func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
BSONObj expectedResult() {
return BSON("" << 10LL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
mongo
|
0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816
| 128,689,098,464,600,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression
|
void RGWListBuckets_ObjStore_SWIFT::handle_listing_chunk(RGWUserBuckets&& buckets)
{
if (wants_reversed) {
/* Just store in the reversal buffer. Its content will be handled later,
* in send_response_end(). */
reverse_buffer.emplace(std::begin(reverse_buffer), std::move(buckets));
} else {
return send_response_data(buckets);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
ceph
|
f44a8ae8aa27ecef69528db9aec220f12492810e
| 10,204,849,441,236,054,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
rgw: RGWSwiftWebsiteHandler::is_web_dir checks empty subdir_name
checking for empty name avoids later assertion in RGWObjectCtx::set_atomic
Fixes: CVE-2021-3531
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 7196a469b4470f3c8628489df9a41ec8b00a5610)
|
parse_set_tunnel(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofp_raw_action_type raw)
{
struct ofpact_tunnel *tunnel;
tunnel = ofpact_put_SET_TUNNEL(ofpacts);
tunnel->ofpact.raw = raw;
return str_to_u64(arg, &tunnel->tun_id);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ovs
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
| 332,052,595,220,560,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
_dbus_geteuid (void)
{
return geteuid ();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-404"
] |
dbus
|
872b085f12f56da25a2dbd9bd0b2dff31d5aea63
| 157,312,035,519,349,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
sysdeps-unix: On MSG_CTRUNC, close the fds we did receive
MSG_CTRUNC indicates that we have received fewer fds that we should
have done because the buffer was too small, but we were treating it
as though it indicated that we received *no* fds. If we received any,
we still have to make sure we close them, otherwise they will be leaked.
On the system bus, if an attacker can induce us to leak fds in this
way, that's a local denial of service via resource exhaustion.
Reported-by: Kevin Backhouse, GitHub Security Lab
Fixes: dbus#294
Fixes: CVE-2020-12049
Fixes: GHSL-2020-057
|
column_format_type column_format() const
{
return (column_format_type)
((flags >> FIELD_FLAGS_COLUMN_FORMAT) & 3);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 255,784,059,926,223,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
rpc_C_EncryptUpdate (CK_X_FUNCTION_LIST *self,
p11_rpc_message *msg)
{
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_BYTE_PTR part;
CK_ULONG part_len;
CK_BYTE_PTR encrypted_part;
CK_ULONG encrypted_part_len;
BEGIN_CALL (EncryptUpdate);
IN_ULONG (session);
IN_BYTE_ARRAY (part, part_len);
IN_BYTE_BUFFER (encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len);
PROCESS_CALL ((self, session, part, part_len, encrypted_part, &encrypted_part_len));
OUT_BYTE_ARRAY (encrypted_part, encrypted_part_len);
END_CALL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
p11-kit
|
5307a1d21a50cacd06f471a873a018d23ba4b963
| 31,982,219,995,934,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Check for arithmetic overflows before allocating
|
static void cli_session_setup_gensec_remote_next(struct tevent_req *req)
{
struct cli_session_setup_gensec_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct cli_session_setup_gensec_state);
struct tevent_req *subreq = NULL;
if (state->remote_ready) {
tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_NETWORK_RESPONSE);
return;
}
subreq = cli_sesssetup_blob_send(state, state->ev,
state->cli, state->blob_out);
if (tevent_req_nomem(subreq, req)) {
return;
}
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq,
cli_session_setup_gensec_remote_done,
req);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94"
] |
samba
|
94295b7aa22d2544af5323bca70d3dcb97fd7c64
| 220,053,344,368,334,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
CVE-2016-2019: s3:libsmb: add comment regarding smbXcli_session_is_guest() with mandatory signing
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11860
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
|
static RRBNode *_node_new(void *data, RRBNode *parent) {
RRBNode *node = R_NEW0 (RRBNode);
r_return_val_if_fail (node, NULL);
node->red = 1;
node->data = data;
node->parent = parent;
return node;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
radare2
|
b5cb90b28ec71fda3504da04e3cc94a362807f5e
| 20,089,131,847,790,557,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Prefer memleak over usaf in io.bank's rbtree bug ##crash
* That's a workaround, proper fix will come later
* Reproducer: bins/fuzzed/iobank-crash
* Reported by Akyne Choi via huntr.dev
|
static void foreach_pairs(RCore *core, const char *cmd, const char *each) {
const char *arg;
int pair = 0;
for (arg = each ; ; ) {
char *next = strchr (arg, ' ');
if (next) {
*next = 0;
}
if (arg && *arg) {
ut64 n = r_num_get (NULL, arg);
if (pair%2) {
r_core_block_size (core, n);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
} else {
r_core_seek (core, n, 1);
}
pair++;
}
if (!next) {
break;
}
arg = next + 1;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
radare2
|
dd739f5a45b3af3d1f65f00fe19af1dbfec7aea7
| 116,321,753,187,279,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
|
static int mxf_absolute_bodysid_offset(MXFContext *mxf, int body_sid, int64_t offset, int64_t *offset_out, MXFPartition **partition_out)
{
MXFPartition *last_p = NULL;
int a, b, m, m0;
if (offset < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
a = -1;
b = mxf->partitions_count;
while (b - a > 1) {
m0 = m = (a + b) >> 1;
while (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_sid != body_sid)
m++;
if (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_offset <= offset)
a = m;
else
b = m0;
}
if (a >= 0)
last_p = &mxf->partitions[a];
if (last_p && (!last_p->essence_length || last_p->essence_length > (offset - last_p->body_offset))) {
*offset_out = last_p->essence_offset + (offset - last_p->body_offset);
if (partition_out)
*partition_out = last_p;
return 0;
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"failed to find absolute offset of %"PRIX64" in BodySID %i - partial file?\n",
offset, body_sid);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
FFmpeg
|
bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75
| 39,944,972,965,673,147,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int moverect_user(VTermRect dest, VTermRect src, void *user)
{
VTermScreen *screen = user;
if(screen->callbacks && screen->callbacks->moverect) {
if(screen->damage_merge != VTERM_DAMAGE_SCROLL)
// Avoid an infinite loop
vterm_screen_flush_damage(screen);
if((*screen->callbacks->moverect)(dest, src, screen->cbdata))
return 1;
}
damagerect(screen, dest);
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
vim
|
cd929f7ba8cc5b6d6dcf35c8b34124e969fed6b8
| 140,158,794,569,572,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
patch 8.1.0633: crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window
Problem: Crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window.
Solution: Handle out-of-memory more gracefully.
|
uECC_VLI_API uECC_word_t uECC_vli_add(uECC_word_t *result,
const uECC_word_t *left,
const uECC_word_t *right,
wordcount_t num_words) {
uECC_word_t carry = 0;
wordcount_t i;
for (i = 0; i < num_words; ++i) {
uECC_word_t sum = left[i] + right[i] + carry;
if (sum != left[i]) {
carry = (sum < left[i]);
}
result[i] = sum;
}
return carry;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
micro-ecc
|
1b5f5cea5145c96dd8791b9b2c41424fc74c2172
| 283,635,745,809,201,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Fix for #168
|
real_save_jpeg (GdkPixbuf *pixbuf,
gchar **keys,
gchar **values,
GError **error,
gboolean to_callback,
FILE *f,
GdkPixbufSaveFunc save_func,
gpointer user_data)
{
/* FIXME error handling is broken */
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
guchar *buf = NULL;
guchar *ptr;
guchar *pixels = NULL;
JSAMPROW *jbuf;
int y = 0;
volatile int quality = 75; /* default; must be between 0 and 100 */
int i, j;
int w, h = 0;
int rowstride = 0;
int n_channels;
struct error_handler_data jerr;
ToFunctionDestinationManager to_callback_destmgr;
int x_density = 0;
int y_density = 0;
gchar *icc_profile = NULL;
gchar *data;
gint retval = TRUE;
gsize icc_profile_size = 0;
to_callback_destmgr.buffer = NULL;
if (keys && *keys) {
gchar **kiter = keys;
gchar **viter = values;
while (*kiter) {
if (strcmp (*kiter, "quality") == 0) {
char *endptr = NULL;
quality = strtol (*viter, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == *viter) {
g_set_error (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_BAD_OPTION,
_("JPEG quality must be a value between 0 and 100; value '%s' could not be parsed."),
*viter);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (quality < 0 ||
quality > 100) {
/* This is a user-visible error;
* lets people skip the range-checking
* in their app.
*/
g_set_error (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_BAD_OPTION,
_("JPEG quality must be a value between 0 and 100; value '%d' is not allowed."),
quality);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (strcmp (*kiter, "x-dpi") == 0) {
char *endptr = NULL;
x_density = strtol (*viter, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == *viter)
x_density = -1;
if (x_density <= 0 ||
x_density > 65535) {
/* This is a user-visible error;
* lets people skip the range-checking
* in their app.
*/
g_set_error (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_BAD_OPTION,
_("JPEG x-dpi must be a value between 1 and 65535; value '%s' is not allowed."),
*viter);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (strcmp (*kiter, "y-dpi") == 0) {
char *endptr = NULL;
y_density = strtol (*viter, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == *viter)
y_density = -1;
if (y_density <= 0 ||
y_density > 65535) {
/* This is a user-visible error;
* lets people skip the range-checking
* in their app.
*/
g_set_error (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_BAD_OPTION,
_("JPEG y-dpi must be a value between 1 and 65535; value '%s' is not allowed."),
*viter);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (strcmp (*kiter, "icc-profile") == 0) {
/* decode from base64 */
icc_profile = (gchar*) g_base64_decode (*viter, &icc_profile_size);
if (icc_profile_size < 127) {
/* This is a user-visible error */
g_set_error (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_BAD_OPTION,
_("Color profile has invalid length '%u'."),
(guint) icc_profile_size);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
g_warning ("Unrecognized parameter (%s) passed to JPEG saver.", *kiter);
}
++kiter;
++viter;
}
}
rowstride = gdk_pixbuf_get_rowstride (pixbuf);
n_channels = gdk_pixbuf_get_n_channels (pixbuf);
w = gdk_pixbuf_get_width (pixbuf);
h = gdk_pixbuf_get_height (pixbuf);
pixels = gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels (pixbuf);
/* Guaranteed by the caller. */
g_assert (w >= 0);
g_assert (h >= 0);
g_assert (rowstride >= 0);
g_assert (n_channels >= 0);
/* Allocate a small buffer to convert image data,
* and a larger buffer if doing to_callback save.
*/
buf = g_try_malloc (w * 3 * sizeof (guchar));
if (!buf) {
g_set_error_literal (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY,
_("Couldn't allocate memory for loading JPEG file"));
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
if (to_callback) {
to_callback_destmgr.buffer = g_try_malloc (TO_FUNCTION_BUF_SIZE);
if (!to_callback_destmgr.buffer) {
g_set_error_literal (error,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR,
GDK_PIXBUF_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY,
_("Couldn't allocate memory for loading JPEG file"));
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* set up error handling */
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&(jerr.pub));
jerr.pub.error_exit = fatal_error_handler;
jerr.pub.output_message = output_message_handler;
jerr.error = error;
if (sigsetjmp (jerr.setjmp_buffer, 1)) {
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
/* setup compress params */
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
if (to_callback) {
to_callback_destmgr.pub.init_destination = to_callback_init;
to_callback_destmgr.pub.empty_output_buffer = to_callback_empty_output_buffer;
to_callback_destmgr.pub.term_destination = to_callback_terminate;
to_callback_destmgr.error = error;
to_callback_destmgr.save_func = save_func;
to_callback_destmgr.user_data = user_data;
cinfo.dest = (struct jpeg_destination_mgr*) &to_callback_destmgr;
} else {
jpeg_stdio_dest (&cinfo, f);
}
cinfo.image_width = w;
cinfo.image_height = h;
cinfo.input_components = 3;
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB;
/* set up jepg compression parameters */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
/* set density information */
if (x_density > 0 && y_density > 0) {
cinfo.density_unit = 1; /* Dots per inch */
cinfo.X_density = x_density;
cinfo.Y_density = y_density;
}
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
/* write ICC profile data */
if (icc_profile != NULL) {
/* optimise for the common case where only one APP2 segment is required */
if (icc_profile_size < 0xffef) {
data = g_new (gchar, icc_profile_size + 14);
memcpy (data, "ICC_PROFILE\000\001\001", 14);
memcpy (data + 14, icc_profile, icc_profile_size);
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_APP0+2, (const JOCTET *) data, icc_profile_size + 14);
g_free (data);
} else {
guint segments;
guint size = 0xffef;
guint offset;
segments = (guint) ceilf ((gfloat) icc_profile_size / (gfloat) 0xffef);
data = g_new (gchar, 0xffff);
memcpy (data, "ICC_PROFILE\000", 12);
data[13] = segments;
for (i=0; i<=segments; i++) {
data[12] = i;
offset = 0xffef * i;
/* last segment */
if (i == segments)
size = icc_profile_size % 0xffef;
memcpy (data + 14, icc_profile + offset, size);
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_APP0+2, (const JOCTET *) data, size + 14);
}
g_free (data);
}
}
/* get the start pointer */
ptr = pixels;
/* go one scanline at a time... and save */
i = 0;
while (cinfo.next_scanline < cinfo.image_height) {
/* convert scanline from ARGB to RGB packed */
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
memcpy (&(buf[j*3]), &(ptr[(gsize)i*rowstride + j*n_channels]), 3);
/* write scanline */
jbuf = (JSAMPROW *)(&buf);
if (jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, jbuf, 1) == 0) {
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
retval = FALSE;
goto cleanup;
}
i++;
y++;
}
/* finish off */
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress(&cinfo);
cleanup:
g_free (buf);
g_free (to_callback_destmgr.buffer);
g_free (icc_profile);
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gdk-pixbuf
|
c2a40a92fe3df4111ed9da51fe3368c079b86926
| 100,354,098,769,178,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 276 |
jpeg: Throw error when number of color components is unsupported
Explicitly check "3" or "4" output color components.
gdk-pixbuf assumed that the value of output_components to be either
3 or 4, but not an invalid value (9) or an unsupported value (1).
The way the buffer size was deduced was using a naive "== 4" check,
with a 1, 3 or 9 color component picture getting the same buffer size,
a size just sufficient for 3 color components, causing invalid writes
later when libjpeg-turbo was decoding the image.
CVE-2017-2862
Sent by from Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco Talos
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784866
|
void DL_Dxf::writeComment(DL_WriterA& dw, const std::string& comment) {
dw.dxfString(999, comment);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-191"
] |
qcad
|
1eeffc5daf5a06cf6213ffc19e95923cdebb2eb8
| 208,679,995,453,488,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
check vertexIndex which might be -1 for broken DXF
|
static void tda8425_setmode(struct CHIPSTATE *chip, int mode)
{
int s1 = chip->shadow.bytes[TDA8425_S1+1] & 0xe1;
if (mode & V4L2_TUNER_MODE_LANG1) {
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_ML_SOUND_A;
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_STEREO_PSEUDO;
} else if (mode & V4L2_TUNER_MODE_LANG2) {
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_ML_SOUND_B;
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_STEREO_PSEUDO;
} else {
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_ML_STEREO;
if (mode & V4L2_TUNER_MODE_MONO)
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_STEREO_MONO;
if (mode & V4L2_TUNER_MODE_STEREO)
s1 |= TDA8425_S1_STEREO_SPATIAL;
}
chip_write(chip,TDA8425_S1,s1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
01a1a3cc1e3fbe718bd06a2a5d4d1a2d0fb4d7d9
| 222,367,751,528,633,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
V4L/DVB (9624): CVE-2008-5033: fix OOPS on tvaudio when controlling bass/treble
This bug were supposed to be fixed by 5ba2f67afb02c5302b2898949ed6fc3b3d37dcf1,
where a call to NULL happens.
Not all tvaudio chips allow controlling bass/treble. So, the driver
has a table with a flag to indicate if the chip does support it.
Unfortunately, the handling of this logic were broken for a very long
time (probably since the first module version). Due to that, an OOPS
were generated for devices that don't support bass/treble.
This were the resulting OOPS message before the patch, with debug messages
enabled:
tvaudio' 1-005b: VIDIOC_S_CTRL
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000
IP: [<00000000>]
*pde = 22fda067 *pte = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: snd_hda_intel snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device
snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_pcm snd_timer snd_hwdep snd soundcore tuner_simple tuner_types tea5767 tuner
tvaudio bttv bridgebnep rfcomm l2cap bluetooth it87 hwmon_vid hwmon fuse sunrpc ipt_REJECT
nf_conntrack_ipv4 iptable_filter ip_tables ip6t_REJECT xt_tcpudp nf_conntrack_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack
ip6table_filter ip6_tables x_tables ipv6 dm_mirrordm_multipath dm_mod configfs videodev v4l1_compat
ir_common 8139cp compat_ioctl32 v4l2_common 8139too videobuf_dma_sg videobuf_core mii btcx_risc tveeprom
i915 button snd_page_alloc serio_raw drm pcspkr i2c_algo_bit i2c_i801 i2c_core iTCO_wdt
iTCO_vendor_support sr_mod cdrom sg ata_generic pata_acpi ata_piix libata sd_mod scsi_mod ext3 jbdmbcache
uhci_hcd ohci_hcd ehci_hcd [last unloaded: soundcore]
Pid: 15413, comm: qv4l2 Not tainted (2.6.25.14-108.fc9.i686 #1)
EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
EIP is at 0x0
EAX: 00008000 EBX: ebd21600 ECX: e2fd9ec4 EDX: 00200046
ESI: f8c0f0c4 EDI: f8c0f0c4 EBP: e2fd9d50 ESP: e2fd9d2c
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process qv4l2 (pid: 15413, ti=e2fd9000 task=ebe44000 task.ti=e2fd9000)
Stack: f8c0c6ae e2ff2a00 00000d00 e2fd9ec4 ebc4e000 e2fd9d5c f8c0c448 00000000
f899c12a e2fd9d5c f899c154 e2fd9d68 e2fd9d80 c0560185 e2fd9d88 f8f3e1d8
f8f3e1dc ebc4e034 f8f3e18c e2fd9ec4 00000000 e2fd9d90 f899c286 c008561c
Call Trace:
[<f8c0c6ae>] ? chip_command+0x266/0x4b6 [tvaudio]
[<f8c0c448>] ? chip_command+0x0/0x4b6 [tvaudio]
[<f899c12a>] ? i2c_cmd+0x0/0x2f [i2c_core]
[<f899c154>] ? i2c_cmd+0x2a/0x2f [i2c_core]
[<c0560185>] ? device_for_each_child+0x21/0x49
[<f899c286>] ? i2c_clients_command+0x1c/0x1e [i2c_core]
[<f8f283d8>] ? bttv_call_i2c_clients+0x14/0x16 [bttv]
[<f8f23601>] ? bttv_s_ctrl+0x1bc/0x313 [bttv]
[<f8f23445>] ? bttv_s_ctrl+0x0/0x313 [bttv]
[<f8b6096d>] ? __video_do_ioctl+0x1f84/0x3726 [videodev]
[<c05abb4e>] ? sock_aio_write+0x100/0x10d
[<c041b23e>] ? kmap_atomic_prot+0x1dd/0x1df
[<c043a0c9>] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0xc2/0xcd
[<c04f4fa4>] ? copy_from_user+0x39/0x121
[<f8b622b9>] ? __video_ioctl2+0x1aa/0x24a [videodev]
[<c04054fd>] ? do_notify_resume+0x768/0x795
[<c043c0f7>] ? getnstimeofday+0x34/0xd1
[<c0437b77>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33
[<f8b62368>] ? video_ioctl2+0xf/0x13 [videodev]
[<c048c6f0>] ? vfs_ioctl+0x50/0x69
[<c048c942>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x239/0x24c
[<c048c995>] ? sys_ioctl+0x40/0x5b
[<c0405bf2>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[<c0620000>] ? cpuid4_cache_sysfs_exit+0x3d/0x69
=======================
Code: Bad EIP value.
EIP: [<00000000>] 0x0 SS:ESP 0068:e2fd9d2c
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static void __init do_add_efi_memmap(void)
{
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr;
unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
int e820_type;
switch (md->type) {
case EFI_LOADER_CODE:
case EFI_LOADER_DATA:
case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE:
case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
case EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY:
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB)
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RAM;
else
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RESERVED;
break;
case EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_ACPI;
break;
case EFI_ACPI_MEMORY_NVS:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_NVS;
break;
case EFI_UNUSABLE_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE;
break;
case EFI_PERSISTENT_MEMORY:
e820_type = E820_TYPE_PMEM;
break;
default:
/*
* EFI_RESERVED_TYPE EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE
* EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO
* EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO_PORT_SPACE EFI_PAL_CODE
*/
e820_type = E820_TYPE_RESERVED;
break;
}
e820__range_add(start, size, e820_type);
}
e820__update_table(e820_table);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-388"
] |
tip
|
4e78921ba4dd0aca1cc89168f45039add4183f8e
| 262,624,270,445,455,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
efi/x86/Add missing error handling to old_memmap 1:1 mapping code
The old_memmap flow in efi_call_phys_prolog() performs numerous memory
allocations, and either does not check for failure at all, or it does
but fails to propagate it back to the caller, which may end up calling
into the firmware with an incomplete 1:1 mapping.
So let's fix this by returning NULL from efi_call_phys_prolog() on
memory allocation failures only, and by handling this condition in the
caller. Also, clean up any half baked sets of page tables that we may
have created before returning with a NULL return value.
Note that any failure at this level will trigger a panic() two levels
up, so none of this makes a huge difference, but it is a nice cleanup
nonetheless.
[ardb: update commit log, add efi_call_phys_epilog() call on error path]
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rob Bradford <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void smb_vfs_call_init_search_op(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
DIR *dirp)
{
VFS_FIND(init_search_op);
handle->fns->init_search_op_fn(handle, dirp);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
samba
|
4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e
| 144,773,984,225,321,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file access outside the share).
Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <[email protected]>
|
CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_CreateRaw(const char *raw)
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item(&global_hooks);
if(item)
{
item->type = cJSON_Raw;
item->valuestring = (char*)cJSON_strdup((const unsigned char*)raw, &global_hooks);
if(!item->valuestring)
{
cJSON_Delete(item);
return NULL;
}
}
return item;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-754",
"CWE-787"
] |
cJSON
|
be749d7efa7c9021da746e685bd6dec79f9dd99b
| 258,203,819,130,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
|
static int matchlabel(js_Ast *node, const char *label)
{
while (node && node->type == STM_LABEL) {
if (!strcmp(node->a->string, label))
return 1;
node = node->parent;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
mujs
|
5008105780c0b0182ea6eda83ad5598f225be3ee
| 264,251,875,672,443,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Fix 697172: degenerate labeled break/continue statement.
A labeled break statement will look for a matching label through
its chain of parent statements. We start looking at the break statement
though, so if the label is attached to the break, we'll return the break
statement itself as a break target.
Start looking for targets one level up instead.
|
int jpc_mqenc_codemps2(jpc_mqenc_t *mqenc)
{
/* Note: This function only performs part of the work associated with
the CODEMPS algorithm from the standard. Some of the work is also
performed by the caller. */
jpc_mqstate_t *state = *(mqenc->curctx);
if (mqenc->areg < state->qeval) {
mqenc->areg = state->qeval;
} else {
mqenc->creg += state->qeval;
}
*mqenc->curctx = state->nmps;
jpc_mqenc_renorme(mqenc->areg, mqenc->creg, mqenc->ctreg, mqenc);
return jpc_mqenc_error(mqenc) ? (-1) : 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
jasper
|
3c55b399c36ef46befcb21e4ebc4799367f89684
| 148,764,936,067,939,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems.
|
batchState2String(batch_state_t state) {
switch(state) {
case BATCH_STATE_RDY:
return "BATCH_STATE_RDY";
case BATCH_STATE_BAD:
return "BATCH_STATE_BAD";
case BATCH_STATE_SUB:
return "BATCH_STATE_SUB";
case BATCH_STATE_COMM:
return "BATCH_STATE_COMM";
case BATCH_STATE_DISC:
return "BATCH_STATE_DISC";
}
return "ERROR, batch state not known!";
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772",
"CWE-401"
] |
rsyslog
|
1ef709cc97d54f74d3fdeb83788cc4b01f4c6a2a
| 270,872,909,415,522,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
bugfix: fixed a memory leak and potential abort condition
this could happen if multiple rulesets were used and some output batches
contained messages belonging to more than one ruleset.
fixes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=226
fixes: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=218
|
static int vfat_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct fat_slot_info sinfo;
int err;
lock_super(sb);
err = vfat_find(dir, &dentry->d_name, &sinfo);
if (err)
goto out;
err = fat_remove_entries(dir, &sinfo); /* and releases bh */
if (err)
goto out;
clear_nlink(inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
fat_detach(inode);
out:
unlock_super(sb);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
0720a06a7518c9d0c0125bd5d1f3b6264c55c3dd
| 94,993,559,329,527,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
striter_dealloc(striterobject *it)
{
_PyObject_GC_UNTRACK(it);
Py_XDECREF(it->it_seq);
PyObject_GC_Del(it);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
cpython
|
6c004b40f9d51872d848981ef1a18bb08c2dfc42
| 311,896,028,399,738,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
bpo-30657: Fix CVE-2017-1000158 (#4758)
Fixes possible integer overflow in PyBytes_DecodeEscape.
Co-Authored-By: Jay Bosamiya <[email protected]>
|
lowerstr_ctx(IspellDict *Conf, const char *src)
{
MemoryContext saveCtx;
char *dst;
saveCtx = MemoryContextSwitchTo(Conf->buildCxt);
dst = lowerstr(src);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(saveCtx);
return dst;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
postgres
|
01824385aead50e557ca1af28640460fa9877d51
| 237,217,816,005,343,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers.
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt()
|
variable_exists(char_u *name, size_t len, cctx_T *cctx)
{
return (cctx != NULL
&& (lookup_local(name, len, NULL, cctx) == OK
|| arg_exists(name, len, NULL, NULL, NULL, cctx) == OK))
|| script_var_exists(name, len, cctx) == OK
|| find_imported(name, len, cctx) != NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
9c23f9bb5fe435b28245ba8ac65aa0ca6b902c04
| 234,274,023,840,875,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
patch 8.2.3902: Vim9: double free with nested :def function
Problem: Vim9: double free with nested :def function.
Solution: Pass "line_to_free" from compile_def_function() and make sure
cmdlinep is valid.
|
void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, long in_syscall)
{
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING) ||
test_thread_flag(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK))
do_signal(regs, in_syscall);
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME)) {
clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
}
}
| 1 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
| 59,503,171,509,773,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjsua_start(void)
{
pj_status_t status;
pjsua_set_state(PJSUA_STATE_STARTING);
pj_log_push_indent();
status = pjsua_call_subsys_start();
if (status != PJ_SUCCESS)
goto on_return;
status = pjsua_media_subsys_start();
if (status != PJ_SUCCESS)
goto on_return;
status = pjsua_pres_start();
if (status != PJ_SUCCESS)
goto on_return;
pjsua_set_state(PJSUA_STATE_RUNNING);
on_return:
pj_log_pop_indent();
return status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
pjproject
|
d27f79da11df7bc8bb56c2f291d71e54df8d2c47
| 96,944,297,926,147,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN() on pjsip_auth_create_digest() and pjsua_init_tpselector() (#3009)
* Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN on pjsip_auth_create_digest
* Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN on pjsua_init_tpselector()
* Fix incorrect check.
* Add return value to pjsip_auth_create_digest() and pjsip_auth_create_digestSHA256()
* Modification based on comments.
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_scheduler(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_assoc_value params;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int retval = -EFAULT;
if (len < sizeof(params)) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
len = sizeof(params);
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, optval, len))
goto out;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.assoc_id);
if (!asoc) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
params.assoc_value = sctp_sched_get_sched(asoc);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
goto out;
if (copy_to_user(optval, ¶ms, len))
goto out;
retval = 0;
out:
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a0ff660058b88d12625a783ce9e5c1371c87951f
| 160,998,410,518,430,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
sctp: return error if the asoc has been peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf
After commit cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from
wait_buf sleep"), it may change to lock another sk if the asoc has been
peeled off in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf.
However, the asoc's new sk could be already closed elsewhere, as it's in
the sendmsg context of the old sk that can't avoid the new sk's closing.
If the sk's last one refcnt is held by this asoc, later on after putting
this asoc, the new sk will be freed, while under it's own lock.
This patch is to revert that commit, but fix the old issue by returning
error under the old sk's lock.
Fixes: cea0cc80a677 ("sctp: use the right sk after waking up from wait_buf sleep")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
bool kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_exception *fault)
{
struct kvm_mmu *fault_mmu;
WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->vector != PF_VECTOR);
fault_mmu = fault->nested_page_fault ? vcpu->arch.mmu :
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
/*
* Invalidate the TLB entry for the faulting address, if it exists,
* else the access will fault indefinitely (and to emulate hardware).
*/
if ((fault->error_code & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK) &&
!(fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))
kvm_mmu_invalidate_gva(vcpu, fault_mmu, fault->address,
fault_mmu->root_hpa);
fault_mmu->inject_page_fault(vcpu, fault);
return fault->nested_page_fault;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 238,158,375,237,123,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
bool arch_within_kprobe_blacklist(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >= (unsigned long)__kprobes_text_start &&
addr < (unsigned long)__kprobes_text_end) ||
(addr >= (unsigned long)__entry_text_start &&
addr < (unsigned long)__entry_text_end);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
548acf19234dbda5a52d5a8e7e205af46e9da840
| 192,208,338,672,156,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling options
Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to
produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the
exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed
out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field.
Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with:
' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space
in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. '
The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a
handler that executes the actions.
We start out with three handlers:
1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP
2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code
3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
list_add_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT);
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
/*
* If we're a stand alone event or group leader, we go to the context
* list, group events are kept attached to the group so that
* perf_group_detach can, at all times, locate all siblings.
*/
if (event->group_leader == event) {
struct list_head *list;
if (is_software_event(event))
event->group_flags |= PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE;
list = ctx_group_list(event, ctx);
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, list);
}
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
ctx->nr_cgroups++;
list_add_rcu(&event->event_entry, &ctx->event_list);
ctx->nr_events++;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat++;
ctx->generation++;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373
| 171,616,506,070,548,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
parser_process_expression_sequence (parser_context_t *context_p) /**< context */
{
if (!CBC_NO_RESULT_OPERATION (context_p->last_cbc_opcode))
{
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_POP);
}
if (context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_LEFT_PAREN)
{
parser_mem_page_t *page_p = context_p->stack.first_p;
JERRY_ASSERT (page_p != NULL);
page_p->bytes[context_p->stack.last_position - 1] = LEXER_COMMA_SEP_LIST;
context_p->stack_top_uint8 = LEXER_COMMA_SEP_LIST;
}
lexer_next_token (context_p);
} /* parser_process_expression_sequence */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
jerryscript
|
3bcd48f72d4af01d1304b754ef19fe1a02c96049
| 69,672,026,285,003,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Improve parse_identifier (#4691)
Ascii string length is no longer computed during string allocation.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Daniel Batiz [email protected]
|
void ConnectionImpl::onMessageCompleteBase() {
ENVOY_CONN_LOG(trace, "message complete", connection_);
if (handling_upgrade_) {
// If this is an upgrade request, swallow the onMessageComplete. The
// upgrade payload will be treated as stream body.
ASSERT(!deferred_end_stream_headers_);
ENVOY_CONN_LOG(trace, "Pausing parser due to upgrade.", connection_);
http_parser_pause(&parser_, 1);
return;
}
onMessageComplete();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014
| 298,296,905,004,421,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]>
|
gdm_user_get_display_name (GdmUser *user)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (GDM_IS_USER (user), NULL);
return (user->display_name ? user->display_name
: gdm_user_get_real_name (user));
}
| 0 |
[] |
gdm
|
c25ef9245be4e0be2126ef3d075df4401949b570
| 103,863,631,182,852,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Store the face and dmrc files in a cache. Refer to bug #565151.
|
MagickExport PixelChannelMap *ClonePixelChannelMap(PixelChannelMap *channel_map)
{
PixelChannelMap
*clone_map;
assert(channel_map != (PixelChannelMap *) NULL);
clone_map=AcquirePixelChannelMap();
if (clone_map == (PixelChannelMap *) NULL)
return((PixelChannelMap *) NULL);
(void) memcpy(clone_map,channel_map,MaxPixelChannels*
sizeof(*channel_map));
return(clone_map);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
ImageMagick
|
406da3af9e09649cda152663c179902edf5ab3ac
| 139,293,522,230,908,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1732
|
cdataSectionProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *start, const char *end,
const char **endPtr) {
enum XML_Error result
= doCdataSection(parser, parser->m_encoding, &start, end, endPtr,
(XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
if (start) {
if (parser->m_parentParser) { /* we are parsing an external entity */
parser->m_processor = externalEntityContentProcessor;
return externalEntityContentProcessor(parser, start, end, endPtr);
} else {
parser->m_processor = contentProcessor;
return contentProcessor(parser, start, end, endPtr);
}
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-611",
"CWE-776",
"CWE-415",
"CWE-125"
] |
libexpat
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
| 156,482,792,861,866,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
send_complete( struct net_local *nl )
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SBNI_MULTILINE
((struct net_local *) nl->master->priv)->stats.tx_packets++;
((struct net_local *) nl->master->priv)->stats.tx_bytes
+= nl->tx_buf_p->len;
#else
nl->stats.tx_packets++;
nl->stats.tx_bytes += nl->tx_buf_p->len;
#endif
dev_kfree_skb_irq( nl->tx_buf_p );
nl->tx_buf_p = NULL;
nl->outpos = 0;
nl->state &= ~(FL_WAIT_ACK | FL_NEED_RESEND);
nl->framelen = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f2455eb176ac87081bbfc9a44b21c7cd2bc1967e
| 51,832,587,408,821,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
wan: Missing capability checks in sbni_ioctl()
There are missing capability checks in the following code:
1300 static int
1301 sbni_ioctl( struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
1302 {
[...]
1319 case SIOCDEVRESINSTATS :
1320 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1321 return -EPERM;
[...]
1336 case SIOCDEVSHWSTATE :
1337 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1338 return -EPERM;
[...]
1357 case SIOCDEVENSLAVE :
1358 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1359 return -EPERM;
[...]
1372 case SIOCDEVEMANSIPATE :
1373 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1374 return -EPERM;
Here's my proposed fix:
Missing capability checks.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
messageAddStr(message *m, const char *data)
{
line_t *repeat = NULL;
assert(m != NULL);
if(data) {
if(*data == '\0')
data = NULL;
else {
/*
* If it's only white space, just store one space to
* save memory. You must store something since it may
* be a header line
*/
int iswhite = 1;
const char *p;
for(p = data; *p; p++)
if(((*p) & 0x80) || !isspace(*p)) {
iswhite = 0;
break;
}
if(iswhite) {
/*cli_dbgmsg("messageAddStr: empty line: '%s'\n", data);*/
data = " ";
}
}
}
if(m->body_first == NULL)
m->body_last = m->body_first = (text *)cli_malloc(sizeof(text));
else {
assert(m->body_last != NULL);
if((data == NULL) && (m->body_last->t_line == NULL))
/*
* Although this would save time and RAM, some
* phish signatures have been built which need the
* blank lines
*/
if(messageGetMimeType(m) != TEXT)
/* don't save two blank lines in sucession */
return 1;
m->body_last->t_next = (text *)cli_malloc(sizeof(text));
if(m->body_last->t_next == NULL) {
messageDedup(m);
m->body_last->t_next = (text *)cli_malloc(sizeof(text));
if(m->body_last->t_next == NULL) {
cli_errmsg("messageAddStr: out of memory\n");
return -1;
}
}
if(data && m->body_last->t_line && (strcmp(data, lineGetData(m->body_last->t_line)) == 0))
repeat = m->body_last->t_line;
m->body_last = m->body_last->t_next;
}
if(m->body_last == NULL) {
cli_errmsg("messageAddStr: out of memory\n");
return -1;
}
m->body_last->t_next = NULL;
if(data && *data) {
if(repeat)
m->body_last->t_line = lineLink(repeat);
else {
m->body_last->t_line = lineCreate(data);
if(m->body_last->t_line == NULL) {
messageDedup(m);
m->body_last->t_line = lineCreate(data);
if(m->body_last->t_line == NULL) {
cli_errmsg("messageAddStr: out of memory\n");
return -1;
}
}
/* cli_chomp(m->body_last->t_text); */
messageIsEncoding(m);
}
} else
m->body_last->t_line = NULL;
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
clamav-devel
|
586a5180287262070637c8943f2f7efd652e4a2c
| 72,703,532,932,222,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 |
bb11797 - fix invalid read in fuzzed mail file.
|
enum precedence precedence() const
{
return ref ? (*ref)->precedence() : DEFAULT_PRECEDENCE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
| 326,267,646,280,748,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]>
|
static int WSAGetLastError()
{
return errno;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
exiv2
|
ccde30afa8ca787a3fe17388a15977f107a53b72
| 273,820,469,772,865,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Avoid null pointer exception due to NULL return value from strchr.
This fixes #793.
(cherry picked from commit ae20c30805b330275b2aa0303a42e1f2bbd53661)
|
static unsigned readChunk_pHYs(LodePNGInfo* info, const unsigned char* data, size_t chunkLength)
{
if(chunkLength != 9) return 74; /*invalid pHYs chunk size*/
info->phys_defined = 1;
info->phys_x = 16777216u * data[0] + 65536u * data[1] + 256u * data[2] + data[3];
info->phys_y = 16777216u * data[4] + 65536u * data[5] + 256u * data[6] + data[7];
info->phys_unit = data[8];
return 0; /* OK */
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
FreeRDP
|
9fee4ae076b1ec97b97efb79ece08d1dab4df29a
| 328,154,495,687,569,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
rotate_point(GdkPoint point, double angle)
{
double sint, cost;
GdkPoint returned;
if (angle == 0.0)
return point;
sint = sin(DEG2RAD(-angle));
cost = cos(DEG2RAD(-angle));
returned.x = lround(cost*point.x - sint*point.y);
returned.y = lround(sint*point.x + cost*point.y);
return returned;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
gerbv
|
b2c2f8da851f2ac8079a91ce9d498d87ff96abcf
| 247,439,282,890,700,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Avoid direct access on array of unknown size
Be requiring a `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t` the `dgk_draw_amacro_funcs` can be sure of the length of the parameter array.
|
static int encode_lookup(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct qstr *name)
{
int len = name->len;
__be32 *p;
RESERVE_SPACE(8 + len);
WRITE32(OP_LOOKUP);
WRITE32(len);
WRITEMEM(name->name, len);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
| 108,463,408,565,326,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
int af_alg_cmsg_send(struct msghdr *msg, struct af_alg_control *con)
{
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_ALG)
continue;
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case ALG_SET_IV:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*con->iv)))
return -EINVAL;
con->iv = (void *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(con->iv->ivlen +
sizeof(*con->iv)))
return -EINVAL;
break;
case ALG_SET_OP:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(u32)))
return -EINVAL;
con->op = *(u32 *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
break;
case ALG_SET_AEAD_ASSOCLEN:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(u32)))
return -EINVAL;
con->aead_assoclen = *(u32 *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
9060cb719e61b685ec0102574e10337fa5f445ea
| 259,921,699,831,096,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
net: crypto set sk to NULL when af_alg_release.
KASAN has found use-after-free in sockfs_setattr.
The existed commit 6d8c50dcb029 ("socket: close race condition between sock_close()
and sockfs_setattr()") is to fix this simillar issue, but it seems to ignore
that crypto module forgets to set the sk to NULL after af_alg_release.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88837b956128 by task syz-executor0/4186
CPU: 2 PID: 4186 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted xxx + #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xca/0x13e
print_address_description+0x79/0x330
? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xf0
kasan_report+0x18a/0x2e0
? sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
? sock_register+0x2d0/0x2d0
notify_change+0x90c/0xd40
? chown_common+0x2ef/0x510
chown_common+0x2ef/0x510
? chmod_common+0x3b0/0x3b0
? __lock_is_held+0xbc/0x160
? __sb_start_write+0x13d/0x2b0
? __mnt_want_write+0x19a/0x250
do_fchownat+0x15c/0x190
? __ia32_sys_chmod+0x80/0x80
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
__x64_sys_fchownat+0xbf/0x160
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39a/0x5e0
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462589
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89
ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3
48 c7 c1 bc ff ff
ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb4b2c83c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000104
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000072bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462589
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb4b2c846bc
R13: 00000000004bc733 R14: 00000000006f5138 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 4185:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x14a/0x350
sk_prot_alloc+0xf6/0x290
sk_alloc+0x3d/0xc00
af_alg_accept+0x9e/0x670
hash_accept+0x4a3/0x650
__sys_accept4+0x306/0x5c0
__x64_sys_accept4+0x98/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 4184:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
kfree+0xeb/0x2f0
__sk_destruct+0x4e6/0x6a0
sk_destruct+0x48/0x70
__sk_free+0xa9/0x270
sk_free+0x2a/0x30
af_alg_release+0x5c/0x70
__sock_release+0xd3/0x280
sock_close+0x1a/0x20
__fput+0x27f/0x7f0
task_work_run+0x136/0x1b0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a7/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x461/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Syzkaller reproducer:
r0 = perf_event_open(&(0x7f0000000000)={0x0, 0x70, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_config_ext}, 0x0, 0x0,
0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0)
r1 = socket$alg(0x26, 0x5, 0x0)
getrusage(0x0, 0x0)
bind(r1, &(0x7f00000001c0)=@alg={0x26, 'hash\x00', 0x0, 0x0,
'sha256-ssse3\x00'}, 0x80)
r2 = accept(r1, 0x0, 0x0)
r3 = accept4$unix(r2, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
r4 = dup3(r3, r0, 0x0)
fchownat(r4, &(0x7f00000000c0)='\x00', 0x0, 0x0, 0x1000)
Fixes: 6d8c50dcb029 ("socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()")
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int migrate_misplaced_page(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int node)
{
pg_data_t *pgdat = NODE_DATA(node);
int isolated;
int nr_remaining;
LIST_HEAD(migratepages);
/*
* Don't migrate file pages that are mapped in multiple processes
* with execute permissions as they are probably shared libraries.
*/
if (page_mapcount(page) != 1 && page_is_file_cache(page) &&
(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
goto out;
/*
* Rate-limit the amount of data that is being migrated to a node.
* Optimal placement is no good if the memory bus is saturated and
* all the time is being spent migrating!
*/
if (numamigrate_update_ratelimit(pgdat, 1))
goto out;
isolated = numamigrate_isolate_page(pgdat, page);
if (!isolated)
goto out;
list_add(&page->lru, &migratepages);
nr_remaining = migrate_pages(&migratepages, alloc_misplaced_dst_page,
NULL, node, MIGRATE_ASYNC,
MR_NUMA_MISPLACED);
if (nr_remaining) {
if (!list_empty(&migratepages)) {
list_del(&page->lru);
dec_zone_page_state(page, NR_ISOLATED_ANON +
page_is_file_cache(page));
putback_lru_page(page);
}
isolated = 0;
} else
count_vm_numa_event(NUMA_PAGE_MIGRATE);
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&migratepages));
return isolated;
out:
put_page(page);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
42cb14b110a5698ccf26ce59c4441722605a3743
| 327,136,195,577,177,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
ceph::bufferlist AES128GCM_OnWireRxHandler::authenticated_decrypt_update_final(
ceph::bufferlist&& ciphertext_and_tag,
std::uint32_t alignment)
{
const auto cnt_len = ciphertext_and_tag.length();
ceph_assert(cnt_len >= AESGCM_TAG_LEN);
// decrypt optional data. Caller is obliged to provide only signature but it
// may supply ciphertext as well. Combining the update + final is reflected
// combined together.
ceph::bufferlist plainbl;
ceph::bufferlist auth_tag;
{
const auto tag_off = cnt_len - AESGCM_TAG_LEN;
ceph::bufferlist ciphertext;
ciphertext_and_tag.splice(0, tag_off, &ciphertext);
// the rest is the signature (a.k.a auth tag)
auth_tag = std::move(ciphertext_and_tag);
if (ciphertext.length()) {
plainbl = authenticated_decrypt_update(std::move(ciphertext), alignment);
}
}
// we need to ensure the tag is stored in continuous memory.
if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ectx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
AESGCM_TAG_LEN, auth_tag.c_str())) {
throw std::runtime_error("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl failed");
}
// I expect that 0 bytes will be appended. The call is supposed solely to
// authenticate the message.
{
int final_len = 0;
if (0 >= EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ectx.get(), nullptr, &final_len)) {
ldout(cct, 15) << __func__
<< " plainbl.length()=" << plainbl.length()
<< " final_len=" << final_len
<< dendl;
throw MsgAuthError();
} else {
ceph_assert_always(final_len == 0);
ceph_assert_always(plainbl.length() + final_len + AESGCM_TAG_LEN == cnt_len);
}
}
return plainbl;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-323"
] |
ceph
|
20b7bb685c5ea74c651ca1ea547ac66b0fee7035
| 278,328,570,821,652,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
msg/async/ProtocolV2: avoid AES-GCM nonce reuse vulnerabilities
The secure mode uses AES-128-GCM with 96-bit nonces consisting of a
32-bit counter followed by a 64-bit salt. The counter is incremented
after processing each frame, the salt is fixed for the duration of
the session. Both are initialized from the session key generated
during session negotiation, so the counter starts with essentially
a random value. It is allowed to wrap, and, after 2**32 frames, it
repeats, resulting in nonce reuse (the actual sequence numbers that
the messenger works with are 64-bit, so the session continues on).
Because of how GCM works, this completely breaks both confidentiality
and integrity aspects of the secure mode. A single nonce reuse reveals
the XOR of two plaintexts and almost completely reveals the subkey
used for producing authentication tags. After a few nonces get used
twice, all confidentiality and integrity goes out the window and the
attacker can potentially encrypt-authenticate plaintext of their
choice.
We can't easily change the nonce format to extend the counter to
64 bits (and possibly XOR it with a longer salt). Instead, just
remember the initial nonce and cut the session before it repeats,
forcing renegotiation.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Radoslaw Zarzynski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
Conflicts:
src/msg/async/ProtocolV2.h [ context: commit ed3ec4c01d17
("msg: Build target 'common' without using namespace in
headers") not in octopus ]
|
static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
int overflow_error = 0;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
if (res == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
8fa9d1ce28f3a894b104979df30d0b65e0f21107
| 203,443,726,186,405,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 |
improve fix #72558, while (u>=0) with unsigned int will always be true
|
bool CephXTicketHandler::have_key()
{
if (have_key_flag) {
have_key_flag = ceph_clock_now() < expires;
}
return have_key_flag;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
| 71,866,966,340,028,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
|
BYTE* crypto_cert_hash(X509* xcert, const char* hash, UINT32* length)
{
UINT32 fp_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
BYTE* fp;
const EVP_MD* md = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash);
if (!md)
return NULL;
if (!length)
return NULL;
if (!xcert)
return NULL;
fp = calloc(fp_len, sizeof(BYTE));
if (!fp)
return NULL;
if (X509_digest(xcert, md, fp, &fp_len) != 1)
{
free(fp);
return NULL;
}
*length = fp_len;
return fp;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
FreeRDP
|
8305349a943c68b1bc8c158f431dc607655aadea
| 258,407,869,867,369,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Fixed GHSL-2020-102 heap overflow
(cherry picked from commit 197b16cc15a12813c2e4fa2d6ae9cd9c4a57e581)
|
static int test_gf2m_moddiv(void)
{
BIGNUM *a = NULL, *b[2] = {NULL, NULL}, *c = NULL, *d = NULL;
BIGNUM *e = NULL, *f = NULL;
int i, j, st = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(a = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(b[0] = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(b[1] = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(c = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(d = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(e = BN_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(f = BN_new()))
goto err;
if (!(TEST_true(BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]))
&& TEST_true(BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]))))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < NUM0; i++) {
if (!(TEST_true(BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0))
&& TEST_true(BN_bntest_rand(c, 512, 0, 0))))
goto err;
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
if (!(TEST_true(BN_GF2m_mod_div(d, a, c, b[j], ctx))
&& TEST_true(BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, d, c, b[j], ctx))
&& TEST_true(BN_GF2m_mod_div(f, a, e, b[j], ctx))
/* Test that ((a/c)*c)/a = 1. */
&& TEST_BN_eq_one(f)))
goto err;
}
}
st = 1;
err:
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b[0]);
BN_free(b[1]);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(f);
return st;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
336923c0c8d705cb8af5216b29a205662db0d590
| 158,965,173,593,664,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
Fix a carry overflow bug in bn_sqr_comba4/8 for mips 32-bit targets
bn_sqr_comba8 does for instance compute a wrong result for the value:
a=0x4aaac919 62056c84 fba7334e 1a6be678 022181ba fd3aa878 899b2346 ee210f45
The correct result is:
r=0x15c72e32 605a3061 d11b1012 3c187483 6df96999 bd0c22ba d3e7d437 4724a82f
912c5e61 6a187efe 8f7c47fc f6945fe5 75be8e3d 97ed17d4 7950b465 3cb32899
but the actual result was:
r=0x15c72e32 605a3061 d11b1012 3c187483 6df96999 bd0c22ba d3e7d437 4724a82f
912c5e61 6a187efe 8f7c47fc f6945fe5 75be8e3c 97ed17d4 7950b465 3cb32899
so the forth word of the result was 0x75be8e3c but should have been
0x75be8e3d instead.
Likewise bn_sqr_comba4 has an identical bug for the same value as well:
a=0x022181ba fd3aa878 899b2346 ee210f45
correct result:
r=0x00048a69 9fe82f8b 62bd2ed1 88781335 75be8e3d 97ed17d4 7950b465 3cb32899
wrong result:
r=0x00048a69 9fe82f8b 62bd2ed1 88781335 75be8e3c 97ed17d4 7950b465 3cb32899
Fortunately the bn_mul_comba4/8 code paths are not affected.
Also the mips64 target does in fact not handle the carry propagation
correctly.
Example:
a=0x4aaac91900000000 62056c8400000000 fba7334e00000000 1a6be67800000000
022181ba00000000 fd3aa87800000000 899b234635dad283 ee210f4500000001
correct result:
r=0x15c72e32272c4471 392debf018c679c8 b85496496bf8254c d0204f36611e2be1
0cdb3db8f3c081d8 c94ba0e1bacc5061 191b83d47ff929f6 5be0aebfc13ae68d
3eea7a7fdf2f5758 42f7ec656cab3cb5 6a28095be34756f2 64f24687bf37de06
2822309cd1d292f9 6fa698c972372f09 771e97d3a868cda0 dc421e8a00000001
wrong result:
r=0x15c72e32272c4471 392debf018c679c8 b85496496bf8254c d0204f36611e2be1
0cdb3db8f3c081d8 c94ba0e1bacc5061 191b83d47ff929f6 5be0aebfc13ae68d
3eea7a7fdf2f5758 42f7ec656cab3cb5 6a28095be34756f2 64f24687bf37de06
2822309cd1d292f8 6fa698c972372f09 771e97d3a868cda0 dc421e8a00000001
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/17258)
|
void blk_put_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
kobject_put(&q->kobj);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
| 52,278,555,164,697,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
register_on_commit_action(Oid relid, OnCommitAction action)
{
OnCommitItem *oc;
MemoryContext oldcxt;
/*
* We needn't bother registering the relation unless there is an ON COMMIT
* action we need to take.
*/
if (action == ONCOMMIT_NOOP || action == ONCOMMIT_PRESERVE_ROWS)
return;
oldcxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(CacheMemoryContext);
oc = (OnCommitItem *) palloc(sizeof(OnCommitItem));
oc->relid = relid;
oc->oncommit = action;
oc->creating_subid = GetCurrentSubTransactionId();
oc->deleting_subid = InvalidSubTransactionId;
on_commits = lcons(oc, on_commits);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcxt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
postgres
|
5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a
| 96,894,476,482,547,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062
|
static const char *parse_interpreter(const char *cmd)
{
static char buf[100];
char *p, *opt;
int n, fd;
/* don't even try a .exe */
n = strlen(cmd);
if (n >= 4 && !strcasecmp(cmd+n-4, ".exe"))
return NULL;
fd = open(cmd, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return NULL;
n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
close(fd);
if (n < 4) /* at least '#!/x' and not error */
return NULL;
if (buf[0] != '#' || buf[1] != '!')
return NULL;
buf[n] = '\0';
p = buf + strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
if (!*p)
return NULL;
*p = '\0';
if (!(p = strrchr(buf+2, '/')) && !(p = strrchr(buf+2, '\\')))
return NULL;
/* strip options */
if ((opt = strchr(p+1, ' ')))
*opt = '\0';
return p+1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
git
|
6d8684161ee9c03bed5cb69ae76dfdddb85a0003
| 50,555,701,919,846,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
mingw: fix quoting of arguments
We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an
argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to
be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are
followed by a double-quote character.
We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument
ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a
double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped!
The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can
turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument
that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows
subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being
mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted
submodule URL during a recursive clone.
Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a
backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example,
`test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be.
To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about
and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends
in a backslash.
This addresses CVE-2019-1350.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
|
void sequencer_unload(void)
{
vfree(queue);
vfree(iqueue);
queue = iqueue = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9
| 232,640,367,932,837,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
convert_indexed_contact_property_to_updatexml_physical_address (ESoapMessage *message,
const gchar *name,
const gchar *uri_element,
const gchar *value,
const gchar *prefix,
const gchar *element_name,
const gchar *key)
{
gchar * fielduri = NULL;
gboolean delete_field = FALSE;
if (!value || g_strcmp0 (value, "") == 0)
delete_field = TRUE;
fielduri = g_strconcat (name, ":", uri_element, NULL);
e_ews_message_start_set_indexed_item_field (message, fielduri , prefix, "Contact", key, delete_field);
if (!delete_field)
{
e_soap_message_start_element (message, element_name, NULL, NULL);
e_soap_message_start_element (message, "Entry", NULL, NULL);
e_soap_message_add_attribute (message, "Key", key, NULL, NULL);
e_ews_message_write_string_parameter (message, uri_element, NULL, value);
e_soap_message_end_element (message);
e_soap_message_end_element (message);
}
e_ews_message_end_set_indexed_item_field (message, delete_field);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 315,364,937,146,235,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
placeholder *clone() const override { return new holder(value_); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
| 292,195,762,183,302,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Fix #122
|
virDomainLeaseDefFormat(virBufferPtr buf,
virDomainLeaseDefPtr def)
{
virBufferAddLit(buf, "<lease>\n");
virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, 2);
virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<lockspace>%s</lockspace>\n", def->lockspace);
virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<key>%s</key>\n", def->key);
virBufferEscapeString(buf, "<target path='%s'", def->path);
if (def->offset)
virBufferAsprintf(buf, " offset='%llu'", def->offset);
virBufferAddLit(buf, "/>\n");
virBufferAdjustIndent(buf, -2);
virBufferAddLit(buf, "</lease>\n");
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-212"
] |
libvirt
|
a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979
| 272,623,553,598,174,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <[email protected]>
|
static inline void rb_event_discard(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
if (event->type_len == RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_EXTEND)
event = skip_time_extend(event);
/* array[0] holds the actual length for the discarded event */
event->array[0] = rb_event_data_length(event) - RB_EVNT_HDR_SIZE;
event->type_len = RINGBUF_TYPE_PADDING;
/* time delta must be non zero */
if (!event->time_delta)
event->time_delta = 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
linux-stable
|
59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
| 27,979,474,758,607,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
apr_status_t h2_beam_destroy(h2_bucket_beam *beam)
{
apr_pool_cleanup_kill(beam->pool, beam, beam_pool_cleanup);
return beam_cleanup(beam, 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
mod_h2
|
83a2e3866918ce6567a683eb4c660688d047ee81
| 203,723,433,533,381,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
* fixes a race condition where aborting streams triggers an unnecessary timeout.
|
static int snd_seq_ioctl_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs = arg;
int result = -ENXIO;
struct snd_seq_client *receiver = NULL, *sender = NULL;
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport = NULL, *dport = NULL;
if ((receiver = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->dest.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sender = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->sender.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(sender, subs->sender.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((dport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(receiver, subs->dest.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
result = check_subscription_permission(client, sport, dport, subs);
if (result < 0)
goto __end;
result = snd_seq_port_disconnect(client, sender, sport, receiver, dport, subs);
if (! result) /* broadcast announce */
snd_seq_client_notify_subscription(SNDRV_SEQ_ADDRESS_SUBSCRIBERS, 0,
subs, SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_PORT_UNSUBSCRIBED);
__end:
if (sport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(sport);
if (dport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(dport);
if (sender)
snd_seq_client_unlock(sender);
if (receiver)
snd_seq_client_unlock(receiver);
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
71105998845fb012937332fe2e806d443c09e026
| 178,260,939,929,583,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
void delayed_work_timer_fn(unsigned long __data)
{
struct delayed_work *dwork = (struct delayed_work *)__data;
/* should have been called from irqsafe timer with irq already off */
__queue_work(dwork->cpu, dwork->wq, &dwork->work);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tip
|
dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1
| 190,033,013,398,416,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xing Gao <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Cochran <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Marek <[email protected]>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Olof Johansson <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
congestion_control_enabled(void)
{
const or_options_t *opts = NULL;
tor_assert_nonfatal_once(in_main_thread());
opts = get_options();
/* If the user has set "__AlwaysCongesttionControl",
* then always try to negotiate congestion control, regardless
* of consensus param. This is to be used for testing and sbws.
*
* Note that we do *not* allow disabling congestion control
* if the consensus says to use it, as this is bad for queueing
* and fairness. */
if (opts->AlwaysCongestionControl)
return 1;
return cc_alg != CC_ALG_SENDME;
}
| 0 |
[] |
tor
|
b0496d40197dd5b4fb7b694c1410082d4e34dda6
| 226,845,317,677,745,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Fix for RTT calculation hang during congestion control.
Only cache RTT on explicit stalls; Only use this cache for the
RTT decrease case. Otherwise use only local circuit RTT state for clock jump
checks.
|
static int setup_rx_descbuffer(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc,
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
dma_addr_t dmaaddr;
struct sk_buff *skb;
B43_WARN_ON(ring->tx);
skb = __dev_alloc_skb(ring->rx_buffersize, gfp_flags);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return -ENOMEM;
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
dmaaddr = map_descbuffer(ring, skb->data, ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
if (b43_dma_mapping_error(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0)) {
/* ugh. try to realloc in zone_dma */
gfp_flags |= GFP_DMA;
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
skb = __dev_alloc_skb(ring->rx_buffersize, gfp_flags);
if (unlikely(!skb))
return -ENOMEM;
b43_poison_rx_buffer(ring, skb);
dmaaddr = map_descbuffer(ring, skb->data,
ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
if (b43_dma_mapping_error(ring, dmaaddr, ring->rx_buffersize, 0)) {
b43err(ring->dev->wl, "RX DMA buffer allocation failed\n");
dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);
return -EIO;
}
}
meta->skb = skb;
meta->dmaaddr = dmaaddr;
ring->ops->fill_descriptor(ring, desc, dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize, 0, 0, 0);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a
| 91,462,858,312,553,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static int __cil_fill_expr_helper(struct cil_tree_node *current, enum cil_flavor flavor, struct cil_list *expr)
{
int rc = SEPOL_ERR;
enum cil_flavor op;
op = __cil_get_expr_operator_flavor(current->data);
rc = cil_verify_expr_syntax(current, op, flavor);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
if (op != CIL_NONE) {
cil_list_append(expr, CIL_OP, (void *)op);
current = current->next;
}
for (;current != NULL; current = current->next) {
rc = __cil_fill_expr(current, flavor, expr);
if (rc != SEPOL_OK) {
goto exit;
}
}
return SEPOL_OK;
exit:
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
selinux
|
340f0eb7f3673e8aacaf0a96cbfcd4d12a405521
| 84,649,531,932,486,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
libsepol/cil: Check for statements not allowed in optional blocks
While there are some checks for invalid statements in an optional
block when resolving the AST, there are no checks when building the
AST.
OSS-Fuzz found the following policy which caused a null dereference
in cil_tree_get_next_path().
(blockinherit b3)
(sid SID)
(sidorder(SID))
(optional o
(ibpkeycon :(1 0)s)
(block b3
(filecon""block())
(filecon""block())))
The problem is that the blockinherit copies block b3 before
the optional block is disabled. When the optional is disabled,
block b3 is deleted along with everything else in the optional.
Later, when filecon statements with the same path are found an
error message is produced and in trying to find out where the block
was copied from, the reference to the deleted block is used. The
error handling code assumes (rightly) that if something was copied
from a block then that block should still exist.
It is clear that in-statements, blocks, and macros cannot be in an
optional, because that allows nodes to be copied from the optional
block to somewhere outside even though the optional could be disabled
later. When optionals are disabled the AST is reset and the
resolution is restarted at the point of resolving macro calls, so
anything resolved before macro calls will never be re-resolved.
This includes tunableifs, in-statements, blockinherits,
blockabstracts, and macro definitions. Tunable declarations also
cannot be in an optional block because they are needed to resolve
tunableifs. It should be fine to allow blockinherit statements in
an optional, because that is copying nodes from outside the optional
to the optional and if the optional is later disabled, everything
will be deleted anyway.
Check and quit with an error if a tunable declaration, in-statement,
block, blockabstract, or macro definition is found within an
optional when either building or resolving the AST.
Signed-off-by: James Carter <[email protected]>
|
static LogEst whereSortingCost(
WhereInfo *pWInfo,
LogEst nRow,
int nOrderBy,
int nSorted
){
/* TUNING: Estimated cost of a full external sort, where N is
** the number of rows to sort is:
**
** cost = (3.0 * N * log(N)).
**
** Or, if the order-by clause has X terms but only the last Y
** terms are out of order, then block-sorting will reduce the
** sorting cost to:
**
** cost = (3.0 * N * log(N)) * (Y/X)
**
** The (Y/X) term is implemented using stack variable rScale
** below.
*/
LogEst rScale, rSortCost;
assert( nOrderBy>0 && 66==sqlite3LogEst(100) );
rScale = sqlite3LogEst((nOrderBy-nSorted)*100/nOrderBy) - 66;
rSortCost = nRow + rScale + 16;
/* Multiple by log(M) where M is the number of output rows.
** Use the LIMIT for M if it is smaller. Or if this sort is for
** a DISTINCT operator, M will be the number of distinct output
** rows, so fudge it downwards a bit.
*/
if( (pWInfo->wctrlFlags & WHERE_USE_LIMIT)!=0 && pWInfo->iLimit<nRow ){
nRow = pWInfo->iLimit;
}else if( (pWInfo->wctrlFlags & WHERE_WANT_DISTINCT) ){
/* TUNING: In the sort for a DISTINCT operator, assume that the DISTINCT
** reduces the number of output rows by a factor of 2 */
if( nRow>10 ){ nRow -= 10; assert( 10==sqlite3LogEst(2) ); }
}
rSortCost += estLog(nRow);
return rSortCost;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-129"
] |
sqlite
|
effc07ec9c6e08d3bd17665f8800054770f8c643
| 118,489,738,246,870,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Fix the whereKeyStats() routine (part of STAT4 processing only) so that it
is able to cope with row-value comparisons against the primary key index
of a WITHOUT ROWID table.
[forum:/forumpost/3607259d3c|Forum post 3607259d3c].
FossilOrigin-Name: 2a6f761864a462de5c2d5bc666b82fb0b7e124a03443cd1482620dde344b34bb
|
static int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */
char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
char attribute[1024];
char value[1024];
char common_name[1024];
char cn_str[1024];
char buf[64];
EAP_HANDLER *handler = NULL;
X509 *client_cert;
X509_CINF *client_inf;
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ext_list;
X509 *issuer_cert;
SSL *ssl;
int err, depth, lookup, loc;
EAP_TLS_CONF *conf;
int my_ok = ok;
REQUEST *request;
ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL;
#endif
client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
lookup = depth;
/*
* Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
* issuing cert.
*/
if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
/*
* Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
* and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
*/
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
handler = (EAP_HANDLER *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 0);
request = handler->request;
conf = (EAP_TLS_CONF *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 1);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 2);
#endif
/*
* Get the Serial Number
*/
buf[0] = '\0';
sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
/*
* For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
* we're at the client or issuing certificate.
*/
if ((lookup <= 1) && sn && (sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
char *p = buf;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
p += 2;
}
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Expiration Date
*/
buf[0] = '\0';
asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
if ((lookup <= 1) && asn_time && (asn_time->length < sizeof(buf))) {
memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Subject & Issuer
*/
subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
sizeof(subject));
subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && subject[0] && (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
sizeof(issuer));
issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] && (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
}
/*
* Get the Common Name, if there is a subject.
*/
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
if ((lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] && subject[0] && (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
}
#ifdef GEN_EMAIL
/*
* Get the RFC822 Subject Alternative Name
*/
loc = X509_get_ext_by_NID(client_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0);
if (lookup <= 1 && loc >= 0) {
X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *names = NULL;
int i;
if ((ext = X509_get_ext(client_cert, loc)) &&
(names = X509V3_EXT_d2i(ext))) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
switch (name->type) {
case GEN_EMAIL:
if (ASN1_STRING_length(name->d.rfc822Name) >= MAX_STRING_LEN)
break;
pairadd(&handler->certs,
pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SAN_EMAIL][lookup],
(char *)ASN1_STRING_data(name->d.rfc822Name), T_OP_SET));
break;
default:
/* XXX TODO handle other SAN types */
break;
}
}
}
if (names != NULL)
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(names);
}
#endif /* GEN_EMAIL */
/*
* If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK.
*/
if (!my_ok &&
(conf->allow_expired_crl) &&
(err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) {
my_ok = 1;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 );
}
if (!my_ok) {
const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
"Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
return my_ok;
}
if (lookup == 0) {
client_inf = client_cert->cert_info;
ext_list = client_inf->extensions;
} else {
ext_list = NULL;
}
/*
* Grab the X509 extensions, and create attributes out of them.
* For laziness, we re-use the OpenSSL names
*/
if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list) > 0) {
int i, len;
char *p;
BIO *out;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
strlcpy(attribute, "TLS-Client-Cert-", sizeof(attribute));
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(ext_list); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(ext_list, i);
obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(out, obj);
len = BIO_read(out, attribute + 16 , sizeof(attribute) - 16 - 1);
if (len <= 0) continue;
attribute[16 + len] = '\0';
X509V3_EXT_print(out, ext, 0, 0);
len = BIO_read(out, value, sizeof(value) - 1);
if (len <= 0) continue;
value[len] = '\0';
/*
* Mash the OpenSSL name to our name, and
* create the attribute.
*/
for (p = attribute + 16; *p != '\0'; p++) {
if (*p == ' ') *p = '-';
}
vp = pairmake(attribute, value, T_OP_ADD);
if (vp) {
pairadd(&handler->certs, vp);
debug_pair_list(vp);
}
}
BIO_free_all(out);
}
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
radlog(L_ERR, "issuer= %s\n", issuer);
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
radlog(L_ERR, "notBefore=");
#if 0
ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
#endif
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
radlog(L_ERR, "notAfter=");
#if 0
ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
#endif
break;
}
/*
* If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional
* checks.
*/
if (depth == 0) {
/*
* If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer
* against the specified value and fail
* verification if they don't match.
*/
if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
(strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
my_ok = 0;
}
/*
* If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the
* cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the
* previous checks passed.
*/
if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) {
if (!radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), conf->check_cert_cn, handler->request, NULL)) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls (%s): xlat failed.",
conf->check_cert_cn);
/* if this fails, fail the verification */
my_ok = 0;
} else {
RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
my_ok = 0;
}
}
} /* check_cert_cn */
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){
RDEBUG2("--> Starting OCSP Request");
if (X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert) != 1) {
radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name);
} else {
my_ok = ocsp_check(ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf);
}
}
#endif
while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
char filename[256];
int fd;
FILE *fp;
snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
fd = mkstemp(filename);
if (fd < 0) {
RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
break;
}
fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (!fp) {
RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
filename, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
fclose(fp);
RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
goto do_unlink;
}
fclose(fp);
if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
"TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
filename, T_OP_SET)) {
RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
goto do_unlink;
}
RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
request, 1, NULL, 0,
EXEC_TIMEOUT,
request->packet->vps,
NULL, 1) != 0) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
my_ok = 0;
} else {
RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
}
do_unlink:
unlink(filename);
break;
}
} /* depth == 0 */
if (debug_flag > 0) {
RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", handler->identity);
RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
}
return my_ok;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
freeradius-server
|
5e698b407dcac2bc45cf03484bac4398109d25c3
| 78,845,657,668,554,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 363 |
Set X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
|
bool_on_stack(cctx_T *cctx)
{
type_T *type;
type = get_type_on_stack(cctx, 0);
if (type == &t_bool)
return OK;
if (type == &t_any
|| type == &t_unknown
|| type == &t_number
|| type == &t_number_bool)
// Number 0 and 1 are OK to use as a bool. "any" could also be a bool.
// This requires a runtime type check.
return generate_COND2BOOL(cctx);
return need_type(type, &t_bool, -1, 0, cctx, FALSE, FALSE);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-122"
] |
vim
|
5f25c3855071bd7e26255c68bf458b1b5cf92f39
| 61,066,450,752,614,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
patch 8.2.4049: Vim9: reading before the start of the line with "$"
Problem: Vim9: reading before the start of the line with "$" by itself.
Solution: Do not subtract one when reporting the error.
|
Status explain(OperationContext* opCtx,
const OpMsgRequest& request,
ExplainOptions::Verbosity verbosity,
BSONObjBuilder* out) const override {
std::string dbname = request.getDatabase().toString();
const BSONObj& cmdObj = request.body;
// Acquire locks and resolve possible UUID. The RAII object is optional, because in the case
// of a view, the locks need to be released.
boost::optional<AutoGetCollectionForReadCommand> ctx;
ctx.emplace(opCtx,
CommandHelpers::parseNsOrUUID(dbname, cmdObj),
AutoGetCollection::ViewMode::kViewsPermitted);
const auto nss = ctx->getNss();
const ExtensionsCallbackReal extensionsCallback(opCtx, &nss);
auto parsedDistinct =
uassertStatusOK(ParsedDistinct::parse(opCtx, nss, cmdObj, extensionsCallback, true));
if (ctx->getView()) {
// Relinquish locks. The aggregation command will re-acquire them.
ctx.reset();
auto viewAggregation = parsedDistinct.asAggregationCommand();
if (!viewAggregation.isOK()) {
return viewAggregation.getStatus();
}
auto viewAggRequest =
AggregationRequest::parseFromBSON(nss, viewAggregation.getValue(), verbosity);
if (!viewAggRequest.isOK()) {
return viewAggRequest.getStatus();
}
return runAggregate(
opCtx, nss, viewAggRequest.getValue(), viewAggregation.getValue(), *out);
}
Collection* const collection = ctx->getCollection();
auto executor =
uassertStatusOK(getExecutorDistinct(opCtx, collection, nss.ns(), &parsedDistinct));
Explain::explainStages(executor.get(), collection, verbosity, out);
return Status::OK();
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
d315547544d7146b93a8e6e94cc4b88cd0d19c95
| 129,405,377,919,576,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
SERVER-38275 ban explain with UUID
|
static void lsr_translate_anim_value(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, SMIL_AnimateValue *val, u32 coded_type)
{
switch (val->type) {
case SVG_StrokeDashArray_datatype:
//if list of fixed only
if (coded_type == 8) {
SVG_StrokeDashArray *da;
GF_List *l = (GF_List *)val->value;
u32 i;
GF_SAFEALLOC(da, SVG_StrokeDashArray);
if (!da) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
return;
}
da->array.count = gf_list_count(l);
if (!da->array.count) {
da->type = SVG_STROKEDASHARRAY_INHERIT;
} else {
da->type = SVG_STROKEDASHARRAY_ARRAY;
da->array.vals = (Fixed *) gf_malloc(sizeof(Fixed)*da->array.count);
da->array.units = (u8 *) gf_malloc(sizeof(u8)*da->array.count);
if (!da->array.vals || !da->array.units) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
return;
}
for (i=0; i<da->array.count; i++) {
Fixed *v = (Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, i);
da->array.vals[i] = *v;
da->array.units[i] = 0;
gf_free(v);
}
}
gf_list_del(l);
val->value = da;
return;
}
break;
case SVG_ViewBox_datatype:
//if list of fixed only
if (coded_type == 8) {
SVG_ViewBox *vb;
GF_List *l = (GF_List *)val->value;
GF_SAFEALLOC(vb, SVG_ViewBox);
if (!vb) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
return;
}
if (gf_list_count(l)==4) {
vb->x = * ((Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, 0));
vb->y = * ((Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, 1));
vb->width = * ((Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, 2));
vb->height = * ((Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, 3));
}
while (gf_list_count(l)) {
Fixed *v = (Fixed *)gf_list_last(l);
gf_free(v);
gf_list_rem_last(l);
}
gf_list_del(l);
val->value = vb;
return;
}
break;
case SVG_Coordinates_datatype:
{
SVG_Coordinates *coords;
if (coded_type==1) {
GF_List *l = gf_list_new();
/*allocated value is already an SVG number*/
gf_list_add(l, val->value);
coords = (SVG_Coordinates*)gf_malloc(sizeof(SVG_Coordinates));
if (!coords) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
} else {
*coords = l;
val->value = coords;
}
return;
} else if (coded_type==8) {
GF_List *l = (GF_List *)val->value;
u32 i, count = gf_list_count(l);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
SVG_Coordinate *c;
Fixed *v = (Fixed *)gf_list_get(l, i);
c = (SVG_Coordinate*)gf_malloc(sizeof(SVG_Coordinate));
if (!c) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
} else {
c->type = SVG_NUMBER_VALUE;
c->value = *v;
}
gf_free(v);
gf_list_rem(l, i);
if (c)
gf_list_insert(l, c, i);
}
coords = (SVG_Coordinates*)gf_malloc(sizeof(SVG_Coordinates));
if (!coords) {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
} else {
*coords = (GF_List *) val->value;
val->value = coords;
}
return;
}
}
break;
case SVG_Motion_datatype:
if (coded_type==9) {
GF_Matrix2D *mat;
SVG_Point *pt = (SVG_Point *)val->value;
GF_SAFEALLOC(mat, GF_Matrix2D);
if (mat) {
gf_mx2d_init(*mat);
mat->m[2] = pt->x;
mat->m[5] = pt->y;
val->value = mat;
} else {
lsr->last_error = GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
gf_free(pt);
return;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
lsr_delete_anim_value(lsr, val, coded_type);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
gpac
|
faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096
| 30,565,671,311,536,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 130 |
fixed #2213
|
//! Load gif file, using ImageMagick or GraphicsMagick's external tools.
/**
\param filename Filename to read data from.
**/
CImgList<T>& load_gif_external(const char *const filename) {
if (!filename)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimglist_instance
"load_gif_external(): Specified filename is (null).",
cimglist_instance);
cimg::fclose(cimg::fopen(filename,"rb")); // Check if file exists
if (!_load_gif_external(filename,false))
if (!_load_gif_external(filename,true))
try { assign(CImg<T>().load_other(filename)); } catch (CImgException&) { assign(); }
if (is_empty())
throw CImgIOException(_cimglist_instance
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 219,470,547,311,104,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
.
|
dump_routerlist_mem_usage(int severity)
{
uint64_t livedescs = 0;
uint64_t olddescs = 0;
if (!routerlist)
return;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerlist->routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
livedescs += r->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerlist->old_routers, signed_descriptor_t *, sd,
olddescs += sd->signed_descriptor_len);
log(severity, LD_DIR,
"In %d live descriptors: "U64_FORMAT" bytes. "
"In %d old descriptors: "U64_FORMAT" bytes.",
smartlist_len(routerlist->routers), U64_PRINTF_ARG(livedescs),
smartlist_len(routerlist->old_routers), U64_PRINTF_ARG(olddescs));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
tor
|
308f6dad20675c42b29862f4269ad1fbfb00dc9a
| 311,226,250,377,559,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit
Tor's and OpenSSL's current design guarantee that there are other leaks,
but this one is likely to be more easily exploitable, and is easy to fix.
|
static int dsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
{
DSA_SIG *dsa_sig;
const unsigned char *p;
if (!sig) {
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
p = sig->data;
dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &p, sig->length);
if (dsa_sig) {
int rv = 0;
size_t buf_len = 0;
unsigned char *m = NULL;
update_buflen(dsa_sig->r, &buf_len);
update_buflen(dsa_sig->s, &buf_len);
m = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
if (m == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIG_PRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "r: ", dsa_sig->r, m, indent))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "s: ", dsa_sig->s, m, indent))
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(m);
DSA_SIG_free(dsa_sig);
return rv;
}
return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
ab4a81f69ec88d06c9d8de15326b9296d7f498ed
| 245,429,661,636,279,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Remove broken DSA private key workarounds.
Remove old code that handled various invalid DSA formats in ancient
software.
This also fixes a double free bug when parsing malformed DSA private keys.
Thanks to Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) for discovering this bug using
libFuzzer.
CVE-2016-0705
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <[email protected]>
|
apr_status_t h2_mplx_pop_task(h2_mplx *m, h2_task **ptask)
{
apr_status_t rv = APR_EOF;
*ptask = NULL;
ap_assert(m);
ap_assert(m->lock);
if (APR_SUCCESS != (rv = apr_thread_mutex_lock(m->lock))) {
return rv;
}
if (m->aborted) {
rv = APR_EOF;
}
else {
*ptask = next_stream_task(m);
rv = (*ptask != NULL && !h2_iq_empty(m->q))? APR_EAGAIN : APR_SUCCESS;
}
if (APR_EAGAIN != rv) {
m->is_registered = 0; /* h2_workers will discard this mplx */
}
H2_MPLX_LEAVE(m);
return rv;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-444"
] |
mod_h2
|
825de6a46027b2f4c30d7ff5a0c8b852d639c207
| 185,299,704,042,264,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
* Fixed keepalives counter on slave connections.
|
enum_field_types field_type_for_temporal_comparison(const Item *other) const
{
if (cmp_type() == TIME_RESULT)
{
if (other->cmp_type() == TIME_RESULT)
return Field::field_type_merge(field_type(), other->field_type());
else
return field_type();
}
else
{
if (other->cmp_type() == TIME_RESULT)
return other->field_type();
DBUG_ASSERT(0); // Two non-temporal data types, we should not get to here
return MYSQL_TYPE_DATETIME;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
| 108,793,612,182,775,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]>
|
static int session_headers_add_pad(nghttp2_session *session,
nghttp2_frame *frame) {
int rv;
ssize_t padded_payloadlen;
nghttp2_active_outbound_item *aob;
nghttp2_bufs *framebufs;
size_t padlen;
size_t max_payloadlen;
aob = &session->aob;
framebufs = &aob->framebufs;
max_payloadlen = nghttp2_min(NGHTTP2_MAX_PAYLOADLEN,
frame->hd.length + NGHTTP2_MAX_PADLEN);
padded_payloadlen =
session_call_select_padding(session, frame, max_payloadlen);
if (nghttp2_is_fatal((int)padded_payloadlen)) {
return (int)padded_payloadlen;
}
padlen = (size_t)padded_payloadlen - frame->hd.length;
DEBUGF("send: padding selected: payloadlen=%zd, padlen=%zu\n",
padded_payloadlen, padlen);
rv = nghttp2_frame_add_pad(framebufs, &frame->hd, padlen, 0);
if (rv != 0) {
return rv;
}
frame->headers.padlen = padlen;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
nghttp2
|
0a6ce87c22c69438ecbffe52a2859c3a32f1620f
| 59,682,663,175,123,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
Add nghttp2_option_set_max_outbound_ack
|
Field *Field_blob::new_key_field(MEM_ROOT *root, TABLE *new_table,
uchar *new_ptr, uint32 length,
uchar *new_null_ptr, uint new_null_bit)
{
Field_varstring *res= new (root) Field_varstring(new_ptr, length, 2,
new_null_ptr,
new_null_bit, Field::NONE,
&field_name,
table->s, charset());
res->init(new_table);
return res;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 281,178,793,253,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
bool Curl_meets_timecondition(struct Curl_easy *data, time_t timeofdoc)
{
if((timeofdoc == 0) || (data->set.timevalue == 0))
return TRUE;
switch(data->set.timecondition) {
case CURL_TIMECOND_IFMODSINCE:
default:
if(timeofdoc <= data->set.timevalue) {
infof(data,
"The requested document is not new enough");
data->info.timecond = TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
break;
case CURL_TIMECOND_IFUNMODSINCE:
if(timeofdoc >= data->set.timevalue) {
infof(data,
"The requested document is not old enough");
data->info.timecond = TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
curl
|
620ea21410030a9977396b4661806bc187231b79
| 234,742,286,586,030,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
transfer: redirects to other protocols or ports clear auth
... unless explicitly permitted.
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27774.html
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Closes #8748
|
static inline struct htx_blk *htx_add_trailer(struct htx *htx, const struct ist name,
const struct ist value)
{
struct htx_blk *blk;
/* FIXME: check name.len (< 256B) and value.len (< 1MB) */
blk = htx_add_blk(htx, HTX_BLK_TLR, name.len + value.len);
if (!blk)
return NULL;
blk->info += (value.len << 8) + name.len;
ist2bin_lc(htx_get_blk_ptr(htx, blk), name);
memcpy(htx_get_blk_ptr(htx, blk) + name.len, value.ptr, value.len);
return blk;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
haproxy
|
3b69886f7dcc3cfb3d166309018e6cfec9ce2c95
| 330,050,885,029,992,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
BUG/MAJOR: htx: fix missing header name length check in htx_add_header/trailer
Ori Hollander of JFrog Security reported that htx_add_header() and
htx_add_trailer() were missing a length check on the header name. While
this does not allow to overwrite any memory area, it results in bits of
the header name length to slip into the header value length and may
result in forging certain header names on the input. The sad thing here
is that a FIXME comment was present suggesting to add the required length
checks :-(
The injected headers are visible to the HTTP internals and to the config
rules, so haproxy will generally stay synchronized with the server. But
there is one exception which is the content-length header field, because
it is already deduplicated on the input, but before being indexed. As
such, injecting a content-length header after the deduplication stage
may be abused to present a different, shorter one on the other side and
help build a request smuggling attack, or even maybe a response splitting
attack. CVE-2021-40346 was assigned to this problem.
As a mitigation measure, it is sufficient to verify that no more than
one such header is present in any message, which is normally the case
thanks to the duplicate checks:
http-request deny if { req.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
http-response deny if { res.hdr_cnt(content-length) gt 1 }
This must be backported to all HTX-enabled versions, hence as far as 2.0.
In 2.3 and earlier, the functions are in src/htx.c instead.
Many thanks to Ori for his work and his responsible report!
|
load_font(
XOC oc)
{
XOCGenericPart *gen = XOC_GENERIC(oc);
FontSet font_set = gen->font_set;
int num = gen->font_set_num;
for ( ; num-- > 0; font_set++) {
if (font_set->font_name == NULL)
continue;
if (load_fontset_data (oc, font_set) != True)
return False;
#ifndef TESTVERSION
if(load_fontdata(oc, font_set->font_data,
font_set->font_data_count) != True)
return False;
if(load_fontdata(oc, font_set->substitute,
font_set->substitute_num) != True)
return False;
#endif
/* Add 1996.05.20 */
if( oc->core.orientation == XOMOrientation_TTB_RTL ||
oc->core.orientation == XOMOrientation_TTB_LTR ){
if (font_set->vpart_initialize == 0) {
load_fontdata(oc, font_set->vmap, font_set->vmap_num);
load_fontdata(oc, (FontData) font_set->vrotate,
font_set->vrotate_num);
font_set->vpart_initialize = 1;
}
}
if (font_set->font->min_byte1 || font_set->font->max_byte1)
font_set->is_xchar2b = True;
else
font_set->is_xchar2b = False;
}
return True;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
libx11
|
acdaaadcb3d85c61fd43669fc5dddf0f8c3f911d
| 72,016,872,277,597,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
Fix an integer overflow in init_om()
CVE-2020-14363
This can lead to a double free later, as reported by Jayden Rivers.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <[email protected]>
|
QUInt16(const uint16_t v) : value(v) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-908",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
ace0c15a22f7f054abcc1f53eabbcb0a1239a9e2
| 60,698,451,866,556,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Default initialize fixed point Eigen types.
In certain cases, tensors are filled with default values of the type. But, for these fixed point types, these values were uninitialized. Thus, we would have uninitialized memory access bugs, some of which were caught by MSAN.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 344101137
Change-Id: I14555fda74dca3b5f1582da9008901937e3f14e2
|
static int vsock_getname(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *addr, int *addr_len, int peer)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
struct sockaddr_vm *vm_addr;
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (peer) {
if (sock->state != SS_CONNECTED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
vm_addr = &vsk->remote_addr;
} else {
vm_addr = &vsk->local_addr;
}
if (!vm_addr) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* sys_getsockname() and sys_getpeername() pass us a
* MAX_SOCK_ADDR-sized buffer and don't set addr_len. Unfortunately
* that macro is defined in socket.c instead of .h, so we hardcode its
* value here.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*vm_addr) > 128);
memcpy(addr, vm_addr, sizeof(*vm_addr));
*addr_len = sizeof(*vm_addr);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
| 152,940,054,358,128,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
if (err)
return err;
if (scontext_len > len) {
err = -ERANGE;
goto out_len;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
err = -EFAULT;
out_len:
if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
kfree(scontext);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548
| 135,660,570,986,069,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
const CString& CUser::GetCleanUserName() const { return m_sCleanUserName; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
znc
|
64613bc8b6b4adf1e32231f9844d99cd512b8973
| 84,636,547,140,411,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917
|
void force_vm_exit(const cpumask_t *mask)
{
smp_call_function_many(mask, exit_vm_noop, NULL, true);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
e8180dcaa8470ceca21109f143876fdcd9fe050a
| 52,300,283,805,278,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <[email protected]>
|
gs_main_lib_open(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *file_name, ref * pfile)
{
/* This is a separate procedure only to avoid tying up */
/* extra stack space while running the file. */
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
#define maxfn 2048
char fn[maxfn];
uint len;
return lib_file_open(&minst->lib_path, imemory,
NULL, /* Don't check permissions here, because permlist
isn't ready running init files. */
file_name, strlen(file_name), fn, maxfn, &len, pfile);
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d
| 274,127,139,413,712,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Bug 697178: Add a file permissions callback
For the rare occasions when the graphics library directly opens a file
(currently for reading), this allows us to apply any restrictions on
file access normally applied in the interpteter.
|
static void test_bug43560(void)
{
MYSQL* conn;
uint rc;
MYSQL_STMT *stmt= 0;
MYSQL_BIND bind;
my_bool is_null= 0;
char buffer[256];
const uint BUFSIZE= sizeof(buffer);
const char* values[] = {"eins", "zwei", "drei", "viele", NULL};
const char insert_str[] = "INSERT INTO t1 (c2) VALUES (?)";
unsigned long length;
const unsigned int drop_db= opt_drop_db;
DBUG_ENTER("test_bug43560");
myheader("test_bug43560");
/* Make sure we only run against a debug server. */
if (!strstr(mysql->server_version, "debug"))
{
fprintf(stdout, "Skipping test_bug43560: server not DEBUG version\n");
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
/*
Set up a separate connection for this test to avoid messing up the
general MYSQL object used in other subtests. Use TCP protocol to avoid
problems with the buffer semantics of AF_UNIX, and turn off auto reconnect.
*/
conn= client_connect(0, MYSQL_PROTOCOL_TCP, 0);
rc= mysql_query(conn, "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS t1");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(conn,
"CREATE TABLE t1 (c1 INT PRIMARY KEY AUTO_INCREMENT, c2 CHAR(10))");
myquery(rc);
stmt= mysql_stmt_init(conn);
check_stmt(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_prepare(stmt, insert_str, strlen(insert_str));
check_execute(stmt, rc);
memset(&bind, 0, sizeof(bind));
bind.buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_STRING;
bind.buffer_length= BUFSIZE;
bind.buffer= buffer;
bind.is_null= &is_null;
bind.length= &length;
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_param(stmt, &bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
/* First execute; should succeed. */
strncpy(buffer, values[0], BUFSIZE);
length= strlen(buffer);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
/*
Set up the server to close this session's server-side socket after
next execution of prep statement.
*/
rc= mysql_query(conn,"SET SESSION debug='+d,close_conn_after_stmt_execute'");
myquery(rc);
/* Second execute; should fail due to socket closed during execution. */
strncpy(buffer, values[1], BUFSIZE);
length= strlen(buffer);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc && mysql_stmt_errno(stmt) == CR_SERVER_LOST);
/*
Third execute; should fail (connection already closed), or SIGSEGV in
case of a Bug#43560 type regression in which case the whole test fails.
*/
strncpy(buffer, values[2], BUFSIZE);
length= strlen(buffer);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc && mysql_stmt_errno(stmt) == CR_SERVER_LOST);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
opt_drop_db= 0;
client_disconnect(conn);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP TABLE t1");
myquery(rc);
opt_drop_db= drop_db;
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
| 293,974,118,814,949,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
|
qf_jump_edit_buffer(
qf_info_T *qi,
qfline_T *qf_ptr,
int forceit,
int prev_winid,
int *opened_window)
{
qf_list_T *qfl = qf_get_curlist(qi);
int old_changedtick = qfl->qf_changedtick;
qfltype_T qfl_type = qfl->qfl_type;
int retval = OK;
int old_qf_curlist = qi->qf_curlist;
int save_qfid = qfl->qf_id;
if (qf_ptr->qf_type == 1)
{
// Open help file (do_ecmd() will set b_help flag, readfile() will
// set b_p_ro flag).
if (!can_abandon(curbuf, forceit))
{
no_write_message();
return FAIL;
}
retval = do_ecmd(qf_ptr->qf_fnum, NULL, NULL, NULL, (linenr_T)1,
ECMD_HIDE + ECMD_SET_HELP,
prev_winid == curwin->w_id ? curwin : NULL);
}
else
retval = buflist_getfile(qf_ptr->qf_fnum,
(linenr_T)1, GETF_SETMARK | GETF_SWITCH, forceit);
// If a location list, check whether the associated window is still
// present.
if (qfl_type == QFLT_LOCATION)
{
win_T *wp = win_id2wp(prev_winid);
if (wp == NULL && curwin->w_llist != qi)
{
emsg(_(e_current_window_was_closed));
*opened_window = FALSE;
return QF_ABORT;
}
}
if (qfl_type == QFLT_QUICKFIX && !qflist_valid(NULL, save_qfid))
{
emsg(_(e_current_quickfix_list_was_changed));
return QF_ABORT;
}
// Check if the list was changed. The pointers may happen to be identical,
// thus also check qf_changedtick.
if (old_qf_curlist != qi->qf_curlist
|| old_changedtick != qfl->qf_changedtick
|| !is_qf_entry_present(qfl, qf_ptr))
{
if (qfl_type == QFLT_QUICKFIX)
emsg(_(e_current_quickfix_list_was_changed));
else
emsg(_(e_current_location_list_was_changed));
return QF_ABORT;
}
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
4f1b083be43f351bc107541e7b0c9655a5d2c0bb
| 247,509,510,388,900,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 67 |
patch 9.0.0322: crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set
Problem: Crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set.
Solution: Do not handle errors if there aren't any.
|
static ssize_t lo_add_fd_mapping(fuse_req_t req, int fd)
{
struct lo_map_elem *elem;
elem = lo_map_alloc_elem(&lo_data(req)->fd_map);
if (!elem) {
return -1;
}
elem->fd = fd;
return elem - lo_data(req)->fd_map.elems;
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
6084633dff3a05d63176e06d7012c7e15aba15be
| 222,372,605,976,086,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
tools/virtiofsd: xattr name mappings: Add option
Add an option to define mappings of xattr names so that
the client and server filesystems see different views.
This can be used to have different SELinux mappings as
seen by the guest, to run the virtiofsd with less privileges
(e.g. in a case where it can't set trusted/system/security
xattrs but you want the guest to be able to), or to isolate
multiple users of the same name; e.g. trusted attributes
used by stacking overlayfs.
A mapping engine is used with 3 simple rules; the rules can
be combined to allow most useful mapping scenarios.
The ruleset is defined by -o xattrmap='rules...'.
This patch doesn't use the rule maps yet.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>
|
void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
const Tensor& tensor_in = context->input(0);
const Tensor& tensor_out = context->input(1);
const Tensor& out_grad_backprop = context->input(2);
// For maxpooling3d, tensor_in should have 5 dimensions.
OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_in.dims() == 5,
errors::InvalidArgument("tensor_in must be 5-dimensional"));
OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_out.dims() == 5,
errors::InvalidArgument("tensor_out must be 5-dimensional"));
// For maxpooling3d, out_grad_backprop should have 5 dimensions.
OP_REQUIRES(
context, out_grad_backprop.dims() == 5,
errors::InvalidArgument("out_grad_backprop must be 5-dimensional"));
Pool3dParameters params{context, ksize_, stride_,
padding_, data_format_, tensor_in.shape()};
Tensor* output = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->forward_input_or_allocate_output(
{2}, 0, tensor_out.shape(), &output));
// Given access patterns in LaunchMaxPooling3dGradGradOp, these tensors must
// have elements.
OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_in.NumElements() > 0,
errors::InvalidArgument("received empty tensor tensor_in: ",
tensor_in.DebugString()));
OP_REQUIRES(context, tensor_out.NumElements() > 0,
errors::InvalidArgument("received empty tensor tensor_out: ",
tensor_out.DebugString()));
OP_REQUIRES(
context, out_grad_backprop.NumElements() > 0,
errors::InvalidArgument("received empty tensor out_grad_backprop: ",
out_grad_backprop.DebugString()));
LaunchMaxPooling3dGradGradOp<Device, T>::launch(
context, params, tensor_in, tensor_out, out_grad_backprop, output);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-369",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
63c6a29d0f2d692b247f7bf81f8732d6442fad09
| 93,004,229,093,993,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 |
Add missing validation, prevent heap OOB
PiperOrigin-RevId: 372246723
Change-Id: I1a454a643810e77d7d14821b342098c56a09fbbf
|
void derive_temporal_luma_vector_prediction(base_context* ctx,
de265_image* img,
const slice_segment_header* shdr,
int xP,int yP,
int nPbW,int nPbH,
int refIdxL,
int X, // which MV (L0/L1) to get
MotionVector* out_mvLXCol,
uint8_t* out_availableFlagLXCol)
{
// --- no temporal MVP -> exit ---
if (shdr->slice_temporal_mvp_enabled_flag == 0) {
out_mvLXCol->x = 0;
out_mvLXCol->y = 0;
*out_availableFlagLXCol = 0;
return;
}
// --- find collocated reference image ---
int Log2CtbSizeY = img->get_sps().Log2CtbSizeY;
int colPic; // TODO: this is the same for the whole slice. We can precompute it.
if (shdr->slice_type == SLICE_TYPE_B &&
shdr->collocated_from_l0_flag == 0)
{
logtrace(LogMotion,"collocated L1 ref_idx=%d\n",shdr->collocated_ref_idx);
colPic = shdr->RefPicList[1][ shdr->collocated_ref_idx ];
}
else
{
logtrace(LogMotion,"collocated L0 ref_idx=%d\n",shdr->collocated_ref_idx);
colPic = shdr->RefPicList[0][ shdr->collocated_ref_idx ];
}
// check whether collocated reference picture exists
if (!ctx->has_image(colPic)) {
out_mvLXCol->x = 0;
out_mvLXCol->y = 0;
*out_availableFlagLXCol = 0;
ctx->add_warning(DE265_WARNING_NONEXISTING_REFERENCE_PICTURE_ACCESSED, false);
return;
}
// --- get collocated MV either at bottom-right corner or from center of PB ---
int xColPb,yColPb;
int yColBr = yP + nPbH; // bottom right collocated motion vector position
int xColBr = xP + nPbW;
/* If neighboring pixel at bottom-right corner is in the same CTB-row and inside the image,
use this (reduced down to 16 pixels resolution) as collocated MV position.
Note: see 2014, Sze, Sect. 5.2.1.2 why candidate C0 is excluded when on another CTB-row.
This is to reduce the memory bandwidth requirements.
*/
if ((yP>>Log2CtbSizeY) == (yColBr>>Log2CtbSizeY) &&
xColBr < img->get_sps().pic_width_in_luma_samples &&
yColBr < img->get_sps().pic_height_in_luma_samples)
{
xColPb = xColBr & ~0x0F; // reduce resolution of collocated motion-vectors to 16 pixels grid
yColPb = yColBr & ~0x0F;
derive_collocated_motion_vectors(ctx,img,shdr, xP,yP, colPic, xColPb,yColPb, refIdxL, X,
out_mvLXCol, out_availableFlagLXCol);
}
else
{
out_mvLXCol->x = 0;
out_mvLXCol->y = 0;
*out_availableFlagLXCol = 0;
}
if (*out_availableFlagLXCol==0) {
int xColCtr = xP+(nPbW>>1);
int yColCtr = yP+(nPbH>>1);
xColPb = xColCtr & ~0x0F; // reduce resolution of collocated motion-vectors to 16 pixels grid
yColPb = yColCtr & ~0x0F;
derive_collocated_motion_vectors(ctx,img,shdr, xP,yP, colPic, xColPb,yColPb, refIdxL, X,
out_mvLXCol, out_availableFlagLXCol);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libde265
|
697aa4f7c774abd6374596e6707a6f4f54265355
| 78,853,456,832,637,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 95 |
fix MC with HDR chroma, but SDR luma (#301)
|
unsigned int msix_nr_vectors_allocated(const PCIDevice *dev)
{
return dev->msix_entries_nr;
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
43b11a91dd861a946b231b89b7542856ade23d1b
| 156,517,482,348,897,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
msix: implement pba write (but read-only)
qpci_msix_pending() writes on pba region, causing qemu to SEGV:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 0x7ffff7fba8c0 (LWP 25882)]
0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0000000000000000 in ()
#1 0x00005555556556c5 in memory_region_oldmmio_write_accessor (mr=0x5555579f3f80, addr=0, value=0x7fffffffbf68, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/memory.c:434
#2 0x00005555556558e1 in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=0, value=0x7fffffffbf68, size=4, access_size_min=1, access_size_max=4, access=0x55555565563e <memory_region_oldmmio_write_accessor>, mr=0x5555579f3f80, attrs=...) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/memory.c:506
#3 0x00005555556581eb in memory_region_dispatch_write (mr=0x5555579f3f80, addr=0, data=0, size=4, attrs=...) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/memory.c:1176
#4 0x000055555560b6f9 in address_space_rw (as=0x555555eff4e0 <address_space_memory>, addr=3759147008, attrs=..., buf=0x7fffffffc1b0 "", len=4, is_write=true) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/exec.c:2439
#5 0x000055555560baa2 in cpu_physical_memory_rw (addr=3759147008, buf=0x7fffffffc1b0 "", len=4, is_write=1) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/exec.c:2534
#6 0x000055555564c005 in cpu_physical_memory_write (addr=3759147008, buf=0x7fffffffc1b0, len=4) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/include/exec/cpu-common.h:80
#7 0x000055555564cd9c in qtest_process_command (chr=0x55555642b890, words=0x5555578de4b0) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qtest.c:378
#8 0x000055555564db77 in qtest_process_inbuf (chr=0x55555642b890, inbuf=0x55555641b340) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qtest.c:569
#9 0x000055555564dc07 in qtest_read (opaque=0x55555642b890, buf=0x7fffffffc2e0 "writel 0xe0100800 0x0\n", size=22) at /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qtest.c:581
#10 0x000055555574ce3e in qemu_chr_be_write (s=0x55555642b890, buf=0x7fffffffc2e0 "writel 0xe0100800 0x0\n", len=22) at qemu-char.c:306
#11 0x0000555555751263 in tcp_chr_read (chan=0x55555642bcf0, cond=G_IO_IN, opaque=0x55555642b890) at qemu-char.c:2876
#12 0x00007ffff64c9a8a in g_main_context_dispatch (context=0x55555641c400) at gmain.c:3122
(without this patch, this can be reproduced with the ivshmem qtest)
Implement an empty mmio write to avoid the crash.
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
g_markup_parse_context_get_element_stack (GMarkupParseContext *context)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (context != NULL, NULL);
return context->tag_stack;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
glib
|
fccef3cc822af74699cca84cd202719ae61ca3b9
| 74,309,225,371,993,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
gmarkup: Fix crash in error handling path for closing elements
If something which looks like a closing tag is left unfinished, but
isn’t paired to an opening tag in the document, the error handling code
would do a null pointer dereference. Avoid that, at the cost of
introducing a new translatable error message.
Includes a test case, courtesy of pdknsk.
Signed-off-by: Philip Withnall <[email protected]>
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/glib/issues/1461
|
NOEXPORT void socks5_client_address(CLI *c) {
SOCKADDR_UNION addr;
SOCKS5_UNION socks;
if(original_dst(c->local_rfd.fd, &addr))
throw_exception(c, 2); /* don't reset */
memset(&socks, 0, sizeof socks);
socks.req.ver=5; /* SOCKS5 */
socks.req.cmd=0x01; /* CONNECT */
switch(addr.sa.sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
socks.req.atyp=0x01; /* IP v4 address */
memcpy(&socks.v4.addr, &addr.in.sin_addr, 4);
memcpy(&socks.v4.port, &addr.in.sin_port, 2);
s_log(LOG_INFO, "Sending SOCKS5 IPv4 address");
s_ssl_write(c, &socks, sizeof socks.v4);
break;
#ifdef USE_IPv6
case AF_INET6:
socks.req.atyp=0x04; /* IP v6 address */
memcpy(&socks.v6.addr, &addr.in6.sin6_addr, 16);
memcpy(&socks.v6.port, &addr.in6.sin6_port, 2);
s_log(LOG_INFO, "Sending SOCKS5 IPv6 address");
s_ssl_write(c, &socks, sizeof socks.v6);
break;
#endif
default:
s_log(LOG_ERR, "Unsupported address type 0x%02x", addr.sa.sa_family);
throw_exception(c, 2); /* don't reset */
}
s_ssl_read(c, &socks, sizeof socks.resp);
if(socks.resp.atyp==0x04) /* IP V6 address */
s_ssl_read(c, &socks.v6.addr, 16+2);
else
s_ssl_read(c, &socks.v4.addr, 4+2);
if(socks.resp.ver!=5) {
s_log(LOG_ERR, "Invalid SOCKS5 message version 0x%02x", socks.req.ver);
throw_exception(c, 2); /* don't reset */
}
switch(socks.resp.rep) {
case 0x00:
s_log(LOG_INFO,
"SOCKS5 request succeeded");
return; /* SUCCESS */
case 0x01:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: General SOCKS server failure");
break;
case 0x02:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Connection not allowed by ruleset");
break;
case 0x03:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Network unreachable");
break;
case 0x04:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Host unreachable");
break;
case 0x05:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Connection refused");
break;
case 0x06:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: TTL expired");
break;
case 0x07:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Command not supported");
break;
case 0x08:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Address type not supported");
break;
default:
s_log(LOG_ERR,
"SOCKS5 request failed: Unknown error 0x%02x", socks.resp.rep);
}
throw_exception(c, 2); /* don't reset */
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
stunnel
|
ebad9ddc4efb2635f37174c9d800d06206f1edf9
| 126,465,878,301,109,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 83 |
stunnel-5.57
|
inline bool SegmentBuilder::tryExtend(word* from, word* to) {
// Careful about overflow.
if (pos == from && to <= ptr.end() && to >= from) {
pos = to;
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
capnproto
|
52bc956459a5e83d7c31be95763ff6399e064ae4
| 124,321,379,359,121,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
SECURITY: Prevent compiler from eliding bounds checks.
Details: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/blob/master/security-advisories/2017-04-17-0-apple-32bit-elides-bounds-check.md
|
void usbip_vhci_driver_close(void)
{
if (!vhci_driver)
return;
udev_device_unref(vhci_driver->hc_device);
free(vhci_driver);
vhci_driver = NULL;
udev_unref(udev_context);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
2f2d0088eb93db5c649d2a5e34a3800a8a935fc5
| 288,361,945,319,833,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
usbip: prevent vhci_hcd driver from leaking a socket pointer address
When a client has a USB device attached over IP, the vhci_hcd driver is
locally leaking a socket pointer address via the
/sys/devices/platform/vhci_hcd/status file (world-readable) and in debug
output when "usbip --debug port" is run.
Fix it to not leak. The socket pointer address is not used at the moment
and it was made visible as a convenient way to find IP address from socket
pointer address by looking up /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6}.
As this opens a security hole, the fix replaces socket pointer address with
sockfd.
Reported-by: Secunia Research <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static UChar32 escLeftBracket5Routine(UChar32 c) {
c = readUnicodeCharacter();
if (c == 0)
return 0;
return doDispatch(c, escLeftBracket5Dispatch);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
mongo
|
035cf2afc04988b22cb67f4ebfd77e9b344cb6e0
| 62,670,691,675,568,315,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
SERVER-25335 avoid group and other permissions when creating .dbshell history file
|
bool CModules::OnClientDisconnect() {
MODUNLOADCHK(OnClientDisconnect());
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-264"
] |
znc
|
8de9e376ce531fe7f3c8b0aa4876d15b479b7311
| 76,649,686,786,855,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix remote code execution and privilege escalation vulnerability.
To trigger this, need to have a user already.
Thanks for Jeriko One <[email protected]> for finding and reporting this.
CVE-2019-12816
|
static size_t ZSTD_resetCCtx_byCopyingCDict(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
const ZSTD_CDict* cdict,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params,
U64 pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTD_buffered_policy_e zbuff)
{
const ZSTD_compressionParameters *cdict_cParams = &cdict->matchState.cParams;
DEBUGLOG(4, "copying dictionary into context");
{ unsigned const windowLog = params.cParams.windowLog;
assert(windowLog != 0);
/* Copy only compression parameters related to tables. */
params.cParams = *cdict_cParams;
params.cParams.windowLog = windowLog;
ZSTD_resetCCtx_internal(cctx, params, pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTDcrp_noMemset, zbuff);
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy == cdict_cParams->strategy);
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.hashLog == cdict_cParams->hashLog);
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog == cdict_cParams->chainLog);
}
/* copy tables */
{ size_t const chainSize = (cdict_cParams->strategy == ZSTD_fast) ? 0 : ((size_t)1 << cdict_cParams->chainLog);
size_t const hSize = (size_t)1 << cdict_cParams->hashLog;
size_t const tableSpace = (chainSize + hSize) * sizeof(U32);
assert((U32*)cctx->blockState.matchState.chainTable == (U32*)cctx->blockState.matchState.hashTable + hSize); /* chainTable must follow hashTable */
assert((U32*)cctx->blockState.matchState.hashTable3 == (U32*)cctx->blockState.matchState.chainTable + chainSize);
assert((U32*)cdict->matchState.chainTable == (U32*)cdict->matchState.hashTable + hSize); /* chainTable must follow hashTable */
assert((U32*)cdict->matchState.hashTable3 == (U32*)cdict->matchState.chainTable + chainSize);
memcpy(cctx->blockState.matchState.hashTable, cdict->matchState.hashTable, tableSpace); /* presumes all tables follow each other */
}
/* Zero the hashTable3, since the cdict never fills it */
{ size_t const h3Size = (size_t)1 << cctx->blockState.matchState.hashLog3;
assert(cdict->matchState.hashLog3 == 0);
memset(cctx->blockState.matchState.hashTable3, 0, h3Size * sizeof(U32));
}
/* copy dictionary offsets */
{ ZSTD_matchState_t const* srcMatchState = &cdict->matchState;
ZSTD_matchState_t* dstMatchState = &cctx->blockState.matchState;
dstMatchState->window = srcMatchState->window;
dstMatchState->nextToUpdate = srcMatchState->nextToUpdate;
dstMatchState->nextToUpdate3= srcMatchState->nextToUpdate3;
dstMatchState->loadedDictEnd= srcMatchState->loadedDictEnd;
}
cctx->dictID = cdict->dictID;
/* copy block state */
memcpy(cctx->blockState.prevCBlock, &cdict->cBlockState, sizeof(cdict->cBlockState));
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
zstd
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
| 239,866,699,541,020,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
fixed T36302429
|
int kvm_emulate_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/* Treat an INVD instruction as a NOP and just skip it. */
return kvm_emulate_as_nop(vcpu);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637
| 336,462,869,252,012,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
struct wireless_dev *brcmf_ap_add_vif(struct wiphy *wiphy, const char *name,
u32 *flags, struct vif_params *params)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(cfg_to_ndev(cfg));
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
int err;
if (brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event_armed(cfg))
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
brcmf_dbg(INFO, "Adding vif \"%s\"\n", name);
vif = brcmf_alloc_vif(cfg, NL80211_IFTYPE_AP);
if (IS_ERR(vif))
return (struct wireless_dev *)vif;
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, vif);
err = brcmf_cfg80211_request_ap_if(ifp);
if (err) {
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, NULL);
goto fail;
}
/* wait for firmware event */
err = brcmf_cfg80211_wait_vif_event(cfg, BRCMF_E_IF_ADD,
BRCMF_VIF_EVENT_TIMEOUT);
brcmf_cfg80211_arm_vif_event(cfg, NULL);
if (!err) {
brcmf_err("timeout occurred\n");
err = -EIO;
goto fail;
}
/* interface created in firmware */
ifp = vif->ifp;
if (!ifp) {
brcmf_err("no if pointer provided\n");
err = -ENOENT;
goto fail;
}
strncpy(ifp->ndev->name, name, sizeof(ifp->ndev->name) - 1);
err = brcmf_net_attach(ifp, true);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("Registering netdevice failed\n");
goto fail;
}
return &ifp->vif->wdev;
fail:
brcmf_free_vif(vif);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c
| 308,367,313,991,033,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 |
brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.