 0, nullRow, P4_STATIC);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Insert, 0, reg3, reg1);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_APPEND);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Close);
}
/* Normal (non-error) return. */
return;
/* If an error occurs, we jump here */
begin_table_error:
sqlite3DbFree(db, zName);
return;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-674",
"CWE-787"
] |
sqlite
|
38096961c7cd109110ac21d3ed7dad7e0cb0ae06
| 126,447,186,164,097,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 193 |
Avoid infinite recursion in the ALTER TABLE code when a view contains an unused CTE that references, directly or indirectly, the view itself.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1d2e53a39b87e364685e21de137655b6eee725e4c6d27fc90865072d7c5892b5
|
db_get_svc_princ(krb5_context ctx, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
ret = krb5_db_get_principal(ctx, princ, flags, server);
if (ret == KRB5_KDB_CANTLOCK_DB)
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE;
if (ret != 0) {
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
krb5
|
4c023ba43c16396f0d199e2df1cfa59b88b62acc
| 251,710,908,953,778,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved
|
static SLJIT_INLINE void copy_ovector(compiler_common *common, int topbracket)
{
DEFINE_COMPILER;
struct sljit_label *loop;
BOOL has_pre;
/* At this point we can freely use all registers. */
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_S2, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), OVECTOR(1));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), OVECTOR(1), STR_PTR, 0);
if (HAS_VIRTUAL_REGISTERS)
{
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R0, 0, ARGUMENTS, 0);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_S0, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), common->start_ptr);
if (common->mark_ptr != 0)
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), common->mark_ptr);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV_U32, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, oveccount));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, startchar_ptr), SLJIT_S0, 0);
if (common->mark_ptr != 0)
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, mark_ptr), SLJIT_R2, 0);
OP2(SLJIT_ADD, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, match_data),
SLJIT_IMM, SLJIT_OFFSETOF(pcre2_match_data, ovector) - sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE));
}
else
{
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_S0, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), common->start_ptr);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(ARGUMENTS), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, match_data));
if (common->mark_ptr != 0)
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R0, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_SP), common->mark_ptr);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV_U32, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(ARGUMENTS), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, oveccount));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(ARGUMENTS), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, startchar_ptr), SLJIT_S0, 0);
if (common->mark_ptr != 0)
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_MEM1(ARGUMENTS), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, mark_ptr), SLJIT_R0, 0);
OP2(SLJIT_ADD, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_IMM, SLJIT_OFFSETOF(pcre2_match_data, ovector) - sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE));
}
has_pre = sljit_emit_mem(compiler, SLJIT_MOV | SLJIT_MEM_SUPP | SLJIT_MEM_PRE, SLJIT_S1, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_S0), sizeof(sljit_sw)) == SLJIT_SUCCESS;
GET_LOCAL_BASE(SLJIT_S0, 0, OVECTOR_START - (has_pre ? sizeof(sljit_sw) : 0));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R0, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(HAS_VIRTUAL_REGISTERS ? SLJIT_R0 : ARGUMENTS), SLJIT_OFFSETOF(jit_arguments, begin));
loop = LABEL();
if (has_pre)
sljit_emit_mem(compiler, SLJIT_MOV | SLJIT_MEM_PRE, SLJIT_S1, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_S0), sizeof(sljit_sw));
else
{
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_S1, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_S0), 0);
OP2(SLJIT_ADD, SLJIT_S0, 0, SLJIT_S0, 0, SLJIT_IMM, sizeof(sljit_sw));
}
OP2(SLJIT_ADD, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_IMM, sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE));
OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_S1, 0, SLJIT_S1, 0, SLJIT_R0, 0);
/* Copy the integer value to the output buffer */
#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 16 || PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
OP2(SLJIT_ASHR, SLJIT_S1, 0, SLJIT_S1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, UCHAR_SHIFT);
#endif
SLJIT_ASSERT(sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE) == 4 || sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE) == 8);
OP1(((sizeof(PCRE2_SIZE) == 4) ? SLJIT_MOV_U32 : SLJIT_MOV), SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R2), 0, SLJIT_S1, 0);
OP2(SLJIT_SUB | SLJIT_SET_Z, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 1);
JUMPTO(SLJIT_NOT_ZERO, loop);
/* Calculate the return value, which is the maximum ovector value. */
if (topbracket > 1)
{
if (sljit_emit_mem(compiler, SLJIT_MOV | SLJIT_MEM_SUPP | SLJIT_MEM_PRE, SLJIT_R2, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), -(2 * (sljit_sw)sizeof(sljit_sw))) == SLJIT_SUCCESS)
{
GET_LOCAL_BASE(SLJIT_R0, 0, OVECTOR_START + topbracket * 2 * sizeof(sljit_sw));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, topbracket + 1);
/* OVECTOR(0) is never equal to SLJIT_S2. */
loop = LABEL();
sljit_emit_mem(compiler, SLJIT_MOV | SLJIT_MEM_PRE, SLJIT_R2, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), -(2 * (sljit_sw)sizeof(sljit_sw)));
OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 1);
CMPTO(SLJIT_EQUAL, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_S2, 0, loop);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_RETURN_REG, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0);
}
else
{
GET_LOCAL_BASE(SLJIT_R0, 0, OVECTOR_START + (topbracket - 1) * 2 * sizeof(sljit_sw));
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, topbracket + 1);
/* OVECTOR(0) is never equal to SLJIT_S2. */
loop = LABEL();
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_MEM1(SLJIT_R0), 0);
OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R0, 0, SLJIT_R0, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 2 * (sljit_sw)sizeof(sljit_sw));
OP2(SLJIT_SUB, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 1);
CMPTO(SLJIT_EQUAL, SLJIT_R2, 0, SLJIT_S2, 0, loop);
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_RETURN_REG, 0, SLJIT_R1, 0);
}
}
else
OP1(SLJIT_MOV, SLJIT_RETURN_REG, 0, SLJIT_IMM, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
pcre2
|
50a51cb7e67268e6ad417eb07c9de9bfea5cc55a
| 144,008,710,178,426,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 96 |
Fixed a unicode properrty matching issue in JIT
|
**/
static CImg<T> matrix(const T& a0, const T& a1,
const T& a2, const T& a3) {
CImg<T> r(2,2); T *ptr = r._data;
*(ptr++) = a0; *(ptr++) = a1;
*(ptr++) = a2; *(ptr++) = a3;
return r;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 147,738,395,695,651,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
static int sg_io(struct request_queue *q, struct gendisk *bd_disk,
struct sg_io_hdr *hdr, fmode_t mode)
{
unsigned long start_time;
int writing = 0, ret = 0;
struct request *rq;
char sense[SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE];
struct bio *bio;
if (hdr->interface_id != 'S')
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->cmd_len > BLK_MAX_CDB)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->dxfer_len > (queue_max_hw_sectors(q) << 9))
return -EIO;
if (hdr->dxfer_len)
switch (hdr->dxfer_direction) {
default:
return -EINVAL;
case SG_DXFER_TO_DEV:
writing = 1;
break;
case SG_DXFER_TO_FROM_DEV:
case SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV:
break;
}
rq = blk_get_request(q, writing ? WRITE : READ, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (blk_fill_sghdr_rq(q, rq, hdr, mode)) {
blk_put_request(rq);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (hdr->iovec_count) {
const int size = sizeof(struct sg_iovec) * hdr->iovec_count;
size_t iov_data_len;
struct sg_iovec *sg_iov;
struct iovec *iov;
int i;
sg_iov = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sg_iov) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(sg_iov, hdr->dxferp, size)) {
kfree(sg_iov);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/*
* Sum up the vecs, making sure they don't overflow
*/
iov = (struct iovec *) sg_iov;
iov_data_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < hdr->iovec_count; i++) {
if (iov_data_len + iov[i].iov_len < iov_data_len) {
kfree(sg_iov);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
iov_data_len += iov[i].iov_len;
}
/* SG_IO howto says that the shorter of the two wins */
if (hdr->dxfer_len < iov_data_len) {
hdr->iovec_count = iov_shorten(iov,
hdr->iovec_count,
hdr->dxfer_len);
iov_data_len = hdr->dxfer_len;
}
ret = blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, NULL, sg_iov, hdr->iovec_count,
iov_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(sg_iov);
} else if (hdr->dxfer_len)
ret = blk_rq_map_user(q, rq, NULL, hdr->dxferp, hdr->dxfer_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
goto out;
bio = rq->bio;
memset(sense, 0, sizeof(sense));
rq->sense = sense;
rq->sense_len = 0;
rq->retries = 0;
start_time = jiffies;
/* ignore return value. All information is passed back to caller
* (if he doesn't check that is his problem).
* N.B. a non-zero SCSI status is _not_ necessarily an error.
*/
blk_execute_rq(q, bd_disk, rq, 0);
hdr->duration = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - start_time);
return blk_complete_sghdr_rq(rq, hdr, bio);
out:
blk_put_request(rq);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
0bfc96cb77224736dfa35c3c555d37b3646ef35e
| 247,998,359,165,456,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 110 |
block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void _usb_write16_async(struct rtl_priv *rtlpriv, u32 addr, u16 val)
{
struct device *dev = rtlpriv->io.dev;
_usb_write_async(to_usb_device(dev), addr, val, 2);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
3f93616951138a598d930dcaec40f2bfd9ce43bb
| 106,979,275,739,712,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
rtlwifi: prevent memory leak in rtl_usb_probe
In rtl_usb_probe if allocation for usb_data fails the allocated hw
should be released. In addition the allocated rtlpriv->usb_data should
be released on error handling path.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
_gnutls_selected_certs_deinit (gnutls_session_t session)
{
if (session->internals.selected_need_free != 0)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < session->internals.selected_cert_list_length; i++)
{
gnutls_pcert_deinit (&session->internals.selected_cert_list[i]);
}
gnutls_free (session->internals.selected_cert_list);
session->internals.selected_cert_list = NULL;
session->internals.selected_cert_list_length = 0;
gnutls_privkey_deinit(session->internals.selected_key);
session->internals.selected_key = NULL;
}
return;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
gnutls
|
9c62f4feb2bdd6fbbb06eb0c60bfdea80d21bbb8
| 161,430,640,807,099,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Deinitialize the correct number of certificates. Reported by Remi Gacogne.
|
bool StringMatching::matchPattern(
const char* pattern,
const char* str)
{
std::string path(pattern);
std::string spec(str);
replace_all(pattern, "*", ".*");
replace_all(pattern, "?", ".");
std::regex path_regex(path);
std::smatch spec_match;
if (std::regex_match(spec, spec_match, path_regex))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
Fast-DDS
|
d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384
| 147,152,419,575,736,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]>
|
handle_keywordonly_args(struct compiling *c, const node *n, int start,
asdl_seq *kwonlyargs, asdl_seq *kwdefaults)
{
PyObject *argname;
node *ch;
expr_ty expression, annotation;
arg_ty arg = NULL;
int i = start;
int j = 0; /* index for kwdefaults and kwonlyargs */
if (kwonlyargs == NULL) {
ast_error(c, CHILD(n, start), "named arguments must follow bare *");
return -1;
}
assert(kwdefaults != NULL);
while (i < NCH(n)) {
ch = CHILD(n, i);
switch (TYPE(ch)) {
case vfpdef:
case tfpdef:
if (i + 1 < NCH(n) && TYPE(CHILD(n, i + 1)) == EQUAL) {
expression = ast_for_expr(c, CHILD(n, i + 2));
if (!expression)
goto error;
asdl_seq_SET(kwdefaults, j, expression);
i += 2; /* '=' and test */
}
else { /* setting NULL if no default value exists */
asdl_seq_SET(kwdefaults, j, NULL);
}
if (NCH(ch) == 3) {
/* ch is NAME ':' test */
annotation = ast_for_expr(c, CHILD(ch, 2));
if (!annotation)
goto error;
}
else {
annotation = NULL;
}
ch = CHILD(ch, 0);
argname = NEW_IDENTIFIER(ch);
if (!argname)
goto error;
if (forbidden_name(c, argname, ch, 0))
goto error;
arg = arg(argname, annotation, NULL, LINENO(ch), ch->n_col_offset,
ch->n_end_lineno, ch->n_end_col_offset,
c->c_arena);
if (!arg)
goto error;
asdl_seq_SET(kwonlyargs, j++, arg);
i += 1; /* the name */
if (i < NCH(n) && TYPE(CHILD(n, i)) == COMMA)
i += 1; /* the comma, if present */
break;
case TYPE_COMMENT:
/* arg will be equal to the last argument processed */
arg->type_comment = NEW_TYPE_COMMENT(ch);
if (!arg->type_comment)
goto error;
i += 1;
break;
case DOUBLESTAR:
return i;
default:
ast_error(c, ch, "unexpected node");
goto error;
}
}
return i;
error:
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpython
|
a4d78362397fc3bced6ea80fbc7b5f4827aec55e
| 90,580,149,040,121,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
bpo-36495: Fix two out-of-bounds array reads (GH-12641)
Research and fix by @bradlarsen.
|
TEST_F(QuicServerTransportTest, IdleTimeoutExpired) {
server->idleTimeout().timeoutExpired();
EXPECT_FALSE(server->idleTimeout().isScheduled());
EXPECT_TRUE(server->isDraining());
EXPECT_TRUE(server->isClosed());
auto serverReadCodec = makeClientEncryptedCodec();
EXPECT_FALSE(verifyFramePresent(
serverWrites, *serverReadCodec, QuicFrame::Type::ConnectionCloseFrame));
EXPECT_FALSE(verifyFramePresent(
serverWrites, *serverReadCodec, QuicFrame::Type::ConnectionCloseFrame));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
] |
mvfst
|
a67083ff4b8dcbb7ee2839da6338032030d712b0
| 302,305,380,850,129,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Close connection if we derive an extra 1-rtt write cipher
Summary: Fixes CVE-2021-24029
Reviewed By: mjoras, lnicco
Differential Revision: D26613890
fbshipit-source-id: 19bb2be2c731808144e1a074ece313fba11f1945
|
dp_packet_hwol_l4_is_udp(struct dp_packet *b)
{
return (*dp_packet_ol_flags_ptr(b) & DP_PACKET_OL_TX_L4_MASK) ==
DP_PACKET_OL_TX_UDP_CKSUM;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ovs
|
79349cbab0b2a755140eedb91833ad2760520a83
| 206,198,171,423,342,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
|
rb_reset_cpu(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
rb_head_page_deactivate(cpu_buffer);
cpu_buffer->head_page
= list_entry(cpu_buffer->pages, struct buffer_page, list);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->write, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->entries, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->page->commit, 0);
cpu_buffer->head_page->read = 0;
cpu_buffer->tail_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
cpu_buffer->commit_page = cpu_buffer->head_page;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->page->commit, 0);
cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0;
local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries_bytes, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->overrun, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->commit_overrun, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->dropped_events, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->committing, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->commits, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_touched, 0);
local_set(&cpu_buffer->pages_read, 0);
cpu_buffer->last_pages_touch = 0;
cpu_buffer->shortest_full = 0;
cpu_buffer->read = 0;
cpu_buffer->read_bytes = 0;
rb_time_set(&cpu_buffer->write_stamp, 0);
rb_time_set(&cpu_buffer->before_stamp, 0);
cpu_buffer->lost_events = 0;
cpu_buffer->last_overrun = 0;
rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
bbeb97464eefc65f506084fd9f18f21653e01137
| 189,107,266,661,334,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
tracing: Fix race in trace_open and buffer resize call
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a07a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
|
static void clock_was_set_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
clock_was_set();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tip
|
dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1
| 117,170,789,826,422,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xing Gao <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Marek <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
peer_register_skeleton (const gchar *obj_path,
RegisteredPath *reg_path,
GDBusConnection *dbus_conn)
{
GDBusInterfaceSkeleton *skeleton;
if (! g_hash_table_contains (reg_path->client_skeletons, dbus_conn))
{
skeleton = reg_path->callback (dbus_conn, obj_path, reg_path->data);
g_hash_table_insert (reg_path->client_skeletons, dbus_conn, skeleton);
}
else
{
/* Interface skeleton has been already registered on the connection, skipping */
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-276"
] |
gvfs
|
e3808a1b4042761055b1d975333a8243d67b8bfe
| 187,186,478,963,102,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
gvfsdaemon: Check that the connecting client is the same user
Otherwise, an attacker who learns the abstract socket address from
netstat(8) or similar could connect to it and issue D-Bus method
calls.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
|
static void register_sched_domain_sysctl(void)
{
int i, cpu_num = num_online_cpus();
struct ctl_table *entry = sd_alloc_ctl_entry(cpu_num + 1);
char buf[32];
WARN_ON(sd_ctl_dir[0].child);
sd_ctl_dir[0].child = entry;
if (entry == NULL)
return;
for_each_online_cpu(i) {
snprintf(buf, 32, "cpu%d", i);
entry->procname = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
entry->mode = 0555;
entry->child = sd_alloc_ctl_cpu_table(i);
entry++;
}
WARN_ON(sd_sysctl_header);
sd_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_table(sd_ctl_root);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c
| 263,885,515,168,887,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To compute 2's load we do:
weight(2) weight(B)
------------ * -----------
rq_weight(B) rw_weight(A)
This yields load fractions in comparable units.
The consequence is that it changes virtual time. We used to have:
time_{i}
vtime_{i} = ------------
weight_{i}
vtime = \Sum vtime_{i} = time / rq_weight.
But with the new way of load calculation we get that vtime equals time.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
ip_free(p)
void *p;
{
struct tcltkip *ptr = p;
int thr_crit_bup;
DUMP2("free Tcl Interp %p", ptr->ip);
if (ptr) {
thr_crit_bup = rb_thread_critical;
rb_thread_critical = Qtrue;
if ( ptr->ip != (Tcl_Interp*)NULL
&& !Tcl_InterpDeleted(ptr->ip)
&& Tcl_GetMaster(ptr->ip) != (Tcl_Interp*)NULL
&& !Tcl_InterpDeleted(Tcl_GetMaster(ptr->ip)) ) {
DUMP2("parent IP(%p) is not deleted",
Tcl_GetMaster(ptr->ip));
DUMP2("slave IP(%p) should not be deleted",
ptr->ip);
xfree(ptr);
/* ckfree((char*)ptr); */
rb_thread_critical = thr_crit_bup;
return;
}
if (ptr->ip == (Tcl_Interp*)NULL) {
DUMP1("ip_free is called for deleted IP");
xfree(ptr);
/* ckfree((char*)ptr); */
rb_thread_critical = thr_crit_bup;
return;
}
if (!Tcl_InterpDeleted(ptr->ip)) {
ip_finalize(ptr->ip);
Tcl_DeleteInterp(ptr->ip);
Tcl_Release(ptr->ip);
}
ptr->ip = (Tcl_Interp*)NULL;
xfree(ptr);
/* ckfree((char*)ptr); */
rb_thread_critical = thr_crit_bup;
}
DUMP1("complete freeing Tcl Interp");
}
| 0 |
[] |
tk
|
ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65
| 173,084,555,089,470,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
tcltklib.c: check argument
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (ip_cancel_eval_core): check argument type and
length.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@51468 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
f_exp(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
float_T f = 0.0;
rettv->v_type = VAR_FLOAT;
if (get_float_arg(argvars, &f) == OK)
rettv->vval.v_float = exp(f);
else
rettv->vval.v_float = 0.0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075
| 196,365,378,501,311,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others.
|
static int sta_set_rate_info_rx(struct sta_info *sta, struct rate_info *rinfo)
{
u16 rate = READ_ONCE(sta_get_last_rx_stats(sta)->last_rate);
if (rate == STA_STATS_RATE_INVALID)
return -EINVAL;
sta_stats_decode_rate(sta->local, rate, rinfo);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287"
] |
linux
|
3e493173b7841259a08c5c8e5cbe90adb349da7e
| 252,395,051,561,161,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int64_t position_for_cues() const { return position_for_cues_; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
| 129,547,834,932,711,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
|
static double mp_vector_map_v(_cimg_math_parser& mp) { // Operator(vector)
unsigned int
siz = (unsigned int)mp.opcode[2],
ptrs = (unsigned int)mp.opcode[4] + 1;
double *ptrd = &_mp_arg(1) + 1;
mp_func op = (mp_func)mp.opcode[3];
CImg<ulongT> l_opcode(1,3);
l_opcode.swap(mp.opcode);
ulongT &argument = mp.opcode[2];
while (siz-->0) { argument = ptrs++; *(ptrd++) = (*op)(mp); }
l_opcode.swap(mp.opcode);
return cimg::type<double>::nan();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
cimg
|
619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90
| 235,029,396,712,028,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size.
|
int ZEXPORT inflateGetHeader(strm, head)
z_streamp strm;
gz_headerp head;
{
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
/* check state */
if (strm == Z_NULL || strm->state == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)strm->state;
if ((state->wrap & 2) == 0) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
/* save header structure */
state->head = head;
head->done = 0;
return Z_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
zlib
|
e54e1299404101a5a9d0cf5e45512b543967f958
| 298,916,722,177,319,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
|
bool set(DTCollation &dt1, DTCollation &dt2, uint flags= 0)
{ set(dt1); return aggregate(dt2, flags); }
| 0 |
[] |
mysql-server
|
f7316aa0c9a3909fc7498e7b95d5d3af044a7e21
| 147,047,045,463,564,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 |
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
Backport of Bug#19143243 fix.
NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments.
NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function.
In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is
created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding
array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE.
ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(),
so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator.
The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item.
|
static UChar32 endKeyRoutine(UChar32 c) {
return thisKeyMetaCtrl | END_KEY;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
mongo
|
035cf2afc04988b22cb67f4ebfd77e9b344cb6e0
| 41,704,070,322,816,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
SERVER-25335 avoid group and other permissions when creating .dbshell history file
|
static struct hash_cell *__get_uuid_cell(const char *str)
{
struct hash_cell *hc;
unsigned int h = hash_str(str);
list_for_each_entry (hc, _uuid_buckets + h, uuid_list)
if (!strcmp(hc->uuid, str)) {
dm_get(hc->md);
return hc;
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
4edbe1d7bcffcd6269f3b5eb63f710393ff2ec7a
| 283,458,035,003,017,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
dm ioctl: fix out of bounds array access when no devices
If there are not any dm devices, we need to zero the "dev" argument in
the first structure dm_name_list. However, this can cause out of
bounds write, because the "needed" variable is zero and len may be
less than eight.
Fix this bug by reporting DM_BUFFER_FULL_FLAG if the result buffer is
too small to hold the "nl->dev" value.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
|
static bool handle_client_startup(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
const char *passwd;
const uint8_t *key;
bool ok;
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
/* don't tolerate partial packets */
if (incomplete_pkt(pkt)) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client sent partial pkt in startup phase");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_welcome) {
if (finish_client_login(client)) {
/* the packet was already parsed */
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
return true;
} else
return false;
}
switch (pkt->type) {
case PKT_SSLREQ:
slog_noise(client, "C: req SSL");
slog_noise(client, "P: nak");
/* reject SSL attempt */
if (!sbuf_answer(&client->sbuf, "N", 1)) {
disconnect_client(client, false, "failed to nak SSL");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_STARTUP_V2:
disconnect_client(client, true, "Old V2 protocol not supported");
return false;
case PKT_STARTUP:
if (client->pool && !client->wait_for_user_conn && !client->wait_for_user) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "client re-sent startup pkt");
return false;
}
if (client->wait_for_user) {
client->wait_for_user = false;
if (!finish_set_pool(client, false))
return false;
} else if (!decide_startup_pool(client, pkt)) {
return false;
}
break;
case 'p': /* PasswordMessage */
/* haven't requested it */
if (cf_auth_type <= AUTH_TRUST) {
disconnect_client(client, true, "unrequested passwd pkt");
return false;
}
ok = mbuf_get_string(&pkt->data, &passwd);
if (ok && check_client_passwd(client, passwd)) {
if (!finish_client_login(client))
return false;
} else {
disconnect_client(client, true, "Auth failed");
return false;
}
break;
case PKT_CANCEL:
if (mbuf_avail_for_read(&pkt->data) == BACKENDKEY_LEN
&& mbuf_get_bytes(&pkt->data, BACKENDKEY_LEN, &key))
{
memcpy(client->cancel_key, key, BACKENDKEY_LEN);
accept_cancel_request(client);
} else
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad cancel request");
return false;
default:
disconnect_client(client, false, "bad packet");
return false;
}
sbuf_prepare_skip(sbuf, pkt->len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
pgbouncer
|
edab5be6665b9e8de66c25ba527509b229468573
| 8,173,781,446,907,756,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 |
Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
|
static void hgcm_call_add_pagelist_size(void *buf, u32 len, size_t *extra)
{
u32 page_count;
page_count = hgcm_call_buf_size_in_pages(buf, len);
*extra += offsetof(struct vmmdev_hgcm_pagelist, pages[page_count]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
e0b0cb9388642c104838fac100a4af32745621e2
| 189,633,130,129,363,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
virt: vbox: fix memory leak in hgcm_call_preprocess_linaddr
In hgcm_call_preprocess_linaddr memory is allocated for bounce_buf but
is not released if copy_form_user fails. In order to prevent memory leak
in case of failure, the assignment to bounce_buf_ret is moved before the
error check. This way the allocated bounce_buf will be released by the
caller.
Fixes: 579db9d45cb4 ("virt: Add vboxguest VMMDEV communication code")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
INST_HANDLER (pop) { // POP Rd
int d = ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4) | ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf);
__generic_pop (op, 1);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // store in Rd
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68
| 140,195,978,602,880,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix crash in anal.avr
|
MONGO_EXPORT void mongo_init_sockets( void ) {
mongo_env_sock_init();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
mongo-c-driver-legacy
|
1a1f5e26a4309480d88598913f9eebf9e9cba8ca
| 6,972,739,440,925,013,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
don't mix up int and size_t (first pass to fix that)
|
update_src_rect(ImageRef *ref, Image *img) {
// The src rect in OpenGL co-ords [0, 1] with origin at top-left corner of image
ref->src_rect.left = (float)ref->src_x / (float)img->width;
ref->src_rect.right = (float)(ref->src_x + ref->src_width) / (float)img->width;
ref->src_rect.top = (float)ref->src_y / (float)img->height;
ref->src_rect.bottom = (float)(ref->src_y + ref->src_height) / (float)img->height;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
kitty
|
82c137878c2b99100a3cdc1c0f0efea069313901
| 165,516,618,193,816,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Graphics protocol: Dont return filename in the error message when opening file fails, since filenames can contain control characters
Fixes #3128
|
int bond_parse_parm(const char *buf, const struct bond_parm_tbl *tbl)
{
int modeint = -1, i, rv;
char *p, modestr[BOND_MAX_MODENAME_LEN + 1] = { 0, };
for (p = (char *)buf; *p; p++)
if (!(isdigit(*p) || isspace(*p)))
break;
if (*p)
rv = sscanf(buf, "%20s", modestr);
else
rv = sscanf(buf, "%d", &modeint);
if (!rv)
return -1;
for (i = 0; tbl[i].modename; i++) {
if (modeint == tbl[i].mode)
return tbl[i].mode;
if (strcmp(modestr, tbl[i].modename) == 0)
return tbl[i].mode;
}
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
| 332,574,917,584,047,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static double mp_gcd(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
return cimg::gcd((long)_mp_arg(2),(long)_mp_arg(3));
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 190,749,162,730,801,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
set_optimize_exact(regex_t* reg, OptExact* e)
{
int r;
if (e->len == 0) return 0;
if (e->ignore_case) {
reg->exact = (UChar* )xmalloc(e->len);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(reg->exact);
xmemcpy(reg->exact, e->s, e->len);
reg->exact_end = reg->exact + e->len;
reg->optimize = OPTIMIZE_EXACT_IC;
}
else {
int allow_reverse;
reg->exact = onigenc_strdup(reg->enc, e->s, e->s + e->len);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(reg->exact);
reg->exact_end = reg->exact + e->len;
allow_reverse =
ONIGENC_IS_ALLOWED_REVERSE_MATCH(reg->enc, reg->exact, reg->exact_end);
if (e->len >= 3 || (e->len >= 2 && allow_reverse)) {
r = set_bm_skip(reg->exact, reg->exact_end, reg->enc,
reg->map, &(reg->int_map));
if (r != 0) return r;
reg->optimize = (allow_reverse != 0
? OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM : OPTIMIZE_EXACT_BM_NO_REV);
}
else {
reg->optimize = OPTIMIZE_EXACT;
}
}
reg->dmin = e->mmd.min;
reg->dmax = e->mmd.max;
if (reg->dmin != INFINITE_LEN) {
reg->threshold_len = reg->dmin + (int )(reg->exact_end - reg->exact);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
oniguruma
|
410f5916429e7d2920e1d4867388514f605413b8
| 243,823,023,060,044,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
fix #87: Read unknown address in onig_error_code_to_str()
|
static MagickBooleanType WritePDFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
#define CFormat "/Filter [ /%s ]\n"
#define ObjectsPerImage 14
#define ThrowPDFException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (xref != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL) \
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref); \
ThrowWriterException((exception),(message)); \
}
DisableMSCWarning(4310)
static const char
XMPProfile[]=
{
"<?xpacket begin=\"%s\" id=\"W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d\"?>\n"
"<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x=\"adobe:ns:meta/\" x:xmptk=\"Adobe XMP Core 4.0-c316 44.253921, Sun Oct 01 2006 17:08:23\">\n"
" <rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\">\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xap=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/\">\n"
" <xap:ModifyDate>%s</xap:ModifyDate>\n"
" <xap:CreateDate>%s</xap:CreateDate>\n"
" <xap:MetadataDate>%s</xap:MetadataDate>\n"
" <xap:CreatorTool>%s</xap:CreatorTool>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:dc=\"http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/\">\n"
" <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>\n"
" <dc:title>\n"
" <rdf:Alt>\n"
" <rdf:li xml:lang=\"x-default\">%s</rdf:li>\n"
" </rdf:Alt>\n"
" </dc:title>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:xapMM=\"http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/\">\n"
" <xapMM:DocumentID>uuid:6ec119d7-7982-4f56-808d-dfe64f5b35cf</xapMM:DocumentID>\n"
" <xapMM:InstanceID>uuid:a79b99b4-6235-447f-9f6c-ec18ef7555cb</xapMM:InstanceID>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdf=\"http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/\">\n"
" <pdf:Producer>%s</pdf:Producer>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" <rdf:Description rdf:about=\"\"\n"
" xmlns:pdfaid=\"http://www.aiim.org/pdfa/ns/id/\">\n"
" <pdfaid:part>3</pdfaid:part>\n"
" <pdfaid:conformance>B</pdfaid:conformance>\n"
" </rdf:Description>\n"
" </rdf:RDF>\n"
"</x:xmpmeta>\n"
"<?xpacket end=\"w\"?>\n"
},
XMPProfileMagick[4]= { (char) 0xef, (char) 0xbb, (char) 0xbf, (char) 0x00 };
RestoreMSCWarning
char
basename[MaxTextExtent],
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
date[MaxTextExtent],
*escape,
**labels,
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*url;
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*device,
*option,
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
pointsize;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*next,
*tile_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene,
*xref;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution,
scale;
RectangleInfo
geometry,
media_info,
page_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register unsigned char
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
channels,
imageListLength,
info_id,
length,
object,
pages_id,
root_id,
text_size,
version;
ssize_t
count,
page_count,
y;
struct tm
local_time;
time_t
seconds;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Allocate X ref memory.
*/
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2048UL,sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(xref,0,2048UL*sizeof(*xref));
/*
Write Info object.
*/
object=0;
version=3;
if (image_info->compression == JPEG2000Compression)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,5);
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
if (next->matte != MagickFalse)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,4);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,6);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
version=(size_t) MagickMax(version,7);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%%PDF-1.%.20g \n",(double)
version);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'%');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe2);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xe3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xcf);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0xd3);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
/*
Write Catalog object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
root_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
object+1);
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Metadata %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Pages %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Catalog");
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"pdf:page-direction");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(option,"right-to-left") == 0))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ViewerPreferences<</PageDirection/R2L>>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
GetPathComponent(image->filename,BasePath,basename);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
{
char
create_date[MaxTextExtent],
modify_date[MaxTextExtent],
timestamp[MaxTextExtent],
xmp_profile[MaxTextExtent],
*url;
/*
Write XMP object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /XML\n");
*modify_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:modify");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(modify_date,value,MaxTextExtent);
*create_date='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"date:create");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(create_date,value,MaxTextExtent);
(void) FormatMagickTime(time((time_t *) NULL),MaxTextExtent,timestamp);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(basename);
i=FormatLocaleString(xmp_profile,MaxTextExtent,XMPProfile,
XMPProfileMagick,modify_date,create_date,timestamp,url,escape,url);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g\n",(double)
i);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Metadata\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\nstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,xmp_profile);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
}
/*
Write Pages object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
pages_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Pages\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Kids [ %.20g 0 R ",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) (pages_id+ObjectsPerImage+1);
page_count=1;
if (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)
{
Image
*kid_image;
/*
Predict page object id's.
*/
kid_image=image;
for ( ; GetNextImageInList(kid_image) != (Image *) NULL; count+=ObjectsPerImage)
{
page_count++;
profile=GetImageProfile(kid_image,"icc");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
count+=2;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 R ",(double)
count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
kid_image=GetNextImageInList(kid_image);
}
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xref,(size_t) count+2048UL,
sizeof(*xref));
if (xref == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Count %.20g\n",(double)
page_count);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
MagickBooleanType
has_icc_profile;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
has_icc_profile=(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if ((SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse) ||
(image->matte != MagickFalse))
compression=RLECompression;
break;
}
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_JPEG_DELEGATE)
case JPEGCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JPEG)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_LIBOPENJP2_DELEGATE)
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (JP2)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
case ZipCompression:
{
compression=RLECompression;
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn","`%s' (ZLIB)",
image->filename);
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* LZW compression is forbidden */
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
compression=RLECompression; /* ASCII 85 compression is forbidden */
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (compression == JPEG2000Compression)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Scale relative to dots-per-inch.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
resolution.x=image->x_resolution;
resolution.y=image->y_resolution;
if ((resolution.x == 0.0) || (resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
resolution.x=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.x+0.5)/100.0);
resolution.y=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.y+0.5)/100.0);
}
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",(double)
image->columns,(double) image->rows);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,image_info->page,MaxTextExtent);
else
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
else
if ((image->gravity != UndefinedGravity) &&
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDF") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,PSPageGeometry,MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(page_geometry,">",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
scale.x=(double) (geometry.width*delta.x)/resolution.x;
geometry.width=(size_t) floor(scale.x+0.5);
scale.y=(double) (geometry.height*delta.y)/resolution.y;
geometry.height=(size_t) floor(scale.y+0.5);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(page_geometry,&media_info);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,page_geometry,&page_info,
&image->exception);
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
geometry.x=(-page_info.x);
geometry.y=(ssize_t) (media_info.height+page_info.y-image->rows);
}
pointsize=12.0;
if (image_info->pointsize != 0.0)
pointsize=image_info->pointsize;
text_size=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
text_size=(size_t) (MultilineCensus(value)*pointsize+12);
(void) text_size;
/*
Write Page object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Page\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Parent %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) pages_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Resources <<\n");
labels=(char **) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
labels=StringToList(value);
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"/Font << /F%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+4);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"/XObject << /Im%.20g %.20g 0 R >>\n",(double) image->scene,(double)
object+5);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/ProcSet %.20g 0 R >>\n",
(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"/MediaBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"/CropBox [0 0 %g %g]\n",72.0*media_info.width/resolution.x,
72.0*media_info.height/resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Contents %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Thumb %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 10 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Contents object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"q\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
for (i=0; labels[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"BT\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/F%.20g %g Tf\n",
(double) image->scene,pointsize);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g Td\n",
(double) geometry.x,(double) (geometry.y+geometry.height+i*pointsize+
12));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"(%s) Tj\n",labels[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"ET\n");
labels[i]=DestroyString(labels[i]);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%g 0 0 %g %.20g %.20g cm\n",
scale.x,scale.y,(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Im%.20g Do\n",(double)
image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"Q\n");
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Procset object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageC",MaxTextExtent);
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageB",MaxTextExtent);
else
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"[ /PDF /Text /ImageI",MaxTextExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image," ]\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Font object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /Font\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Type1\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Name /F%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/BaseFont /Helvetica\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Encoding /MacRomanEncoding\n");
labels=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(labels);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write XObject object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Name /Im%.20g\n",(double)
image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+2);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/SMask %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 9 : 7));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((4*number_pixels) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) (4*number_pixels)))
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,image);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,image);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)));
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p))));
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jpeg",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,image,"jp2",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)));
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Colorspace object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=0;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
device="DeviceCMYK";
channels=4;
}
else
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
device="DeviceGray";
channels=1;
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
{
device="DeviceRGB";
channels=3;
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if ((profile == (StringInfo *) NULL) || (channels == 0))
{
if (channels != 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/%s\n",device);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"[ /Indexed /%s %.20g %.20g 0 R ]\n",device,(double) image->colors-
1,(double) object+3);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
const unsigned char
*p;
/*
Write ICC profile.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"[/ICCBased %.20g 0 R]\n",(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"<<\n/N %.20g\n"
"/Filter /ASCII85Decode\n/Length %.20g 0 R\n/Alternate /%s\n>>\n"
"stream\n",(double) channels,(double) object+1,device);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
offset=TellBlob(image);
Ascii85Initialize(image);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) *p++);
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",
(double) object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Thumb object.
*/
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry("106x106+0+0>",&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
tile_image=ThumbnailImage(image,geometry.width,geometry.height,
&image->exception);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,image->exception.reason);
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"DCTDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"JPXDecode");
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
break;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Decode [1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"FlateDecode");
break;
}
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"/Filter [ /CCITTFaxDecode ]\n",
MaxTextExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/DecodeParms [ << "
"/K %s /BlackIs1 false /Columns %.20g /Rows %.20g >> ]\n",CCITTParam,
(double) tile_image->columns,(double) tile_image->rows);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",(double)
tile_image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/ColorSpace %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object-(has_icc_profile != MagickFalse ? 3 : 1));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression) ?
1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows;
if ((compression == FaxCompression) ||
(compression == Group4Compression) ||
((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(tile_image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)))
{
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
if (LocaleCompare(CCITTParam,"0") == 0)
{
(void) HuffmanEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image);
break;
}
(void) Huffman2DEncodeImage(image_info,image,tile_image);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,tile_image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,tile_image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(tile_image,p)));
p++;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(tile_image,p))));
p++;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
else
if ((tile_image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(tile_image->colors > 256) || (compression == JPEGCompression) ||
(compression == JPEG2000Compression))
switch (compression)
{
case JPEGCompression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jpeg",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,tile_image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case JPEG2000Compression:
{
status=InjectImageBlob(image_info,image,tile_image,"jp2",
&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPDFException(CoderError,tile_image->exception.reason);
break;
}
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
length*=tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4UL : 3UL;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump runoffset encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(tile_image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
if (tile_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
p++;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(tile_image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(p)));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(p)));
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)));
p++;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(tile_image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
&tile_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(tile_image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
Ascii85Encode(image,(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x));
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
}
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256) ||
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression))
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
/*
Write Colormap object.
*/
if (compression == NoCompression)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Filter [ /ASCII85Decode ]\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if (compression == NoCompression)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green));
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue));
continue;
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green));
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue));
}
if (compression == NoCompression)
Ascii85Flush(image);
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write softmask object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
else
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Type /XObject\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/Subtype /Image\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Name /Ma%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case NoCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,
"ASCII85Decode");
break;
}
case LZWCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,"LZWDecode");
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,
"FlateDecode");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,CFormat,
"RunLengthDecode");
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Width %.20g\n",(double)
image->columns);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Height %.20g\n",
(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"/ColorSpace /DeviceGray\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/BitsPerComponent %d\n",
(compression == FaxCompression) || (compression == Group4Compression)
? 1 : 8);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Length %.20g 0 R\n",
(double) object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"stream\n");
offset=TellBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
/*
Allocate pixel array.
*/
length=(size_t) number_pixels;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,4*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
ThrowPDFException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Dump Runlength encoded pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (compression == ZipCompression)
status=ZLIBEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
#endif
if (compression == LZWCompression)
status=LZWEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
else
status=PackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
Ascii85Initialize(image);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
Ascii85Encode(image,ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum) (QuantumRange-
GetPixelOpacity(p))));
p++;
}
}
Ascii85Flush(image);
break;
}
}
offset=TellBlob(image)-offset;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\nendstream\n");
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Length object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
/*
Write Metadata object.
*/
xref[object++]=TellBlob(image);
info_id=object;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g 0 obj\n",(double)
object);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (%s)\n",
EscapeParenthesis(basename));
else
{
wchar_t
*utf16;
utf16=ConvertUTF8ToUTF16((unsigned char *) basename,&length);
if (utf16 != (wchar_t *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"/Title (\xfe\xff");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) utf16[i]);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,")\n");
utf16=(wchar_t *) RelinquishMagickMemory(utf16);
}
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
seconds=time((time_t *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_LOCALTIME_R)
(void) localtime_r(&seconds,&local_time);
#else
(void) memcpy(&local_time,localtime(&seconds),sizeof(local_time));
#endif
(void) FormatLocaleString(date,MaxTextExtent,"D:%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d",
local_time.tm_year+1900,local_time.tm_mon+1,local_time.tm_mday,
local_time.tm_hour,local_time.tm_min,local_time.tm_sec);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/CreationDate (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/ModDate (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
url=(char *) MagickAuthoritativeURL;
escape=EscapeParenthesis(url);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Producer (%s)\n",escape);
escape=DestroyString(escape);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"endobj\n");
/*
Write Xref object.
*/
offset=TellBlob(image)-xref[0]+
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PDFA") == 0 ? 6 : 0)+10;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"xref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"0 %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"0000000000 65535 f \n");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) object; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%010lu 00000 n \n",
(unsigned long) xref[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"trailer\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"<<\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Size %.20g\n",(double)
object+1);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Info %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
info_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/Root %.20g 0 R\n",(double)
root_id);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) SignatureImage(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"/ID [<%s> <%s>]\n",
GetImageProperty(image,"signature"),GetImageProperty(image,"signature"));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,">>\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"startxref\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double) offset);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EOF\n");
xref=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xref);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
ImageMagick6
|
3b28c8d93aa469f6d90c8b3c05fe3d88c2584e32
| 160,284,551,424,657,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1,804 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454
|
R_API char *r_bin_java_get_version(RBinJavaObj *bin) {
return r_str_newf ("0x%02x%02x 0x%02x%02x",
bin->cf.major[1], bin->cf.major[0],
bin->cf.minor[1], bin->cf.minor[0]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-788"
] |
radare2
|
6c4428f018d385fc80a33ecddcb37becea685dd5
| 328,474,708,411,237,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Improve boundary checks to fix oobread segfaults ##crash
* Reported by Cen Zhang via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: bins/fuzzed/javaoob-havoc.class
|
router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest)
{
return router_get_hash_impl(s, s_len, digest, "extra-info",
"\nrouter-signature",'\n', DIGEST_SHA1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
tor
|
d978216dea6b21ac38230a59d172139185a68dbd
| 327,591,976,121,208,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix parsing bug with unecognized token at EOS
In get_token(), we could read one byte past the end of the
region. This is only a big problem in the case where the region
itself is (a) potentially hostile, and (b) not explicitly
nul-terminated.
This patch fixes the underlying bug, and also makes sure that the
one remaining case of not-NUL-terminated potentially hostile data
gets NUL-terminated.
Fix for bug 21018, TROVE-2016-12-002, and CVE-2016-1254
|
static void end_packfile(void)
{
static int running;
if (running || !pack_data)
return;
running = 1;
clear_delta_base_cache();
if (object_count) {
struct packed_git *new_p;
unsigned char cur_pack_sha1[20];
char *idx_name;
int i;
struct branch *b;
struct tag *t;
close_pack_windows(pack_data);
sha1close(pack_file, cur_pack_sha1, 0);
fixup_pack_header_footer(pack_data->pack_fd, pack_data->sha1,
pack_data->pack_name, object_count,
cur_pack_sha1, pack_size);
close(pack_data->pack_fd);
idx_name = keep_pack(create_index());
/* Register the packfile with core git's machinery. */
new_p = add_packed_git(idx_name, strlen(idx_name), 1);
if (!new_p)
die("core git rejected index %s", idx_name);
all_packs[pack_id] = new_p;
install_packed_git(new_p);
/* Print the boundary */
if (pack_edges) {
fprintf(pack_edges, "%s:", new_p->pack_name);
for (i = 0; i < branch_table_sz; i++) {
for (b = branch_table[i]; b; b = b->table_next_branch) {
if (b->pack_id == pack_id)
fprintf(pack_edges, " %s", sha1_to_hex(b->sha1));
}
}
for (t = first_tag; t; t = t->next_tag) {
if (t->pack_id == pack_id)
fprintf(pack_edges, " %s", sha1_to_hex(t->sha1));
}
fputc('\n', pack_edges);
fflush(pack_edges);
}
pack_id++;
}
else {
close(pack_data->pack_fd);
unlink_or_warn(pack_data->pack_name);
}
free(pack_data);
pack_data = NULL;
running = 0;
/* We can't carry a delta across packfiles. */
strbuf_release(&last_blob.data);
last_blob.offset = 0;
last_blob.depth = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
git
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
| 303,136,033,924,623,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 |
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
proto_register_fb_zero(void)
{
static hf_register_info hf[] = {
{ &hf_fb_zero_puflags,
{ "Public Flags", "fb_zero.puflags",
FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
"Specifying per-packet public flags", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_puflags_vrsn,
{ "Version", "fb_zero.puflags.version",
FT_BOOLEAN, 8, TFS(&tfs_yes_no), PUFLAGS_VRSN,
"Signifies that this packet also contains the version of the FB Zero protocol", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_puflags_unknown,
{ "Unknown", "fb_zero.puflags.unknown",
FT_UINT8, BASE_HEX, NULL, PUFLAGS_UNKN,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_version,
{ "Version", "fb_zero.version",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"32 bit opaque tag that represents the version of the ZB Zero (Always QTV)", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_length,
{ "Length", "fb_zero.length",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag,
{ "Tag", "fb_zero.tag",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_number,
{ "Tag Number", "fb_zero.tag_number",
FT_UINT16, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tags,
{ "Tag/value", "fb_zero.tags",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_type,
{ "Tag Type", "fb_zero.tag_type",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_offset_end,
{ "Tag offset end", "fb_zero.tag_offset_end",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_length,
{ "Tag length", "fb_zero.tag_offset_length",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_value,
{ "Tag/value", "fb_zero.tag_value",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_sni,
{ "Server Name Indication", "fb_zero.tag.sni",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"The fully qualified DNS name of the server, canonicalised to lowercase with no trailing period", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_vers,
{ "Version", "fb_zero.tag.version",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Version of FB Zero supported", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_sno,
{ "Server nonce", "fb_zero.tag.sno",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_aead,
{ "Authenticated encryption algorithms", "fb_zero.tag.aead",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"A list of tags, in preference order, specifying the AEAD primitives supported by the server", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_scid,
{ "Server Config ID", "fb_zero.tag.scid",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"An opaque, 16-byte identifier for this server config", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_time,
{ "Time", "fb_zero.tag.time",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_alpn,
{ "ALPN", "fb_zero.tag.alpn",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation supported", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_pubs,
{ "Public value", "fb_zero.tag.pubs",
FT_UINT24, BASE_DEC_HEX, NULL, 0x0,
"A list of public values, 24-bit, little-endian length prefixed", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_kexs,
{ "Key exchange algorithms", "fb_zero.tag.kexs",
FT_STRING, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"A list of tags, in preference order, specifying the key exchange algorithms that the server supports", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_nonc,
{ "Client nonce", "fb_zero.tag.nonc",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"32 bytes consisting of 4 bytes of timestamp (big-endian, UNIX epoch seconds), 8 bytes of server orbit and 20 bytes of random data", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_tag_unknown,
{ "Unknown tag", "fb_zero.tag.unknown",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_padding,
{ "Padding", "fb_zero.padding",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
NULL, HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_payload,
{ "Payload", "fb_zero.payload",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Fb Zero Payload..", HFILL }
},
{ &hf_fb_zero_unknown,
{ "Unknown", "fb_zero.unknown",
FT_BYTES, BASE_NONE, NULL, 0x0,
"Unknown Data", HFILL }
},
};
static gint *ett[] = {
&ett_fb_zero,
&ett_fb_zero_puflags,
&ett_fb_zero_prflags,
&ett_fb_zero_ft,
&ett_fb_zero_ftflags,
&ett_fb_zero_tag_value
};
static ei_register_info ei[] = {
{ &ei_fb_zero_tag_undecoded, { "fb_zero.tag.undecoded", PI_UNDECODED, PI_NOTE, "Dissector for FB Zero Tag code not implemented, Contact Wireshark developers if you want this supported", EXPFILL }},
{ &ei_fb_zero_tag_length, { "fb_zero.tag.length.truncated", PI_MALFORMED, PI_NOTE, "Truncated Tag Length...", EXPFILL }},
{ &ei_fb_zero_tag_unknown, { "fb_zero.tag.unknown.data", PI_UNDECODED, PI_NOTE, "Unknown Data", EXPFILL }},
{ &ei_fb_zero_length_invalid, { "fb_zero.length.invalid", PI_PROTOCOL, PI_WARN, "Invalid length", EXPFILL }},
};
expert_module_t *expert_fb_zero;
proto_fb_zero = proto_register_protocol("(Facebook) Zero Protocol", "FBZERO", "fb_zero");
fb_zero_handle = register_dissector("fb_zero", dissect_fb_zero, proto_fb_zero);
proto_register_field_array(proto_fb_zero, hf, array_length(hf));
proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
expert_fb_zero = expert_register_protocol(proto_fb_zero);
expert_register_field_array(expert_fb_zero, ei, array_length(ei));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
wireshark
|
3ff940652962c099b73ae3233322b8697b0d10ab
| 1,722,421,101,447,625,800,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 165 |
FBZERO: Make sure our offset advances.
Make sure our offset advances so that we don't infinitely loop.
Fixes #16887.
|
static void unlink_all_urbs(struct ems_usb *dev)
{
int i;
usb_unlink_urb(dev->intr_urb);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i)
usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,
dev->rxbuf[i], dev->rxbuf_dma[i]);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted);
atomic_set(&dev->active_tx_urbs, 0);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TX_URBS; i++)
dev->tx_contexts[i].echo_index = MAX_TX_URBS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
c70222752228a62135cee3409dccefd494a24646
| 337,661,607,178,069,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
can: ems_usb: ems_usb_start_xmit(): fix double dev_kfree_skb() in error path
There is no need to call dev_kfree_skb() when usb_submit_urb() fails
beacause can_put_echo_skb() deletes the original skb and
can_free_echo_skb() deletes the cloned skb.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
Fixes: 702171adeed3 ("ems_usb: Added support for EMS CPC-USB/ARM7 CAN/USB interface")
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Sebastian Haas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>
|
static int StreamTcpPacketStateClosed(ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p,
StreamTcpThread *stt, TcpSession *ssn, PacketQueueNoLock *pq)
{
if (ssn == NULL)
return -1;
if (p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST) {
SCLogDebug("RST on closed state");
return 0;
}
TcpStream *stream = NULL, *ostream = NULL;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p)) {
stream = &ssn->client;
ostream = &ssn->server;
} else {
stream = &ssn->server;
ostream = &ssn->client;
}
SCLogDebug("stream %s ostream %s",
stream->flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV?"true":"false",
ostream->flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV ? "true":"false");
/* if we've seen a RST on our direction, but not on the other
* see if we perhaps need to continue processing anyway. */
if ((stream->flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV) == 0) {
if (ostream->flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_RST_RECV) {
if (StreamTcpStateDispatch(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue, ssn->pstate) < 0)
return -1;
/* if state is still "closed", it wasn't updated by our dispatch. */
if (ssn->state == TCP_CLOSED)
ssn->state = ssn->pstate;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
suricata
|
50e2b973eeec7172991bf8f544ab06fb782b97df
| 83,088,361,911,289,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
stream/tcp: handle RST with MD5 or AO header
Special handling for RST packets if they have an TCP MD5 or AO header option.
The options hash can't be validated. The end host might be able to validate
it, as it can have a key/password that was communicated out of band.
The sender could use this to move the TCP state to 'CLOSED', leading to
a desync of the TCP session.
This patch builds on top of
843d0b7a10bb ("stream: support RST getting lost/ignored")
It flags the receiver as having received an RST and moves the TCP state
into the CLOSED state. It then reverts this if the sender continues to
send traffic. In this case it sets the following event:
stream-event:suspected_rst_inject;
Bug: #4710.
|
do_exedit(
exarg_T *eap,
win_T *old_curwin) // curwin before doing a split or NULL
{
int n;
int need_hide;
int exmode_was = exmode_active;
if ((eap->cmdidx != CMD_pedit && ERROR_IF_POPUP_WINDOW)
|| ERROR_IF_TERM_POPUP_WINDOW)
return;
/*
* ":vi" command ends Ex mode.
*/
if (exmode_active && (eap->cmdidx == CMD_visual
|| eap->cmdidx == CMD_view))
{
exmode_active = FALSE;
ex_pressedreturn = FALSE;
if (*eap->arg == NUL)
{
// Special case: ":global/pat/visual\NLvi-commands"
if (global_busy)
{
int rd = RedrawingDisabled;
int nwr = no_wait_return;
int ms = msg_scroll;
#ifdef FEAT_GUI
int he = hold_gui_events;
#endif
if (eap->nextcmd != NULL)
{
stuffReadbuff(eap->nextcmd);
eap->nextcmd = NULL;
}
if (exmode_was != EXMODE_VIM)
settmode(TMODE_RAW);
RedrawingDisabled = 0;
no_wait_return = 0;
need_wait_return = FALSE;
msg_scroll = 0;
#ifdef FEAT_GUI
hold_gui_events = 0;
#endif
set_must_redraw(UPD_CLEAR);
pending_exmode_active = TRUE;
main_loop(FALSE, TRUE);
pending_exmode_active = FALSE;
RedrawingDisabled = rd;
no_wait_return = nwr;
msg_scroll = ms;
#ifdef FEAT_GUI
hold_gui_events = he;
#endif
}
return;
}
}
if ((eap->cmdidx == CMD_new
|| eap->cmdidx == CMD_tabnew
|| eap->cmdidx == CMD_tabedit
|| eap->cmdidx == CMD_vnew) && *eap->arg == NUL)
{
// ":new" or ":tabnew" without argument: edit a new empty buffer
setpcmark();
(void)do_ecmd(0, NULL, NULL, eap, ECMD_ONE,
ECMD_HIDE + (eap->forceit ? ECMD_FORCEIT : 0),
old_curwin == NULL ? curwin : NULL);
}
else if ((eap->cmdidx != CMD_split && eap->cmdidx != CMD_vsplit)
|| *eap->arg != NUL
#ifdef FEAT_BROWSE
|| (cmdmod.cmod_flags & CMOD_BROWSE)
#endif
)
{
// Can't edit another file when "textlock" or "curbuf_lock" is set.
// Only ":edit" or ":script" can bring us here, others are stopped
// earlier.
if (*eap->arg != NUL && text_or_buf_locked())
return;
n = readonlymode;
if (eap->cmdidx == CMD_view || eap->cmdidx == CMD_sview)
readonlymode = TRUE;
else if (eap->cmdidx == CMD_enew)
readonlymode = FALSE; // 'readonly' doesn't make sense in an
// empty buffer
if (eap->cmdidx != CMD_balt && eap->cmdidx != CMD_badd)
setpcmark();
if (do_ecmd(0, (eap->cmdidx == CMD_enew ? NULL : eap->arg),
NULL, eap,
// ":edit" goes to first line if Vi compatible
(*eap->arg == NUL && eap->do_ecmd_lnum == 0
&& vim_strchr(p_cpo, CPO_GOTO1) != NULL)
? ECMD_ONE : eap->do_ecmd_lnum,
(buf_hide(curbuf) ? ECMD_HIDE : 0)
+ (eap->forceit ? ECMD_FORCEIT : 0)
// after a split we can use an existing buffer
+ (old_curwin != NULL ? ECMD_OLDBUF : 0)
+ (eap->cmdidx == CMD_badd ? ECMD_ADDBUF : 0)
+ (eap->cmdidx == CMD_balt ? ECMD_ALTBUF : 0)
, old_curwin == NULL ? curwin : NULL) == FAIL)
{
// Editing the file failed. If the window was split, close it.
if (old_curwin != NULL)
{
need_hide = (curbufIsChanged() && curbuf->b_nwindows <= 1);
if (!need_hide || buf_hide(curbuf))
{
#if defined(FEAT_EVAL)
cleanup_T cs;
// Reset the error/interrupt/exception state here so that
// aborting() returns FALSE when closing a window.
enter_cleanup(&cs);
#endif
#ifdef FEAT_GUI
need_mouse_correct = TRUE;
#endif
win_close(curwin, !need_hide && !buf_hide(curbuf));
#if defined(FEAT_EVAL)
// Restore the error/interrupt/exception state if not
// discarded by a new aborting error, interrupt, or
// uncaught exception.
leave_cleanup(&cs);
#endif
}
}
}
else if (readonlymode && curbuf->b_nwindows == 1)
{
// When editing an already visited buffer, 'readonly' won't be set
// but the previous value is kept. With ":view" and ":sview" we
// want the file to be readonly, except when another window is
// editing the same buffer.
curbuf->b_p_ro = TRUE;
}
readonlymode = n;
}
else
{
if (eap->do_ecmd_cmd != NULL)
do_cmd_argument(eap->do_ecmd_cmd);
n = curwin->w_arg_idx_invalid;
check_arg_idx(curwin);
if (n != curwin->w_arg_idx_invalid)
maketitle();
}
/*
* if ":split file" worked, set alternate file name in old window to new
* file
*/
if (old_curwin != NULL
&& *eap->arg != NUL
&& curwin != old_curwin
&& win_valid(old_curwin)
&& old_curwin->w_buffer != curbuf
&& (cmdmod.cmod_flags & CMOD_KEEPALT) == 0)
old_curwin->w_alt_fnum = curbuf->b_fnum;
ex_no_reprint = TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
35d21c6830fc2d68aca838424a0e786821c5891c
| 169,894,117,159,052,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 170 |
patch 9.0.0360: crash when invalid line number on :for is ignored
Problem: Crash when invalid line number on :for is ignored.
Solution: Do not check breakpoint for non-existing line.
|
WERROR dns_common_wildcard_lookup(struct ldb_context *samdb,
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_dn *dn,
struct dnsp_DnssrvRpcRecord **records,
uint16_t *num_records)
{
const struct timeval start = timeval_current();
int ret;
WERROR werr = WERR_OK;
struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
struct ldb_message_element *el = NULL;
const struct ldb_val *name = NULL;
*records = NULL;
*num_records = 0;
name = ldb_dn_get_rdn_val(dn);
if (name == NULL) {
werr = DNS_ERR(NAME_ERROR);
goto exit;
}
/* Don't look for a wildcard for @ */
if (name->length == 1 && name->data[0] == '@') {
werr = dns_common_lookup(samdb,
mem_ctx,
dn,
records,
num_records,
NULL);
goto exit;
}
werr = dns_name_check(
mem_ctx,
strlen((const char*)name->data),
(const char*) name->data);
if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
goto exit;
}
/*
* Do a point search first, then fall back to a wildcard
* lookup if it does not exist
*/
werr = dns_common_lookup(samdb,
mem_ctx,
dn,
records,
num_records,
NULL);
if (!W_ERROR_EQUAL(werr, WERR_DNS_ERROR_NAME_DOES_NOT_EXIST)) {
goto exit;
}
ret = dns_wildcard_lookup(samdb, mem_ctx, dn, &msg);
if (ret == LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR) {
werr = DNS_ERR(SERVER_FAILURE);
goto exit;
}
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
werr = DNS_ERR(NAME_ERROR);
goto exit;
}
el = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "dnsRecord");
if (el == NULL) {
werr = WERR_DNS_ERROR_NAME_DOES_NOT_EXIST;
goto exit;
}
werr = dns_common_extract(samdb, el, mem_ctx, records, num_records);
TALLOC_FREE(msg);
if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) {
goto exit;
}
werr = WERR_OK;
exit:
DNS_COMMON_LOG_OPERATION(
win_errstr(werr),
&start,
NULL,
dn == NULL ? NULL : ldb_dn_get_linearized(dn),
NULL);
return werr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
samba
|
0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77
| 308,523,300,311,601,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 |
CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <[email protected]>
|
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, NegatedRangeStrGT) {
addIndex(BSON("i" << 1));
runQuery(fromjson("{i: {$not: {$gt: 'a'}}}"));
assertNumSolutions(2U);
assertSolutionExists("{cscan: {dir: 1}}");
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: null, node: {ixscan: {pattern: {i:1}, "
"bounds: {i: [['MinKey','a',true,true], "
"[{},'MaxKey',true,true]]}}}}}");
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3
| 16,473,380,221,722,058,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr.
|
static inline int StreamTcpValidateAck(TcpSession *ssn, TcpStream *stream, Packet *p)
{
SCEnter();
uint32_t ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
/* fast track */
if (SEQ_GT(ack, stream->last_ack) && SEQ_LEQ(ack, stream->next_win))
{
SCLogDebug("ACK in bounds");
SCReturnInt(0);
}
/* fast track */
else if (SEQ_EQ(ack, stream->last_ack)) {
SCLogDebug("pkt ACK %"PRIu32" == stream last ACK %"PRIu32, TCP_GET_ACK(p), stream->last_ack);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
/* exception handling */
if (SEQ_LT(ack, stream->last_ack)) {
SCLogDebug("pkt ACK %"PRIu32" < stream last ACK %"PRIu32, TCP_GET_ACK(p), stream->last_ack);
/* This is an attempt to get a 'left edge' value that we can check against.
* It doesn't work when the window is 0, need to think of a better way. */
if (stream->window != 0 && SEQ_LT(ack, (stream->last_ack - stream->window))) {
SCLogDebug("ACK %"PRIu32" is before last_ack %"PRIu32" - window "
"%"PRIu32" = %"PRIu32, ack, stream->last_ack,
stream->window, stream->last_ack - stream->window);
goto invalid;
}
SCReturnInt(0);
}
if (ssn->state > TCP_SYN_SENT && SEQ_GT(ack, stream->next_win)) {
SCLogDebug("ACK %"PRIu32" is after next_win %"PRIu32, ack, stream->next_win);
goto invalid;
/* a toclient RST as a reponse to SYN, next_win is 0, ack will be isn+1, just like
* the syn ack */
} else if (ssn->state == TCP_SYN_SENT && PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) &&
p->tcph->th_flags & TH_RST &&
SEQ_EQ(ack, stream->isn + 1)) {
SCReturnInt(0);
}
SCLogDebug("default path leading to invalid: ACK %"PRIu32", last_ack %"PRIu32
" next_win %"PRIu32, ack, stream->last_ack, stream->next_win);
invalid:
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_PKT_INVALID_ACK);
SCReturnInt(-1);
}
| 0 |
[] |
suricata
|
843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
| 123,372,870,180,870,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 |
stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
|
static int tcf_block_offload_bind(struct tcf_block *block, struct Qdisc *q,
struct tcf_block_ext_info *ei,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
struct net_device *dev = q->dev_queue->dev;
int err;
down_write(&block->cb_lock);
/* If tc offload feature is disabled and the block we try to bind
* to already has some offloaded filters, forbid to bind.
*/
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc &&
!tc_can_offload(dev) &&
tcf_block_offload_in_use(block)) {
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Bind to offloaded block failed as dev has offload disabled");
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto err_unlock;
}
err = tcf_block_offload_cmd(block, dev, q, ei, FLOW_BLOCK_BIND, extack);
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto no_offload_dev_inc;
if (err)
goto err_unlock;
up_write(&block->cb_lock);
return 0;
no_offload_dev_inc:
if (tcf_block_offload_in_use(block))
goto err_unlock;
err = 0;
block->nooffloaddevcnt++;
err_unlock:
up_write(&block->cb_lock);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5
| 219,523,180,356,569,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter()
Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label,
we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again,
or risk use-after-free as in [1]
For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain()
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945
CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline]
tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386
tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline]
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059
RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1944:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline]
qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941
qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 3609:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754
slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline]
kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106
qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109
tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238
tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0
head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline]
new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004
___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787
devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618
inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278
inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698
veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250
zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline]
zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline]
zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline]
zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline]
unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561
unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606
unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638
exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178
__mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114
mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135
exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline]
do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
vte_sequence_handler_as (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
terminal->pvt->screen->alternate_charset = TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
vte
|
58bc3a942f198a1a8788553ca72c19d7c1702b74
| 117,890,257,649,299,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
fix bug #548272
svn path=/trunk/; revision=2365
|
static void compare_dump_files_help_display(void) {
fprintf(stdout,"\nList of parameters for the compare_dump_files function \n");
fprintf(stdout,"\n");
fprintf(stdout," -b \t REQUIRED \t filename to the reference/baseline dump file \n");
fprintf(stdout," -t \t REQUIRED \t filename to the test dump file image\n");
fprintf(stdout,"\n");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-310"
] |
openjpeg
|
e078172b1c3f98d2219c37076b238fb759c751ea
| 338,718,363,077,519,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Add sanity check for tile coordinates (#823)
Coordinates are casted from OPJ_UINT32 to OPJ_INT32
Add sanity check for negative values and upper bound becoming lower
than lower bound.
See also
https://pdfium.googlesource.com/pdfium/+/b6befb2ed2485a3805cddea86dc7574510178ea9
|
static int find_annots(struct mailbox *mailbox, struct found_uids *annots)
{
int r = 0;
r = annotatemore_findall_mailbox(mailbox, ANNOTATE_ANY_UID, "*",
/*modseq*/0, addannot_uid, annots, /*flags*/0);
if (r) return r;
/* make sure UIDs are sorted for comparison */
qsort(annots->found, annots->nused, sizeof(annots->found[0]), sort_found);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
cyrus-imapd
|
1d6d15ee74e11a9bd745e80be69869e5fb8d64d6
| 180,417,661,467,611,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
mailbox.c/reconstruct.c: Add mailbox_mbentry_from_path()
|
static int rtrs_map_sg_fr(struct rtrs_clt_io_req *req, size_t count)
{
int nr;
/* Align the MR to a 4K page size to match the block virt boundary */
nr = ib_map_mr_sg(req->mr, req->sglist, count, NULL, SZ_4K);
if (nr < 0)
return nr;
if (nr < req->sg_cnt)
return -EINVAL;
ib_update_fast_reg_key(req->mr, ib_inc_rkey(req->mr->rkey));
return nr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
8700af2cc18c919b2a83e74e0479038fd113c15d
| 152,471,523,517,898,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
RDMA/rtrs-clt: Fix possible double free in error case
Callback function rtrs_clt_dev_release() for put_device() calls kfree(clt)
to free memory. We shouldn't call kfree(clt) again, and we can't use the
clt after kfree too.
Replace device_register() with device_initialize() and device_add() so that
dev_set_name can() be used appropriately.
Move mutex_destroy() to the release function so it can be called in
the alloc_clt err path.
Fixes: eab098246625 ("RDMA/rtrs-clt: Refactor the failure cases in alloc_clt")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Md Haris Iqbal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jack Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
|
static void io_uring_cancel_sqpoll(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
{
struct io_sq_data *sqd = ctx->sq_data;
struct io_uring_task *tctx;
s64 inflight;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
if (!sqd)
return;
io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx);
if (!io_sq_thread_park(sqd))
return;
tctx = ctx->sq_data->thread->io_uring;
/* can happen on fork/alloc failure, just ignore that state */
if (!tctx) {
io_sq_thread_unpark(sqd);
return;
}
atomic_inc(&tctx->in_idle);
do {
/* read completions before cancelations */
inflight = tctx_inflight(tctx);
if (!inflight)
break;
io_uring_cancel_task_requests(ctx, NULL);
prepare_to_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
/*
* If we've seen completions, retry without waiting. This
* avoids a race where a completion comes in before we did
* prepare_to_wait().
*/
if (inflight == tctx_inflight(tctx))
schedule();
finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait);
} while (1);
atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle);
io_sq_thread_unpark(sqd);
| 0 |
[
"CWE-667"
] |
linux
|
3ebba796fa251d042be42b929a2d916ee5c34a49
| 125,918,295,836,146,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
io_uring: ensure that SQPOLL thread is started for exit
If we create it in a disabled state because IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED is
set on ring creation, we need to ensure that we've kicked the thread if
we're exiting before it's been explicitly disabled. Otherwise we can run
into a deadlock where exit is waiting go park the SQPOLL thread, but the
SQPOLL thread itself is waiting to get a signal to start.
That results in the below trace of both tasks hung, waiting on each other:
INFO: task syz-executor458:8401 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.11.0-next-20210226-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor458 state:D stack:27536 pid: 8401 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread_park fs/io_uring.c:7115 [inline]
io_sq_thread_park+0xd5/0x130 fs/io_uring.c:7103
io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0x24c/0xd90 fs/io_uring.c:8745
__io_uring_files_cancel+0x110/0x230 fs/io_uring.c:8840
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:47 [inline]
do_exit+0x299/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:780
do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:933 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:931 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:931
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x43e899
RSP: 002b:00007ffe89376d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004af2f0 RCX: 000000000043e899
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 0000000010000000
R10: 0000000000008011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004af2f0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 can't die for more than 143 seconds.
task:iou-sqp-8401 state:D stack:30272 pid: 8402 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread+0x27d/0x1ae0 fs/io_uring.c:6717
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
if(pData->dynBulkId) {
CHKiRet(OMSRsetEntry(*ppOMSR, 1, ustrdup(pData->bulkId),
OMSR_NO_RQD_TPL_OPTS));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
rsyslog
|
80f88242982c9c6ad6ce8628fc5b94ea74051cf4
| 46,577,219,549,736,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
bugfix: double-free in omelasticsearch
closes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=461
Thanks to Marius Ionescu for providing a detailled bug report
|
TRIO_PRIVATE int TrioFormatRef TRIO_ARGS5((reference, format, arglist, argfunc, argarray),
trio_reference_t* reference, TRIO_CONST char* format,
va_list arglist, trio_argfunc_t argfunc,
trio_pointer_t* argarray)
{
int status;
trio_parameter_t parameters[MAX_PARAMETERS];
status = TrioParse(TYPE_PRINT, format, parameters, arglist, argfunc, argarray);
if (status < 0)
return status;
status = TrioFormatProcess(reference->data, format, parameters);
if (reference->data->error != 0)
{
status = reference->data->error;
}
return status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27
| 276,121,860,247,022,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this.
|
listener_show_message (GSListener *listener,
DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message)
{
DBusMessageIter iter;
DBusMessage *reply;
DBusError error;
reply = dbus_message_new_method_return (message);
dbus_message_iter_init_append (reply, &iter);
if (reply == NULL) {
g_error ("No memory");
}
if (listener->priv->active) {
char *summary;
char *body;
char *icon;
/* if we're not active we ignore the request */
dbus_error_init (&error);
if (! dbus_message_get_args (message, &error,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &summary,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &body,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING, &icon,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)) {
raise_syntax (connection, message, "ShowMessage");
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
}
g_signal_emit (listener, signals [SHOW_MESSAGE], 0, summary, body, icon);
}
if (! dbus_connection_send (connection, reply, NULL)) {
g_error ("No memory");
}
dbus_message_unref (reply);
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_HANDLED;
}
| 0 |
[] |
gnome-screensaver
|
284c9924969a49dbf2d5fae1d680d3310c4df4a3
| 159,497,193,525,454,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
Remove session inhibitors if the originator falls of the bus
This fixes a problem where totem leaves inhibitors behind, see
bug 600488.
|
encode_opaque_fixed(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const void *buf, size_t len)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(xdr_stream_encode_opaque_fixed(xdr, buf, len) < 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925
| 93,856,930,297,724,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
pNFS/flexfiles: fix incorrect size check in decode_nfs_fh()
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int usb_chmap_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
struct snd_pcm_chmap *info = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol);
struct snd_usb_substream *subs = info->private_data;
struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem *chmap = NULL;
int i;
memset(ucontrol->value.integer.value, 0,
sizeof(ucontrol->value.integer.value));
if (subs->cur_audiofmt)
chmap = subs->cur_audiofmt->chmap;
if (chmap) {
for (i = 0; i < chmap->channels; i++)
ucontrol->value.integer.value[i] = chmap->map[i];
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
836b34a935abc91e13e63053d0a83b24dfb5ea78
| 233,210,905,525,838,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix double-free in error paths after snd_usb_add_audio_stream() call
create_fixed_stream_quirk(), snd_usb_parse_audio_interface() and
create_uaxx_quirk() functions allocate the audioformat object by themselves
and free it upon error before returning. However, once the object is linked
to a stream, it's freed again in snd_usb_audio_pcm_free(), thus it'll be
double-freed, eventually resulting in a memory corruption.
This patch fixes these failures in the error paths by unlinking the audioformat
object before freeing it.
Based on a patch by Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[Note for stable backports:
this patch requires the commit 902eb7fd1e4a ('ALSA: usb-audio: Minor
code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()')]
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283358
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # see the note above
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
void bpf_map_init_from_attr(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr)
{
map->map_type = attr->map_type;
map->key_size = attr->key_size;
map->value_size = attr->value_size;
map->max_entries = attr->max_entries;
map->map_flags = bpf_map_flags_retain_permanent(attr->map_flags);
map->numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
map->map_extra = attr->map_extra;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-367"
] |
bpf
|
353050be4c19e102178ccc05988101887c25ae53
| 105,125,787,244,992,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
bpf: Fix toctou on read-only map's constant scalar tracking
Commit a23740ec43ba ("bpf: Track contents of read-only maps as scalars") is
checking whether maps are read-only both from BPF program side and user space
side, and then, given their content is constant, reading out their data via
map->ops->map_direct_value_addr() which is then subsequently used as known
scalar value for the register, that is, it is marked as __mark_reg_known()
with the read value at verification time. Before a23740ec43ba, the register
content was marked as an unknown scalar so the verifier could not make any
assumptions about the map content.
The current implementation however is prone to a TOCTOU race, meaning, the
value read as known scalar for the register is not guaranteed to be exactly
the same at a later point when the program is executed, and as such, the
prior made assumptions of the verifier with regards to the program will be
invalid which can cause issues such as OOB access, etc.
While the BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG map flag is always fixed and required to be
specified at map creation time, the map->frozen property is initially set to
false for the map given the map value needs to be populated, e.g. for global
data sections. Once complete, the loader "freezes" the map from user space
such that no subsequent updates/deletes are possible anymore. For the rest
of the lifetime of the map, this freeze one-time trigger cannot be undone
anymore after a successful BPF_MAP_FREEZE cmd return. Meaning, any new BPF_*
cmd calls which would update/delete map entries will be rejected with -EPERM
since map_get_sys_perms() removes the FMODE_CAN_WRITE permission. This also
means that pending update/delete map entries must still complete before this
guarantee is given. This corner case is not an issue for loaders since they
create and prepare such program private map in successive steps.
However, a malicious user is able to trigger this TOCTOU race in two different
ways: i) via userfaultfd, and ii) via batched updates. For i) userfaultfd is
used to expand the competition interval, so that map_update_elem() can modify
the contents of the map after map_freeze() and bpf_prog_load() were executed.
This works, because userfaultfd halts the parallel thread which triggered a
map_update_elem() at the time where we copy key/value from the user buffer and
this already passed the FMODE_CAN_WRITE capability test given at that time the
map was not "frozen". Then, the main thread performs the map_freeze() and
bpf_prog_load(), and once that had completed successfully, the other thread
is woken up to complete the pending map_update_elem() which then changes the
map content. For ii) the idea of the batched update is similar, meaning, when
there are a large number of updates to be processed, it can increase the
competition interval between the two. It is therefore possible in practice to
modify the contents of the map after executing map_freeze() and bpf_prog_load().
One way to fix both i) and ii) at the same time is to expand the use of the
map's map->writecnt. The latter was introduced in fc9702273e2e ("bpf: Add mmap()
support for BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY") and further refined in 1f6cb19be2e2 ("bpf:
Prevent re-mmap()'ing BPF map as writable for initially r/o mapping") with
the rationale to make a writable mmap()'ing of a map mutually exclusive with
read-only freezing. The counter indicates writable mmap() mappings and then
prevents/fails the freeze operation. Its semantics can be expanded beyond
just mmap() by generally indicating ongoing write phases. This would essentially
span any parallel regular and batched flavor of update/delete operation and
then also have map_freeze() fail with -EBUSY. For the check_mem_access() in
the verifier we expand upon the bpf_map_is_rdonly() check ensuring that all
last pending writes have completed via bpf_map_write_active() test. Once the
map->frozen is set and bpf_map_write_active() indicates a map->writecnt of 0
only then we are really guaranteed to use the map's data as known constants.
For map->frozen being set and pending writes in process of still being completed
we fall back to marking that register as unknown scalar so we don't end up
making assumptions about it. With this, both TOCTOU reproducers from i) and
ii) are fixed.
Note that the map->writecnt has been converted into a atomic64 in the fix in
order to avoid a double freeze_mutex mutex_{un,}lock() pair when updating
map->writecnt in the various map update/delete BPF_* cmd flavors. Spanning
the freeze_mutex over entire map update/delete operations in syscall side
would not be possible due to then causing everything to be serialized.
Similarly, something like synchronize_rcu() after setting map->frozen to wait
for update/deletes to complete is not possible either since it would also
have to span the user copy which can sleep. On the libbpf side, this won't
break d66562fba1ce ("libbpf: Add BPF object skeleton support") as the
anonymous mmap()-ed "map initialization image" is remapped as a BPF map-backed
mmap()-ed memory where for .rodata it's non-writable.
Fixes: a23740ec43ba ("bpf: Track contents of read-only maps as scalars")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
Status PyArray_TYPE_to_TF_DataType(PyArrayObject* array,
TF_DataType* out_tf_datatype) {
int pyarray_type = PyArray_TYPE(array);
PyArray_Descr* descr = PyArray_DESCR(array);
switch (pyarray_type) {
case NPY_FLOAT16:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_HALF;
break;
case NPY_FLOAT32:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_FLOAT;
break;
case NPY_FLOAT64:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_DOUBLE;
break;
case NPY_INT32:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT32;
break;
case NPY_UINT8:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT8;
break;
case NPY_UINT16:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT16;
break;
case NPY_UINT32:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT32;
break;
case NPY_UINT64:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT64;
break;
case NPY_INT8:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT8;
break;
case NPY_INT16:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT16;
break;
case NPY_INT64:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT64;
break;
case NPY_BOOL:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_BOOL;
break;
case NPY_COMPLEX64:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_COMPLEX64;
break;
case NPY_COMPLEX128:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_COMPLEX128;
break;
case NPY_OBJECT:
case NPY_STRING:
case NPY_UNICODE:
*out_tf_datatype = TF_STRING;
break;
case NPY_VOID:
// Quantized types are currently represented as custom struct types.
// PyArray_TYPE returns NPY_VOID for structs, and we should look into
// descr to derive the actual type.
// Direct feeds of certain types of ResourceHandles are represented as a
// custom struct type.
return PyArrayDescr_to_TF_DataType(descr, out_tf_datatype);
default:
if (pyarray_type == Bfloat16NumpyType()) {
*out_tf_datatype = TF_BFLOAT16;
break;
} else if (pyarray_type == NPY_ULONGLONG) {
// NPY_ULONGLONG is equivalent to NPY_UINT64, while their enum values
// might be different on certain platforms.
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT64;
break;
} else if (pyarray_type == NPY_LONGLONG) {
// NPY_LONGLONG is equivalent to NPY_INT64, while their enum values
// might be different on certain platforms.
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT64;
break;
} else if (pyarray_type == NPY_INT) {
// NPY_INT is equivalent to NPY_INT32, while their enum values might be
// different on certain platforms.
*out_tf_datatype = TF_INT32;
break;
} else if (pyarray_type == NPY_UINT) {
// NPY_UINT is equivalent to NPY_UINT32, while their enum values might
// be different on certain platforms.
*out_tf_datatype = TF_UINT32;
break;
}
return errors::Internal("Unsupported numpy type: ",
numpy_type_name(pyarray_type));
}
return Status::OK();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-843"
] |
tensorflow
|
030af767d357d1b4088c4a25c72cb3906abac489
| 191,162,610,387,280,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 |
Fix `tf.raw_ops.ResourceCountUpTo` null pointer dereference.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 368294347
Change-Id: I2c16fbfc9b4966c402c3d8e311f0d665a9c852d8
|
static struct bsg_command *bsg_next_done_cmd(struct bsg_device *bd)
{
struct bsg_command *bc = NULL;
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
if (bd->done_cmds) {
bc = list_first_entry(&bd->done_list, struct bsg_command, list);
list_del(&bc->list);
bd->done_cmds--;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
return bc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0
| 125,694,469,421,892,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Enforce a minimum SG_IO timeout
There's no point in having too short SG_IO timeouts, since if the
command does end up timing out, we'll end up through the reset sequence
that is several seconds long in order to abort the command that timed
out.
As a result, shorter timeouts than a few seconds simply do not make
sense, as the recovery would be longer than the timeout itself.
Add a BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT to match the existign BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static bool setsockopt_needs_rtnl(int optname)
{
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
net
|
95baa60a0da80a0143e3ddd4d3725758b4513825
| 299,707,448,096,926,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
ipv6_sockglue: Fix a missing-check bug in ip6_ra_control()
In function ip6_ra_control(), the pointer new_ra is allocated a memory
space via kmalloc(). And it is used in the following codes. However,
when there is a memory allocation error, kmalloc() fails. Thus null
pointer dereference may happen. And it will cause the kernel to crash.
Therefore, we should check the return value and handle the error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __netlink_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
struct mutex *cb_mutex, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
sock->ops = &netlink_ops;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_NETLINK, GFP_KERNEL, &netlink_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (cb_mutex) {
nlk->cb_mutex = cb_mutex;
} else {
nlk->cb_mutex = &nlk->cb_def_mutex;
mutex_init(nlk->cb_mutex);
lockdep_set_class_and_name(nlk->cb_mutex,
nlk_cb_mutex_keys + protocol,
nlk_cb_mutex_key_strings[protocol]);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&nlk->wait);
sk->sk_destruct = netlink_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
93c647643b48f0131f02e45da3bd367d80443291
| 248,806,453,142,529,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
netlink: Add netns check on taps
Currently, a nlmon link inside a child namespace can observe systemwide
netlink activity. Filter the traffic so that nlmon can only sniff
netlink messages from its own netns.
Test case:
vpnns -- bash -c "ip link add nlmon0 type nlmon; \
ip link set nlmon0 up; \
tcpdump -i nlmon0 -q -w /tmp/nlmon.pcap -U" &
sudo ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \
spi 0x1 mode transport \
auth sha1 0x6162633132330000000000000000000000000000 \
enc aes 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
grep --binary abc123 /tmp/nlmon.pcap
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
do_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *pst, int flags, rb_encoding *enc)
{
int ret = lstat(path, pst);
if (ret < 0 && !to_be_ignored(errno))
sys_warning(path, enc);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
ruby
|
143eb22f1877815dd802f7928959c5f93d4c7bb3
| 36,812,396,001,706,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
merge revision(s) 62989:
dir.c: check NUL bytes
* dir.c (GlobPathValue): should be used in rb_push_glob only.
other methods should use FilePathValue.
https://hackerone.com/reports/302338
* dir.c (rb_push_glob): expand GlobPathValue
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_2_2@63015 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
GF_EXPORT
u32 gf_isom_get_fragments_count(GF_ISOFile *movie, Bool segments_only)
{
u32 i=0;
u32 nb_frags = 0;
GF_Box *b;
while ((b=(GF_Box*)gf_list_enum(movie->TopBoxes, &i))) {
if (segments_only) {
if (b->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SIDX)
nb_frags++;
} else {
if (b->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_MOOF)
nb_frags++;
}
}
return nb_frags;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
gpac
|
ebfa346eff05049718f7b80041093b4c5581c24e
| 98,425,965,617,317,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
fixed #1706
|
Bool gf_isom_enable_raw_pack(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 pack_num_samples)
{
u32 afmt, bps, nb_ch;
Bool from_qt=GF_FALSE;
GF_TrackBox *trak;
GF_MPEGAudioSampleEntryBox *entry;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, trackNumber);
if (!trak) return GF_FALSE;
trak->pack_num_samples = 0;
//we only activate sample packing for raw audio
if (!trak->Media || !trak->Media->handler) return GF_FALSE;
if (trak->Media->handler->handlerType != GF_ISOM_MEDIA_AUDIO) return GF_FALSE;
//and sample duration of 1
if (!trak->Media->information || !trak->Media->information->sampleTable || !trak->Media->information->sampleTable->TimeToSample) return GF_FALSE;
if (trak->Media->information->sampleTable->TimeToSample->nb_entries != 1) return GF_FALSE;
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable->TimeToSample->entries) return GF_FALSE;
if (trak->Media->information->sampleTable->TimeToSample->entries[0].sampleDelta != 1) return GF_FALSE;
//and sample with constant size
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleSize || !trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleSize->sampleSize) return GF_FALSE;
trak->pack_num_samples = pack_num_samples;
if (!pack_num_samples) return GF_FALSE;
entry = gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->child_boxes, 0);
if (!entry) return GF_FALSE;
if (entry->internal_type!=GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_ENTRY_AUDIO) return GF_FALSE;
//sanity check, some files have wrong stsz sampleSize for raw audio !
afmt = gf_audio_fmt_from_isobmf(entry->type);
bps = gf_audio_fmt_bit_depth(afmt) / 8;
if (!bps) {
//unknown format, try QTv2
if (entry->qtff_mode && (entry->internal_type==GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_ENTRY_AUDIO)) {
bps = entry->extensions[8]<<24 | entry->extensions[9]<<16 | entry->extensions[10]<<8 | entry->extensions[11];
from_qt = GF_TRUE;
}
}
nb_ch = entry->channel_count;
if (entry->qtff_mode && (entry->version==2)) {
//QTFFv2 audio, channel count is 32 bit, after 32bit size of struct and 64 bit samplerate
//hence start at 12 in extensions
nb_ch = entry->extensions[11]<<24 | entry->extensions[12]<<16 | entry->extensions[13]<<8 | entry->extensions[14];
}
if (bps) {
u32 res = trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleSize->sampleSize % bps;
if (res) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("ISOBMF: size mismatch for raw audio sample description: constant sample size %d but %d bytes per channel for %s%s!\n", trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleSize->sampleSize,
bps,
gf_4cc_to_str(entry->type),
from_qt ? " (as indicated in QT sample description)" : ""
));
trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleSize->sampleSize = bps * nb_ch;
}
}
return GF_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
f0a41d178a2dc5ac185506d9fa0b0a58356b16f7
| 34,635,886,998,278,737,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 |
fixed #2120
|
static int get_unicode(textw_text_enum_t *penum, gs_font *font, gs_glyph glyph, gs_char ch, unsigned short *Buffer)
{
int code;
gs_const_string gnstr;
unsigned short fallback = ch;
ushort *unicode = NULL;
int length;
length = font->procs.decode_glyph((gs_font *)font, glyph, ch, NULL, 0);
if (length == 0) {
code = font->procs.glyph_name(font, glyph, &gnstr);
if (code >= 0 && gnstr.size == 7) {
if (!memcmp(gnstr.data, "uni", 3)) {
static const char *hexdigits = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char *d0 = strchr(hexdigits, gnstr.data[3]);
char *d1 = strchr(hexdigits, gnstr.data[4]);
char *d2 = strchr(hexdigits, gnstr.data[5]);
char *d3 = strchr(hexdigits, gnstr.data[6]);
if (d0 != NULL && d1 != NULL && d2 != NULL && d3 != NULL) {
*Buffer++ = ((d0 - hexdigits) << 12) + ((d1 - hexdigits) << 8) + ((d2 - hexdigits) << 4) + (d3 - hexdigits);
return 1;
}
}
}
if (length == 0) {
single_glyph_list_t *sentry = (single_glyph_list_t *)&SingleGlyphList;
double_glyph_list_t *dentry = (double_glyph_list_t *)&DoubleGlyphList;
treble_glyph_list_t *tentry = (treble_glyph_list_t *)&TrebleGlyphList;
quad_glyph_list_t *qentry = (quad_glyph_list_t *)&QuadGlyphList;
/* Search glyph to single Unicode value table */
while (sentry->Glyph != 0) {
if (sentry->Glyph[0] < gnstr.data[0]) {
sentry++;
continue;
}
if (sentry->Glyph[0] > gnstr.data[0]){
break;
}
if (strlen(sentry->Glyph) == gnstr.size) {
if(memcmp(gnstr.data, sentry->Glyph, gnstr.size) == 0) {
*Buffer = sentry->Unicode;
return 1;
}
}
sentry++;
}
/* Search glyph to double Unicode value table */
while (dentry->Glyph != 0) {
if (dentry->Glyph[0] < gnstr.data[0]) {
dentry++;
continue;
}
if (dentry->Glyph[0] > gnstr.data[0]){
break;
}
if (strlen(dentry->Glyph) == gnstr.size) {
if(memcmp(gnstr.data, dentry->Glyph, gnstr.size) == 0) {
memcpy(Buffer, dentry->Unicode, 2);
return 2;
}
}
dentry++;
}
/* Search glyph to triple Unicode value table */
while (tentry->Glyph != 0) {
if (tentry->Glyph[0] < gnstr.data[0]) {
tentry++;
continue;
}
if (tentry->Glyph[0] > gnstr.data[0]){
break;
}
if (strlen(tentry->Glyph) == gnstr.size) {
if(memcmp(gnstr.data, tentry->Glyph, gnstr.size) == 0) {
memcpy(Buffer, tentry->Unicode, 3);
return 3;
}
}
tentry++;
}
/* Search glyph to quadruple Unicode value table */
while (qentry->Glyph != 0) {
if (qentry->Glyph[0] < gnstr.data[0]) {
qentry++;
continue;
}
if (qentry->Glyph[0] > gnstr.data[0]){
break;
}
if (strlen(qentry->Glyph) == gnstr.size) {
if(memcmp(gnstr.data, qentry->Glyph, gnstr.size) == 0) {
memcpy(Buffer, qentry->Unicode, 4);
return 4;
}
}
qentry++;
}
}
*Buffer = fallback;
return 1;
} else {
char *b, *u;
int l = length - 1;
unicode = (ushort *)gs_alloc_bytes(penum->dev->memory, length, "temporary Unicode array");
length = font->procs.decode_glyph((gs_font *)font, glyph, ch, unicode, length);
#if ARCH_IS_BIG_ENDIAN
memcpy(Buffer, unicode, length);
#else
b = (char *)Buffer;
u = (char *)unicode;
while (l >= 0) {
*b++ = *(u + l);
l--;
}
#endif
gs_free_object(penum->dev->memory, unicode, "free temporary unicode buffer");
return length / sizeof(short);
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
ghostpdl
|
407c98a38c3a6ac1681144ed45cc2f4fc374c91f
| 108,730,927,771,797,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 126 |
txtwrite - guard against using GS_NO_GLYPH to retrieve Unicode values
Bug 701822 "Segmentation fault at psi/iname.c:296 in names_index_ref"
Avoid using a glyph with the value GS_NO_GLYPH to retrieve a glyph
name or Unicode code point from the glyph ID, as this is not a valid
ID.
|
static inline void pmixp_coll_ring_ctx_sanity_check(
pmixp_coll_ring_ctx_t *coll_ctx)
{
xassert(NULL != coll_ctx);
xassert(coll_ctx->in_use);
pmixp_coll_sanity_check(coll_ctx->coll);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
slurm
|
c3142dd87e06621ff148791c3d2f298b5c0b3a81
| 216,135,444,482,595,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
PMIx - fix potential buffer overflows from use of unpackmem().
CVE-2020-27745.
|
static void sisusb_free_outbuf(struct sisusb_usb_data *sisusb, int index)
{
if ((index >= 0) && (index < sisusb->numobufs))
sisusb->urbstatus[index] &= ~SU_URB_ALLOC;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
9a5729f68d3a82786aea110b1bfe610be318f80a
| 10,359,077,046,824,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
USB: sisusbvga: fix oops in error path of sisusb_probe
The pointer used to log a failure of usb_register_dev() must
be set before the error is logged.
v2: fix that minor is not available before registration
Signed-off-by: oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 7b5cd5fefbe02 ("USB: SisUSB2VGA: Convert printk to dev_* macros")
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
int idx, ret = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
return 0;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
BUG_ON(guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
continue;
/*
* VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
* interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
* for these kind of interrupts.
*
* For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
* those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
* configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
* irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
*
* We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
*/
kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu)) {
/*
* Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
* we don't handle it in posted mode.
*/
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
host_irq);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(vcpu->vcpu_id, host_irq, e->gsi,
vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
if (set)
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
else {
/* suppress notification event before unposting */
pi_set_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
pi_clear_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
}
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] |
linux
|
3a8b0677fc6180a467e26cc32ce6b0c09a32f9bb
| 304,626,166,831,868,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 79 |
KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
The value of the guest_irq argument to vmx_update_pi_irte() is
ultimately coming from a KVM_IRQFD API call. Do not BUG() in
vmx_update_pi_irte() if the value is out-of bounds. (Especially,
since KVM as a whole seems to hang after that.)
Instead, print a message only once if we find that we don't have a
route for a certain IRQ (which can be out-of-bounds or within the
array).
This fixes CVE-2017-1000252.
Fixes: efc644048ecde54 ("KVM: x86: Update IRTE for posted-interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
ast_for_listcomp(struct compiling *c, const node *n)
{
assert(TYPE(n) == (testlist_comp));
return ast_for_itercomp(c, n, COMP_LISTCOMP);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpython
|
a4d78362397fc3bced6ea80fbc7b5f4827aec55e
| 222,190,001,488,431,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
bpo-36495: Fix two out-of-bounds array reads (GH-12641)
Research and fix by @bradlarsen.
|
static int should_include(struct commit *commit, void *_data)
{
struct include_data *data = _data;
int bitmap_pos;
bitmap_pos = bitmap_position(commit->object.oid.hash);
if (bitmap_pos < 0)
bitmap_pos = ext_index_add_object((struct object *)commit, NULL);
if (!add_to_include_set(data, commit->object.oid.hash, bitmap_pos)) {
struct commit_list *parent = commit->parents;
while (parent) {
parent->item->object.flags |= SEEN;
parent = parent->next;
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
git
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
| 325,322,900,689,687,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t uio_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct uio_listener *listener = filep->private_data;
struct uio_device *idev = listener->dev;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
ssize_t retval;
s32 event_count;
if (!idev->info->irq)
return -EIO;
if (count != sizeof(s32))
return -EINVAL;
add_wait_queue(&idev->wait, &wait);
do {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
event_count = atomic_read(&idev->event);
if (event_count != listener->event_count) {
if (copy_to_user(buf, &event_count, count))
retval = -EFAULT;
else {
listener->event_count = event_count;
retval = count;
}
break;
}
if (filep->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
schedule();
} while (1);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&idev->wait, &wait);
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-189",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
| 156,724,524,631,365,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected].
|
static void snd_usbmidi_output_drain(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
{
struct usbmidi_out_port *port = substream->runtime->private_data;
struct snd_usb_midi_out_endpoint *ep = port->ep;
unsigned int drain_urbs;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
long timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(50);
if (ep->umidi->disconnected)
return;
/*
* The substream buffer is empty, but some data might still be in the
* currently active URBs, so we have to wait for those to complete.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&ep->buffer_lock);
drain_urbs = ep->active_urbs;
if (drain_urbs) {
ep->drain_urbs |= drain_urbs;
do {
prepare_to_wait(&ep->drain_wait, &wait,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&ep->buffer_lock);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
spin_lock_irq(&ep->buffer_lock);
drain_urbs &= ep->drain_urbs;
} while (drain_urbs && timeout);
finish_wait(&ep->drain_wait, &wait);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ep->buffer_lock);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7
| 265,599,137,170,005,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
dirserv_get_consensus(const char *flavor_name)
{
if (!cached_consensuses)
return NULL;
return strmap_get(cached_consensuses, flavor_name);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
tor
|
00fffbc1a15e2696a89c721d0c94dc333ff419ef
| 215,315,223,511,708,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Don't give the Guard flag to relays without the CVE-2011-2768 fix
|
char *g_dhcp_client_get_netmask(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client)
{
GList *option = NULL;
if (dhcp_client->type == G_DHCP_IPV6)
return NULL;
switch (dhcp_client->state) {
case IPV4LL_DEFEND:
case IPV4LL_MONITOR:
return g_strdup("255.255.0.0");
case BOUND:
case RENEWING:
case REBINDING:
option = g_dhcp_client_get_option(dhcp_client, G_DHCP_SUBNET);
if (option)
return g_strdup(option->data);
case INIT_SELECTING:
case REBOOTING:
case REQUESTING:
case RELEASED:
case DECLINED:
case IPV4LL_PROBE:
case IPV4LL_ANNOUNCE:
case INFORMATION_REQ:
case SOLICITATION:
case REQUEST:
case CONFIRM:
case RENEW:
case REBIND:
case RELEASE:
case DECLINE:
break;
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[] |
connman
|
a74524b3e3fad81b0fd1084ffdf9f2ea469cd9b1
| 175,270,680,067,024,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
gdhcp: Avoid leaking stack data via unitiialized variable
Fixes: CVE-2021-26676
|
rsvg_filter_primitive_component_transfer_render (RsvgFilterPrimitive *
self, RsvgFilterContext * ctx)
{
gint x, y, c;
guint i;
gint temp;
gint rowstride, height, width;
RsvgIRect boundarys;
RsvgNodeComponentTransferFunc *channels[4];
ComponentTransferFunc functions[4];
guchar *inpix, outpix[4];
gint achan = ctx->channelmap[3];
guchar *in_pixels;
guchar *output_pixels;
RsvgFilterPrimitiveComponentTransfer *upself;
GdkPixbuf *output;
GdkPixbuf *in;
upself = (RsvgFilterPrimitiveComponentTransfer *) self;
boundarys = rsvg_filter_primitive_get_bounds (self, ctx);
for (c = 0; c < 4; c++) {
char channel = "RGBA"[c];
for (i = 0; i < self->super.children->len; i++) {
RsvgNodeComponentTransferFunc *temp;
temp = (RsvgNodeComponentTransferFunc *)
g_ptr_array_index (self->super.children, i);
if (!strncmp (temp->super.type->str, "feFunc", 6))
if (temp->super.type->str[6] == channel) {
functions[ctx->channelmap[c]] = temp->function;
channels[ctx->channelmap[c]] = temp;
break;
}
}
if (i == self->super.children->len)
functions[ctx->channelmap[c]] = identity_component_transfer_func;
}
in = rsvg_filter_get_in (self->in, ctx);
in_pixels = gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels (in);
height = gdk_pixbuf_get_height (in);
width = gdk_pixbuf_get_width (in);
rowstride = gdk_pixbuf_get_rowstride (in);
output = _rsvg_pixbuf_new_cleared (GDK_COLORSPACE_RGB, 1, 8, width, height);
output_pixels = gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels (output);
for (y = boundarys.y0; y < boundarys.y1; y++)
for (x = boundarys.x0; x < boundarys.x1; x++) {
inpix = in_pixels + (y * rowstride + x * 4);
for (c = 0; c < 4; c++) {
int inval;
if (c != achan) {
if (inpix[achan] == 0)
inval = 0;
else
inval = inpix[c] * 255 / inpix[achan];
} else
inval = inpix[c];
temp = functions[c] (inval, channels[c]);
if (temp > 255)
temp = 255;
else if (temp < 0)
temp = 0;
outpix[c] = temp;
}
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++)
output_pixels[y * rowstride + x * 4 + ctx->channelmap[c]] =
outpix[ctx->channelmap[c]] * outpix[achan] / 255;
output_pixels[y * rowstride + x * 4 + achan] = outpix[achan];
}
rsvg_filter_store_result (self->result, output, ctx);
g_object_unref (in);
g_object_unref (output);
}
| 1 |
[] |
librsvg
|
34c95743ca692ea0e44778e41a7c0a129363de84
| 68,198,138,291,941,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 |
Store node type separately in RsvgNode
The node name (formerly RsvgNode:type) cannot be used to infer
the sub-type of RsvgNode that we're dealing with, since for unknown
elements we put type = node-name. This lead to a (potentially exploitable)
crash e.g. when the element name started with "fe" which tricked
the old code into considering it as a RsvgFilterPrimitive.
CVE-2011-3146
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=658014
|
static struct stream_encoder *dcn10_stream_encoder_create(
enum engine_id eng_id,
struct dc_context *ctx)
{
struct dcn10_stream_encoder *enc1 =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct dcn10_stream_encoder), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!enc1)
return NULL;
dcn10_stream_encoder_construct(enc1, ctx, ctx->dc_bios, eng_id,
&stream_enc_regs[eng_id],
&se_shift, &se_mask);
return &enc1->base;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
104c307147ad379617472dd91a5bcb368d72bd6d
| 139,651,143,344,631,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak
In dcn*_create_resource_pool the allocated memory should be released if
construct pool fails.
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
|
static int cpu_clock_sample_group(const clockid_t which_clock,
struct task_struct *p,
union cpu_time_count *cpu)
{
int ret;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
ret = cpu_clock_sample_group_locked(CPUCLOCK_WHICH(which_clock), p,
cpu);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&p->sighand->siglock, flags);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
| 299,837,548,785,934,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void vga_common_reset(VGACommonState *s)
{
s->sr_index = 0;
memset(s->sr, '\0', sizeof(s->sr));
s->gr_index = 0;
memset(s->gr, '\0', sizeof(s->gr));
s->ar_index = 0;
memset(s->ar, '\0', sizeof(s->ar));
s->ar_flip_flop = 0;
s->cr_index = 0;
memset(s->cr, '\0', sizeof(s->cr));
s->msr = 0;
s->fcr = 0;
s->st00 = 0;
s->st01 = 0;
s->dac_state = 0;
s->dac_sub_index = 0;
s->dac_read_index = 0;
s->dac_write_index = 0;
memset(s->dac_cache, '\0', sizeof(s->dac_cache));
s->dac_8bit = 0;
memset(s->palette, '\0', sizeof(s->palette));
s->bank_offset = 0;
s->vbe_index = 0;
memset(s->vbe_regs, '\0', sizeof(s->vbe_regs));
s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_ID] = VBE_DISPI_ID5;
s->vbe_start_addr = 0;
s->vbe_line_offset = 0;
s->vbe_bank_mask = (s->vram_size >> 16) - 1;
memset(s->font_offsets, '\0', sizeof(s->font_offsets));
s->graphic_mode = -1; /* force full update */
s->shift_control = 0;
s->double_scan = 0;
s->line_offset = 0;
s->line_compare = 0;
s->start_addr = 0;
s->plane_updated = 0;
s->last_cw = 0;
s->last_ch = 0;
s->last_width = 0;
s->last_height = 0;
s->last_scr_width = 0;
s->last_scr_height = 0;
s->cursor_start = 0;
s->cursor_end = 0;
s->cursor_offset = 0;
memset(s->invalidated_y_table, '\0', sizeof(s->invalidated_y_table));
memset(s->last_palette, '\0', sizeof(s->last_palette));
memset(s->last_ch_attr, '\0', sizeof(s->last_ch_attr));
switch (vga_retrace_method) {
case VGA_RETRACE_DUMB:
break;
case VGA_RETRACE_PRECISE:
memset(&s->retrace_info, 0, sizeof (s->retrace_info));
break;
}
vga_update_memory_access(s);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
qemu
|
c1b886c45dc70f247300f549dce9833f3fa2def5
| 159,737,907,052,461,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 |
vbe: rework sanity checks
Plug a bunch of holes in the bochs dispi interface parameter checking.
Add a function doing verification on all registers. Call that
unconditionally on every register write. That way we should catch
everything, even changing one register affecting the valid range of
another register.
Some of the holes have been added by commit
e9c6149f6ae6873f14a12eea554925b6aa4c4dec. Before that commit the
maximum possible framebuffer (VBE_DISPI_MAX_XRES * VBE_DISPI_MAX_YRES *
32 bpp) has been smaller than the qemu vga memory (8MB) and the checking
for VBE_DISPI_MAX_XRES + VBE_DISPI_MAX_YRES + VBE_DISPI_MAX_BPP was ok.
Some of the holes have been there forever, such as
VBE_DISPI_INDEX_X_OFFSET and VBE_DISPI_INDEX_Y_OFFSET register writes
lacking any verification.
Security impact:
(1) Guest can make the ui (gtk/vnc/...) use memory rages outside the vga
frame buffer as source -> host memory leak. Memory isn't leaked to
the guest but to the vnc client though.
(2) Qemu will segfault in case the memory range happens to include
unmapped areas -> Guest can DoS itself.
The guest can not modify host memory, so I don't think this can be used
by the guest to escape.
CVE-2014-3615
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <[email protected]>
|
udpport_string(netdissect_options *ndo, register u_short port)
{
register struct hnamemem *tp;
register uint32_t i = port;
char buf[sizeof("00000")];
for (tp = &uporttable[i & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)]; tp->nxt; tp = tp->nxt)
if (tp->addr == i)
return (tp->name);
tp->addr = i;
tp->nxt = newhnamemem(ndo);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", i);
tp->name = strdup(buf);
if (tp->name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "udpport_string: strdup(buf)");
return (tp->name);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51
| 93,808,402,686,371,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7
| 211,214,025,778,831,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to
access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause
a number of problems.
Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was
suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit
1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective
task credentials").
This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's
objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the
current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem
reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these
cases.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials")
Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
SProcRecordCreateContext(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRecordCreateContextReq);
int status;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRecordCreateContextReq);
if ((status = SwapCreateRegister(client, (void *) stuff)) != Success)
return status;
return ProcRecordCreateContext(client);
} /* SProcRecordCreateContext */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-191"
] |
xserver
|
2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc
| 171,408,564,338,298,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <[email protected]>
|
guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state,
circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out)
{
const node_t *r = NULL;
const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL;
entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL;
if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) {
/* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be
* chosen as our guard for this circuit. Remember that fact in a
* restriction. */
rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t));
memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(),
GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC,
rst,
&r,
guard_state_out) < 0) {
tor_assert(r == NULL);
}
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tor
|
665baf5ed5c6186d973c46cdea165c0548027350
| 319,092,449,240,708,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
|
bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn_t pfn)
{
if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
int reserved;
struct page *tail = pfn_to_page(pfn);
struct page *head = compound_trans_head(tail);
reserved = PageReserved(head);
if (head != tail) {
/*
* "head" is not a dangling pointer
* (compound_trans_head takes care of that)
* but the hugepage may have been splitted
* from under us (and we may not hold a
* reference count on the head page so it can
* be reused before we run PageReferenced), so
* we've to check PageTail before returning
* what we just read.
*/
smp_rmb();
if (PageTail(tail))
return reserved;
}
return PageReserved(tail);
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
12d6e7538e2d418c08f082b1b44ffa5fb7270ed8
| 90,983,420,169,504,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
make_spnego_token(const char *name)
{
return (spnego_token_t)strdup(name);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
krb5
|
f18ddf5d82de0ab7591a36e465bc24225776940f
| 336,796,685,785,441,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix double-free in SPNEGO [CVE-2014-4343]
In commit cd7d6b08 ("Verify acceptor's mech in SPNEGO initiator") the
pointer sc->internal_mech became an alias into sc->mech_set->elements,
which should be considered constant for the duration of the SPNEGO
context. So don't free it.
CVE-2014-4343:
In MIT krb5 releases 1.10 and newer, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to spoof packets appearing to be from a
GSSAPI acceptor can cause a double-free condition in GSSAPI initiators
(clients) which are using the SPNEGO mechanism, by returning a
different underlying mechanism than was proposed by the initiator. At
this stage of the negotiation, the acceptor is unauthenticated, and
the acceptor's response could be spoofed by an attacker with the
ability to inject traffic to the initiator.
Historically, some double-free vulnerabilities can be translated into
remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored
to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated. Double-frees can also be exploited to cause an
application crash, for a denial of service. However, most GSSAPI
client applications are not vulnerable, as the SPNEGO mechanism is not
used by default (when GSS_C_NO_OID is passed as the mech_type argument
to gss_init_sec_context()). The most common use of SPNEGO is for
HTTP-Negotiate, used in web browsers and other web clients. Most such
clients are believed to not offer HTTP-Negotiate by default, instead
requiring a whitelist of sites for which it may be used to be
configured. If the whitelist is configured to only allow
HTTP-Negotiate over TLS connections ("https://"), a successful
attacker must also spoof the web server's SSL certificate, due to the
way the WWW-Authenticate header is sent in a 401 (Unauthorized)
response message. Unfortunately, many instructions for enabling
HTTP-Negotiate in common web browsers do not include a TLS
requirement.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary and CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7969 (new)
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup
|
static void manager_invoke_notify_message(Manager *m, Unit *u, pid_t pid, const char *buf, FDSet *fds) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **tags = NULL;
assert(m);
assert(u);
assert(buf);
tags = strv_split(buf, "\n\r");
if (!tags) {
log_oom();
return;
}
if (UNIT_VTABLE(u)->notify_message)
UNIT_VTABLE(u)->notify_message(u, pid, tags, fds);
else
log_unit_debug(u, "Got notification message for unit. Ignoring.");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
systemd
|
8523bf7dd514a3a2c6114b7b8fb8f308b4f09fc4
| 105,193,483,333,185,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
pid1: process zero-length notification messages again
This undoes 531ac2b234. I acked that patch without looking at the code
carefully enough. There are two problems:
- we want to process the fds anyway
- in principle empty notification messages are valid, and we should
process them as usual, including logging using log_unit_debug().
|
UnicodeStringTest::TestBasicManipulation()
{
UnicodeString test1("Now is the time for all men to come swiftly to the aid of the party.\n");
UnicodeString expectedValue;
UnicodeString *c;
c=test1.clone();
test1.insert(24, "good ");
expectedValue = "Now is the time for all good men to come swiftly to the aid of the party.\n";
if (test1 != expectedValue)
errln("insert() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + test1 + "\"");
c->insert(24, "good ");
if(*c != expectedValue) {
errln("clone()->insert() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + *c + "\"");
}
delete c;
test1.remove(41, 8);
expectedValue = "Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of the party.\n";
if (test1 != expectedValue)
errln("remove() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + test1 + "\"");
test1.replace(58, 6, "ir country");
expectedValue = "Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their country.\n";
if (test1 != expectedValue)
errln("replace() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + test1 + "\"");
UChar temp[80];
test1.extract(0, 15, temp);
UnicodeString test2(temp, 15);
expectedValue = "Now is the time";
if (test2 != expectedValue)
errln("extract() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + test2 + "\"");
test2 += " for me to go!\n";
expectedValue = "Now is the time for me to go!\n";
if (test2 != expectedValue)
errln("operator+=() failed: expected \"" + expectedValue + "\"\n,got \"" + test2 + "\"");
if (test1.length() != 70)
errln(UnicodeString("length() failed: expected 70, got ") + test1.length());
if (test2.length() != 30)
errln(UnicodeString("length() failed: expected 30, got ") + test2.length());
UnicodeString test3;
test3.append((UChar32)0x20402);
if(test3 != CharsToUnicodeString("\\uD841\\uDC02")){
errln((UnicodeString)"append failed for UChar32, expected \"\\\\ud841\\\\udc02\", got " + prettify(test3));
}
if(test3.length() != 2){
errln(UnicodeString("append or length failed for UChar32, expected 2, got ") + test3.length());
}
test3.append((UChar32)0x0074);
if(test3 != CharsToUnicodeString("\\uD841\\uDC02t")){
errln((UnicodeString)"append failed for UChar32, expected \"\\\\uD841\\\\uDC02t\", got " + prettify(test3));
}
if(test3.length() != 3){
errln((UnicodeString)"append or length failed for UChar32, expected 2, got " + test3.length());
}
// test some UChar32 overloads
if( test3.setTo((UChar32)0x10330).length() != 2 ||
test3.insert(0, (UChar32)0x20100).length() != 4 ||
test3.replace(2, 2, (UChar32)0xe0061).length() != 4 ||
(test3 = (UChar32)0x14001).length() != 2
) {
errln((UnicodeString)"simple UChar32 overloads for replace, insert, setTo or = failed");
}
{
// test moveIndex32()
UnicodeString s=UNICODE_STRING("\\U0002f999\\U0001d15f\\u00c4\\u1ed0", 32).unescape();
if(
s.moveIndex32(2, -1)!=0 ||
s.moveIndex32(2, 1)!=4 ||
s.moveIndex32(2, 2)!=5 ||
s.moveIndex32(5, -2)!=2 ||
s.moveIndex32(0, -1)!=0 ||
s.moveIndex32(6, 1)!=6
) {
errln("UnicodeString::moveIndex32() failed");
}
if(s.getChar32Start(1)!=0 || s.getChar32Start(2)!=2) {
errln("UnicodeString::getChar32Start() failed");
}
if(s.getChar32Limit(1)!=2 || s.getChar32Limit(2)!=2) {
errln("UnicodeString::getChar32Limit() failed");
}
}
{
// test new 2.2 constructors and setTo function that parallel Java's substring function.
UnicodeString src("Hello folks how are you?");
UnicodeString target1("how are you?");
if (target1 != UnicodeString(src, 12)) {
errln("UnicodeString(const UnicodeString&, int32_t) failed");
}
UnicodeString target2("folks");
if (target2 != UnicodeString(src, 6, 5)) {
errln("UnicodeString(const UnicodeString&, int32_t, int32_t) failed");
}
if (target1 != target2.setTo(src, 12)) {
errln("UnicodeString::setTo(const UnicodeString&, int32_t) failed");
}
}
{
// op+ is new in ICU 2.8
UnicodeString s=UnicodeString("abc", "")+UnicodeString("def", "")+UnicodeString("ghi", "");
if(s!=UnicodeString("abcdefghi", "")) {
errln("operator+(UniStr, UniStr) failed");
}
}
{
// tests for Jitterbug 2360
// verify that APIs with source pointer + length accept length == -1
// mostly test only where modified, only few functions did not already do this
if(UnicodeString("abc", -1, "")!=UnicodeString("abc", "")) {
errln("UnicodeString(codepageData, dataLength, codepage) does not work with dataLength==-1");
}
UChar buffer[10]={ 0x61, 0x62, 0x20ac, 0xd900, 0xdc05, 0, 0x62, 0xffff, 0xdbff, 0xdfff };
UnicodeString s, t(buffer, -1, UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer));
if(s.setTo(buffer, -1, UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer)).length()!=u_strlen(buffer)) {
errln("UnicodeString.setTo(buffer, length, capacity) does not work with length==-1");
}
if(t.length()!=u_strlen(buffer)) {
errln("UnicodeString(buffer, length, capacity) does not work with length==-1");
}
if(0!=s.caseCompare(buffer, -1, U_FOLD_CASE_DEFAULT)) {
errln("UnicodeString.caseCompare(const UChar *, length, options) does not work with length==-1");
}
if(0!=s.caseCompare(0, s.length(), buffer, U_FOLD_CASE_DEFAULT)) {
errln("UnicodeString.caseCompare(start, _length, const UChar *, options) does not work");
}
buffer[u_strlen(buffer)]=0xe4;
UnicodeString u(buffer, -1, UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer));
if(s.setTo(buffer, -1, UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer)).length()!=UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer)) {
errln("UnicodeString.setTo(buffer without NUL, length, capacity) does not work with length==-1");
}
if(u.length()!=UPRV_LENGTHOF(buffer)) {
errln("UnicodeString(buffer without NUL, length, capacity) does not work with length==-1");
}
static const char cs[]={ 0x61, (char)0xe4, (char)0x85, 0 };
UConverter *cnv;
UErrorCode errorCode=U_ZERO_ERROR;
cnv=ucnv_open("ISO-8859-1", &errorCode);
UnicodeString v(cs, -1, cnv, errorCode);
ucnv_close(cnv);
if(v!=CharsToUnicodeString("a\\xe4\\x85")) {
errln("UnicodeString(const char *, length, cnv, errorCode) does not work with length==-1");
}
}
#if U_CHARSET_IS_UTF8
{
// Test the hardcoded-UTF-8 UnicodeString optimizations.
static const uint8_t utf8[]={ 0x61, 0xC3, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xB8, 0x80, 0 };
static const UChar utf16[]={ 0x61, 0xE4, 0xDF, 0x4E00 };
UnicodeString from8a = UnicodeString((const char *)utf8);
UnicodeString from8b = UnicodeString((const char *)utf8, (int32_t)sizeof(utf8)-1);
UnicodeString from16(FALSE, utf16, UPRV_LENGTHOF(utf16));
if(from8a != from16 || from8b != from16) {
errln("UnicodeString(const char * U_CHARSET_IS_UTF8) failed");
}
char buffer[16];
int32_t length8=from16.extract(0, 0x7fffffff, buffer, (uint32_t)sizeof(buffer));
if(length8!=((int32_t)sizeof(utf8)-1) || 0!=uprv_memcmp(buffer, utf8, sizeof(utf8))) {
errln("UnicodeString::extract(char * U_CHARSET_IS_UTF8) failed");
}
length8=from16.extract(1, 2, buffer, (uint32_t)sizeof(buffer));
if(length8!=4 || buffer[length8]!=0 || 0!=uprv_memcmp(buffer, utf8+1, length8)) {
errln("UnicodeString::extract(substring to char * U_CHARSET_IS_UTF8) failed");
}
}
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] |
icu
|
b7d08bc04a4296982fcef8b6b8a354a9e4e7afca
| 181,693,644,886,683,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 189 |
ICU-20958 Prevent SEGV_MAPERR in append
See #971
|
static int pppol2tp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int flags)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
err = -EIO;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND)
goto end;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
err = 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto end;
if (len > skb->len)
len = skb->len;
else if (len < skb->len)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, len);
if (likely(err == 0))
err = len;
kfree_skb(skb);
end:
return err;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
| 302,854,640,964,099,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.