func
stringlengths
0
484k
target
int64
0
1
cwe
listlengths
0
4
project
stringclasses
799 values
commit_id
stringlengths
40
40
hash
float64
1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
size
int64
1
24k
message
stringlengths
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13.3k
gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromXbm(FILE * fd) { char fline[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE]; char iname[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE]; char *type; int value; unsigned int width = 0, height = 0; int fail = 0; int max_bit = 0; gdImagePtr im; int bytes = 0, i; int bit, x = 0, y = 0; int ch; char h[8]; unsigned int b; rewind(fd); while (fgets(fline, MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE, fd)) { fline[MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE-1] = '\0'; if (strlen(fline) == MAX_XBM_LINE_SIZE-1) { return 0; } if (sscanf(fline, "#define %s %d", iname, &value) == 2) { if (!(type = strrchr(iname, '_'))) { type = iname; } else { type++; } if (!strcmp("width", type)) { width = (unsigned int) value; } if (!strcmp("height", type)) { height = (unsigned int) value; } } else { if ( sscanf(fline, "static unsigned char %s = {", iname) == 1 || sscanf(fline, "static char %s = {", iname) == 1) { max_bit = 128; } else if (sscanf(fline, "static unsigned short %s = {", iname) == 1 || sscanf(fline, "static short %s = {", iname) == 1) { max_bit = 32768; } if (max_bit) { bytes = (width + 7) / 8 * height; if (!bytes) { return 0; } if (!(type = strrchr(iname, '_'))) { type = iname; } else { type++; } if (!strcmp("bits[]", type)) { break; } } } } if (!bytes || !max_bit) { return 0; } if(!(im = gdImageCreate(width, height))) { return 0; } gdImageColorAllocate(im, 255, 255, 255); gdImageColorAllocate(im, 0, 0, 0); h[2] = '\0'; h[4] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < bytes; i++) { while (1) { if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) { fail = 1; break; } if (ch == 'x') { break; } } if (fail) { break; } /* Get hex value */ if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) { break; } h[0] = ch; if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) { break; } h[1] = ch; if (max_bit == 32768) { if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) { break; } h[2] = ch; if ((ch=getc(fd)) == EOF) { break; } h[3] = ch; } if (sscanf(h, "%x", &b) != 1) { php_gd_error("invalid XBM"); gdImageDestroy(im); return 0; } for (bit = 1; bit <= max_bit; bit = bit << 1) { gdImageSetPixel(im, x++, y, (b & bit) ? 1 : 0); if (x == im->sx) { x = 0; y++; if (y == im->sy) { return im; } break; } } } php_gd_error("EOF before image was complete"); gdImageDestroy(im); return 0; }
0
[ "CWE-908" ]
php-src
ed6dee9a198c904ad5e03113e58a2d2c200f5184
1,858,295,820,955,081,200,000,000,000,000,000,000
127
Fix #77973: Uninitialized read in gdImageCreateFromXbm We have to ensure that `sscanf()` does indeed read a hex value here, and bail out otherwise.
void Item_trigger_field::set_required_privilege(bool rw) { /* Require SELECT and UPDATE privilege if this field will be read and set, and only UPDATE privilege for setting the field. */ want_privilege= (rw ? SELECT_ACL | UPDATE_ACL : UPDATE_ACL); }
0
[]
server
b000e169562697aa072600695d4f0c0412f94f4f
340,251,475,144,884,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
8
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL)) based on: commit f7316aa0c9a Author: Ajo Robert <[email protected]> Date: Thu Aug 24 17:03:21 2017 +0530 Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL)) Backport of Bug#19143243 fix. NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments. NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function. In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE. ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(), so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator. The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item.
static void skb_gro_reset_offset(struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct skb_shared_info *pinfo = skb_shinfo(skb); const skb_frag_t *frag0 = &pinfo->frags[0]; NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->data_offset = 0; NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = NULL; NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = 0; if (skb_mac_header(skb) == skb_tail_pointer(skb) && pinfo->nr_frags && !PageHighMem(skb_frag_page(frag0))) { NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0 = skb_frag_address(frag0); NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->frag0_len = skb_frag_size(frag0); }
0
[ "CWE-400", "CWE-703" ]
linux
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
174,953,552,329,153,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
16
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation. When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation. Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum, more IP length fields and they are unaware of this. No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them. UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking that would cause problems. Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack") Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
void WebContents::DevToolsOpened() { v8::Isolate* isolate = JavascriptEnvironment::GetIsolate(); v8::Locker locker(isolate); v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate); DCHECK(inspectable_web_contents_); DCHECK(inspectable_web_contents_->GetDevToolsWebContents()); auto handle = FromOrCreate( isolate, inspectable_web_contents_->GetDevToolsWebContents()); devtools_web_contents_.Reset(isolate, handle.ToV8()); // Set inspected tabID. base::Value tab_id(ID()); inspectable_web_contents_->CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.setInspectedTabId", &tab_id, nullptr, nullptr); // Inherit owner window in devtools when it doesn't have one. auto* devtools = inspectable_web_contents_->GetDevToolsWebContents(); bool has_window = devtools->GetUserData(NativeWindowRelay::UserDataKey()); if (owner_window() && !has_window) handle->SetOwnerWindow(devtools, owner_window()); Emit("devtools-opened"); }
0
[]
electron
e9fa834757f41c0b9fe44a4dffe3d7d437f52d34
324,206,048,126,515,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
23
fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to appropriate render frames (#33344) * fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to authorized render frames Notes: no-notes * refactor: extract electron API IPC to its own mojo interface * fix: just check main frame not primary main frame Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]>
pthread_mutex_init(pthread_mutex_t *mutex, const pthread_mutexattr_t *attr) { InitializeCriticalSection(mutex); return 0; }
1
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-125" ]
portable
17c88164016df821df2dff4b2b1291291ec4f28a
51,339,741,359,860,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
Make pthread_mutex static initialisation work on Windows. This takes the dynamic initialisation code added to CRYPTO_lock() in e5081719 and applies it to the Window's pthread_mutex implementation. This allows for PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER to be used on Windows. bcook has agreed to place this code in the public domain (as per the rest of the code in pthread.h).
uint32_t mobi_buffer_get_varlen_dec(MOBIBuffer *buf, size_t *len) { return _buffer_get_varlen(buf, len, -1); }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
libmobi
ab5bf0e37e540eac682a14e628853b918626e72b
146,365,576,616,527,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
3
fix oob write bug inside libmobi
void* Type_ColorantOrderType_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n) { return _cmsDupMem(self ->ContextID, Ptr, cmsMAXCHANNELS * sizeof(cmsUInt8Number)); cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n); }
0
[]
Little-CMS
41d222df1bc6188131a8f46c32eab0a4d4cdf1b6
221,562,501,923,429,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
6
Memory squeezing fix: lcms2 cmsPipeline construction When creating a new pipeline, lcms would often try to allocate a stage and pass it to cmsPipelineInsertStage without checking whether the allocation succeeded. cmsPipelineInsertStage would then assert (or crash) if it had not. The fix here is to change cmsPipelineInsertStage to check and return an error value. All calling code is then checked to test this return value and cope.
static int r_cmd_is_object_descriptor (const char *name, ut32 name_len) { int found_L = false, found_Semi = false; ut32 idx = 0, L_pos = 0, Semi_pos = 0; const char *p_name = name; for (idx = 0, L_pos = 0; idx < name_len; idx++,p_name++) { if (*p_name == 'L') { found_L = true; L_pos = idx; break; } } for (idx = 0, Semi_pos = 0; idx < name_len; idx++,p_name++) { if (*p_name == ';') { found_Semi = true; Semi_pos = idx; break; } } return true ? found_L == found_Semi && found_L == true && L_pos < Semi_pos : false; }
0
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-193" ]
radare2
ced0223c7a1b3b5344af315715cd28fe7c0d9ebc
199,081,756,816,412,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
23
Fix unmatched array length in core_java.c (issue #16304) (#16313)
static void bgp_packet_mpattr_tea(struct bgp *bgp, struct peer *peer, struct stream *s, struct attr *attr, uint8_t attrtype) { unsigned int attrlenfield = 0; unsigned int attrhdrlen = 0; struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *subtlvs; struct bgp_attr_encap_subtlv *st; const char *attrname; if (!attr || (attrtype == BGP_ATTR_ENCAP && (!attr->encap_tunneltype || attr->encap_tunneltype == BGP_ENCAP_TYPE_MPLS))) return; switch (attrtype) { case BGP_ATTR_ENCAP: attrname = "Tunnel Encap"; subtlvs = attr->encap_subtlvs; if (subtlvs == NULL) /* nothing to do */ return; /* * The tunnel encap attr has an "outer" tlv. * T = tunneltype, * L = total length of subtlvs, * V = concatenated subtlvs. */ attrlenfield = 2 + 2; /* T + L */ attrhdrlen = 1 + 1; /* subTLV T + L */ break; #if ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR case BGP_ATTR_VNC: attrname = "VNC"; subtlvs = attr->vnc_subtlvs; if (subtlvs == NULL) /* nothing to do */ return; attrlenfield = 0; /* no outer T + L */ attrhdrlen = 2 + 2; /* subTLV T + L */ break; #endif default: assert(0); } /* compute attr length */ for (st = subtlvs; st; st = st->next) { attrlenfield += (attrhdrlen + st->length); } if (attrlenfield > 0xffff) { zlog_info("%s attribute is too long (length=%d), can't send it", attrname, attrlenfield); return; } if (attrlenfield > 0xff) { /* 2-octet length field */ stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN); stream_putc(s, attrtype); stream_putw(s, attrlenfield & 0xffff); } else { /* 1-octet length field */ stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL); stream_putc(s, attrtype); stream_putc(s, attrlenfield & 0xff); } if (attrtype == BGP_ATTR_ENCAP) { /* write outer T+L */ stream_putw(s, attr->encap_tunneltype); stream_putw(s, attrlenfield - 4); } /* write each sub-tlv */ for (st = subtlvs; st; st = st->next) { if (attrtype == BGP_ATTR_ENCAP) { stream_putc(s, st->type); stream_putc(s, st->length); #if ENABLE_BGP_VNC } else { stream_putw(s, st->type); stream_putw(s, st->length); #endif } stream_put(s, st->value, st->length); } }
0
[ "CWE-20", "CWE-436" ]
frr
943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a
210,993,703,588,243,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
91
bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]>
static int snd_c400_create_mixer(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer) { int err; err = snd_c400_create_vol_ctls(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_c400_create_effect_vol_ctls(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_c400_create_effect_ret_vol_ctls(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_ftu_create_effect_switch(mixer, 2, 0x43); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_c400_create_effect_volume_ctl(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_c400_create_effect_duration_ctl(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; err = snd_c400_create_effect_feedback_ctl(mixer); if (err < 0) return err; return 0; }
0
[]
sound
447d6275f0c21f6cc97a88b3a0c601436a4cdf2a
119,903,066,874,553,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
34
ALSA: usb-audio: Add sanity checks for endpoint accesses Add some sanity check codes before actually accessing the endpoint via get_endpoint() in order to avoid the invalid access through a malformed USB descriptor. Mostly just checking bNumEndpoints, but in one place (snd_microii_spdif_default_get()), the validity of iface and altsetting index is checked as well. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125 Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid) { struct smack_known *skp; rcu_read_lock(); skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred)); *secid = skp->smk_secid; rcu_read_unlock(); }
0
[ "CWE-416" ]
linux
a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7
330,164,274,086,181,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
9
selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause a number of problems. Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials"). This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these cases. Cc: [email protected] Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
int session_info_get_fd(struct session_info *si) { return sd_login_monitor_get_fd(si->mon); }
0
[ "CWE-362" ]
spice-vd_agent
5c50131797e985d0a5654c1fd7000ae945ed29a7
248,562,099,497,631,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
4
Better check for sessions Do not allow other users to hijack a session checking that the process is launched by the owner of the session. Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <[email protected]> Acked-by: Uri Lublin <[email protected]>
my_decimal *Item_default_value::val_decimal(my_decimal *decimal_value) { calculate(); return Item_field::val_decimal(decimal_value); }
0
[ "CWE-416" ]
server
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
86,888,916,713,689,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
MDEV-24176 Preparations 1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table() mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session 2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
poly_box(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) { POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0); BOX *box; if (poly->npts < 1) PG_RETURN_NULL(); box = box_copy(&poly->boundbox); PG_RETURN_BOX_P(box); }
0
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-189" ]
postgres
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
190,840,456,166,420,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
12
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns. Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter. Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow in related functions. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0. Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane. Security: CVE-2014-0064
vhost_user_reset_owner(struct virtio_net **pdev, struct VhostUserMsg *msg __rte_unused, int main_fd __rte_unused) { struct virtio_net *dev = *pdev; vhost_destroy_device_notify(dev); cleanup_device(dev, 0); reset_device(dev); return RTE_VHOST_MSG_RESULT_OK; }
1
[]
dpdk
bf472259dde6d9c4dd3ebad2c2b477a168c6e021
157,879,196,002,467,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
11
vhost: fix possible denial of service by leaking FDs A malicious Vhost-user master could send in loop hand-crafted vhost-user messages containing more file descriptors the vhost-user slave expects. Doing so causes the application using the vhost-user library to run out of FDs. This issue has been assigned CVE-2019-14818 Fixes: 8f972312b8f4 ("vhost: support vhost-user") Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <[email protected]>
GF_Err dimm_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs) { GF_Err e; GF_DIMMBox *ptr = (GF_DIMMBox *)s; if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM; e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs); if (e) return e; gf_bs_write_u64(bs, ptr->nbBytes); return GF_OK; }
0
[ "CWE-400", "CWE-401" ]
gpac
d2371b4b204f0a3c0af51ad4e9b491144dd1225c
210,123,036,978,065,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
10
prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
mrb_f_send(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self) { mrb_sym name; mrb_value block, *regs; mrb_method_t m; struct RClass *c; mrb_callinfo *ci = mrb->c->ci; int n = ci->n; if (ci->cci > CINFO_NONE) { funcall:; const mrb_value *argv; mrb_int argc; mrb_get_args(mrb, "n*&", &name, &argv, &argc, &block); return mrb_funcall_with_block(mrb, self, name, argc, argv, block); } regs = mrb->c->ci->stack+1; if (n == 0) { argnum_error: mrb_argnum_error(mrb, 0, 1, -1); } else if (n == 15) { if (RARRAY_LEN(regs[0]) == 0) goto argnum_error; name = mrb_obj_to_sym(mrb, RARRAY_PTR(regs[0])[0]); } else { name = mrb_obj_to_sym(mrb, regs[0]); } c = mrb_class(mrb, self); m = mrb_method_search_vm(mrb, &c, name); if (MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) { /* call method_mising */ goto funcall; } ci->mid = name; ci->u.target_class = c; /* remove first symbol from arguments */ if (n == 15) { /* variable length arguments */ regs[0] = mrb_ary_subseq(mrb, regs[0], 1, RARRAY_LEN(regs[0]) - 1); } else { /* n > 0 */ for (int i=0; i<n; i++) { regs[i] = regs[i+1]; } regs[n] = regs[n+1]; /* copy kdict or block */ if (ci->nk > 0) { regs[n+1] = regs[n+2]; /* copy block */ } ci->n--; } if (MRB_METHOD_CFUNC_P(m)) { if (MRB_METHOD_NOARG_P(m)) { check_method_noarg(mrb, ci); } if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m)) { mrb_vm_ci_proc_set(ci, MRB_METHOD_PROC(m)); } return MRB_METHOD_CFUNC(m)(mrb, self); } return exec_irep(mrb, self, MRB_METHOD_PROC(m)); }
0
[ "CWE-122", "CWE-787" ]
mruby
47068ae07a5fa3aa9a1879cdfe98a9ce0f339299
8,584,623,441,398,876,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
66
vm.c: packed arguments length may be zero for `send` method.
TPM_RESULT SWTPM_NVRAM_Set_MigrationKey(const unsigned char *key, uint32_t keylen, enum encryption_mode encmode) { TPM_RESULT rc; rc = SWTPM_NVRAM_KeyParamCheck(keylen, encmode); if (rc == 0) { memcpy(migrationkey.symkey.userKey, key, keylen); migrationkey.symkey.userKeyLength = keylen; migrationkey.data_encmode = encmode; } return rc; }
0
[]
swtpm
cae5991423826f21b11f7a5bc7f7b2b538bde2a2
125,373,572,026,180,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
16
swtpm: Do not follow symlinks when opening lockfile (CVE-2020-28407) This patch addresses CVE-2020-28407. Prevent us from following symliks when we open the lockfile for writing. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
parse_content_range (const char *hdr, wgint *first_byte_ptr, wgint *last_byte_ptr, wgint *entity_length_ptr) { wgint num; /* Ancient versions of Netscape proxy server, presumably predating rfc2068, sent out `Content-Range' without the "bytes" specifier. */ if (0 == strncasecmp (hdr, "bytes", 5)) { hdr += 5; /* "JavaWebServer/1.1.1" sends "bytes: x-y/z", contrary to the HTTP spec. */ if (*hdr == ':') ++hdr; while (c_isspace (*hdr)) ++hdr; if (!*hdr) return false; } if (!c_isdigit (*hdr)) return false; for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); if (*hdr != '-' || !c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1))) return false; *first_byte_ptr = num; ++hdr; for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); if (*hdr != '/') return false; *last_byte_ptr = num; if (!(c_isdigit (*(hdr + 1)) || *(hdr + 1) == '*')) return false; if (*last_byte_ptr < *first_byte_ptr) return false; ++hdr; if (*hdr == '*') num = -1; else for (num = 0; c_isdigit (*hdr); hdr++) num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0'); *entity_length_ptr = num; if ((*entity_length_ptr <= *last_byte_ptr) && *entity_length_ptr != -1) return false; return true; }
0
[ "CWE-119" ]
wget
d892291fb8ace4c3b734ea5125770989c215df3f
4,080,117,649,741,193,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
48
Fix stack overflow in HTTP protocol handling (CVE-2017-13089) * src/http.c (skip_short_body): Return error on negative chunk size Reported-by: Antti Levomäki, Christian Jalio, Joonas Pihlaja from Forcepoint Reported-by: Juhani Eronen from Finnish National Cyber Security Centre
static void *find_audio_control_unit(struct mixer_build *state, unsigned char unit) { /* we just parse the header */ struct uac_feature_unit_descriptor *hdr = NULL; while ((hdr = snd_usb_find_desc(state->buffer, state->buflen, hdr, USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE)) != NULL) { if (hdr->bLength >= 4 && hdr->bDescriptorSubtype >= UAC_INPUT_TERMINAL && hdr->bDescriptorSubtype <= UAC3_SAMPLE_RATE_CONVERTER && hdr->bUnitID == unit) return hdr; } return NULL; }
0
[ "CWE-674" ]
sound
19bce474c45be69a284ecee660aa12d8f1e88f18
114,884,989,285,348,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
17
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix a stack buffer overflow bug in check_input_term `check_input_term` recursively calls itself with input from device side (e.g., uac_input_terminal_descriptor.bCSourceID) as argument (id). In `check_input_term`, if `check_input_term` is called with the same `id` argument as the caller, it triggers endless recursive call, resulting kernel space stack overflow. This patch fixes the bug by adding a bitmap to `struct mixer_build` to keep track of the checked ids and stop the execution if some id has been checked (similar to how parse_audio_unit handles unitid argument). Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]> Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
iasecc_get_challenge(struct sc_card *card, u8 * rnd, size_t len) { /* As IAS/ECC cannot handle other data length than 0x08 */ u8 rbuf[8]; size_t out_len; int r; LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx); r = iso_ops->get_challenge(card, rbuf, sizeof rbuf); LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "GET CHALLENGE cmd failed"); if (len < (size_t) r) { out_len = len; } else { out_len = (size_t) r; } memcpy(rnd, rbuf, out_len); LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, (int) out_len); }
0
[]
OpenSC
ae1cf0be90396fb6c0be95829bf0d3eecbd2fd1c
261,201,501,953,976,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
21
iasecc: Prevent stack buffer overflow when empty ACL is returned Thanks oss-fuzz https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=30800
static char *setup_next_processed_event(GList **events_list) { free(g_event_selected); g_event_selected = NULL; char *event = get_next_processed_event(&g_auto_event_list); if (!event) { /* No next event, go to progress page and finish */ gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_event_log, _("Processing finished.")); /* we don't know the result of the previous event here * so at least hide the spinner, because we're obviously finished */ gtk_widget_hide(GTK_WIDGET(g_spinner_event_log)); hide_next_step_button(); return NULL; } log_notice("selected -e EVENT:%s", event); return event; }
0
[ "CWE-200" ]
libreport
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
32,843,400,047,853,256,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
21
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug report. report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text views are thrown away. Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the reloading and updating gui functions away from this function. Related to rhbz#1270235 Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
http_add_field(http_t *http, /* I - HTTP connection */ http_field_t field, /* I - HTTP field */ const char *value, /* I - Value string */ int append) /* I - Append value? */ { char newvalue[1024]; /* New value string */ const char *oldvalue; /* Old field value */ /* * Optionally append the new value to the existing one... */ if (append && field != HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_ENCODING && field != HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE && field != HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_RANGES && field != HTTP_FIELD_ALLOW && field != HTTP_FIELD_LINK && field != HTTP_FIELD_TRANSFER_ENCODING && field != HTTP_FIELD_UPGRADE && field != HTTP_FIELD_WWW_AUTHENTICATE) append = 0; if (field == HTTP_FIELD_HOST) { /* * Special-case for Host: as we don't want a trailing "." on the hostname and * need to bracket IPv6 numeric addresses. */ char *ptr = strchr(value, ':'); if (value[0] != '[' && ptr && strchr(ptr + 1, ':')) { /* * Bracket IPv6 numeric addresses... */ snprintf(newvalue, sizeof(newvalue), "[%s]", value); value = newvalue; } else if (*value && value[strlen(value) - 1] == '.') { /* * Strip the trailing dot on the hostname... */ strlcpy(newvalue, value, sizeof(newvalue)); newvalue[strlen(newvalue) - 1] = '\0'; value = newvalue; } } else if (append && *value && (oldvalue = httpGetField(http, field)) != NULL && *oldvalue) { snprintf(newvalue, sizeof(newvalue), "%s, %s", oldvalue, value); value = newvalue; } /* * Save the new value... */ switch (field) { case HTTP_FIELD_ACCEPT_ENCODING : if (http->accept_encoding) _cupsStrFree(http->accept_encoding); http->accept_encoding = _cupsStrAlloc(value); break; case HTTP_FIELD_ALLOW : if (http->allow) _cupsStrFree(http->allow); http->allow = _cupsStrAlloc(value); break; case HTTP_FIELD_SERVER : if (http->server) _cupsStrFree(http->server); http->server = _cupsStrAlloc(value); break; case HTTP_FIELD_AUTHENTICATION_INFO : if (http->authentication_info) _cupsStrFree(http->authentication_info); http->authentication_info = _cupsStrAlloc(value); break; default : strlcpy(http->fields[field], value, HTTP_MAX_VALUE); break; } if (field == HTTP_FIELD_AUTHORIZATION) { /* * Special case for Authorization: as its contents can be * longer than HTTP_MAX_VALUE */ if (http->field_authorization) free(http->field_authorization); http->field_authorization = strdup(value); } #ifdef HAVE_LIBZ else if (field == HTTP_FIELD_CONTENT_ENCODING && http->data_encoding != HTTP_ENCODING_FIELDS) { DEBUG_puts("1http_add_field: Calling http_content_coding_start."); http_content_coding_start(http, value); } #endif /* HAVE_LIBZ */ }
0
[ "CWE-120" ]
cups
f24e6cf6a39300ad0c3726a41a4aab51ad54c109
331,678,562,256,778,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
112
Fix multiple security/disclosure issues: - CVE-2019-8696 and CVE-2019-8675: Fixed SNMP buffer overflows (rdar://51685251) - Fixed IPP buffer overflow (rdar://50035411) - Fixed memory disclosure issue in the scheduler (rdar://51373853) - Fixed DoS issues in the scheduler (rdar://51373929)
static ut64 compute_addr(RBin *bin, ut64 paddr, ut64 vaddr, int va) { return paddr == UT64_MAX? vaddr: rva (bin, paddr, vaddr, va); }
0
[ "CWE-78" ]
radare2
5411543a310a470b1257fb93273cdd6e8dfcb3af
269,671,262,622,687,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
3
More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
void MainWindow::on_actionSync_triggered() { auto dialog = new SystemSyncDialog(this); dialog->show(); dialog->raise(); dialog->activateWindow(); }
0
[ "CWE-89", "CWE-327", "CWE-295" ]
shotcut
f008adc039642307f6ee3378d378cdb842e52c1d
337,368,989,274,416,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
7
fix upgrade check is not using TLS correctly
static inline int copy_regset_from_user(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset_view *view, unsigned int setno, unsigned int offset, unsigned int size, const void __user *data) { const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[setno]; if (!regset->set) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, data, size)) return -EIO; return regset->set(target, regset, offset, size, NULL, data); }
0
[ "CWE-476" ]
linux
c8e252586f8d5de906385d8cf6385fee289a825e
133,158,751,634,597,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
16
regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods. Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods. Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with null .get or .set methods explicitly. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
PERL_STATIC_INLINE UV S_invlist_highest(SV* const invlist) { /* Returns the highest code point that matches an inversion list. This API * has an ambiguity, as it returns 0 under either the highest is actually * 0, or if the list is empty. If this distinction matters to you, check * for emptiness before calling this function */ UV len = _invlist_len(invlist); UV *array; PERL_ARGS_ASSERT_INVLIST_HIGHEST; if (len == 0) { return 0; } array = invlist_array(invlist); /* The last element in the array in the inversion list always starts a * range that goes to infinity. That range may be for code points that are * matched in the inversion list, or it may be for ones that aren't * matched. In the latter case, the highest code point in the set is one * less than the beginning of this range; otherwise it is the final element * of this range: infinity */ return (ELEMENT_RANGE_MATCHES_INVLIST(len - 1)) ? UV_MAX : array[len - 1] - 1;
0
[ "CWE-190", "CWE-787" ]
perl5
897d1f7fd515b828e4b198d8b8bef76c6faf03ed
130,740,239,630,977,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
28
regcomp.c: Prevent integer overflow from nested regex quantifiers. (CVE-2020-10543) On 32bit systems the size calculations for nested regular expression quantifiers could overflow causing heap memory corruption. Fixes: Perl/perl5-security#125 (cherry picked from commit bfd31397db5dc1a5c5d3e0a1f753a4f89a736e71)
nautilus_mime_file_opens_in_external_app (NautilusFile *file) { ActivationAction activation_action; activation_action = get_activation_action (file); return (activation_action == ACTIVATION_ACTION_OPEN_IN_APPLICATION); }
0
[ "CWE-20" ]
nautilus
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
336,010,926,062,517,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
8
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious desktop file. However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file comes from a compressed file. To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file, which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer. Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come with the file itself. https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
lspci_process_line(const char *line, void *data) { UNUSED(data); char *lspci_command[5] = { "lspci", "-m", "-n", "-v", NULL }; if (!strcmp(line, "LSPCI")) { memset(&current_device, 0, sizeof(current_device)); subprocess(lspci_command, handle_child_line, NULL); /* Send single dot to indicate end of enumeration */ lspci_send(".\n"); } else { logger(Core, Error, "lspci_process_line(), invalid line '%s'", line); } return True; }
0
[ "CWE-119", "CWE-125", "CWE-703", "CWE-787" ]
rdesktop
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
155,830,995,041,411,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
18
Malicious RDP server security fixes This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used. All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin. * Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes * Refactor of process_bitmap_updates * Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch * Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794 * Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795 * Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797 * Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175 * Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175 * Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176 * Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176 * Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791 * Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792 * Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793 * Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796 * Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798 * Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799 * Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800 * Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174 * Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177 * Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178 * Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179 * Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180 * Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181 * Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
TfLiteStatus Eval(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) { auto* params = reinterpret_cast<TfLiteLocalResponseNormParams*>(node->builtin_data); const TfLiteTensor* input; TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, GetInputSafe(context, node, kInputTensor, &input)); TfLiteTensor* output; TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, GetOutputSafe(context, node, kOutputTensor, &output)); if (output->type == kTfLiteFloat32) { #define TF_LITE_LOCAL_RESPONSE_NORM(type) \ tflite::LocalResponseNormalizationParams op_params; \ op_params.range = params->radius; \ op_params.bias = params->bias; \ op_params.alpha = params->alpha; \ op_params.beta = params->beta; \ type::LocalResponseNormalization( \ op_params, GetTensorShape(input), GetTensorData<float>(input), \ GetTensorShape(output), GetTensorData<float>(output)) if (kernel_type == kReference) { TF_LITE_LOCAL_RESPONSE_NORM(reference_ops); } if (kernel_type == kGenericOptimized) { TF_LITE_LOCAL_RESPONSE_NORM(optimized_ops); } #undef TF_LITE_LOCAL_RESPONSE_NORM } else { context->ReportError(context, "Output type is %d, requires float.", output->type); return kTfLiteError; } return kTfLiteOk; }
0
[ "CWE-125", "CWE-787" ]
tensorflow
1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35
236,263,096,873,306,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
35
[tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors. As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages. We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`). PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299 Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56
inline float PrintOneElement(bfloat16 f, bool print_v2) { return static_cast<float>(f); }
0
[ "CWE-345" ]
tensorflow
abcced051cb1bd8fb05046ac3b6023a7ebcc4578
67,907,905,303,713,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
3
Prevent crashes when loading tensor slices with unsupported types. Also fix the `Tensor(const TensorShape&)` constructor swapping the LOG(FATAL) messages for the unset and unsupported types. PiperOrigin-RevId: 392695027 Change-Id: I4beda7db950db951d273e3259a7c8534ece49354
static unsigned char *DecodeImage(Image *blob,Image *image, size_t bytes_per_line,const unsigned int bits_per_pixel,size_t *extent, ExceptionInfo *exception) { MagickSizeType number_pixels; register ssize_t i; register unsigned char *p, *q; size_t bytes_per_pixel, length, row_bytes, scanline_length, width; ssize_t count, j, y; unsigned char *pixels, *scanline; /* Determine pixel buffer size. */ if (bits_per_pixel <= 8) bytes_per_line&=0x7fff; width=image->columns; bytes_per_pixel=1; if (bits_per_pixel == 16) { bytes_per_pixel=2; width*=2; } else if (bits_per_pixel == 32) width*=image->alpha_trait ? 4 : 3; if (bytes_per_line == 0) bytes_per_line=width; row_bytes=(size_t) (image->columns | 0x8000); if (image->storage_class == DirectClass) row_bytes=(size_t) ((4*image->columns) | 0x8000); /* Allocate pixel and scanline buffer. */ pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->rows,row_bytes* sizeof(*pixels)); if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) return((unsigned char *) NULL); *extent=row_bytes*image->rows*sizeof(*pixels); (void) ResetMagickMemory(pixels,0,*extent); scanline=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_bytes,2* sizeof(*scanline)); if (scanline == (unsigned char *) NULL) return((unsigned char *) NULL); if (bytes_per_line < 8) { /* Pixels are already uncompressed. */ for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { q=pixels+y*width*GetPixelChannels(image);; number_pixels=bytes_per_line; count=ReadBlob(blob,(size_t) number_pixels,scanline); if (count != (ssize_t) number_pixels) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'", image->filename); break; } p=ExpandBuffer(scanline,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel); if ((q+number_pixels) > (pixels+(*extent))) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'", image->filename); break; } (void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels); } scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline); return(pixels); } /* Uncompress RLE pixels into uncompressed pixel buffer. */ for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++) { q=pixels+y*width; if (bytes_per_line > 200) scanline_length=ReadBlobMSBShort(blob); else scanline_length=1UL*ReadBlobByte(blob); if (scanline_length >= row_bytes) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",image->filename); break; } count=ReadBlob(blob,scanline_length,scanline); if (count != (ssize_t) scanline_length) { (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(), CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage","`%s'",image->filename); break; } for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) scanline_length; ) if ((scanline[j] & 0x80) == 0) { length=(size_t) ((scanline[j] & 0xff)+1); number_pixels=length*bytes_per_pixel; p=ExpandBuffer(scanline+j+1,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel); if ((q-pixels+number_pixels) <= *extent) (void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels); q+=number_pixels; j+=(ssize_t) (length*bytes_per_pixel+1); } else { length=(size_t) (((scanline[j] ^ 0xff) & 0xff)+2); number_pixels=bytes_per_pixel; p=ExpandBuffer(scanline+j+1,&number_pixels,bits_per_pixel); for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++) { if ((q-pixels+number_pixels) <= *extent) (void) CopyMagickMemory(q,p,(size_t) number_pixels); q+=number_pixels; } j+=(ssize_t) bytes_per_pixel+1; } } scanline=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(scanline); return(pixels); }
0
[ "CWE-190", "CWE-189", "CWE-703" ]
ImageMagick
0f6fc2d5bf8f500820c3dbcf0d23ee14f2d9f734
19,752,197,130,056,833,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
144
TEST(SegmentSumOpModelTest, TestFailIfSegmentsAreNegative) { SegmentSumOpModel<int32_t> model({TensorType_INT32, {3, 2}}, {TensorType_INT32, {3}}); model.PopulateTensor<int32_t>(model.data(), {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}); model.PopulateTensor<int32_t>(model.segment_ids(), {-1, 0, 1}); ASSERT_EQ(model.InvokeUnchecked(), kTfLiteError); }
0
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-787" ]
tensorflow
204945b19e44b57906c9344c0d00120eeeae178a
41,120,069,046,519,515,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
7
[tflite] Validate segment ids for segment_sum. Segment identifiers in segment_sum should be in a 1-D tensor of same size as the first dimension of the input. The values of the tensor should be integers from {0, 1, 2, ... k-1}, where k is the first dimension of the input. The segment identifiers must not contain jumps and must be increasing. See https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/math#Segmentation as the source for these constraints. PiperOrigin-RevId: 332510942 Change-Id: I898beaba00642c918bcd4b4d4ce893ebb190d869
static void vmxnet3_set_variable_mac(VMXNET3State *s, uint32_t h, uint32_t l) { s->conf.macaddr.a[0] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 0); s->conf.macaddr.a[1] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 1); s->conf.macaddr.a[2] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 2); s->conf.macaddr.a[3] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 3); s->conf.macaddr.a[4] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 0); s->conf.macaddr.a[5] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 1); VMW_CFPRN("Variable MAC: " VMXNET_MF, VMXNET_MA(s->conf.macaddr.a)); qemu_format_nic_info_str(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->conf.macaddr.a); }
0
[ "CWE-20" ]
qemu
a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b9dadebe2ae25e48
199,987,020,797,345,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
13
net/vmxnet3: Refine l2 header validation Validation of l2 header length assumed minimal packet size as eth_header + 2 * vlan_header regardless of the actual protocol. This caused crash for valid non-IP packets shorter than 22 bytes, as 'tx_pkt->packet_type' hasn't been assigned for such packets, and 'vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats()' expects it to be properly set. Refine header length validation in 'vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers'. Check its return value during packet processing flow. As a side effect, in case IPv4 and IPv6 header validation failure, corrupt packets will be dropped. Signed-off-by: Dana Rubin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
**/ CImgList<Tfloat> get_gradient(const char *const axes=0, const int scheme=3) const { CImgList<Tfloat> grad(2,_width,_height,_depth,_spectrum); bool is_3d = false; if (axes) { for (unsigned int a = 0; axes[a]; ++a) { const char axis = cimg::lowercase(axes[a]); switch (axis) { case 'x' : case 'y' : break; case 'z' : is_3d = true; break; default : throw CImgArgumentException(_cimg_instance "get_gradient(): Invalid specified axis '%c'.", cimg_instance, axis); } } } else is_3d = (_depth>1); if (is_3d) { CImg<Tfloat>(_width,_height,_depth,_spectrum).move_to(grad); switch (scheme) { // 3d. case -1 : { // Backward finite differences. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height*_depth>=1048576 && _spectrum>=2)) cimg_forC(*this,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off, *ptrd2 = grad[2]._data + off; CImg_3x3x3(I,Tfloat); cimg_for3x3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = Iccc - Ipcc; *(ptrd1++) = Iccc - Icpc; *(ptrd2++) = Iccc - Iccp; } } } break; case 1 : { // Forward finite differences. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height*_depth>=1048576 && _spectrum>=2)) cimg_forC(*this,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off, *ptrd2 = grad[2]._data + off; CImg_2x2x2(I,Tfloat); cimg_for2x2x2(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = Incc - Iccc; *(ptrd1++) = Icnc - Iccc; *(ptrd2++) = Iccn - Iccc; } } } break; case 4 : { // Deriche filter with low standard variation. grad[0] = get_deriche(0,1,'x'); grad[1] = get_deriche(0,1,'y'); grad[2] = get_deriche(0,1,'z'); } break; case 5 : { // Van Vliet filter with low standard variation. grad[0] = get_vanvliet(0,1,'x'); grad[1] = get_vanvliet(0,1,'y'); grad[2] = get_vanvliet(0,1,'z'); } break; default : { // Central finite differences. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height*_depth>=1048576 && _spectrum>=2)) cimg_forC(*this,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off, *ptrd2 = grad[2]._data + off; CImg_3x3x3(I,Tfloat); cimg_for3x3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = (Incc - Ipcc)/2; *(ptrd1++) = (Icnc - Icpc)/2; *(ptrd2++) = (Iccn - Iccp)/2; } } } } } else switch (scheme) { // 2d. case -1 : { // Backward finite differences. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height>=1048576 && _depth*_spectrum>=2)) cimg_forZC(*this,z,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth + z*_width*_height; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off; CImg_3x3(I,Tfloat); cimg_for3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = Icc - Ipc; *(ptrd1++) = Icc - Icp; } } } break; case 1 : { // Forward finite differences. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height>=1048576 && _depth*_spectrum>=2)) cimg_forZC(*this,z,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth + z*_width*_height; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off; CImg_2x2(I,Tfloat); cimg_for2x2(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = Inc - Icc; *(ptrd1++) = Icn - Icc; } } } break; case 2 : { // Sobel scheme. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height>=1048576 && _depth*_spectrum>=2)) cimg_forZC(*this,z,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth + z*_width*_height; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off; CImg_3x3(I,Tfloat); cimg_for3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = -Ipp - 2*Ipc - Ipn + Inp + 2*Inc + Inn; *(ptrd1++) = -Ipp - 2*Icp - Inp + Ipn + 2*Icn + Inn; } } } break; case 3 : { // Rotation invariant kernel. cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height>=1048576 && _depth*_spectrum>=2)) cimg_forZC(*this,z,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth + z*_width*_height; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off; CImg_3x3(I,Tfloat); const Tfloat a = (Tfloat)(0.25f*(2 - std::sqrt(2.0f))), b = (Tfloat)(0.5f*(std::sqrt(2.0f) - 1)); cimg_for3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = -a*Ipp - b*Ipc - a*Ipn + a*Inp + b*Inc + a*Inn; *(ptrd1++) = -a*Ipp - b*Icp - a*Inp + a*Ipn + b*Icn + a*Inn; } } } break; case 4 : { // Van Vliet filter with low standard variation grad[0] = get_deriche(0,1,'x'); grad[1] = get_deriche(0,1,'y'); } break; case 5 : { // Deriche filter with low standard variation grad[0] = get_vanvliet(0,1,'x'); grad[1] = get_vanvliet(0,1,'y'); } break; default : { // Central finite differences cimg_pragma_openmp(parallel for collapse(2) cimg_openmp_if(_width*_height>=1048576 && _depth*_spectrum>=2)) cimg_forZC(*this,z,c) { const ulongT off = (ulongT)c*_width*_height*_depth + z*_width*_height; Tfloat *ptrd0 = grad[0]._data + off, *ptrd1 = grad[1]._data + off; CImg_3x3(I,Tfloat); cimg_for3x3(*this,x,y,z,c,I,Tfloat) { *(ptrd0++) = (Inc - Ipc)/2; *(ptrd1++) = (Icn - Icp)/2; } } } } if (!axes) return grad; CImgList<Tfloat> res; for (unsigned int l = 0; axes[l]; ++l) { const char axis = cimg::lowercase(axes[l]); switch (axis) { case 'x' : res.insert(grad[0]); break; case 'y' : res.insert(grad[1]); break; case 'z' : res.insert(grad[2]); break; } } grad.assign(); return res;
0
[ "CWE-125" ]
CImg
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
37,357,203,616,073,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
154
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
virtual void __fastcall Execute() { unsigned long Read; FStr.SetLength(10240); FResult = ReadConsole(FInput, FStr.c_str(), FStr.Length(), &Read, NULL); DebugAssert(FResult); FStr.SetLength(Read); TrimNewLine(FStr); }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
winscp
faa96e8144e6925a380f94a97aa382c9427f688d
169,547,411,979,402,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
9
Bug 1943: Prevent loading session settings that can lead to remote code execution from handled URLs https://winscp.net/tracker/1943 (cherry picked from commit ec584f5189a856cd79509f754722a6898045c5e0) Source commit: 0f4be408b3f01132b00682da72d925d6c4ee649b
ssize_t sftp_write(sftp_file file, const void *buf, size_t count) { sftp_session sftp = file->sftp; sftp_message msg = NULL; sftp_status_message status; ssh_string datastring; ssh_buffer buffer; uint32_t id; int len; int packetlen; buffer = ssh_buffer_new(); if (buffer == NULL) { ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session); return -1; } datastring = ssh_string_new(count); if (datastring == NULL) { ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session); ssh_buffer_free(buffer); return -1; } ssh_string_fill(datastring, buf, count); id = sftp_get_new_id(file->sftp); if (buffer_add_u32(buffer, id) < 0 || buffer_add_ssh_string(buffer, file->handle) < 0 || buffer_add_u64(buffer, htonll(file->offset)) < 0 || buffer_add_ssh_string(buffer, datastring) < 0) { ssh_set_error_oom(sftp->session); ssh_buffer_free(buffer); ssh_string_free(datastring); return -1; } ssh_string_free(datastring); packetlen=buffer_get_rest_len(buffer); len = sftp_packet_write(file->sftp, SSH_FXP_WRITE, buffer); ssh_buffer_free(buffer); if (len < 0) { return -1; } else if (len != packetlen) { ssh_log(sftp->session, SSH_LOG_PACKET, "Could not write as much data as expected"); } while (msg == NULL) { if (sftp_read_and_dispatch(file->sftp) < 0) { /* something nasty has happened */ return -1; } msg = sftp_dequeue(file->sftp, id); } switch (msg->packet_type) { case SSH_FXP_STATUS: status = parse_status_msg(msg); sftp_message_free(msg); if (status == NULL) { return -1; } sftp_set_error(sftp, status->status); switch (status->status) { case SSH_FX_OK: file->offset += count; status_msg_free(status); return count; default: break; } ssh_set_error(sftp->session, SSH_REQUEST_DENIED, "SFTP server: %s", status->errormsg); file->offset += count; status_msg_free(status); return -1; default: ssh_set_error(sftp->session, SSH_FATAL, "Received message %d during write!", msg->packet_type); sftp_message_free(msg); return -1; } return -1; /* not reached */ }
0
[]
libssh
4d8420f3282ed07fc99fc5e930c17df27ef1e9b2
203,436,235,175,121,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
83
sftp: Fix bug in sftp_mkdir not returning on error. resolves: #84 (cherry picked from commit a92c97b2e17715c1b3cdd693d14af6c3311d8e44)
static int wtp_connect(struct hid_device *hdev, bool connected) { struct hidpp_device *hidpp = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); struct wtp_data *wd = hidpp->private_data; int ret; if (!wd->x_size) { ret = wtp_get_config(hidpp); if (ret) { hid_err(hdev, "Can not get wtp config: %d\n", ret); return ret; } } return hidpp_touchpad_set_raw_report_state(hidpp, wd->mt_feature_index, true, true); }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
linux
d9d4b1e46d9543a82c23f6df03f4ad697dab361b
148,887,207,453,656,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
17
HID: Fix assumption that devices have inputs The syzbot fuzzer found a slab-out-of-bounds write bug in the hid-gaff driver. The problem is caused by the driver's assumption that the device must have an input report. While this will be true for all normal HID input devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the assumption. The same assumption is present in over a dozen other HID drivers. This patch fixes them by checking that the list of hid_inputs for the hid_device is nonempty before allowing it to be used. Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> CC: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
pfm_buf_fmt_exit(pfm_buffer_fmt_t *fmt, struct task_struct *task, void *buf, struct pt_regs *regs) { int ret = 0; if (fmt->fmt_exit) ret = (*fmt->fmt_exit)(task, buf, regs); return ret; }
0
[]
linux-2.6
41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4
322,492,825,555,874,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
6
[IA64] permon use-after-free fix Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after-free bugs and multiple freeing of pages, etc. I saw this bug on an Altix on SLES9. Haven't reproduced upstream but it looks like the same issue is there. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
lacks_mount (NautilusFile *file) { return (!file->details->mount_is_up_to_date && ( /* Unix mountpoint, could be a GMount */ file->details->is_mountpoint || /* The toplevel directory of something */ (file->details->type == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY && nautilus_file_is_self_owned (file)) || /* Mountable with a target_uri, could be a mountpoint */ (file->details->type == G_FILE_TYPE_MOUNTABLE && file->details->activation_location != NULL) ) ); }
0
[]
nautilus
7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983
93,277,264,843,700,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
18
Check for trusted desktop file launchers. 2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]> * libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c: Check for trusted desktop file launchers. * libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h: * libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c: * libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h: Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link. Allow unsetting of custom display name. * libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c: Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file. svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003
void Huff_transmit (huff_t *huff, int ch, byte *fout, int maxoffset) { int i; if (huff->loc[ch] == NULL) { /* node_t hasn't been transmitted, send a NYT, then the symbol */ Huff_transmit(huff, NYT, fout, maxoffset); for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { add_bit((char)((ch >> i) & 0x1), fout); } } else { send(huff->loc[ch], NULL, fout, maxoffset); } }
0
[ "CWE-119" ]
ioq3
d2b1d124d4055c2fcbe5126863487c52fd58cca1
280,965,075,679,946,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
12
Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT. Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of possibly failing with a few bytes left.
static void mkiss_put(struct mkiss *ax) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ax->refcnt)) complete(&ax->dead); }
0
[ "CWE-416" ]
linux
b2f37aead1b82a770c48b5d583f35ec22aabb61e
136,130,966,075,126,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
hamradio: improve the incomplete fix to avoid NPD The previous commit 3e0588c291d6 ("hamradio: defer ax25 kfree after unregister_netdev") reorder the kfree operations and unregister_netdev operation to prevent UAF. This commit improves the previous one by also deferring the nullify of the ax->tty pointer. Otherwise, a NULL pointer dereference bug occurs. Partial of the stack trace is shown below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000538 RIP: 0010:ax_xmit+0x1f9/0x400 ... Call Trace: dev_hard_start_xmit+0xec/0x320 sch_direct_xmit+0xea/0x240 __qdisc_run+0x166/0x5c0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2c7/0xaf0 ax25_std_establish_data_link+0x59/0x60 ax25_connect+0x3a0/0x500 ? security_socket_connect+0x2b/0x40 __sys_connect+0x96/0xc0 ? __hrtimer_init+0xc0/0xc0 ? common_nsleep+0x2e/0x50 ? switch_fpu_return+0x139/0x1a0 __x64_sys_connect+0x11/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 The crash point is shown as below static void ax_encaps(...) { ... set_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &ax->tty->flags); // ax->tty = NULL! ... } By placing the nullify action after the unregister_netdev, the ax->tty pointer won't be assigned as NULL net_device framework layer is well synchronized. Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
*/ void xmlXPathValueFlipSign(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) { if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->context == NULL)) return; CAST_TO_NUMBER; CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NUMBER);
0
[ "CWE-476" ]
libxml2
a436374994c47b12d5de1b8b1d191a098fa23594
82,567,923,012,437,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
6
Fix nullptr deref with XPath logic ops If the XPath stack is corrupted, for example by a misbehaving extension function, the "and" and "or" XPath operators could dereference NULL pointers. Check that the XPath stack isn't empty and optimize the logic operators slightly. Closes: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/issues/5 Also see https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=901817 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1595985 This is CVE-2018-14404. Thanks to Guy Inbar for the report.
print_pipeline (p, job_index, format, stream) PROCESS *p; int job_index, format; FILE *stream; { PROCESS *first, *last, *show; int es, name_padding; char *temp; if (p == 0) return; first = last = p; while (last->next != first) last = last->next; for (;;) { if (p != first) fprintf (stream, format ? " " : " |"); if (format != JLIST_STANDARD) fprintf (stream, "%5ld", (long)p->pid); fprintf (stream, " "); if (format > -1 && job_index >= 0) { show = format ? p : last; temp = printable_job_status (job_index, show, format); if (p != first) { if (format) { if (show->running == first->running && WSTATUS (show->status) == WSTATUS (first->status)) temp = ""; } else temp = (char *)NULL; } if (temp) { fprintf (stream, "%s", temp); es = STRLEN (temp); if (es == 0) es = 2; /* strlen ("| ") */ name_padding = LONGEST_SIGNAL_DESC - es; fprintf (stream, "%*s", name_padding, ""); if ((WIFSTOPPED (show->status) == 0) && (WIFCONTINUED (show->status) == 0) && WIFCORED (show->status)) fprintf (stream, _("(core dumped) ")); } } if (p != first && format) fprintf (stream, "| "); if (p->command) fprintf (stream, "%s", p->command); if (p == last && job_index >= 0) { temp = current_working_directory (); if (RUNNING (job_index) && (IS_FOREGROUND (job_index) == 0)) fprintf (stream, " &"); if (strcmp (temp, jobs[job_index]->wd) != 0) fprintf (stream, _(" (wd: %s)"), polite_directory_format (jobs[job_index]->wd)); } if (format || (p == last)) { /* We need to add a CR only if this is an interactive shell, and we're reporting the status of a completed job asynchronously. We can't really check whether this particular job is being reported asynchronously, so just add the CR if the shell is currently interactive and asynchronous notification is enabled. */ if (asynchronous_notification && interactive) fprintf (stream, "\r\n"); else fprintf (stream, "\n"); } if (p == last) break; p = p->next; } fflush (stream); }
0
[]
bash
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
57,026,369,027,094,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
98
bash-4.4-rc2 release
static int pmu_dev_alloc(struct pmu *pmu) { int ret = -ENOMEM; pmu->dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct device), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pmu->dev) goto out; pmu->dev->groups = pmu->attr_groups; device_initialize(pmu->dev); ret = dev_set_name(pmu->dev, "%s", pmu->name); if (ret) goto free_dev; dev_set_drvdata(pmu->dev, pmu); pmu->dev->bus = &pmu_bus; pmu->dev->release = pmu_dev_release; ret = device_add(pmu->dev); if (ret) goto free_dev; out: return ret; free_dev: put_device(pmu->dev); goto out; }
0
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-189" ]
linux
8176cced706b5e5d15887584150764894e94e02f
43,645,800,912,910,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
28
perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init() Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in sw_perf_event_destroy(). Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU implementations"). Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
nfssvc_decode_createargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfsd_createargs *args) { if ( !(p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh)) || !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->name, &args->len))) return 0; p = decode_sattr(p, &args->attrs); return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p); }
0
[ "CWE-119", "CWE-703" ]
linux
13bf9fbff0e5e099e2b6f003a0ab8ae145436309
67,377,085,587,944,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
10
nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add checks to catch these. Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]> Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
scan_unsigned_octal_number(UChar** src, UChar* end, int maxlen, OnigEncoding enc) { OnigCodePoint c; unsigned int num, val; UChar* p = *src; PFETCH_READY; num = 0; while (! PEND && maxlen-- != 0) { PFETCH(c); if (ONIGENC_IS_CODE_DIGIT(enc, c) && c < '8') { val = ODIGITVAL(c); if ((INT_MAX_LIMIT - val) / 8UL < num) return -1; /* overflow */ num = (num << 3) + val; } else { PUNFETCH; break; } } *src = p; return num; }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
oniguruma
ddbf55698b5f7ffdfa737b0b8e0079af1fdd7cb1
309,132,589,506,686,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
26
re-fix #60 by check val_type
rb_str_each_byte(VALUE str) { long i; RETURN_ENUMERATOR(str, 0, 0); for (i=0; i<RSTRING_LEN(str); i++) { rb_yield(INT2FIX(RSTRING_PTR(str)[i] & 0xff)); } return str; }
0
[ "CWE-119" ]
ruby
1c2ef610358af33f9ded3086aa2d70aac03dcac5
335,617,782,185,342,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
10
* string.c (rb_str_justify): CVE-2009-4124. Fixes a bug reported by Emmanouel Kellinis <Emmanouel.Kellinis AT kpmg.co.uk>, KPMG London; Patch by nobu. git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@26038 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
SV * Perl_regclass_swash(pTHX_ const regexp *prog, const regnode* node, bool doinit, SV** listsvp, SV **altsvp) { PERL_ARGS_ASSERT_REGCLASS_SWASH; if (altsvp) { *altsvp = NULL; } return newSVsv(_get_regclass_nonbitmap_data(prog, node, doinit, listsvp, NULL, NULL));
0
[ "CWE-416" ]
perl5
22b433eff9a1ffa2454e18405a56650f07b385b5
209,925,052,338,642,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
10
PATCH [perl #123562] Regexp-matching "hangs" The regex engine got into an infinite loop because of the malformation. It is trying to back-up over a sequence of UTF-8 continuation bytes. But the character just before the sequence should be a start byte. If not, there is a malformation. I added a test to croak if that isn't the case so that it doesn't just infinitely loop. I did this also in the similar areas of regexec.c. Comments long ago added to the code suggested that we check for malformations in the vicinity of the new tests. But that was never done. These new tests should be good enough to prevent looping, anyway.
int ldb_kv_search(struct ldb_kv_context *ctx) { struct ldb_context *ldb; struct ldb_module *module = ctx->module; struct ldb_request *req = ctx->req; void *data = ldb_module_get_private(module); struct ldb_kv_private *ldb_kv = talloc_get_type(data, struct ldb_kv_private); int ret; ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module); ldb_request_set_state(req, LDB_ASYNC_PENDING); if (ldb_kv->kv_ops->lock_read(module) != 0) { return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } if (ldb_kv_cache_load(module) != 0) { ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } if (req->op.search.tree == NULL) { ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } ctx->tree = req->op.search.tree; ctx->scope = req->op.search.scope; ctx->base = req->op.search.base; ctx->attrs = req->op.search.attrs; if ((req->op.search.base == NULL) || (ldb_dn_is_null(req->op.search.base) == true)) { /* Check what we should do with a NULL dn */ switch (req->op.search.scope) { case LDB_SCOPE_BASE: ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "NULL Base DN invalid for a base search"); ret = LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX; break; case LDB_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "NULL Base DN invalid for a one-level search"); ret = LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX; break; case LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE: default: /* We accept subtree searches from a NULL base DN, ie over the whole DB */ ret = LDB_SUCCESS; } } else if (ldb_dn_is_valid(req->op.search.base) == false) { /* We don't want invalid base DNs here */ ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "Invalid Base DN: %s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.search.base)); ret = LDB_ERR_INVALID_DN_SYNTAX; } else if (req->op.search.scope == LDB_SCOPE_BASE) { /* * If we are LDB_SCOPE_BASE, do just one search and * return early. This is critical to ensure we do not * go into the index code for special DNs, as that * will try to look up an index record for a special * record (which doesn't exist). */ ret = ldb_kv_search_and_return_base(ldb_kv, ctx); ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return ret; } else if (ldb_kv->check_base) { /* * This database has been marked as * 'checkBaseOnSearch', so do a spot check of the base * dn. Also optimise the subsequent filter by filling * in the ctx->base to be exactly case correct */ ret = ldb_kv_search_base( module, ctx, req->op.search.base, &ctx->base); if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb, "No such Base DN: %s", ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.search.base)); } } else { /* If we are not checking the base DN life is easy */ ret = LDB_SUCCESS; } if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS) { uint32_t match_count = 0; ret = ldb_kv_search_indexed(ctx, &match_count); if (ret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) { /* Not in the index, therefore OK! */ ret = LDB_SUCCESS; } /* Check if we got just a normal error. * In that case proceed to a full search unless we got a * callback error */ if (!ctx->request_terminated && ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { /* Not indexed, so we need to do a full scan */ if (ldb_kv->warn_unindexed || ldb_kv->disable_full_db_scan) { /* useful for debugging when slow performance * is caused by unindexed searches */ char *expression = ldb_filter_from_tree(ctx, ctx->tree); ldb_debug(ldb, LDB_DEBUG_ERROR, "ldb FULL SEARCH: %s SCOPE: %s DN: %s", expression, req->op.search.scope==LDB_SCOPE_BASE?"base": req->op.search.scope==LDB_SCOPE_ONELEVEL?"one": req->op.search.scope==LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE?"sub":"UNKNOWN", ldb_dn_get_linearized(req->op.search.base)); talloc_free(expression); } if (match_count != 0) { /* the indexing code gave an error * after having returned at least one * entry. This means the indexes are * corrupt or a database record is * corrupt. We cannot continue with a * full search or we may return * duplicate entries */ ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR; } if (ldb_kv->disable_full_db_scan) { ldb_set_errstring(ldb, "ldb FULL SEARCH disabled"); ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return LDB_ERR_INAPPROPRIATE_MATCHING; } ret = ldb_kv_search_full(ctx); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { ldb_set_errstring(ldb, "Indexed and full searches both failed!\n"); } } } ldb_kv->kv_ops->unlock_read(module); return ret; }
1
[ "CWE-20" ]
samba
3c1fbb18321f61df44d7b0f0c7452ae230960293
35,393,062,921,800,165,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
156
CVE-2018-1140 ldb_tdb: Check for DN validity in add, rename and search This ensures we fail with a good error code before an eventual ldb_dn_get_casefold() which would otherwise fail. Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]> BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374
static int stbi__getn(stbi__context *s, stbi_uc *buffer, int n) { if (s->io.read) { int blen = (int) (s->img_buffer_end - s->img_buffer); if (blen < n) { int res, count; memcpy(buffer, s->img_buffer, blen); count = (s->io.read)(s->io_user_data, (char*) buffer + blen, n - blen); res = (count == (n-blen)); s->img_buffer = s->img_buffer_end; return res; } } if (s->img_buffer+n <= s->img_buffer_end) { memcpy(buffer, s->img_buffer, n); s->img_buffer += n; return 1; } else return 0; }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
stb
5ba0baaa269b3fd681828e0e3b3ac0f1472eaf40
272,736,903,347,227,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
23
stb_image: Reject fractional JPEG component subsampling ratios The component resamplers are not written to support this and I've never seen it happen in a real (non-crafted) JPEG file so I'm fine rejecting this as outright corrupt. Fixes issue #1178.
CannotReadFile(const std::string &msg) : std::runtime_error(msg) { };
0
[ "CWE-22" ]
Sigil
0979ba8d10c96ebca330715bfd4494ea0e019a8f
331,718,114,238,874,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
1
harden plugin unzipping to zip-slip attacks
static i40e_status i40e_force_link_state(struct i40e_pf *pf, bool is_up) { struct i40e_aq_get_phy_abilities_resp abilities; struct i40e_aq_set_phy_config config = {0}; struct i40e_hw *hw = &pf->hw; i40e_status err; u64 mask; u8 speed; /* Card might've been put in an unstable state by other drivers * and applications, which causes incorrect speed values being * set on startup. In order to clear speed registers, we call * get_phy_capabilities twice, once to get initial state of * available speeds, and once to get current PHY config. */ err = i40e_aq_get_phy_capabilities(hw, false, true, &abilities, NULL); if (err) { dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "failed to get phy cap., ret = %s last_status = %s\n", i40e_stat_str(hw, err), i40e_aq_str(hw, hw->aq.asq_last_status)); return err; } speed = abilities.link_speed; /* Get the current phy config */ err = i40e_aq_get_phy_capabilities(hw, false, false, &abilities, NULL); if (err) { dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "failed to get phy cap., ret = %s last_status = %s\n", i40e_stat_str(hw, err), i40e_aq_str(hw, hw->aq.asq_last_status)); return err; } /* If link needs to go up, but was not forced to go down, * and its speed values are OK, no need for a flap */ if (is_up && abilities.phy_type != 0 && abilities.link_speed != 0) return I40E_SUCCESS; /* To force link we need to set bits for all supported PHY types, * but there are now more than 32, so we need to split the bitmap * across two fields. */ mask = I40E_PHY_TYPES_BITMASK; config.phy_type = is_up ? cpu_to_le32((u32)(mask & 0xffffffff)) : 0; config.phy_type_ext = is_up ? (u8)((mask >> 32) & 0xff) : 0; /* Copy the old settings, except of phy_type */ config.abilities = abilities.abilities; if (abilities.link_speed != 0) config.link_speed = abilities.link_speed; else config.link_speed = speed; config.eee_capability = abilities.eee_capability; config.eeer = abilities.eeer_val; config.low_power_ctrl = abilities.d3_lpan; config.fec_config = abilities.fec_cfg_curr_mod_ext_info & I40E_AQ_PHY_FEC_CONFIG_MASK; err = i40e_aq_set_phy_config(hw, &config, NULL); if (err) { dev_err(&pf->pdev->dev, "set phy config ret = %s last_status = %s\n", i40e_stat_str(&pf->hw, err), i40e_aq_str(&pf->hw, pf->hw.aq.asq_last_status)); return err; } /* Update the link info */ err = i40e_update_link_info(hw); if (err) { /* Wait a little bit (on 40G cards it sometimes takes a really * long time for link to come back from the atomic reset) * and try once more */ msleep(1000); i40e_update_link_info(hw); } i40e_aq_set_link_restart_an(hw, true, NULL); return I40E_SUCCESS; }
0
[ "CWE-400", "CWE-401" ]
linux
27d461333459d282ffa4a2bdb6b215a59d493a8f
242,819,165,174,591,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
86
i40e: prevent memory leak in i40e_setup_macvlans In i40e_setup_macvlans if i40e_setup_channel fails the allocated memory for ch should be released. Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
bool vnc_has_job(VncState *vs) { bool ret; vnc_lock_queue(queue); ret = vnc_has_job_locked(vs); vnc_unlock_queue(queue); return ret; }
0
[ "CWE-125" ]
qemu
9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7
201,170,432,106,708,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
9
pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc. The vnc code uses *three* DisplaySurfaces: First is the surface of the actual QemuConsole, usually the guest screen, but could also be a text console (monitor/serial reachable via Ctrl-Alt-<nr> keys). This is left as-is. Second is the current server's view of the screen content. The vnc code uses this to figure which parts of the guest screen did _really_ change to reduce the amount of updates sent to the vnc clients. It is also used as data source when sending out the updates to the clients. This surface gets replaced by a pixman image. The format changes too, instead of using the guest screen format we'll use fixed 32bit rgb framebuffer and convert the pixels on the fly when comparing and updating the server framebuffer. Third surface carries the format expected by the vnc client. That isn't used to store image data. This surface is switched to PixelFormat and a boolean for bigendian byte order. Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
int kernel_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct kvec *vec, size_t num, size_t size, int flags) { mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs(); int result; set_fs(KERNEL_DS); /* * the following is safe, since for compiler definitions of kvec and * iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment */ iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, READ, (struct iovec *)vec, num, size); result = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags); set_fs(oldfs); return result; }
0
[ "CWE-264" ]
net
4de930efc23b92ddf88ce91c405ee645fe6e27ea
171,908,749,023,742,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
16
net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom Cc: [email protected] # v3.19 Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
save_8 (FILE *fp, gint width, gint height, const guchar *buffer) { int row; for (row = 0; row < height; ++row) { writeline (fp, buffer, width); buffer += width; gimp_progress_update ((double) row / (double) height); } }
0
[ "CWE-190" ]
gimp
a9671395f6573e90316a9d748588c5435216f6ce
89,759,487,013,921,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
14
PCX: Avoid allocation overflows. Multiplying gint values may overflow unless cast into a larger type.
static int bind_ubo_locs(struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog, int id, int next_ubo_id) { if (!has_feature(feat_ubo)) return next_ubo_id; if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.ubo_used_mask) { const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id); unsigned mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.ubo_used_mask; while (mask) { uint32_t ubo_idx = u_bit_scan(&mask); char name[32]; if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.ubo_indirect) snprintf(name, 32, "%subo[%d]", prefix, ubo_idx - 1); else snprintf(name, 32, "%subo%d", prefix, ubo_idx); GLuint loc = glGetUniformBlockIndex(sprog->id, name); glUniformBlockBinding(sprog->id, loc, next_ubo_id++); } } sprog->ubo_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.ubo_used_mask; return next_ubo_id; }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
virglrenderer
cbc8d8b75be360236cada63784046688aeb6d921
86,822,220,664,292,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
26
vrend: check transfer bounds for negative values too and report error Closes #138 Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <[email protected]>
calc_enc_length (gnutls_session_t session, int data_size, int hash_size, uint8_t * pad, int random_pad, unsigned block_algo, unsigned auth_cipher, uint16_t blocksize) { uint8_t rnd; unsigned int length; int ret; *pad = 0; switch (block_algo) { case CIPHER_STREAM: length = data_size + hash_size; if (auth_cipher) length += AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE; break; case CIPHER_BLOCK: ret = _gnutls_rnd (GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, &rnd, 1); if (ret < 0) return gnutls_assert_val(ret); /* make rnd a multiple of blocksize */ if (session->security_parameters.version == GNUTLS_SSL3 || random_pad == 0) { rnd = 0; } else { rnd = (rnd / blocksize) * blocksize; /* added to avoid the case of pad calculated 0 * seen below for pad calculation. */ if (rnd > blocksize) rnd -= blocksize; } length = data_size + hash_size; *pad = (uint8_t) (blocksize - (length % blocksize)) + rnd; length += *pad; if (_gnutls_version_has_explicit_iv (session->security_parameters.version)) length += blocksize; /* for the IV */ break; default: return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR); } return length; }
0
[ "CWE-310" ]
gnutls
b495740f2ff66550ca9395b3fda3ea32c3acb185
7,745,663,360,408,685,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
55
changes in packet parsing.
int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags) { int r; BIO *cont; if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DECRYPT, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA); return 0; } if (!dcont && !check_content(cms)) return 0; if (flags & CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT) cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 1; else cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug = 0; if (!pk && !cert && !dcont && !out) return 1; if (pk && !CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(cms, pk, cert)) return 0; cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont); if (!cont) return 0; r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags); do_free_upto(cont, dcont); return r; }
1
[ "CWE-311", "CWE-327" ]
openssl
08229ad838c50f644d7e928e2eef147b4308ad64
150,549,614,870,288,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
26
Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777) (cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
bool AuthorizationManagerImpl::shouldValidateAuthSchemaOnStartup() { return _startupAuthSchemaValidation; }
0
[ "CWE-613" ]
mongo
e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7
6,312,202,995,297,344,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
3
SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit
static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image) { ExceptionInfo *exception; Image *images, *next, *pyramid_image; ImageInfo *write_info; MagickBooleanType status; PointInfo resolution; size_t columns, rows; /* Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image. */ exception=(&image->exception); images=NewImageList(); for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next)) { Image *clone_image; clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception); if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL) break; clone_image->previous=NewImageList(); clone_image->next=NewImageList(); (void) SetImageProperty(clone_image,"tiff:subfiletype","none"); AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image); columns=next->columns; rows=next->rows; resolution.x=next->x_resolution; resolution.y=next->y_resolution; while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64)) { columns/=2; rows/=2; resolution.x/=2.0; resolution.y/=2.0; pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,image->blur, exception); if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL) break; DestroyBlob(pyramid_image); pyramid_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(next->blob); pyramid_image->x_resolution=resolution.x; pyramid_image->y_resolution=resolution.y; (void) SetImageProperty(pyramid_image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE"); AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image); } } status=MagickFalse; if (images != (Image *) NULL) { /* Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image. */ images=GetFirstImageInList(images); write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info); write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue; status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,images); images=DestroyImageList(images); write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info); } return(status); }
0
[ "CWE-125" ]
ImageMagick6
d8d844c6f23f4d90d8fe893fe9225dd78fc1e6ef
6,072,113,724,222,905,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
78
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1532
static apr_status_t md_calc_md_list(apr_pool_t *p, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *base_server) { md_srv_conf_t *sc; md_mod_conf_t *mc; md_t *md, *omd; const char *domain; apr_status_t rv = APR_SUCCESS; ap_listen_rec *lr; apr_sockaddr_t *sa; int i, j; (void)plog; sc = md_config_get(base_server); mc = sc->mc; mc->can_http = 0; mc->can_https = 0; for (lr = ap_listeners; lr; lr = lr->next) { for (sa = lr->bind_addr; sa; sa = sa->next) { if (sa->port == mc->local_80 && (!lr->protocol || !strncmp("http", lr->protocol, 4))) { mc->can_http = 1; } else if (sa->port == mc->local_443 && (!lr->protocol || !strncmp("http", lr->protocol, 4))) { mc->can_https = 1; } } } ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, base_server, APLOGNO(10037) "server seems%s reachable via http: (port 80->%d) " "and%s reachable via https: (port 443->%d) ", mc->can_http? "" : " not", mc->local_80, mc->can_https? "" : " not", mc->local_443); /* Complete the properties of the MDs, now that we have the complete, merged * server configurations. */ for (i = 0; i < mc->mds->nelts; ++i) { md = APR_ARRAY_IDX(mc->mds, i, md_t*); md_merge_srv(md, sc, p); /* Check that we have no overlap with the MDs already completed */ for (j = 0; j < i; ++j) { omd = APR_ARRAY_IDX(mc->mds, j, md_t*); if ((domain = md_common_name(md, omd)) != NULL) { ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, base_server, APLOGNO(10038) "two Managed Domains have an overlap in domain '%s'" ", first definition in %s(line %d), second in %s(line %d)", domain, md->defn_name, md->defn_line_number, omd->defn_name, omd->defn_line_number); return APR_EINVAL; } } /* Assign MD to the server_rec configs that it matches. Perform some * last finishing touches on the MD. */ if (APR_SUCCESS != (rv = assign_to_servers(md, base_server, p, ptemp))) { return rv; } ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, base_server, APLOGNO(10039) "Completed MD[%s, CA=%s, Proto=%s, Agreement=%s, Drive=%d, renew=%ld]", md->name, md->ca_url, md->ca_proto, md->ca_agreement, md->drive_mode, (long)md->renew_window); } return rv; }
0
[ "CWE-476" ]
mod_md
e71001955809247b3aa4d269e1e0741b4fe0fc3d
111,269,186,870,851,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
72
v1.1.12, notifycmd improvements
static int test_rand_add(void) { unsigned char rand_buf[256]; size_t rand_buflen; memset(rand_buf, 0xCD, sizeof(rand_buf)); /* make sure it's instantiated */ RAND_seed(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)); if (!TEST_true(RAND_status())) return 0; for ( rand_buflen = 256 ; rand_buflen > 0 ; --rand_buflen ) { RAND_add(rand_buf, rand_buflen, 0.0); if (!TEST_true(RAND_status())) return 0; } return 1; }
0
[ "CWE-330" ]
openssl
1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be
38,883,846,872,927,346,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
20
drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handler When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1, it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe, which the old CSPRNG hadn't been. The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd095, so the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise. This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach. It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed after a fork is necessary. To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that the child reseeds after fork. CVE-2019-1549 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
trace(const unsigned int tracelevel) { curses_trace(tracelevel); }
0
[]
ncurses
790a85dbd4a81d5f5d8dd02a44d84f01512ef443
36,873,953,145,356,195,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
4
ncurses 6.2 - patch 20200531 + correct configure version-check/warnng for g++ to allow for 10.x + re-enable "bel" in konsole-base (report by Nia Huang) + add linux-s entry (patch by Alexandre Montaron). + drop long-obsolete convert_configure.pl + add test/test_parm.c, for checking tparm changes. + improve parameter-checking for tparm, adding function _nc_tiparm() to handle the most-used case, which accepts only numeric parameters (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor"). + use a more conservative estimate of the buffer-size in lib_tparm.c's save_text() and save_number(), in case the sprintf() function passes-through unexpected characters from a format specifier (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor"). + add a check for end-of-string in cvtchar to handle a malformed string in infotocap (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor").
static int oidc_request_post_preserved_restore(request_rec *r, const char *original_url) { oidc_debug(r, "enter: original_url=%s", original_url); const char *method = "postOnLoad"; const char *script = apr_psprintf(r->pool, " <script type=\"text/javascript\">\n" " function str_decode(string) {\n" " try {\n" " result = decodeURIComponent(string);\n" " } catch (e) {\n" " result = unescape(string);\n" " }\n" " return result;\n" " }\n" " function %s() {\n" " var mod_auth_openidc_preserve_post_params = JSON.parse(sessionStorage.getItem('mod_auth_openidc_preserve_post_params'));\n" " sessionStorage.removeItem('mod_auth_openidc_preserve_post_params');\n" " for (var key in mod_auth_openidc_preserve_post_params) {\n" " var input = document.createElement(\"input\");\n" " input.name = str_decode(key);\n" " input.value = str_decode(mod_auth_openidc_preserve_post_params[key]);\n" " input.type = \"hidden\";\n" " document.forms[0].appendChild(input);\n" " }\n" " document.forms[0].action = \"%s\";\n" " document.forms[0].submit();\n" " }\n" " </script>\n", method, original_url); const char *body = " <p>Restoring...</p>\n" " <form method=\"post\"></form>\n"; return oidc_util_html_send(r, "Restoring...", script, method, body, OK); }
1
[ "CWE-79" ]
mod_auth_openidc
55ea0a085290cd2c8cdfdd960a230cbc38ba8b56
136,991,931,915,956,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
38
Add a function to escape Javascript characters
void compareHeaders(Headers&& headers, const ExpectedHeaders& expected_headers) { headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"content-length"}); headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"date"}); if (!routerSuppressEnvoyHeaders()) { headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"x-envoy-expected-rq-timeout-ms"}); headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"x-envoy-upstream-service-time"}); } headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"x-forwarded-proto"}); headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"x-request-id"}); headers.remove(Envoy::Http::LowerCaseString{"x-envoy-internal"}); EXPECT_THAT(&headers, HeaderMapEqualIgnoreOrder(&expected_headers)); }
0
[ "CWE-22" ]
envoy
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
123,144,836,467,198,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
13
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path Fixes: CVE-2021-29492 Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
R_API int r_bin_load_io(RBin *bin, int fd, ut64 baseaddr, ut64 loadaddr, int xtr_idx) { return r_bin_load_io_at_offset_as (bin, fd, baseaddr, loadaddr, xtr_idx, 0, NULL); }
0
[ "CWE-125" ]
radare2
d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9
317,046,946,856,672,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
3
Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
gst_asf_demux_is_unknown_stream (GstASFDemux * demux, guint stream_num) { return g_slist_find (demux->other_streams, GINT_TO_POINTER (stream_num)) == NULL; }
0
[ "CWE-125", "CWE-787" ]
gst-plugins-ugly
d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
201,357,953,129,331,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
NCURSES_SP_NAME(_nc_screen_wrap) (NCURSES_SP_DCL0) { if (SP_PARM != 0) { UpdateAttrs(SP_PARM, normal); #if NCURSES_EXT_FUNCS if (SP_PARM->_coloron && !SP_PARM->_default_color) { static const NCURSES_CH_T blank = NewChar(BLANK_TEXT); SP_PARM->_default_color = TRUE; NCURSES_SP_NAME(_nc_do_color) (NCURSES_SP_ARGx -1, 0, FALSE, NCURSES_SP_NAME(_nc_outch)); SP_PARM->_default_color = FALSE; TINFO_MVCUR(NCURSES_SP_ARGx SP_PARM->_cursrow, SP_PARM->_curscol, screen_lines(SP_PARM) - 1, 0); ClrToEOL(NCURSES_SP_ARGx blank, TRUE); } #endif if (SP_PARM->_color_defs) { NCURSES_SP_NAME(_nc_reset_colors) (NCURSES_SP_ARG); } } }
0
[]
ncurses
790a85dbd4a81d5f5d8dd02a44d84f01512ef443
62,304,088,349,878,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
31
ncurses 6.2 - patch 20200531 + correct configure version-check/warnng for g++ to allow for 10.x + re-enable "bel" in konsole-base (report by Nia Huang) + add linux-s entry (patch by Alexandre Montaron). + drop long-obsolete convert_configure.pl + add test/test_parm.c, for checking tparm changes. + improve parameter-checking for tparm, adding function _nc_tiparm() to handle the most-used case, which accepts only numeric parameters (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor"). + use a more conservative estimate of the buffer-size in lib_tparm.c's save_text() and save_number(), in case the sprintf() function passes-through unexpected characters from a format specifier (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor"). + add a check for end-of-string in cvtchar to handle a malformed string in infotocap (report/testcase by "puppet-meteor").
void Field_num::make_field(Send_field *field) { Field::make_field(field); field->decimals= dec; }
0
[ "CWE-120" ]
server
eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1
241,131,034,949,156,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size. Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations. It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix.
void qxl_render_resize(PCIQXLDevice *qxl) { QXLSurfaceCreate *sc = &qxl->guest_primary.surface; qxl->guest_primary.qxl_stride = sc->stride; qxl->guest_primary.abs_stride = abs(sc->stride); qxl->guest_primary.resized++; switch (sc->format) { case SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_16_555: qxl->guest_primary.bytes_pp = 2; qxl->guest_primary.bits_pp = 15; break; case SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_16_565: qxl->guest_primary.bytes_pp = 2; qxl->guest_primary.bits_pp = 16; break; case SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_32_xRGB: case SPICE_SURFACE_FMT_32_ARGB: qxl->guest_primary.bytes_pp = 4; qxl->guest_primary.bits_pp = 32; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "%s: unhandled format: %x\n", __func__, qxl->guest_primary.surface.format); qxl->guest_primary.bytes_pp = 4; qxl->guest_primary.bits_pp = 32; break; } }
0
[]
qemu
9569f5cb5b4bffa9d3ebc8ba7da1e03830a9a895
324,993,051,255,012,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
29
display/qxl-render: fix race condition in qxl_cursor (CVE-2021-4207) Avoid fetching 'width' and 'height' a second time to prevent possible race condition. Refer to security advisory https://starlabs.sg/advisories/22-4207/ for more information. Fixes: CVE-2021-4207 Signed-off-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
static int StreamTcpTest27(void) { Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET); if (unlikely(p == NULL)) return 0; Flow f; ThreadVars tv; StreamTcpThread stt; uint8_t payload[4]; TCPHdr tcph; int ret = 0; PacketQueue pq; memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue)); memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET); memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow)); memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars)); memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread)); memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr)); FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f); p->flow = &f; tcph.th_win = htons(5480); tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_CWR | TH_ECN; p->tcph = &tcph; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER; StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx); if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1) goto end; p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1); p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ACK; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1); p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1); p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1); p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(2); p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER; StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/ p->payload = payload; p->payload_len = 3; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1); p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6); p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER; StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/ p->payload = payload; p->payload_len = 3; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT; if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL) goto end; StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx); ret = 1; end: SCFree(p); FLOW_DESTROY(&f); StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx); return ret; }
0
[]
suricata
843d0b7a10bb45627f94764a6c5d468a24143345
307,338,218,255,969,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
88
stream: support RST getting lost/ignored In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'. However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name. In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly. This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider the state if the receiver continues to talk. To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation. If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case a stream event is generated. Ticket: #2501 Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
void Item_decimal_typecast::print(String *str, enum_query_type query_type) { char len_buf[20*3 + 1]; char *end; uint precision= my_decimal_length_to_precision(max_length, decimals, unsigned_flag); str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN("cast(")); args[0]->print(str, query_type); str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN(" as decimal(")); end=int10_to_str(precision, len_buf,10); str->append(len_buf, (uint32) (end - len_buf)); str->append(','); end=int10_to_str(decimals, len_buf,10); str->append(len_buf, (uint32) (end - len_buf)); str->append(')'); str->append(')'); }
0
[ "CWE-120" ]
server
eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1
52,858,204,405,681,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
22
MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size. Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations. It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix.
inc_tx_bcast_or_mcast_count(E1000State *s, const unsigned char *arr) { if (!memcmp(arr, bcast, sizeof bcast)) { e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(s->mac_reg, BPTC); } else if (arr[0] & 1) { e1000x_inc_reg_if_not_full(s->mac_reg, MPTC); } }
0
[ "CWE-835" ]
qemu
1caff0340f49c93d535c6558a5138d20d475315c
77,162,720,200,057,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
8
e1000: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for loopback This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect reentrancy and return early. This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416. Cc: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
static bool nic_exists(char *nic) { char path[MAXPATHLEN]; int ret; struct stat sb; if (strcmp(nic, "none") == 0) return true; ret = snprintf(path, MAXPATHLEN, "/sys/class/net/%s", nic); if (ret < 0 || ret >= MAXPATHLEN) // should never happen! return false; ret = stat(path, &sb); if (ret != 0) return false; return true; }
0
[ "CWE-284", "CWE-862" ]
lxc
16af238036a5464ae8f2420ed3af214f0de875f9
61,232,645,080,950,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
16
CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege. This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by temporarily dropping privilege. Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676 Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) { struct net *net = sock_net(sk); if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr; int chk_addr_ret; if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr)) return -EINVAL; if (addr->sin_family != AF_INET && !(addr->sin_family == AF_UNSPEC && addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY))) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI4,port=%d)\n", sk, &addr->sin_addr.s_addr, ntohs(addr->sin_port)); chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr); if (addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_ANY)) chk_addr_ret = RTN_LOCAL; if ((net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind == 0 && isk->freebind == 0 && isk->transparent == 0 && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL) || chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr; int addr_type, scoped, has_addr; struct net_device *dev = NULL; if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr)) return -EINVAL; if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI6c,port=%d)\n", sk, addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr, ntohs(addr->sin6_port)); addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr); scoped = __ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type); if ((addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && !(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_UNICAST)) || (scoped && !addr->sin6_scope_id)) return -EINVAL; rcu_read_lock(); if (addr->sin6_scope_id) { dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, addr->sin6_scope_id); if (!dev) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -ENODEV; } } has_addr = pingv6_ops.ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr, dev, scoped); rcu_read_unlock(); if (!(net->ipv6.sysctl.ip_nonlocal_bind || isk->freebind || isk->transparent || has_addr || addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_ANY)) return -EADDRNOTAVAIL; if (scoped) sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id; #endif } else { return -EAFNOSUPPORT; } return 0; }
0
[ "CWE-284" ]
linux
0eab121ef8750a5c8637d51534d5e9143fb0633f
18,565,236,689,340,307,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
77
net: ping: check minimum size on ICMP header length Prior to commit c0371da6047a ("put iov_iter into msghdr") in v3.19, there was no check that the iovec contained enough bytes for an ICMP header, and the read loop would walk across neighboring stack contents. Since the iov_iter conversion, bad arguments are noticed, but the returned error is EFAULT. Returning EINVAL is a clearer error and also solves the problem prior to v3.19. This was found using trinity with KASAN on v3.18: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623 page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 flags: 0x0() page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G BU 3.18.0-dirty #15 Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT) Call trace: [<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90 [<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171 [< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50 [< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147 [< inline >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236 [<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259 [< inline >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264 [<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507 [<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15 [< inline >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667 [<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674 [<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714 [<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624 [< inline >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643 [< inline >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761 CVE-2016-8399 Reported-by: Qidan He <[email protected]> Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjsua_create(void) { pj_status_t status; /* Init pjsua data */ init_data(); /* Set default logging settings */ pjsua_logging_config_default(&pjsua_var.log_cfg); /* Init PJLIB: */ status = pj_init(); PJ_ASSERT_RETURN(status == PJ_SUCCESS, status); pj_log_push_indent(); /* Init random seed */ init_random_seed(); /* Init PJLIB-UTIL: */ status = pjlib_util_init(); if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) { pj_log_pop_indent(); pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Failed in initializing pjlib-util", status); pj_shutdown(); return status; } /* Init PJNATH */ status = pjnath_init(); if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) { pj_log_pop_indent(); pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Failed in initializing pjnath", status); pj_shutdown(); return status; } /* Set default sound device ID */ pjsua_var.cap_dev = PJMEDIA_AUD_DEFAULT_CAPTURE_DEV; pjsua_var.play_dev = PJMEDIA_AUD_DEFAULT_PLAYBACK_DEV; /* Set default video device ID */ pjsua_var.vcap_dev = PJMEDIA_VID_DEFAULT_CAPTURE_DEV; pjsua_var.vrdr_dev = PJMEDIA_VID_DEFAULT_RENDER_DEV; /* Init caching pool. */ pj_caching_pool_init(&pjsua_var.cp, NULL, 0); /* Create memory pools for application and internal use. */ pjsua_var.pool = pjsua_pool_create("pjsua", PJSUA_POOL_LEN, PJSUA_POOL_INC); pjsua_var.timer_pool = pjsua_pool_create("pjsua_timer", 500, 500); if (pjsua_var.pool == NULL || pjsua_var.timer_pool == NULL) { pj_log_pop_indent(); status = PJ_ENOMEM; pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Unable to create pjsua/timer pool", status); pj_shutdown(); return status; } /* Create mutex */ status = pj_mutex_create_recursive(pjsua_var.pool, "pjsua", &pjsua_var.mutex); if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) { pj_log_pop_indent(); pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Unable to create mutex", status); pjsua_destroy(); return status; } /* Must create SIP endpoint to initialize SIP parser. The parser * is needed for example when application needs to call pjsua_verify_url(). */ status = pjsip_endpt_create(&pjsua_var.cp.factory, pj_gethostname()->ptr, &pjsua_var.endpt); if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) { pj_log_pop_indent(); pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Unable to create endpoint", status); pjsua_destroy(); return status; } /* Init timer entry and event list */ pj_list_init(&pjsua_var.active_timer_list); pj_list_init(&pjsua_var.timer_list); pj_list_init(&pjsua_var.event_list); /* Create timer mutex */ status = pj_mutex_create_recursive(pjsua_var.pool, "pjsua_timer", &pjsua_var.timer_mutex); if (status != PJ_SUCCESS) { pj_log_pop_indent(); pjsua_perror(THIS_FILE, "Unable to create mutex", status); pjsua_destroy(); return status; } pjsua_set_state(PJSUA_STATE_CREATED); pj_log_pop_indent(); return PJ_SUCCESS; }
0
[ "CWE-120", "CWE-787" ]
pjproject
d27f79da11df7bc8bb56c2f291d71e54df8d2c47
37,217,045,998,828,153,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
101
Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN() on pjsip_auth_create_digest() and pjsua_init_tpselector() (#3009) * Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN on pjsip_auth_create_digest * Use PJ_ASSERT_RETURN on pjsua_init_tpselector() * Fix incorrect check. * Add return value to pjsip_auth_create_digest() and pjsip_auth_create_digestSHA256() * Modification based on comments.
int unregister_ftrace_command(struct ftrace_func_command *cmd) { struct ftrace_func_command *p, *n; int ret = -ENODEV; mutex_lock(&ftrace_cmd_mutex); list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &ftrace_commands, list) { if (strcmp(cmd->name, p->name) == 0) { ret = 0; list_del_init(&p->list); goto out_unlock; } } out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&ftrace_cmd_mutex); return ret; }
0
[ "CWE-703" ]
linux
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
288,277,876,442,328,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
18
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic. It can be easily reproduced with following command: $ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing $ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a") and then the fopen() internally calls lseek(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
unsigned char *aligned_alloc(size_t dsize) { unsigned char*data = (unsigned char*) custom_malloc( dsize + 16); if (data) { size_t rem = (size_t)(data - 0) & 0xf; if (rem) { data += rem; data[-1] = rem; } else { data += 0x10; data[-1] = 0x10; } } return data; }
0
[ "CWE-1187" ]
lepton
82167c144a322cc956da45407f6dce8d4303d346
87,992,984,943,559,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
14
fix #87 : always check that threads_required set up the appropriate number of threads---fire off nop functions on unused threads for consistency
TEST(IndexBoundsBuilderTest, TranslateEqualityToStringWithMockCollator) { CollatorInterfaceMock collator(CollatorInterfaceMock::MockType::kReverseString); auto testIndex = buildSimpleIndexEntry(); testIndex.collator = &collator; BSONObj obj = BSON("a" << "foo"); auto expr = parseMatchExpression(obj); BSONElement elt = obj.firstElement(); OrderedIntervalList oil; IndexBoundsBuilder::BoundsTightness tightness; IndexBoundsBuilder::translate(expr.get(), elt, testIndex, &oil, &tightness); ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.name, "a"); ASSERT_EQUALS(oil.intervals.size(), 1U); ASSERT_EQUALS( Interval::INTERVAL_EQUALS, oil.intervals[0].compare(Interval(fromjson("{'': 'oof', '': 'oof'}"), true, true))); ASSERT_EQUALS(tightness, IndexBoundsBuilder::EXACT); }
0
[ "CWE-754" ]
mongo
f8f55e1825ee5c7bdb3208fc7c5b54321d172732
153,908,319,210,030,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
21
SERVER-44377 generate correct plan for indexed inequalities to null
TABLE *open_n_lock_single_table(THD *thd, TABLE_LIST *table_l, thr_lock_type lock_type, uint flags, Prelocking_strategy *prelocking_strategy) { TABLE_LIST *save_next_global; DBUG_ENTER("open_n_lock_single_table"); /* Remember old 'next' pointer. */ save_next_global= table_l->next_global; /* Break list. */ table_l->next_global= NULL; /* Set requested lock type. */ table_l->lock_type= lock_type; /* Allow to open real tables only. */ table_l->required_type= TABLE_TYPE_NORMAL; /* Open the table. */ if (open_and_lock_tables(thd, table_l, FALSE, flags, prelocking_strategy)) table_l->table= NULL; /* Just to be sure. */ /* Restore list. */ table_l->next_global= save_next_global; DBUG_RETURN(table_l->table); }
0
[ "CWE-416" ]
server
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
262,891,848,794,594,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
27
MDEV-24176 Preparations 1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table() mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session 2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
void RGWBulkUploadOp::pre_exec() { rgw_bucket_object_pre_exec(s); }
0
[ "CWE-770" ]
ceph
ab29bed2fc9f961fe895de1086a8208e21ddaddc
43,570,266,816,238,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
4
rgw: fix issues with 'enforce bounds' patch The patch to enforce bounds on max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts had a few issues that would prevent us from compiling it. Instead of changing the code provided by the submitter, we're addressing them in a separate commit to maintain the DCO. Signed-off-by: Joao Eduardo Luis <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Abhishek Lekshmanan <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 29bc434a6a81a2e5c5b8cfc4c8d5c82ca5bf538a) mimic specific fixes: As the largeish change from master g_conf() isn't in mimic yet, use the g_conf global structure, also make rgw_op use the value from req_info ceph context as we do for all the requests
libssh2_channel_forward_listen_ex(LIBSSH2_SESSION *session, const char *host, int port, int *bound_port, int queue_maxsize) { LIBSSH2_LISTENER *ptr; if(!session) return NULL; BLOCK_ADJUST_ERRNO(ptr, session, channel_forward_listen(session, host, port, bound_port, queue_maxsize)); return ptr; }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
libssh2
dc109a7f518757741590bb993c0c8412928ccec2
251,795,606,419,780,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
13
Security fixes (#315) * Bounds checks Fixes for CVEs https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3863.html https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3856.html * Packet length bounds check CVE https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3855.html * Response length check CVE https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html * Bounds check CVE https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3857.html * Bounds checking CVE https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html and additional data validation * Check bounds before reading into buffers * Bounds checking CVE https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html * declare SIZE_MAX and UINT_MAX if needed
QPDF_Stream::filterable(std::vector<std::string>& filters, bool& specialized_compression, bool& lossy_compression, int& predictor, int& columns, int& colors, int& bits_per_component, bool& early_code_change) { if (filter_abbreviations.empty()) { // The PDF specification provides these filter abbreviations // for use in inline images, but according to table H.1 in the // pre-ISO versions of the PDF specification, Adobe Reader // also accepts them for stream filters. filter_abbreviations["/AHx"] = "/ASCIIHexDecode"; filter_abbreviations["/A85"] = "/ASCII85Decode"; filter_abbreviations["/LZW"] = "/LZWDecode"; filter_abbreviations["/Fl"] = "/FlateDecode"; filter_abbreviations["/RL"] = "/RunLengthDecode"; filter_abbreviations["/CCF"] = "/CCITTFaxDecode"; filter_abbreviations["/DCT"] = "/DCTDecode"; } // Check filters QPDFObjectHandle filter_obj = this->stream_dict.getKey("/Filter"); bool filters_okay = true; if (filter_obj.isNull()) { // No filters } else if (filter_obj.isName()) { // One filter filters.push_back(filter_obj.getName()); } else if (filter_obj.isArray()) { // Potentially multiple filters int n = filter_obj.getArrayNItems(); for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) { QPDFObjectHandle item = filter_obj.getArrayItem(i); if (item.isName()) { filters.push_back(item.getName()); } else { filters_okay = false; } } } else { filters_okay = false; } if (! filters_okay) { QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF_Stream invalid filter"); warn(QPDFExc(qpdf_e_damaged_pdf, qpdf->getFilename(), "", this->offset, "stream filter type is not name or array")); return false; } bool filterable = true; for (std::vector<std::string>::iterator iter = filters.begin(); iter != filters.end(); ++iter) { std::string& filter = *iter; if (filter_abbreviations.count(filter)) { QTC::TC("qpdf", "QPDF_Stream expand filter abbreviation"); filter = filter_abbreviations[filter]; } if (filter == "/RunLengthDecode") { specialized_compression = true; } else if (filter == "/DCTDecode") { specialized_compression = true; lossy_compression = true; } else if (! ((filter == "/Crypt") || (filter == "/FlateDecode") || (filter == "/LZWDecode") || (filter == "/ASCII85Decode") || (filter == "/ASCIIHexDecode"))) { filterable = false; } } if (! filterable) { return false; } // `filters' now contains a list of filters to be applied in // order. See which ones we can support. // Initialize values to their defaults as per the PDF spec predictor = 1; columns = 0; colors = 1; bits_per_component = 8; early_code_change = true; // See if we can support any decode parameters that are specified. QPDFObjectHandle decode_obj = this->stream_dict.getKey("/DecodeParms"); std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle> decode_parms; if (decode_obj.isArray() && (decode_obj.getArrayNItems() == 0)) { decode_obj = QPDFObjectHandle::newNull(); } if (decode_obj.isArray()) { for (int i = 0; i < decode_obj.getArrayNItems(); ++i) { decode_parms.push_back(decode_obj.getArrayItem(i)); } } else { for (unsigned int i = 0; i < filters.size(); ++i) { decode_parms.push_back(decode_obj); } } // Ignore /DecodeParms entirely if /Filters is empty. At least // one case of a file whose /DecodeParms was [ << >> ] when // /Filters was empty has been seen in the wild. if ((filters.size() != 0) && (decode_parms.size() != filters.size())) { warn(QPDFExc(qpdf_e_damaged_pdf, qpdf->getFilename(), "", this->offset, "stream /DecodeParms length is" " inconsistent with filters")); filterable = false; } if (! filterable) { return false; } for (unsigned int i = 0; i < filters.size(); ++i) { QPDFObjectHandle decode_item = decode_parms.at(i); if (decode_item.isNull()) { // okay } else if (decode_item.isDictionary()) { if (! understandDecodeParams( filters.at(i), decode_item, predictor, columns, colors, bits_per_component, early_code_change)) { filterable = false; } } else { filterable = false; } } if ((predictor > 1) && (columns == 0)) { // invalid filterable = false; } if (! filterable) { return false; } return filterable; }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
qpdf
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
76,734,067,942,244,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
190
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major) This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion -Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential crashes from bogus integer values. There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent overflow condition.
int cil_gen_senscat(struct cil_db *db, struct cil_tree_node *parse_current, struct cil_tree_node *ast_node) { enum cil_syntax syntax[] = { CIL_SYN_STRING, CIL_SYN_STRING, CIL_SYN_STRING | CIL_SYN_LIST, CIL_SYN_END }; int syntax_len = sizeof(syntax)/sizeof(*syntax); struct cil_senscat *senscat = NULL; int rc = SEPOL_ERR; if (db == NULL || parse_current == NULL || ast_node == NULL) { goto exit; } rc = __cil_verify_syntax(parse_current, syntax, syntax_len); if (rc != SEPOL_OK) { goto exit; } cil_senscat_init(&senscat); senscat->sens_str = parse_current->next->data; rc = cil_fill_cats(parse_current->next->next, &senscat->cats); if (rc != SEPOL_OK) { goto exit; } ast_node->data = senscat; ast_node->flavor = CIL_SENSCAT; return SEPOL_OK; exit: cil_tree_log(parse_current, CIL_ERR, "Bad sensitivitycategory declaration"); cil_destroy_senscat(senscat); return rc; }
0
[ "CWE-125" ]
selinux
340f0eb7f3673e8aacaf0a96cbfcd4d12a405521
301,500,892,786,301,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
40
libsepol/cil: Check for statements not allowed in optional blocks While there are some checks for invalid statements in an optional block when resolving the AST, there are no checks when building the AST. OSS-Fuzz found the following policy which caused a null dereference in cil_tree_get_next_path(). (blockinherit b3) (sid SID) (sidorder(SID)) (optional o (ibpkeycon :(1 0)s) (block b3 (filecon""block()) (filecon""block()))) The problem is that the blockinherit copies block b3 before the optional block is disabled. When the optional is disabled, block b3 is deleted along with everything else in the optional. Later, when filecon statements with the same path are found an error message is produced and in trying to find out where the block was copied from, the reference to the deleted block is used. The error handling code assumes (rightly) that if something was copied from a block then that block should still exist. It is clear that in-statements, blocks, and macros cannot be in an optional, because that allows nodes to be copied from the optional block to somewhere outside even though the optional could be disabled later. When optionals are disabled the AST is reset and the resolution is restarted at the point of resolving macro calls, so anything resolved before macro calls will never be re-resolved. This includes tunableifs, in-statements, blockinherits, blockabstracts, and macro definitions. Tunable declarations also cannot be in an optional block because they are needed to resolve tunableifs. It should be fine to allow blockinherit statements in an optional, because that is copying nodes from outside the optional to the optional and if the optional is later disabled, everything will be deleted anyway. Check and quit with an error if a tunable declaration, in-statement, block, blockabstract, or macro definition is found within an optional when either building or resolving the AST. Signed-off-by: James Carter <[email protected]>
MaybeLocal<Value> GetCipherStandardName( Environment* env, const SSLPointer& ssl) { return GetCipherStandardName(env, SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl.get())); }
0
[ "CWE-295" ]
node
466e5415a2b7b3574ab5403acb87e89a94a980d1
256,745,292,457,354,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
crypto,tls: implement safe x509 GeneralName format This change introduces JSON-compatible escaping rules for strings that include X.509 GeneralName components (see RFC 5280). This non-standard format avoids ambiguities and prevents injection attacks that could previously lead to X.509 certificates being accepted even though they were not valid for the target hostname. These changes affect the format of subject alternative names and the format of authority information access. The checkServerIdentity function has been modified to safely handle the new format, eliminating the possibility of injecting subject alternative names into the verification logic. Because each subject alternative name is only encoded as a JSON string literal if necessary for security purposes, this change will only be visible in rare cases. This addresses CVE-2021-44532. CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44532 PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300 Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <[email protected]> Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <[email protected]>
Variant c_SimpleXMLElementIterator::t_current() { if (m_iter1 == nullptr) return uninit_null(); if (m_parent->m_is_attribute) { return m_iter1->second(); } ArrayIter *iter = m_iter2; if (iter == nullptr && m_iter1->second().isObject()) { iter = m_iter1; } if (iter) { return iter->second(); } assert(false); return uninit_null(); }
0
[ "CWE-94" ]
hhvm
95f96e7287effe2fcdfb9a5338d1a7e4f55b083b
82,518,600,454,851,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
18
Fix libxml_disable_entity_loader() This wasn't calling requestInit and setting the libxml handler no null. So the first time an error came along it would reset the handler from no-op to reading again. This is a much better fix, we set our custom handler in requestInit and when libxml_disable_entity_loader we store that state as a member bool ensuring requestInit is always called to set our own handler. If the handler isn't inserted then the behavious is as before. The only time this could go pear shaped is say we wanted to make the default be off. In that case we'd need a global requestInit that is always called since there are libxml references everywhere. Reviewed By: @jdelong Differential Revision: D1116686
static int prepare_sdp_description(FFServerStream *stream, uint8_t **pbuffer, struct in_addr my_ip) { AVFormatContext *avc; AVOutputFormat *rtp_format = av_guess_format("rtp", NULL, NULL); AVDictionaryEntry *entry = av_dict_get(stream->metadata, "title", NULL, 0); int i; *pbuffer = NULL; avc = avformat_alloc_context(); if (!avc || !rtp_format) return -1; avc->oformat = rtp_format; av_dict_set(&avc->metadata, "title", entry ? entry->value : "No Title", 0); if (stream->is_multicast) { snprintf(avc->filename, 1024, "rtp://%s:%d?multicast=1?ttl=%d", inet_ntoa(stream->multicast_ip), stream->multicast_port, stream->multicast_ttl); } else snprintf(avc->filename, 1024, "rtp://0.0.0.0"); for(i = 0; i < stream->nb_streams; i++) { AVStream *st = avformat_new_stream(avc, NULL); if (!st) goto sdp_done; avcodec_parameters_from_context(stream->streams[i]->codecpar, stream->streams[i]->codec); unlayer_stream(st, stream->streams[i]); } #define PBUFFER_SIZE 2048 *pbuffer = av_mallocz(PBUFFER_SIZE); if (!*pbuffer) goto sdp_done; av_sdp_create(&avc, 1, *pbuffer, PBUFFER_SIZE); sdp_done: av_freep(&avc->streams); av_dict_free(&avc->metadata); av_free(avc); return *pbuffer ? strlen(*pbuffer) : AVERROR(ENOMEM); }
0
[ "CWE-119", "CWE-787" ]
FFmpeg
a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156
339,065,813,932,518,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
44
ffserver: Check chunk size Fixes out of array access Fixes: poc_ffserver.py Found-by: Paul Cher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
evbuffer_incref_and_lock_(struct evbuffer *buf) { EVBUFFER_LOCK(buf); ++buf->refcnt; }
0
[ "CWE-189" ]
libevent
841ecbd96105c84ac2e7c9594aeadbcc6fb38bc4
315,623,971,842,774,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.1 For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap. Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum. This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into.
recvauth_common(krb5_context context, krb5_auth_context * auth_context, /* IN */ krb5_pointer fd, char *appl_version, krb5_principal server, krb5_int32 flags, krb5_keytab keytab, /* OUT */ krb5_ticket ** ticket, krb5_data *version) { krb5_auth_context new_auth_context; krb5_flags ap_option = 0; krb5_error_code retval, problem; krb5_data inbuf; krb5_data outbuf; krb5_rcache rcache = 0; krb5_octet response; krb5_data null_server; int need_error_free = 0; int local_rcache = 0, local_authcon = 0; /* * Zero out problem variable. If problem is set at the end of * the intial version negotiation section, it means that we * need to send an error code back to the client application * and exit. */ problem = 0; response = 0; if (!(flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION)) { /* * First read the sendauth version string and check it. */ if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf))) return(retval); if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) { problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; response = 1; } free(inbuf.data); } if (flags & KRB5_RECVAUTH_BADAUTHVERS) { problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS; response = 1; } /* * Do the same thing for the application version string. */ if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf))) return(retval); if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) { if (!problem) { problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS; response = 2; } } if (version && !problem) *version = inbuf; else free(inbuf.data); /* * Now we actually write the response. If the response is non-zero, * exit with a return value of problem */ if ((krb5_net_write(context, *((int *)fd), (char *)&response, 1)) < 0) { return(problem); /* We'll return the top-level problem */ } if (problem) return(problem); /* We are clear of errors here */ /* * Now, let's read the AP_REQ message and decode it */ if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf))) return retval; if (*auth_context == NULL) { problem = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &new_auth_context); *auth_context = new_auth_context; local_authcon = 1; } krb5_auth_con_getrcache(context, *auth_context, &rcache); if ((!problem) && rcache == NULL) { /* * Setup the replay cache. */ if (server != NULL && server->length > 0) { problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &server->data[0], &rcache); } else { null_server.length = 7; null_server.data = "default"; problem = krb5_get_server_rcache(context, &null_server, &rcache); } if (!problem) problem = krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, rcache); local_rcache = 1; } if (!problem) { problem = krb5_rd_req(context, auth_context, &inbuf, server, keytab, &ap_option, ticket); free(inbuf.data); } /* * If there was a problem, send back a krb5_error message, * preceeded by the length of the krb5_error message. If * everything's ok, send back 0 for the length. */ if (problem) { krb5_error error; const char *message; memset(&error, 0, sizeof(error)); krb5_us_timeofday(context, &error.stime, &error.susec); if(server) error.server = server; else { /* If this fails - ie. ENOMEM we are hosed we cannot even send the error if we wanted to... */ (void) krb5_parse_name(context, "????", &error.server); need_error_free = 1; } error.error = problem - ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (error.error > 127) error.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; message = error_message(problem); error.text.length = strlen(message) + 1; error.text.data = strdup(message); if (!error.text.data) { retval = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } if ((retval = krb5_mk_error(context, &error, &outbuf))) { free(error.text.data); goto cleanup; } free(error.text.data); if(need_error_free) krb5_free_principal(context, error.server); } else { outbuf.length = 0; outbuf.data = 0; } retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf); if (outbuf.data) { free(outbuf.data); /* We sent back an error, we need cleanup then return */ retval = problem; goto cleanup; } if (retval) goto cleanup; /* Here lies the mutual authentication stuff... */ if ((ap_option & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED)) { if ((retval = krb5_mk_rep(context, *auth_context, &outbuf))) { return(retval); } retval = krb5_write_message(context, fd, &outbuf); free(outbuf.data); } cleanup:; if (retval) { if (local_authcon) { krb5_auth_con_free(context, *auth_context); } else if (local_rcache && rcache != NULL) { krb5_rc_close(context, rcache); krb5_auth_con_setrcache(context, *auth_context, NULL); } } return retval; }
1
[ "CWE-703" ]
krb5
102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec
41,068,162,389,352,763,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
184
Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355] In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected krb5_data value and use data_eq(). In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf and krb5_parse_name. CVE-2014-5355: In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string. The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name string. The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash. uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without verifying that it is a valid C string. The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a complete denial of service. Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [[email protected]: CVSS score] ticket: 8050 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup
countFrequencies (Int64 freq[HUF_ENCSIZE], const unsigned short data[/*n*/], int n) #endif { for (int i = 0; i < HUF_ENCSIZE; ++i) freq[i] = 0; for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) ++freq[data[i]]; }
0
[ "CWE-190" ]
openexr
ed560b8a932c78d5e8e5990ce36fe7808b35d9f0
73,282,987,702,140,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
11
prevent overflow in hufUncompress if nBits is large (#836) Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <[email protected]>
flatpak_dir_update_summary (FlatpakDir *self, GCancellable *cancellable, GError **error) { g_auto(GLnxLockFile) lock = { 0, }; if (flatpak_dir_use_system_helper (self, NULL)) { const char *installation = flatpak_dir_get_id (self); return flatpak_dir_system_helper_call_update_summary (self, FLATPAK_HELPER_UPDATE_SUMMARY_FLAGS_NONE, installation ? installation : "", cancellable, error); } if (!flatpak_dir_ensure_repo (self, cancellable, error)) return FALSE; /* Keep a shared repo lock to avoid prunes removing objects we're relying on * while generating the summary. */ if (!flatpak_dir_repo_lock (self, &lock, LOCK_SH, cancellable, error)) return FALSE; g_debug ("Updating summary"); return ostree_repo_regenerate_summary (self->repo, NULL, cancellable, error); }
0
[ "CWE-668" ]
flatpak
cd2142888fc4c199723a0dfca1f15ea8788a5483
38,842,782,169,919,937,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
28
Don't expose /proc when running apply_extra As shown by CVE-2019-5736, it is sometimes possible for the sandbox app to access outside files using /proc/self/exe. This is not typically an issue for flatpak as the sandbox runs as the user which has no permissions to e.g. modify the host files. However, when installing apps using extra-data into the system repo we *do* actually run a sandbox as root. So, in this case we disable mounting /proc in the sandbox, which will neuter attacks like this.
static int pptp_call_clear_rqst(struct pptp_conn_t *conn) { struct pptp_call_clear_rqst *rqst = (struct pptp_call_clear_rqst *)conn->in_buf; if (conf_verbose) log_ppp_info2("recv [PPTP Call-Clear-Request <Call-ID %x>]\n", ntohs(rqst->call_id)); if (conn->echo_timer.tpd) triton_timer_del(&conn->echo_timer); if (conn->state == STATE_PPP) { __sync_sub_and_fetch(&stat_active, 1); conn->state = STATE_CLOSE; ap_session_terminate(&conn->ppp.ses, TERM_USER_REQUEST, 1); } return send_pptp_call_disconnect_notify(conn, 4); }
0
[ "CWE-787" ]
accel-ppp
a0b8bfc4e74ff31b15ccfa6c626e3bbc591ba98f
3,401,591,443,602,242,400,000,000,000,000,000,000
18
Fix post_msg implementation bug I think the error handling code of `post_msg` is wrongly implemented due to coding typo. The `EPIPE` should be also considered and then return -1, just like `PPTP_write`: https://github.com/xebd/accel-ppp/blob/1b8711cf75a7c278d99840112bc7a396398e0205/accel-pppd/ctrl/pptp/pptp.c#L539-L570 This pr fixes #158.
static int nsv_parse_NSVf_header(AVFormatContext *s) { NSVContext *nsv = s->priv_data; AVIOContext *pb = s->pb; unsigned int av_unused file_size; unsigned int size; int64_t duration; int strings_size; int table_entries; int table_entries_used; nsv->state = NSV_UNSYNC; /* in case we fail */ size = avio_rl32(pb); if (size < 28) return -1; nsv->NSVf_end = size; file_size = (uint32_t)avio_rl32(pb); av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf chunk_size %u\n", size); av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf file_size %u\n", file_size); nsv->duration = duration = avio_rl32(pb); /* in ms */ av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf duration %"PRId64" ms\n", duration); // XXX: store it in AVStreams strings_size = avio_rl32(pb); table_entries = avio_rl32(pb); table_entries_used = avio_rl32(pb); av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf info-strings size: %d, table entries: %d, bis %d\n", strings_size, table_entries, table_entries_used); if (avio_feof(pb)) return -1; av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got header; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb)); if (strings_size > 0) { char *strings; /* last byte will be '\0' to play safe with str*() */ char *p, *endp; char *token, *value; char quote; p = strings = av_mallocz((size_t)strings_size + 1); if (!p) return AVERROR(ENOMEM); endp = strings + strings_size; avio_read(pb, strings, strings_size); while (p < endp) { while (*p == ' ') p++; /* strip out spaces */ if (p >= endp-2) break; token = p; p = strchr(p, '='); if (!p || p >= endp-2) break; *p++ = '\0'; quote = *p++; value = p; p = strchr(p, quote); if (!p || p >= endp) break; *p++ = '\0'; av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV NSVf INFO: %s='%s'\n", token, value); av_dict_set(&s->metadata, token, value, 0); } av_free(strings); } if (avio_feof(pb)) return -1; av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got infos; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb)); if (table_entries_used > 0) { int i; nsv->index_entries = table_entries_used; if((unsigned)table_entries_used >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(uint32_t)) return -1; nsv->nsvs_file_offset = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (!nsv->nsvs_file_offset) return AVERROR(ENOMEM); for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) { if (avio_feof(pb)) return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA; nsv->nsvs_file_offset[i] = avio_rl32(pb) + size; } if(table_entries > table_entries_used && avio_rl32(pb) == MKTAG('T','O','C','2')) { nsv->nsvs_timestamps = av_malloc_array((unsigned)table_entries_used, sizeof(uint32_t)); if (!nsv->nsvs_timestamps) return AVERROR(ENOMEM); for(i=0;i<table_entries_used;i++) { nsv->nsvs_timestamps[i] = avio_rl32(pb); } } } av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "NSV got index; filepos %"PRId64"\n", avio_tell(pb)); avio_seek(pb, nsv->base_offset + size, SEEK_SET); /* required for dumbdriving-271.nsv (2 extra bytes) */ if (avio_feof(pb)) return -1; nsv->state = NSV_HAS_READ_NSVF; return 0; }
0
[ "CWE-703", "CWE-834" ]
FFmpeg
c24bcb553650b91e9eff15ef6e54ca73de2453b7
114,808,036,402,210,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
108
avformat/nsvdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check in nsvs_file_offset loop. Fixes: 20170829.nsv Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]> Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, int top, int bottom ) { int need_ca_bit; /* Parent must be the issuer */ if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 ) return( -1 ); /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ need_ca_bit = 1; /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ if( top && parent->version < 3 ) need_ca_bit = 0; /* Exception: self-signed end-entity certs that are locally trusted. */ if( top && bottom && child->raw.len == parent->raw.len && memcmp( child->raw.p, parent->raw.p, child->raw.len ) == 0 ) { need_ca_bit = 0; } if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue ) return( -1 ); #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE) if( need_ca_bit && mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 ) { return( -1 ); } #endif return( 0 ); }
0
[ "CWE-287", "CWE-284" ]
mbedtls
d15795acd5074e0b44e71f7ede8bdfe1b48591fc
68,872,047,206,211,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
38
Improve behaviour on fatal errors If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe thing to do.
parse_asntype(FILE * fp, char *name, int *ntype, char *ntoken) { int type, i; char token[MAXTOKEN]; char quoted_string_buffer[MAXQUOTESTR]; char *hint = NULL; char *descr = NULL; struct tc *tcp; int level; type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type == SEQUENCE || type == CHOICE) { level = 0; while ((type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN)) != ENDOFFILE) { if (type == LEFTBRACKET) { level++; } else if (type == RIGHTBRACKET && --level == 0) { *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); return NULL; } } print_error("Expected \"}\"", token, type); return NULL; } else if (type == LEFTBRACKET) { struct node *np; int ch_next = '{'; ungetc(ch_next, fp); np = parse_objectid(fp, name); if (np != NULL) { *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); return np; } return NULL; } else if (type == LEFTSQBRACK) { int size = 0; do { type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); } while (type != ENDOFFILE && type != RIGHTSQBRACK); if (type != RIGHTSQBRACK) { print_error("Expected \"]\"", token, type); return NULL; } type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type == IMPLICIT) type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype == LEFTPAREN) { switch (type) { case OCTETSTR: *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype != SIZE) { print_error("Expected SIZE", ntoken, *ntype); return NULL; } size = 1; *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype != LEFTPAREN) { print_error("Expected \"(\" after SIZE", ntoken, *ntype); return NULL; } /* FALL THROUGH */ case INTEGER: *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); do { if (*ntype != NUMBER) print_error("Expected NUMBER", ntoken, *ntype); *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype == RANGE) { *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype != NUMBER) print_error("Expected NUMBER", ntoken, *ntype); *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); } } while (*ntype == BAR); if (*ntype != RIGHTPAREN) { print_error("Expected \")\"", ntoken, *ntype); return NULL; } *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (size) { if (*ntype != RIGHTPAREN) { print_error("Expected \")\" to terminate SIZE", ntoken, *ntype); return NULL; } *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); } } } return NULL; } else { if (type == CONVENTION) { while (type != SYNTAX && type != ENDOFFILE) { if (type == DISPLAYHINT) { type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type != QUOTESTRING) { print_error("DISPLAY-HINT must be string", token, type); } else { free(hint); hint = strdup(token); } } else if (type == DESCRIPTION && netsnmp_ds_get_boolean(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_SAVE_MIB_DESCRS)) { type = get_token(fp, quoted_string_buffer, MAXQUOTESTR); if (type != QUOTESTRING) { print_error("DESCRIPTION must be string", token, type); } else { free(descr); descr = strdup(quoted_string_buffer); } } else type = get_token(fp, quoted_string_buffer, MAXQUOTESTR); } type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type == OBJECT) { type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type != IDENTIFIER) { print_error("Expected IDENTIFIER", token, type); goto err; } type = OBJID; } } else if (type == OBJECT) { type = get_token(fp, token, MAXTOKEN); if (type != IDENTIFIER) { print_error("Expected IDENTIFIER", token, type); goto err; } type = OBJID; } if (type == LABEL) { type = get_tc(token, current_module, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } /* * textual convention */ for (i = 0; i < MAXTC; i++) { if (tclist[i].type == 0) break; } if (i == MAXTC) { print_error("Too many textual conventions", token, type); goto err; } if (!(type & SYNTAX_MASK)) { print_error("Textual convention doesn't map to real type", token, type); goto err; } tcp = &tclist[i]; tcp->modid = current_module; tcp->descriptor = strdup(name); tcp->hint = hint; tcp->description = descr; tcp->type = type; *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); if (*ntype == LEFTPAREN) { tcp->ranges = parse_ranges(fp, &tcp->ranges); *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); } else if (*ntype == LEFTBRACKET) { /* * if there is an enumeration list, parse it */ tcp->enums = parse_enumlist(fp, &tcp->enums); *ntype = get_token(fp, ntoken, MAXTOKEN); } return NULL; } err: SNMP_FREE(descr); SNMP_FREE(hint); return NULL; }
0
[ "CWE-59", "CWE-61" ]
net-snmp
4fd9a450444a434a993bc72f7c3486ccce41f602
263,222,936,256,771,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
182
CHANGES: snmpd: Stop reading and writing the mib_indexes/* files Caching directory contents is something the operating system should do and is not something Net-SNMP should do. Instead of storing a copy of the directory contents in ${tmp_dir}/mib_indexes/${n}, always scan a MIB directory.
cmpspellaffix(const void *s1, const void *s2) { return (strncmp((*(SPELL *const *) s1)->p.flag, (*(SPELL *const *) s2)->p.flag, MAXFLAGLEN)); }
0
[ "CWE-119" ]
postgres
01824385aead50e557ca1af28640460fa9877d51
297,768,470,045,101,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
4
Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers. Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using strlcpy() and similar functions. Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports. In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result. The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g., "FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes, I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues. This issue was reported by Honza Horak. Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt()
static int release(struct socket *sock) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct tipc_port *tport; struct sk_buff *buf; int res; /* * Exit if socket isn't fully initialized (occurs when a failed accept() * releases a pre-allocated child socket that was never used) */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; tport = tipc_sk_port(sk); lock_sock(sk); /* * Reject all unreceived messages, except on an active connection * (which disconnects locally & sends a 'FIN+' to peer) */ while (sock->state != SS_DISCONNECTING) { buf = __skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); if (buf == NULL) break; if (TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle != NULL) kfree_skb(buf); else { if ((sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) || (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED)) { sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING; tipc_disconnect(tport->ref); } tipc_reject_msg(buf, TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT); } } /* * Delete TIPC port; this ensures no more messages are queued * (also disconnects an active connection & sends a 'FIN-' to peer) */ res = tipc_deleteport(tport->ref); /* Discard any remaining (connection-based) messages in receive queue */ __skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue); /* Reject any messages that accumulated in backlog queue */ sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING; release_sock(sk); sock_put(sk); sock->sk = NULL; return res; }
0
[ "CWE-20", "CWE-269" ]
linux
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
39,304,678,460,260,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
55
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pud_t *pud) { return NULL; }
0
[]
linux
a4a118f2eead1d6c49e00765de89878288d4b890
229,624,746,836,078,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
5
hugetlbfs: flush TLBs correctly after huge_pmd_unshare When __unmap_hugepage_range() calls to huge_pmd_unshare() succeed, a TLB flush is missing. This TLB flush must be performed before releasing the i_mmap_rwsem, in order to prevent an unshared PMDs page from being released and reused before the TLB flush took place. Arguably, a comprehensive solution would use mmu_gather interface to batch the TLB flushes and the PMDs page release, however it is not an easy solution: (1) try_to_unmap_one() and try_to_migrate_one() also call huge_pmd_unshare() and they cannot use the mmu_gather interface; and (2) deferring the release of the page reference for the PMDs page until after i_mmap_rwsem is dropeed can confuse huge_pmd_unshare() into thinking PMDs are shared when they are not. Fix __unmap_hugepage_range() by adding the missing TLB flush, and forcing a flush when unshare is successful. Fixes: 24669e58477e ("hugetlb: use mmu_gather instead of a temporary linked list for accumulating pages)" # 3.6 Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
term_job_ended(job_T *job) { term_T *term; int did_one = FALSE; for (term = first_term; term != NULL; term = term->tl_next) if (term->tl_job == job) { VIM_CLEAR(term->tl_title); VIM_CLEAR(term->tl_status_text); redraw_buf_and_status_later(term->tl_buffer, VALID); did_one = TRUE; } if (did_one) redraw_statuslines(); if (curbuf->b_term != NULL) { if (curbuf->b_term->tl_job == job) maketitle(); update_cursor(curbuf->b_term, TRUE); } }
0
[ "CWE-476" ]
vim
cd929f7ba8cc5b6d6dcf35c8b34124e969fed6b8
40,744,191,473,891,296,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
22
patch 8.1.0633: crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window Problem: Crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window. Solution: Handle out-of-memory more gracefully.