func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
char *
copy_fifo_list (sizep)
int *sizep;
{
if (sizep)
*sizep = 0;
return (char *)NULL; | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
]
| bash | 4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715 | 317,783,823,912,346,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Bash-4.4 patch 7 |
static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
int regno, int off, int size,
enum bpf_access_type atype,
int value_regno)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
const struct btf_type *t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, reg->btf_id);
const char *tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
u32 btf_id;
int ret;
if (off < 0) {
verbose(env,
"R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
regno, tname, off);
return -EACCES;
}
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env,
"R%d is ptr_%s invalid variable offset: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
regno, tname, off, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->ops->btf_struct_access) {
ret = env->ops->btf_struct_access(&env->log, t, off, size,
atype, &btf_id);
} else {
if (atype != BPF_READ) {
verbose(env, "only read is supported\n");
return -EACCES;
}
ret = btf_struct_access(&env->log, t, off, size, atype,
&btf_id);
}
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, btf_id);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-681",
"CWE-787"
]
| linux | 5b9fbeb75b6a98955f628e205ac26689bcb1383e | 276,655,852,367,498,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | bpf: Fix scalar32_min_max_or bounds tracking
Simon reported an issue with the current scalar32_min_max_or() implementation.
That is, compared to the other 32 bit subreg tracking functions, the code in
scalar32_min_max_or() stands out that it's using the 64 bit registers instead
of 32 bit ones. This leads to bounds tracking issues, for example:
[...]
8: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: (b7) r0 = 1
10: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
10: (18) r2 = 0x600000002
12: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
12: (ad) if r1 < r2 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: (95) exit
14: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ffffffff)) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
14: (25) if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: (95) exit
16: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
16: (47) r1 |= 0
17: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=32212254719,var_off=(0x1; 0x700000000),s32_max_value=1,u32_max_value=1) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
[...]
The bound tests on the map value force the upper unsigned bound to be 25769803777
in 64 bit (0b11000000000000000000000000000000001) and then lower one to be 1. By
using OR they are truncated and thus result in the range [1,1] for the 32 bit reg
tracker. This is incorrect given the only thing we know is that the value must be
positive and thus 2147483647 (0b1111111111111111111111111111111) at max for the
subregs. Fix it by using the {u,s}32_{min,max}_value vars instead. This also makes
sense, for example, for the case where we update dst_reg->s32_{min,max}_value in
the else branch we need to use the newly computed dst_reg->u32_{min,max}_value as
we know that these are positive. Previously, in the else branch the 64 bit values
of umin_value=1 and umax_value=32212254719 were used and latter got truncated to
be 1 as upper bound there. After the fix the subreg range is now correct:
[...]
8: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=48,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
9: (b7) r0 = 1
10: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
10: (18) r2 = 0x600000002
12: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
12: (ad) if r1 < r2 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=25769803778) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
13: (95) exit
14: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x7ffffffff)) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
14: (25) if r1 > 0x0 goto pc+1
R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=0,var_off=(0x0; 0x7fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
15: (95) exit
16: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=25769803777,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
16: (47) r1 |= 0
17: R0_w=inv1 R1_w=inv(id=0,umin_value=1,umax_value=32212254719,var_off=(0x0; 0x77fffffff),u32_max_value=2147483647) R2_w=inv25769803778 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
[...]
Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Simon Scannell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
ptaInsertPt(PTA *pta,
l_int32 index,
l_int32 x,
l_int32 y)
{
l_int32 i, n;
PROCNAME("ptaInsertPt");
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
n = ptaGetCount(pta);
if (index < 0 || index > n)
return ERROR_INT("index not in {0...n}", procName, 1);
if (n > pta->nalloc)
ptaExtendArrays(pta);
pta->n++;
for (i = n; i > index; i--) {
pta->x[i] = pta->x[i - 1];
pta->y[i] = pta->y[i - 1];
}
pta->x[index] = x;
pta->y[index] = y;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
]
| leptonica | ee301cb2029db8a6289c5295daa42bba7715e99a | 334,633,466,613,805,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf(). |
static void tg3_process_error(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 val;
bool real_error = false;
if (tg3_flag(tp, ERROR_PROCESSED))
return;
/* Check Flow Attention register */
val = tr32(HOSTCC_FLOW_ATTN);
if (val & ~HOSTCC_FLOW_ATTN_MBUF_LWM) {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "FLOW Attention error. Resetting chip.\n");
real_error = true;
}
if (tr32(MSGINT_STATUS) & ~MSGINT_STATUS_MSI_REQ) {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "MSI Status error. Resetting chip.\n");
real_error = true;
}
if (tr32(RDMAC_STATUS) || tr32(WDMAC_STATUS)) {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "DMA Status error. Resetting chip.\n");
real_error = true;
}
if (!real_error)
return;
tg3_dump_state(tp);
tg3_flag_set(tp, ERROR_PROCESSED);
tg3_reset_task_schedule(tp);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
]
| linux | 715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | 197,916,589,157,046,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static void h2_destroy(struct connection *conn)
{
struct h2c *h2c = conn->ctx;
if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id))
h2_release(h2c->conn);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
]
| haproxy | a01f45e3ced23c799f6e78b5efdbd32198a75354 | 190,015,984,733,671,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | BUG/CRITICAL: mux-h2: re-check the frame length when PRIORITY is used
Tim D�sterhus reported a possible crash in the H2 HEADERS frame decoder
when the PRIORITY flag is present. A check is missing to ensure the 5
extra bytes needed with this flag are actually part of the frame. As per
RFC7540#4.2, let's return a connection error with code FRAME_SIZE_ERROR.
Many thanks to Tim for responsibly reporting this issue with a working
config and reproducer. This issue was assigned CVE-2018-20615.
This fix must be backported to 1.9 and 1.8. |
static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
int broadcast_flags, struct sock *one_sk,
struct net *net)
{
struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
int err = -ESRCH;
/* XXX Do we need something like netlink_overrun? I think
* XXX PF_KEY socket apps will not mind current behavior.
*/
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
rcu_read_lock();
sk_for_each_rcu(sk, &net_pfkey->table) {
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
int err2;
/* Yes, it means that if you are meant to receive this
* pfkey message you receive it twice as promiscuous
* socket.
*/
if (pfk->promisc)
pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk);
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (sk == one_sk)
continue;
if (broadcast_flags != BROADCAST_ALL) {
if (broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY)
continue;
if ((broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_REGISTERED) &&
!pfk->registered)
continue;
if (broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_ONE)
continue;
}
err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, sk);
/* Error is cleare after succecful sending to at least one
* registered KM */
if ((broadcast_flags & BROADCAST_REGISTERED) && err)
err = err2;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (one_sk != NULL)
err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, one_sk);
kfree_skb(skb2);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
]
| linux | f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c | 289,439,744,223,542,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int kdb_help(int argc, const char **argv)
{
kdbtab_t *kt;
kdb_printf("%-15.15s %-20.20s %s\n", "Command", "Usage", "Description");
kdb_printf("-----------------------------"
"-----------------------------\n");
list_for_each_entry(kt, &kdb_cmds_head, list_node) {
char *space = "";
if (KDB_FLAG(CMD_INTERRUPT))
return 0;
if (!kdb_check_flags(kt->flags, kdb_cmd_enabled, true))
continue;
if (strlen(kt->usage) > 20)
space = "\n ";
kdb_printf("%-15.15s %-20s%s%s\n", kt->name,
kt->usage, space, kt->help);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| linux | eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 | 53,716,144,507,530,735,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus
should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a
serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud
vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is
important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is
triggered.
Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions
mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism
(although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply
and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking
any action.
For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then
this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before
the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen.
CVE: CVE-2022-21499
Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
bgp_write_notify (struct peer *peer)
{
int ret, val;
u_char type;
struct stream *s;
/* There should be at least one packet. */
s = stream_fifo_head (peer->obuf);
if (!s)
return 0;
assert (stream_get_endp (s) >= BGP_HEADER_SIZE);
/* Put socket in blocking mode. */
val = fcntl (peer->fd, F_GETFL, 0);
fcntl (peer->fd, F_SETFL, val & ~O_NONBLOCK);
ret = writen (peer->fd, STREAM_DATA (s), stream_get_endp (s));
if (ret <= 0)
{
BGP_EVENT_ADD (peer, TCP_fatal_error);
return 0;
}
/* Retrieve BGP packet type. */
stream_set_getp (s, BGP_MARKER_SIZE + 2);
type = stream_getc (s);
assert (type == BGP_MSG_NOTIFY);
/* Type should be notify. */
peer->notify_out++;
/* Double start timer. */
peer->v_start *= 2;
/* Overflow check. */
if (peer->v_start >= (60 * 2))
peer->v_start = (60 * 2);
BGP_EVENT_ADD (peer, BGP_Stop);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
]
| quagga | 5861739f8c38bc36ea9955e5cb2be2bf2f482d70 | 70,698,109,488,154,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | bgpd: Open option parse errors don't NOTIFY, resulting in abort & DoS
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Errors from bgp_open_option_parse are
detected, and the code will stop processing the OPEN and return. However
it does so without calling bgp_notify_send to send a NOTIFY - which means
the peer FSM doesn't get stopped, and bgp_read will be called again later.
Because it returns, it doesn't go through the code near the end of the
function that removes the current message from the peer input streaam.
Thus the next call to bgp_read will try to parse a half-parsed stream as
if it were a new BGP message, leading to an assert later in the code when
it tries to read stuff that isn't there. Add the required call to
bgp_notify_send before returning.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_as4) Be a bit stricter, check the length field
corresponds to the only value it can be, which is the amount we're going to
read off the stream. And make sure the capability flag gets set, so
callers can know this capability was read, regardless.
(peek_for_as4_capability) Let bgp_capability_as4 do the length check. |
AsyncUDPSocket& getSocket() {
return *socket_;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-703"
]
| mvfst | a67083ff4b8dcbb7ee2839da6338032030d712b0 | 139,624,842,802,262,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Close connection if we derive an extra 1-rtt write cipher
Summary: Fixes CVE-2021-24029
Reviewed By: mjoras, lnicco
Differential Revision: D26613890
fbshipit-source-id: 19bb2be2c731808144e1a074ece313fba11f1945 |
void ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStream::onStreamMaxDurationReached() {
ENVOY_STREAM_LOG(debug, "Stream max duration time reached", *this);
connection_manager_.stats_.named_.downstream_rq_max_duration_reached_.inc();
connection_manager_.doEndStream(*this);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
]
| envoy | 0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c | 292,963,207,476,131,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]> |
static sector_t ext4_bmap(struct address_space *mapping, sector_t block)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
journal_t *journal;
int err;
/*
* We can get here for an inline file via the FIBMAP ioctl
*/
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
return 0;
if (mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY) &&
test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) {
/*
* With delalloc we want to sync the file
* so that we can make sure we allocate
* blocks for file
*/
filemap_write_and_wait(mapping);
}
if (EXT4_JOURNAL(inode) &&
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA)) {
/*
* This is a REALLY heavyweight approach, but the use of
* bmap on dirty files is expected to be extremely rare:
* only if we run lilo or swapon on a freshly made file
* do we expect this to happen.
*
* (bmap requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO so this does not
* represent an unprivileged user DOS attack --- we'd be
* in trouble if mortal users could trigger this path at
* will.)
*
* NB. EXT4_STATE_JDATA is not set on files other than
* regular files. If somebody wants to bmap a directory
* or symlink and gets confused because the buffer
* hasn't yet been flushed to disk, they deserve
* everything they get.
*/
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
journal = EXT4_JOURNAL(inode);
jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal);
err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal);
jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal);
if (err)
return 0;
}
return iomap_bmap(mapping, block, &ext4_iomap_ops);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | ce9f24cccdc019229b70a5c15e2b09ad9c0ab5d1 | 316,743,682,948,340,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | ext4: check journal inode extents more carefully
Currently, system zones just track ranges of block, that are "important"
fs metadata (bitmaps, group descriptors, journal blocks, etc.). This
however complicates how extent tree (or indirect blocks) can be checked
for inodes that actually track such metadata - currently the journal
inode but arguably we should be treating quota files or resize inode
similarly. We cannot run __ext4_ext_check() on such metadata inodes when
loading their extents as that would immediately trigger the validity
checks and so we just hack around that and special-case the journal
inode. This however leads to a situation that a journal inode which has
extent tree of depth at least one can have invalid extent tree that gets
unnoticed until ext4_cache_extents() crashes.
To overcome this limitation, track inode number each system zone belongs
to (0 is used for zones not belonging to any inode). We can then verify
inode number matches the expected one when verifying extent tree and
thus avoid the false errors. With this there's no need to to
special-case journal inode during extent tree checking anymore so remove
it.
Fixes: 0a944e8a6c66 ("ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode")
Reported-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> |
TEST(ParseOperand, ShouldRecognizeNumberLiteral) {
auto resultExpression = parseOperand(BSON("" << 5));
auto constantExpression = dynamic_cast<ExpressionConstant*>(resultExpression.get());
ASSERT_TRUE(constantExpression);
ASSERT_VALUE_EQ(constantExpression->serialize(false), Value(Document{{"$const", 5}}));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
]
| mongo | 0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816 | 14,155,221,077,736,097,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression |
lex(struct scanner *s, union lvalue *val)
{
skip_more_whitespace_and_comments:
/* Skip spaces. */
while (is_space(peek(s)))
if (next(s) == '\n')
return TOK_END_OF_LINE;
/* Skip comments. */
if (chr(s, '#')) {
skip_to_eol(s);
goto skip_more_whitespace_and_comments;
}
/* See if we're done. */
if (eof(s)) return TOK_END_OF_FILE;
/* New token. */
s->token_line = s->line;
s->token_column = s->column;
s->buf_pos = 0;
/* LHS Keysym. */
if (chr(s, '<')) {
while (peek(s) != '>' && !eol(s))
buf_append(s, next(s));
if (!chr(s, '>')) {
scanner_err(s, "unterminated keysym literal");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
if (!buf_append(s, '\0')) {
scanner_err(s, "keysym literal is too long");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
val->string.str = s->buf;
val->string.len = s->buf_pos;
return TOK_LHS_KEYSYM;
}
/* Colon. */
if (chr(s, ':'))
return TOK_COLON;
if (chr(s, '!'))
return TOK_BANG;
if (chr(s, '~'))
return TOK_TILDE;
/* String literal. */
if (chr(s, '\"')) {
while (!eof(s) && !eol(s) && peek(s) != '\"') {
if (chr(s, '\\')) {
uint8_t o;
if (chr(s, '\\')) {
buf_append(s, '\\');
}
else if (chr(s, '"')) {
buf_append(s, '"');
}
else if (chr(s, 'x') || chr(s, 'X')) {
if (hex(s, &o))
buf_append(s, (char) o);
else
scanner_warn(s, "illegal hexadecimal escape sequence in string literal");
}
else if (oct(s, &o)) {
buf_append(s, (char) o);
}
else {
scanner_warn(s, "unknown escape sequence (%c) in string literal", peek(s));
/* Ignore. */
}
} else {
buf_append(s, next(s));
}
}
if (!chr(s, '\"')) {
scanner_err(s, "unterminated string literal");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
if (!buf_append(s, '\0')) {
scanner_err(s, "string literal is too long");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
if (!is_valid_utf8(s->buf, s->buf_pos - 1)) {
scanner_err(s, "string literal is not a valid UTF-8 string");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
val->string.str = s->buf;
val->string.len = s->buf_pos;
return TOK_STRING;
}
/* Identifier or include. */
if (is_alpha(peek(s)) || peek(s) == '_') {
s->buf_pos = 0;
while (is_alnum(peek(s)) || peek(s) == '_')
buf_append(s, next(s));
if (!buf_append(s, '\0')) {
scanner_err(s, "identifier is too long");
return TOK_ERROR;
}
if (streq(s->buf, "include"))
return TOK_INCLUDE;
val->string.str = s->buf;
val->string.len = s->buf_pos;
return TOK_IDENT;
}
/* Discard rest of line. */
skip_to_eol(s);
scanner_err(s, "unrecognized token");
return TOK_ERROR;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-835"
]
| libxkbcommon | 842e4351c2c97de6051cab6ce36b4a81e709a0e1 | 201,779,090,834,516,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 116 | compose: fix infinite loop in parser on some inputs
The parser would enter an infinite loop if an unterminated keysym
literal occurs at EOF.
Found with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]> |
int cdrom_mode_select(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
const struct cdrom_device_ops *cdo = cdi->ops;
memset(cgc->cmd, 0, sizeof(cgc->cmd));
memset(cgc->buffer, 0, 2);
cgc->cmd[0] = GPCMD_MODE_SELECT_10;
cgc->cmd[1] = 0x10; /* PF */
cgc->cmd[7] = cgc->buflen >> 8;
cgc->cmd[8] = cgc->buflen & 0xff;
cgc->data_direction = CGC_DATA_WRITE;
return cdo->generic_packet(cdi, cgc);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
]
| linux | 9de4ee40547fd315d4a0ed1dd15a2fa3559ad707 | 300,596,598,460,445,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()
This cast is wrong. "cdi->capacity" is an int and "arg" is an unsigned
long. The way the check is written now, if one of the high 32 bits is
set then we could read outside the info->slots[] array.
This bug is pretty old and it predates git.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, MaxMinSortInequalityFirstSortSecond) {
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1 << "b" << 1));
// Run an empty query, sort {b: 1}, max/min arguments.
runQueryFull(BSONObj(),
fromjson("{b: 1}"),
BSONObj(),
0,
0,
BSONObj(),
fromjson("{a: 1, b: 1}"),
fromjson("{a: 2, b: 2}"),
false);
assertNumSolutions(1);
assertSolutionExists(
"{sort: {pattern: {b: 1}, limit: 0, node: {sortKeyGen: {node: "
"{fetch: {node: "
"{ixscan: {filter: null, pattern: {a: 1, b: 1}}}}}}}}}");
} | 0 | []
| mongo | b0ef26c639112b50648a02d969298650fbd402a4 | 340,009,197,622,907,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | SERVER-51083 Reject invalid UTF-8 from $regex match expressions |
int regexp_c_locale(char **u, size_t *len) {
/* Without uselocale, we need to expand character ranges */
int r;
char *s = *u;
size_t s_len, u_len;
if (len == NULL) {
len = &u_len;
s_len = strlen(s);
} else {
s_len = *len;
}
r = fa_expand_char_ranges(s, s_len, u, len);
if (r != 0) {
*u = s;
*len = s_len;
}
if (r < 0)
return -1;
/* Syntax errors will be caught when the result is compiled */
if (r > 0)
return 0;
free(s);
return 1;
} | 0 | []
| augeas | 1a66739c3fc14b3257af5d4a32d0a2a714a7b39d | 131,531,422,041,905,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | * src/transform.c (xread_file): catch failed fopen, e.g. EACCES |
memory_read_privatekey(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session,
const LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_METHOD ** hostkey_method,
void **hostkey_abstract,
const unsigned char *method, int method_len,
const char *privkeyfiledata, size_t privkeyfiledata_len,
const char *passphrase)
{
const LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_METHOD **hostkey_methods_avail =
libssh2_hostkey_methods();
*hostkey_method = NULL;
*hostkey_abstract = NULL;
while(*hostkey_methods_avail && (*hostkey_methods_avail)->name) {
if((*hostkey_methods_avail)->initPEMFromMemory
&& strncmp((*hostkey_methods_avail)->name, (const char *) method,
method_len) == 0) {
*hostkey_method = *hostkey_methods_avail;
break;
}
hostkey_methods_avail++;
}
if(!*hostkey_method) {
return _libssh2_error(session, LIBSSH2_ERROR_METHOD_NONE,
"No handler for specified private key");
}
if((*hostkey_method)->
initPEMFromMemory(session, privkeyfiledata, privkeyfiledata_len,
(unsigned char *) passphrase,
hostkey_abstract)) {
return _libssh2_error(session, LIBSSH2_ERROR_FILE,
"Unable to initialize private key from file");
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| libssh2 | dc109a7f518757741590bb993c0c8412928ccec2 | 55,897,827,482,040,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | Security fixes (#315)
* Bounds checks
Fixes for CVEs
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3863.html
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3856.html
* Packet length bounds check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3855.html
* Response length check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
* Bounds check
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3857.html
* Bounds checking
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
and additional data validation
* Check bounds before reading into buffers
* Bounds checking
CVE
https://www.libssh2.org/CVE-2019-3859.html
* declare SIZE_MAX and UINT_MAX if needed |
static int hci_req_add_le_interleaved_scan(struct hci_request *req,
unsigned long opt)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev;
int ret = 0;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN))
hci_req_add_le_scan_disable(req, false);
hci_req_add_le_passive_scan(req);
switch (hdev->interleave_scan_state) {
case INTERLEAVE_SCAN_ALLOWLIST:
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "next state: allowlist");
hdev->interleave_scan_state = INTERLEAVE_SCAN_NO_FILTER;
break;
case INTERLEAVE_SCAN_NO_FILTER:
bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "next state: no filter");
hdev->interleave_scan_state = INTERLEAVE_SCAN_ALLOWLIST;
break;
case INTERLEAVE_SCAN_NONE:
BT_ERR("unexpected error");
ret = -1;
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
]
| linux | e2cb6b891ad2b8caa9131e3be70f45243df82a80 | 118,057,993,764,912,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | bluetooth: eliminate the potential race condition when removing the HCI controller
There is a possible race condition vulnerability between issuing a HCI
command and removing the cont. Specifically, functions hci_req_sync()
and hci_dev_do_close() can race each other like below:
thread-A in hci_req_sync() | thread-B in hci_dev_do_close()
| hci_req_sync_lock(hdev);
test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags); |
... | test_and_clear_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags)
hci_req_sync_lock(hdev); |
|
In this commit we alter the sequence in function hci_req_sync(). Hence,
the thread-A cannot issue th.
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Fixes: 7c6a329e4447 ("[Bluetooth] Fix regression from using default link policy")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
vc4_cl_lookup_bos(struct drm_device *dev,
struct drm_file *file_priv,
struct vc4_exec_info *exec)
{
struct drm_vc4_submit_cl *args = exec->args;
uint32_t *handles;
int ret = 0;
int i;
exec->bo_count = args->bo_handle_count;
if (!exec->bo_count) {
/* See comment on bo_index for why we have to check
* this.
*/
DRM_ERROR("Rendering requires BOs to validate\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
exec->bo = drm_calloc_large(exec->bo_count,
sizeof(struct drm_gem_cma_object *));
if (!exec->bo) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to allocate validated BO pointers\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
handles = drm_malloc_ab(exec->bo_count, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (!handles) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
DRM_ERROR("Failed to allocate incoming GEM handles\n");
goto fail;
}
if (copy_from_user(handles,
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)args->bo_handles,
exec->bo_count * sizeof(uint32_t))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
DRM_ERROR("Failed to copy in GEM handles\n");
goto fail;
}
spin_lock(&file_priv->table_lock);
for (i = 0; i < exec->bo_count; i++) {
struct drm_gem_object *bo = idr_find(&file_priv->object_idr,
handles[i]);
if (!bo) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to look up GEM BO %d: %d\n",
i, handles[i]);
ret = -EINVAL;
spin_unlock(&file_priv->table_lock);
goto fail;
}
drm_gem_object_reference(bo);
exec->bo[i] = (struct drm_gem_cma_object *)bo;
}
spin_unlock(&file_priv->table_lock);
fail:
drm_free_large(handles);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | 0f2ff82e11c86c05d051cae32b58226392d33bbf | 28,257,515,780,899,937,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 61 | drm/vc4: Fix an integer overflow in temporary allocation layout.
We copy the unvalidated ioctl arguments from the user into kernel
temporary memory to run the validation from, to avoid a race where the
user updates the unvalidate contents in between validating them and
copying them into the validated BO.
However, in setting up the layout of the kernel side, we failed to
check one of the additions (the roundup() for shader_rec_offset)
against integer overflow, allowing a nearly MAX_UINT value of
bin_cl_size to cause us to under-allocate the temporary space that we
then copy_from_user into.
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <[email protected]>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.") |
void vrend_set_single_ssbo(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t shader_type,
uint32_t index,
uint32_t offset, uint32_t length,
uint32_t handle)
{
struct vrend_ssbo *ssbo = &ctx->sub->ssbo[shader_type][index];
struct vrend_resource *res;
if (!has_feature(feat_ssbo))
return;
if (handle) {
res = vrend_renderer_ctx_res_lookup(ctx, handle);
if (!res) {
vrend_report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_RESOURCE, handle);
return;
}
ssbo->res = res;
ssbo->buffer_offset = offset;
ssbo->buffer_size = length;
ctx->sub->ssbo_used_mask[shader_type] |= (1u << index);
} else {
ssbo->res = 0;
ssbo->buffer_offset = 0;
ssbo->buffer_size = 0;
ctx->sub->ssbo_used_mask[shader_type] &= ~(1u << index);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| virglrenderer | 95e581fd181b213c2ed7cdc63f2abc03eaaa77ec | 5,229,854,211,678,195,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | vrend: Add test to resource OOB write and fix it
v2: Also check that no depth != 1 has been send when none is due
Closes: #250
Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chia-I Wu <[email protected]> |
parseMaxPDU(DUL_MAXLENGTH * max, unsigned char *buf,
unsigned long *itemLength, unsigned long availData)
{
// We want to read 8 bytes of data, is there enough data?
if (availData < 8)
return makeLengthError("Max PDU", availData, 8);
max->type = *buf++;
max->rsv1 = *buf++;
EXTRACT_SHORT_BIG(buf, max->length);
buf += 2;
EXTRACT_LONG_BIG(buf, max->maxLength);
*itemLength = 2 + 2 + max->length;
if (max->length != 4)
DCMNET_WARN("Invalid length (" << max->length << ") for maximum length item, must be 4");
// Is there less data than the length field claims there is?
if (availData - 4 < max->length)
return makeLengthError("Max PDU", availData, 0, max->length);
DCMNET_TRACE("Maximum PDU Length: " << (unsigned long)max->maxLength);
return EC_Normal;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
]
| dcmtk | a9697dfeb672b0b9412c00c7d36d801e27ec85cb | 163,177,917,272,488,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fixed poss. NULL pointer dereference/double free.
Thanks to Jinsheng Ba <[email protected]> for the report and some patches. |
void mddev_unlock(struct mddev *mddev)
{
if (mddev->to_remove) {
/* These cannot be removed under reconfig_mutex as
* an access to the files will try to take reconfig_mutex
* while holding the file unremovable, which leads to
* a deadlock.
* So hold set sysfs_active while the remove in happeing,
* and anything else which might set ->to_remove or my
* otherwise change the sysfs namespace will fail with
* -EBUSY if sysfs_active is still set.
* We set sysfs_active under reconfig_mutex and elsewhere
* test it under the same mutex to ensure its correct value
* is seen.
*/
struct attribute_group *to_remove = mddev->to_remove;
mddev->to_remove = NULL;
mddev->sysfs_active = 1;
mutex_unlock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex);
if (mddev->kobj.sd) {
if (to_remove != &md_redundancy_group)
sysfs_remove_group(&mddev->kobj, to_remove);
if (mddev->pers == NULL ||
mddev->pers->sync_request == NULL) {
sysfs_remove_group(&mddev->kobj, &md_redundancy_group);
if (mddev->sysfs_action)
sysfs_put(mddev->sysfs_action);
mddev->sysfs_action = NULL;
}
}
mddev->sysfs_active = 0;
} else
mutex_unlock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex);
/* As we've dropped the mutex we need a spinlock to
* make sure the thread doesn't disappear
*/
spin_lock(&pers_lock);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
spin_unlock(&pers_lock);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
]
| linux | b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 | 110,179,796,029,992,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]> |
rb_str_aref(str, indx)
VALUE str;
VALUE indx;
{
long idx;
switch (TYPE(indx)) {
case T_FIXNUM:
idx = FIX2LONG(indx);
num_index:
if (idx < 0) {
idx = RSTRING(str)->len + idx;
}
if (idx < 0 || RSTRING(str)->len <= idx) {
return Qnil;
}
return INT2FIX(RSTRING(str)->ptr[idx] & 0xff);
case T_REGEXP:
return rb_str_subpat(str, indx, 0);
case T_STRING:
if (rb_str_index(str, indx, 0) != -1)
return rb_str_dup(indx);
return Qnil;
default:
/* check if indx is Range */
{
long beg, len;
VALUE tmp;
switch (rb_range_beg_len(indx, &beg, &len, RSTRING(str)->len, 0)) {
case Qfalse:
break;
case Qnil:
return Qnil;
default:
tmp = rb_str_substr(str, beg, len);
OBJ_INFECT(tmp, indx);
return tmp;
}
}
idx = NUM2LONG(indx);
goto num_index;
}
return Qnil; /* not reached */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
]
| ruby | e926ef5233cc9f1035d3d51068abe9df8b5429da | 197,023,519,829,661,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | * random.c (rb_genrand_int32, rb_genrand_real), intern.h: Export.
* string.c (rb_str_tmp_new), intern.h: New function.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_1_8@16014 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
explicit CollectiveBcastSendV2OpKernel(OpKernelConstruction* c)
: CollectiveOpV2Kernel(c) {
const bool is_source = true;
name_ = strings::StrCat(name(), ": Broadcast(", is_source, ")");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
]
| tensorflow | ca38dab9d3ee66c5de06f11af9a4b1200da5ef75 | 121,060,510,396,229,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix undefined behavior in CollectiveReduceV2 and others
We should not call done after it's moved.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 400838185
Change-Id: Ifc979740054b8f8c6f4d50acc89472fe60c4fdb1 |
parameter_brace_substring (varname, value, ind, substr, quoted, flags)
char *varname, *value;
int ind;
char *substr;
int quoted, flags;
{
intmax_t e1, e2;
int vtype, r, starsub;
char *temp, *val, *tt, *oname;
SHELL_VAR *v;
if (value == 0 && ((varname[0] != '@' && varname[0] != '*') || varname[1]))
return ((char *)NULL);
oname = this_command_name;
this_command_name = varname;
vtype = get_var_and_type (varname, value, ind, quoted, flags, &v, &val);
if (vtype == -1)
{
this_command_name = oname;
return ((char *)NULL);
}
starsub = vtype & VT_STARSUB;
vtype &= ~VT_STARSUB;
r = verify_substring_values (v, val, substr, vtype, &e1, &e2);
this_command_name = oname;
if (r <= 0)
{
if (vtype == VT_VARIABLE)
FREE (val);
return ((r == 0) ? &expand_param_error : (char *)NULL);
}
switch (vtype)
{
case VT_VARIABLE:
case VT_ARRAYMEMBER:
#if defined (HANDLE_MULTIBYTE)
if (MB_CUR_MAX > 1)
tt = mb_substring (val, e1, e2);
else
#endif
tt = substring (val, e1, e2);
if (vtype == VT_VARIABLE)
FREE (val);
if (quoted & (Q_DOUBLE_QUOTES|Q_HERE_DOCUMENT))
temp = quote_string (tt);
else
temp = tt ? quote_escapes (tt) : (char *)NULL;
FREE (tt);
break;
case VT_POSPARMS:
tt = pos_params (varname, e1, e2, quoted);
if ((quoted & (Q_DOUBLE_QUOTES|Q_HERE_DOCUMENT)) == 0)
{
temp = tt ? quote_escapes (tt) : (char *)NULL;
FREE (tt);
}
else
temp = tt;
break;
#if defined (ARRAY_VARS)
case VT_ARRAYVAR:
if (assoc_p (v))
/* we convert to list and take first e2 elements starting at e1th
element -- officially undefined for now */
temp = assoc_subrange (assoc_cell (v), e1, e2, starsub, quoted);
else
/* We want E2 to be the number of elements desired (arrays can be sparse,
so verify_substring_values just returns the numbers specified and we
rely on array_subrange to understand how to deal with them). */
temp = array_subrange (array_cell (v), e1, e2, starsub, quoted);
/* array_subrange now calls array_quote_escapes as appropriate, so the
caller no longer needs to. */
break;
#endif
default:
temp = (char *)NULL;
}
return temp;
} | 0 | []
| bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 202,903,533,609,240,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 86 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
int crypto_has_ahash(const char *alg_name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return crypto_type_has_alg(alg_name, &crypto_ahash_type, type, mask);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
]
| linux | ef0579b64e93188710d48667cb5e014926af9f1b | 192,711,503,507,643,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | crypto: ahash - Fix EINPROGRESS notification callback
The ahash API modifies the request's callback function in order
to clean up after itself in some corner cases (unaligned final
and missing finup).
When the request is complete ahash will restore the original
callback and everything is fine. However, when the request gets
an EBUSY on a full queue, an EINPROGRESS callback is made while
the request is still ongoing.
In this case the ahash API will incorrectly call its own callback.
This patch fixes the problem by creating a temporary request
object on the stack which is used to relay EINPROGRESS back to
the original completion function.
This patch also adds code to preserve the original flags value.
Fixes: ab6bf4e5e5e4 ("crypto: hash - Fix the pointer voodoo in...")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
explicit AddOpsRewriteStage(const GraphOptimizerContext& ctx,
const ArithmeticOptimizerContext& ctx_ext)
: ArithmeticNodesGroupOptimizerStage("AddOpsRewrite", ctx, ctx_ext) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
]
| tensorflow | e6340f0665d53716ef3197ada88936c2a5f7a2d3 | 21,479,876,630,254,176,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Handle a special grappler case resulting in crash.
It might happen that a malformed input could be used to trick Grappler into trying to optimize a node with no inputs. This, in turn, would produce a null pointer dereference and a segfault.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 369242852
Change-Id: I2e5cbe7aec243d34a6d60220ac8ac9b16f136f6b |
RecordDisableContext(RecordContextPtr pContext)
{
RecordClientsAndProtocolPtr pRCAP;
int i;
if (!pContext->pRecordingClient)
return;
if (!pContext->pRecordingClient->clientGone) {
RecordAProtocolElement(pContext, NULL, XRecordEndOfData, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
RecordFlushReplyBuffer(pContext, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
}
/* Re-enable request processing on this connection. */
AttendClient(pContext->pRecordingClient);
for (pRCAP = pContext->pListOfRCAP; pRCAP; pRCAP = pRCAP->pNextRCAP) {
RecordUninstallHooks(pRCAP, 0);
}
pContext->pRecordingClient = NULL;
/* move the newly disabled context to the rear part of ppAllContexts,
* where all the disabled contexts are
*/
i = RecordFindContextOnAllContexts(pContext);
assert(i != -1);
assert(i < numEnabledContexts);
if (i != (numEnabledContexts - 1)) {
ppAllContexts[i] = ppAllContexts[numEnabledContexts - 1];
ppAllContexts[numEnabledContexts - 1] = pContext;
}
--numEnabledContexts;
assert(numEnabledContexts >= 0);
} /* RecordDisableContext */ | 0 | [
"CWE-191"
]
| xserver | 2902b78535ecc6821cc027351818b28a5c7fdbdc | 200,653,983,551,854,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Fix XRecordRegisterClients() Integer underflow
CVE-2020-14362 ZDI-CAN-11574
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Herrb <[email protected]> |
xsltDefaultProcessOneNode(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xsltStackElemPtr params) {
xmlNodePtr copy;
xmlNodePtr delete = NULL, cur;
int nbchild = 0, oldSize;
int childno = 0, oldPos;
xsltTemplatePtr template;
CHECK_STOPPED;
/*
* Handling of leaves
*/
switch (node->type) {
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
break;
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy CDATA %s\n",
node->content));
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, node, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: cdata copy failed\n");
}
return;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (node->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
return;
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
node->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, node, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
return;
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
cur = node->children;
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type != XML_TEXT_NODE))
cur = cur->next;
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: no text for attribute\n");
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
cur->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, node,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
}
return;
default:
return;
}
/*
* Handling of Elements: first pass, cleanup and counting
*/
cur = node->children;
while (cur != NULL) {
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
nbchild++;
break;
case XML_DTD_NODE:
/* Unlink the DTD, it's still reachable using doc->intSubset */
if (cur->next != NULL)
cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL)
cur->prev->next = cur->next;
break;
default:
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: skipping node type %d\n",
cur->type));
#endif
delete = cur;
}
cur = cur->next;
if (delete != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
xmlFreeNode(delete);
delete = NULL;
}
}
if (delete != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: removing ignorable blank node\n"));
#endif
xmlUnlinkNode(delete);
xmlFreeNode(delete);
delete = NULL;
}
/*
* Handling of Elements: second pass, actual processing
*
* Note that params are passed to the next template. This matches
* XSLT 2.0 behavior but doesn't conform to XSLT 1.0.
*/
oldSize = ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize;
oldPos = ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition;
cur = node->children;
while (cur != NULL) {
childno++;
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
xsltProcessOneNode(ctxt, cur, params);
break;
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: applying template for CDATA %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
} else /* if (ctxt->mode == NULL) */ {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy CDATA %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: cdata copy failed\n");
}
}
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: applying template for text %s\n",
cur->content));
#endif
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
} else /* if (ctxt->mode == NULL) */ {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->content == NULL) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy empty text\n"));
} else {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: copy text %s\n",
cur->content));
}
#endif
copy = xsltCopyText(ctxt, ctxt->insert, cur, 0);
if (copy == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: text copy failed\n");
}
}
break;
case XML_PI_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
template = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, cur, NULL);
if (template) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
if (cur->type == XML_PI_NODE) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: template found for PI %s\n",
cur->name));
} else if (cur->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_PROCESS_NODE,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltDefaultProcessOneNode: template found for comment\n"));
}
#endif
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = nbchild;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = childno;
/*
* Instantiate the xsl:template.
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, cur, template->content,
template, params);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = oldSize;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = oldPos;
} | 0 | []
| libxslt | e03553605b45c88f0b4b2980adfbbb8f6fca2fd6 | 52,886,267,465,473,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 235 | Fix security framework bypass
xsltCheckRead and xsltCheckWrite return -1 in case of error but callers
don't check for this condition and allow access. With a specially
crafted URL, xsltCheckRead could be tricked into returning an error
because of a supposedly invalid URL that would still be loaded
succesfully later on.
Fixes #12.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report. |
static void handle_RMD(ctrl_t *ctrl, char *arg)
{
handle_DELE(ctrl, arg);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
]
| uftpd | 0fb2c031ce0ace07cc19cd2cb2143c4b5a63c9dd | 286,084,565,394,783,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | FTP: Fix buffer overflow in PORT parser, reported by Aaron Esau
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <[email protected]> |
static void b43_short_slot_timing_disable(struct b43_wldev *dev)
{
b43_set_slot_time(dev, 20);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-134"
]
| wireless | 9538cbaab6e8b8046039b4b2eb6c9d614dc782bd | 120,991,387,906,729,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | b43: stop format string leaking into error msgs
The module parameter "fwpostfix" is userspace controllable, unfiltered,
and is used to define the firmware filename. b43_do_request_fw() populates
ctx->errors[] on error, containing the firmware filename. b43err()
parses its arguments as a format string. For systems with b43 hardware,
this could lead to a uid-0 to ring-0 escalation.
CVE-2013-2852
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> |
static void tcf_proto_put(struct tcf_proto *tp, bool rtnl_held,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tp->refcnt))
tcf_proto_destroy(tp, rtnl_held, true, extack);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
]
| linux | 04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5 | 90,178,259,932,599,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter()
Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label,
we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again,
or risk use-after-free as in [1]
For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain()
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945
CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline]
tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386
tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline]
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059
RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1944:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline]
qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941
qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 3609:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754
slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline]
kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106
qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109
tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238
tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0
head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline]
new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004
___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787
devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618
inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278
inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698
veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250
zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline]
zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline]
zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline]
zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline]
unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561
unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606
unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638
exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178
__mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114
mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135
exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline]
do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> |
size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
{
size_t ret = 0;
if (s->s3 != NULL)
{
ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (count > ret)
count = ret;
memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
}
return ret;
} | 0 | []
| openssl | ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516 | 98,897,796,779,007,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Add Next Protocol Negotiation. |
int ext4_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
handle_t *handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
int ret = 0, started = 0;
unsigned max_blocks = bh_result->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
int dio_credits;
if (create && !handle) {
/* Direct IO write... */
if (max_blocks > DIO_MAX_BLOCKS)
max_blocks = DIO_MAX_BLOCKS;
dio_credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, dio_credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
started = 1;
}
ret = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, iblock, max_blocks, bh_result,
create ? EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE : 0);
if (ret > 0) {
bh_result->b_size = (ret << inode->i_blkbits);
ret = 0;
}
if (started)
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 330,215,994,617,483,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> |
evbuffer_expand(struct evbuffer *buf, size_t datlen)
{
struct evbuffer_chain *chain;
EVBUFFER_LOCK(buf);
chain = evbuffer_expand_singlechain(buf, datlen);
EVBUFFER_UNLOCK(buf);
return chain ? 0 : -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
]
| libevent | 20d6d4458bee5d88bda1511c225c25b2d3198d6c | 271,237,291,003,032,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.0
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into. |
static inline int dev_requeue_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct Qdisc *q)
{
if (unlikely(skb->next))
dev->gso_skb = skb;
else
q->ops->requeue(skb, q);
netif_schedule(dev);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
]
| linux-2.6 | 2ba2506ca7ca62c56edaa334b0fe61eb5eab6ab0 | 223,019,746,771,586,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | [NET]: Add preemption point in qdisc_run
The qdisc_run loop is currently unbounded and runs entirely in a
softirq. This is bad as it may create an unbounded softirq run.
This patch fixes this by calling need_resched and breaking out if
necessary.
It also adds a break out if the jiffies value changes since that would
indicate we've been transmitting for too long which starves other
softirqs.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
int ssl2_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
return (1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
]
| openssl | 86f8fb0e344d62454f8daf3e15236b2b59210756 | 177,812,147,112,798,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix reachable assert in SSLv2 servers.
This assert is reachable for servers that support SSLv2 and export ciphers.
Therefore, such servers can be DoSed by sending a specially crafted
SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY.
Also fix s2_srvr.c to error out early if the key lengths are malformed.
These lengths are sent unencrypted, so this does not introduce an oracle.
CVE-2015-0293
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper of
the OpenSSL development team.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]> |
add_tree_first_ipv4(const u_char *data, const int len, const int datalink)
{
tcpr_tree_t *newnode, *findnode;
const u_char *packet = data;
uint32_t _U_ vlan_offset;
uint32_t pkt_len = len;
uint16_t ether_type;
uint32_t l2offset;
ipv4_hdr_t ip_hdr;
uint32_t l2len;
int res;
assert(packet);
res = get_l2len_protocol(packet,
pkt_len,
datalink,
ðer_type,
&l2len,
&l2offset,
&vlan_offset);
if (res == -1 || len < (TCPR_ETH_H + TCPR_IPV4_H)) {
errx(-1, "Capture length %d too small for IPv4 parsing", len);
return;
}
packet += l2offset;
l2len -= l2offset;
pkt_len -= l2offset;
/*
* first add/find the source IP/client
*/
newnode = new_tree();
/* prevent issues with byte alignment, must memcpy */
memcpy(&ip_hdr, (packet + TCPR_ETH_H), TCPR_IPV4_H);
/* copy over the source ip, and values to guarantee this a client */
newnode->family = AF_INET;
newnode->u.ip = ip_hdr.ip_src.s_addr;
newnode->type = DIR_CLIENT;
newnode->client_cnt = 1000;
findnode = RB_FIND(tcpr_data_tree_s, &treeroot, newnode);
/* if we didn't find it, add it to the tree, else free it */
if (findnode == NULL) {
RB_INSERT(tcpr_data_tree_s, &treeroot, newnode);
} else {
safe_free(newnode);
}
/*
* now add/find the destination IP/server
*/
newnode = new_tree();
memcpy(&ip_hdr, (packet + TCPR_ETH_H), TCPR_IPV4_H);
newnode->family = AF_INET;
newnode->u.ip = ip_hdr.ip_dst.s_addr;
newnode->type = DIR_SERVER;
newnode->server_cnt = 1000;
findnode = RB_FIND(tcpr_data_tree_s, &treeroot, newnode);
if (findnode == NULL) {
RB_INSERT(tcpr_data_tree_s, &treeroot, newnode);
} else {
safe_free(newnode);
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
]
| tcpreplay | 46cf964a7db636da76abeebf10482acf6f682a87 | 100,694,689,434,345,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | Bug #677 - fixes for tcpprep tree |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_INIT_ARRAY_SPEC_VAR_CONST_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
zend_op *opline = EX(opline);
array_init(&EX_T(opline->result.u.var).tmp_var);
if (IS_VAR == IS_UNUSED) {
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
#if 0 || IS_VAR != IS_UNUSED
} else {
return ZEND_ADD_ARRAY_ELEMENT_SPEC_VAR_CONST_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS_PASSTHRU);
#endif
}
} | 0 | []
| php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 312,607,084,606,594,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus |
srtp_protect_aead (srtp_ctx_t *ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream,
void *rtp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_len)
{
srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t*)rtp_hdr;
uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */
unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */
xtd_seq_num_t est; /* estimated xtd_seq_num_t of *hdr */
int delta; /* delta of local pkt idx and that in hdr */
err_status_t status;
int tag_len;
v128_t iv;
unsigned int aad_len;
debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_protect_aead", NULL);
/*
* update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we
* didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call
* the event handler if we hit either.
*/
switch (key_limit_update(stream->limit)) {
case key_event_normal:
break;
case key_event_hard_limit:
srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit);
return err_status_key_expired;
case key_event_soft_limit:
default:
srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit);
break;
}
/* get tag length from stream */
tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth);
/*
* find starting point for encryption and length of data to be
* encrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header
* extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc,
* if any are present
*/
enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc;
if (hdr->x == 1) {
srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t*)enc_start;
enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1);
}
if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start < (uint8_t*)hdr + (*pkt_octet_len - tag_len)))
return err_status_parse_err;
enc_octet_len = (unsigned int)(*pkt_octet_len -
((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr));
/*
* estimate the packet index using the start of the replay window
* and the sequence number from the header
*/
delta = rdbx_estimate_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, &est, ntohs(hdr->seq));
status = rdbx_check(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta);
if (status) {
if (status != err_status_replay_fail || !stream->allow_repeat_tx) {
return status; /* we've been asked to reuse an index */
}
} else {
rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta);
}
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %08x%08x",
high32(est), low32(est));
#else
debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %016llx", est);
#endif
/*
* AEAD uses a new IV formation method
*/
srtp_calc_aead_iv(stream, &iv, &est, hdr);
status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt);
if (status) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
/* shift est, put into network byte order */
#ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH
est = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) |
(low32(est) >> 16),
low32(est) << 16));
#else
est = be64_to_cpu(est << 16);
#endif
/*
* Set the AAD over the RTP header
*/
aad_len = (uint8_t *)enc_start - (uint8_t *)hdr;
status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, aad_len);
if (status) {
return ( err_status_cipher_fail);
}
/* Encrypt the payload */
status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtp_cipher,
(uint8_t*)enc_start, &enc_octet_len);
if (status) {
return err_status_cipher_fail;
}
/*
* If we're doing GCM, we need to get the tag
* and append that to the output
*/
status = cipher_get_tag(stream->rtp_cipher,
(uint8_t*)enc_start+enc_octet_len, &tag_len);
if (status) {
return ( err_status_cipher_fail);
}
enc_octet_len += tag_len;
/* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag */
*pkt_octet_len += tag_len;
return err_status_ok;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
]
| libsrtp | be95365fbb4788b688cab7af61c65b7989055fb4 | 88,340,226,123,085,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 121 | Apply a7216c19582827cdbd5cacce5618db0b6be8d851 to 1.5.x throttle |
TEST_F(OAuth2Test, OAuthErrorQueryString) {
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl request_headers{
{Http::Headers::get().Path.get(), "/_oauth?error=someerrorcode"},
{Http::Headers::get().Host.get(), "traffic.example.com"},
{Http::Headers::get().Method.get(), Http::Headers::get().MethodValues.Get},
};
Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl response_headers{
{Http::Headers::get().Status.get(), "401"},
{Http::Headers::get().ContentLength.get(), "18"}, // unauthorizedBodyMessage()
{Http::Headers::get().ContentType.get(), "text/plain"},
};
EXPECT_CALL(*validator_, setParams(_, _));
EXPECT_CALL(*validator_, isValid()).WillOnce(Return(false));
EXPECT_CALL(decoder_callbacks_, encodeHeaders_(HeaderMapEqualRef(&response_headers), false));
EXPECT_CALL(decoder_callbacks_, encodeData(_, true));
EXPECT_EQ(Http::FilterHeadersStatus::StopIteration,
filter_->decodeHeaders(request_headers, false));
EXPECT_EQ(scope_.counterFromString("test.oauth_failure").value(), 1);
EXPECT_EQ(scope_.counterFromString("test.oauth_success").value(), 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
]
| envoy | 7ffda4e809dec74449ebc330cebb9d2f4ab61360 | 97,175,582,113,237,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | oauth2: do not blindly accept requests with a token in the Authorization headera (781)
The logic was broken because it assumed an additional call would be
performed to the auth server, which isn't the case. Per the filter
documentation, a request is only considered subsequently authenticated
if there's valid cookie that was set after the access token was received
from the auth server:
https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/configuration/http/http_filters/oauth2_filter
More info about how to validate an access token (which we don't do, per
above):
https://www.oauth.com/oauth2-servers/token-introspection-endpoint/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662
Also fix the fact that ee shouldn't be calling continueDecoding() after
decoder_callbacks_->encodeHeaders().
Signed-off-by: Raul Gutierrez Segales <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <[email protected]> |
repinfo_copy_rrsets(struct reply_info* dest, struct reply_info* from,
struct regional* region)
{
size_t i, s;
struct packed_rrset_data* fd, *dd;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* fk, *dk;
for(i=0; i<dest->rrset_count; i++) {
fk = from->rrsets[i];
dk = dest->rrsets[i];
fd = (struct packed_rrset_data*)fk->entry.data;
dk->entry.hash = fk->entry.hash;
dk->rk = fk->rk;
if(region) {
dk->id = fk->id;
dk->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init(region,
fk->rk.dname, fk->rk.dname_len);
} else
dk->rk.dname = (uint8_t*)memdup(fk->rk.dname,
fk->rk.dname_len);
if(!dk->rk.dname)
return 0;
s = packed_rrset_sizeof(fd);
if(region)
dd = (struct packed_rrset_data*)regional_alloc_init(
region, fd, s);
else dd = (struct packed_rrset_data*)memdup(fd, s);
if(!dd)
return 0;
packed_rrset_ptr_fixup(dd);
dk->entry.data = (void*)dd;
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| unbound | 6c3a0b54ed8ace93d5b5ca7b8078dc87e75cd640 | 132,811,705,259,801,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | - Fix Out of Bound Write Compressed Names in rdata_copy(),
reported by X41 D-Sec. |
void Downstream::set_request_downstream_host(const StringRef &host) {
request_downstream_host_ = host;
} | 0 | []
| nghttp2 | 319d5ab1c6d916b6b8a0d85b2ae3f01b3ad04f2c | 166,039,217,095,061,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | nghttpx: Fix request stall
Fix request stall if backend connection is reused and buffer is full. |
S_invlist_previous_index(SV* const invlist)
{
/* Returns cached index of previous search */
PERL_ARGS_ASSERT_INVLIST_PREVIOUS_INDEX;
return *get_invlist_previous_index_addr(invlist);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
]
| perl5 | 43b2f4ef399e2fd7240b4eeb0658686ad95f8e62 | 71,281,672,501,605,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | regcomp.c: Convert some strchr to memchr
This allows things to work properly in the face of embedded NULs.
See the branch merge message for more information. |
u32 __tcp_select_window(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* MSS for the peer's data. Previous versions used mss_clamp
* here. I don't know if the value based on our guesses
* of peer's MSS is better for the performance. It's more correct
* but may be worse for the performance because of rcv_mss
* fluctuations. --SAW 1998/11/1
*/
int mss = icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss;
int free_space = tcp_space(sk);
int allowed_space = tcp_full_space(sk);
int full_space = min_t(int, tp->window_clamp, allowed_space);
int window;
if (unlikely(mss > full_space)) {
mss = full_space;
if (mss <= 0)
return 0;
}
if (free_space < (full_space >> 1)) {
icsk->icsk_ack.quick = 0;
if (tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
tp->rcv_ssthresh = min(tp->rcv_ssthresh,
4U * tp->advmss);
/* free_space might become our new window, make sure we don't
* increase it due to wscale.
*/
free_space = round_down(free_space, 1 << tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale);
/* if free space is less than mss estimate, or is below 1/16th
* of the maximum allowed, try to move to zero-window, else
* tcp_clamp_window() will grow rcv buf up to tcp_rmem[2], and
* new incoming data is dropped due to memory limits.
* With large window, mss test triggers way too late in order
* to announce zero window in time before rmem limit kicks in.
*/
if (free_space < (allowed_space >> 4) || free_space < mss)
return 0;
}
if (free_space > tp->rcv_ssthresh)
free_space = tp->rcv_ssthresh;
/* Don't do rounding if we are using window scaling, since the
* scaled window will not line up with the MSS boundary anyway.
*/
if (tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale) {
window = free_space;
/* Advertise enough space so that it won't get scaled away.
* Import case: prevent zero window announcement if
* 1<<rcv_wscale > mss.
*/
window = ALIGN(window, (1 << tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale));
} else {
window = tp->rcv_wnd;
/* Get the largest window that is a nice multiple of mss.
* Window clamp already applied above.
* If our current window offering is within 1 mss of the
* free space we just keep it. This prevents the divide
* and multiply from happening most of the time.
* We also don't do any window rounding when the free space
* is too small.
*/
if (window <= free_space - mss || window > free_space)
window = rounddown(free_space, mss);
else if (mss == full_space &&
free_space > window + (full_space >> 1))
window = free_space;
}
return window;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
]
| net | 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff | 27,062,373,953,850,233,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 77 | tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static DnsStream *dns_stream_free(DnsStream *s) {
DnsPacket *p;
Iterator i;
assert(s);
dns_stream_stop(s);
if (s->server && s->server->stream == s)
s->server->stream = NULL;
if (s->manager) {
LIST_REMOVE(streams, s->manager->dns_streams, s);
s->manager->n_dns_streams--;
}
#if ENABLE_DNS_OVER_TLS
if (s->encrypted)
dnstls_stream_free(s);
#endif
ORDERED_SET_FOREACH(p, s->write_queue, i)
dns_packet_unref(ordered_set_remove(s->write_queue, p));
dns_packet_unref(s->write_packet);
dns_packet_unref(s->read_packet);
dns_server_unref(s->server);
ordered_set_free(s->write_queue);
return mfree(s);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
]
| systemd | d973d94dec349fb676fdd844f6fe2ada3538f27c | 235,641,531,743,469,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | resolved: pin stream while calling callbacks for it
These callbacks might unref the stream, but we still have to access it,
let's hence ref it explicitly.
Maybe fixes: #10725 |
static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *dev,
void __user *useraddr)
{
struct ethtool_rxnfc info;
const struct ethtool_ops *ops = dev->ethtool_ops;
int ret;
void *rule_buf = NULL;
if (!ops->get_rxnfc)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (copy_from_user(&info, useraddr, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.cmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) {
if (info.rule_cnt > 0) {
rule_buf = kmalloc(info.rule_cnt * sizeof(u32),
GFP_USER);
if (!rule_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
ret = ops->get_rxnfc(dev, &info, rule_buf);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_out;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(useraddr, &info, sizeof(info)))
goto err_out;
if (rule_buf) {
useraddr += offsetof(struct ethtool_rxnfc, rule_locs);
if (copy_to_user(useraddr, rule_buf,
info.rule_cnt * sizeof(u32)))
goto err_out;
}
ret = 0;
err_out:
kfree(rule_buf);
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190"
]
| linux-2.6 | db048b69037e7fa6a7d9e95a1271a50dc08ae233 | 256,352,693,318,403,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | ethtool: Fix potential kernel buffer overflow in ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL
On a 32-bit machine, info.rule_cnt >= 0x40000000 leads to integer
overflow and the buffer may be smaller than needed. Since
ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL is unprivileged, this can presumably be used for at
least denial of service.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
dt_lite_to_s(VALUE self)
{
return strftimev("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%:z", self, set_tmx);
} | 0 | []
| date | 3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0 | 70,650,362,064,189,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301 |
static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
audit_inode_child(inode, dentry, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE);
fsnotify(inode, FS_CREATE, dentry->d_inode, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_INODE, dentry->d_name.name, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
]
| linux | 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e | 69,434,350,152,555,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
xmlBufResize(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t size)
{
unsigned int newSize;
xmlChar* rebuf = NULL;
size_t start_buf;
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error))
return(0);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE) return(0);
if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_BOUNDED) {
/*
* Used to provide parsing limits
*/
if (size >= XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) {
xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "buffer error: text too long\n");
return(0);
}
}
/* Don't resize if we don't have to */
if (size < buf->size)
return 1;
/* figure out new size */
switch (buf->alloc){
case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO:
case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_DOUBLEIT:
/*take care of empty case*/
newSize = (buf->size ? buf->size*2 : size + 10);
while (size > newSize) {
if (newSize > UINT_MAX / 2) {
xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
return 0;
}
newSize *= 2;
}
break;
case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_EXACT:
newSize = size+10;
break;
case XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_HYBRID:
if (buf->use < BASE_BUFFER_SIZE)
newSize = size;
else {
newSize = buf->size * 2;
while (size > newSize) {
if (newSize > UINT_MAX / 2) {
xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
return 0;
}
newSize *= 2;
}
}
break;
default:
newSize = size+10;
break;
}
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) && (buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
start_buf = buf->content - buf->contentIO;
if (start_buf > newSize) {
/* move data back to start */
memmove(buf->contentIO, buf->content, buf->use);
buf->content = buf->contentIO;
buf->content[buf->use] = 0;
buf->size += start_buf;
} else {
rebuf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf->contentIO, start_buf + newSize);
if (rebuf == NULL) {
xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
return 0;
}
buf->contentIO = rebuf;
buf->content = rebuf + start_buf;
}
} else {
if (buf->content == NULL) {
rebuf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(newSize);
} else if (buf->size - buf->use < 100) {
rebuf = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf->content, newSize);
} else {
/*
* if we are reallocating a buffer far from being full, it's
* better to make a new allocation and copy only the used range
* and free the old one.
*/
rebuf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(newSize);
if (rebuf != NULL) {
memcpy(rebuf, buf->content, buf->use);
xmlFree(buf->content);
rebuf[buf->use] = 0;
}
}
if (rebuf == NULL) {
xmlBufMemoryError(buf, "growing buffer");
return 0;
}
buf->content = rebuf;
}
buf->size = newSize;
UPDATE_COMPAT(buf)
return 1;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190"
]
| libxml2 | 6c283d83eccd940bcde15634ac8c7f100e3caefd | 320,104,047,698,532,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 109 | [CVE-2022-29824] Fix integer overflows in xmlBuf and xmlBuffer
In several places, the code handling string buffers didn't check for
integer overflow or used wrong types for buffer sizes. This could
result in out-of-bounds writes or other memory errors when working on
large, multi-gigabyte buffers.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report. |
circle_diameter(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(2 * circle->radius);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
]
| postgres | 31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a | 105,949,840,910,826,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 |
static struct array_cache *alloc_arraycache(int node, int entries,
int batchcount, gfp_t gfp)
{
size_t memsize = sizeof(void *) * entries + sizeof(struct array_cache);
struct array_cache *ac = NULL;
ac = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
init_arraycache(ac, entries, batchcount);
return ac;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f | 14,528,903,392,654,502,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
TfLiteRegistration* Register_SPACE_TO_BATCH_ND() {
// return Register_SPACE_TO_BATCH_ND_REF();
return Register_SPACE_TO_BATCH_ND_GENERIC_OPT();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-369"
]
| tensorflow | 6d36ba65577006affb272335b7c1abd829010708 | 146,264,596,586,993,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Prevent division by 0
PiperOrigin-RevId: 370984990
Change-Id: Ib324955bbeb1cbd97c82fd5d61a00a2697c9a2de |
static void stimer_cleanup(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
trace_kvm_hv_stimer_cleanup(hv_stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
stimer->index);
hrtimer_cancel(&stimer->timer);
clear_bit(stimer->index,
to_hv_vcpu(vcpu)->stimer_pending_bitmap);
stimer->msg_pending = false;
stimer->exp_time = 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
]
| linux | 919f4ebc598701670e80e31573a58f1f2d2bf918 | 288,630,239,026,670,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | KVM: x86: hyper-v: Fix Hyper-V context null-ptr-deref
Reported by syzkaller:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000140-0x0000000000000147]
CPU: 1 PID: 8370 Comm: syz-executor859 Not tainted 5.11.0-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:synic_get arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:165 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_set_sint_gsi arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:475 [inline]
RIP: 0010:kvm_hv_irq_routing_update+0x230/0x460 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c:498
Call Trace:
kvm_set_irq_routing+0x69b/0x940 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/irqchip.c:223
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x12d0/0x2800 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3959
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Hyper-V context is lazily allocated until Hyper-V specific MSRs are accessed
or SynIC is enabled. However, the syzkaller testcase sets irq routing table
directly w/o enabling SynIC. This results in null-ptr-deref when accessing
SynIC Hyper-V context. This patch fixes it.
syzkaller source: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=163342ccd00000
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 8f014550dfb1 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: Make Hyper-V emulation enablement conditional")
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
size_t bgp_packet_mpattr_start(struct stream *s, struct peer *peer, afi_t afi,
safi_t safi, struct bpacket_attr_vec_arr *vecarr,
struct attr *attr)
{
size_t sizep;
iana_afi_t pkt_afi;
iana_safi_t pkt_safi;
afi_t nh_afi;
/* Set extended bit always to encode the attribute length as 2 bytes */
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL | BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN);
stream_putc(s, BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI);
sizep = stream_get_endp(s);
stream_putw(s, 0); /* Marker: Attribute length. */
/* Convert AFI, SAFI to values for packet. */
bgp_map_afi_safi_int2iana(afi, safi, &pkt_afi, &pkt_safi);
stream_putw(s, pkt_afi); /* AFI */
stream_putc(s, pkt_safi); /* SAFI */
/* Nexthop AFI */
if (afi == AFI_IP
&& (safi == SAFI_UNICAST || safi == SAFI_LABELED_UNICAST))
nh_afi = peer_cap_enhe(peer, afi, safi) ? AFI_IP6 : AFI_IP;
else
nh_afi = BGP_NEXTHOP_AFI_FROM_NHLEN(attr->mp_nexthop_len);
/* Nexthop */
bpacket_attr_vec_arr_set_vec(vecarr, BGP_ATTR_VEC_NH, s, attr);
switch (nh_afi) {
case AFI_IP:
switch (safi) {
case SAFI_UNICAST:
case SAFI_MULTICAST:
case SAFI_LABELED_UNICAST:
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_put_ipv4(s, attr->nexthop.s_addr);
break;
case SAFI_MPLS_VPN:
stream_putc(s, 12);
stream_putl(s, 0); /* RD = 0, per RFC */
stream_putl(s, 0);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global_in, 4);
break;
case SAFI_ENCAP:
case SAFI_EVPN:
stream_putc(s, 4);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global_in, 4);
break;
case SAFI_FLOWSPEC:
stream_putc(s, 0); /* no nexthop for flowspec */
default:
break;
}
break;
case AFI_IP6:
switch (safi) {
case SAFI_UNICAST:
case SAFI_MULTICAST:
case SAFI_LABELED_UNICAST:
case SAFI_EVPN: {
if (attr->mp_nexthop_len
== BGP_ATTR_NHLEN_IPV6_GLOBAL_AND_LL) {
stream_putc(s,
BGP_ATTR_NHLEN_IPV6_GLOBAL_AND_LL);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_local,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
} else {
stream_putc(s, IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
}
} break;
case SAFI_MPLS_VPN: {
if (attr->mp_nexthop_len
== BGP_ATTR_NHLEN_IPV6_GLOBAL) {
stream_putc(s, 24);
stream_putl(s, 0); /* RD = 0, per RFC */
stream_putl(s, 0);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
} else if (attr->mp_nexthop_len
== BGP_ATTR_NHLEN_IPV6_GLOBAL_AND_LL) {
stream_putc(s, 48);
stream_putl(s, 0); /* RD = 0, per RFC */
stream_putl(s, 0);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
stream_putl(s, 0); /* RD = 0, per RFC */
stream_putl(s, 0);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_local,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
}
} break;
case SAFI_ENCAP:
stream_putc(s, IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
stream_put(s, &attr->mp_nexthop_global,
IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN);
break;
case SAFI_FLOWSPEC:
stream_putc(s, 0); /* no nexthop for flowspec */
default:
break;
}
break;
default:
if (safi != SAFI_FLOWSPEC)
flog_err(
EC_BGP_ATTR_NH_SEND_LEN,
"Bad nexthop when sending to %s, AFI %u SAFI %u nhlen %d",
peer->host, afi, safi, attr->mp_nexthop_len);
break;
}
/* SNPA */
stream_putc(s, 0);
return sizep;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-436"
]
| frr | 943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a | 79,299,797,337,651,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 122 | bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]> |
static int vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
unsigned index, unsigned start,
unsigned count, uint32_t flags, void *data)
{
int i;
bool msix = (index == VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX) ? true : false;
if (irq_is(vdev, index) && !count && (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE)) {
vfio_msi_disable(vdev, msix);
return 0;
}
if (!(irq_is(vdev, index) || is_irq_none(vdev)))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD) {
int32_t *fds = data;
int ret;
if (vdev->irq_type == index)
return vfio_msi_set_block(vdev, start, count,
fds, msix);
ret = vfio_msi_enable(vdev, start + count, msix);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = vfio_msi_set_block(vdev, start, count, fds, msix);
if (ret)
vfio_msi_disable(vdev, msix);
return ret;
}
if (!irq_is(vdev, index) || start + count > vdev->num_ctx)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = start; i < start + count; i++) {
if (!vdev->ctx[i].trigger)
continue;
if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE) {
eventfd_signal(vdev->ctx[i].trigger, 1);
} else if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL) {
uint8_t *bools = data;
if (bools[i - start])
eventfd_signal(vdev->ctx[i].trigger, 1);
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-190"
]
| linux | 05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a | 252,793,958,502,744,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> |
key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
key_perm_t perm)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
int ret;
try_again:
ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
switch (id) {
case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
goto error;
ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
}
key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
/* always install a session keyring upon access if one
* doesn't exist yet */
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
else
ret = install_session_keyring(
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
} else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto reget_creds;
}
rcu_read_lock();
key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
__key_get(key);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
ret = install_user_keyrings();
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
}
key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
if (!key)
goto error;
__key_get(key);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
goto error;
down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
key = rka->dest_keyring;
__key_get(key);
}
up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (!key)
goto error;
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
break;
default:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (id < 1)
goto error;
key = key_lookup(id);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
goto error;
}
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* check to see if we possess the key */
ctx.index_key.type = key->type;
ctx.index_key.description = key->description;
ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description);
ctx.match_data.raw_data = key;
kdebug("check possessed");
skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = skey_ref;
}
break;
}
/* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
* the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
ret = 0;
goto error;
}
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
switch (ret) {
case -ERESTARTSYS:
goto invalid_key;
default:
if (perm)
goto invalid_key;
case 0:
break;
}
} else if (perm) {
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
}
ret = -EIO;
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
error:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
return key_ref;
invalid_key:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
/* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
* creds to be installed */
reget_creds:
put_cred(ctx.cred);
goto try_again;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
]
| linux | 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | 270,789,946,000,235,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 225 | KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> |
static void Rp_exec(js_State *J)
{
js_RegExp_prototype_exec(J, js_toregexp(J, 0), js_tostring(J, 1));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674",
"CWE-787"
]
| mujs | 00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2 | 69,215,517,374,774,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings. |
trnext(t)
struct tr *t;
{
for (;;) {
if (!t->gen) {
if (t->p == t->pend) return -1;
if (t->p < t->pend - 1 && *t->p == '\\') {
t->p++;
}
t->now = *(USTR)t->p++;
if (t->p < t->pend - 1 && *t->p == '-') {
t->p++;
if (t->p < t->pend) {
if (t->now > *(USTR)t->p) {
t->p++;
continue;
}
t->gen = 1;
t->max = *(USTR)t->p++;
}
}
return t->now;
}
else if (++t->now < t->max) {
return t->now;
}
else {
t->gen = 0;
return t->max;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
]
| ruby | e926ef5233cc9f1035d3d51068abe9df8b5429da | 298,914,096,854,153,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | * random.c (rb_genrand_int32, rb_genrand_real), intern.h: Export.
* string.c (rb_str_tmp_new), intern.h: New function.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_1_8@16014 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
static JSValue js_sys_prompt_echo_off(JSContext *ctx, JSValueConst this_val, int argc, JSValueConst *argv)
{
Bool echo_off;
if (!argc) return GF_JS_EXCEPTION(ctx);
echo_off = JS_ToBool(ctx, argv[0]);
if (argc<2)
gf_prompt_set_echo_off(echo_off);
return JS_UNDEFINED;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| gpac | ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0 | 215,592,758,371,428,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | fixed #2138 |
static u32 *avic_get_logical_id_entry(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 ldr, bool flat)
{
struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm);
int index;
u32 *logical_apic_id_table;
int dlid = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(ldr);
if (!dlid)
return NULL;
if (flat) { /* flat */
index = ffs(dlid) - 1;
if (index > 7)
return NULL;
} else { /* cluster */
int cluster = (dlid & 0xf0) >> 4;
int apic = ffs(dlid & 0x0f) - 1;
if ((apic < 0) || (apic > 7) ||
(cluster >= 0xf))
return NULL;
index = (cluster << 2) + apic;
}
logical_apic_id_table = (u32 *) page_address(kvm_svm->avic_logical_id_table_page);
return &logical_apic_id_table[index];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
]
| linux | d80b64ff297e40c2b6f7d7abc1b3eba70d22a068 | 211,718,659,853,731,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | KVM: SVM: Fix potential memory leak in svm_cpu_init()
When kmalloc memory for sd->sev_vmcbs failed, we forget to free the page
held by sd->save_area. Also get rid of the var r as '-ENOMEM' is actually
the only possible outcome here.
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, key)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_AS_FILENAME)) {
RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190"
]
| php-src | 7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba | 246,450,915,863,881,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int |
static int tcp_v4_send_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
struct flowi *fl,
struct request_sock *req,
struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc,
enum tcp_synack_type synack_type)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct flowi4 fl4;
int err = -1;
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* First, grab a route. */
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, &fl4, req)) == NULL)
return -1;
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, foc, synack_type);
if (skb) {
__tcp_v4_send_check(skb, ireq->ir_loc_addr, ireq->ir_rmt_addr);
err = ip_build_and_send_pkt(skb, sk, ireq->ir_loc_addr,
ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
ireq->opt);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
]
| linux | ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3 | 281,017,652,615,394,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
int kvm_dev_ioctl_check_extension(long ext)
{
int r;
switch (ext) {
case KVM_CAP_IRQCHIP:
case KVM_CAP_HLT:
case KVM_CAP_MMU_SHADOW_CACHE_CONTROL:
case KVM_CAP_SET_TSS_ADDR:
case KVM_CAP_EXT_CPUID:
case KVM_CAP_CLOCKSOURCE:
case KVM_CAP_PIT:
case KVM_CAP_NOP_IO_DELAY:
case KVM_CAP_MP_STATE:
case KVM_CAP_SYNC_MMU:
case KVM_CAP_USER_NMI:
case KVM_CAP_REINJECT_CONTROL:
case KVM_CAP_IRQ_INJECT_STATUS:
case KVM_CAP_ASSIGN_DEV_IRQ:
case KVM_CAP_IRQFD:
case KVM_CAP_IOEVENTFD:
case KVM_CAP_PIT2:
case KVM_CAP_PIT_STATE2:
case KVM_CAP_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR:
case KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM:
case KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK:
case KVM_CAP_VCPU_EVENTS:
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV:
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VAPIC:
case KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SPIN:
case KVM_CAP_PCI_SEGMENT:
case KVM_CAP_DEBUGREGS:
case KVM_CAP_X86_ROBUST_SINGLESTEP:
case KVM_CAP_XSAVE:
case KVM_CAP_ASYNC_PF:
case KVM_CAP_GET_TSC_KHZ:
r = 1;
break;
case KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO:
r = KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET;
break;
case KVM_CAP_VAPIC:
r = !kvm_x86_ops->cpu_has_accelerated_tpr();
break;
case KVM_CAP_NR_VCPUS:
r = KVM_SOFT_MAX_VCPUS;
break;
case KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS:
r = KVM_MAX_VCPUS;
break;
case KVM_CAP_NR_MEMSLOTS:
r = KVM_MEMORY_SLOTS;
break;
case KVM_CAP_PV_MMU: /* obsolete */
r = 0;
break;
case KVM_CAP_IOMMU:
r = iommu_present(&pci_bus_type);
break;
case KVM_CAP_MCE:
r = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
break;
case KVM_CAP_XCRS:
r = cpu_has_xsave;
break;
case KVM_CAP_TSC_CONTROL:
r = kvm_has_tsc_control;
break;
case KVM_CAP_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER:
r = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC_DEADLINE_TIMER);
break;
default:
r = 0;
break;
}
return r;
} | 0 | []
| kvm | 0769c5de24621141c953fbe1f943582d37cb4244 | 137,811,468,008,432,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 78 | KVM: x86: extend "struct x86_emulate_ops" with "get_cpuid"
In order to be able to proceed checks on CPU-specific properties
within the emulator, function "get_cpuid" is introduced.
With "get_cpuid" it is possible to virtually call the guests
"cpuid"-opcode without changing the VM's context.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> |
find_minimal_sface_of_shell(T& D, SFace_visited_hash& Vi)
: Base(D), Done(Vi), SORT(D) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
]
| cgal | 5a1ab45058112f8647c14c02f58905ecc597ec76 | 235,129,216,872,096,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 | Fix Nef_3 |
_outSubqueryScan(StringInfo str, const SubqueryScan *node)
{
WRITE_NODE_TYPE("SUBQUERYSCAN");
_outScanInfo(str, (const Scan *) node);
WRITE_NODE_FIELD(subplan);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
]
| postgres | 5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a | 150,223,053,742,601,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062 |
ext4_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, unsigned nr_pages)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
/* If the file has inline data, no need to do readpages. */
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
return 0;
return ext4_mpage_readpages(mapping, pages, NULL, nr_pages, true);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-401"
]
| linux | 4ea99936a1630f51fc3a2d61a58ec4a1c4b7d55a | 326,638,903,904,422,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | ext4: add more paranoia checking in ext4_expand_extra_isize handling
It's possible to specify a non-zero s_want_extra_isize via debugging
option, and this can cause bad things(tm) to happen when using a file
system with an inode size of 128 bytes.
Add better checking when the file system is mounted, as well as when
we are actually doing the trying to do the inode expansion.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
static uint16_t nvme_map_addr_pmr(NvmeCtrl *n, QEMUIOVector *iov, hwaddr addr,
size_t len)
{
if (!len) {
return NVME_SUCCESS;
}
if (!nvme_addr_is_pmr(n, addr) || !nvme_addr_is_pmr(n, addr + len - 1)) {
return NVME_DATA_TRAS_ERROR;
}
qemu_iovec_add(iov, nvme_addr_to_pmr(n, addr), len);
return NVME_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | []
| qemu | 736b01642d85be832385063f278fe7cd4ffb5221 | 256,735,362,771,553,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | hw/nvme: fix CVE-2021-3929
This fixes CVE-2021-3929 "locally" by denying DMA to the iomem of the
device itself. This still allows DMA to MMIO regions of other devices
(e.g. doing P2P DMA to the controller memory buffer of another NVMe
device).
Fixes: CVE-2021-3929
Reported-by: Qiuhao Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <[email protected]> |
join_read_last_key(JOIN_TAB *tab)
{
int error;
TABLE *table= tab->table;
if (!table->file->inited &&
(error= table->file->ha_index_init(tab->ref.key, tab->sorted)))
{
(void) report_error(table, error);
return 1;
}
if (cp_buffer_from_ref(tab->join->thd, table, &tab->ref))
return -1;
if ((error= table->file->prepare_index_key_scan_map(tab->ref.key_buff, make_prev_keypart_map(tab->ref.key_parts))))
{
report_error(table,error);
return -1;
}
if ((error= table->file->ha_index_read_map(table->record[0],
tab->ref.key_buff,
make_prev_keypart_map(tab->ref.key_parts),
HA_READ_PREFIX_LAST)))
{
if (error != HA_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND && error != HA_ERR_END_OF_FILE)
return report_error(table, error);
return -1; /* purecov: inspected */
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
]
| server | 5ba77222e9fe7af8ff403816b5338b18b342053c | 181,728,711,006,414,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | MDEV-21028 Server crashes in Query_arena::set_query_arena upon SELECT from view
if the view has algorithm=temptable it is not updatable,
so DEFAULT() for its fields is meaningless,
and thus it's NULL or 0/'' for NOT NULL columns. |
static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
defaultoptions(&h);
lua_settop(L, 2);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res);
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f);
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d);
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format `c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size);
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1);
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1);
return lua_gettop(L) - 2;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
]
| redis | 1eb08bcd4634ae42ec45e8284923ac048beaa4c3 | 22,297,221,737,219,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author. |
Value ExpressionRandom::evaluate(const Document& root, Variables* variables) const {
return Value(getRandomValue());
} | 0 | []
| mongo | 1772b9a0393b55e6a280a35e8f0a1f75c014f301 | 200,154,399,937,294,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | SERVER-49404 Enforce additional checks in $arrayToObject |
static u32 mp4box_cleanup(u32 ret_code) {
if (mpd_base_urls) {
gf_free(mpd_base_urls);
mpd_base_urls = NULL;
}
if (sdp_lines) {
gf_free(sdp_lines);
sdp_lines = NULL;
}
if (metas) {
u32 i;
for (i=0; i<nb_meta_act; i++) {
if (metas[i].enc_type) gf_free(metas[i].enc_type);
if (metas[i].mime_type) gf_free(metas[i].mime_type);
if (metas[i].szName) gf_free(metas[i].szName);
if (metas[i].szPath) gf_free(metas[i].szPath);
if (metas[i].keep_props) gf_free(metas[i].keep_props);
if (metas[i].image_props) {
GF_ImageItemProperties *iprops = metas[i].image_props;
if (iprops->overlay_offsets) gf_free(iprops->overlay_offsets);
if (iprops->aux_urn) gf_free((char *) iprops->aux_urn);
if (iprops->aux_data) gf_free((char *) iprops->aux_data);
gf_free(iprops);
}
}
gf_free(metas);
metas = NULL;
}
if (tracks) {
u32 i;
for (i = 0; i<nb_track_act; i++) {
if (tracks[i].out_name)
gf_free(tracks[i].out_name);
if (tracks[i].src_name)
gf_free(tracks[i].src_name);
if (tracks[i].string)
gf_free(tracks[i].string);
if (tracks[i].kind_scheme)
gf_free(tracks[i].kind_scheme);
if (tracks[i].kind_value)
gf_free(tracks[i].kind_value);
}
gf_free(tracks);
tracks = NULL;
}
if (tsel_acts) {
gf_free(tsel_acts);
tsel_acts = NULL;
}
if (brand_add) {
gf_free(brand_add);
brand_add = NULL;
}
if (brand_rem) {
gf_free(brand_rem);
brand_rem = NULL;
}
if (dash_inputs) {
u32 i, j;
for (i = 0; i<nb_dash_inputs; i++) {
GF_DashSegmenterInput *di = &dash_inputs[i];
if (di->nb_baseURL) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_baseURL; j++) {
gf_free(di->baseURL[j]);
}
gf_free(di->baseURL);
}
if (di->rep_descs) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_rep_descs; j++) {
gf_free(di->rep_descs[j]);
}
gf_free(di->rep_descs);
}
if (di->as_descs) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_as_descs; j++) {
gf_free(di->as_descs[j]);
}
gf_free(di->as_descs);
}
if (di->as_c_descs) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_as_c_descs; j++) {
gf_free(di->as_c_descs[j]);
}
gf_free(di->as_c_descs);
}
if (di->p_descs) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_p_descs; j++) {
gf_free(di->p_descs[j]);
}
gf_free(di->p_descs);
}
if (di->representationID) gf_free(di->representationID);
if (di->periodID) gf_free(di->periodID);
if (di->xlink) gf_free(di->xlink);
if (di->seg_template) gf_free(di->seg_template);
if (di->hls_pl) gf_free(di->hls_pl);
if (di->source_opts) gf_free(di->source_opts);
if (di->filter_chain) gf_free(di->filter_chain);
if (di->roles) {
for (j = 0; j<di->nb_roles; j++) {
gf_free(di->roles[j]);
}
gf_free(di->roles);
}
}
gf_free(dash_inputs);
dash_inputs = NULL;
}
if (logfile) gf_fclose(logfile);
gf_sys_close();
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
if (mem_track && (gf_memory_size() || gf_file_handles_count() )) {
gf_log_set_tool_level(GF_LOG_MEMORY, GF_LOG_INFO);
gf_memory_print();
}
#endif
return ret_code; | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| gpac | 4e56ad72ac1afb4e049a10f2d99e7512d7141f9d | 264,239,850,165,742,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 121 | fixed #2216 |
static int test_unaligned_bulk(
struct usbtest_dev *tdev,
int pipe,
unsigned length,
int iterations,
unsigned transfer_flags,
const char *label)
{
int retval;
struct urb *urb = usbtest_alloc_urb(testdev_to_usbdev(tdev),
pipe, length, transfer_flags, 1, 0, simple_callback);
if (!urb)
return -ENOMEM;
retval = simple_io(tdev, urb, iterations, 0, 0, label);
simple_free_urb(urb);
return retval;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
]
| linux | 7c80f9e4a588f1925b07134bb2e3689335f6c6d8 | 197,877,331,208,853,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]> |
bool LEX::stmt_create_udf_function(const DDL_options_st &options,
enum_sp_aggregate_type agg_type,
const Lex_ident_sys_st &name,
Item_result return_type,
const LEX_CSTRING &soname)
{
if (stmt_create_function_start(options))
return true;
if (unlikely(is_native_function(thd, &name)))
{
my_error(ER_NATIVE_FCT_NAME_COLLISION, MYF(0), name.str);
return true;
}
sql_command= SQLCOM_CREATE_FUNCTION;
udf.name= name;
udf.returns= return_type;
udf.dl= soname.str;
udf.type= agg_type == GROUP_AGGREGATE ? UDFTYPE_AGGREGATE :
UDFTYPE_FUNCTION;
stmt_create_routine_finalize();
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
]
| server | 39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2 | 58,847,578,718,747,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused a crash of the server. This happened because the
outer context field in the Name_resolution_context structure was not set
to NULL for such references. Rather it pointed to the first element in
the select_stack.
Note that starting from 10.4 we cannot use the SELECT_LEX::outer_select()
method when parsing a SELECT construct.
Approved by Oleksandr Byelkin <[email protected]> |
HTC_Status(enum htc_status_e e)
{
switch (e) {
#define HTC_STATUS(e, n, s, l) \
case HTC_S_ ## e: return (s);
#include "tbl/htc.h"
default:
WRONG("HTC_Status");
}
NEEDLESS(return (NULL));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
]
| varnish-cache | 2d8fc1a784a1e26d78c30174923a2b14ee2ebf62 | 283,154,987,654,548,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Take sizeof pool_task into account when reserving WS in SES_Wait
The assert on WS_ReserveSize() in ses_handle() can not trip because
sizeof (struct pool_task) is less than sizeof (struct waited). But to safe
guard against future problems if that were to change, this patch makes
sure that the session workspace can hold the largest of them before
entering the waiter, erroring out if not. |
static void CompressZip(unsigned char *dst,
tinyexr::tinyexr_uint64 &compressedSize,
const unsigned char *src, unsigned long src_size) {
std::vector<unsigned char> tmpBuf(src_size);
//
// Apply EXR-specific? postprocess. Grabbed from OpenEXR's
// ImfZipCompressor.cpp
//
//
// Reorder the pixel data.
//
const char *srcPtr = reinterpret_cast<const char *>(src);
{
char *t1 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(&tmpBuf.at(0));
char *t2 = reinterpret_cast<char *>(&tmpBuf.at(0)) + (src_size + 1) / 2;
const char *stop = srcPtr + src_size;
for (;;) {
if (srcPtr < stop)
*(t1++) = *(srcPtr++);
else
break;
if (srcPtr < stop)
*(t2++) = *(srcPtr++);
else
break;
}
}
//
// Predictor.
//
{
unsigned char *t = &tmpBuf.at(0) + 1;
unsigned char *stop = &tmpBuf.at(0) + src_size;
int p = t[-1];
while (t < stop) {
int d = int(t[0]) - p + (128 + 256);
p = t[0];
t[0] = static_cast<unsigned char>(d);
++t;
}
}
#if TINYEXR_USE_MINIZ
//
// Compress the data using miniz
//
miniz::mz_ulong outSize = miniz::mz_compressBound(src_size);
int ret = miniz::mz_compress(
dst, &outSize, static_cast<const unsigned char *>(&tmpBuf.at(0)),
src_size);
assert(ret == miniz::MZ_OK);
(void)ret;
compressedSize = outSize;
#else
uLong outSize = compressBound(static_cast<uLong>(src_size));
int ret = compress(dst, &outSize, static_cast<const Bytef *>(&tmpBuf.at(0)),
src_size);
assert(ret == Z_OK);
compressedSize = outSize;
#endif
// Use uncompressed data when compressed data is larger than uncompressed.
// (Issue 40)
if (compressedSize >= src_size) {
compressedSize = src_size;
memcpy(dst, src, src_size);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-190"
]
| tinyexr | a685e3332f61cd4e59324bf3f669d36973d64270 | 334,068,664,508,901,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | Make line_no with too large value(2**20) invalid. Fixes #124 |
static int acm_start_wb(struct acm *acm, struct acm_wb *wb)
{
int rc;
acm->transmitting++;
wb->urb->transfer_buffer = wb->buf;
wb->urb->transfer_dma = wb->dmah;
wb->urb->transfer_buffer_length = wb->len;
wb->urb->dev = acm->dev;
rc = usb_submit_urb(wb->urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (rc < 0) {
dev_err(&acm->data->dev,
"%s - usb_submit_urb(write bulk) failed: %d\n",
__func__, rc);
acm_write_done(acm, wb);
}
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | 8835ba4a39cf53f705417b3b3a94eb067673f2c9 | 40,762,902,776,299,246,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
if (data->o_arg.claim == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_PREVIOUS)
return _nfs4_opendata_reclaim_to_nfs4_state(data);
return _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(data);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-401"
]
| linux | 7d3e91a89b7adbc2831334def9e494dd9892f9af | 103,136,065,957,576,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
psf_close_handle (HANDLE handle)
{ if (handle == NULL)
return 0 ;
if (CloseHandle (handle) == 0)
return -1 ;
return 0 ;
} /* psf_close_handle */ | 0 | [
"CWE-369",
"CWE-189"
]
| libsndfile | 725c7dbb95bfaf8b4bb7b04820e3a00cceea9ce6 | 319,551,029,346,683,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92 |
XML_GetInputContext(XML_Parser parser, int *offset, int *size)
{
#ifdef XML_CONTEXT_BYTES
if (parser == NULL)
return NULL;
if (eventPtr && buffer) {
if (offset != NULL)
*offset = (int)(eventPtr - buffer);
if (size != NULL)
*size = (int)(bufferEnd - buffer);
return buffer;
}
#else
(void)parser;
(void)offset;
(void)size;
#endif /* defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */
return (char *) 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-611"
]
| libexpat | c4bf96bb51dd2a1b0e185374362ee136fe2c9d7f | 33,389,823,142,760,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | xmlparse.c: Fix external entity infinite loop bug (CVE-2017-9233) |
void mnt_pin(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
mnt->mnt_pinned++;
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-269"
]
| linux-2.6 | ee6f958291e2a768fd727e7a67badfff0b67711a | 271,180,373,454,972,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | check privileges before setting mount propagation
There's a missing check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in do_change_type().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
R_API RBinJavaAttrInfo *r_bin_java_read_next_attr_from_buffer(ut8 *buffer, st64 sz, st64 buf_offset) {
RBinJavaAttrInfo *attr = NULL;
ut64 offset = 0;
ut16 name_idx;
st64 nsz;
if (!buffer || ((int) sz) < 4 || buf_offset < 0) {
eprintf ("r_bin_Java_read_next_attr_from_buffer: invalid buffer size %d\n", (int) sz);
return NULL;
}
name_idx = R_BIN_JAVA_USHORT (buffer, offset);
offset += 2;
nsz = R_BIN_JAVA_UINT (buffer, offset);
offset += 4;
char *name = r_bin_java_get_utf8_from_bin_cp_list (R_BIN_JAVA_GLOBAL_BIN, name_idx);
if (!name) {
name = strdup ("unknown");
}
IFDBG eprintf("r_bin_java_read_next_attr: name_idx = %d is %s\n", name_idx, name);
RBinJavaAttrMetas *type_info = r_bin_java_get_attr_type_by_name (name);
if (type_info) {
IFDBG eprintf("Typeinfo: %s, was %s\n", type_info->name, name);
// printf ("SZ %d %d %d\n", nsz, sz, buf_offset);
if (nsz > sz) {
free (name);
return NULL;
}
if ((attr = type_info->allocs->new_obj (buffer, nsz, buf_offset))) {
attr->metas->ord = (R_BIN_JAVA_GLOBAL_BIN->attr_idx++);
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_bin_java_read_next_attr_from_buffer: Cannot find type_info for %s\n", name);
}
free (name);
return attr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
]
| radare2 | e9ce0d64faf19fa4e9c260250fbdf25e3c11e152 | 247,442,855,713,269,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix #10498 - Fix crash in fuzzed java files (#10511) |
lacks_directory_count (NautilusFile *file)
{
return !file->details->directory_count_is_up_to_date
&& nautilus_file_should_show_directory_item_count (file);
} | 0 | []
| nautilus | 7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983 | 283,634,785,936,165,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003 |
validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
struct key_entry_key* kkey)
{
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
size_t wl;
int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
size_t i;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
/* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
/* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard
* expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be
* made in the authority section. */
if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has "
"inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
return;
}
/* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597.
* Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because
* its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME &&
ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) {
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a "
"wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname,
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
return;
}
/* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one.
* The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct
* order. */
if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
break;
}
}
/* AUTHORITY section */
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
/* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a
* (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove
* that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard
* was used. */
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
}
/* if not, continue looking for proof */
}
/* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and
* we have NSEC3 records */
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
nsec3s_seen = 1;
}
}
/* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
* proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
* records. */
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen) {
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc);
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is "
"insecure");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
return;
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure)
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
}
/* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
* response, fail. */
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard "
"expansion and did not prove original data "
"did not exist");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
return;
}
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response");
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-613",
"CWE-703"
]
| unbound | f6753a0f1018133df552347a199e0362fc1dac68 | 225,322,211,921,176,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 101 | - Fix the novel ghost domain issues CVE-2022-30698 and CVE-2022-30699. |
xfs_zero_last_block(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
xfs_fsize_t offset,
xfs_fsize_t isize)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
xfs_fileoff_t last_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSBT(mp, isize);
int zero_offset = XFS_B_FSB_OFFSET(mp, isize);
int zero_len;
int nimaps = 1;
int error = 0;
struct xfs_bmbt_irec imap;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
error = xfs_bmapi_read(ip, last_fsb, 1, &imap, &nimaps, 0);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_EXCL);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nimaps > 0);
/*
* If the block underlying isize is just a hole, then there
* is nothing to zero.
*/
if (imap.br_startblock == HOLESTARTBLOCK)
return 0;
zero_len = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize - zero_offset;
if (isize + zero_len > offset)
zero_len = offset - isize;
return xfs_iozero(ip, isize, zero_len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
]
| linux | 8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958 | 19,844,329,483,926,859,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
cmsBool Type_LUT16_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsUInt32Number nTabSize;
cmsPipeline* NewLUT = (cmsPipeline*) Ptr;
cmsStage* mpe;
_cmsStageToneCurvesData* PreMPE = NULL, *PostMPE = NULL;
_cmsStageMatrixData* MatMPE = NULL;
_cmsStageCLutData* clut = NULL;
int i, InputChannels, OutputChannels, clutPoints;
// Disassemble the LUT into components.
mpe = NewLUT -> Elements;
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigMatrixElemType) {
MatMPE = (_cmsStageMatrixData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
PreMPE = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCLutElemType) {
clut = (_cmsStageCLutData*) mpe -> Data;
mpe = mpe ->Next;
}
if (mpe != NULL && mpe ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
PostMPE = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) mpe ->Data;
mpe = mpe -> Next;
}
// That should be all
if (mpe != NULL) {
cmsSignalError(mpe->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "LUT is not suitable to be saved as LUT16");
return FALSE;
}
InputChannels = cmsPipelineInputChannels(NewLUT);
OutputChannels = cmsPipelineOutputChannels(NewLUT);
if (clut == NULL)
clutPoints = 0;
else
clutPoints = clut->Params->nSamples[0];
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) InputChannels)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) OutputChannels)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, (cmsUInt8Number) clutPoints)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt8Number(io, 0)) return FALSE; // Padding
if (MatMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[0])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[1])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[2])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[3])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[4])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[5])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[6])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[7])) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, MatMPE -> Double[8])) return FALSE;
}
else {
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, 1)) return FALSE;
}
if (PreMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) PreMPE ->TheCurves[0]->nEntries)) return FALSE;
} else {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
}
if (PostMPE != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) PostMPE ->TheCurves[0]->nEntries)) return FALSE;
} else {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
}
// The prelinearization table
if (PreMPE != NULL) {
if (!Write16bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, PreMPE)) return FALSE;
}
else {
for (i=0; i < InputChannels; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0xffff)) return FALSE;
}
}
nTabSize = uipow(OutputChannels, clutPoints, InputChannels);
if (nTabSize == (cmsUInt32Number) -1) return FALSE;
if (nTabSize > 0) {
// The 3D CLUT.
if (clut != NULL) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Array(io, nTabSize, clut->Tab.T)) return FALSE;
}
}
// The postlinearization table
if (PostMPE != NULL) {
if (!Write16bitTables(self ->ContextID, io, PostMPE)) return FALSE;
}
else {
for (i=0; i < OutputChannels; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 0xffff)) return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
]
| Little-CMS | 5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2 | 172,523,376,558,700,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 131 | Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug |
typeToCodecType(Http::CodecClient::Type type) {
switch (type) {
case Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP1:
return envoy::config::filter::network::http_connection_manager::v2::HttpConnectionManager::
HTTP1;
case Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP2:
return envoy::config::filter::network::http_connection_manager::v2::HttpConnectionManager::
HTTP2;
default:
RELEASE_ASSERT(0, "");
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
]
| envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 198,616,319,294,548,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
static void unit_status_log_starting_stopping_reloading(Unit *u, JobType t) {
const char *format;
char buf[LINE_MAX];
sd_id128_t mid;
assert(u);
if (t != JOB_START && t != JOB_STOP && t != JOB_RELOAD)
return;
if (log_on_console())
return;
/* We log status messages for all units and all operations. */
format = unit_get_status_message_format_try_harder(u, t);
if (!format)
return;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, unit_description(u));
char_array_0(buf);
mid = t == JOB_START ? SD_MESSAGE_UNIT_STARTING :
t == JOB_STOP ? SD_MESSAGE_UNIT_STOPPING :
SD_MESSAGE_UNIT_RELOADING;
log_struct_unit(LOG_INFO,
u->id,
MESSAGE_ID(mid),
"MESSAGE=%s", buf,
NULL);
} | 0 | []
| systemd | 5ba6985b6c8ef85a8bcfeb1b65239c863436e75b | 304,404,789,677,293,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | core: allow PIDs to be watched by two units at the same time
In some cases it is interesting to map a PID to two units at the same
time. For example, when a user logs in via a getty, which is reexeced to
/sbin/login that binary will be explicitly referenced as main pid of the
getty service, as well as implicitly referenced as part of the session
scope. |
static int hns_roce_init_hem(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev)
{
int ret;
struct device *dev = hr_dev->dev;
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_table,
HEM_TYPE_MTT, hr_dev->caps.mtt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_mtt_segs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTT context memory, aborting.\n");
return ret;
}
if (hns_roce_check_whether_mhop(hr_dev, HEM_TYPE_CQE)) {
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_cqe_table,
HEM_TYPE_CQE, hr_dev->caps.mtt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_cqe_segs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTT CQE context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_cqe;
}
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtpt_table,
HEM_TYPE_MTPT, hr_dev->caps.mtpt_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_mtpts, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init MTPT context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_mtt;
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.qp_table,
HEM_TYPE_QPC, hr_dev->caps.qpc_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init QP context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_dmpt;
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.irrl_table,
HEM_TYPE_IRRL,
hr_dev->caps.irrl_entry_sz *
hr_dev->caps.max_qp_init_rdma,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init irrl_table memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_qp;
}
if (hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz) {
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->qp_table.trrl_table,
HEM_TYPE_TRRL,
hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz *
hr_dev->caps.max_qp_dest_rdma,
hr_dev->caps.num_qps, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev,
"Failed to init trrl_table memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_irrl;
}
}
ret = hns_roce_init_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->cq_table.table,
HEM_TYPE_CQC, hr_dev->caps.cqc_entry_sz,
hr_dev->caps.num_cqs, 1);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to init CQ context memory, aborting.\n");
goto err_unmap_trrl;
}
return 0;
err_unmap_trrl:
if (hr_dev->caps.trrl_entry_sz)
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->qp_table.trrl_table);
err_unmap_irrl:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.irrl_table);
err_unmap_qp:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->qp_table.qp_table);
err_unmap_dmpt:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtpt_table);
err_unmap_mtt:
if (hns_roce_check_whether_mhop(hr_dev, HEM_TYPE_CQE))
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev,
&hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_cqe_table);
err_unmap_cqe:
hns_roce_cleanup_hem_table(hr_dev, &hr_dev->mr_table.mtt_table);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-665"
]
| kernel | 72be029e947510dd6cbbbaf51879622af26e4200 | 84,987,613,601,237,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | RDMA/hns: Fix init resp when alloc ucontext (bsc#1104427
FATE#326416).
suse-commit: 8e5436bc2806cbe952f043cc995804c188ce047a |
void shash_free_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(shash_instance(inst));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| linux | af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 | 183,054,519,917,431,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
kvm_pfn_t gfn_to_pfn_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
return __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn, false, NULL, true, NULL);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
]
| linux | 0774a964ef561b7170d8d1b1bfe6f88002b6d219 | 37,026,052,342,131,464,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KVM: Fix out of range accesses to memslots
Reset the LRU slot if it becomes invalid when deleting a memslot to fix
an out-of-bounds/use-after-free access when searching through memslots.
Explicitly check for there being no used slots in search_memslots(), and
in the caller of s390's approximation variant.
Fixes: 36947254e5f9 ("KVM: Dynamically size memslot array based on number of used slots")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, getFlags)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->flags & (SPL_FILE_DIR_KEY_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_MODE_MASK | SPL_FILE_DIR_OTHERS_MASK));
} /* }}} */ | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
]
| php-src | 7245bff300d3fa8bacbef7897ff080a6f1c23eba | 27,053,984,519,713,964,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int |
void *sock_kmalloc(struct sock *sk, int size, gfp_t priority)
{
if ((unsigned int)size <= sysctl_optmem_max &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc) + size < sysctl_optmem_max) {
void *mem;
/* First do the add, to avoid the race if kmalloc
* might sleep.
*/
atomic_add(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
mem = kmalloc(size, priority);
if (mem)
return mem;
atomic_sub(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
]
| linux | b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 | 94,342,296,770,926,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
struct razer_report razer_chroma_misc_set_orochi2011_poll_dpi(unsigned short poll_rate, unsigned char dpi_x, unsigned char dpi_y)
{
struct razer_report report = {0};
memcpy(&report, &orochi2011_dpi, sizeof(orochi2011_dpi));
switch(poll_rate) {
case 1000:
poll_rate = 0x01;
break;
case 500:
poll_rate = 0x02;
break;
case 125:
poll_rate = 0x08;
break;
default: // 500Hz
poll_rate = 0x02;
break;
}
report.arguments[1] = poll_rate;
report.arguments[3] = clamp_u8(dpi_x, 0x15, 0x9C);
report.arguments[4] = clamp_u8(dpi_y, 0x15, 0x9C);
return report;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
]
| openrazer | 7e8a04feb378a679f1bcdcae079a5100cc45663b | 291,510,171,618,935,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Fix oob memcpy in matrix_custom_frame methods
Adjust row_length if it exeeds the arguments array |
static inline int crypto_rng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
{
return crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->generate(tfm, src, slen, dst, dlen);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-703"
]
| linux | 94f1bb15bed84ad6c893916b7e7b9db6f1d7eec6 | 139,521,051,229,510,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
worker_err_ratelimit(struct worker* worker, int err)
{
if(worker->err_limit_time == *worker->env.now) {
/* see if limit is exceeded for this second */
if(worker->err_limit_count++ > ERROR_RATELIMIT)
return -1;
} else {
/* new second, new limits */
worker->err_limit_time = *worker->env.now;
worker->err_limit_count = 1;
}
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-613",
"CWE-703"
]
| unbound | f6753a0f1018133df552347a199e0362fc1dac68 | 5,719,998,935,179,149,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | - Fix the novel ghost domain issues CVE-2022-30698 and CVE-2022-30699. |
int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
{
int ret;
int size;
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
/* the direction of urb must be OUT. */
if (usb_pipein(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
} else {
/* the direction of urb must be IN. */
if (usb_pipeout(urb->pipe))
return 0;
size = urb->actual_length;
}
/* no need to recv xbuff */
if (!(size > 0))
return 0;
ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
if (ret != size) {
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
} else {
usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
return -EPIPE;
}
}
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119"
]
| linux | b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb | 305,454,016,037,161,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
static int atrtr_delete(struct atalk_addr * addr)
{
struct atalk_route **r = &atalk_routes;
int retval = 0;
struct atalk_route *tmp;
write_lock_bh(&atalk_routes_lock);
while ((tmp = *r) != NULL) {
if (tmp->target.s_net == addr->s_net &&
(!(tmp->flags&RTF_GATEWAY) ||
tmp->target.s_node == addr->s_node)) {
*r = tmp->next;
dev_put(tmp->dev);
kfree(tmp);
goto out;
}
r = &tmp->next;
}
retval = -ENOENT;
out:
write_unlock_bh(&atalk_routes_lock);
return retval;
} | 0 | []
| history | 7ab442d7e0a76402c12553ee256f756097cae2d2 | 62,613,400,245,905,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | [DDP]: Convert to new protocol interface.
Convert ddp to the new protocol interface which means it has to
handle fragmented skb's. The only big change is in the checksum
routine which has to do more work (like skb_checksum).
Minor speedup is folding the carry to avoid a branch.
Tested against a 2.4 system and by running both code over
a range of packets. |
void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
ResourceHandle handle;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context,
HandleFromInput(context, kResourceHandleName, &handle));
core::RefCountPtr<QuantileStreamResource> stream_resource;
// Create a reference to the underlying resource using the handle.
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, LookupResource(context, handle, &stream_resource));
// Remove the reference at the end of this scope.
mutex_lock l(*stream_resource->mutex());
OpInputList summaries_list;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context,
context->input_list(kSummariesName, &summaries_list));
int32_t num_streams = stream_resource->num_streams();
CHECK_EQ(static_cast<int>(num_streams), summaries_list.size());
auto do_quantile_add_summary = [&](const int64_t begin, const int64_t end) {
// Iterating all features.
for (int64_t feature_idx = begin; feature_idx < end; ++feature_idx) {
QuantileStream* stream = stream_resource->stream(feature_idx);
if (stream->IsFinalized()) {
VLOG(1) << "QuantileStream has already been finalized for feature"
<< feature_idx << ".";
continue;
}
const Tensor& summaries = summaries_list[feature_idx];
const auto summary_values = summaries.matrix<float>();
const auto& tensor_shape = summaries.shape();
const int64_t entries_size = tensor_shape.dim_size(0);
CHECK_EQ(tensor_shape.dim_size(1), 4);
std::vector<QuantileSummaryEntry> summary_entries;
summary_entries.reserve(entries_size);
for (int64_t i = 0; i < entries_size; i++) {
float value = summary_values(i, 0);
float weight = summary_values(i, 1);
float min_rank = summary_values(i, 2);
float max_rank = summary_values(i, 3);
QuantileSummaryEntry entry(value, weight, min_rank, max_rank);
summary_entries.push_back(entry);
}
stream_resource->stream(feature_idx)->PushSummary(summary_entries);
}
};
// TODO(tanzheny): comment on the magic number.
const int64_t kCostPerUnit = 500 * num_streams;
const DeviceBase::CpuWorkerThreads& worker_threads =
*context->device()->tensorflow_cpu_worker_threads();
Shard(worker_threads.num_threads, worker_threads.workers, num_streams,
kCostPerUnit, do_quantile_add_summary);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-681"
]
| tensorflow | 8a84f7a2b5a2b27ecf88d25bad9ac777cd2f7992 | 146,768,006,737,553,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Ensure num_streams >= 0 in tf.raw_ops.BoostedTreesCreateQuantileStreamResource
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387452765
Change-Id: I9990c760e177fabca6a3b9b4612ceeaeeba51495 |
void bn_init(BIGNUM *a)
{
static BIGNUM nilbn;
*a = nilbn;
bn_check_top(a);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
]
| openssl | aab7c770353b1dc4ba045938c8fb446dd1c4531e | 165,014,393,623,226,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Cesar Pereida Garcia <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6009)
(cherry picked from commit 40e48e54582e46c1a01e184ecf5bd31f4f7f8294) |
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