func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
XML_SetElementHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_StartElementHandler start,
XML_EndElementHandler end)
{
startElementHandler = start;
endElementHandler = end;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
libexpat
|
ba0f9c3b40c264b8dd392e02a7a060a8fa54f032
| 273,567,176,867,146,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
CVE-2015-1283 Sanity check size calculations. r=peterv, a=abillings
https://sourceforge.net/p/expat/bugs/528/
|
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, PrefixRegex) {
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1));
runQuery(fromjson("{a: /^foo/}"));
ASSERT_EQUALS(getNumSolutions(), 2U);
assertSolutionExists("{cscan: {dir: 1, filter: {a: /^foo/}}}");
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: null, node: {ixscan: "
"{filter: null, pattern: {a: 1}}}}}");
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3
| 86,716,536,525,162,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr.
|
WasmResult Context::dequeueSharedQueue(uint32_t token, std::string* data) {
return global_shared_data.dequeue(token, data);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
envoy
|
8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153
| 250,463,164,345,425,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
|
static __always_inline int alloc_block(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct array_cache *ac, struct page *page, int batchcount)
{
/*
* There must be at least one object available for
* allocation.
*/
BUG_ON(page->active >= cachep->num);
while (page->active < cachep->num && batchcount--) {
STATS_INC_ALLOCED(cachep);
STATS_INC_ACTIVE(cachep);
STATS_SET_HIGH(cachep);
ac->entry[ac->avail++] = slab_get_obj(cachep, page);
}
return batchcount;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f
| 77,228,303,759,156,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4 + 4, s->offsets, offsets_size);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
/* initialize zlib engine */
s->compressed_block = g_malloc(max_compressed_block_size + 1);
s->uncompressed_block = g_malloc(s->block_size);
if (inflateInit(&s->zstream) != Z_OK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->current_block = s->n_blocks;
s->sectors_per_block = s->block_size/512;
bs->total_sectors = s->n_blocks * s->sectors_per_block;
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(s->offsets);
g_free(s->compressed_block);
g_free(s->uncompressed_block);
return ret;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
qemu
|
d65f97a82c4ed48374a764c769d4ba1ea9724e97
| 186,713,796,561,905,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 61 |
block/cloop: validate block_size header field (CVE-2014-0144)
Avoid unbounded s->uncompressed_block memory allocation by checking that
the block_size header field has a reasonable value. Also enforce the
assumption that the value is a non-zero multiple of 512.
These constraints conform to cloop 2.639's code so we accept existing
image files.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
|
TEST(HttpUtility, SendLocalReplyHeadRequest) {
MockStreamDecoderFilterCallbacks callbacks;
bool is_reset = false;
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks, streamInfo());
EXPECT_CALL(callbacks, encodeHeaders_(_, true))
.WillOnce(Invoke([&](const ResponseHeaderMap& headers, bool) -> void {
EXPECT_EQ(headers.getContentLengthValue(), fmt::format("{}", strlen("large")));
}));
Utility::sendLocalReply(
is_reset, callbacks,
Utility::LocalReplyData{false, Http::Code::PayloadTooLarge, "large", absl::nullopt, true});
}
| 0 |
[] |
envoy
|
3b5acb2f43548862dadb243de7cf3994986a8e04
| 339,040,361,541,053,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
http, url: Bring back chromium_url and http_parser_parse_url (#198)
* Revert GURL as HTTP URL parser utility
This reverts:
1. commit c9c4709c844b90b9bb2935d784a428d667c9df7d
2. commit d828958b591a6d79f4b5fa608ece9962b7afbe32
3. commit 2d69e30c51f2418faf267aaa6c1126fce9948c62
Signed-off-by: Dhi Aurrahman <[email protected]>
|
_sc_asn1_decode(sc_context_t *ctx, struct sc_asn1_entry *asn1,
const u8 *in, size_t len, const u8 **newp, size_t *left,
int choice, int depth)
{
return asn1_decode(ctx, asn1, in, len, newp, left, choice, depth);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
OpenSC
|
412a6142c27a5973c61ba540e33cdc22d5608e68
| 131,163,141,637,350,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
fixed out of bounds access of ASN.1 Bitstring
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
|
int kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_level *irq_event)
{
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
return -ENXIO;
irq_event->status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event->irq, irq_event->level);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
6d1068b3a98519247d8ba4ec85cd40ac136dbdf9
| 137,201,012,173,452,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)
On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger
oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest
cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN
ioctl.
invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP
Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables
...
Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae
EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm]
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0
task.ti=d7c62000)
Stack:
00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000
ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0
c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80
Call Trace:
[<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm]
...
[<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74
1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01
d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89
EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP
0068:d7c63e70
QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked
out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with
X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with
X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be
susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well.
Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support.
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
evutil_inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, size_t len)
{
#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_INET_NTOP) && !defined(USE_INTERNAL_NTOP)
return inet_ntop(af, src, dst, len);
#else
if (af == AF_INET) {
const struct in_addr *in = src;
const ev_uint32_t a = ntohl(in->s_addr);
int r;
r = evutil_snprintf(dst, len, "%d.%d.%d.%d",
(int)(ev_uint8_t)((a>>24)&0xff),
(int)(ev_uint8_t)((a>>16)&0xff),
(int)(ev_uint8_t)((a>>8 )&0xff),
(int)(ev_uint8_t)((a )&0xff));
if (r<0||(size_t)r>=len)
return NULL;
else
return dst;
#ifdef AF_INET6
} else if (af == AF_INET6) {
const struct in6_addr *addr = src;
char buf[64], *cp;
int longestGapLen = 0, longestGapPos = -1, i,
curGapPos = -1, curGapLen = 0;
ev_uint16_t words[8];
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
words[i] =
(((ev_uint16_t)addr->s6_addr[2*i])<<8) + addr->s6_addr[2*i+1];
}
if (words[0] == 0 && words[1] == 0 && words[2] == 0 && words[3] == 0 &&
words[4] == 0 && ((words[5] == 0 && words[6] && words[7]) ||
(words[5] == 0xffff))) {
/* This is an IPv4 address. */
if (words[5] == 0) {
evutil_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "::%d.%d.%d.%d",
addr->s6_addr[12], addr->s6_addr[13],
addr->s6_addr[14], addr->s6_addr[15]);
} else {
evutil_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "::%x:%d.%d.%d.%d", words[5],
addr->s6_addr[12], addr->s6_addr[13],
addr->s6_addr[14], addr->s6_addr[15]);
}
if (strlen(buf) > len)
return NULL;
strlcpy(dst, buf, len);
return dst;
}
i = 0;
while (i < 8) {
if (words[i] == 0) {
curGapPos = i++;
curGapLen = 1;
while (i<8 && words[i] == 0) {
++i; ++curGapLen;
}
if (curGapLen > longestGapLen) {
longestGapPos = curGapPos;
longestGapLen = curGapLen;
}
} else {
++i;
}
}
if (longestGapLen<=1)
longestGapPos = -1;
cp = buf;
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
if (words[i] == 0 && longestGapPos == i) {
if (i == 0)
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = ':';
while (i < 8 && words[i] == 0)
++i;
--i; /* to compensate for loop increment. */
} else {
evutil_snprintf(cp,
sizeof(buf)-(cp-buf), "%x", (unsigned)words[i]);
cp += strlen(cp);
if (i != 7)
*cp++ = ':';
}
}
*cp = '\0';
if (strlen(buf) > len)
return NULL;
strlcpy(dst, buf, len);
return dst;
#endif
} else {
return NULL;
}
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
libevent
|
329acc18a0768c21ba22522f01a5c7f46cacc4d5
| 215,101,784,809,066,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 94 |
evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
|
static void qemu_chr_set_echo_win_stdio(CharDriverState *chr, bool echo)
{
WinStdioCharState *stdio = chr->opaque;
DWORD dwMode = 0;
GetConsoleMode(stdio->hStdIn, &dwMode);
if (echo) {
SetConsoleMode(stdio->hStdIn, dwMode | ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT);
} else {
SetConsoleMode(stdio->hStdIn, dwMode & ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
qemu
|
a4afa548fc6dd9842ed86639b4d37d4d1c4ad480
| 59,029,634,842,820,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
char: move front end handlers in CharBackend
Since the hanlders are associated with a CharBackend, rather than the
CharDriverState, it is more appropriate to store in CharBackend. This
avoids the handler copy dance in qemu_chr_fe_set_handlers() then
mux_chr_update_read_handler(), by storing the CharBackend pointer
directly.
Also a mux CharDriver should go through mux->backends[focused], since
chr->be will stay NULL. Before that, it was possible to call
chr->handler by mistake with surprising results, for ex through
qemu_chr_be_can_write(), which would result in calling the last set
handler front end, not the one with focus.
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int zr364xx_vidioc_querycap(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_capability *cap)
{
struct zr364xx_camera *cam = video_drvdata(file);
strscpy(cap->driver, DRIVER_DESC, sizeof(cap->driver));
strscpy(cap->card, cam->udev->product, sizeof(cap->card));
strscpy(cap->bus_info, dev_name(&cam->udev->dev),
sizeof(cap->bus_info));
cap->device_caps = V4L2_CAP_VIDEO_CAPTURE |
V4L2_CAP_READWRITE |
V4L2_CAP_STREAMING;
cap->capabilities = cap->device_caps | V4L2_CAP_DEVICE_CAPS;
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
5d2e73a5f80a5b5aff3caf1ec6d39b5b3f54b26e
| 19,542,346,844,015,226,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
media: usb:zr364xx:Fix KASAN:null-ptr-deref Read in zr364xx_vidioc_querycap
SyzKaller hit the null pointer deref while reading from uninitialized
udev->product in zr364xx_vidioc_querycap().
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
include/linux/compiler.h:274
Read of size 1 at addr 0000000000000000 by task v4l_id/5287
CPU: 1 PID: 5287 Comm: v4l_id Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3-319004-g43151d6 #6
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xe8/0x16e lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report.cold+0x5/0x3c mm/kasan/report.c:321
read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 include/linux/compiler.h:274
strscpy+0x8a/0x280 lib/string.c:207
zr364xx_vidioc_querycap+0xb5/0x210 drivers/media/usb/zr364xx/zr364xx.c:706
v4l_querycap+0x12b/0x340 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:1062
__video_do_ioctl+0x5bb/0xb40 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:2874
video_usercopy+0x44e/0xf00 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3056
v4l2_ioctl+0x14e/0x1a0 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:364
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xced/0x12f0 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xa0/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x74/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x4f0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f3b56d8b347
Code: 90 90 90 48 8b 05 f1 fa 2a 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff
ff c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d c1 fa 2a 00 31 d2 48 29 c2 64
RSP: 002b:00007ffe005d5d68 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f3b56d8b347
RDX: 00007ffe005d5d70 RSI: 0000000080685600 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400884
R13: 00007ffe005d5ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
==================================================================
For this device udev->product is not initialized and accessing it causes a NULL pointer deref.
The fix is to check for NULL before strscpy() and copy empty string, if
product is NULL
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vandana BN <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
inline void Fill(const tstring* data, size_t n, TensorProto* t) {
typename protobuf::RepeatedPtrField<string> copy(data, data + n);
t->mutable_string_val()->Swap(©);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-345"
] |
tensorflow
|
368af875869a204b4ac552b9ddda59f6a46a56ec
| 89,021,053,671,937,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Avoid buffer overflow when loading tensors with insufficient data from checkpoints.
`CopyDataFromTensorSliceToTensorSlice` does not (and cannot conveniently)
provide any bounds checking on its own, so the size is instead checked prior
to passing unvalidated data to that function.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 392971286
Change-Id: If2073b36d4d5eedd386329f56729395fd7effee1
|
bfad_im_serial_num_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
struct bfad_im_port_s *im_port =
(struct bfad_im_port_s *) shost->hostdata[0];
struct bfad_s *bfad = im_port->bfad;
char serial_num[BFA_ADAPTER_SERIAL_NUM_LEN];
bfa_get_adapter_serial_num(&bfad->bfa, serial_num);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", serial_num);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
0e62395da2bd5166d7c9e14cbc7503b256a34cb0
| 259,113,734,247,755,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
scsi: bfa: release allocated memory in case of error
In bfad_im_get_stats if bfa_port_get_stats fails, allocated memory needs to
be released.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
onigenc_unicode_is_code_ctype(OnigCodePoint code, unsigned int ctype)
{
if (
#ifdef USE_UNICODE_PROPERTIES
ctype <= ONIGENC_MAX_STD_CTYPE &&
#endif
code < 256) {
return ONIGENC_IS_UNICODE_ISO_8859_1_CTYPE(code, ctype);
}
if (ctype >= CODE_RANGES_NUM) {
return ONIGERR_TYPE_BUG;
}
if (CodeRangeTableInited == 0) init_code_range_array();
return onig_is_in_code_range((UChar* )CodeRanges[ctype], code);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
oniguruma
|
65a9b1aa03c9bc2dc01b074295b9603232cb3b78
| 317,148,953,713,827,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
onig-5.9.2
|
evbuffer_write_atmost(struct evbuffer *buffer, evutil_socket_t fd,
ev_ssize_t howmuch)
{
int n = -1;
EVBUFFER_LOCK(buffer);
if (buffer->freeze_start) {
goto done;
}
if (howmuch < 0 || (size_t)howmuch > buffer->total_len)
howmuch = buffer->total_len;
if (howmuch > 0) {
#ifdef USE_SENDFILE
struct evbuffer_chain *chain = buffer->first;
if (chain != NULL && (chain->flags & EVBUFFER_SENDFILE))
n = evbuffer_write_sendfile(buffer, fd, howmuch);
else {
#endif
#ifdef USE_IOVEC_IMPL
n = evbuffer_write_iovec(buffer, fd, howmuch);
#elif defined(WIN32)
/* XXX(nickm) Don't disable this code until we know if
* the WSARecv code above works. */
void *p = evbuffer_pullup(buffer, howmuch);
EVUTIL_ASSERT(p || !howmuch);
n = send(fd, p, howmuch, 0);
#else
void *p = evbuffer_pullup(buffer, howmuch);
EVUTIL_ASSERT(p || !howmuch);
n = write(fd, p, howmuch);
#endif
#ifdef USE_SENDFILE
}
#endif
}
if (n > 0)
evbuffer_drain(buffer, n);
done:
EVBUFFER_UNLOCK(buffer);
return (n);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
libevent
|
20d6d4458bee5d88bda1511c225c25b2d3198d6c
| 320,877,674,345,438,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.0
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into.
|
RGWOpType get_type() override { return RGW_OP_PUT_METADATA_BUCKET; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
ceph
|
ab29bed2fc9f961fe895de1086a8208e21ddaddc
| 134,754,333,348,294,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
rgw: fix issues with 'enforce bounds' patch
The patch to enforce bounds on max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts had a few
issues that would prevent us from compiling it. Instead of changing the
code provided by the submitter, we're addressing them in a separate
commit to maintain the DCO.
Signed-off-by: Joao Eduardo Luis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Lekshmanan <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 29bc434a6a81a2e5c5b8cfc4c8d5c82ca5bf538a)
mimic specific fixes:
As the largeish change from master g_conf() isn't in mimic yet, use the g_conf
global structure, also make rgw_op use the value from req_info ceph context as
we do for all the requests
|
static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct fw_sysfs *fw_sysfs = to_fw_sysfs(dev);
struct fw_priv *fw_priv;
ssize_t written = count;
int loading = simple_strtol(buf, NULL, 10);
mutex_lock(&fw_lock);
fw_priv = fw_sysfs->fw_priv;
if (fw_state_is_aborted(fw_priv))
goto out;
switch (loading) {
case 1:
/* discarding any previous partial load */
if (!fw_sysfs_done(fw_priv)) {
fw_free_paged_buf(fw_priv);
fw_state_start(fw_priv);
}
break;
case 0:
if (fw_sysfs_loading(fw_priv)) {
int rc;
/*
* Several loading requests may be pending on
* one same firmware buf, so let all requests
* see the mapped 'buf->data' once the loading
* is completed.
* */
rc = fw_map_paged_buf(fw_priv);
if (rc)
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
else
rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
fw_priv->data, fw_priv->size,
READING_FIRMWARE);
/*
* Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
* is ignored and we set ABORT only on failure.
*/
list_del_init(&fw_priv->pending_list);
if (rc) {
fw_state_aborted(fw_priv);
written = rc;
} else {
fw_state_done(fw_priv);
}
break;
}
fallthrough;
default:
dev_err(dev, "%s: unexpected value (%d)\n", __func__, loading);
fallthrough;
case -1:
fw_load_abort(fw_sysfs);
break;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fw_lock);
return written;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47
| 82,294,938,162,692,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 |
drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.
Done with:
$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .
And cocci script:
$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- strcpy(buf, chr);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
- len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
...
- strcpy(buf, chr);
- return strlen(buf);
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void __generic_sub_update_flags_rk(RAnalOp *op, int d, int k, int carry) {
__generic_sub_update_flags(op, 'r', d, 'k', k, carry);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68
| 89,352,392,937,426,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix crash in anal.avr
|
void gf_media_reduce_aspect_ratio(u32 *width, u32 *height)
{
u32 i=0;
u32 w = *width;
u32 h = *height;
while (std_par[i].w) {
if (std_par[i].w * h == std_par[i].h * w) {
*width = std_par[i].w;
*height = std_par[i].h;
return;
}
i++;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
| 19,200,551,761,125,144,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
|
_add_files_end (SaveData *save_data,
gpointer user_data)
{
AddData *add_data = user_data;
LoadData *load_data = LOAD_DATA (save_data);
GList *remaining_files;
GList *scan;
/* allow to add files to a new archive */
if (g_error_matches (load_data->error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND))
g_clear_error (&load_data->error);
/* add the files that weren't present in the archive already */
remaining_files = g_hash_table_get_values (add_data->files_to_add);
for (scan = remaining_files; (load_data->error == NULL) && scan; scan = scan->next) {
AddFile *add_file = scan->data;
if (g_cancellable_is_cancelled (load_data->cancellable))
break;
if (_archive_write_file (save_data->b,
save_data,
add_file,
add_data->follow_links,
NULL,
load_data->cancellable) == WRITE_ACTION_ABORT)
{
break;
}
fr_archive_progress_inc_completed_files (load_data->archive, 1);
}
g_list_free (remaining_files);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
file-roller
|
b147281293a8307808475e102a14857055f81631
| 334,099,070,693,465,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
libarchive: sanitize filenames before extracting
|
bool CudnnSupport::DoPoolBackward(
Stream* stream, const dnn::PoolingDescriptor& pooling_dimensions,
const dnn::BatchDescriptor& input_dimensions,
const DeviceMemory<double>& input_data,
const dnn::BatchDescriptor& output_dimensions,
const DeviceMemory<double>& output_data,
const DeviceMemory<double>& input_diff_data,
DeviceMemory<double>* output_diff_data,
ScratchAllocator* workspace_allocator) {
// Alpha is the scaling factor for input.
double alpha = 1.0;
// Beta is the scaling factor for output.
double beta = 0.0;
CudnnTensorDescriptor src_desc(input_dimensions, CUDNN_DATA_DOUBLE);
CudnnTensorDescriptor dest_desc(output_dimensions, CUDNN_DATA_DOUBLE);
CudnnPoolingDescriptor pooling_desc(pooling_dimensions);
auto cudnn = cudnn_->GetHandle(parent_, stream);
const auto status = [&] {
RETURN_IF_CUDNN_ERROR(cudnnPoolingBackward(
cudnn.handle(), pooling_desc.handle(), &alpha, dest_desc.handle(),
output_data.opaque(), dest_desc.handle(), input_diff_data.opaque(),
src_desc.handle(), input_data.opaque(), &beta, src_desc.handle(),
output_diff_data->opaque()));
return port::Status::OK();
}();
return IsStatusOk(status, /*report_error=*/true);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
tensorflow
|
14755416e364f17fb1870882fa778c7fec7f16e3
| 107,345,158,826,090,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
Prevent CHECK-fail in LSTM/GRU with zero-length input.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 346239181
Change-Id: I5f233dbc076aab7bb4e31ba24f5abd4eaf99ea4f
|
MagickPrivate void XFreeStandardColormap(Display *display,
const XVisualInfo *visual_info,XStandardColormap *map_info,XPixelInfo *pixel)
{
/*
Free colormap.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(display != (Display *) NULL);
assert(visual_info != (XVisualInfo *) NULL);
assert(map_info != (XStandardColormap *) NULL);
(void) XFlush(display);
if (map_info->colormap != (Colormap) NULL)
{
if (map_info->colormap != XDefaultColormap(display,visual_info->screen))
(void) XFreeColormap(display,map_info->colormap);
else
if (pixel != (XPixelInfo *) NULL)
if ((visual_info->klass != TrueColor) &&
(visual_info->klass != DirectColor))
(void) XFreeColors(display,map_info->colormap,pixel->pixels,
(int) pixel->colors,0);
}
map_info->colormap=(Colormap) NULL;
if (pixel != (XPixelInfo *) NULL)
{
if (pixel->pixels != (unsigned long *) NULL)
pixel->pixels=(unsigned long *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixel->pixels);
pixel->pixels=(unsigned long *) NULL;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
ImageMagick
|
f391a5f4554fe47eb56d6277ac32d1f698572f0e
| 244,913,582,664,439,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1531
|
void recovery_cipher_finalize(void)
{
if (!recovery_started) {
recovery_abort();
fsm_sendFailure(FailureType_Failure_UnexpectedMessage, "Not in Recovery mode");
layoutHome();
return;
}
static char CONFIDENTIAL new_mnemonic[MNEMONIC_BUF] = "";
static char CONFIDENTIAL temp_word[CURRENT_WORD_BUF];
volatile bool auto_completed = true;
/* Attempt to autocomplete each word */
char *tok = strtok(mnemonic, " ");
while(tok) {
strlcpy(temp_word, tok, CURRENT_WORD_BUF);
auto_completed &= attempt_auto_complete(temp_word);
strlcat(new_mnemonic, temp_word, MNEMONIC_BUF);
strlcat(new_mnemonic, " ", MNEMONIC_BUF);
tok = strtok(NULL, " ");
}
memzero(temp_word, sizeof(temp_word));
if (!auto_completed && !enforce_wordlist) {
if (!dry_run) {
storage_reset();
}
fsm_sendFailure(FailureType_Failure_SyntaxError,
"Words were not entered correctly. Make sure you are using the substition cipher.");
awaiting_character = false;
layoutHome();
return;
}
/* Truncate additional space at the end */
new_mnemonic[MAX(0u, strnlen(new_mnemonic, sizeof(new_mnemonic)) - 1)] = '\0';
if (!dry_run && (!enforce_wordlist || mnemonic_check(new_mnemonic))) {
storage_setMnemonic(new_mnemonic);
memzero(new_mnemonic, sizeof(new_mnemonic));
if (!enforce_wordlist) {
// not enforcing => mark storage as imported
storage_setImported(true);
}
storage_commit();
fsm_sendSuccess("Device recovered");
} else if (dry_run) {
bool match = storage_isInitialized() && storage_containsMnemonic(new_mnemonic);
if (match) {
review(ButtonRequestType_ButtonRequest_Other, "Recovery Dry Run",
"The seed is valid and MATCHES the one in the device.");
fsm_sendSuccess("The seed is valid and matches the one in the device.");
} else if (mnemonic_check(new_mnemonic)) {
review(ButtonRequestType_ButtonRequest_Other, "Recovery Dry Run",
"The seed is valid, but DOES NOT MATCH the one in the device.");
fsm_sendFailure(FailureType_Failure_Other,
"The seed is valid, but does not match the one in the device.");
} else {
review(ButtonRequestType_ButtonRequest_Other, "Recovery Dry Run",
"The seed is INVALID, and DOES NOT MATCH the one in the device.");
fsm_sendFailure(FailureType_Failure_Other,
"The seed is invalid, and does not match the one in the device.");
}
memzero(new_mnemonic, sizeof(new_mnemonic));
} else {
session_clear(true);
fsm_sendFailure(FailureType_Failure_SyntaxError,
"Invalid mnemonic, are words in correct order?");
recovery_abort();
}
memzero(new_mnemonic, sizeof(new_mnemonic));
awaiting_character = false;
memzero(mnemonic, sizeof(mnemonic));
memzero(cipher, sizeof(cipher));
layoutHome();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-354"
] |
keepkey-firmware
|
769714fcb569e7a4faff9530a2d9ac1f9d6e5680
| 301,921,647,233,502,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 |
firmware: stronger recovery state machine checks
|
static int manager_dispatch_notify_fd(sd_event_source *source, int fd, uint32_t revents, void *userdata) {
_cleanup_fdset_free_ FDSet *fds = NULL;
Manager *m = userdata;
char buf[NOTIFY_BUFFER_MAX+1];
struct iovec iovec = {
.iov_base = buf,
.iov_len = sizeof(buf)-1,
};
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsghdr;
uint8_t buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred)) +
CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int) * NOTIFY_FD_MAX)];
} control = {};
struct msghdr msghdr = {
.msg_iov = &iovec,
.msg_iovlen = 1,
.msg_control = &control,
.msg_controllen = sizeof(control),
};
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
struct ucred *ucred = NULL;
bool found = false;
Unit *u1, *u2, *u3;
int r, *fd_array = NULL;
unsigned n_fds = 0;
ssize_t n;
assert(m);
assert(m->notify_fd == fd);
if (revents != EPOLLIN) {
log_warning("Got unexpected poll event for notify fd.");
return 0;
}
n = recvmsg(m->notify_fd, &msghdr, MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC);
if (n < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
return -errno;
}
if (n == 0) {
log_debug("Got zero-length notification message. Ignoring.");
return 0;
}
CMSG_FOREACH(cmsg, &msghdr) {
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS) {
fd_array = (int*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
n_fds = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(int);
} else if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg->cmsg_type == SCM_CREDENTIALS &&
cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred))) {
ucred = (struct ucred*) CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
}
}
if (n_fds > 0) {
assert(fd_array);
r = fdset_new_array(&fds, fd_array, n_fds);
if (r < 0) {
close_many(fd_array, n_fds);
return log_oom();
}
}
if (!ucred || ucred->pid <= 0) {
log_warning("Received notify message without valid credentials. Ignoring.");
return 0;
}
if ((size_t) n >= sizeof(buf)) {
log_warning("Received notify message exceeded maximum size. Ignoring.");
return 0;
}
buf[n] = 0;
/* Notify every unit that might be interested, but try
* to avoid notifying the same one multiple times. */
u1 = manager_get_unit_by_pid_cgroup(m, ucred->pid);
if (u1) {
manager_invoke_notify_message(m, u1, ucred->pid, buf, n, fds);
found = true;
}
u2 = hashmap_get(m->watch_pids1, PID_TO_PTR(ucred->pid));
if (u2 && u2 != u1) {
manager_invoke_notify_message(m, u2, ucred->pid, buf, n, fds);
found = true;
}
u3 = hashmap_get(m->watch_pids2, PID_TO_PTR(ucred->pid));
if (u3 && u3 != u2 && u3 != u1) {
manager_invoke_notify_message(m, u3, ucred->pid, buf, n, fds);
found = true;
}
if (!found)
log_warning("Cannot find unit for notify message of PID "PID_FMT".", ucred->pid);
if (fdset_size(fds) > 0)
log_warning("Got auxiliary fds with notification message, closing all.");
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
systemd
|
9987750e7a4c62e0eb8473603150596ba7c3a015
| 318,766,193,371,630,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 113 |
pid1: don't return any error in manager_dispatch_notify_fd() (#4240)
If manager_dispatch_notify_fd() fails and returns an error then the handling of
service notifications will be disabled entirely leading to a compromised system.
For example pid1 won't be able to receive the WATCHDOG messages anymore and
will kill all services supposed to send such messages.
|
ip_finalize(ip)
Tcl_Interp *ip;
{
Tcl_CmdInfo info;
int thr_crit_bup;
VALUE rb_debug_bup, rb_verbose_bup;
/* When ruby is exiting, printing debug messages in some callback
operations from Tcl-IP sometimes cause SEGV. I don't know the
reason. But I got SEGV when calling "rb_io_write(rb_stdout, ...)".
So, in some part of this function, debug mode and verbose mode
are disabled. If you know the reason, please fix it.
-- Hidetoshi NAGAI ([email protected]) */
DUMP1("start ip_finalize");
if (ip == (Tcl_Interp*)NULL) {
DUMP1("ip is NULL");
return;
}
if (Tcl_InterpDeleted(ip)) {
DUMP2("ip(%p) is already deleted", ip);
return;
}
#if TCL_NAMESPACE_DEBUG
if (ip_null_namespace(ip)) {
DUMP2("ip(%p) has null namespace", ip);
return;
}
#endif
thr_crit_bup = rb_thread_critical;
rb_thread_critical = Qtrue;
rb_debug_bup = ruby_debug;
rb_verbose_bup = ruby_verbose;
Tcl_Preserve(ip);
/* delete slaves */
delete_slaves(ip);
/* shut off some connections from Tcl-proc to Ruby */
if (at_exit) {
/* NOTE: Only when at exit.
Because, ruby removes objects, which depends on the deleted
interpreter, on some callback operations.
It is important for GC. */
#if TCL_MAJOR_VERSION >= 8
Tcl_CreateObjCommand(ip, "ruby", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
Tcl_CreateObjCommand(ip, "ruby_eval", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
Tcl_CreateObjCommand(ip, "ruby_cmd", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
#else /* TCL_MAJOR_VERSION < 8 */
Tcl_CreateCommand(ip, "ruby", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
Tcl_CreateCommand(ip, "ruby_eval", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
Tcl_CreateCommand(ip, "ruby_cmd", ip_null_proc,
(ClientData)NULL, (Tcl_CmdDeleteProc *)NULL);
#endif
/*
rb_thread_critical = thr_crit_bup;
return;
*/
}
/* delete root widget */
#ifdef RUBY_VM
/* cause SEGV on Ruby 1.9 */
#else
DUMP1("check `destroy'");
if (Tcl_GetCommandInfo(ip, "destroy", &info)) {
DUMP1("call `destroy .'");
Tcl_GlobalEval(ip, "catch {destroy .}");
}
#endif
#if 1
DUMP1("destroy root widget");
if (tk_stubs_init_p() && Tk_MainWindow(ip) != (Tk_Window)NULL) {
/*
* On Ruby VM, this code piece may be not called, because
* Tk_MainWindow() returns NULL on a native thread except
* the thread which initialize Tk environment.
* Of course, that is a problem. But maybe not so serious.
* All widgets are destroyed when the Tcl interp is deleted.
* At then, Ruby may raise exceptions on the delete hook
* callbacks which registered for the deleted widgets, and
* may fail to clear objects which depends on the widgets.
* Although it is the problem, it is possibly avoidable by
* rescuing exceptions and the finalize hook of the interp.
*/
Tk_Window win = Tk_MainWindow(ip);
DUMP1("call Tk_DestroyWindow");
ruby_debug = Qfalse;
ruby_verbose = Qnil;
if (! (((Tk_FakeWin*)win)->flags & TK_ALREADY_DEAD)) {
Tk_DestroyWindow(win);
}
ruby_debug = rb_debug_bup;
ruby_verbose = rb_verbose_bup;
}
#endif
/* call finalize-hook-proc */
DUMP1("check `finalize-hook-proc'");
if ( Tcl_GetCommandInfo(ip, finalize_hook_name, &info)) {
DUMP2("call finalize hook proc '%s'", finalize_hook_name);
ruby_debug = Qfalse;
ruby_verbose = Qnil;
Tcl_GlobalEval(ip, finalize_hook_name);
ruby_debug = rb_debug_bup;
ruby_verbose = rb_verbose_bup;
}
DUMP1("check `foreach' & `after'");
if ( Tcl_GetCommandInfo(ip, "foreach", &info)
&& Tcl_GetCommandInfo(ip, "after", &info) ) {
DUMP1("cancel after callbacks");
ruby_debug = Qfalse;
ruby_verbose = Qnil;
Tcl_GlobalEval(ip, "catch {foreach id [after info] {after cancel $id}}");
ruby_debug = rb_debug_bup;
ruby_verbose = rb_verbose_bup;
}
Tcl_Release(ip);
DUMP1("finish ip_finalize");
ruby_debug = rb_debug_bup;
ruby_verbose = rb_verbose_bup;
rb_thread_critical = thr_crit_bup;
}
| 0 |
[] |
tk
|
ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65
| 230,967,641,304,791,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 138 |
tcltklib.c: check argument
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (ip_cancel_eval_core): check argument type and
length.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@51468 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
PREFIX(scanLt)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
const char **nextTokPtr) {
# ifdef XML_NS
int hadColon;
# endif
REQUIRE_CHAR(enc, ptr, end);
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
CHECK_NMSTRT_CASES(enc, ptr, end, nextTokPtr)
case BT_EXCL:
ptr += MINBPC(enc);
REQUIRE_CHAR(enc, ptr, end);
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
case BT_MINUS:
return PREFIX(scanComment)(enc, ptr + MINBPC(enc), end, nextTokPtr);
case BT_LSQB:
return PREFIX(scanCdataSection)(enc, ptr + MINBPC(enc), end, nextTokPtr);
}
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
case BT_QUEST:
return PREFIX(scanPi)(enc, ptr + MINBPC(enc), end, nextTokPtr);
case BT_SOL:
return PREFIX(scanEndTag)(enc, ptr + MINBPC(enc), end, nextTokPtr);
default:
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
# ifdef XML_NS
hadColon = 0;
# endif
/* we have a start-tag */
while (HAS_CHAR(enc, ptr, end)) {
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
CHECK_NAME_CASES(enc, ptr, end, nextTokPtr)
# ifdef XML_NS
case BT_COLON:
if (hadColon) {
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
hadColon = 1;
ptr += MINBPC(enc);
REQUIRE_CHAR(enc, ptr, end);
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
CHECK_NMSTRT_CASES(enc, ptr, end, nextTokPtr)
default:
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
break;
# endif
case BT_S:
case BT_CR:
case BT_LF: {
ptr += MINBPC(enc);
while (HAS_CHAR(enc, ptr, end)) {
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
CHECK_NMSTRT_CASES(enc, ptr, end, nextTokPtr)
case BT_GT:
goto gt;
case BT_SOL:
goto sol;
case BT_S:
case BT_CR:
case BT_LF:
ptr += MINBPC(enc);
continue;
default:
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
return PREFIX(scanAtts)(enc, ptr, end, nextTokPtr);
}
return XML_TOK_PARTIAL;
}
case BT_GT:
gt:
*nextTokPtr = ptr + MINBPC(enc);
return XML_TOK_START_TAG_NO_ATTS;
case BT_SOL:
sol:
ptr += MINBPC(enc);
REQUIRE_CHAR(enc, ptr, end);
if (! CHAR_MATCHES(enc, ptr, ASCII_GT)) {
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
*nextTokPtr = ptr + MINBPC(enc);
return XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_NO_ATTS;
default:
*nextTokPtr = ptr;
return XML_TOK_INVALID;
}
}
return XML_TOK_PARTIAL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-116"
] |
libexpat
|
3f0a0cb644438d4d8e3294cd0b1245d0edb0c6c6
| 120,001,919,018,106,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 96 |
lib: Add missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235)
|
localtime_r(const time_t *t, struct tm *tm)
{
auto struct tm *tmp = localtime(t);
if (tmp)
*tm = *tmp;
return tmp;
}
| 0 |
[] |
date
|
3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0
| 43,613,615,411,050,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301
|
static void mld_add_delrec(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct ifmcaddr6 *im)
{
struct ifmcaddr6 *pmc;
/* this is an "ifmcaddr6" for convenience; only the fields below
* are actually used. In particular, the refcnt and users are not
* used for management of the delete list. Using the same structure
* for deleted items allows change reports to use common code with
* non-deleted or query-response MCA's.
*/
pmc = kzalloc(sizeof(*pmc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pmc)
return;
pmc->idev = im->idev;
in6_dev_hold(idev);
pmc->mca_addr = im->mca_addr;
pmc->mca_crcount = idev->mc_qrv;
pmc->mca_sfmode = im->mca_sfmode;
if (pmc->mca_sfmode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
struct ip6_sf_list *psf;
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->mca_tomb,
mc_dereference(im->mca_tomb, idev));
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->mca_sources,
mc_dereference(im->mca_sources, idev));
RCU_INIT_POINTER(im->mca_tomb, NULL);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(im->mca_sources, NULL);
for_each_psf_mclock(pmc, psf)
psf->sf_crcount = pmc->mca_crcount;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->next, idev->mc_tomb);
rcu_assign_pointer(idev->mc_tomb, pmc);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
2d3916f3189172d5c69d33065c3c21119fe539fc
| 269,759,101,707,571,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
ipv6: fix skb drops in igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()
While investigating on why a synchronize_net() has been added recently
in ipv6_mc_down(), I found that igmp6_event_query() and igmp6_event_report()
might drop skbs in some cases.
Discussion about removing synchronize_net() from ipv6_mc_down()
will happen in a different thread.
Fixes: f185de28d9ae ("mld: add new workqueues for process mld events")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
ErrorType decrypt_block(unsigned char* data,
uint32_t data_len,
uint32_t seqno) {
ErrorType r = kErrNone;
int outlen;
uint8_t seqbuf[4] = {0};
((uint8_t*)(seqbuf))[0] = (seqno >> 24) & 0xff;
((uint8_t*)(seqbuf))[1] = (seqno >> 16) & 0xff;
((uint8_t*)(seqbuf))[2] = (seqno >> 8) & 0xff;
((uint8_t*)(seqbuf))[3] = seqno & 0xff;
if (!is_stream_ && data_len != block_size_) {
r = kErrBadBlockLen;
goto out;
}
// Decrypt block
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx_, data, &outlen, data, data_len) != 1) {
r = kErrOpenSSL;
goto out;
}
if (static_cast<size_t>(outlen) != data_len) {
r = kErrPartialDecrypt;
goto out;
}
out:
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
ssh2
|
f763271f41320e71d5cbee02ea5bc6a2ded3ca21
| 171,593,930,525,752,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
examples,lib,test: switch to code rewrite
For more information see: https://github.com/mscdex/ssh2/issues/935
|
expand_words (list)
WORD_LIST *list;
{
return (expand_word_list_internal (list, WEXP_ALL));
}
| 0 |
[] |
bash
|
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
| 335,094,992,222,098,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
bash-4.4-rc2 release
|
int nfs4_detect_session_trunking(struct nfs_client *clp,
struct nfs41_exchange_id_res *res,
struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
{
/* Check eir_clientid */
if (clp->cl_clientid != res->clientid)
goto out_err;
/* Check eir_server_owner so_major_id */
if (!nfs4_check_serverowner_major_id(clp->cl_serverowner,
res->server_owner))
goto out_err;
/* Check eir_server_owner so_minor_id */
if (clp->cl_serverowner->minor_id != res->server_owner->minor_id)
goto out_err;
/* Check eir_server_scope */
if (!nfs4_check_server_scope(clp->cl_serverscope, res->server_scope))
goto out_err;
pr_info("NFS: %s: Session trunking succeeded for %s\n",
clp->cl_hostname,
xprt->address_strings[RPC_DISPLAY_ADDR]);
return 0;
out_err:
pr_info("NFS: %s: Session trunking failed for %s\n", clp->cl_hostname,
xprt->address_strings[RPC_DISPLAY_ADDR]);
return -EINVAL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dd99e9f98fbf423ff6d365b37a98e8879170f17c
| 275,998,569,885,879,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
NFSv4: Initialise connection to the server in nfs4_alloc_client()
Set up the connection to the NFSv4 server in nfs4_alloc_client(), before
we've added the struct nfs_client to the net-namespace's nfs_client_list
so that a downed server won't cause other mounts to hang in the trunking
detection code.
Reported-by: Michael Wakabayashi <[email protected]>
Fixes: 5c6e5b60aae4 ("NFS: Fix an Oops in the pNFS files and flexfiles connection setup to the DS")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
TIFFOpen(const char* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpen";
int m, fd;
TIFF* tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
if (m == -1)
return ((TIFF*)0);
/* for cygwin and mingw */
#ifdef O_BINARY
m |= O_BINARY;
#endif
fd = open(name, m, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno > 0 && strerror(errno) != NULL ) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: %s", name, strerror(errno) );
} else {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: Cannot open", name);
}
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd, name, mode);
if(!tif)
close(fd);
return tif;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
libtiff
|
3c5eb8b1be544e41d2c336191bc4936300ad7543
| 272,353,429,863,033,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
* libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
|
cli_vba_readdir(const char *dir, struct uniq *U, uint32_t which)
{
unsigned char *buf;
const unsigned char vba56_signature[] = { 0xcc, 0x61 };
uint16_t record_count, buflen, ffff, byte_count;
uint32_t offset;
int i, j, fd, big_endian = FALSE;
vba_project_t *vba_project;
struct vba56_header v56h;
off_t seekback;
char fullname[1024], *hash;
cli_dbgmsg("in cli_vba_readdir()\n");
if(dir == NULL)
return NULL;
/*
* _VBA_PROJECT files are embedded within office documents (OLE2)
*/
if (!uniq_get(U, "_vba_project", 12, &hash))
return NULL;
snprintf(fullname, sizeof(fullname), "%s"PATHSEP"%s_%u", dir, hash, which);
fullname[sizeof(fullname)-1] = '\0';
fd = open(fullname, O_RDONLY|O_BINARY);
if(fd == -1)
return NULL;
if(cli_readn(fd, &v56h, sizeof(struct vba56_header)) != sizeof(struct vba56_header)) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(v56h.magic, vba56_signature, sizeof(v56h.magic)) != 0) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
i = vba_read_project_strings(fd, TRUE);
seekback = lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_CUR);
if (lseek(fd, sizeof(struct vba56_header), SEEK_SET) == -1) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
j = vba_read_project_strings(fd, FALSE);
if(!i && !j) {
close(fd);
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: Unable to guess VBA type\n");
return NULL;
}
if (i > j) {
big_endian = TRUE;
lseek(fd, seekback, SEEK_SET);
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: Guessing big-endian\n");
} else {
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: Guessing little-endian\n");
}
/* junk some more stuff */
do
if (cli_readn(fd, &ffff, 2) != 2) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
while(ffff != 0xFFFF);
/* check for alignment error */
if(!seekandread(fd, -3, SEEK_CUR, &ffff, sizeof(uint16_t))) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (ffff != 0xFFFF)
lseek(fd, 1, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &ffff, big_endian)) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if(ffff != 0xFFFF)
lseek(fd, ffff, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &ffff, big_endian)) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if(ffff == 0xFFFF)
ffff = 0;
lseek(fd, ffff + 100, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &record_count, big_endian)) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: VBA Record count %d\n", record_count);
if (record_count == 0) {
/* No macros, assume clean */
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (record_count > MAX_VBA_COUNT) {
/* Almost certainly an error */
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: VBA Record count too big\n");
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
vba_project = create_vba_project(record_count, dir, U);
if(vba_project == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
buf = NULL;
buflen = 0;
for(i = 0; i < record_count; i++) {
uint16_t length;
char *ptr;
vba_project->colls[i] = 0;
if(!read_uint16(fd, &length, big_endian))
break;
if (length == 0) {
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: zero name length\n");
break;
}
if(length > buflen) {
unsigned char *newbuf = (unsigned char *)cli_realloc(buf, length);
if(newbuf == NULL)
break;
buflen = length;
buf = newbuf;
}
if (cli_readn(fd, buf, length) != length) {
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: read name failed\n");
break;
}
ptr = get_unicode_name((const char *)buf, length, big_endian);
if(ptr == NULL) break;
if (!(vba_project->colls[i]=uniq_get(U, ptr, strlen(ptr), &hash))) {
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: cannot find project %s (%s)\n", ptr, hash);
break;
}
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: project name: %s (%s)\n", ptr, hash);
free(ptr);
vba_project->name[i] = hash;
if(!read_uint16(fd, &length, big_endian))
break;
lseek(fd, length, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &ffff, big_endian))
break;
if (ffff == 0xFFFF) {
lseek(fd, 2, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &ffff, big_endian))
break;
lseek(fd, ffff + 8, SEEK_CUR);
} else
lseek(fd, ffff + 10, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint16(fd, &byte_count, big_endian))
break;
lseek(fd, (8 * byte_count) + 5, SEEK_CUR);
if(!read_uint32(fd, &offset, big_endian))
break;
cli_dbgmsg("vba_readdir: offset: %u\n", (unsigned int)offset);
vba_project->offset[i] = offset;
lseek(fd, 2, SEEK_CUR);
}
if(buf)
free(buf);
close(fd);
if(i < record_count) {
free(vba_project->name);
free(vba_project->colls);
free(vba_project->dir);
free(vba_project->offset);
free(vba_project);
return NULL;
}
return vba_project;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
clamav-devel
|
d21fb8d975f8c9688894a8cef4d50d977022e09f
| 331,474,631,549,582,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 189 |
libclamav/vba_extract.c: fix error path double free (bb#2486)
|
static bool try_match_pkt_pointers(const struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch,
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch)
{
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X)
return false;
switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
case BPF_JGT:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' > pkt_end, pkt_meta' > pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, false);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end > pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, true);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JLT:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' < pkt_end, pkt_meta' < pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, true);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end < pkt_data', pkt_data > pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, false);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JGE:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' >= pkt_end, pkt_meta' >= pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, true);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end >= pkt_data', pkt_data >= pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, false);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
case BPF_JLE:
if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) ||
(dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(src_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET))) {
/* pkt_data' <= pkt_end, pkt_meta' <= pkt_data */
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg,
dst_reg->type, false);
} else if ((dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET) ||
(reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
src_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META)) {
/* pkt_end <= pkt_data', pkt_data <= pkt_meta' */
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, src_reg,
src_reg->type, true);
} else {
return false;
}
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
c131187db2d3fa2f8bf32fdf4e9a4ef805168467
| 108,150,559,161,345,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 |
bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static bool samba_private_attr_name(const char *unix_ea_name)
{
static const char * const prohibited_ea_names[] = {
SAMBA_POSIX_INHERITANCE_EA_NAME,
SAMBA_XATTR_DOS_ATTRIB,
SAMBA_XATTR_MARKER,
XATTR_NTACL_NAME,
NULL
};
int i;
for (i = 0; prohibited_ea_names[i]; i++) {
if (strequal( prohibited_ea_names[i], unix_ea_name))
return true;
}
if (StrnCaseCmp(unix_ea_name, SAMBA_XATTR_DOSSTREAM_PREFIX,
strlen(SAMBA_XATTR_DOSSTREAM_PREFIX)) == 0) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
samba
|
bd269443e311d96ef495a9db47d1b95eb83bb8f4
| 303,180,637,918,697,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
Fix bug 7104 - "wide links" and "unix extensions" are incompatible.
Change parameter "wide links" to default to "no".
Ensure "wide links = no" if "unix extensions = yes" on a share.
Fix man pages to refect this.
Remove "within share" checks for a UNIX symlink set - even if
widelinks = no. The server will not follow that link anyway.
Correct DEBUG message in check_reduced_name() to add missing "\n"
so it's really clear when a path is being denied as it's outside
the enclosing share path.
Jeremy.
|
s32 gf_media_hevc_read_sps_ex(char *data, u32 size, HEVCState *hevc, u32 *vui_flag_pos)
{
GF_BitStream *bs;
char *data_without_emulation_bytes = NULL;
u32 data_without_emulation_bytes_size = 0;
s32 sps_id= -1;
u8 layer_id;
if (vui_flag_pos) *vui_flag_pos = 0;
data_without_emulation_bytes_size = avc_emulation_bytes_remove_count(data, size);
if (!data_without_emulation_bytes_size) {
bs = gf_bs_new(data, size, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
} else {
/*still contains emulation bytes*/
data_without_emulation_bytes = gf_malloc(size*sizeof(char));
data_without_emulation_bytes_size = avc_remove_emulation_bytes(data, data_without_emulation_bytes, size);
bs = gf_bs_new(data_without_emulation_bytes, data_without_emulation_bytes_size, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
}
if (!bs) goto exit;
if (! hevc_parse_nal_header(bs, NULL, NULL, &layer_id)) goto exit;
sps_id = gf_media_hevc_read_sps_bs(bs, hevc, layer_id, vui_flag_pos);
exit:
if (bs) gf_bs_del(bs);
if (data_without_emulation_bytes) gf_free(data_without_emulation_bytes);
return sps_id;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
| 236,996,663,168,236,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
|
void register_inmem_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct inmem_pages *new;
f2fs_trace_pid(page);
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)ATOMIC_WRITTEN_PAGE);
SetPagePrivate(page);
new = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(inmem_entry_slab, GFP_NOFS);
/* add atomic page indices to the list */
new->page = page;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->list);
/* increase reference count with clean state */
mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
get_page(page);
list_add_tail(&new->list, &fi->inmem_pages);
inc_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
trace_f2fs_register_inmem_page(page, INMEM);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4
| 222,214,222,121,207,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
static int jpc_rgn_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_rgn_t *rgn = &ms->parms.rgn;
if (cstate->numcomps <= 256) {
if (jpc_putuint8(out, rgn->compno)) {
return -1;
}
} else {
if (jpc_putuint16(out, rgn->compno)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (jpc_putuint8(out, rgn->roisty) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, rgn->roishift)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
jasper
|
4031ca321d8cb5798c316ab39c7a5dc88a61fdd7
| 73,132,883,416,450,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Incorporated changes from patch
jasper-1.900.3-libjasper-stepsizes-overflow.patch
|
static void sas_probe_devices(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct domain_device *dev, *n;
struct sas_discovery_event *ev = to_sas_discovery_event(work);
struct asd_sas_port *port = ev->port;
clear_bit(DISCE_PROBE, &port->disc.pending);
/* devices must be domain members before link recovery and probe */
list_for_each_entry(dev, &port->disco_list, disco_list_node) {
spin_lock_irq(&port->dev_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&dev->dev_list_node, &port->dev_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&port->dev_list_lock);
}
sas_probe_sata(port);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, n, &port->disco_list, disco_list_node) {
int err;
err = sas_rphy_add(dev->rphy);
if (err)
sas_fail_probe(dev, __func__, err);
else
list_del_init(&dev->disco_list_node);
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
0558f33c06bb910e2879e355192227a8e8f0219d
| 128,668,528,811,272,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
void list_all_buckets_end(struct req_state *s)
{
s->formatter->close_section();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-79"
] |
ceph
|
8f90658c731499722d5f4393c8ad70b971d05f77
| 237,113,282,347,008,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400)
|
static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
count=ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment,exception);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=(int) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->alpha_trait=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->storage_class=(viff_info.number_data_bands < 3 ? PseudoClass :
DirectClass);
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
else
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(number_pixels,
max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)),q);
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(image,q);
SetPixelRed(image,image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].red,q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].green,q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].blue,q);
}
SetPixelAlpha(image,image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueAlpha,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
ImageMagick
|
134463b926fa965571aa4febd61b810be5e7da05
| 307,447,390,233,310,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 622 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
|
static void print_health_info(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
{
struct mlx5_core_health *health = &dev->priv.health;
struct health_buffer __iomem *h = health->health;
char fw_str[18];
u32 fw;
int i;
/* If the syndrome is 0, the device is OK and no need to print buffer */
if (!ioread8(&h->synd))
return;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(h->assert_var); i++)
mlx5_core_err(dev, "assert_var[%d] 0x%08x\n", i,
ioread32be(h->assert_var + i));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "assert_exit_ptr 0x%08x\n",
ioread32be(&h->assert_exit_ptr));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "assert_callra 0x%08x\n",
ioread32be(&h->assert_callra));
sprintf(fw_str, "%d.%d.%d", fw_rev_maj(dev), fw_rev_min(dev), fw_rev_sub(dev));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "fw_ver %s\n", fw_str);
mlx5_core_err(dev, "hw_id 0x%08x\n", ioread32be(&h->hw_id));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "irisc_index %d\n", ioread8(&h->irisc_index));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "synd 0x%x: %s\n", ioread8(&h->synd),
hsynd_str(ioread8(&h->synd)));
mlx5_core_err(dev, "ext_synd 0x%04x\n", ioread16be(&h->ext_synd));
fw = ioread32be(&h->fw_ver);
mlx5_core_err(dev, "raw fw_ver 0x%08x\n", fw);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
c7ed6d0183d5ea9bc31bcaeeba4070bd62546471
| 15,634,663,336,396,507,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
net/mlx5: fix memory leak in mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump
In mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump if mlx5_crdump_collect fails the
allocated memory for cr_data must be released otherwise there will be
memory leak. To fix this, this commit changes the return instruction
into goto error handling.
Fixes: 9b1f29823605 ("net/mlx5: Add support for FW fatal reporter dump")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
|
bool CModules::OnRawMode(const CNick& OpNick, CChan& Channel,
const CString& sModes, const CString& sArgs) {
MODUNLOADCHK(OnRawMode(OpNick, Channel, sModes, sArgs));
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-264"
] |
znc
|
8de9e376ce531fe7f3c8b0aa4876d15b479b7311
| 24,842,045,037,403,925,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix remote code execution and privilege escalation vulnerability.
To trigger this, need to have a user already.
Thanks for Jeriko One <[email protected]> for finding and reporting this.
CVE-2019-12816
|
static int validate_geneve_opts(struct sw_flow_key *key)
{
struct geneve_opt *option;
int opts_len = key->tun_opts_len;
bool crit_opt = false;
option = (struct geneve_opt *)TUN_METADATA_OPTS(key, key->tun_opts_len);
while (opts_len > 0) {
int len;
if (opts_len < sizeof(*option))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(*option) + option->length * 4;
if (len > opts_len)
return -EINVAL;
crit_opt |= !!(option->type & GENEVE_CRIT_OPT_TYPE);
option = (struct geneve_opt *)((u8 *)option + len);
opts_len -= len;
}
key->tun_key.tun_flags |= crit_opt ? TUNNEL_CRIT_OPT : 0;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
cefa91b2332d7009bc0be5d951d6cbbf349f90f8
| 97,572,522,218,530,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
openvswitch: fix OOB access in reserve_sfa_size()
Given a sufficiently large number of actions, while copying and
reserving memory for a new action of a new flow, if next_offset is
greater than MAX_ACTIONS_BUFSIZE, the function reserve_sfa_size() does
not return -EMSGSIZE as expected, but it allocates MAX_ACTIONS_BUFSIZE
bytes increasing actions_len by req_size. This can then lead to an OOB
write access, especially when further actions need to be copied.
Fix it by rearranging the flow action size check.
KASAN splat below:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in reserve_sfa_size+0x1ba/0x380 [openvswitch]
Write of size 65360 at addr ffff888147e4001c by task handler15/836
CPU: 1 PID: 836 Comm: handler15 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ #27
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a
print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
? __lock_text_start+0x8/0x8
? reserve_sfa_size+0x1ba/0x380 [openvswitch]
kasan_report+0xb5/0x130
? reserve_sfa_size+0x1ba/0x380 [openvswitch]
kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0
memcpy+0x39/0x60
reserve_sfa_size+0x1ba/0x380 [openvswitch]
__add_action+0x24/0x120 [openvswitch]
ovs_nla_add_action+0xe/0x20 [openvswitch]
ovs_ct_copy_action+0x29d/0x1130 [openvswitch]
? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
? unwind_get_return_address+0x56/0xa0
? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x20/0x20
? ovs_ct_verify+0xf0/0xf0 [openvswitch]
? prep_compound_page+0x198/0x2a0
? __kasan_check_byte+0x10/0x40
? kasan_unpoison+0x40/0x70
? ksize+0x44/0x60
? reserve_sfa_size+0x75/0x380 [openvswitch]
__ovs_nla_copy_actions+0xc26/0x2070 [openvswitch]
? __zone_watermark_ok+0x420/0x420
? validate_set.constprop.0+0xc90/0xc90 [openvswitch]
? __alloc_pages+0x1a9/0x3e0
? __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0x1da0/0x1da0
? unwind_next_frame+0x991/0x1e40
? __mod_node_page_state+0x99/0x120
? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x2e3/0x470
? __kasan_kmalloc_large+0x90/0xe0
ovs_nla_copy_actions+0x1b4/0x2c0 [openvswitch]
ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x3cd/0xb10 [openvswitch]
...
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: f28cd2af22a0 ("openvswitch: fix flow actions reallocation")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Valerio <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void wait_current_trans_commit_start(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_transaction *trans)
{
wait_event(root->fs_info->transaction_blocked_wait, trans->in_commit);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
| 322,629,183,913,907,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
|
ins_horscroll(void)
{
pos_T tpos;
undisplay_dollar();
tpos = curwin->w_cursor;
if (gui_do_horiz_scroll(scrollbar_value, FALSE))
{
start_arrow(&tpos);
# ifdef FEAT_CINDENT
can_cindent = TRUE;
# endif
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
vim
|
98a336dd497d3422e7efeef9f24cc9e25aeb8a49
| 282,598,213,820,197,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
patch 8.2.0133: invalid memory access with search command
Problem: Invalid memory access with search command.
Solution: When :normal runs out of characters in bracketed paste mode break
out of the loop.(closes #5511)
|
void rose_stop_idletimer(struct sock *sk)
{
sk_stop_timer(sk, &rose_sk(sk)->idletimer);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
9cc02ede696272c5271a401e4f27c262359bc2f6
| 289,677,318,756,966,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
net: rose: fix UAF bugs caused by timer handler
There are UAF bugs in rose_heartbeat_expiry(), rose_timer_expiry()
and rose_idletimer_expiry(). The root cause is that del_timer()
could not stop the timer handler that is running and the refcount
of sock is not managed properly.
One of the UAF bugs is shown below:
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
| rose_bind
| rose_connect
| rose_start_heartbeat
rose_release | (wait a time)
case ROSE_STATE_0 |
rose_destroy_socket | rose_heartbeat_expiry
rose_stop_heartbeat |
sock_put(sk) | ...
sock_put(sk) // FREE |
| bh_lock_sock(sk) // USE
The sock is deallocated by sock_put() in rose_release() and
then used by bh_lock_sock() in rose_heartbeat_expiry().
Although rose_destroy_socket() calls rose_stop_heartbeat(),
it could not stop the timer that is running.
The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800ae59098 by task swapper/3/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x230
? irq_work_single+0xbb/0x140
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_report+0xed/0x120
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0
_raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
rose_heartbeat_expiry+0x39/0x370
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
expire_timers+0x1f3/0x320
__run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0
run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80
__do_softirq+0x233/0x544
irq_exit_rcu+0x41/0xa0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x10
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000012fea0 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 000000000000bcae RBX: ffff888006660f00 RCX: 000000000000bcae
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff843a11c0 RDI: ffffffff843a1180
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffed100da36d46
R10: dfffe9100da36d47 R11: ffffffff83cf0950 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 1ffff11000ccc1e0 R14: ffffffff8542af28 R15: dffffc0000000000
...
Allocated by task 146:
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xf0
sk_prot_alloc+0xdd/0x1a0
sk_alloc+0x2d/0x4e0
rose_create+0x7b/0x330
__sock_create+0x2dd/0x640
__sys_socket+0xc7/0x270
__x64_sys_socket+0x71/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Freed by task 152:
kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x70
kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x190
kfree+0xd3/0x270
__sk_destruct+0x314/0x460
rose_release+0x2fa/0x3b0
sock_close+0xcb/0x230
__fput+0x2d9/0x650
task_work_run+0xd6/0x160
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xc7/0xd0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x4e/0x80
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This patch adds refcount of sock when we use functions
such as rose_start_heartbeat() and so on to start timer,
and decreases the refcount of sock when timer is finished
or deleted by functions such as rose_stop_heartbeat()
and so on. As a result, the UAF bugs could be mitigated.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
|
static int build_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->portid, 0, XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE, sizeof(*ue), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ue = nlmsg_data(nlh);
copy_to_user_state(x, &ue->state);
ue->hard = (c->data.hard != 0) ? 1 : 0;
/* clear the padding bytes */
memset(&ue->hard + 1, 0, sizeof(*ue) - offsetofend(typeof(*ue), hard));
err = xfrm_mark_put(skb, &x->mark);
if (err)
return err;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2
| 43,000,849,213,583,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
static void *conn_timeout_thread(void *arg) {
int i;
conn *c;
char buf[TIMEOUT_MSG_SIZE];
rel_time_t oldest_last_cmd;
int sleep_time;
useconds_t timeslice = 1000000 / (max_fds / CONNS_PER_SLICE);
while(1) {
if (settings.verbose > 2)
fprintf(stderr, "idle timeout thread at top of connection list\n");
oldest_last_cmd = current_time;
for (i = 0; i < max_fds; i++) {
if ((i % CONNS_PER_SLICE) == 0) {
if (settings.verbose > 2)
fprintf(stderr, "idle timeout thread sleeping for %dus\n",
timeslice);
usleep(timeslice);
}
if (!conns[i])
continue;
c = conns[i];
if (!IS_TCP(c->transport))
continue;
if (c->state != conn_new_cmd && c->state != conn_read)
continue;
if ((current_time - c->last_cmd_time) > settings.idle_timeout) {
buf[0] = 't';
memcpy(&buf[1], &i, sizeof(int));
if (write(c->thread->notify_send_fd, buf, TIMEOUT_MSG_SIZE)
!= TIMEOUT_MSG_SIZE)
perror("Failed to write timeout to notify pipe");
} else {
if (c->last_cmd_time < oldest_last_cmd)
oldest_last_cmd = c->last_cmd_time;
}
}
/* This is the soonest we could have another connection time out */
sleep_time = settings.idle_timeout - (current_time - oldest_last_cmd) + 1;
if (sleep_time <= 0)
sleep_time = 1;
if (settings.verbose > 2)
fprintf(stderr,
"idle timeout thread finished pass, sleeping for %ds\n",
sleep_time);
usleep((useconds_t) sleep_time * 1000000);
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
memcached
|
bd578fc34b96abe0f8d99c1409814a09f51ee71c
| 520,100,209,692,864,900,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 |
CVE reported by cisco talos
|
void PngChunk::decodeIHDRChunk(const DataBuf& data,
int* outWidth,
int* outHeight)
{
assert(data.size_ >= 8);
// Extract image width and height from IHDR chunk.
*outWidth = getLong((const byte*)data.pData_, bigEndian);
*outHeight = getLong((const byte*)data.pData_ + 4, bigEndian);
} // PngChunk::decodeIHDRChunk
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
exiv2
|
35b3e596edacd2437c2c5d3dd2b5c9502626163d
| 79,036,492,518,388,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Add overflow & overread checks to PngChunk::parseTXTChunk()
This function was creating a lot of new pointers and strings without
properly checking the array bounds. This commit adds several calls
to enforce(), making sure that the pointers stay within bounds.
Strings are now created using the helper function
string_from_unterminated() to prevent overreads in the constructor of
std::string.
This fixes #400
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageCopyMerge (gdImagePtr dst, gdImagePtr src, int dstX, int dstY,
int srcX, int srcY, int w, int h, int pct)
{
int c, dc;
int x, y;
int tox, toy;
int ncR, ncG, ncB;
toy = dstY;
for (y = srcY; (y < (srcY + h)); y++) {
tox = dstX;
for (x = srcX; (x < (srcX + w)); x++) {
int nc;
c = gdImageGetPixel (src, x, y);
/* Added 7/24/95: support transparent copies */
if (gdImageGetTransparent (src) == c) {
tox++;
continue;
}
/* If it's the same image, mapping is trivial */
if (dst == src) {
nc = c;
} else {
dc = gdImageGetPixel (dst, tox, toy);
ncR = gdImageRed (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ gdImageRed (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncG = gdImageGreen (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ gdImageGreen (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
ncB = gdImageBlue (src, c) * (pct / 100.0)
+ gdImageBlue (dst, dc) * ((100 - pct) / 100.0);
/* Find a reasonable color */
nc = gdImageColorResolve (dst, ncR, ncG, ncB);
}
gdImageSetPixel (dst, tox, toy, nc);
tox++;
}
toy++;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
libgd
|
77f619d48259383628c3ec4654b1ad578e9eb40e
| 9,603,591,604,405,955,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 |
fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
|
static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk,
struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct sk_buff_head *queue,
struct inet_cork *cork,
struct inet6_cork *v6_cork,
struct page_frag *pfrag,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
unsigned int flags, struct ipcm6_cookie *ipc6,
const struct sockcm_cookie *sockc)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen, mtu, orig_mtu;
int exthdrlen = 0;
int dst_exthdrlen = 0;
int hh_len;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
u32 tskey = 0;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = v6_cork->opt;
int csummode = CHECKSUM_NONE;
unsigned int maxnonfragsize, headersize;
skb = skb_peek_tail(queue);
if (!skb) {
exthdrlen = opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
}
mtu = cork->fragsize;
orig_mtu = mtu;
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
(opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) +
(dst_allfrag(&rt->dst) ?
sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) +
rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
if (cork->length + length > mtu - headersize && ipc6->dontfrag &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP ||
sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_RAW)) {
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu - headersize +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
goto emsgsize;
}
if (ip6_sk_ignore_df(sk))
maxnonfragsize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN;
else
maxnonfragsize = mtu;
if (cork->length + length > maxnonfragsize - headersize) {
emsgsize:
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6,
mtu - headersize +
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
/* CHECKSUM_PARTIAL only with no extension headers and when
* we are not going to fragment
*/
if (transhdrlen && sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP &&
headersize == sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) &&
length <= mtu - headersize &&
!(flags & MSG_MORE) &&
rt->dst.dev->features & (NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM))
csummode = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM || sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, sockc->tsflags, &tx_flags);
if (tx_flags & SKBTX_ANY_SW_TSTAMP &&
sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID)
tskey = sk->sk_tskey++;
}
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if ((((length + (skb ? skb->len : headersize)) > mtu) ||
(skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO) && !dst_xfrm(&rt->dst) &&
(sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) && !udp_get_no_check6_tx(sk)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, queue, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen, exthdrlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, fl6);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
if (!skb)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (!skb || !skb_prev)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt,
orig_mtu);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(!skb))
err = -ENOBUFS;
}
if (!skb)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = csummode;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
/* Only the initial fragment is time stamped */
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
tx_flags = 0;
skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey = tskey;
tskey = 0;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
if (copy > 0 &&
getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset,
copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
if ((flags & MSG_CONFIRM) && !skb_prev)
skb_set_dst_pending_confirm(skb, 1);
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
refcount_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
net
|
85f1bd9a7b5a79d5baa8bf44af19658f7bf77bfa
| 8,125,454,131,355,751,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 315 |
udp: consistently apply ufo or fragmentation
When iteratively building a UDP datagram with MSG_MORE and that
datagram exceeds MTU, consistently choose UFO or fragmentation.
Once skb_is_gso, always apply ufo. Conversely, once a datagram is
split across multiple skbs, do not consider ufo.
Sendpage already maintains the first invariant, only add the second.
IPv6 does not have a sendpage implementation to modify.
A gso skb must have a partial checksum, do not follow sk_no_check_tx
in udp_send_skb.
Found by syzkaller.
Fixes: e89e9cf539a2 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void ion_handle_destroy(struct kref *kref)
{
struct ion_handle *handle = container_of(kref, struct ion_handle, ref);
struct ion_client *client = handle->client;
struct ion_buffer *buffer = handle->buffer;
mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
while (handle->kmap_cnt)
ion_handle_kmap_put(handle);
mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
idr_remove(&client->idr, handle->id);
if (!RB_EMPTY_NODE(&handle->node))
rb_erase(&handle->node, &client->handles);
ion_buffer_remove_from_handle(buffer);
ion_buffer_put(buffer);
kfree(handle);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7
| 45,920,932,029,961,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void vmxnet3_update_rx_mode(VMXNET3State *s)
{
s->rx_mode = VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED32(s->drv_shmem,
devRead.rxFilterConf.rxMode);
VMW_CFPRN("RX mode: 0x%08X", s->rx_mode);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
qemu
|
a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b9dadebe2ae25e48
| 197,373,660,587,640,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
net/vmxnet3: Refine l2 header validation
Validation of l2 header length assumed minimal packet size as
eth_header + 2 * vlan_header regardless of the actual protocol.
This caused crash for valid non-IP packets shorter than 22 bytes, as
'tx_pkt->packet_type' hasn't been assigned for such packets, and
'vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats()' expects it to be properly set.
Refine header length validation in 'vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers'.
Check its return value during packet processing flow.
As a side effect, in case IPv4 and IPv6 header validation failure,
corrupt packets will be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Dana Rubin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
|
int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, int delay_iput,
int nr)
{
struct btrfs_root *root;
struct list_head splice;
int ret;
if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR, &fs_info->fs_state))
return -EROFS;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&splice);
mutex_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex);
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
list_splice_init(&fs_info->delalloc_roots, &splice);
while (!list_empty(&splice) && nr) {
root = list_first_entry(&splice, struct btrfs_root,
delalloc_root);
root = btrfs_grab_fs_root(root);
BUG_ON(!root);
list_move_tail(&root->delalloc_root,
&fs_info->delalloc_roots);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
ret = __start_delalloc_inodes(root, delay_iput, nr);
btrfs_put_fs_root(root);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
if (nr != -1) {
nr -= ret;
WARN_ON(nr < 0);
}
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
ret = 0;
atomic_inc(&fs_info->async_submit_draining);
while (atomic_read(&fs_info->nr_async_submits) ||
atomic_read(&fs_info->async_delalloc_pages)) {
wait_event(fs_info->async_submit_wait,
(atomic_read(&fs_info->nr_async_submits) == 0 &&
atomic_read(&fs_info->async_delalloc_pages) == 0));
}
atomic_dec(&fs_info->async_submit_draining);
out:
if (!list_empty_careful(&splice)) {
spin_lock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
list_splice_tail(&splice, &fs_info->delalloc_roots);
spin_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_lock);
}
mutex_unlock(&fs_info->delalloc_root_mutex);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
| 259,518,798,846,071,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
uint32_t CompactProtocolWriter::writeBinary(folly::ByteRange str) {
uint32_t size = str.size();
uint32_t result = apache::thrift::util::writeVarint(out_, (int32_t)size);
out_.push(str.data(), size);
return result + size;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-770"
] |
fbthrift
|
c9a903e5902834e95bbd4ab0e9fa53ba0189f351
| 134,447,894,087,008,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Better handling of truncated data when reading strings
Summary:
Currently we read string size and blindly pre-allocate it. This allows malicious attacker to send a few bytes message and cause server to allocate huge amount of memory (>1GB).
This diff changes the logic to check if we have enough data in the buffer before allocating the string.
This is a second part of a fix for CVE-2019-3553.
Reviewed By: vitaut
Differential Revision: D14393393
fbshipit-source-id: e2046d2f5b087d3abc9a9d2c6c107cf088673057
|
static int local_chown(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path, FsCred *credp)
{
char *dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(fs_path->data);
char *name = g_path_get_basename(fs_path->data);
int ret = -1;
int dirfd;
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
goto out;
}
if ((credp->fc_uid == -1 && credp->fc_gid == -1) ||
(fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_PASSTHROUGH) ||
(fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_NONE)) {
ret = fchownat(dirfd, name, credp->fc_uid, credp->fc_gid,
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
} else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
ret = local_set_xattrat(dirfd, name, credp);
} else if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
ret = local_set_mapped_file_attrat(dirfd, name, credp);
}
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
out:
g_free(name);
g_free(dirpath);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-732"
] |
qemu
|
9c6b899f7a46893ab3b671e341a2234e9c0c060e
| 230,247,493,570,276,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
9pfs: local: set the path of the export root to "."
The local backend was recently converted to using "at*()" syscalls in order
to ensure all accesses happen below the shared directory. This requires that
we only pass relative paths, otherwise the dirfd argument to the "at*()"
syscalls is ignored and the path is treated as an absolute path in the host.
This is actually the case for paths in all fids, with the notable exception
of the root fid, whose path is "/". This causes the following backend ops to
act on the "/" directory of the host instead of the virtfs shared directory
when the export root is involved:
- lstat
- chmod
- chown
- utimensat
ie, chmod /9p_mount_point in the guest will be converted to chmod / in the
host for example. This could cause security issues with a privileged QEMU.
All "*at()" syscalls are being passed an open file descriptor. In the case
of the export root, this file descriptor points to the path in the host that
was passed to -fsdev.
The fix is thus as simple as changing the path of the export root fid to be
"." instead of "/".
This is CVE-2017-7471.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Léo Gaspard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit ip6gre_fini(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ip6gre_tap_ops);
rtnl_link_unregister(&ip6gre_link_ops);
inet6_del_protocol(&ip6gre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
unregister_pernet_device(&ip6gre_net_ops);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
net
|
7892032cfe67f4bde6fc2ee967e45a8fbaf33756
| 190,547,075,259,292,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
ip6_gre: fix ip6gre_err() invalid reads
Andrey Konovalov reported out of bound accesses in ip6gre_err()
If GRE flags contains GRE_KEY, the following expression
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1)
accesses data ~40 bytes after the expected point, since
grehlen includes the size of IPv6 headers.
Let's use a "struct gre_base_hdr *greh" pointer to make this
code more readable.
p[1] becomes greh->protocol.
grhlen is the GRE header length.
Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
R_API int r_socket_close (RSocket *s) {
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
radare2
|
04edfa82c1f3fa2bc3621ccdad2f93bdbf00e4f9
| 213,972,358,556,761,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix command injection on PDB download (#16966)
* Fix r_sys_mkdirp with absolute path on Windows
* Fix build with --with-openssl
* Use RBuffer in r_socket_http_answer()
* r_socket_http_answer: Fix read for big responses
* Implement r_str_escape_sh()
* Cleanup r_socket_connect() on Windows
* Fix socket being created without a protocol
* Fix socket connect with SSL ##socket
* Use select() in r_socket_ready()
* Fix read failing if received only protocol answer
* Fix double-free
* r_socket_http_get: Fail if req. SSL with no support
* Follow redirects in r_socket_http_answer()
* Fix r_socket_http_get result length with R2_CURL=1
* Also follow redirects
* Avoid using curl for downloading PDBs
* Use r_socket_http_get() on UNIXs
* Use WinINet API on Windows for r_socket_http_get()
* Fix command injection
* Fix r_sys_cmd_str_full output for binary data
* Validate GUID on PDB download
* Pass depth to socket_http_get_recursive()
* Remove 'r_' and '__' from static function names
* Fix is_valid_guid
* Fix for comments
|
static int snd_pcm_oss_get_trigger(struct snd_pcm_oss_file *pcm_oss_file)
{
struct snd_pcm_substream *psubstream = NULL, *csubstream = NULL;
int result = 0;
psubstream = pcm_oss_file->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_PLAYBACK];
csubstream = pcm_oss_file->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE];
if (psubstream && psubstream->runtime && psubstream->runtime->oss.trigger)
result |= PCM_ENABLE_OUTPUT;
if (csubstream && csubstream->runtime && csubstream->runtime->oss.trigger)
result |= PCM_ENABLE_INPUT;
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
8423f0b6d513b259fdab9c9bf4aaa6188d054c2d
| 259,250,861,081,269,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix race at SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC
There is a small race window at snd_pcm_oss_sync() that is called from
OSS PCM SNDCTL_DSP_SYNC ioctl; namely the function calls
snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() at first, then takes the params_lock mutex
for the rest. When the stream is set up again by another thread
between them, it leads to inconsistency, and may result in unexpected
results such as NULL dereference of OSS buffer as a fuzzer spotted
recently.
The fix is simply to cover snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() call into the same
params_lock mutex with snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked() variant.
Reported-and-tested-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAFcO6XN7JDM4xSXGhtusQfS2mSBcx50VJKwQpCq=WeLt57aaZA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int nft_flow_offload_cmd(const struct nft_chain *chain,
const struct nft_rule *rule,
struct nft_flow_rule *flow,
enum flow_cls_command command,
struct flow_cls_offload *cls_flow)
{
struct netlink_ext_ack extack = {};
struct nft_base_chain *basechain;
if (!nft_is_base_chain(chain))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
basechain = nft_base_chain(chain);
nft_flow_cls_offload_setup(cls_flow, basechain, rule, flow, &extack,
command);
return nft_setup_cb_call(TC_SETUP_CLSFLOWER, cls_flow,
&basechain->flow_block.cb_list);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
nf
|
b1a5983f56e371046dcf164f90bfaf704d2b89f6
| 295,045,308,353,311,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
netfilter: nf_tables_offload: incorrect flow offload action array size
immediate verdict expression needs to allocate one slot in the flow offload
action array, however, immediate data expression does not need to do so.
fwd and dup expression need to allocate one slot, this is missing.
Add a new offload_action interface to report if this expression needs to
allocate one slot in the flow offload action array.
Fixes: be2861dc36d7 ("netfilter: nft_{fwd,dup}_netdev: add offload support")
Reported-and-tested-by: Nick Gregory <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
bool Field_longstr::can_optimize_group_min_max(const Item_bool_func *cond,
const Item *const_item) const
{
/*
Can't use indexes when comparing a string to a number or a date
Don't use an index when comparing strings of different collations.
*/
DBUG_ASSERT(cmp_type() == STRING_RESULT);
return cmp_to_string_with_same_collation(cond, const_item);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 4,098,569,837,849,221,600,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
getCutPathForHole(PIX *pix,
PTA *pta,
BOX *boxinner,
l_int32 *pdir,
l_int32 *plen)
{
l_int32 w, h, nc, x, y, xl, yl, xmid, ymid;
l_uint32 val;
PTA *ptac;
PROCNAME("getCutPathForHole");
if (!pix)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pix not defined", procName, NULL);
if (!pta)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not defined", procName, NULL);
if (!boxinner)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("boxinner not defined", procName, NULL);
pixGetDimensions(pix, &w, &h, NULL);
ptac = ptaCreate(4);
xmid = boxinner->x + boxinner->w / 2;
ymid = boxinner->y + boxinner->h / 2;
/* try top first */
for (y = ymid; y >= 0; y--) {
pixGetPixel(pix, xmid, y, &val);
if (val == 1) {
ptaAddPt(ptac, xmid, y);
break;
}
}
for (y = y - 1; y >= 0; y--) {
pixGetPixel(pix, xmid, y, &val);
if (val == 1)
ptaAddPt(ptac, xmid, y);
else
break;
}
nc = ptaGetCount(ptac);
ptaGetIPt(ptac, nc - 1, &xl, &yl);
if (ptaContainsPt(pta, xl, yl)) {
*pdir = 1;
*plen = nc;
return ptac;
}
/* Next try bottom */
ptaEmpty(ptac);
for (y = ymid; y < h; y++) {
pixGetPixel(pix, xmid, y, &val);
if (val == 1) {
ptaAddPt(ptac, xmid, y);
break;
}
}
for (y = y + 1; y < h; y++) {
pixGetPixel(pix, xmid, y, &val);
if (val == 1)
ptaAddPt(ptac, xmid, y);
else
break;
}
nc = ptaGetCount(ptac);
ptaGetIPt(ptac, nc - 1, &xl, &yl);
if (ptaContainsPt(pta, xl, yl)) {
*pdir = 3;
*plen = nc;
return ptac;
}
/* Next try left */
ptaEmpty(ptac);
for (x = xmid; x >= 0; x--) {
pixGetPixel(pix, x, ymid, &val);
if (val == 1) {
ptaAddPt(ptac, x, ymid);
break;
}
}
for (x = x - 1; x >= 0; x--) {
pixGetPixel(pix, x, ymid, &val);
if (val == 1)
ptaAddPt(ptac, x, ymid);
else
break;
}
nc = ptaGetCount(ptac);
ptaGetIPt(ptac, nc - 1, &xl, &yl);
if (ptaContainsPt(pta, xl, yl)) {
*pdir = 0;
*plen = nc;
return ptac;
}
/* Finally try right */
ptaEmpty(ptac);
for (x = xmid; x < w; x++) {
pixGetPixel(pix, x, ymid, &val);
if (val == 1) {
ptaAddPt(ptac, x, ymid);
break;
}
}
for (x = x + 1; x < w; x++) {
pixGetPixel(pix, x, ymid, &val);
if (val == 1)
ptaAddPt(ptac, x, ymid);
else
break;
}
nc = ptaGetCount(ptac);
ptaGetIPt(ptac, nc - 1, &xl, &yl);
if (ptaContainsPt(pta, xl, yl)) {
*pdir = 2;
*plen = nc;
return ptac;
}
/* If we get here, we've failed! */
ptaEmpty(ptac);
L_WARNING("no path found\n", procName);
*plen = 0;
return ptac;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
leptonica
|
8d6e1755518cfb98536d6c3daf0601f226d16842
| 38,512,045,883,090,696,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 125 |
Issue 23433 in oss-fuzz: Heap-buffer-overflow in findNextBorderPixel()
* Check pix boundary when looking for the next pixel.
|
static void *default_malloc(size_t size, void *allocdata UNUSED)
{
void *ptr = malloc(size);
if(ptr)
memset(ptr, 0, size);
return ptr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
vim
|
cd929f7ba8cc5b6d6dcf35c8b34124e969fed6b8
| 313,177,874,962,179,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
patch 8.1.0633: crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window
Problem: Crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window.
Solution: Handle out-of-memory more gracefully.
|
TPMI_RH_ACT_Unmarshal( TPMI_RH_ACT *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
TPM_RC rc = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPM_HANDLE_Unmarshal(target, buffer, size);
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
BOOL isNotACT = (*target < TPM_RH_ACT_0) || (*target > TPM_RH_ACT_F);
if (isNotACT) {
rc = TPM_RC_VALUE;
}
}
return rc;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libtpms
|
5cc98a62dc6f204dcf5b87c2ee83ac742a6a319b
| 79,366,039,648,806,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
tpm2: Restore original value if unmarshalled value was illegal
Restore the original value of the memory location where data from
a stream was unmarshalled and the unmarshalled value was found to
be illegal. The goal is to not keep illegal values in memory.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
|
create_contact_dtor (LDAPOp *op)
{
LDAPCreateOp *create_op = (LDAPCreateOp *) op;
g_free (create_op->dn);
g_object_unref (create_op->new_contact);
g_free (create_op);
}
| 0 |
[] |
evolution-data-server
|
34bad61738e2127736947ac50e0c7969cc944972
| 204,838,519,693,034,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Bug 796174 - strcat() considered unsafe for buffer overflow
|
static long btrfs_ioctl_dev_info(struct btrfs_root *root, void __user *arg)
{
struct btrfs_ioctl_dev_info_args *di_args;
struct btrfs_device *dev;
struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices = root->fs_info->fs_devices;
int ret = 0;
char *s_uuid = NULL;
di_args = memdup_user(arg, sizeof(*di_args));
if (IS_ERR(di_args))
return PTR_ERR(di_args);
if (!btrfs_is_empty_uuid(di_args->uuid))
s_uuid = di_args->uuid;
mutex_lock(&fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
dev = btrfs_find_device(root->fs_info, di_args->devid, s_uuid, NULL);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
di_args->devid = dev->devid;
di_args->bytes_used = btrfs_device_get_bytes_used(dev);
di_args->total_bytes = btrfs_device_get_total_bytes(dev);
memcpy(di_args->uuid, dev->uuid, sizeof(di_args->uuid));
if (dev->name) {
struct rcu_string *name;
rcu_read_lock();
name = rcu_dereference(dev->name);
strncpy(di_args->path, name->str, sizeof(di_args->path));
rcu_read_unlock();
di_args->path[sizeof(di_args->path) - 1] = 0;
} else {
di_args->path[0] = '\0';
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
if (ret == 0 && copy_to_user(arg, di_args, sizeof(*di_args)))
ret = -EFAULT;
kfree(di_args);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
8039d87d9e473aeb740d4fdbd59b9d2f89b2ced9
| 268,625,104,535,778,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning inline extents
Currently the clone ioctl allows to clone an inline extent from one file
to another that already has other (non-inlined) extents. This is a problem
because btrfs is not designed to deal with files having inline and regular
extents, if a file has an inline extent then it must be the only extent
in the file and must start at file offset 0. Having a file with an inline
extent followed by regular extents results in EIO errors when doing reads
or writes against the first 4K of the file.
Also, the clone ioctl allows one to lose data if the source file consists
of a single inline extent, with a size of N bytes, and the destination
file consists of a single inline extent with a size of M bytes, where we
have M > N. In this case the clone operation removes the inline extent
from the destination file and then copies the inline extent from the
source file into the destination file - we lose the M - N bytes from the
destination file, a read operation will get the value 0x00 for any bytes
in the the range [N, M] (the destination inode's i_size remained as M,
that's why we can read past N bytes).
So fix this by not allowing such destructive operations to happen and
return errno EOPNOTSUPP to user space.
Currently the fstest btrfs/035 tests the data loss case but it totally
ignores this - i.e. expects the operation to succeed and does not check
the we got data loss.
The following test case for fstests exercises all these cases that result
in file corruption and data loss:
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
_require_btrfs_fs_feature "no_holes"
_require_btrfs_mkfs_feature "no-holes"
rm -f $seqres.full
test_cloning_inline_extents()
{
local mkfs_opts=$1
local mount_opts=$2
_scratch_mkfs $mkfs_opts >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount $mount_opts
# File bar, the source for all the following clone operations, consists
# of a single inline extent (50 bytes).
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 50" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar \
| _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning into a file with an extent (non-inlined) where the
# destination offset overlaps that extent. It should not be possible to
# clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0xaa (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 0 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a hole in its
# first 4K followed by a non-inlined extent. It should not be possible
# as well to clone the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 4K 12K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "File foo2 data after clone operation:"
# All bytes should have the value 0x00 (clone operation failed and did
# not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size of zero
# but has a prealloc extent. It should not be possible as well to clone
# the inline extent from file bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
# Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent,
# these operations resulted in EIO errors.
echo "First 50 bytes of foo3 after clone operation:"
# Should not be able to read any bytes, file has 0 bytes i_size (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size not greater than the size of
# bar's inline extent (40 < 50).
# It should be possible to do the extent cloning from bar to this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x01 0 40" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
# Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work.
echo "File foo4 data after clone operation:"
# Must match file bar's content.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0x02 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 | _filter_xfs_io
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a
# single inline extent that has a size greater than the size of bar's
# inline extent (60 > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x03 0 60" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 \
| _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo5 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 60 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x03
# (the clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size greater than bar's inline extent (16K > 50).
# It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar
# into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo6 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 16K, with all bytes having a value of 0x00 (the
# clone operation failed and did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but
# has a size not greater than bar's inline extent (30 < 50).
# It should be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar into
# this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 30" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Reading the file should not fail.
echo "File foo7 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 50 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0xbb.
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7
# Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size not
# greater than the size of bar's inline extent (20 < 50) but has
# a prealloc extent that goes beyond the file's size. It should not be
# possible to clone the inline extent from bar into this file.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x88 0 20" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 | _filter_xfs_io
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
echo "File foo8 data after clone operation:"
# Must have a size of 20 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x88
# (the clone operation did not modify our file).
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8
_scratch_unmount
}
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and without the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "" "-o compress"
echo -e "\nTesting without compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" ""
echo -e "\nTesting with compression and with the no-holes feature...\n"
test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "-o compress"
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
static int rtl_usb_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
{
int err;
struct rtl_priv *rtlpriv = rtl_priv(hw);
struct rtl_hal *rtlhal = rtl_hal(rtl_priv(hw));
struct rtl_usb *rtlusb = rtl_usbdev(rtl_usbpriv(hw));
err = rtlpriv->cfg->ops->hw_init(hw);
if (!err) {
rtl_init_rx_config(hw);
/* Enable software */
SET_USB_START(rtlusb);
/* should after adapter start and interrupt enable. */
set_hal_start(rtlhal);
/* Start bulk IN */
err = _rtl_usb_receive(hw);
}
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
3f93616951138a598d930dcaec40f2bfd9ce43bb
| 311,177,069,394,380,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
rtlwifi: prevent memory leak in rtl_usb_probe
In rtl_usb_probe if allocation for usb_data fails the allocated hw
should be released. In addition the allocated rtlpriv->usb_data should
be released on error handling path.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
void OwnedImpl::coalesceOrAddSlice(SlicePtr&& other_slice) {
const uint64_t slice_size = other_slice->dataSize();
// The `other_slice` content can be coalesced into the existing slice IFF:
// 1. The `other_slice` can be coalesced. Objects of type UnownedSlice can not be coalesced. See
// comment in the UnownedSlice class definition;
// 2. There are existing slices;
// 3. The `other_slice` content length is under the CopyThreshold;
// 4. There is enough unused space in the existing slice to accommodate the `other_slice` content.
if (other_slice->canCoalesce() && !slices_.empty() && slice_size < CopyThreshold &&
slices_.back()->reservableSize() >= slice_size) {
// Copy content of the `other_slice`. The `move` methods which call this method effectively
// drain the source buffer.
addImpl(other_slice->data(), slice_size);
other_slice->transferDrainTrackersTo(*slices_.back());
} else {
// Take ownership of the slice.
slices_.emplace_back(std::move(other_slice));
length_ += slice_size;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
envoy
|
5eba69a1f375413fb93fab4173f9c393ac8c2818
| 272,382,232,634,979,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
[buffer] Add on-drain hook to buffer API and use it to avoid fragmentation due to tracking of H2 data and control frames in the output buffer (#144)
Signed-off-by: antonio <[email protected]>
|
ReadChannelMasks (guint32 *tmp, Bitmap_Channel *masks, guint channels)
{
guint32 mask;
gint i, nbits, offset, bit;
for (i = 0; i < channels; i++)
{
mask = tmp[i];
masks[i].mask = mask;
nbits = 0;
offset = -1;
for (bit = 0; bit < 32; bit++)
{
if (mask & 1)
{
nbits++;
if (offset == -1)
offset = bit;
}
mask = mask >> 1;
}
masks[i].shiftin = offset;
masks[i].max_value = (gfloat)((1<<(nbits))-1);
#ifdef DEBUG
g_print ("Channel %d mask %08x in %d max_val %d\n",
i, masks[i].mask, masks[i].shiftin, (gint)masks[i].max_value);
#endif
}
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
gimp
|
e3afc99b2fa7aeddf0dba4778663160a5bc682d3
| 126,281,686,616,643,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
Harden the BMP plugin against integer overflows.
Issues discovered by Stefan Cornelius, Secunia Research, advisory SA37232
and CVE identifier CVE-2009-1570. Fixes bug #600484.
|
static void ttm_page_pool_init_locked(struct ttm_page_pool *pool, gfp_t flags,
char *name, unsigned int order)
{
spin_lock_init(&pool->lock);
pool->fill_lock = false;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pool->list);
pool->npages = pool->nfrees = 0;
pool->gfp_flags = flags;
pool->name = name;
pool->order = order;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
453393369dc9806d2455151e329c599684762428
| 65,296,453,804,878,305,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
drm/ttm: fix incrementing the page pointer for huge pages
When we increment the counter we need to increment the pointer as well.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Fixes: e16858a7e6e7 drm/ttm: fix start page for huge page check in ttm_put_pages()
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Huang Rui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
|
static inline int vhost_get_avail_head(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
__virtio16 *head, int idx)
{
return vhost_get_avail(vq, *head,
&vq->avail->ring[idx & (vq->num - 1)]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux
|
060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4
| 6,992,743,631,494,056,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
vhost: make sure log_num < in_num
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
|
lexer_string_is_use_strict (parser_context_t *context_p) /**< context */
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->token.type == LEXER_LITERAL
&& context_p->token.lit_location.type == LEXER_STRING_LITERAL);
return (context_p->token.lit_location.length == 10
&& !(context_p->token.lit_location.status_flags & LEXER_LIT_LOCATION_HAS_ESCAPE)
&& memcmp (context_p->token.lit_location.char_p, "use strict", 10) == 0);
} /* lexer_string_is_use_strict */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
jerryscript
|
3bcd48f72d4af01d1304b754ef19fe1a02c96049
| 282,877,611,564,678,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Improve parse_identifier (#4691)
Ascii string length is no longer computed during string allocation.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Daniel Batiz [email protected]
|
fr_archive_libarchive_init (FrArchiveLibarchive *self)
{
FrArchive *base = FR_ARCHIVE (self);
self->priv = fr_archive_libarchive_get_instance_private (self);
base->propAddCanReplace = TRUE;
base->propAddCanUpdate = TRUE;
base->propAddCanStoreFolders = TRUE;
base->propAddCanStoreLinks = TRUE;
base->propExtractCanAvoidOverwrite = TRUE;
base->propExtractCanSkipOlder = TRUE;
base->propExtractCanJunkPaths = TRUE;
base->propCanExtractAll = TRUE;
base->propCanDeleteNonEmptyFolders = TRUE;
base->propCanExtractNonEmptyFolders = TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
file-roller
|
21dfcdbfe258984db89fb65243a1a888924e45a0
| 143,878,052,298,161,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
libarchive: do not follow external links when extracting files
Do not extract a file if its parent is a symbolic link to a
directory external to the destination.
|
static int png_decode_idat(PNGDecContext *s, int length)
{
int ret;
s->zstream.avail_in = FFMIN(length, bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->gb));
s->zstream.next_in = (unsigned char *)s->gb.buffer;
bytestream2_skip(&s->gb, length);
/* decode one line if possible */
while (s->zstream.avail_in > 0) {
ret = inflate(&s->zstream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
if (ret != Z_OK && ret != Z_STREAM_END) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "inflate returned error %d\n", ret);
return AVERROR_EXTERNAL;
}
if (s->zstream.avail_out == 0) {
if (!(s->state & PNG_ALLIMAGE)) {
png_handle_row(s);
}
s->zstream.avail_out = s->crow_size;
s->zstream.next_out = s->crow_buf;
}
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END && s->zstream.avail_in > 0) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"%d undecompressed bytes left in buffer\n", s->zstream.avail_in);
return 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
FFmpeg
|
e371f031b942d73e02c090170975561fabd5c264
| 12,556,023,921,990,643,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
avcodec/pngdec: Fix off by 1 size in decode_zbuf()
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 444/fuzz-2-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_PNG_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
CNF_GetLeapSecMode(void)
{
return leapsec_mode;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59"
] |
chrony
|
e18903a6b56341481a2e08469c0602010bf7bfe3
| 60,925,484,911,447,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
switch to new util file functions
Replace all fopen(), rename(), and unlink() calls with the new util
functions.
|
static int unix_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
{
struct sock *ska = socka->sk, *skb = sockb->sk;
/* Join our sockets back to back */
sock_hold(ska);
sock_hold(skb);
unix_peer(ska) = skb;
unix_peer(skb) = ska;
init_peercred(ska);
init_peercred(skb);
ska->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
skb->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
socka->state = SS_CONNECTED;
sockb->state = SS_CONNECTED;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
35306eb23814444bd4021f8a1c3047d3cb0c8b2b
| 326,187,142,079,372,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
af_unix: fix races in sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred accesses
Jann Horn reported that SO_PEERCRED and SO_PEERGROUPS implementations
are racy, as af_unix can concurrently change sk_peer_pid and sk_peer_cred.
In order to fix this issue, this patch adds a new spinlock that needs
to be used whenever these fields are read or written.
Jann also pointed out that l2cap_sock_get_peer_pid_cb() is currently
reading sk->sk_peer_pid which makes no sense, as this field
is only possibly set by AF_UNIX sockets.
We will have to clean this in a separate patch.
This could be done by reverting b48596d1dc25 "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Add get_peer_pid callback"
or implementing what was truly expected.
Fixes: 109f6e39fa07 ("af_unix: Allow SO_PEERCRED to work across namespaces.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
inline T is_equal(T x, T y)
{
return is_zero(x ^ y);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
botan
|
bcf13fa153a11b3e0ad54e2af6962441cea3adf1
| 99,891,248,191,961,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fixes for CVE-2015-7827 and CVE-2016-2849
|
EncryptionUtilTest() { _aes_key = "doris_aes_key"; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
incubator-doris
|
246ac4e37aa4da6836b7850cb990f02d1c3725a3
| 62,248,683,456,245,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
[fix] fix a bug of encryption function with iv may return wrong result (#8277)
|
PJ_DEF(int) pj_scan_get_char( pj_scanner *scanner )
{
int chr = *scanner->curptr;
if (!chr) {
pj_scan_syntax_err(scanner);
return 0;
}
++scanner->curptr;
if (PJ_SCAN_IS_PROBABLY_SPACE(*scanner->curptr) && scanner->skip_ws) {
pj_scan_skip_whitespace(scanner);
}
return chr;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
pjproject
|
077b465c33f0aec05a49cd2ca456f9a1b112e896
| 250,257,059,547,301,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Merge pull request from GHSA-7fw8-54cv-r7pm
|
void HeaderMapImpl::HeaderEntryImpl::value(absl::string_view value) {
this->value(value.data(), static_cast<uint32_t>(value.size()));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014
| 28,620,410,736,662,837,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]>
|
iasecc_sdo_get_tagged_data(struct sc_card *card, int sdo_tag, struct iasecc_sdo *sdo)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char sbuf[0x100];
size_t offs = sizeof(sbuf) - 1;
unsigned char rbuf[0x400];
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sbuf[offs--] = 0x80;
sbuf[offs--] = sdo_tag & 0xFF;
if ((sdo_tag >> 8) & 0xFF)
sbuf[offs--] = (sdo_tag >> 8) & 0xFF;
sbuf[offs] = sizeof(sbuf) - offs - 1;
offs--;
sbuf[offs--] = sdo->sdo_ref & 0x9F;
sbuf[offs--] = sdo->sdo_class | IASECC_OBJECT_REF_LOCAL;
sbuf[offs--] = IASECC_SDO_TAG_HEADER;
sbuf[offs] = sizeof(sbuf) - offs - 1;
offs--;
sbuf[offs--] = IASECC_SDO_TEMPLATE_TAG;
sbuf[offs] = sizeof(sbuf) - offs - 1;
offs--;
sbuf[offs] = 0x4D;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xCB, 0x3F, 0xFF);
apdu.data = sbuf + offs;
apdu.datalen = sizeof(sbuf) - offs;
apdu.lc = sizeof(sbuf) - offs;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 0x100;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "SDO get data error");
rv = iasecc_sdo_parse(card, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen, sdo);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "cannot parse SDO data");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
OpenSC
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
| 25,529,644,230,219,157,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int binder_thread_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{
struct binder_transaction *t;
struct binder_transaction *send_reply = NULL;
int active_transactions = 0;
struct binder_transaction *last_t = NULL;
binder_inner_proc_lock(thread->proc);
/*
* take a ref on the proc so it survives
* after we remove this thread from proc->threads.
* The corresponding dec is when we actually
* free the thread in binder_free_thread()
*/
proc->tmp_ref++;
/*
* take a ref on this thread to ensure it
* survives while we are releasing it
*/
atomic_inc(&thread->tmp_ref);
rb_erase(&thread->rb_node, &proc->threads);
t = thread->transaction_stack;
if (t) {
spin_lock(&t->lock);
if (t->to_thread == thread)
send_reply = t;
}
thread->is_dead = true;
while (t) {
last_t = t;
active_transactions++;
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_DEAD_TRANSACTION,
"release %d:%d transaction %d %s, still active\n",
proc->pid, thread->pid,
t->debug_id,
(t->to_thread == thread) ? "in" : "out");
if (t->to_thread == thread) {
t->to_proc = NULL;
t->to_thread = NULL;
if (t->buffer) {
t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
t->buffer = NULL;
}
t = t->to_parent;
} else if (t->from == thread) {
t->from = NULL;
t = t->from_parent;
} else
BUG();
spin_unlock(&last_t->lock);
if (t)
spin_lock(&t->lock);
}
/*
* If this thread used poll, make sure we remove the waitqueue
* from any epoll data structures holding it with POLLFREE.
* waitqueue_active() is safe to use here because we're holding
* the inner lock.
*/
if ((thread->looper & BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL) &&
waitqueue_active(&thread->wait)) {
wake_up_poll(&thread->wait, EPOLLHUP | POLLFREE);
}
binder_inner_proc_unlock(thread->proc);
if (send_reply)
binder_send_failed_reply(send_reply, BR_DEAD_REPLY);
binder_release_work(proc, &thread->todo);
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(thread);
return active_transactions;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
5eeb2ca02a2f6084fc57ae5c244a38baab07033a
| 75,422,387,859,923,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 |
ANDROID: binder: synchronize_rcu() when using POLLFREE.
To prevent races with ep_remove_waitqueue() removing the
waitqueue at the same time.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void exif_process_TIFF_in_JPEG(image_info_type *ImageInfo, char *CharBuf, size_t length, size_t displacement TSRMLS_DC)
{
unsigned exif_value_2a, offset_of_ifd;
/* set the thumbnail stuff to nothing so we can test to see if they get set up */
if (memcmp(CharBuf, "II", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 0;
} else if (memcmp(CharBuf, "MM", 2) == 0) {
ImageInfo->motorola_intel = 1;
} else {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF alignment marker");
return;
}
/* Check the next two values for correctness. */
if (length < 8) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF start (1)");
return;
}
exif_value_2a = php_ifd_get16u(CharBuf+2, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
offset_of_ifd = php_ifd_get32u(CharBuf+4, ImageInfo->motorola_intel);
if (exif_value_2a != 0x2a || offset_of_ifd < 0x08) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid TIFF start (1)");
return;
}
if (offset_of_ifd > length) {
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_WARNING, "Invalid IFD start");
return;
}
ImageInfo->sections_found |= FOUND_IFD0;
/* First directory starts at offset 8. Offsets starts at 0. */
exif_process_IFD_in_JPEG(ImageInfo, CharBuf+offset_of_ifd, CharBuf, length/*-14*/, displacement, SECTION_IFD0 TSRMLS_CC);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Process TIFF in JPEG done");
#endif
/* Compute the CCD width, in milimeters. */
if (ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes != 0) {
ImageInfo->CCDWidth = (float)(ImageInfo->ExifImageWidth * ImageInfo->FocalplaneUnits / ImageInfo->FocalplaneXRes);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
1366c0362f1fa85e82bde9c0b393bd3bb3d32892
| 49,884,082,822,043,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
Fix bug #72094 - Out of bounds heap read access in exif header processing
|
static int remove_connection_headers (orderedmap hashofheaders)
{
static const char *headers[] = {
"connection",
"proxy-connection"
};
char *data;
char *ptr;
ssize_t len;
int i;
for (i = 0; i != (sizeof (headers) / sizeof (char *)); ++i) {
/* Look for the connection header. If it's not found, return. */
data = orderedmap_find(hashofheaders, headers[i]);
if (!data)
return 0;
len = strlen(data);
/*
* Go through the data line and replace any special characters
* with a NULL.
*/
ptr = data;
while ((ptr = strpbrk (ptr, "()<>@,;:\\\"/[]?={} \t")))
*ptr++ = '\0';
/*
* All the tokens are separated by NULLs. Now go through the
* token and remove them from the hashofheaders.
*/
ptr = data;
while (ptr < data + len) {
orderedmap_remove (hashofheaders, ptr);
/* Advance ptr to the next token */
ptr += strlen (ptr) + 1;
while (ptr < data + len && *ptr == '\0')
ptr++;
}
/* Now remove the connection header it self. */
orderedmap_remove (hashofheaders, headers[i]);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tinyproxy
|
3764b8551463b900b5b4e3ec0cd9bb9182191cb7
| 153,972,229,035,809,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
prevent junk from showing up in error page in invalid requests
fixes #457
|
static int net_client_init1(const Netdev *netdev, bool is_netdev, Error **errp)
{
NetClientState *peer = NULL;
NetClientState *nc;
if (is_netdev) {
if (netdev->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC ||
!net_client_init_fun[netdev->type]) {
error_setg(errp, QERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, "type",
"a netdev backend type");
return -1;
}
} else {
if (netdev->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NONE) {
return 0; /* nothing to do */
}
if (netdev->type == NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_HUBPORT ||
!net_client_init_fun[netdev->type]) {
error_setg(errp, QERR_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE, "type",
"a net backend type (maybe it is not compiled "
"into this binary)");
return -1;
}
/* Do not add to a hub if it's a nic with a netdev= parameter. */
if (netdev->type != NET_CLIENT_DRIVER_NIC ||
!netdev->u.nic.has_netdev) {
peer = net_hub_add_port(0, NULL, NULL);
}
}
nc = qemu_find_netdev(netdev->id);
if (nc) {
error_setg(errp, "Duplicate ID '%s'", netdev->id);
return -1;
}
if (net_client_init_fun[netdev->type](netdev, netdev->id, peer, errp) < 0) {
/* FIXME drop when all init functions store an Error */
if (errp && !*errp) {
error_setg(errp, "Device '%s' could not be initialized",
NetClientDriver_str(netdev->type));
}
return -1;
}
if (is_netdev) {
nc = qemu_find_netdev(netdev->id);
assert(nc);
nc->is_netdev = true;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
qemu
|
705df5466c98f3efdd2b68d3b31dad86858acad7
| 19,129,021,778,331,148,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
net: introduce qemu_receive_packet()
Some NIC supports loopback mode and this is done by calling
nc->info->receive() directly which in fact suppresses the effort of
reentrancy check that is done in qemu_net_queue_send().
Unfortunately we can't use qemu_net_queue_send() here since for
loopback there's no sender as peer, so this patch introduce a
qemu_receive_packet() which is used for implementing loopback mode
for a NIC with this check.
NIC that supports loopback mode will be converted to this helper.
This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
Cc: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
|
static void ff_layout_read_release(void *data)
{
struct nfs_pgio_header *hdr = data;
ff_layout_read_record_layoutstats_done(&hdr->task, hdr);
if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_RESEND_PNFS, &hdr->flags))
ff_layout_resend_pnfs_read(hdr);
else if (test_bit(NFS_IOHDR_RESEND_MDS, &hdr->flags))
ff_layout_reset_read(hdr);
pnfs_generic_rw_release(data);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925
| 8,856,986,107,342,943,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
pNFS/flexfiles: fix incorrect size check in decode_nfs_fh()
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
int TC_LOG_BINLOG::unlog(ulong cookie, my_xid xid)
{
DBUG_ENTER("TC_LOG_BINLOG::unlog");
mysql_mutex_lock(&LOCK_prep_xids);
// prepared_xids can be 0 if the transaction had ignorable errors.
DBUG_ASSERT(prepared_xids >= 0);
if (prepared_xids > 0)
prepared_xids--;
if (prepared_xids == 0) {
DBUG_PRINT("info", ("prepared_xids=%lu", prepared_xids));
mysql_cond_signal(&COND_prep_xids);
}
mysql_mutex_unlock(&LOCK_prep_xids);
DBUG_RETURN(rotate_and_purge(0)); // as ::write() did not rotate
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mysql-server
|
48bd8b16fe382be302c6f0b45931be5aa6f29a0e
| 45,874,938,044,277,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Bug#24388753: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING MYSQLD_SAFE
[This is the 5.5/5.6 version of the bugfix].
The problem was that it was possible to write log files ending
in .ini/.cnf that later could be parsed as an options file.
This made it possible for users to specify startup options
without the permissions to do so.
This patch fixes the problem by disallowing general query log
and slow query log to be written to files ending in .ini and .cnf.
|
static void ahash_op_unaligned_finish(struct ahash_request *req, int err)
{
struct ahash_request_priv *priv = req->priv;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
if (!err)
memcpy(priv->result, req->result,
crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req)));
ahash_restore_req(req);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
ef0579b64e93188710d48667cb5e014926af9f1b
| 273,392,265,733,652,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
crypto: ahash - Fix EINPROGRESS notification callback
The ahash API modifies the request's callback function in order
to clean up after itself in some corner cases (unaligned final
and missing finup).
When the request is complete ahash will restore the original
callback and everything is fine. However, when the request gets
an EBUSY on a full queue, an EINPROGRESS callback is made while
the request is still ongoing.
In this case the ahash API will incorrectly call its own callback.
This patch fixes the problem by creating a temporary request
object on the stack which is used to relay EINPROGRESS back to
the original completion function.
This patch also adds code to preserve the original flags value.
Fixes: ab6bf4e5e5e4 ("crypto: hash - Fix the pointer voodoo in...")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
R_API int r_config_free(RConfig *cfg) {
if (!cfg) {
return 0;
}
cfg->nodes->free = r_config_node_free; // damn
r_list_free (cfg->nodes);
ht_free (cfg->ht);
free (cfg);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
radare2
|
f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005
| 106,633,956,429,459,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
|
TEST(GtOp, MatchesNull) {
BSONObj operand = BSON("$gt" << BSONNULL);
GTMatchExpression gt("a", operand["$gt"]);
ASSERT(!gt.matchesBSON(BSONObj(), NULL));
ASSERT(!gt.matchesBSON(BSON("a" << BSONNULL), NULL));
ASSERT(!gt.matchesBSON(BSON("a" << 4), NULL));
// A non-existent field is treated same way as an empty bson object
ASSERT(!gt.matchesBSON(BSON("b" << 4), NULL));
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
64095239f41e9f3841d8be9088347db56d35c891
| 173,425,605,410,113,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
SERVER-51083 Reject invalid UTF-8 from $regex match expressions
|
RZ_API void rz_bin_dwarf_debug_abbrev_free(RzBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da) {
size_t i;
if (!da) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->count; i++) {
RZ_FREE(da->decls[i].defs);
}
RZ_FREE(da->decls);
free(da);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rizin
|
aa6917772d2f32e5a7daab25a46c72df0b5ea406
| 238,908,785,704,714,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Fix oob write for dwarf with abbrev with count 0 (Fix #2083) (#2086)
|
struct MACH0_(obj_t) *MACH0_(new_buf)(RBuffer *buf, struct MACH0_(opts_t) *options) {
r_return_val_if_fail (buf, NULL);
struct MACH0_(obj_t) *bin = R_NEW0 (struct MACH0_(obj_t));
if (bin) {
bin->b = r_buf_ref (buf);
bin->main_addr = UT64_MAX;
bin->kv = sdb_new (NULL, "bin.mach0", 0);
bin->size = r_buf_size (bin->b);
if (options) {
bin->verbose = options->verbose;
bin->header_at = options->header_at;
bin->symbols_off = options->symbols_off;
}
if (!init (bin)) {
return MACH0_(mach0_free)(bin);
}
}
return bin;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
0052500c1ed5bf8263b26b9fd7773dbdc6f170c4
| 20,146,175,813,019,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fix heap OOB read in macho.iterate_chained_fixups ##crash
* Reported by peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer 'tests_65305'
mrmacete:
* Return early if segs_count is 0
* Initialize segs_count also for reconstructed fixups
Co-authored-by: pancake <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Francesco Tamagni <[email protected]>
|
void xen_copy_trap_info(struct trap_info *traps)
{
const struct desc_ptr *desc = this_cpu_ptr(&idt_desc);
xen_convert_trap_info(desc, traps);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-276"
] |
linux
|
cadfad870154e14f745ec845708bc17d166065f2
| 86,915,014,874,710,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
x86/ioperm: Fix io bitmap invalidation on Xen PV
tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() wasn't wired up properly through the pvop
machinery, so the TSS and Xen's io bitmap would get out of sync
whenever disabling a valid io bitmap.
Add a new pvop for tss_invalidate_io_bitmap() to fix it.
This is XSA-329.
Fixes: 22fe5b0439dd ("x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d53075590e1f91c19f8af705059d3ff99424c020.1595030016.git.luto@kernel.org
|
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516
| 20,571,813,871,925,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Add Next Protocol Negotiation.
|
static bool update_sd_pick_busiest(struct lb_env *env,
struct sd_lb_stats *sds,
struct sched_group *sg,
struct sg_lb_stats *sgs)
{
struct sg_lb_stats *busiest = &sds->busiest_stat;
/*
* Don't try to pull misfit tasks we can't help.
* We can use max_capacity here as reduction in capacity on some
* CPUs in the group should either be possible to resolve
* internally or be covered by avg_load imbalance (eventually).
*/
if (sgs->group_type == group_misfit_task &&
(!group_smaller_max_cpu_capacity(sg, sds->local) ||
!group_has_capacity(env, &sds->local_stat)))
return false;
if (sgs->group_type > busiest->group_type)
return true;
if (sgs->group_type < busiest->group_type)
return false;
if (sgs->avg_load <= busiest->avg_load)
return false;
if (!(env->sd->flags & SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY))
goto asym_packing;
/*
* Candidate sg has no more than one task per CPU and
* has higher per-CPU capacity. Migrating tasks to less
* capable CPUs may harm throughput. Maximize throughput,
* power/energy consequences are not considered.
*/
if (sgs->sum_nr_running <= sgs->group_weight &&
group_smaller_min_cpu_capacity(sds->local, sg))
return false;
/*
* If we have more than one misfit sg go with the biggest misfit.
*/
if (sgs->group_type == group_misfit_task &&
sgs->group_misfit_task_load < busiest->group_misfit_task_load)
return false;
asym_packing:
/* This is the busiest node in its class. */
if (!(env->sd->flags & SD_ASYM_PACKING))
return true;
/* No ASYM_PACKING if target CPU is already busy */
if (env->idle == CPU_NOT_IDLE)
return true;
/*
* ASYM_PACKING needs to move all the work to the highest
* prority CPUs in the group, therefore mark all groups
* of lower priority than ourself as busy.
*/
if (sgs->sum_nr_running &&
sched_asym_prefer(env->dst_cpu, sg->asym_prefer_cpu)) {
if (!sds->busiest)
return true;
/* Prefer to move from lowest priority CPU's work */
if (sched_asym_prefer(sds->busiest->asym_prefer_cpu,
sg->asym_prefer_cpu))
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
| 239,801,857,948,557,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int jpc_siz_dumpparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, FILE *out)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
fprintf(out, "caps = 0x%02x;\n", siz->caps);
fprintf(out, "width = %d; height = %d; xoff = %d; yoff = %d;\n",
siz->width, siz->height, siz->xoff, siz->yoff);
fprintf(out, "tilewidth = %d; tileheight = %d; tilexoff = %d; "
"tileyoff = %d;\n", siz->tilewidth, siz->tileheight, siz->tilexoff,
siz->tileyoff);
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
fprintf(out, "prec[%d] = %d; sgnd[%d] = %d; hsamp[%d] = %d; "
"vsamp[%d] = %d\n", i, siz->comps[i].prec, i,
siz->comps[i].sgnd, i, siz->comps[i].hsamp, i,
siz->comps[i].vsamp);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
jasper
|
4031ca321d8cb5798c316ab39c7a5dc88a61fdd7
| 196,765,200,548,862,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Incorporated changes from patch
jasper-1.900.3-libjasper-stepsizes-overflow.patch
|
#include <gpac/mpd.h>
void get_file_callback(void *usr_cbk, GF_NETIO_Parameter *parameter)
{
if (parameter->msg_type==GF_NETIO_DATA_EXCHANGE) {
u64 tot_size, done, max;
u32 bps;
gf_dm_sess_get_stats(parameter->sess, NULL, NULL, &tot_size, &done, &bps, NULL);
if (tot_size) {
max = done;
max *= 100;
max /= tot_size;
fprintf(stderr, "download %02d %% at %05d kpbs\r", (u32) max, bps*8/1000);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-401"
] |
gpac
|
289ffce3e0d224d314f5f92a744d5fe35999f20b
| 187,742,494,896,782,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
fixed #1767 (fuzz)
|
static int instantiate_veth(char *n1, char **n2)
{
int err;
err = snprintf(*n2, IFNAMSIZ, "%sp", n1);
if (err < 0 || err >= IFNAMSIZ) {
fprintf(stderr, "nic name too long\n");
return -1;
}
err = lxc_veth_create(n1, *n2);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to create %s-%s : %s\n", n1, *n2,
strerror(-err));
return -1;
}
/* changing the high byte of the mac address to 0xfe, the bridge interface
* will always keep the host's mac address and not take the mac address
* of a container */
err = setup_private_host_hw_addr(n1);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to change mac address of host interface '%s' : %s\n",
n1, strerror(-err));
}
return netdev_set_flag(n1, IFF_UP);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-862"
] |
lxc
|
16af238036a5464ae8f2420ed3af214f0de875f9
| 280,256,881,153,555,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
|
int cfg80211_mgd_wext_giwfreq(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_freq *freq, char *extra)
{
struct wireless_dev *wdev = dev->ieee80211_ptr;
struct ieee80211_channel *chan = NULL;
/* call only for station! */
if (WARN_ON(wdev->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
return -EINVAL;
wdev_lock(wdev);
if (wdev->current_bss)
chan = wdev->current_bss->pub.channel;
else if (wdev->wext.connect.channel)
chan = wdev->wext.connect.channel;
wdev_unlock(wdev);
if (chan) {
freq->m = chan->center_freq;
freq->e = 6;
return 0;
}
/* no channel if not joining */
return -EINVAL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux
|
4ac2813cc867ae563a1ba5a9414bfb554e5796fa
| 57,496,943,533,732,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
cfg80211: wext: avoid copying malformed SSIDs
Ensure the SSID element is bounds-checked prior to invoking memcpy()
with its length field, when copying to userspace.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nicolas Waisman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[adjust commit log a bit]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.