func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
bool HeaderMapImpl::operator==(const HeaderMapImpl& rhs) const {
if (size() != rhs.size()) {
return false;
}
for (auto i = headers_.begin(), j = rhs.headers_.begin(); i != headers_.end(); ++i, ++j) {
if (i->key() != j->key().getStringView() || i->value() != j->value().getStringView()) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 326,393,149,736,214,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
static int read_next_command(void)
{
static int stdin_eof = 0;
if (stdin_eof) {
unread_command_buf = 0;
return EOF;
}
for (;;) {
const char *p;
if (unread_command_buf) {
unread_command_buf = 0;
} else {
struct recent_command *rc;
strbuf_detach(&command_buf, NULL);
stdin_eof = strbuf_getline(&command_buf, stdin, '\n');
if (stdin_eof)
return EOF;
if (!seen_data_command
&& !starts_with(command_buf.buf, "feature ")
&& !starts_with(command_buf.buf, "option ")) {
parse_argv();
}
rc = rc_free;
if (rc)
rc_free = rc->next;
else {
rc = cmd_hist.next;
cmd_hist.next = rc->next;
cmd_hist.next->prev = &cmd_hist;
free(rc->buf);
}
rc->buf = command_buf.buf;
rc->prev = cmd_tail;
rc->next = cmd_hist.prev;
rc->prev->next = rc;
cmd_tail = rc;
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "get-mark ", &p)) {
parse_get_mark(p);
continue;
}
if (skip_prefix(command_buf.buf, "cat-blob ", &p)) {
parse_cat_blob(p);
continue;
}
if (command_buf.buf[0] == '#')
continue;
return 0;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | git | 34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305 | 272,512,472,013,987,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> |
evbuffer_set_parent(struct evbuffer *buf, struct bufferevent *bev)
{
EVBUFFER_LOCK(buf);
buf->parent = bev;
EVBUFFER_UNLOCK(buf);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | libevent | 20d6d4458bee5d88bda1511c225c25b2d3198d6c | 225,685,700,869,578,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.0
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into. |
Discovered_table_list::Discovered_table_list(THD *thd_arg,
Dynamic_array<LEX_CSTRING*> *tables_arg,
const LEX_CSTRING *wild_arg) :
thd(thd_arg), with_temps(false), tables(tables_arg)
{
if (wild_arg->str && wild_arg->str[0])
{
wild= wild_arg->str;
wend= wild + wild_arg->length;
}
else
wild= 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | 52,647,209,355,936,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | MDEV-28098 incorrect key in "dup value" error after long unique
reset errkey after using it, so that it wouldn't affect
the next error message in the next statement |
static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(extractTo)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zval *zval_files = NULL;
zval *zval_file = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
char *pathto;
size_t pathto_len;
int ret, i;
int nelems;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|z", &pathto, &pathto_len, &zval_files) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (pathto_len < 1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_stream_stat_path_ex(pathto, PHP_STREAM_URL_STAT_QUIET, &ssb, NULL) < 0) {
ret = php_stream_mkdir(pathto, 0777, PHP_STREAM_MKDIR_RECURSIVE, NULL);
if (!ret) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zval_files && (Z_TYPE_P(zval_files) != IS_NULL)) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_files)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (!php_zip_extract_file(intern, pathto, Z_STRVAL_P(zval_files), Z_STRLEN_P(zval_files))) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files));
if (nelems == 0 ) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < nelems; i++) {
if ((zval_file = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files), i)) != NULL) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_file)) {
case IS_LONG:
break;
case IS_STRING:
if (!php_zip_extract_file(intern, pathto, Z_STRVAL_P(zval_file), Z_STRLEN_P(zval_file))) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
}
break;
case IS_LONG:
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid argument, expect string or array of strings");
break;
}
} else {
/* Extract all files */
int filecount = zip_get_num_files(intern);
if (filecount == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Illegal archive");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < filecount; i++) {
char *file = (char*)zip_get_name(intern, i, ZIP_FL_UNCHANGED);
if (!file || !php_zip_extract_file(intern, pathto, file, strlen(file))) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | php-src | 3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c | 47,247,376,167,792,425,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 83 | Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom* |
int mp_montgomery_calc_normalization(mp_int *a, mp_int *b)
{
fp_montgomery_calc_normalization(a, b);
return MP_OKAY;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] | wolfssl | 1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f | 300,868,012,475,258,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign. |
static void vhost_net_busy_poll(struct vhost_net *net,
struct vhost_virtqueue *rvq,
struct vhost_virtqueue *tvq,
bool *busyloop_intr,
bool poll_rx)
{
unsigned long busyloop_timeout;
unsigned long endtime;
struct socket *sock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = poll_rx ? tvq : rvq;
/* Try to hold the vq mutex of the paired virtqueue. We can't
* use mutex_lock() here since we could not guarantee a
* consistenet lock ordering.
*/
if (!mutex_trylock(&vq->mutex))
return;
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
sock = rvq->private_data;
busyloop_timeout = poll_rx ? rvq->busyloop_timeout:
tvq->busyloop_timeout;
preempt_disable();
endtime = busy_clock() + busyloop_timeout;
while (vhost_can_busy_poll(endtime)) {
if (vhost_has_work(&net->dev)) {
*busyloop_intr = true;
break;
}
if ((sock_has_rx_data(sock) &&
!vhost_vq_avail_empty(&net->dev, rvq)) ||
!vhost_vq_avail_empty(&net->dev, tvq))
break;
cpu_relax();
}
preempt_enable();
if (poll_rx || sock_has_rx_data(sock))
vhost_net_busy_poll_try_queue(net, vq);
else if (!poll_rx) /* On tx here, sock has no rx data. */
vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, rvq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 42d84c8490f9f0931786f1623191fcab397c3d64 | 260,664,298,696,531,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | vhost: Check docket sk_family instead of call getname
Doing so, we save one call to get data we already have in the struct.
Also, since there is no guarantee that getname use sockaddr_ll
parameter beyond its size, we add a little bit of security here.
It should do not do beyond MAX_ADDR_LEN, but syzbot found that
ax25_getname writes more (72 bytes, the size of full_sockaddr_ax25,
versus 20 + 32 bytes of sockaddr_ll + MAX_ADDR_LEN in syzbot repro).
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e9593 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
unsigned char *p,rec_char;
size_t md_size;
int npad;
int t;
if (send)
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->write_hash;
}
else
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
if (t < 0)
return -1;
md_size=t;
npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
if (!send &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
{
/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
* data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
* timing-oracle. */
/* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
*
* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
* total size. */
unsigned char header[75];
unsigned j = 0;
memcpy(header+j, mac_sec, md_size);
j += md_size;
memcpy(header+j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
j += npad;
memcpy(header+j, seq, 8);
j += 8;
header[j++] = rec->type;
header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
hash,
md, &md_size,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
mac_sec, md_size,
1 /* is SSLv3 */);
}
else
{
unsigned int md_size_u;
/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_1,npad);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,seq,8);
rec_char=rec->type;
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&rec_char,1);
p=md;
s2n(rec->length,p);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,2);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex( &md_ctx,hash);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,mac_sec,md_size);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,ssl3_pad_2,npad);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,md,md_size);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex( &md_ctx,md,&md_size_u);
md_size = md_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
}
ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
return(md_size);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | openssl | e5420be6cd09af2550b128575a675490cfba0483 | 128,722,472,772,765,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | Make CBC decoding constant time.
This patch makes the decoding of SSLv3 and TLS CBC records constant
time. Without this, a timing side-channel can be used to build a padding
oracle and mount Vaudenay's attack.
This patch also disables the stitched AESNI+SHA mode pending a similar
fix to that code.
In order to be easy to backport, this change is implemented in ssl/,
rather than as a generic AEAD mode. In the future this should be changed
around so that HMAC isn't in ssl/, but crypto/ as FIPS expects.
(cherry picked from commit e130841bccfc0bb9da254dc84e23bc6a1c78a64e)
Conflicts:
crypto/evp/c_allc.c
ssl/ssl_algs.c
ssl/ssl_locl.h
ssl/t1_enc.c |
static void vhost_vdpa_iotlb_free(struct vhost_vdpa *v)
{
struct vhost_dev *dev = &v->vdev;
vhost_vdpa_iotlb_unmap(v, 0ULL, 0ULL - 1);
kfree(dev->iotlb);
dev->iotlb = NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | f6bbf0010ba004f5e90c7aefdebc0ee4bd3283b9 | 323,974,736,029,287,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | vhost-vdpa: fix use-after-free of v->config_ctx
When the 'v->config_ctx' eventfd_ctx reference is released we didn't
set it to NULL. So if the same character device (e.g. /dev/vhost-vdpa-0)
is re-opened, the 'v->config_ctx' is invalid and calling again
vhost_vdpa_config_put() causes use-after-free issues like the
following refcount_t underflow:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 872 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xae/0xf0
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xae/0xf0
Call Trace:
eventfd_ctx_put+0x5b/0x70
vhost_vdpa_release+0xcd/0x150 [vhost_vdpa]
__fput+0x8e/0x240
____fput+0xe/0x10
task_work_run+0x66/0xa0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x118/0x120
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50
? __x64_sys_close+0x12/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: 776f395004d8 ("vhost_vdpa: Support config interrupt in vdpa")
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhu Lingshan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> |
bool ms_can_fast_dispatch(const Message *m) const override {
switch (m->get_type()) {
case CEPH_MSG_OSD_OP:
case CEPH_MSG_OSD_BACKOFF:
case MSG_OSD_SUBOP:
case MSG_OSD_REPOP:
case MSG_OSD_SUBOPREPLY:
case MSG_OSD_REPOPREPLY:
case MSG_OSD_PG_PUSH:
case MSG_OSD_PG_PULL:
case MSG_OSD_PG_PUSH_REPLY:
case MSG_OSD_PG_SCAN:
case MSG_OSD_PG_BACKFILL:
case MSG_OSD_PG_BACKFILL_REMOVE:
case MSG_OSD_EC_WRITE:
case MSG_OSD_EC_WRITE_REPLY:
case MSG_OSD_EC_READ:
case MSG_OSD_EC_READ_REPLY:
case MSG_OSD_SCRUB_RESERVE:
case MSG_OSD_REP_SCRUB:
case MSG_OSD_REP_SCRUBMAP:
case MSG_OSD_PG_UPDATE_LOG_MISSING:
case MSG_OSD_PG_UPDATE_LOG_MISSING_REPLY:
case MSG_OSD_PG_RECOVERY_DELETE:
case MSG_OSD_PG_RECOVERY_DELETE_REPLY:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 62,387,647,309,762,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random() |
string t_cpp_generator::local_reflection_name(const char* prefix, t_type* ttype, bool external) {
ttype = get_true_type(ttype);
// We have to use the program name as part of the identifier because
// if two thrift "programs" are compiled into one actual program
// you would get a symbol collision if they both defined list<i32>.
// trlo = Thrift Reflection LOcal.
string prog;
string name;
string nspace;
// TODO(dreiss): Would it be better to pregenerate the base types
// and put them in Thrift.{h,cpp} ?
if (ttype->is_base_type()) {
prog = program_->get_name();
name = ttype->get_ascii_fingerprint();
} else if (ttype->is_enum()) {
assert(ttype->get_program() != NULL);
prog = ttype->get_program()->get_name();
name = ttype->get_ascii_fingerprint();
} else if (ttype->is_container()) {
prog = program_->get_name();
name = ttype->get_ascii_fingerprint();
} else {
assert(ttype->is_struct() || ttype->is_xception());
assert(ttype->get_program() != NULL);
prog = ttype->get_program()->get_name();
name = ttype->get_ascii_fingerprint();
}
if (external && ttype->get_program() != NULL && ttype->get_program() != program_) {
nspace = namespace_prefix(ttype->get_program()->get_namespace("cpp"));
}
return nspace + "trlo_" + prefix + "_" + prog + "_" + name;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | thrift | cfaadcc4adcfde2a8232c62ec89870b73ef40df1 | 213,514,037,625,477,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | THRIFT-3231 CPP: Limit recursion depth to 64
Client: cpp
Patch: Ben Craig <[email protected]> |
BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromWBMP(FILE *inFile)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewFileCtx(inFile);
if (in == NULL) return NULL;
im = gdImageCreateFromWBMPCtx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | libgd | 553702980ae89c83f2d6e254d62cf82e204956d0 | 259,573,925,859,434,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix #492: Potential double-free in gdImage*Ptr()
Whenever `gdImage*Ptr()` calls `gdImage*Ctx()` and the latter fails, we
must not call `gdDPExtractData()`; otherwise a double-free would
happen. Since `gdImage*Ctx()` are void functions, and we can't change
that for BC reasons, we're introducing static helpers which are used
internally.
We're adding a regression test for `gdImageJpegPtr()`, but not for
`gdImageGifPtr()` and `gdImageWbmpPtr()` since we don't know how to
trigger failure of the respective `gdImage*Ctx()` calls.
This potential security issue has been reported by Solmaz Salimi (aka.
Rooney). |
coderange_scan(const char *p, long len, rb_encoding *enc)
{
const char *e = p + len;
if (rb_enc_to_index(enc) == 0) {
/* enc is ASCII-8BIT. ASCII-8BIT string never be broken. */
p = search_nonascii(p, e);
return p ? ENC_CODERANGE_VALID : ENC_CODERANGE_7BIT;
}
if (rb_enc_asciicompat(enc)) {
p = search_nonascii(p, e);
if (!p) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_7BIT;
}
while (p < e) {
int ret = rb_enc_precise_mbclen(p, e, enc);
if (!MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_P(ret)) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_BROKEN;
}
p += MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_LEN(ret);
if (p < e) {
p = search_nonascii(p, e);
if (!p) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_VALID;
}
}
}
if (e < p) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_BROKEN;
}
return ENC_CODERANGE_VALID;
}
while (p < e) {
int ret = rb_enc_precise_mbclen(p, e, enc);
if (!MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_P(ret)) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_BROKEN;
}
p += MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_LEN(ret);
}
if (e < p) {
return ENC_CODERANGE_BROKEN;
}
return ENC_CODERANGE_VALID;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | ruby | 1c2ef610358af33f9ded3086aa2d70aac03dcac5 | 149,995,418,371,283,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | * string.c (rb_str_justify): CVE-2009-4124.
Fixes a bug reported by
Emmanouel Kellinis <Emmanouel.Kellinis AT kpmg.co.uk>, KPMG London;
Patch by nobu.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@26038 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
void *arpt_alloc_initial_table(const struct xt_table *info)
{
return xt_alloc_initial_table(arpt, ARPT);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 | 133,724,299,329,120,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> |
test_empty (void)
{
g_autoptr(FlatpakBwrap) bwrap = flatpak_bwrap_new (NULL);
g_autoptr(FlatpakExports) exports = flatpak_exports_new ();
gsize i;
g_assert_false (flatpak_exports_path_is_visible (exports, "/run"));
g_assert_cmpint (flatpak_exports_path_get_mode (exports, "/tmp"), ==,
FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
flatpak_bwrap_add_arg (bwrap, "bwrap");
flatpak_exports_append_bwrap_args (exports, bwrap);
flatpak_bwrap_finish (bwrap);
print_bwrap (bwrap);
i = 0;
g_assert_cmpuint (i, <, bwrap->argv->len);
g_assert_cmpstr (bwrap->argv->pdata[i++], ==, "bwrap");
i = assert_next_is_os_release (bwrap, i);
g_assert_cmpuint (i, <, bwrap->argv->len);
g_assert_cmpstr (bwrap->argv->pdata[i++], ==, NULL);
g_assert_cmpuint (i, ==, bwrap->argv->len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-74"
] | flatpak | 4108e022452303093d8b90c838695a0476cb09c7 | 217,246,563,691,179,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | context: Add --unset-env option and a corresponding override
This follows up from GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2 to fix missing functionality
that I noticed while resolving that vulnerability, but is not required
for fixing the vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]> |
int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool,
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist)
{
if(asn1_bool) return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist);
return X509V3_add_value(name, "FALSE", extlist);
} | 0 | [] | openssl | a70da5b3ecc3160368529677006801c58cb369db | 322,481,417,326,249,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
certificate. Add options to s_client, s_server and x509 utilities
to print results of checks. |
parser_parse_unary_expression (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
size_t *grouping_level_p) /**< grouping level */
{
bool new_was_seen = false;
/* Collect unary operators. */
while (true)
{
/* Convert plus and minus binary operators to unary operators. */
switch (context_p->token.type)
{
case LEXER_ADD:
{
context_p->token.type = LEXER_PLUS;
break;
}
case LEXER_SUBTRACT:
{
context_p->token.type = LEXER_NEGATE;
break;
}
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
case LEXER_KEYW_AWAIT:
{
#if JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM
if ((context_p->global_status_flags & ECMA_PARSE_MODULE)
&& !(context_p->status_flags & PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION))
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_AWAIT_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
#endif /* JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM */
if (JERRY_UNLIKELY (context_p->token.lit_location.has_escape))
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_INVALID_KEYWORD);
}
break;
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
#if JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM
case LEXER_KEYW_IMPORT:
{
if (new_was_seen)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_IMPORT_AFTER_NEW);
}
break;
}
#endif /* JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM */
}
/* Bracketed expressions are primary expressions. At this
* point their left paren is pushed onto the stack and
* they are processed when their closing paren is reached. */
if (context_p->token.type == LEXER_LEFT_PAREN)
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->source_p == context_p->source_p)
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION);
break;
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
(*grouping_level_p) += PARSER_GROUPING_LEVEL_INCREASE;
new_was_seen = false;
}
else if (context_p->token.type == LEXER_KEYW_NEW)
{
/* After 'new' unary operators are not allowed. */
new_was_seen = true;
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
/* Check if "new.target" is written here. */
if (scanner_try_scan_new_target (context_p))
{
if (!(context_p->status_flags & PARSER_ALLOW_NEW_TARGET))
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_NEW_TARGET_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, CBC_EXT_PUSH_NEW_TARGET);
lexer_next_token (context_p);
/* Found "new.target" return here */
return false;
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
}
else if (new_was_seen
|| (*grouping_level_p == PARSE_EXPR_LEFT_HAND_SIDE)
|| !LEXER_IS_UNARY_OP_TOKEN (context_p->token.type))
{
break;
}
parser_stack_push_uint8 (context_p, context_p->token.type);
lexer_next_token (context_p);
}
/* Parse primary expression. */
switch (context_p->token.type)
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
case LEXER_TEMPLATE_LITERAL:
{
if (context_p->source_p[-1] != LIT_CHAR_GRAVE_ACCENT)
{
parser_parse_template_literal (context_p);
break;
}
/* The string is a normal string literal. */
/* FALLTHRU */
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
case LEXER_LITERAL:
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
if (JERRY_UNLIKELY (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->source_p == context_p->source_p))
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION);
uint32_t arrow_status_flags = (PARSER_IS_FUNCTION
| PARSER_IS_ARROW_FUNCTION
| (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_INSIDE_CLASS_FIELD));
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->u8_arg & SCANNER_FUNCTION_ASYNC)
{
JERRY_ASSERT (lexer_token_is_async (context_p));
JERRY_ASSERT (!(context_p->next_scanner_info_p->u8_arg & SCANNER_FUNCTION_STATEMENT));
uint32_t saved_status_flags = context_p->status_flags;
context_p->status_flags |= PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION | PARSER_DISALLOW_AWAIT_YIELD;
lexer_next_token (context_p);
context_p->status_flags = saved_status_flags;
if (context_p->token.type == LEXER_KEYW_FUNCTION)
{
uint32_t status_flags = (PARSER_FUNCTION_CLOSURE
| PARSER_IS_FUNC_EXPRESSION
| PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION
| PARSER_DISALLOW_AWAIT_YIELD);
parser_parse_function_expression (context_p, status_flags);
break;
}
arrow_status_flags = (PARSER_IS_FUNCTION
| PARSER_IS_ARROW_FUNCTION
| PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION
| PARSER_DISALLOW_AWAIT_YIELD);
}
parser_check_assignment_expr (context_p);
parser_parse_function_expression (context_p, arrow_status_flags);
return parser_abort_parsing_after_assignment_expression (context_p);
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
uint8_t type = context_p->token.lit_location.type;
if (type == LEXER_IDENT_LITERAL || type == LEXER_STRING_LITERAL)
{
lexer_construct_literal_object (context_p,
&context_p->token.lit_location,
context_p->token.lit_location.type);
}
else if (type == LEXER_NUMBER_LITERAL)
{
bool is_negative_number = false;
if ((context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_PLUS || context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_NEGATE)
&& !lexer_check_post_primary_exp (context_p))
{
do
{
if (context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_NEGATE)
{
is_negative_number = !is_negative_number;
}
#if JERRY_BUILTIN_BIGINT
else if (JERRY_LIKELY (context_p->token.extra_value == LEXER_NUMBER_BIGINT))
{
break;
}
#endif /* JERRY_BUILTIN_BIGINT */
parser_stack_pop_uint8 (context_p);
}
while (context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_PLUS
|| context_p->stack_top_uint8 == LEXER_NEGATE);
}
if (lexer_construct_number_object (context_p, true, is_negative_number))
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->lit_object.index <= CBC_PUSH_NUMBER_BYTE_RANGE_END);
parser_emit_cbc_push_number (context_p, is_negative_number);
break;
}
}
cbc_opcode_t opcode = CBC_PUSH_LITERAL;
if (context_p->token.keyword_type != LEXER_KEYW_EVAL)
{
if (context_p->last_cbc_opcode == CBC_PUSH_LITERAL)
{
context_p->last_cbc_opcode = CBC_PUSH_TWO_LITERALS;
context_p->last_cbc.value = context_p->lit_object.index;
context_p->last_cbc.literal_type = context_p->token.lit_location.type;
context_p->last_cbc.literal_keyword_type = context_p->token.keyword_type;
break;
}
if (context_p->last_cbc_opcode == CBC_PUSH_TWO_LITERALS)
{
context_p->last_cbc_opcode = CBC_PUSH_THREE_LITERALS;
context_p->last_cbc.third_literal_index = context_p->lit_object.index;
context_p->last_cbc.literal_type = context_p->token.lit_location.type;
context_p->last_cbc.literal_keyword_type = context_p->token.keyword_type;
break;
}
if (context_p->last_cbc_opcode == CBC_PUSH_THIS)
{
context_p->last_cbc_opcode = PARSER_CBC_UNAVAILABLE;
opcode = CBC_PUSH_THIS_LITERAL;
}
}
parser_emit_cbc_literal_from_token (context_p, (uint16_t) opcode);
break;
}
case LEXER_KEYW_FUNCTION:
{
parser_parse_function_expression (context_p, PARSER_FUNCTION_CLOSURE | PARSER_IS_FUNC_EXPRESSION);
break;
}
case LEXER_LEFT_BRACE:
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->source_p == context_p->source_p
&& context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_INITIALIZER)
{
if (parser_is_assignment_expr (context_p))
{
uint32_t flags = PARSER_PATTERN_NO_OPTS;
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->u8_arg & SCANNER_LITERAL_OBJECT_HAS_REST)
{
flags |= PARSER_PATTERN_HAS_REST_ELEMENT;
}
parser_parse_object_initializer (context_p, flags);
return parser_abort_parsing_after_assignment_expression (context_p);
}
scanner_release_next (context_p, sizeof (scanner_location_info_t));
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
parser_parse_object_literal (context_p);
break;
}
case LEXER_LEFT_SQUARE:
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->source_p == context_p->source_p)
{
if (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_INITIALIZER)
{
if (parser_is_assignment_expr (context_p))
{
parser_parse_array_initializer (context_p, PARSER_PATTERN_NO_OPTS);
return parser_abort_parsing_after_assignment_expression (context_p);
}
scanner_release_next (context_p, sizeof (scanner_location_info_t));
}
else
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_LITERAL_FLAGS
&& context_p->next_scanner_info_p->u8_arg == SCANNER_LITERAL_NO_DESTRUCTURING);
scanner_release_next (context_p, sizeof (scanner_info_t));
}
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
parser_parse_array_literal (context_p);
break;
}
case LEXER_DIVIDE:
case LEXER_ASSIGN_DIVIDE:
{
lexer_construct_regexp_object (context_p, false);
uint16_t literal_index = (uint16_t) (context_p->literal_count - 1);
if (context_p->last_cbc_opcode == CBC_PUSH_LITERAL)
{
context_p->last_cbc_opcode = CBC_PUSH_TWO_LITERALS;
context_p->last_cbc.value = literal_index;
}
else if (context_p->last_cbc_opcode == CBC_PUSH_TWO_LITERALS)
{
context_p->last_cbc_opcode = CBC_PUSH_THREE_LITERALS;
context_p->last_cbc.third_literal_index = literal_index;
}
else
{
parser_emit_cbc_literal (context_p, CBC_PUSH_LITERAL, literal_index);
}
context_p->last_cbc.literal_type = LEXER_REGEXP_LITERAL;
context_p->last_cbc.literal_keyword_type = LEXER_EOS;
break;
}
case LEXER_KEYW_THIS:
{
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
if (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_ALLOW_SUPER_CALL)
{
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, CBC_EXT_RESOLVE_LEXICAL_THIS);
}
else
{
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_PUSH_THIS);
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
break;
}
case LEXER_LIT_TRUE:
{
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_PUSH_TRUE);
break;
}
case LEXER_LIT_FALSE:
{
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_PUSH_FALSE);
break;
}
case LEXER_LIT_NULL:
{
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_PUSH_NULL);
break;
}
#if JERRY_ESNEXT
case LEXER_KEYW_CLASS:
{
parser_parse_class (context_p, false);
return false;
}
case LEXER_KEYW_SUPER:
{
if (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_ALLOW_SUPER)
{
if (lexer_check_next_characters (context_p, LIT_CHAR_DOT, LIT_CHAR_LEFT_SQUARE))
{
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, CBC_EXT_PUSH_SUPER);
break;
}
if (lexer_check_next_character (context_p, LIT_CHAR_LEFT_PAREN)
&& (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_ALLOW_SUPER_CALL))
{
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, CBC_EXT_PUSH_SUPER_CONSTRUCTOR);
break;
}
}
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_UNEXPECTED_SUPER_KEYWORD);
}
case LEXER_LEFT_PAREN:
{
JERRY_ASSERT (context_p->next_scanner_info_p->source_p == context_p->source_p
&& context_p->next_scanner_info_p->type == SCANNER_TYPE_FUNCTION);
parser_check_assignment_expr (context_p);
uint32_t arrow_status_flags = (PARSER_IS_FUNCTION
| PARSER_IS_ARROW_FUNCTION
| (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_INSIDE_CLASS_FIELD));
parser_parse_function_expression (context_p, arrow_status_flags);
return parser_abort_parsing_after_assignment_expression (context_p);
}
case LEXER_KEYW_YIELD:
{
JERRY_ASSERT ((context_p->status_flags & PARSER_IS_GENERATOR_FUNCTION)
&& !(context_p->status_flags & PARSER_DISALLOW_AWAIT_YIELD));
if (context_p->token.lit_location.has_escape)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_INVALID_KEYWORD);
}
parser_check_assignment_expr (context_p);
lexer_next_token (context_p);
cbc_ext_opcode_t opcode = ((context_p->status_flags & PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION) ? CBC_EXT_ASYNC_YIELD
: CBC_EXT_YIELD);
if (!lexer_check_yield_no_arg (context_p))
{
if (context_p->token.type == LEXER_MULTIPLY)
{
lexer_next_token (context_p);
opcode = ((context_p->status_flags & PARSER_IS_ASYNC_FUNCTION) ? CBC_EXT_ASYNC_YIELD_ITERATOR
: CBC_EXT_YIELD_ITERATOR);
}
parser_parse_expression (context_p, PARSE_EXPR_NO_COMMA);
}
else
{
parser_emit_cbc (context_p, CBC_PUSH_UNDEFINED);
}
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, opcode);
return (context_p->token.type != LEXER_RIGHT_PAREN
&& context_p->token.type != LEXER_COMMA);
}
#endif /* JERRY_ESNEXT */
#if JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM
case LEXER_KEYW_IMPORT:
{
lexer_next_token (context_p);
if (context_p->token.type != LEXER_LEFT_PAREN)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_LEFT_PAREN_EXPECTED);
}
lexer_next_token (context_p);
parser_parse_expression (context_p, PARSE_EXPR_NO_COMMA);
if (context_p->token.type != LEXER_RIGHT_PAREN)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_RIGHT_PAREN_EXPECTED);
}
parser_emit_cbc_ext (context_p, CBC_EXT_MODULE_IMPORT);
break;
}
#endif /* JERRY_MODULE_SYSTEM */
default:
{
bool is_left_hand_side = (*grouping_level_p == PARSE_EXPR_LEFT_HAND_SIDE);
parser_raise_error (context_p, (is_left_hand_side ? PARSER_ERR_LEFT_HAND_SIDE_EXP_EXPECTED
: PARSER_ERR_PRIMARY_EXP_EXPECTED));
break;
}
}
lexer_next_token (context_p);
return false;
} /* parser_parse_unary_expression */ | 1 | [
"CWE-416"
] | jerryscript | 3bcd48f72d4af01d1304b754ef19fe1a02c96049 | 32,347,926,419,598,707,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 456 | Improve parse_identifier (#4691)
Ascii string length is no longer computed during string allocation.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Daniel Batiz [email protected] |
Formattable::~Formattable()
{
dispose();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | icu | 53d8c8f3d181d87a6aa925b449b51c4a2c922a51 | 135,861,320,188,060,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | ICU-20246 Fixing another integer overflow in number parsing. |
void hstrlenCommand(client *c) {
robj *o;
if ((o = lookupKeyReadOrReply(c,c->argv[1],shared.czero)) == NULL ||
checkType(c,o,OBJ_HASH)) return;
addReplyLongLong(c,hashTypeGetValueLength(o,c->argv[2]->ptr));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | redis | f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3 | 256,120,571,656,443,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error. |
TIFFWriteDirectoryTagLong8Array(TIFF* tif, uint32* ndir, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 tag, uint32 count, uint64* value)
{
if (dir==NULL)
{
(*ndir)++;
return(1);
}
return(TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedLong8Array(tif,ndir,dir,tag,count,value));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | libtiff | de144fd228e4be8aa484c3caf3d814b6fa88c6d9 | 26,974,338,801,450,537,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | TIFFWriteDirectorySec: avoid assertion. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2795. CVE-2018-10963 |
static void free_recv_msg_list(struct list_head *q)
{
struct ipmi_recv_msg *msg, *msg2;
list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, msg2, q, link) {
list_del(&msg->link);
ipmi_free_recv_msg(msg);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8 | 171,961,343,521,113,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]> |
asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int mode)
{
struct nameidata nd;
int old_fsuid, old_fsgid;
kernel_cap_t old_cap;
int res;
if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
return -EINVAL;
old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
old_cap = current->cap_effective;
current->fsuid = current->uid;
current->fsgid = current->gid;
/*
* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user
*
* FIXME: There is a race here against sys_capset. The
* capabilities can change yet we will restore the old
* value below. We should hold task_capabilities_lock,
* but we cannot because user_path_walk can sleep.
*/
if (current->uid)
cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
else
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
res = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_ACCESS, &nd);
if (res)
goto out;
res = vfs_permission(&nd, mode);
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
if(res || !(mode & S_IWOTH) ||
special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto out_path_release;
if(IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode))
res = -EROFS;
out_path_release:
path_release(&nd);
out:
current->fsuid = old_fsuid;
current->fsgid = old_fsgid;
current->cap_effective = old_cap;
return res;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 7b82dc0e64e93f430182f36b46b79fcee87d3532 | 113,272,852,082,053,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | Remove suid/sgid bits on [f]truncate()
.. to match what we do on write(). This way, people who write to files
by using [f]truncate + writable mmap have the same semantics as if they
were using the write() family of system calls.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static int do_end_io(struct multipath *m, struct request *clone,
int error, struct dm_mpath_io *mpio)
{
/*
* We don't queue any clone request inside the multipath target
* during end I/O handling, since those clone requests don't have
* bio clones. If we queue them inside the multipath target,
* we need to make bio clones, that requires memory allocation.
* (See drivers/md/dm.c:end_clone_bio() about why the clone requests
* don't have bio clones.)
* Instead of queueing the clone request here, we queue the original
* request into dm core, which will remake a clone request and
* clone bios for it and resubmit it later.
*/
int r = DM_ENDIO_REQUEUE;
unsigned long flags;
if (!error && !clone->errors)
return 0; /* I/O complete */
if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP || error == -EREMOTEIO || error == -EILSEQ)
return error;
if (mpio->pgpath)
fail_path(mpio->pgpath);
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
if (!m->nr_valid_paths) {
if (!m->queue_if_no_path) {
if (!__must_push_back(m))
r = -EIO;
} else {
if (error == -EBADE)
r = error;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
return r;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462 | 178,674,022,076,269,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
Set or fetch imap timeout */
PHP_FUNCTION(imap_timeout)
{
zend_long ttype, timeout=-1;
int timeout_type;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "l|l", &ttype, &timeout) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (timeout == -1) {
switch (ttype) {
case 1:
timeout_type = GET_OPENTIMEOUT;
break;
case 2:
timeout_type = GET_READTIMEOUT;
break;
case 3:
timeout_type = GET_WRITETIMEOUT;
break;
case 4:
timeout_type = GET_CLOSETIMEOUT;
break;
default:
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
timeout = (zend_long) mail_parameters(NIL, timeout_type, NIL);
RETURN_LONG(timeout);
} else if (timeout >= 0) {
switch (ttype) {
case 1:
timeout_type = SET_OPENTIMEOUT;
break;
case 2:
timeout_type = SET_READTIMEOUT;
break;
case 3:
timeout_type = SET_WRITETIMEOUT;
break;
case 4:
timeout_type = SET_CLOSETIMEOUT;
break;
default:
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
timeout = (zend_long) mail_parameters(NIL, timeout_type, (void *) timeout);
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-88"
] | php-src | 336d2086a9189006909ae06c7e95902d7d5ff77e | 13,513,265,289,644,548,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | Disable rsh/ssh functionality in imap by default (bug #77153) |
static char *ask_new_field(struct chfn_control *ctl, const char *question,
char *def_val)
{
int len;
char *buf = NULL; /* leave initialized to NULL or getline segfaults */
size_t dummy = 0;
if (!def_val)
def_val = "";
while (true) {
printf("%s [%s]:", question, def_val);
__fpurge(stdin);
putchar(' ');
fflush(stdout);
if (getline(&buf, &dummy, stdin) < 0)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("Aborted."));
/* remove white spaces from string end */
ltrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) buf);
len = rtrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) buf);
if (len == 0) {
free(buf);
return xstrdup(def_val);
}
if (!strcasecmp(buf, "none")) {
free(buf);
ctl->changed = 1;
return xstrdup("");
}
if (check_gecos_string(question, buf) >= 0)
break;
}
ctl->changed = 1;
return buf;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-209"
] | util-linux | faa5a3a83ad0cb5e2c303edbfd8cd823c9d94c17 | 116,951,210,502,340,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | chsh, chfn: remove readline support [CVE-2022-0563]
The readline library uses INPUTRC= environment variable to get a path
to the library config file. When the library cannot parse the
specified file, it prints an error message containing data from the
file.
Unfortunately, the library does not use secure_getenv() (or a similar
concept) to avoid vulnerabilities that could occur if set-user-ID or
set-group-ID programs.
Reported-by: Rory Mackie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> |
static enum hrtimer_restart napi_watchdog(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct napi_struct *napi;
napi = container_of(timer, struct napi_struct, timer);
if (napi->gro_list)
napi_schedule(napi);
return HRTIMER_NORESTART; | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971 | 260,367,093,010,787,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static bool is_domain_in_set(
const uint32_t domain_id,
const Domains& domains)
{
bool returned_value = false;
for (auto range : domains.ranges)
{
if (range.second == 0)
{
if (domain_id == range.first)
{
returned_value = true;
break;
}
}
else
{
if (domain_id >= range.first &&
domain_id <= range.second)
{
returned_value = true;
break;
}
}
}
return returned_value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | Fast-DDS | d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384 | 199,377,171,246,473,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]> |
static bool ok_jpg_read_sos(ok_jpg_decoder *decoder) {
// JPEG spec: Table B.3
ok_jpg *jpg = decoder->jpg;
uint8_t buffer[16];
const size_t header_size = 3;
if (!ok_read(decoder, buffer, header_size)) {
return false;
}
uint16_t length = readBE16(buffer);
decoder->num_scan_components = buffer[2];
if (decoder->num_scan_components > decoder->num_components) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (Ns)");
return false;
}
const size_t expected_size = 3 + (size_t)decoder->num_scan_components * 2;
if (length != expected_size + header_size) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (L)");
return false;
}
if (sizeof(buffer) < expected_size) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Too many components for buffer");
return false;
}
if (!ok_read(decoder, buffer, expected_size)) {
return false;
}
uint8_t *src = buffer;
for (int i = 0; i < decoder->num_scan_components; i++, src += 2) {
int C = src[0];
bool component_found = false;
for (int j = 0; j < decoder->num_components; j++) {
ok_jpg_component *c = decoder->components + j;
if (c->id == C) {
decoder->scan_components[i] = j;
component_found = true;
}
}
if (!component_found) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (C)");
return false;
}
// Make sure component is unique
for (int j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (decoder->scan_components[i] == decoder->scan_components[j]) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (component ids)");
return false;
}
}
ok_jpg_component *comp = decoder->components + decoder->scan_components[i];
comp->Td = src[1] >> 4;
comp->Ta = src[1] & 0x0f;
if (comp->Td > 3 || comp->Ta > 3) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (Td/Ta)");
return false;
}
}
decoder->scan_start = src[0];
decoder->scan_end = src[1];
decoder->scan_prev_scale = src[2] >> 4;
decoder->scan_scale = src[2] & 0x0f;
if (decoder->progressive) {
if (decoder->scan_start < 0 || decoder->scan_start > 63 ||
decoder->scan_end < decoder->scan_start || decoder->scan_end > 63 ||
decoder->scan_prev_scale < 0 || decoder->scan_prev_scale > 13 ||
decoder->scan_scale < 0 || decoder->scan_scale > 13) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid progressive SOS segment (Ss/Se/Ah/Al)");
return false;
}
} else {
// Sequential
if (decoder->scan_start != 0 || decoder->scan_end != 63 ||
decoder->scan_prev_scale != 0 || decoder->scan_scale != 0) {
ok_jpg_error(jpg, OK_JPG_ERROR_INVALID, "Invalid SOS segment (Ss/Se/Ah/Al)");
return false;
}
}
#if 0
printf("SOS: Scan components: (");
for (int i = 0; i < decoder->num_scan_components; i++) {
ok_jpg_component *comp = decoder->components + decoder->scan_components[i];
if (i != 0) {
printf(",");
}
printf("%i", comp->id);
}
printf(") ");
for (int i = decoder->num_scan_components; i < decoder->num_components; i++) {
printf(" ");
}
printf("\trange: %i...%i \tah: %i al: %i\n",
decoder->scan_start, decoder->scan_end,
decoder->scan_prev_scale, decoder->scan_scale);
#endif
return ok_jpg_decode_scan(decoder);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | ok-file-formats | a9cc1711dd4ed6a215038f1c5c03af0ef52c3211 | 65,771,290,652,425,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 103 | ok_jpg: Fix invalid DHT (#11) |
int __hnbad(const char *dotted)
{
unsigned char c, n, *cp;
unsigned char buf[NS_MAXCDNAME];
cp = (unsigned char *)dotted;
while ((c = *cp++))
if (c < 0x21 || c > 0x7E)
return (1);
if (ns_name_pton(dotted, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
return (2);
if (buf[0] > 0 && buf[1] == '-')
return (3);
cp = buf;
while ((n = *cp++)) {
if (n > 63)
return (4);
while (n--) {
c = *cp++;
if (c < '-' ||
(c > '-' && c < '0') ||
(c > '9' && c < 'A') ||
(c > 'Z' && c < '_') ||
(c > '_' && c < 'a') ||
c > 'z')
return (5);
}
}
return (0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | uclibc-ng | 0f822af0445e5348ce7b7bd8ce1204244f31d174 | 177,572,401,761,957,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | libc/inet/resolv.c: add __hnbad to check DNS entries for validity…
… using the same rules glibc does
also call __hnbad in some places to check answers |
static int cmd_match(const char *cmd, const char *str)
{
/* See if cmd, written into a sysfs file, matches
* str. They must either be the same, or cmd can
* have a trailing newline
*/
while (*cmd && *str && *cmd == *str) {
cmd++;
str++;
}
if (*cmd == '\n')
cmd++;
if (*str || *cmd)
return 0;
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 | 298,990,157,567,172,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]> |
static inline s16 fixp_mult(s16 a, s16 b)
{
a = ((s32)a * 0x100) / 0x7fff;
return ((s32)(a * b)) >> FRAC_N;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | fa3a5a1880c91bb92594ad42dfe9eedad7996b86 | 219,189,792,942,650,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Input: ff-memless - kill timer in destroy()
No timer must be left running when the device goes away.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]> |
DestroyJNG(unsigned char *chunk,Image **color_image,
ImageInfo **color_image_info,Image **alpha_image,ImageInfo **alpha_image_info)
{
(void) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (color_image_info && *color_image_info)
{
DestroyImageInfo(*color_image_info);
*color_image_info = (ImageInfo *)NULL;
}
if (alpha_image_info && *alpha_image_info)
{
DestroyImageInfo(*alpha_image_info);
*alpha_image_info = (ImageInfo *)NULL;
}
if (color_image && *color_image)
{
DestroyImage(*color_image);
*color_image = (Image *)NULL;
}
if (alpha_image && *alpha_image)
{
DestroyImage(*alpha_image);
*alpha_image = (Image *)NULL;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | ImageMagick6 | 9eda4b36a8695e4a0cd27bea28b9c173c68a01ec | 62,280,414,334,980,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fixed infinite loop (#1095). |
SdMmcHcPowerControl (
IN EFI_PCI_IO_PROTOCOL *PciIo,
IN UINT8 Slot,
IN UINT8 PowerCtrl
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
//
// Clr SD Bus Power
//
PowerCtrl &= (UINT8)~BIT0;
Status = SdMmcHcRwMmio (PciIo, Slot, SD_MMC_HC_POWER_CTRL, FALSE, sizeof (PowerCtrl), &PowerCtrl);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
// Set SD Bus Voltage Select and SD Bus Power fields in Power Control Register
//
PowerCtrl |= BIT0;
Status = SdMmcHcRwMmio (PciIo, Slot, SD_MMC_HC_POWER_CTRL, FALSE, sizeof (PowerCtrl), &PowerCtrl);
return Status;
}
| 0 | [] | edk2 | e36d5ac7d10a6ff5becb0f52fdfd69a1752b0d14 | 212,440,923,779,137,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | MdeModulePkg/SdMmcPciHcDxe: Fix double PciIo Unmap in TRB creation (CVE-2019-14587)
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1989
The commit will avoid unmapping the same resource in error handling logic
for function BuildAdmaDescTable() and SdMmcCreateTrb().
For the error handling in BuildAdmaDescTable():
The error is directly related with the corresponding Map() operation
(mapped address beyond 4G, which is not supported in ADMA), so the Unmap()
operation is done in the error handling logic, and then setting
'Trb->AdmaMap' to NULL to avoid double Unmap.
For the error handling in SdMmcCreateTrb():
The error is not directly related with the corresponding Map() operation,
so the commit will update the code to left SdMmcFreeTrb() for the Unmap
operation to avoid double Unmap.
Cc: Jian J Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Ray Ni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hao A Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <[email protected]> |
static int validate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
unsigned long *map)
{
void *p;
void *addr = page_address(page);
if (!check_slab(s, page) ||
!on_freelist(s, page, NULL))
return 0;
/* Now we know that a valid freelist exists */
bitmap_zero(map, page->objects);
for_each_free_object(p, s, page->freelist) {
set_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map);
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 0))
return 0;
}
for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects)
if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map))
if (!check_object(s, page, p, 1))
return 0;
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | 222,784,563,880,556,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static inline struct i915_priolist *to_priolist(struct rb_node *rb)
{
return rb_entry(rb, struct i915_priolist, node);
} | 0 | [] | linux | bc8a76a152c5f9ef3b48104154a65a68a8b76946 | 159,521,327,316,952,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | drm/i915/gen9: Clear residual context state on context switch
Intel ID: PSIRT-TA-201910-001
CVEID: CVE-2019-14615
Intel GPU Hardware prior to Gen11 does not clear EU state
during a context switch. This can result in information
leakage between contexts.
For Gen8 and Gen9, hardware provides a mechanism for
fast cleardown of the EU state, by issuing a PIPE_CONTROL
with bit 27 set. We can use this in a context batch buffer
to explicitly cleardown the state on every context switch.
As this workaround is already in place for gen8, we can borrow
the code verbatim for Gen9.
Signed-off-by: Mika Kuoppala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Akeem G Abodunrin <[email protected]>
Cc: Kumar Valsan Prathap <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Balestrieri Francesco <[email protected]>
Cc: Bloomfield Jon <[email protected]>
Cc: Dutt Sudeep <[email protected]> |
ldns_rr2buffer_str(ldns_buffer *output, const ldns_rr *rr)
{
return ldns_rr2buffer_str_fmt(output, ldns_output_format_default, rr);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | ldns | 070b4595981f48a21cc6b4f5047fdc2d09d3da91 | 110,657,315,804,234,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CAA and URI |
struct regulator *regulator_get_exclusive(struct device *dev, const char *id)
{
return _regulator_get(dev, id, true, false);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba | 8,011,957,973,666,654,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> |
static int vp7_fade_frame(VP8Context *s, VP56RangeCoder *c)
{
int alpha = (int8_t) vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
int beta = (int8_t) vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
int ret;
if (!s->keyframe && (alpha || beta)) {
int width = s->mb_width * 16;
int height = s->mb_height * 16;
AVFrame *src, *dst;
if (!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] ||
!s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN]) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding interframe without a prior keyframe!\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
dst =
src = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]->tf.f;
/* preserve the golden frame, write a new previous frame */
if (s->framep[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] == s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]) {
s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS] = vp8_find_free_buffer(s);
if ((ret = vp8_alloc_frame(s, s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS], 1)) < 0)
return ret;
dst = s->framep[VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS]->tf.f;
copy_chroma(dst, src, width, height);
}
fade(dst->data[0], dst->linesize[0],
src->data[0], src->linesize[0],
width, height, alpha, beta);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | FFmpeg | 6b5d3fb26fb4be48e4966e4b1d97c2165538d4ef | 68,950,931,675,687,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static int get_malloc_block_total_size(void *ptr)
{
mbed_heap_overhead_t *c = (mbed_heap_overhead_t *)((char *)ptr - offsetof(mbed_heap_overhead, next));
// Skip the padding area
if (c->size < 0) {
c = (mbed_heap_overhead_t *)((char *)c + c->size);
}
// Mask LSB as it is used for usage flags
return (c->size & ~0x1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | mbed-os | 4450464fc87fb104a45190a2334b82b3bb2b13fb | 256,021,059,601,632,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Add integer overflow check to the malloc wrappers
Add a check that the combined size of the buffer to allocate and
alloc_info_t does not exceed the maximum integer value representable
by size_t. |
SpaceToBatchNDContext(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
input = GetInput(context, node, 0);
block_shape = GetInput(context, node, 1);
paddings = GetInput(context, node, 2);
output = GetOutput(context, node, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
] | tensorflow | 6d36ba65577006affb272335b7c1abd829010708 | 220,714,602,661,280,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Prevent division by 0
PiperOrigin-RevId: 370984990
Change-Id: Ib324955bbeb1cbd97c82fd5d61a00a2697c9a2de |
const SubFramework* Binary::sub_framework() const {
return command<SubFramework>();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | LIEF | 7acf0bc4224081d4f425fcc8b2e361b95291d878 | 283,508,667,057,539,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Resolve #764 |
int nlmsg_notify(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 pid,
unsigned int group, int report, gfp_t flags)
{
int err = 0;
if (group) {
int exclude_pid = 0;
if (report) {
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
exclude_pid = pid;
}
/* errors reported via destination sk->sk_err, but propagate
* delivery errors if NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR flag is set */
err = nlmsg_multicast(sk, skb, exclude_pid, group, flags);
}
if (report) {
int err2;
err2 = nlmsg_unicast(sk, skb, pid);
if (!err || err == -ESRCH)
err = err2;
}
return err;
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 16e5726269611b71c930054ffe9b858c1cea88eb | 322,124,535,911,354,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default
Since commit 7361c36c5224 (af_unix: Allow credentials to work across
user and pid namespaces) af_unix performance dropped a lot.
This is because we now take a reference on pid and cred in each write(),
and release them in read(), usually done from another process,
eventually from another cpu. This triggers false sharing.
# Events: 154K cycles
#
# Overhead Command Shared Object Symbol
# ........ ....... .................. .........................
#
10.40% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] put_pid
8.60% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_recvmsg
7.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_stream_sendmsg
6.11% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] do_raw_spin_lock
4.95% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_scm_to_skb
4.87% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] pid_nr_ns
4.34% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] cred_to_ucred
2.39% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] unix_destruct_scm
2.24% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sub_preempt_count
1.75% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] fget_light
1.51% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k]
__mutex_lock_interruptible_slowpath
1.42% hackbench [kernel.kallsyms] [k] sock_alloc_send_pskb
This patch includes SCM_CREDENTIALS information in a af_unix message/skb
only if requested by the sender, [man 7 unix for details how to include
ancillary data using sendmsg() system call]
Note: This might break buggy applications that expected SCM_CREDENTIAL
from an unaware write() system call, and receiver not using SO_PASSCRED
socket option.
If SOCK_PASSCRED is set on source or destination socket, we still
include credentials for mere write() syscalls.
Performance boost in hackbench : more than 50% gain on a 16 thread
machine (2 quad-core cpus, 2 threads per core)
hackbench 20 thread 2000
4.228 sec instead of 9.102 sec
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static void autoname_imp_trampoline(RzCore *core, RzAnalysisFunction *fcn) {
if (rz_list_length(fcn->bbs) == 1 && ((RzAnalysisBlock *)rz_list_first(fcn->bbs))->ninstr == 1) {
RzList *xrefs = rz_analysis_function_get_xrefs_from(fcn);
if (xrefs && rz_list_length(xrefs) == 1) {
RzAnalysisXRef *xref = rz_list_first(xrefs);
if (xref->type != RZ_ANALYSIS_REF_TYPE_CALL) { /* Some fcns don't return */
RzFlagItem *flg = rz_flag_get_i(core->flags, xref->to);
if (flg && rz_str_startswith(flg->name, "sym.imp.")) {
RZ_FREE(fcn->name);
fcn->name = rz_str_newf("sub.%s", flg->name + 8);
}
}
}
rz_list_free(xrefs);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | rizin | 6ce71d8aa3dafe3cdb52d5d72ae8f4b95916f939 | 160,723,993,652,495,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | Initialize retctx,ctx before freeing the inner elements
In rz_core_analysis_type_match retctx structure was initialized on the
stack only after a "goto out_function", where a field of that structure
was freed. When the goto path is taken, the field is not properly
initialized and it cause cause a crash of Rizin or have other effects.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4022 |
copy64 (uint32x * M, uschar *in)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
M[i] = (in[i * 4 + 3] << 24) | (in[i * 4 + 2] << 16) |
(in[i * 4 + 1] << 8) | (in[i * 4 + 0] << 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | exim | 57aa14b216432be381b6295c312065b2fd034f86 | 212,882,461,621,303,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Fix SPA authenticator, checking client-supplied data before using it. Bug 2571 |
shell_gtk_embed_get_preferred_height (ClutterActor *actor,
float for_width,
float *min_height_p,
float *natural_height_p)
{
ShellGtkEmbed *embed = SHELL_GTK_EMBED (actor);
ShellGtkEmbedPrivate *priv = shell_gtk_embed_get_instance_private (embed);
if (priv->window
&& gtk_widget_get_visible (GTK_WIDGET (priv->window)))
{
GtkRequisition min_req, natural_req;
gtk_widget_get_preferred_size (GTK_WIDGET (priv->window), &min_req, &natural_req);
*min_height_p = min_req.height;
*natural_height_p = natural_req.height;
}
else
*min_height_p = *natural_height_p = 0;
} | 0 | [] | gnome-shell | 90c55e1977fde252b79bcfd9d0ef41144fb21fe2 | 301,832,194,646,989,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | gtk-embed: ensure we only listen for window-created events once
If a tray icon gets a mapped and unmapped and the mapped again
in quick succession, we can end up with multiple handlers
listening for window creation events.
This commit tries to guard against that by only listening for
window-created events when we don't know the actor associated
with the icon.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=787361 |
dev_t blk_lookup_devt(const char *name, int partno)
{
dev_t devt = MKDEV(0, 0);
struct class_dev_iter iter;
struct device *dev;
class_dev_iter_init(&iter, &block_class, NULL, &disk_type);
while ((dev = class_dev_iter_next(&iter))) {
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
struct hd_struct *part;
if (strcmp(dev_name(dev), name))
continue;
if (partno < disk->minors) {
/* We need to return the right devno, even
* if the partition doesn't exist yet.
*/
devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(dev->devt),
MINOR(dev->devt) + partno);
break;
}
part = disk_get_part(disk, partno);
if (part) {
devt = part_devt(part);
disk_put_part(part);
break;
}
disk_put_part(part);
}
class_dev_iter_exit(&iter);
return devt;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux-stable | 77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84 | 200,024,962,496,274,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
int rdbSaveKeyValuePair(rio *rdb, robj *key, robj *val, long long expiretime) {
int savelru = server.maxmemory_policy & MAXMEMORY_FLAG_LRU;
int savelfu = server.maxmemory_policy & MAXMEMORY_FLAG_LFU;
/* Save the expire time */
if (expiretime != -1) {
if (rdbSaveType(rdb,RDB_OPCODE_EXPIRETIME_MS) == -1) return -1;
if (rdbSaveMillisecondTime(rdb,expiretime) == -1) return -1;
}
/* Save the LRU info. */
if (savelru) {
uint64_t idletime = estimateObjectIdleTime(val);
idletime /= 1000; /* Using seconds is enough and requires less space.*/
if (rdbSaveType(rdb,RDB_OPCODE_IDLE) == -1) return -1;
if (rdbSaveLen(rdb,idletime) == -1) return -1;
}
/* Save the LFU info. */
if (savelfu) {
uint8_t buf[1];
buf[0] = LFUDecrAndReturn(val);
/* We can encode this in exactly two bytes: the opcode and an 8
* bit counter, since the frequency is logarithmic with a 0-255 range.
* Note that we do not store the halving time because to reset it
* a single time when loading does not affect the frequency much. */
if (rdbSaveType(rdb,RDB_OPCODE_FREQ) == -1) return -1;
if (rdbWriteRaw(rdb,buf,1) == -1) return -1;
}
/* Save type, key, value */
if (rdbSaveObjectType(rdb,val) == -1) return -1;
if (rdbSaveStringObject(rdb,key) == -1) return -1;
if (rdbSaveObject(rdb,val,key) == -1) return -1;
/* Delay return if required (for testing) */
if (server.rdb_key_save_delay)
usleep(server.rdb_key_save_delay);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | redis | a30d367a71b7017581cf1ca104242a3c644dec0f | 283,956,936,436,676,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | Fix Integer overflow issue with intsets (CVE-2021-32687)
The vulnerability involves changing the default set-max-intset-entries
configuration parameter to a very large value and constructing specially
crafted commands to manipulate sets |
void htc_sta_drain(struct htc_target *target, u8 idx)
{
target->hif->sta_drain(target->hif_dev, idx);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 853acf7caf10b828102d92d05b5c101666a6142b | 325,081,162,889,324,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | ath9k_htc: release allocated buffer if timed out
In htc_config_pipe_credits, htc_setup_complete, and htc_connect_service
if time out happens, the allocated buffer needs to be released.
Otherwise there will be memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> |
void opj_j2k_read_int16_to_int32 (const void * p_src_data, void * p_dest_data, OPJ_UINT32 p_nb_elem)
{
OPJ_BYTE * l_src_data = (OPJ_BYTE *) p_src_data;
OPJ_INT32 * l_dest_data = (OPJ_INT32 *) p_dest_data;
OPJ_UINT32 i;
OPJ_UINT32 l_temp;
for (i=0;i<p_nb_elem;++i) {
opj_read_bytes(l_src_data,&l_temp,2);
l_src_data+=sizeof(OPJ_INT16);
*(l_dest_data++) = (OPJ_INT32) l_temp;
}
} | 0 | [] | openjpeg | 0fa5a17c98c4b8f9ee2286f4f0a50cf52a5fccb0 | 107,410,554,193,336,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | [trunk] Correct potential double free on malloc failure in opj_j2k_copy_default_tcp_and_create_tcp (fixes issue 492) |
int do_migrate_pages(struct mm_struct *mm,
const nodemask_t *from_nodes, const nodemask_t *to_nodes, int flags)
{
int busy = 0;
int err;
nodemask_t tmp;
err = migrate_prep();
if (err)
return err;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
err = migrate_vmas(mm, from_nodes, to_nodes, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Find a 'source' bit set in 'tmp' whose corresponding 'dest'
* bit in 'to' is not also set in 'tmp'. Clear the found 'source'
* bit in 'tmp', and return that <source, dest> pair for migration.
* The pair of nodemasks 'to' and 'from' define the map.
*
* If no pair of bits is found that way, fallback to picking some
* pair of 'source' and 'dest' bits that are not the same. If the
* 'source' and 'dest' bits are the same, this represents a node
* that will be migrating to itself, so no pages need move.
*
* If no bits are left in 'tmp', or if all remaining bits left
* in 'tmp' correspond to the same bit in 'to', return false
* (nothing left to migrate).
*
* This lets us pick a pair of nodes to migrate between, such that
* if possible the dest node is not already occupied by some other
* source node, minimizing the risk of overloading the memory on a
* node that would happen if we migrated incoming memory to a node
* before migrating outgoing memory source that same node.
*
* A single scan of tmp is sufficient. As we go, we remember the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved (s != d). If we find a pair
* that not only moved, but what's better, moved to an empty slot
* (d is not set in tmp), then we break out then, with that pair.
* Otherwise when we finish scanning from_tmp, we at least have the
* most recent <s, d> pair that moved. If we get all the way through
* the scan of tmp without finding any node that moved, much less
* moved to an empty node, then there is nothing left worth migrating.
*/
tmp = *from_nodes;
while (!nodes_empty(tmp)) {
int s,d;
int source = -1;
int dest = 0;
for_each_node_mask(s, tmp) {
d = node_remap(s, *from_nodes, *to_nodes);
if (s == d)
continue;
source = s; /* Node moved. Memorize */
dest = d;
/* dest not in remaining from nodes? */
if (!node_isset(dest, tmp))
break;
}
if (source == -1)
break;
node_clear(source, tmp);
err = migrate_to_node(mm, source, dest, flags);
if (err > 0)
busy += err;
if (err < 0)
break;
}
out:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
return busy;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 | 109,543,330,188,792,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 83 | mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static ssize_t lbs_highsnr_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return lbs_threshold_read(TLV_TYPE_SNR_HIGH, CMD_SUBSCRIBE_SNR_HIGH,
file, userbuf, count, ppos);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | a497e47d4aec37aaf8f13509f3ef3d1f6a717d88 | 164,366,150,994,953,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> |
virSecuritySELinuxSetSysinfoLabel(virSecurityManager *mgr,
virSysinfoDef *def,
virSecuritySELinuxData *data)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < def->nfw_cfgs; i++) {
virSysinfoFWCfgDef *f = &def->fw_cfgs[i];
if (f->file &&
virSecuritySELinuxSetFilecon(mgr, f->file,
data->content_context, true) < 0)
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-732"
] | libvirt | 15073504dbb624d3f6c911e85557019d3620fdb2 | 71,359,510,963,710,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | security: fix SELinux label generation logic
A process can access a file if the set of MCS categories
for the file is equal-to *or* a subset-of, the set of
MCS categories for the process.
If there are two VMs:
a) svirt_t:s0:c117
b) svirt_t:s0:c117,c720
Then VM (b) is able to access files labelled for VM (a).
IOW, we must discard case where the categories are equal
because that is a subset of many other valid category pairs.
Fixes: https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/issues/153
CVE-2021-3631
Reviewed-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> |
static void smtp_to_smtps(struct connectdata *conn)
{
/* Change the connection handler */
conn->handler = &Curl_handler_smtps;
/* Set the connection's upgraded to TLS flag */
conn->tls_upgraded = TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | curl | ba1dbd78e5f1ed67c1b8d37ac89d90e5e330b628 | 189,178,256,426,818,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html |
static void set_indicator_in_key_fields(KEY *key_info)
{
KEY_PART_INFO *key_part;
uint key_parts= key_info->user_defined_key_parts, i;
for (i= 0, key_part=key_info->key_part; i < key_parts; i++, key_part++)
key_part->field->flags|= GET_FIXED_FIELDS_FLAG;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585 | 332,297,276,704,973,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments. |
int vb2_ioctl_create_bufs(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_create_buffers *p)
{
struct video_device *vdev = video_devdata(file);
int res = vb2_verify_memory_type(vdev->queue, p->memory,
p->format.type);
p->index = vdev->queue->num_buffers;
/*
* If count == 0, then just check if memory and type are valid.
* Any -EBUSY result from vb2_verify_memory_type can be mapped to 0.
*/
if (p->count == 0)
return res != -EBUSY ? res : 0;
if (res)
return res;
if (vb2_queue_is_busy(vdev, file))
return -EBUSY;
res = vb2_create_bufs(vdev->queue, p);
if (res == 0)
vdev->queue->owner = file->private_data;
return res;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 2c1f6951a8a82e6de0d82b1158b5e493fc6c54ab | 38,736,212,793,785,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> |
static void __ept_release(struct kref *kref)
{
struct rpmsg_endpoint *ept = container_of(kref, struct rpmsg_endpoint,
refcount);
/*
* At this point no one holds a reference to ept anymore,
* so we can directly free it
*/
kfree(ept);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | linux | 1680939e9ecf7764fba8689cfb3429c2fe2bb23c | 82,018,438,313,957,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | rpmsg: virtio: Fix possible double free in rpmsg_virtio_add_ctrl_dev()
vch will be free in virtio_rpmsg_release_device() when
rpmsg_ctrldev_register_device() fails. There is no need to call
kfree() again.
Fixes: c486682ae1e2 ("rpmsg: virtio: Register the rpmsg_char device")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]> |
static void tcp_update_pacing_rate(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
u64 rate;
/* set sk_pacing_rate to 200 % of current rate (mss * cwnd / srtt) */
rate = (u64)tp->mss_cache * ((USEC_PER_SEC / 100) << 3);
/* current rate is (cwnd * mss) / srtt
* In Slow Start [1], set sk_pacing_rate to 200 % the current rate.
* In Congestion Avoidance phase, set it to 120 % the current rate.
*
* [1] : Normal Slow Start condition is (tp->snd_cwnd < tp->snd_ssthresh)
* If snd_cwnd >= (tp->snd_ssthresh / 2), we are approaching
* end of slow start and should slow down.
*/
if (tp->snd_cwnd < tp->snd_ssthresh / 2)
rate *= sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio;
else
rate *= sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio;
rate *= max(tp->snd_cwnd, tp->packets_out);
if (likely(tp->srtt_us))
do_div(rate, tp->srtt_us);
/* ACCESS_ONCE() is needed because sch_fq fetches sk_pacing_rate
* without any lock. We want to make sure compiler wont store
* intermediate values in this location.
*/
ACCESS_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_rate) = min_t(u64, rate,
sk->sk_max_pacing_rate);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | 8b8a321ff72c785ed5e8b4cf6eda20b35d427390 | 149,832,201,615,945,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
doZipFinish(ptcpsess_t *pSess)
{
int zRet; /* zlib return state */
DEFiRet;
unsigned outavail;
struct syslogTime stTime;
uchar zipBuf[32*1024]; // TODO: use "global" one from pSess
if(!pSess->bzInitDone)
goto done;
pSess->zstrm.avail_in = 0;
/* run inflate() on buffer until everything has been compressed */
do {
DBGPRINTF("doZipFinish: in inflate() loop, avail_in %d, total_in %ld\n", pSess->zstrm.avail_in,
pSess->zstrm.total_in);
pSess->zstrm.avail_out = sizeof(zipBuf);
pSess->zstrm.next_out = zipBuf;
zRet = inflate(&pSess->zstrm, Z_FINISH); /* no bad return value */
DBGPRINTF("after inflate, ret %d, avail_out %d\n", zRet, pSess->zstrm.avail_out);
outavail = sizeof(zipBuf) - pSess->zstrm.avail_out;
if(outavail != 0) {
pSess->pLstn->rcvdDecompressed += outavail;
CHKiRet(DataRcvdUncompressed(pSess, (char*)zipBuf, outavail, &stTime, 0));
// TODO: query time!
}
} while (pSess->zstrm.avail_out == 0);
finalize_it:
zRet = inflateEnd(&pSess->zstrm);
if(zRet != Z_OK) {
DBGPRINTF("imptcp: error %d returned from zlib/inflateEnd()\n", zRet);
}
pSess->bzInitDone = 0;
done: RETiRet;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | rsyslog | 89955b0bcb1ff105e1374aad7e0e993faa6a038f | 14,727,604,906,510,768,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | net bugfix: potential buffer overrun |
static int x509parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
rsa_context *rsa,
const unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen )
{
int ret;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end;
x509_buf pk_alg_oid;
p = (unsigned char *) key;
end = p + keylen;
/*
* This function parses the PrivatKeyInfo object (PKCS#8)
*
* PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* version Version,
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* PrivateKey BIT STRING
* }
*
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
* }
*
* The PrivateKey BIT STRING is a PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey
*/
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,
ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
end = p + len;
if( ( ret = asn1_get_int( &p, end, &rsa->ver ) ) != 0 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
if( rsa->ver != 0 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_VERSION + ret );
}
if( ( ret = x509_get_alg( &p, end, &pk_alg_oid ) ) != 0 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
}
/*
* only RSA keys handled at this time
*/
if( pk_alg_oid.len != 9 ||
memcmp( pk_alg_oid.p, OID_PKCS1_RSA, 9 ) != 0 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG );
}
/*
* Get the OCTET STRING and parse the PKCS#1 format inside
*/
if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );
if( ( end - p ) < 1 )
{
return( POLARSSL_ERR_X509_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT +
POLARSSL_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA );
}
end = p + len;
if( ( ret = x509parse_key_pkcs1_der( rsa, p, end - p ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | polarssl | 43f9799ce61c6392a014d0a2ea136b4b3a9ee194 | 261,867,338,478,095,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks |
static char *sun4u_fw_dev_path(FWPathProvider *p, BusState *bus,
DeviceState *dev)
{
PCIDevice *pci;
IDEBus *ide_bus;
IDEState *ide_s;
int bus_id;
if (!strcmp(object_get_typename(OBJECT(dev)), "pbm-bridge")) {
pci = PCI_DEVICE(dev);
if (PCI_FUNC(pci->devfn)) {
return g_strdup_printf("pci@%x,%x", PCI_SLOT(pci->devfn),
PCI_FUNC(pci->devfn));
} else {
return g_strdup_printf("pci@%x", PCI_SLOT(pci->devfn));
}
}
if (!strcmp(object_get_typename(OBJECT(dev)), "ide-drive")) {
ide_bus = IDE_BUS(qdev_get_parent_bus(dev));
ide_s = idebus_active_if(ide_bus);
bus_id = ide_bus->bus_id;
if (ide_s->drive_kind == IDE_CD) {
return g_strdup_printf("ide@%x/cdrom", bus_id);
}
return g_strdup_printf("ide@%x/disk", bus_id);
}
if (!strcmp(object_get_typename(OBJECT(dev)), "ide-hd")) {
return g_strdup("disk");
}
if (!strcmp(object_get_typename(OBJECT(dev)), "ide-cd")) {
return g_strdup("cdrom");
}
if (!strcmp(object_get_typename(OBJECT(dev)), "virtio-blk-device")) {
return g_strdup("disk");
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | qemu | ad280559c68360c9f1cd7be063857853759e6a73 | 304,438,319,139,161,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | sun4u: add power_mem_read routine
Define skeleton 'power_mem_read' routine. Avoid NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Fakhri Zulkifli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> |
Item_func_sp::Item_func_sp(THD *thd, Name_resolution_context *context_arg,
sp_name *name_arg, List<Item> &list):
Item_func(thd, list), context(context_arg), m_name(name_arg), m_sp(NULL),
sp_result_field(NULL)
{
maybe_null= 1;
m_name->init_qname(thd);
dummy_table= (TABLE*) thd->calloc(sizeof(TABLE)+ sizeof(TABLE_SHARE));
dummy_table->s= (TABLE_SHARE*) (dummy_table+1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | server | eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1 | 99,536,955,070,535,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the
existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix. |
TEST_P(RedirectIntegrationTest, UpstreamRedirectPreservesURIFragmentInLocation) {
// Use base class initialize.
HttpProtocolIntegrationTest::initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl redirect_response{
{":status", "302"},
{"content-length", "0"},
{"location", "http://authority2/new/url?p1=v1&p2=v2#fragment"}};
auto response = sendRequestAndWaitForResponse(default_request_headers_, 0, redirect_response, 0);
EXPECT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("302", response->headers().getStatusValue());
EXPECT_EQ("http://authority2/new/url?p1=v1&p2=v2#fragment",
response->headers().getLocationValue());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | 18871dbfb168d3512a10c78dd267ff7c03f564c6 | 328,269,257,837,297,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | [1.18] CVE-2022-21655
Crash with direct_response
Signed-off-by: Otto van der Schaaf <[email protected]> |
static sqlite3_index_info *allocateIndexInfo(
WhereInfo *pWInfo, /* The WHERE clause */
WhereClause *pWC, /* The WHERE clause being analyzed */
Bitmask mUnusable, /* Ignore terms with these prereqs */
SrcItem *pSrc, /* The FROM clause term that is the vtab */
u16 *pmNoOmit /* Mask of terms not to omit */
){
int i, j;
int nTerm;
Parse *pParse = pWInfo->pParse;
struct sqlite3_index_constraint *pIdxCons;
struct sqlite3_index_orderby *pIdxOrderBy;
struct sqlite3_index_constraint_usage *pUsage;
struct HiddenIndexInfo *pHidden;
WhereTerm *pTerm;
int nOrderBy;
sqlite3_index_info *pIdxInfo;
u16 mNoOmit = 0;
const Table *pTab;
int eDistinct = 0;
ExprList *pOrderBy = pWInfo->pOrderBy;
assert( pSrc!=0 );
pTab = pSrc->pTab;
assert( pTab!=0 );
assert( IsVirtual(pTab) );
/* Find all WHERE clause constraints referring to this virtual table.
** Mark each term with the TERM_OK flag. Set nTerm to the number of
** terms found.
*/
for(i=nTerm=0, pTerm=pWC->a; i<pWC->nTerm; i++, pTerm++){
pTerm->wtFlags &= ~TERM_OK;
if( pTerm->leftCursor != pSrc->iCursor ) continue;
if( pTerm->prereqRight & mUnusable ) continue;
assert( IsPowerOfTwo(pTerm->eOperator & ~WO_EQUIV) );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IN );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ISNULL );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_IS );
testcase( pTerm->eOperator & WO_ALL );
if( (pTerm->eOperator & ~(WO_EQUIV))==0 ) continue;
if( pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_VNULL ) continue;
assert( (pTerm->eOperator & (WO_OR|WO_AND))==0 );
assert( pTerm->u.x.leftColumn>=XN_ROWID );
assert( pTerm->u.x.leftColumn<pTab->nCol );
/* tag-20191211-002: WHERE-clause constraints are not useful to the
** right-hand table of a LEFT JOIN nor to the either table of a
** RIGHT JOIN. See tag-20191211-001 for the
** equivalent restriction for ordinary tables. */
if( (pSrc->fg.jointype & (JT_LEFT|JT_LTORJ|JT_RIGHT))!=0 ){
testcase( (pSrc->fg.jointype & (JT_LEFT|JT_LTORJ|JT_RIGHT))==JT_LEFT );
testcase( (pSrc->fg.jointype & (JT_LEFT|JT_LTORJ|JT_RIGHT))==JT_RIGHT );
testcase( (pSrc->fg.jointype & (JT_LEFT|JT_LTORJ|JT_RIGHT))==JT_LTORJ );
testcase( ExprHasProperty(pTerm->pExpr, EP_OuterON) );
testcase( ExprHasProperty(pTerm->pExpr, EP_InnerON) );
if( !ExprHasProperty(pTerm->pExpr, EP_OuterON|EP_InnerON)
|| pTerm->pExpr->w.iJoin != pSrc->iCursor
){
continue;
}
}
nTerm++;
pTerm->wtFlags |= TERM_OK;
}
/* If the ORDER BY clause contains only columns in the current
** virtual table then allocate space for the aOrderBy part of
** the sqlite3_index_info structure.
*/
nOrderBy = 0;
if( pOrderBy ){
int n = pOrderBy->nExpr;
for(i=0; i<n; i++){
Expr *pExpr = pOrderBy->a[i].pExpr;
Expr *pE2;
/* Skip over constant terms in the ORDER BY clause */
if( sqlite3ExprIsConstant(pExpr) ){
continue;
}
/* Virtual tables are unable to deal with NULLS FIRST */
if( pOrderBy->a[i].fg.sortFlags & KEYINFO_ORDER_BIGNULL ) break;
/* First case - a direct column references without a COLLATE operator */
if( pExpr->op==TK_COLUMN && pExpr->iTable==pSrc->iCursor ){
assert( pExpr->iColumn>=XN_ROWID && pExpr->iColumn<pTab->nCol );
continue;
}
/* 2nd case - a column reference with a COLLATE operator. Only match
** of the COLLATE operator matches the collation of the column. */
if( pExpr->op==TK_COLLATE
&& (pE2 = pExpr->pLeft)->op==TK_COLUMN
&& pE2->iTable==pSrc->iCursor
){
const char *zColl; /* The collating sequence name */
assert( !ExprHasProperty(pExpr, EP_IntValue) );
assert( pExpr->u.zToken!=0 );
assert( pE2->iColumn>=XN_ROWID && pE2->iColumn<pTab->nCol );
pExpr->iColumn = pE2->iColumn;
if( pE2->iColumn<0 ) continue; /* Collseq does not matter for rowid */
zColl = sqlite3ColumnColl(&pTab->aCol[pE2->iColumn]);
if( zColl==0 ) zColl = sqlite3StrBINARY;
if( sqlite3_stricmp(pExpr->u.zToken, zColl)==0 ) continue;
}
/* No matches cause a break out of the loop */
break;
}
if( i==n ){
nOrderBy = n;
if( (pWInfo->wctrlFlags & WHERE_DISTINCTBY) ){
eDistinct = 2 + ((pWInfo->wctrlFlags & WHERE_SORTBYGROUP)!=0);
}else if( pWInfo->wctrlFlags & WHERE_GROUPBY ){
eDistinct = 1;
}
}
}
/* Allocate the sqlite3_index_info structure
*/
pIdxInfo = sqlite3DbMallocZero(pParse->db, sizeof(*pIdxInfo)
+ (sizeof(*pIdxCons) + sizeof(*pUsage))*nTerm
+ sizeof(*pIdxOrderBy)*nOrderBy + sizeof(*pHidden)
+ sizeof(sqlite3_value*)*nTerm );
if( pIdxInfo==0 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "out of memory");
return 0;
}
pHidden = (struct HiddenIndexInfo*)&pIdxInfo[1];
pIdxCons = (struct sqlite3_index_constraint*)&pHidden->aRhs[nTerm];
pIdxOrderBy = (struct sqlite3_index_orderby*)&pIdxCons[nTerm];
pUsage = (struct sqlite3_index_constraint_usage*)&pIdxOrderBy[nOrderBy];
pIdxInfo->aConstraint = pIdxCons;
pIdxInfo->aOrderBy = pIdxOrderBy;
pIdxInfo->aConstraintUsage = pUsage;
pHidden->pWC = pWC;
pHidden->pParse = pParse;
pHidden->eDistinct = eDistinct;
pHidden->mIn = 0;
for(i=j=0, pTerm=pWC->a; i<pWC->nTerm; i++, pTerm++){
u16 op;
if( (pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_OK)==0 ) continue;
pIdxCons[j].iColumn = pTerm->u.x.leftColumn;
pIdxCons[j].iTermOffset = i;
op = pTerm->eOperator & WO_ALL;
if( op==WO_IN ){
if( (pTerm->wtFlags & TERM_SLICE)==0 ){
pHidden->mIn |= SMASKBIT32(j);
}
op = WO_EQ;
}
if( op==WO_AUX ){
pIdxCons[j].op = pTerm->eMatchOp;
}else if( op & (WO_ISNULL|WO_IS) ){
if( op==WO_ISNULL ){
pIdxCons[j].op = SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_ISNULL;
}else{
pIdxCons[j].op = SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_IS;
}
}else{
pIdxCons[j].op = (u8)op;
/* The direct assignment in the previous line is possible only because
** the WO_ and SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_ codes are identical. The
** following asserts verify this fact. */
assert( WO_EQ==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_EQ );
assert( WO_LT==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LT );
assert( WO_LE==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_LE );
assert( WO_GT==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GT );
assert( WO_GE==SQLITE_INDEX_CONSTRAINT_GE );
assert( pTerm->eOperator&(WO_IN|WO_EQ|WO_LT|WO_LE|WO_GT|WO_GE|WO_AUX) );
if( op & (WO_LT|WO_LE|WO_GT|WO_GE)
&& sqlite3ExprIsVector(pTerm->pExpr->pRight)
){
testcase( j!=i );
if( j<16 ) mNoOmit |= (1 << j);
if( op==WO_LT ) pIdxCons[j].op = WO_LE;
if( op==WO_GT ) pIdxCons[j].op = WO_GE;
}
}
j++;
}
assert( j==nTerm );
pIdxInfo->nConstraint = j;
for(i=j=0; i<nOrderBy; i++){
Expr *pExpr = pOrderBy->a[i].pExpr;
if( sqlite3ExprIsConstant(pExpr) ) continue;
assert( pExpr->op==TK_COLUMN
|| (pExpr->op==TK_COLLATE && pExpr->pLeft->op==TK_COLUMN
&& pExpr->iColumn==pExpr->pLeft->iColumn) );
pIdxOrderBy[j].iColumn = pExpr->iColumn;
pIdxOrderBy[j].desc = pOrderBy->a[i].fg.sortFlags & KEYINFO_ORDER_DESC;
j++;
}
pIdxInfo->nOrderBy = j;
*pmNoOmit = mNoOmit;
return pIdxInfo;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-129"
] | sqlite | effc07ec9c6e08d3bd17665f8800054770f8c643 | 118,036,693,794,038,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 204 | Fix the whereKeyStats() routine (part of STAT4 processing only) so that it
is able to cope with row-value comparisons against the primary key index
of a WITHOUT ROWID table.
[forum:/forumpost/3607259d3c|Forum post 3607259d3c].
FossilOrigin-Name: 2a6f761864a462de5c2d5bc666b82fb0b7e124a03443cd1482620dde344b34bb |
static int ieee80211_auth(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *dev,
struct cfg80211_auth_request *req)
{
return ieee80211_mgd_auth(IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev), req);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287"
] | linux | 3e493173b7841259a08c5c8e5cbe90adb349da7e | 63,233,719,577,003,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
xsltNewStylesheet(void) {
xsltStylesheetPtr ret = NULL;
ret = (xsltStylesheetPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltStylesheet));
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewStylesheet : malloc failed\n");
goto internal_err;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(xsltStylesheet));
ret->omitXmlDeclaration = -1;
ret->standalone = -1;
ret->decimalFormat = xsltNewDecimalFormat(NULL, NULL);
ret->indent = -1;
ret->errors = 0;
ret->warnings = 0;
ret->exclPrefixNr = 0;
ret->exclPrefixMax = 0;
ret->exclPrefixTab = NULL;
ret->extInfos = NULL;
ret->extrasNr = 0;
ret->internalized = 1;
ret->literal_result = 0;
ret->forwards_compatible = 0;
ret->dict = xmlDictCreate();
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"creating dictionary for stylesheet\n");
#endif
xsltInit();
return(ret);
internal_err:
if (ret != NULL)
xsltFreeStylesheet(ret);
return(NULL);
} | 0 | [] | libxslt | e03553605b45c88f0b4b2980adfbbb8f6fca2fd6 | 322,111,322,932,583,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | Fix security framework bypass
xsltCheckRead and xsltCheckWrite return -1 in case of error but callers
don't check for this condition and allow access. With a specially
crafted URL, xsltCheckRead could be tricked into returning an error
because of a supposedly invalid URL that would still be loaded
succesfully later on.
Fixes #12.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report. |
enum ndr_err_code ndr_push_dns_string_list(struct ndr_push *ndr,
struct ndr_token_list *string_list,
int ndr_flags,
const char *s,
bool is_nbt)
{
const char *start = s;
bool use_compression;
size_t max_length;
if (is_nbt) {
use_compression = true;
/*
* Max length is longer in NBT/Wins, because Windows counts
* the semi-decompressed size of the netbios name (16 bytes)
* rather than the wire size of 32, which is what you'd expect
* if it followed RFC1002 (it uses the short form in
* [MS-WINSRA]). In other words the maximum size of the
* "scope" is 237, not 221.
*
* We make the size limit slightly larger than 255 + 16,
* because the 237 scope limit is already enforced in the
* winsserver code with a specific return value; bailing out
* here would muck with that.
*/
max_length = 274;
} else {
use_compression = !(ndr->flags & LIBNDR_FLAG_NO_COMPRESSION);
max_length = 255;
}
if (!(ndr_flags & NDR_SCALARS)) {
return NDR_ERR_SUCCESS;
}
while (s && *s) {
enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
char *compname;
size_t complen;
uint32_t offset;
if (use_compression) {
/* see if we have pushed the remaining string already,
* if so we use a label pointer to this string
*/
ndr_err = ndr_token_retrieve_cmp_fn(string_list, s,
&offset,
(comparison_fn_t)strcmp,
false);
if (NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
uint8_t b[2];
if (offset > 0x3FFF) {
return ndr_push_error(ndr, NDR_ERR_STRING,
"offset for dns string " \
"label pointer " \
"%u[%08X] > 0x00003FFF",
offset, offset);
}
b[0] = 0xC0 | (offset>>8);
b[1] = (offset & 0xFF);
return ndr_push_bytes(ndr, b, 2);
}
}
complen = strcspn(s, ".");
/* the length must fit into 6 bits (i.e. <= 63) */
if (complen > 0x3F) {
return ndr_push_error(ndr, NDR_ERR_STRING,
"component length %u[%08X] > " \
"0x0000003F",
(unsigned)complen,
(unsigned)complen);
}
if (complen == 0 && s[complen] == '.') {
return ndr_push_error(ndr, NDR_ERR_STRING,
"component length is 0 "
"(consecutive dots)");
}
if (is_nbt && s[complen] == '.' && s[complen + 1] == '\0') {
/* nbt names are sometimes usernames, and we need to
* keep a trailing dot to ensure it is byte-identical,
* (not just semantically identical given DNS
* semantics). */
complen++;
}
compname = talloc_asprintf(ndr, "%c%*.*s",
(unsigned char)complen,
(unsigned char)complen,
(unsigned char)complen, s);
NDR_ERR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(compname);
/* remember the current component + the rest of the string
* so it can be reused later
*/
if (use_compression) {
NDR_CHECK(ndr_token_store(ndr, string_list, s,
ndr->offset));
}
/* push just this component into the blob */
NDR_CHECK(ndr_push_bytes(ndr, (const uint8_t *)compname,
complen+1));
talloc_free(compname);
s += complen;
if (*s == '.') {
s++;
}
if (s - start > max_length) {
return ndr_push_error(ndr, NDR_ERR_STRING,
"name > %zu character long",
max_length);
}
}
/* if we reach the end of the string and have pushed the last component
* without using a label pointer, we need to terminate the string
*/
return ndr_push_bytes(ndr, (const uint8_t *)"", 1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | samba | cc3a67760cf9faaad3af73b1eed9e2ef85276633 | 24,399,994,098,302,414,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 126 | CVE-2020-10745: ndr/dns-utils: prepare for NBT compatibility
NBT has a funny thing where it sometimes needs to send a trailing dot as
part of the last component, because the string representation is a user
name. In DNS, "example.com", and "example.com." are the same, both
having three components ("example", "com", ""); in NBT, we want to treat
them differently, with the second form having the three components
("example", "com.", "").
This retains the logic of e6e2ec0001fe3c010445e26cc0efddbc1f73416b.
Also DNS compression cannot be turned off for NBT.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14378
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]> |
static int lookup_pi_state(u32 uval, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps)
{
struct futex_q *match = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
/*
* If there is a waiter on that futex, validate it and
* attach to the pi_state when the validation succeeds.
*/
if (match)
return attach_to_pi_state(uval, match->pi_state, ps);
/*
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on
* @uval and attach to it.
*/
return attach_to_pi_owner(uval, key, ps);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 65d8fc777f6dcfee12785c057a6b57f679641c90 | 141,163,270,191,176,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Cc: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> |
static int bpf_enable_stats(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_ENABLE_STATS))
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (attr->enable_stats.type) {
case BPF_STATS_RUN_TIME:
return bpf_enable_runtime_stats();
default:
break;
}
return -EINVAL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-307"
] | linux | 350a5c4dd2452ea999cc5e1d4a8dbf12de2f97ef | 259,898,901,841,837,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | bpf: Dont allow vmlinux BTF to be used in map_create and prog_load.
The syzbot got FD of vmlinux BTF and passed it into map_create which caused
crash in btf_type_id_size() when it tried to access resolved_ids. The vmlinux
BTF doesn't have 'resolved_ids' and 'resolved_sizes' initialized to save
memory. To avoid such issues disallow using vmlinux BTF in prog_load and
map_create commands.
Fixes: 5329722057d4 ("bpf: Assign ID to vmlinux BTF and return extra info for BTF in GET_OBJ_INFO")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] |
struct bio *bio_clone_fast(struct bio *bio, gfp_t gfp_mask, struct bio_set *bs)
{
struct bio *b;
b = bio_alloc_bioset(gfp_mask, 0, bs);
if (!b)
return NULL;
__bio_clone_fast(b, bio);
if (bio_integrity(bio)) {
int ret;
ret = bio_integrity_clone(b, bio, gfp_mask);
if (ret < 0) {
bio_put(b);
return NULL;
}
}
return b;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-772",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 95d78c28b5a85bacbc29b8dba7c04babb9b0d467 | 188,235,148,987,863,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
static ssize_t rbd_pool_ns_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct rbd_device *rbd_dev = dev_to_rbd_dev(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", rbd_dev->spec->pool_ns ?: "");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-863"
] | linux | f44d04e696feaf13d192d942c4f14ad2e117065a | 163,874,904,864,670,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | rbd: require global CAP_SYS_ADMIN for mapping and unmapping
It turns out that currently we rely only on sysfs attribute
permissions:
$ ll /sys/bus/rbd/{add*,remove*}
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/remove
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:38 /sys/bus/rbd/remove_single_major
This means that images can be mapped and unmapped (i.e. block devices
can be created and deleted) by a UID 0 process even after it drops all
privileges or by any process with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE in its user namespace
as long as UID 0 is mapped into that user namespace.
Be consistent with other virtual block devices (loop, nbd, dm, md, etc)
and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace for mapping and
unmapping, and also for dumping the configuration string and refreshing
the image header.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> |
ext4_mb_new_group_pa(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac)
{
struct super_block *sb = ac->ac_sb;
struct ext4_locality_group *lg;
struct ext4_prealloc_space *pa;
struct ext4_group_info *grp;
/* preallocate only when found space is larger then requested */
BUG_ON(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_len >= ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len);
BUG_ON(ac->ac_status != AC_STATUS_FOUND);
BUG_ON(!S_ISREG(ac->ac_inode->i_mode));
BUG_ON(ac->ac_pa == NULL);
pa = ac->ac_pa;
/* preallocation can change ac_b_ex, thus we store actually
* allocated blocks for history */
ac->ac_f_ex = ac->ac_b_ex;
pa->pa_pstart = ext4_grp_offs_to_block(sb, &ac->ac_b_ex);
pa->pa_lstart = pa->pa_pstart;
pa->pa_len = ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len;
pa->pa_free = pa->pa_len;
spin_lock_init(&pa->pa_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pa->pa_inode_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pa->pa_group_list);
pa->pa_deleted = 0;
pa->pa_type = MB_GROUP_PA;
mb_debug(sb, "new group pa %p: %llu/%d for %u\n", pa, pa->pa_pstart,
pa->pa_len, pa->pa_lstart);
trace_ext4_mb_new_group_pa(ac, pa);
ext4_mb_use_group_pa(ac, pa);
atomic_add(pa->pa_free, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mb_preallocated);
grp = ext4_get_group_info(sb, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group);
lg = ac->ac_lg;
BUG_ON(lg == NULL);
pa->pa_obj_lock = &lg->lg_prealloc_lock;
pa->pa_inode = NULL;
list_add(&pa->pa_group_list, &grp->bb_prealloc_list);
/*
* We will later add the new pa to the right bucket
* after updating the pa_free in ext4_mb_release_context
*/
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | ce9f24cccdc019229b70a5c15e2b09ad9c0ab5d1 | 246,234,617,249,052,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | ext4: check journal inode extents more carefully
Currently, system zones just track ranges of block, that are "important"
fs metadata (bitmaps, group descriptors, journal blocks, etc.). This
however complicates how extent tree (or indirect blocks) can be checked
for inodes that actually track such metadata - currently the journal
inode but arguably we should be treating quota files or resize inode
similarly. We cannot run __ext4_ext_check() on such metadata inodes when
loading their extents as that would immediately trigger the validity
checks and so we just hack around that and special-case the journal
inode. This however leads to a situation that a journal inode which has
extent tree of depth at least one can have invalid extent tree that gets
unnoticed until ext4_cache_extents() crashes.
To overcome this limitation, track inode number each system zone belongs
to (0 is used for zones not belonging to any inode). We can then verify
inode number matches the expected one when verifying extent tree and
thus avoid the false errors. With this there's no need to to
special-case journal inode during extent tree checking anymore so remove
it.
Fixes: 0a944e8a6c66 ("ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode")
Reported-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> |
qemuProcessHandleAcpiOstInfo(qemuMonitorPtr mon G_GNUC_UNUSED,
virDomainObjPtr vm,
const char *alias,
const char *slotType,
const char *slot,
unsigned int source,
unsigned int status,
void *opaque)
{
virQEMUDriverPtr driver = opaque;
virObjectEventPtr event = NULL;
virObjectLock(vm);
VIR_DEBUG("ACPI OST info for device %s domain %p %s. "
"slotType='%s' slot='%s' source=%u status=%u",
NULLSTR(alias), vm, vm->def->name, slotType, slot, source, status);
if (!alias)
goto cleanup;
if (STREQ(slotType, "DIMM")) {
if ((source == 0x003 || source == 0x103) &&
(status == 0x01 || (status >= 0x80 && status <= 0x83))) {
qemuDomainSignalDeviceRemoval(vm, alias,
QEMU_DOMAIN_UNPLUGGING_DEVICE_STATUS_GUEST_REJECTED);
event = virDomainEventDeviceRemovalFailedNewFromObj(vm, alias);
}
}
cleanup:
virObjectUnlock(vm);
virObjectEventStateQueue(driver->domainEventState, event);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | libvirt | 1ac703a7d0789e46833f4013a3876c2e3af18ec7 | 16,095,016,604,055,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | qemu: Add missing lock in qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF
qemuMonitorUnregister will be called in multiple threads (e.g. threads
in rpc worker pool and the vm event thread). In some cases, it isn't
protected by the monitor lock, which may lead to call g_source_unref
more than one time and a use-after-free problem eventually.
Add the missing lock in qemuProcessHandleMonitorEOF (which is the only
position missing lock of monitor I found).
Suggested-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peng Liang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]> |
gst_matroska_demux_reset (GstElement * element)
{
GstMatroskaDemux *demux = GST_MATROSKA_DEMUX (element);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "Resetting state");
gst_matroska_read_common_reset (GST_ELEMENT (demux), &demux->common);
demux->num_a_streams = 0;
demux->num_t_streams = 0;
demux->num_v_streams = 0;
demux->have_nonintraonly_v_streams = FALSE;
demux->have_group_id = FALSE;
demux->group_id = G_MAXUINT;
demux->clock = NULL;
demux->tracks_parsed = FALSE;
if (demux->clusters) {
g_array_free (demux->clusters, TRUE);
demux->clusters = NULL;
}
g_list_foreach (demux->seek_parsed,
(GFunc) gst_matroska_read_common_free_parsed_el, NULL);
g_list_free (demux->seek_parsed);
demux->seek_parsed = NULL;
demux->last_stop_end = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->seek_block = 0;
demux->stream_start_time = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->to_time = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->cluster_time = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->cluster_offset = 0;
demux->cluster_prevsize = 0;
demux->seen_cluster_prevsize = FALSE;
demux->next_cluster_offset = 0;
demux->stream_last_time = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->last_cluster_offset = 0;
demux->index_offset = 0;
demux->seekable = FALSE;
demux->need_segment = FALSE;
demux->segment_seqnum = 0;
demux->requested_seek_time = GST_CLOCK_TIME_NONE;
demux->seek_offset = -1;
demux->audio_lead_in_ts = 0;
demux->building_index = FALSE;
if (demux->seek_event) {
gst_event_unref (demux->seek_event);
demux->seek_event = NULL;
}
demux->seek_index = NULL;
demux->seek_entry = 0;
if (demux->new_segment) {
gst_event_unref (demux->new_segment);
demux->new_segment = NULL;
}
demux->invalid_duration = FALSE;
demux->cached_length = G_MAXUINT64;
if (demux->deferred_seek_event)
gst_event_unref (demux->deferred_seek_event);
demux->deferred_seek_event = NULL;
demux->deferred_seek_pad = NULL;
gst_flow_combiner_clear (demux->flowcombiner);
} | 0 | [] | gst-plugins-good | 9181191511f9c0be6a89c98b311f49d66bd46dc3 | 201,311,898,078,402,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | matroskademux: Fix extraction of multichannel WavPack
The old code had a couple of issues that all lead to potential memory
safety bugs.
- Use a constant for the Wavpack4Header size instead of using sizeof.
It's written out into the data and not from the struct and who knows
what special alignment/padding requirements some C compilers have.
- gst_buffer_set_size() does not realloc the buffer when setting a
bigger size than allocated, it only allows growing up to the maximum
allocated size. Instead use a GstAdapter to collect all the blocks
and take out everything at once in the end.
- Check that enough data is actually available in the input and
otherwise handle it an error in all cases instead of silently
ignoring it.
Among other things this fixes out of bounds writes because the code
assumed gst_buffer_set_size() can grow the buffer and simply wrote after
the end of the buffer.
Thanks to Natalie Silvanovich for reporting.
Fixes https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gst-plugins-good/-/issues/859
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/gstreamer/gst-plugins-good/-/merge_requests/903> |
static int mp_tiocmset(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned int set, unsigned int clear)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
int ret = -EIO;
MP_STATE_LOCK(state);
if (!(tty->flags & (1 << TTY_IO_ERROR))) {
mp_update_mctrl(port, set, clear);
ret = 0;
}
MP_STATE_UNLOCK(state);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427 | 286,306,717,046,627,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static void print_primaries(WriterContext *w, enum AVColorPrimaries color_primaries)
{
const char *val = av_color_primaries_name(color_primaries);
if (!val || color_primaries == AVCOL_PRI_UNSPECIFIED) {
print_str_opt("color_primaries", "unknown");
} else {
print_str("color_primaries", val);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | FFmpeg | 837cb4325b712ff1aab531bf41668933f61d75d2 | 2,816,641,362,508,964,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
int tg_nop(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df | 115,056,988,974,000,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | sched: panic on corrupted stack end
Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g. via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).
Just panic directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
proc_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode * inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
char *page;
ssize_t retval=0;
int eof=0;
ssize_t n, count;
char *start;
struct proc_dir_entry * dp;
unsigned long long pos;
/*
* Gaah, please just use "seq_file" instead. The legacy /proc
* interfaces cut loff_t down to off_t for reads, and ignore
* the offset entirely for writes..
*/
pos = *ppos;
if (pos > MAX_NON_LFS)
return 0;
if (nbytes > MAX_NON_LFS - pos)
nbytes = MAX_NON_LFS - pos;
dp = PDE(inode);
if (!(page = (char*) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL)))
return -ENOMEM;
while ((nbytes > 0) && !eof) {
count = min_t(size_t, PROC_BLOCK_SIZE, nbytes);
start = NULL;
if (dp->get_info) {
/* Handle old net routines */
n = dp->get_info(page, &start, *ppos, count);
if (n < count)
eof = 1;
} else if (dp->read_proc) {
/*
* How to be a proc read function
* ------------------------------
* Prototype:
* int f(char *buffer, char **start, off_t offset,
* int count, int *peof, void *dat)
*
* Assume that the buffer is "count" bytes in size.
*
* If you know you have supplied all the data you
* have, set *peof.
*
* You have three ways to return data:
* 0) Leave *start = NULL. (This is the default.)
* Put the data of the requested offset at that
* offset within the buffer. Return the number (n)
* of bytes there are from the beginning of the
* buffer up to the last byte of data. If the
* number of supplied bytes (= n - offset) is
* greater than zero and you didn't signal eof
* and the reader is prepared to take more data
* you will be called again with the requested
* offset advanced by the number of bytes
* absorbed. This interface is useful for files
* no larger than the buffer.
* 1) Set *start = an unsigned long value less than
* the buffer address but greater than zero.
* Put the data of the requested offset at the
* beginning of the buffer. Return the number of
* bytes of data placed there. If this number is
* greater than zero and you didn't signal eof
* and the reader is prepared to take more data
* you will be called again with the requested
* offset advanced by *start. This interface is
* useful when you have a large file consisting
* of a series of blocks which you want to count
* and return as wholes.
* (Hack by [email protected])
* 2) Set *start = an address within the buffer.
* Put the data of the requested offset at *start.
* Return the number of bytes of data placed there.
* If this number is greater than zero and you
* didn't signal eof and the reader is prepared to
* take more data you will be called again with the
* requested offset advanced by the number of bytes
* absorbed.
*/
n = dp->read_proc(page, &start, *ppos,
count, &eof, dp->data);
} else
break;
if (n == 0) /* end of file */
break;
if (n < 0) { /* error */
if (retval == 0)
retval = n;
break;
}
if (start == NULL) {
if (n > PAGE_SIZE) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"proc_file_read: Apparent buffer overflow!\n");
n = PAGE_SIZE;
}
n -= *ppos;
if (n <= 0)
break;
if (n > count)
n = count;
start = page + *ppos;
} else if (start < page) {
if (n > PAGE_SIZE) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"proc_file_read: Apparent buffer overflow!\n");
n = PAGE_SIZE;
}
if (n > count) {
/*
* Don't reduce n because doing so might
* cut off part of a data block.
*/
printk(KERN_WARNING
"proc_file_read: Read count exceeded\n");
}
} else /* start >= page */ {
unsigned long startoff = (unsigned long)(start - page);
if (n > (PAGE_SIZE - startoff)) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"proc_file_read: Apparent buffer overflow!\n");
n = PAGE_SIZE - startoff;
}
if (n > count)
n = count;
}
n -= copy_to_user(buf, start < page ? page : start, n);
if (n == 0) {
if (retval == 0)
retval = -EFAULT;
break;
}
*ppos += start < page ? (unsigned long)start : n;
nbytes -= n;
buf += n;
retval += n;
}
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return retval;
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8b90db0df7187a01fb7177f1f812123138f562cf | 77,848,453,600,422,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 149 | Insanity avoidance in /proc
The old /proc interfaces were never updated to use loff_t, and are just
generally broken. Now, we should be using the seq_file interface for
all of the proc files, but converting the legacy functions is more work
than most people care for and has little upside..
But at least we can make the non-LFS rules explicit, rather than just
insanely wrapping the offset or something.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
int git_pkt_buffer_wants(
const git_remote_head * const *refs,
size_t count,
transport_smart_caps *caps,
git_buf *buf)
{
size_t i = 0;
const git_remote_head *head;
if (caps->common) {
for (; i < count; ++i) {
head = refs[i];
if (!head->local)
break;
}
if (buffer_want_with_caps(refs[i], caps, buf) < 0)
return -1;
i++;
}
for (; i < count; ++i) {
char oid[GIT_OID_HEXSZ];
head = refs[i];
if (head->local)
continue;
git_oid_fmt(oid, &head->oid);
git_buf_put(buf, pkt_want_prefix, strlen(pkt_want_prefix));
git_buf_put(buf, oid, GIT_OID_HEXSZ);
git_buf_putc(buf, '\n');
if (git_buf_oom(buf))
return -1;
}
return git_pkt_buffer_flush(buf);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libgit2 | 66e3774d279672ee51c3b54545a79d20d1ada834 | 337,357,655,590,456,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | smart_pkt: verify packet length exceeds PKT_LEN_SIZE
Each packet line in the Git protocol is prefixed by a four-byte
length of how much data will follow, which we parse in
`git_pkt_parse_line`. The transmitted length can either be equal
to zero in case of a flush packet or has to be at least of length
four, as it also includes the encoded length itself. Not
checking this may result in a buffer overflow as we directly pass
the length to functions which accept a `size_t` length as
parameter.
Fix the issue by verifying that non-flush packets have at least a
length of `PKT_LEN_SIZE`. |
DISOpticalFlowImpl::DISOpticalFlowImpl()
{
finest_scale = 2;
patch_size = 8;
patch_stride = 4;
grad_descent_iter = 16;
variational_refinement_iter = 5;
variational_refinement_alpha = 20.f;
variational_refinement_gamma = 10.f;
variational_refinement_delta = 5.f;
border_size = 16;
use_mean_normalization = true;
use_spatial_propagation = true;
coarsest_scale = 10;
/* Use separate variational refinement instances for different scales to avoid repeated memory allocation: */
int max_possible_scales = 10;
ws = hs = w = h = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < max_possible_scales; i++)
variational_refinement_processors.push_back(VariationalRefinement::create());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-369"
] | opencv | d1615ba11a93062b1429fce9f0f638d1572d3418 | 292,067,150,545,361,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | video:fixed DISOpticalFlow segfault from small img |
GF_Err pdin_box_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox *p = (GF_ProgressiveDownloadBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ProgressiveDownloadBox", trace);
gf_fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size) {
for (i=0; i<p->count; i++) {
gf_fprintf(trace, "<DownloadInfo rate=\"%d\" estimatedTime=\"%d\" />\n", p->rates[i], p->times[i]);
}
} else {
gf_fprintf(trace, "<DownloadInfo rate=\"\" estimatedTime=\"\" />\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ProgressiveDownloadBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0 | 124,917,698,168,124,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | fixed #2138 |
need_nsec_chain(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbversion_t *ver,
const dns_rdata_nsec3param_t *param,
bool *answer)
{
dns_dbnode_t *node = NULL;
dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT;
dns_rdata_nsec3param_t myparam;
dns_rdataset_t rdataset;
isc_result_t result;
*answer = false;
result = dns_db_getoriginnode(db, &node);
RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
dns_rdataset_init(&rdataset);
result = dns_db_findrdataset(db, node, ver, dns_rdatatype_nsec,
0, 0, &rdataset, NULL);
if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
dns_rdataset_disassociate(&rdataset);
dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
return (result);
}
if (result != ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
return (result);
}
result = dns_db_findrdataset(db, node, ver, dns_rdatatype_nsec3param,
0, 0, &rdataset, NULL);
if (result == ISC_R_NOTFOUND) {
*answer = true;
dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
return (ISC_R_SUCCESS);
}
if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
return (result);
}
for (result = dns_rdataset_first(&rdataset);
result == ISC_R_SUCCESS;
result = dns_rdataset_next(&rdataset)) {
dns_rdataset_current(&rdataset, &rdata);
CHECK(dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &myparam, NULL));
dns_rdata_reset(&rdata);
/*
* Ignore any NSEC3PARAM removals.
*/
if (NSEC3REMOVE(myparam.flags))
continue;
/*
* Ignore the chain that we are in the process of deleting.
*/
if (myparam.hash == param->hash &&
myparam.iterations == param->iterations &&
myparam.salt_length == param->salt_length &&
!memcmp(myparam.salt, param->salt, myparam.salt_length))
continue;
/*
* Found an active NSEC3 chain.
*/
break;
}
if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) {
*answer = true;
result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
}
failure:
if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&rdataset))
dns_rdataset_disassociate(&rdataset);
dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
return (result);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | bind9 | f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0 | 118,275,139,742,095,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 | Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key. |
com_use(String *buffer __attribute__((unused)), char *line)
{
char *tmp, buff[FN_REFLEN + 1];
int select_db;
bzero(buff, sizeof(buff));
strmake_buf(buff, line);
tmp= get_arg(buff, 0);
if (!tmp || !*tmp)
{
put_info("USE must be followed by a database name", INFO_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
We need to recheck the current database, because it may change
under our feet, for example if DROP DATABASE or RENAME DATABASE
(latter one not yet available by the time the comment was written)
*/
get_current_db();
if (!current_db || cmp_database(charset_info, current_db,tmp))
{
if (one_database)
{
skip_updates= 1;
select_db= 0; // don't do mysql_select_db()
}
else
select_db= 2; // do mysql_select_db() and build_completion_hash()
}
else
{
/*
USE to the current db specified.
We do need to send mysql_select_db() to make server
update database level privileges, which might
change since last USE (see bug#10979).
For performance purposes, we'll skip rebuilding of completion hash.
*/
skip_updates= 0;
select_db= 1; // do only mysql_select_db(), without completion
}
if (select_db)
{
/*
reconnect once if connection is down or if connection was found to
be down during query
*/
if (!connected && reconnect())
return opt_reconnect ? -1 : 1; // Fatal error
if (mysql_select_db(&mysql,tmp))
{
if (mysql_errno(&mysql) != CR_SERVER_GONE_ERROR)
return put_error(&mysql);
if (reconnect())
return opt_reconnect ? -1 : 1; // Fatal error
if (mysql_select_db(&mysql,tmp))
return put_error(&mysql);
}
my_free(current_db);
current_db=my_strdup(tmp,MYF(MY_WME));
#ifdef HAVE_READLINE
if (select_db > 1)
build_completion_hash(opt_rehash, 1);
#endif
}
put_info("Database changed",INFO_INFO);
return 0;
} | 1 | [] | server | 383007c75d6ef5043fa5781956a6a02b24e2b79e | 251,334,105,837,671,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | mysql cli: fix USE command quoting
* use proper sql quoting rules for USE, while preserving
as much of historical behavior as possible
* short commands (\u) behave as before |
int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag;
ushort len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
if (jh->clrs > 6 || !jh->huff[0]) return 0;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | LibRaw | 4606c28f494a750892c5c1ac7903e62dd1c6fdb5 | 195,744,538,282,138,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | 0.16.1: fix for dcraw ljpeg_start() vulnerability |
const TfLiteTensor* GetOptionalInputTensor(const TfLiteContext* context,
const TfLiteNode* node, int index) {
const bool use_tensor = index < node->inputs->size &&
node->inputs->data[index] != kTfLiteOptionalTensor;
if (use_tensor) {
return GetMutableInput(context, node, index);
}
return nullptr;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 00302787b788c5ff04cb6f62aed5a74d936e86c0 | 268,531,922,670,221,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | [tflite] Make `GetOptionalInputTensor` the same as `GetInput`.
With the previous change, there is no more need for two separate APIs. We would deprecate `GetOptionalInputTensor` in the future.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332513386
Change-Id: Id7110271c25ebd6126ad8c82a493e37e0e0756b3 |
static int opfisttp(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY ) {
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_WORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xdf;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xdb;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_QWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0xdd;
data[l++] = 0x08 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | radare2 | 9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185 | 92,685,606,558,464,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx-- |
void my_net_local_init(NET *net)
{
net->max_packet= (uint) net_buffer_length;
my_net_set_read_timeout(net, CLIENT_NET_READ_TIMEOUT);
my_net_set_write_timeout(net, CLIENT_NET_WRITE_TIMEOUT);
net->retry_count= 1;
net->max_packet_size= max(net_buffer_length, max_allowed_packet);
} | 0 | [] | mysql-server | 3d8134d2c9b74bc8883ffe2ef59c168361223837 | 297,861,009,903,168,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Bug#25988681: USE-AFTER-FREE IN MYSQL_STMT_CLOSE()
Description: If mysql_stmt_close() encountered error,
it recorded error in prepared statement
but then frees memory assigned to prepared
statement. If mysql_stmt_error() is used
to get error information, it will result
into use after free.
In all cases where mysql_stmt_close() can
fail, error would have been set by
cli_advanced_command in MYSQL structure.
Solution: Don't copy error from MYSQL using set_stmt_errmsg.
There is no automated way to test the fix since
it is in mysql_stmt_close() which does not expect
any reply from server.
Reviewed-By: Georgi Kodinov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Ramil Kalimullin <[email protected]> |
double Field_enum::val_real(void)
{
return (double) Field_enum::val_int();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 207,272,654,954,712,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]> |
static void kvm_register_steal_time(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct kvm_steal_time *st = &per_cpu(steal_time, cpu);
if (!has_steal_clock)
return;
memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
wrmsrl(MSR_KVM_STEAL_TIME, (slow_virt_to_phys(st) | KVM_MSR_ENABLED));
pr_info("kvm-stealtime: cpu %d, msr %llx\n",
cpu, (unsigned long long) slow_virt_to_phys(st));
} | 0 | [] | kvm | 29fa6825463c97e5157284db80107d1bfac5d77b | 166,772,444,996,711,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | x86, kvm: Clear paravirt_enabled on KVM guests for espfix32's benefit
paravirt_enabled has the following effects:
- Disables the F00F bug workaround warning. There is no F00F bug
workaround any more because Linux's standard IDT handling already
works around the F00F bug, but the warning still exists. This
is only cosmetic, and, in any event, there is no such thing as
KVM on a CPU with the F00F bug.
- Disables 32-bit APM BIOS detection. On a KVM paravirt system,
there should be no APM BIOS anyway.
- Disables tboot. I think that the tboot code should check the
CPUID hypervisor bit directly if it matters.
- paravirt_enabled disables espfix32. espfix32 should *not* be
disabled under KVM paravirt.
The last point is the purpose of this patch. It fixes a leak of the
high 16 bits of the kernel stack address on 32-bit KVM paravirt
guests. Fixes CVE-2014-8134.
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
xmlBufCreate(void) {
xmlBufPtr ret;
ret = (xmlBufPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlBuf));
if (ret == NULL) {
xmlBufMemoryError(NULL, "creating buffer");
return(NULL);
}
ret->compat_use = 0;
ret->use = 0;
ret->error = 0;
ret->buffer = NULL;
ret->size = xmlDefaultBufferSize;
ret->compat_size = xmlDefaultBufferSize;
ret->alloc = xmlBufferAllocScheme;
ret->content = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(ret->size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (ret->content == NULL) {
xmlBufMemoryError(ret, "creating buffer");
xmlFree(ret);
return(NULL);
}
ret->content[0] = 0;
ret->contentIO = NULL;
return(ret);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | libxml2 | 213f1fe0d76d30eaed6e5853057defc43e6df2c9 | 118,356,951,086,759,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | CVE-2015-1819 Enforce the reader to run in constant memory
One of the operation on the reader could resolve entities
leading to the classic expansion issue. Make sure the
buffer used for xmlreader operation is bounded.
Introduce a new allocation type for the buffers for this effect. |
HuffmanDecoder * operator()() const
{
unsigned int codeLengths[32];
std::fill(codeLengths + 0, codeLengths + 32, 5);
member_ptr<HuffmanDecoder> pDecoder(new HuffmanDecoder);
pDecoder->Initialize(codeLengths, 32);
return pDecoder.release();
}
| 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] | cryptopp | 07dbcc3d9644b18e05c1776db2a57fe04d780965 | 27,835,650,915,753,803,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Add Inflator::BadDistanceErr exception (Issue 414)
The improved validation and excpetion clears the Address Sanitizer and Undefined Behavior Sanitizer findings |
const boost::optional<std::string>& TopologyDescription::getSetName() const {
return _setName;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-755"
] | mongo | 75f7184eafa78006a698cda4c4adfb57f1290047 | 99,665,677,411,901,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | SERVER-50170 fix max staleness read preference parameter for server selection |
cached_NPN_GetStringIdentifiers(const NPUTF8 **names, int32_t nameCount, NPIdentifier *identifiers)
{
/* XXX: could be optimized further */
invoke_NPN_GetStringIdentifiers(names, nameCount, identifiers);
#if USE_NPIDENTIFIER_CACHE
if (use_npidentifier_cache()) {
for (int i = 0; i < nameCount; i++) {
NPIdentifier ident = identifiers[i];
if (npidentifier_cache_lookup(ident) == NULL) {
npidentifier_cache_reserve(1);
npidentifier_cache_add_string(ident, names[i]);
}
}
}
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | nspluginwrapper | 7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98 | 80,448,270,142,590,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Support all the new variables added |
nfnl_cthelper_update(const struct nlattr * const tb[],
struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper)
{
int ret;
if (tb[NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN])
return -EBUSY;
if (tb[NFCTH_POLICY]) {
ret = nfnl_cthelper_update_policy(helper, tb[NFCTH_POLICY]);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
if (tb[NFCTH_QUEUE_NUM])
helper->queue_num = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFCTH_QUEUE_NUM]));
if (tb[NFCTH_STATUS]) {
int status = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFCTH_STATUS]));
switch(status) {
case NFCT_HELPER_STATUS_ENABLED:
helper->flags |= NF_CT_HELPER_F_CONFIGURED;
break;
case NFCT_HELPER_STATUS_DISABLED:
helper->flags &= ~NF_CT_HELPER_F_CONFIGURED;
break;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-862"
] | linux | 4b380c42f7d00a395feede754f0bc2292eebe6e5 | 164,898,436,274,996,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: Add missing permission checks
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the
system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:
$ nfct helper list
nfct v1.4.4: netlink error: Operation not permitted
$ vpnns -- nfct helper list
{
.name = ftp,
.queuenum = 0,
.l3protonum = 2,
.l4protonum = 6,
.priv_data_len = 24,
.status = enabled,
};
Add capable() checks in nfnetlink_cthelper, as this is cleaner than
trying to generalize the solution.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
static GtkBuilder *make_builder()
{
GError *error = NULL;
GtkBuilder *builder = gtk_builder_new();
if (!g_glade_file)
{
/* load additional widgets from glade */
gtk_builder_add_objects_from_string(builder,
WIZARD_GLADE_CONTENTS, sizeof(WIZARD_GLADE_CONTENTS) - 1,
(gchar**)misc_widgets,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
error_msg_and_die("Error loading glade data: %s", error->message);
/* Load pages from internal string */
gtk_builder_add_objects_from_string(builder,
WIZARD_GLADE_CONTENTS, sizeof(WIZARD_GLADE_CONTENTS) - 1,
(gchar**)page_names,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
error_msg_and_die("Error loading glade data: %s", error->message);
}
else
{
/* -g FILE: load UI from it */
/* load additional widgets from glade */
gtk_builder_add_objects_from_file(builder, g_glade_file, (gchar**)misc_widgets, &error);
if (error != NULL)
error_msg_and_die("Can't load %s: %s", g_glade_file, error->message);
gtk_builder_add_objects_from_file(builder, g_glade_file, (gchar**)page_names, &error);
if (error != NULL)
error_msg_and_die("Can't load %s: %s", g_glade_file, error->message);
}
return builder;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | libreport | 257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360 | 28,766,785,502,210,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]> |
SMB2_write(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_io_parms *io_parms,
unsigned int *nbytes, struct kvec *iov, int n_vec)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb2_write_req *req = NULL;
struct smb2_write_rsp *rsp = NULL;
int resp_buftype;
*nbytes = 0;
if (n_vec < 1)
return rc;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_WRITE, io_parms->tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (io_parms->tcon->ses->server == NULL)
return -ECONNABORTED;
req->hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(io_parms->pid);
req->PersistentFileId = io_parms->persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = io_parms->volatile_fid;
req->WriteChannelInfoOffset = 0;
req->WriteChannelInfoLength = 0;
req->Channel = 0;
req->Length = cpu_to_le32(io_parms->length);
req->Offset = cpu_to_le64(io_parms->offset);
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
req->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer) - 4);
req->RemainingBytes = 0;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for Buffer */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
/* length of entire message including data to be written */
inc_rfc1001_len(req, io_parms->length - 1 /* Buffer */);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, io_parms->tcon->ses, iov, n_vec + 1,
&resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_write_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(io_parms->tcon, SMB2_WRITE_HE);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Send error in write = %d\n", rc);
} else
*nbytes = le32_to_cpu(rsp->DataLength);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux | 18f39e7be0121317550d03e267e3ebd4dbfbb3ce | 50,489,718,958,481,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CC: Stable <[email protected]> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <[email protected]> |
void LibRaw::process_Sony_0x0116(uchar *buf, ushort len, unsigned long long id)
{
int i = 0;
if (((id == SonyID_DSLR_A900) ||
(id == SonyID_DSLR_A900_APSC) ||
(id == SonyID_DSLR_A850) ||
(id == SonyID_DSLR_A850_APSC)) &&
(len >= 2))
i = 1;
else if ((id >= SonyID_DSLR_A550) && (len >= 3))
i = 2;
else
return;
imCommon.BatteryTemperature = (float)(buf[i] - 32) / 1.8f;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | LibRaw | c243f4539233053466c1309bde606815351bee81 | 11,669,846,482,309,768,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | additional checks in parseSonySRF
parseSonySR2: buffer size check |
ffi_closure_free (void *ptr)
{
void *codeseg, *dataseg;
size_t rounded_size;
dataseg = ADD_TO_POINTER(ptr, -overhead);
memcpy(&rounded_size, dataseg, sizeof(rounded_size));
memcpy(&codeseg, ADD_TO_POINTER(dataseg, sizeof(size_t)), sizeof(void *));
munmap(dataseg, rounded_size);
munmap(codeseg, rounded_size);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | libffi | 44a6c28545186d78642487927952844156fc7ab5 | 89,380,002,484,716,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | aarch64: Flush code mapping in addition to data mapping (#471)
This needs a new function, ffi_data_to_code_pointer, to translate
from data pointers to code pointers.
Fixes issue #470. |
static int ff_layout_async_handle_error_v3(struct rpc_task *task,
struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,
u32 idx)
{
struct nfs4_deviceid_node *devid = FF_LAYOUT_DEVID_NODE(lseg, idx);
switch (task->tk_status) {
/* File access problems. Don't mark the device as unavailable */
case -EACCES:
case -ESTALE:
case -EISDIR:
case -EBADHANDLE:
case -ELOOP:
case -ENOSPC:
break;
case -EJUKEBOX:
nfs_inc_stats(lseg->pls_layout->plh_inode, NFSIOS_DELAY);
goto out_retry;
default:
dprintk("%s DS connection error %d\n", __func__,
task->tk_status);
nfs4_delete_deviceid(devid->ld, devid->nfs_client,
&devid->deviceid);
}
/* FIXME: Need to prevent infinite looping here. */
return -NFS4ERR_RESET_TO_PNFS;
out_retry:
task->tk_status = 0;
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
rpc_delay(task, NFS_JUKEBOX_RETRY_TIME);
return -EAGAIN;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | ed34695e15aba74f45247f1ee2cf7e09d449f925 | 50,022,064,211,193,575,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | pNFS/flexfiles: fix incorrect size check in decode_nfs_fh()
We (adam zabrocki, alexander matrosov, alexander tereshkin, maksym
bazalii) observed the check:
if (fh->size > sizeof(struct nfs_fh))
should not use the size of the nfs_fh struct which includes an extra two
bytes from the size field.
struct nfs_fh {
unsigned short size;
unsigned char data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE];
}
but should determine the size from data[NFS_MAXFHSIZE] so the memcpy
will not write 2 bytes beyond destination. The proposed fix is to
compare against the NFS_MAXFHSIZE directly, as is done elsewhere in fs
code base.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Nikola Livic <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
T _cubic_atX_pc(const float fx, const int y, const int z, const int c) const {
return cimg::type<T>::cut(_cubic_atX_p(fx,y,z,c));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 116,817,289,603,728,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static NOINLINE void ReleaseFreeInCache(nedpool *p, threadcache *tc, int mymspace) THROWSPEC
{
unsigned int age=THREADCACHEMAXFREESPACE/8192;
/*ACQUIRE_LOCK(&p->m[mymspace]->mutex);*/
while(age && tc->freeInCache>=THREADCACHEMAXFREESPACE)
{
RemoveCacheEntries(p, tc, age);
/*printf("*** Removing cache entries older than %u (%u)\n", age, (unsigned int) tc->freeInCache);*/
age>>=1;
}
/*RELEASE_LOCK(&p->m[mymspace]->mutex);*/
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | git | 34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305 | 274,167,393,305,576,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> |
Subsets and Splits