func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Word setEffectiveContextHandler(void* raw_context, Word context_id) {
auto context = WASM_CONTEXT(raw_context);
uint32_t cid = static_cast<uint32_t>(context_id.u64_);
auto c = context->wasm()->getContext(cid);
if (!c) {
return wasmResultToWord(WasmResult::BadArgument);
}
effective_context_id_ = cid;
return wasmResultToWord(WasmResult::Ok);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
envoy
|
8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153
| 228,814,468,929,147,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
|
void thread_group_times(struct task_struct *p, cputime_t *ut, cputime_t *st)
{
struct task_cputime cputime;
thread_group_cputime(p, &cputime);
*ut = cputime.utime;
*st = cputime.stime;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
| 325,487,418,313,176,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
proto_free_deregistered_fields (void)
{
expert_free_deregistered_expertinfos();
g_ptr_array_foreach(deregistered_fields, free_deregistered_field, NULL);
g_ptr_array_free(deregistered_fields, TRUE);
deregistered_fields = g_ptr_array_new();
g_ptr_array_foreach(deregistered_data, free_deregistered_data, NULL);
g_ptr_array_free(deregistered_data, TRUE);
deregistered_data = g_ptr_array_new();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
wireshark
|
a9fc769d7bb4b491efb61c699d57c9f35269d871
| 2,553,290,035,466,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
epan: Fix a memory leak.
Make sure _proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val allocates a bits array using the
packet scope, otherwise we leak memory. Fixes #17032.
|
static ssize_t srpt_tpg_attrib_srp_sq_size_store(struct config_item *item,
const char *page, size_t count)
{
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg = attrib_to_tpg(item);
struct srpt_port *sport = container_of(se_tpg, struct srpt_port, port_tpg_1);
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul(page, 0, &val);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("kstrtoul() failed with ret: %d\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val > MAX_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE) {
pr_err("val: %lu exceeds MAX_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE: %d\n", val,
MAX_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val < MIN_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE) {
pr_err("val: %lu smaller than MIN_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE: %d\n", val,
MIN_SRPT_SRQ_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
sport->port_attrib.srp_sq_size = val;
return count;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
| 320,163,883,660,513,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
char **env_set(char **envp, const char *envstr) {
size_t count, found;
char **p, *envtmp;
/*
* count the number of elements, including the null pointer;
* also set 'found' to -1 or index of entry if already in here.
*/
found = (size_t)-1;
for (count = 0; envp[count] != NULL; count++) {
if (!strcmp_until(envp[count], envstr, '='))
found = count;
}
count++; /* for the NULL */
if (found != (size_t)-1) {
/*
* it exists already, so just free the existing setting,
* save our new one there, and return the existing array.
*/
if ((envtmp = strdup(envstr)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
free(envp[found]);
envp[found] = envtmp;
return (envp);
}
/*
* it doesn't exist yet, so resize the array, move null pointer over
* one, save our string over the old null pointer, and return resized
* array.
*/
if ((envtmp = strdup(envstr)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
p = (char **) realloc((void *) envp,
(count + 1) * sizeof (char *));
if (p == NULL) {
free(envtmp);
return (NULL);
}
p[count] = p[count - 1];
p[count - 1] = envtmp;
return (p);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
cronie
|
a6576769f01325303b11edc3e0cfb05ef382ce56
| 171,086,608,061,556,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 |
Fix CVE-2019-9704 and CVE-2019-9705
The users can cause DoS of the crond by loading huge crontab files.
We now allow maximum 1000 environment variables and 1000 crontab entries.
Also the comments and whitespace between the entries and variables
are now limited to 32768 characters.
|
getRuleCharsText(FileInfo *file, CharsString *ruleChars) {
CharsString token;
if (!getToken(file, &token, "Characters operand")) return 0;
return parseChars(file, ruleChars, &token);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
liblouis
|
2e4772befb2b1c37cb4b9d6572945115ee28630a
| 327,105,771,944,493,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Prevent an invalid memory writes in compileRule
Thanks to Han Zheng for reporting it
Fixes #1214
|
static void PruneToCubeDepth(CubeInfo *cube_info,const NodeInfo *node_info)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_children;
/*
Traverse any children.
*/
number_children=cube_info->associate_alpha == MagickFalse ? 8UL : 16UL;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_children; i++)
if (node_info->child[i] != (NodeInfo *) NULL)
PruneToCubeDepth(cube_info,node_info->child[i]);
if (node_info->level > cube_info->depth)
PruneChild(cube_info,node_info);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ImageMagick
|
5294966898532a6bd54699fbf04edf18902513ac
| 74,368,604,099,002,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1156
|
int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data,
SSL_CTX* ctx,
char *cert_file,
const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
const char *cert_type,
char *key_file,
const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
const char *key_type,
char *key_passwd)
{
char error_buffer[256];
bool check_privkey = TRUE;
int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
if(cert_file || cert_blob || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
int cert_done = 0;
int cert_use_result;
if(key_passwd) {
/* set the password in the callback userdata */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, key_passwd);
/* Set passwd callback: */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
}
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(ctx, cert_blob, key_passwd) :
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file);
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
failf(data,
"could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s, "
"(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
ASN1 files. */
cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(ctx, cert_blob,
file_type, key_passwd) :
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, file_type);
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
failf(data,
"could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s, "
"(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
{
/* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
* cert_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
if(!data->state.engine) {
if(is_pkcs11_uri(cert_file)) {
if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
return 0;
}
}
}
if(data->state.engine) {
const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
struct {
const char *cert_id;
X509 *cert;
} params;
params.cert_id = cert_file;
params.cert = NULL;
/* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
return 0;
}
/* Load the certificate from the engine */
if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
0, ¶ms, NULL, 1)) {
failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
" '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)));
return 0;
}
if(!params.cert) {
failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
"properly.");
return 0;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
X509_free(params.cert);
return 0;
}
X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
}
else {
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
return 0;
}
}
break;
#else
failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
return 0;
#endif
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
{
BIO *cert_bio = NULL;
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pri;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
if(cert_blob) {
cert_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(cert_blob->data, (int)(cert_blob->len));
if(!cert_bio) {
failf(data,
"BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
return 0;
}
}
else {
cert_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if(!cert_bio) {
failf(data,
"BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
return 0;
}
if(BIO_read_filename(cert_bio, cert_file) <= 0) {
failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
BIO_free(cert_bio);
return 0;
}
}
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(cert_bio, NULL);
BIO_free(cert_bio);
if(!p12) {
failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'",
cert_blob ? "(memory blob)" : cert_file);
return 0;
}
PKCS12_PBE_add();
if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, key_passwd, &pri, &x509,
&ca)) {
failf(data,
"could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
PKCS12_free(p12);
return 0;
}
PKCS12_free(p12);
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
failf(data,
"could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
" error %s",
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
goto fail;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
cert_file);
goto fail;
}
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
"does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
goto fail;
}
/* Set Certificate Verification chain */
if(ca) {
while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
/*
* Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
* removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
* SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(), which takes ownership. Previously
* we used sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the
* subsequent sk_X509_pop_free() call.
*/
X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) {
X509_free(x);
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
goto fail;
}
if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
X509_free(x);
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
goto fail;
}
}
}
cert_done = 1;
fail:
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
#ifdef USE_AMISSL
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, Curl_amiga_X509_free);
#else
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
#endif
if(!cert_done)
return 0; /* failure! */
break;
}
default:
failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
return 0;
}
if((!key_file) && (!key_blob)) {
key_file = cert_file;
key_blob = cert_blob;
}
else
file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
if(cert_done)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
cert_use_result = key_blob ?
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(ctx, key_blob, file_type, key_passwd) :
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type);
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
key_file?key_file:"(memory blob)", key_type?key_type:"PEM");
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
/* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
* key_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
if(!data->state.engine) {
if(is_pkcs11_uri(key_file)) {
if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
return 0;
}
}
}
if(data->state.engine) {
UI_METHOD *ui_method =
UI_create_method((char *)"curl user interface");
if(!ui_method) {
failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
" user-interface method");
return 0;
}
UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
/* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
ui_method,
key_passwd);
UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
if(!priv_key) {
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
return 0;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key");
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
}
else {
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
return 0;
}
}
break;
#else
failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
return 0;
#endif
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
if(!cert_done) {
failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
return 0;
}
break;
default:
failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
return 0;
}
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
if(!ssl) {
failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
return 0;
}
x509 = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
leak memory as the previous version: */
if(x509) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
{
/* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate
* it doesn't support it. */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
int pktype;
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(priv_key);
#else
pktype = priv_key->type;
#endif
if(pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(priv_key);
if(RSA_flags(rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)
check_privkey = FALSE;
RSA_free(rsa); /* Decrement reference count */
}
}
#endif
SSL_free(ssl);
/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
* the private key */
if(check_privkey == TRUE) {
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return 0;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-295"
] |
curl
|
7f4a9a9b2a49547eae24d2e19bc5c346e9026479
| 271,597,268,288,502,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 389 |
openssl: associate/detach the transfer from connection
CVE-2021-22901
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22901.html
|
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
int ret;
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
return 0;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
return -1;
crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
/* Copy verify params across */
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
openssl
|
370ac320301e28bb615cee80124c042649c95d14
| 263,818,094,786,405,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
|
int MkvReader::Read(long long offset, long len, unsigned char* buffer) {
if (m_file == NULL)
return -1;
if (offset < 0)
return -1;
if (len < 0)
return -1;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (offset >= m_length)
return -1;
#ifdef _MSC_VER
const int status = _fseeki64(m_file, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (status)
return -1; // error
#elif defined(_WIN32)
fseeko64(m_file, static_cast<off_t>(offset), SEEK_SET);
#else
fseeko(m_file, static_cast<off_t>(offset), SEEK_SET);
#endif
const size_t size = fread(buffer, 1, len, m_file);
if (size < size_t(len))
return -1; // error
return 0; // success
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
| 114,250,978,447,119,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
|
int ext4_mb_add_groupinfo(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group,
struct ext4_group_desc *desc)
{
int i;
int metalen = 0;
int idx = group >> EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK_BITS(sb);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_group_info **meta_group_info;
struct kmem_cache *cachep = get_groupinfo_cache(sb->s_blocksize_bits);
/*
* First check if this group is the first of a reserved block.
* If it's true, we have to allocate a new table of pointers
* to ext4_group_info structures
*/
if (group % EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) == 0) {
metalen = sizeof(*meta_group_info) <<
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK_BITS(sb);
meta_group_info = kmalloc(metalen, GFP_NOFS);
if (meta_group_info == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't allocate mem "
"for a buddy group");
goto exit_meta_group_info;
}
rcu_read_lock();
rcu_dereference(sbi->s_group_info)[idx] = meta_group_info;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
meta_group_info = sbi_array_rcu_deref(sbi, s_group_info, idx);
i = group & (EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1);
meta_group_info[i] = kmem_cache_zalloc(cachep, GFP_NOFS);
if (meta_group_info[i] == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't allocate buddy mem");
goto exit_group_info;
}
set_bit(EXT4_GROUP_INFO_NEED_INIT_BIT,
&(meta_group_info[i]->bb_state));
/*
* initialize bb_free to be able to skip
* empty groups without initialization
*/
if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
(desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) {
meta_group_info[i]->bb_free =
ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, group, desc);
} else {
meta_group_info[i]->bb_free =
ext4_free_group_clusters(sb, desc);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta_group_info[i]->bb_prealloc_list);
init_rwsem(&meta_group_info[i]->alloc_sem);
meta_group_info[i]->bb_free_root = RB_ROOT;
meta_group_info[i]->bb_largest_free_order = -1; /* uninit */
mb_group_bb_bitmap_alloc(sb, meta_group_info[i], group);
return 0;
exit_group_info:
/* If a meta_group_info table has been allocated, release it now */
if (group % EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) == 0) {
struct ext4_group_info ***group_info;
rcu_read_lock();
group_info = rcu_dereference(sbi->s_group_info);
kfree(group_info[idx]);
group_info[idx] = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
exit_meta_group_info:
return -ENOMEM;
} /* ext4_mb_add_groupinfo */
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
ce9f24cccdc019229b70a5c15e2b09ad9c0ab5d1
| 136,349,250,069,457,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 |
ext4: check journal inode extents more carefully
Currently, system zones just track ranges of block, that are "important"
fs metadata (bitmaps, group descriptors, journal blocks, etc.). This
however complicates how extent tree (or indirect blocks) can be checked
for inodes that actually track such metadata - currently the journal
inode but arguably we should be treating quota files or resize inode
similarly. We cannot run __ext4_ext_check() on such metadata inodes when
loading their extents as that would immediately trigger the validity
checks and so we just hack around that and special-case the journal
inode. This however leads to a situation that a journal inode which has
extent tree of depth at least one can have invalid extent tree that gets
unnoticed until ext4_cache_extents() crashes.
To overcome this limitation, track inode number each system zone belongs
to (0 is used for zones not belonging to any inode). We can then verify
inode number matches the expected one when verifying extent tree and
thus avoid the false errors. With this there's no need to to
special-case journal inode during extent tree checking anymore so remove
it.
Fixes: 0a944e8a6c66 ("ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inode")
Reported-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static int lxc_mount_auto_mounts(struct lxc_conf *conf, int flags, struct lxc_handler *handler)
{
int r;
size_t i;
static struct {
int match_mask;
int match_flag;
const char *source;
const char *destination;
const char *fstype;
unsigned long flags;
const char *options;
} default_mounts[] = {
/* Read-only bind-mounting... In older kernels, doing that required
* to do one MS_BIND mount and then MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY the same
* one. According to mount(2) manpage, MS_BIND honors MS_RDONLY from
* kernel 2.6.26 onwards. However, this apparently does not work on
* kernel 3.8. Unfortunately, on that very same kernel, doing the
* same trick as above doesn't seem to work either, there one needs
* to ALSO specify MS_BIND for the remount, otherwise the entire
* fs is remounted read-only or the mount fails because it's busy...
* MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY seems to work for kernels as low as
* 2.6.32...
*/
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
/* proc/tty is used as a temporary placeholder for proc/sys/net which we'll move back in a few steps */
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys/net", "%r/proc/tty", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sys", "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/tty", "%r/proc/sys/net", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_MIXED, NULL, "%r/proc/sysrq-trigger", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_PROC_MASK, LXC_AUTO_PROC_RW, "proc", "%r/proc", "proc", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RW, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_RO, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys", "sysfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys", "%r/sys", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "sysfs", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", "sysfs", 0, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net/devices/virtual/net", "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL },
{ LXC_AUTO_SYS_MASK, LXC_AUTO_SYS_MIXED, NULL, "%r/sys/devices/virtual/net", NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC, NULL },
{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }
};
for (i = 0; default_mounts[i].match_mask; i++) {
if ((flags & default_mounts[i].match_mask) == default_mounts[i].match_flag) {
char *source = NULL;
char *destination = NULL;
int saved_errno;
unsigned long mflags;
if (default_mounts[i].source) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
source = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].source);
if (!source) {
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
return -1;
}
}
if (default_mounts[i].destination) {
/* will act like strdup if %r is not present */
destination = lxc_string_replace("%r", conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", default_mounts[i].destination);
if (!destination) {
saved_errno = errno;
SYSERROR("memory allocation error");
free(source);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
mflags = add_required_remount_flags(source, destination,
default_mounts[i].flags);
r = safe_mount(source, destination, default_mounts[i].fstype, mflags, default_mounts[i].options, conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : NULL);
saved_errno = errno;
if (r < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
INFO("Mount source or target for %s on %s doesn't exist. Skipping.", source, destination);
r = 0;
}
else if (r < 0)
SYSERROR("error mounting %s on %s flags %lu", source, destination, mflags);
free(source);
free(destination);
if (r < 0) {
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
}
}
if (flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK) {
int cg_flags;
cg_flags = flags & LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MASK;
/* If the type of cgroup mount was not specified, it depends on the
* container's capabilities as to what makes sense: if we have
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN, the read-only part can be remounted read-write
* anyway, so we may as well default to read-write; then the admin
* will not be given a false sense of security. (And if they really
* want mixed r/o r/w, then they can explicitly specify :mixed.)
* OTOH, if the container lacks CAP_SYS_ADMIN, do only default to
* :mixed, because then the container can't remount it read-write. */
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC || cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_NOSPEC) {
int has_sys_admin = 0;
if (!lxc_list_empty(&conf->keepcaps)) {
has_sys_admin = in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->keepcaps);
} else {
has_sys_admin = !in_caplist(CAP_SYS_ADMIN, &conf->caps);
}
if (cg_flags == LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_NOSPEC) {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_MIXED;
} else {
cg_flags = has_sys_admin ? LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_RW : LXC_AUTO_CGROUP_FULL_MIXED;
}
}
if (!cgroup_mount(conf->rootfs.path ? conf->rootfs.mount : "", handler, cg_flags)) {
SYSERROR("error mounting /sys/fs/cgroup");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
lxc
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
| 22,735,813,425,034,475,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 124 |
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
struct dentry *lookup_one_len(const char *name, struct dentry *base, int len)
{
struct qstr this;
unsigned int c;
int err;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(base->d_inode));
this.name = name;
this.len = len;
this.hash = full_name_hash(base, name, len);
if (!len)
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
if (unlikely(name[0] == '.')) {
if (len < 2 || (len == 2 && name[1] == '.'))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
while (len--) {
c = *(const unsigned char *)name++;
if (c == '/' || c == '\0')
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
/*
* See if the low-level filesystem might want
* to use its own hash..
*/
if (base->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_HASH) {
int err = base->d_op->d_hash(base, &this);
if (err < 0)
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
err = inode_permission(base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
return __lookup_hash(&this, base, 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
| 93,024,821,456,371,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
sso_ntlm_close (SoupAuthNTLMPrivate *priv)
{
if (priv->fd_in != -1) {
close (priv->fd_in);
priv->fd_in = -1;
}
if (priv->fd_out != -1) {
close (priv->fd_out);
priv->fd_out = -1;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libsoup
|
f8a54ac85eec2008c85393f331cdd251af8266ad
| 15,058,784,774,967,146,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
NTLM: Avoid a potential heap buffer overflow in v2 authentication
Check the length of the decoded v2 challenge before attempting to
parse it, to avoid reading past it.
Fixes #173
|
static int decode_layoutget(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct nfs4_layoutget_res *res)
{
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21
| 71,682,402,525,668,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <[email protected]>
[Trond: clean up duplicate test of label->len != 0]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
const Tensor& tensor_in = context->input(0);
const Tensor& grad_in = context->input(1);
const Tensor& argmax = context->input(2);
PoolParameters params{context,
ksize_,
stride_,
padding_,
/*explicit_paddings=*/{},
FORMAT_NHWC,
tensor_in.shape()};
if (!context->status().ok()) {
return;
}
TensorShape out_shape({params.tensor_in_batch, params.tensor_in_rows,
params.tensor_in_cols, params.depth});
Tensor* grad_out = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->forward_input_or_allocate_output(
{0}, 0, out_shape, &grad_out));
LaunchMaxPoolingGradWithArgmax<Device, T>::launch(
context, params, grad_in, argmax, grad_out, include_batch_in_index_);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
tensorflow
|
376c352a37ce5a68b721406dc7e77ac4b6cf483d
| 305,049,194,830,879,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Don't do any work if output tensor is null (prevent div by 0)
PiperOrigin-RevId: 372208700
Change-Id: Iea6b6293e887ade8538facfdb50fb931e17f511e
|
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
{
unsigned char *p;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
return -1;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
/* message length */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
/* status type */
*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516
| 254,608,328,410,369,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
Add Next Protocol Negotiation.
|
static void multi_shutdown(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
struct mp_port *mtpt = (struct mp_port *)port;
unsigned long flags;
mtpt->ier = 0;
serial_outp(mtpt, UART_IER, 0);
spin_lock_irqsave(&mtpt->port.lock, flags);
mtpt->port.mctrl &= ~TIOCM_OUT2;
multi_set_mctrl(&mtpt->port, mtpt->port.mctrl);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mtpt->port.lock, flags);
serial_out(mtpt, UART_LCR, serial_inp(mtpt, UART_LCR) & ~UART_LCR_SBC);
serial_outp(mtpt, UART_FCR, UART_FCR_ENABLE_FIFO |
UART_FCR_CLEAR_RCVR |
UART_FCR_CLEAR_XMIT);
serial_outp(mtpt, UART_FCR, 0);
(void) serial_in(mtpt, UART_RX);
if ((!is_real_interrupt(mtpt->port.irq))||(mtpt->poll_type==TYPE_POLL))
{
del_timer_sync(&mtpt->timer);
}
else
{
serial_unlink_irq_chain(mtpt);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
| 246,586,200,541,711,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static inline void acpi_smbus_callback(void *context)
{
struct acpi_smb_hc *hc = context;
if (hc->callback)
hc->callback(hc->context);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
43cdd1b716b26f6af16da4e145b6578f98798bf6
| 159,670,675,129,464,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
ACPI: sbshc: remove raw pointer from printk() message
There's no need to be printing a raw kernel pointer to the kernel log at
every boot. So just remove it, and change the whole message to use the
correct dev_info() call at the same time.
Reported-by: Wang Qize <[email protected]>
Cc: All applicable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
|
static bool move_normal_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long old_addr,
unsigned long new_addr, unsigned long old_end,
pmd_t *old_pmd, pmd_t *new_pmd)
{
spinlock_t *old_ptl, *new_ptl;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pmd_t pmd;
if ((old_addr & ~PMD_MASK) || (new_addr & ~PMD_MASK)
|| old_end - old_addr < PMD_SIZE)
return false;
/*
* The destination pmd shouldn't be established, free_pgtables()
* should have release it.
*/
if (WARN_ON(!pmd_none(*new_pmd)))
return false;
/*
* We don't have to worry about the ordering of src and dst
* ptlocks because exclusive mmap_sem prevents deadlock.
*/
old_ptl = pmd_lock(vma->vm_mm, old_pmd);
new_ptl = pmd_lockptr(mm, new_pmd);
if (new_ptl != old_ptl)
spin_lock_nested(new_ptl, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* Clear the pmd */
pmd = *old_pmd;
pmd_clear(old_pmd);
VM_BUG_ON(!pmd_none(*new_pmd));
/* Set the new pmd */
set_pmd_at(mm, new_addr, new_pmd, pmd);
flush_tlb_range(vma, old_addr, old_addr + PMD_SIZE);
if (new_ptl != old_ptl)
spin_unlock(new_ptl);
spin_unlock(old_ptl);
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
dcde237319e626d1ec3c9d8b7613032f0fd4663a
| 104,171,276,417,226,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
mm: Avoid creating virtual address aliases in brk()/mmap()/mremap()
Currently the arm64 kernel ignores the top address byte passed to brk(),
mmap() and mremap(). When the user is not aware of the 56-bit address
limit or relies on the kernel to return an error, untagging such
pointers has the potential to create address aliases in user-space.
Passing a tagged address to munmap(), madvise() is permitted since the
tagged pointer is expected to be inside an existing mapping.
The current behaviour breaks the existing glibc malloc() implementation
which relies on brk() with an address beyond 56-bit to be rejected by
the kernel.
Remove untagging in the above functions by partially reverting commit
ce18d171cb73 ("mm: untag user pointers in mmap/munmap/mremap/brk"). In
addition, update the arm64 tagged-address-abi.rst document accordingly.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1797052
Fixes: ce18d171cb73 ("mm: untag user pointers in mmap/munmap/mremap/brk")
Cc: <[email protected]> # 5.4.x-
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Victor Stinner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
|
static void php_sqlite3_func_step_callback(sqlite3_context *context, int argc,
sqlite3_value **argv)
{
struct pdo_sqlite_func *func = (struct pdo_sqlite_func*)sqlite3_user_data(context);
TSRMLS_FETCH();
do_callback(&func->astep, func->step, argc, argv, context, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
php-src
|
055ecbc62878e86287d742c7246c21606cee8183
| 291,984,345,501,818,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Improve check for :memory: pseudo-filename in SQlite
|
vc4_job_handle_completed(struct vc4_dev *vc4)
{
unsigned long irqflags;
struct vc4_seqno_cb *cb, *cb_temp;
spin_lock_irqsave(&vc4->job_lock, irqflags);
while (!list_empty(&vc4->job_done_list)) {
struct vc4_exec_info *exec =
list_first_entry(&vc4->job_done_list,
struct vc4_exec_info, head);
list_del(&exec->head);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vc4->job_lock, irqflags);
vc4_complete_exec(vc4->dev, exec);
spin_lock_irqsave(&vc4->job_lock, irqflags);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(cb, cb_temp, &vc4->seqno_cb_list, work.entry) {
if (cb->seqno <= vc4->finished_seqno) {
list_del_init(&cb->work.entry);
schedule_work(&cb->work);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&vc4->job_lock, irqflags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
0f2ff82e11c86c05d051cae32b58226392d33bbf
| 318,681,832,043,932,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
drm/vc4: Fix an integer overflow in temporary allocation layout.
We copy the unvalidated ioctl arguments from the user into kernel
temporary memory to run the validation from, to avoid a race where the
user updates the unvalidate contents in between validating them and
copying them into the validated BO.
However, in setting up the layout of the kernel side, we failed to
check one of the additions (the roundup() for shader_rec_offset)
against integer overflow, allowing a nearly MAX_UINT value of
bin_cl_size to cause us to under-allocate the temporary space that we
then copy_from_user into.
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <[email protected]>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.")
|
int ip_route_input_noref(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct fib_result res;
int err;
tos &= IPTOS_RT_MASK;
rcu_read_lock();
err = ip_route_input_rcu(skb, daddr, saddr, tos, dev, &res);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
bc3aae2bbac46dd894c89db5d5e98f7f0ef9e205
| 54,486,602,343,448,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ArgParser::argRemovePageLabels()
{
o.remove_page_labels = true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qpdf
|
d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e
| 39,813,937,634,594,044,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition.
|
rsvg_filter_primitive_composite_set_atts (RsvgNode *node, gpointer impl, RsvgHandle *handle, RsvgPropertyBag *atts)
{
RsvgFilterPrimitiveComposite *filter = impl;
const char *value;
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "operator"))) {
if (!strcmp (value, "in"))
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_IN;
else if (!strcmp (value, "out"))
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_OUT;
else if (!strcmp (value, "atop"))
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_ATOP;
else if (!strcmp (value, "xor"))
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_XOR;
else if (!strcmp (value, "arithmetic"))
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_ARITHMETIC;
else
filter->mode = COMPOSITE_MODE_OVER;
}
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "in")))
g_string_assign (filter->super.in, value);
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "in2")))
g_string_assign (filter->in2, value);
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "result")))
g_string_assign (filter->super.result, value);
filter_primitive_set_x_y_width_height_atts ((RsvgFilterPrimitive *) filter, atts);
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "k1")))
filter->k1 = g_ascii_strtod (value, NULL) * 255.;
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "k2")))
filter->k2 = g_ascii_strtod (value, NULL) * 255.;
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "k3")))
filter->k3 = g_ascii_strtod (value, NULL) * 255.;
if ((value = rsvg_property_bag_lookup (atts, "k4")))
filter->k4 = g_ascii_strtod (value, NULL) * 255.;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
librsvg
|
ecf9267a24b2c3c0cd211dbdfa9ef2232511972a
| 198,378,060,363,965,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
bgo#783835 - Don't divide by zero in box_blur_line() for gaussian blurs
We were making the decision to use box blurs, instead of a true
Gaussian kernel, based on the size of *both* x and y dimensions. Do
them individually instead.
|
static int decode_sao_merge_flag(thread_context* tctx)
{
logtrace(LogSlice,"# sao_merge_left/up_flag\n");
int bit = decode_CABAC_bit(&tctx->cabac_decoder,
&tctx->ctx_model[CONTEXT_MODEL_SAO_MERGE_FLAG]);
logtrace(LogSymbols,"$1 sao_merge_flag=%d\n",bit);
return bit;
}
| 0 |
[] |
libde265
|
e83f3798dd904aa579425c53020c67e03735138d
| 300,509,074,586,301,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
fix check for valid PPS idx (#298)
|
static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct descriptor_table *dt)
{
dt->limit = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
dt->base = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
16175a796d061833aacfbd9672235f2d2725df65
| 273,820,195,175,099,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
KVM: VMX: Don't allow uninhibited access to EFER on i386
vmx_set_msr() does not allow i386 guests to touch EFER, but they can still
do so through the default: label in the switch. If they set EFER_LME, they
can oops the host.
Fix by having EFER access through the normal channel (which will check for
EFER_LME) even on i386.
Reported-and-tested-by: Benjamin Gilbert <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
CImgDisplay& assign(const CImgDisplay& disp) {
if (!disp) return assign();
_assign(disp._width,disp._height,disp._title,disp._normalization,disp._is_fullscreen,disp._is_closed);
std::memcpy(_data,disp._data,sizeof(unsigned int)*_width*_height);
return paint();
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 196,729,080,046,876,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
static int is_good_config(struct usbtest_dev *tdev, int len)
{
struct usb_config_descriptor *config;
if (len < sizeof(*config))
return 0;
config = (struct usb_config_descriptor *) tdev->buf;
switch (config->bDescriptorType) {
case USB_DT_CONFIG:
case USB_DT_OTHER_SPEED_CONFIG:
if (config->bLength != 9) {
ERROR(tdev, "bogus config descriptor length\n");
return 0;
}
/* this bit 'must be 1' but often isn't */
if (!realworld && !(config->bmAttributes & 0x80)) {
ERROR(tdev, "high bit of config attributes not set\n");
return 0;
}
if (config->bmAttributes & 0x1f) { /* reserved == 0 */
ERROR(tdev, "reserved config bits set\n");
return 0;
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(config->wTotalLength) == len) /* read it all */
return 1;
if (le16_to_cpu(config->wTotalLength) >= TBUF_SIZE) /* max partial read */
return 1;
ERROR(tdev, "bogus config descriptor read size\n");
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
7c80f9e4a588f1925b07134bb2e3689335f6c6d8
| 175,724,392,686,928,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
|
UpdateRangeTableOfViewParse(Oid viewOid, Query *viewParse)
{
Relation viewRel;
List *new_rt;
RangeTblEntry *rt_entry1,
*rt_entry2;
ParseState *pstate;
/*
* Make a copy of the given parsetree. It's not so much that we don't
* want to scribble on our input, it's that the parser has a bad habit of
* outputting multiple links to the same subtree for constructs like
* BETWEEN, and we mustn't have OffsetVarNodes increment the varno of a
* Var node twice. copyObject will expand any multiply-referenced subtree
* into multiple copies.
*/
viewParse = copyObject(viewParse);
/* Create a dummy ParseState for addRangeTableEntryForRelation */
pstate = make_parsestate(NULL);
/* need to open the rel for addRangeTableEntryForRelation */
viewRel = relation_open(viewOid, AccessShareLock);
/*
* Create the 2 new range table entries and form the new range table...
* OLD first, then NEW....
*/
rt_entry1 = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(pstate, viewRel,
makeAlias("old", NIL),
false, false);
rt_entry2 = addRangeTableEntryForRelation(pstate, viewRel,
makeAlias("new", NIL),
false, false);
/* Must override addRangeTableEntry's default access-check flags */
rt_entry1->requiredPerms = 0;
rt_entry2->requiredPerms = 0;
new_rt = lcons(rt_entry1, lcons(rt_entry2, viewParse->rtable));
viewParse->rtable = new_rt;
/*
* Now offset all var nodes by 2, and jointree RT indexes too.
*/
OffsetVarNodes((Node *) viewParse, 2, 0);
relation_close(viewRel, AccessShareLock);
return viewParse;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94"
] |
postgres
|
f52d2fbd8c62f667191b61228acf9d8aa53607b9
| 108,532,826,364,923,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
In extensions, don't replace objects not belonging to the extension.
Previously, if an extension script did CREATE OR REPLACE and there was
an existing object not belonging to the extension, it would overwrite
the object and adopt it into the extension. This is problematic, first
because the overwrite is probably unintentional, and second because we
didn't change the object's ownership. Thus a hostile user could create
an object in advance of an expected CREATE EXTENSION command, and would
then have ownership rights on an extension object, which could be
modified for trojan-horse-type attacks.
Hence, forbid CREATE OR REPLACE of an existing object unless it already
belongs to the extension. (Note that we've always forbidden replacing
an object that belongs to some other extension; only the behavior for
previously-free-standing objects changes here.)
For the same reason, also fail CREATE IF NOT EXISTS when there is
an existing object that doesn't belong to the extension.
Our thanks to Sven Klemm for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2022-2625
|
static struct usb_function *f_midi_alloc(struct usb_function_instance *fi)
{
struct f_midi *midi = NULL;
struct f_midi_opts *opts;
int status, i;
opts = container_of(fi, struct f_midi_opts, func_inst);
mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
/* sanity check */
if (opts->in_ports > MAX_PORTS || opts->out_ports > MAX_PORTS) {
status = -EINVAL;
goto setup_fail;
}
/* allocate and initialize one new instance */
midi = kzalloc(
sizeof(*midi) + opts->in_ports * sizeof(*midi->in_ports_array),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!midi) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto setup_fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < opts->in_ports; i++)
midi->in_ports_array[i].cable = i;
/* set up ALSA midi devices */
midi->id = kstrdup(opts->id, GFP_KERNEL);
if (opts->id && !midi->id) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto setup_fail;
}
midi->in_ports = opts->in_ports;
midi->out_ports = opts->out_ports;
midi->index = opts->index;
midi->buflen = opts->buflen;
midi->qlen = opts->qlen;
midi->in_last_port = 0;
midi->free_ref = 1;
status = kfifo_alloc(&midi->in_req_fifo, midi->qlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (status)
goto setup_fail;
spin_lock_init(&midi->transmit_lock);
++opts->refcnt;
mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
midi->func.name = "gmidi function";
midi->func.bind = f_midi_bind;
midi->func.unbind = f_midi_unbind;
midi->func.set_alt = f_midi_set_alt;
midi->func.disable = f_midi_disable;
midi->func.free_func = f_midi_free;
return &midi->func;
setup_fail:
mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
kfree(midi);
return ERR_PTR(status);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
7fafcfdf6377b18b2a726ea554d6e593ba44349f
| 40,848,505,979,375,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 |
USB: gadget: f_midi: fixing a possible double-free in f_midi
It looks like there is a possibility of a double-free vulnerability on an
error path of the f_midi_set_alt function in the f_midi driver. If the
path is feasible then free_ep_req gets called twice:
req->complete = f_midi_complete;
err = usb_ep_queue(midi->out_ep, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=> ...
usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_midi_complete (CALLBACK)
(inside f_midi_complete, for various cases of status)
free_ep_req(ep, req); // first kfree
if (err) {
ERROR(midi, "%s: couldn't enqueue request: %d\n",
midi->out_ep->name, err);
free_ep_req(midi->out_ep, req); // second kfree
return err;
}
The double-free possibility was introduced with commit ad0d1a058eac
("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests").
Found by MOXCAFE tool.
Signed-off-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Fixes: ad0d1a058eac ("usb: gadget: f_midi: fix leak on failed to enqueue out requests")
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int homing_search_cmp(const void *key, const void *array_member)
{
const struct tree_key_search *ksearch = key;
const git_tree_entry *entry = array_member;
const size_t len1 = ksearch->filename_len;
const size_t len2 = entry->filename_len;
return memcmp(
ksearch->filename,
entry->filename,
len1 < len2 ? len1 : len2
);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libgit2
|
928429c5c96a701bcbcafacb2421a82602b36915
| 113,997,709,619,983,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
tree: Check for `.git` with case insensitivy
|
print_address_information(address_item *addr, FILE *f, uschar *si, uschar *sc,
uschar *se)
{
BOOL yield = TRUE;
uschar *printed = US"";
address_item *ancestor = addr;
while (ancestor->parent) ancestor = ancestor->parent;
fprintf(f, "%s", CS si);
if (addr->parent && testflag(addr, af_hide_child))
{
printed = US"an undisclosed address";
yield = FALSE;
}
else if (!testflag(addr, af_pfr) || !addr->parent)
printed = addr->address;
else
{
uschar *s = addr->address;
uschar *ss;
if (addr->address[0] == '>') { ss = US"mail"; s++; }
else if (addr->address[0] == '|') ss = US"pipe";
else ss = US"save";
fprintf(f, "%s to %s%sgenerated by ", ss, s, sc);
printed = addr->parent->address;
}
fprintf(f, "%s", CS string_printing(printed));
if (ancestor != addr)
{
uschar *original = ancestor->onetime_parent;
if (!original) original= ancestor->address;
if (strcmpic(original, printed) != 0)
fprintf(f, "%s(%sgenerated from %s)", sc,
ancestor != addr->parent ? "ultimately " : "",
string_printing(original));
}
if (addr->host_used)
fprintf(f, "\n host %s [%s]",
addr->host_used->name, addr->host_used->address);
fprintf(f, "%s", CS se);
return yield;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
exim
|
d740d2111f189760593a303124ff6b9b1f83453d
| 304,128,185,214,193,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
Fix CVE-2019-10149
|
static int cgroup_procs_write_permission(struct cgroup *src_cgrp,
struct cgroup *dst_cgrp,
struct super_block *sb,
struct cgroup_namespace *ns)
{
struct cgroup *com_cgrp = src_cgrp;
int ret;
lockdep_assert_held(&cgroup_mutex);
/* find the common ancestor */
while (!cgroup_is_descendant(dst_cgrp, com_cgrp))
com_cgrp = cgroup_parent(com_cgrp);
/* %current should be authorized to migrate to the common ancestor */
ret = cgroup_may_write(com_cgrp, sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* If namespaces are delegation boundaries, %current must be able
* to see both source and destination cgroups from its namespace.
*/
if ((cgrp_dfl_root.flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE) &&
(!cgroup_is_descendant(src_cgrp, ns->root_cset->dfl_cgrp) ||
!cgroup_is_descendant(dst_cgrp, ns->root_cset->dfl_cgrp)))
return -ENOENT;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a06247c6804f1a7c86a2e5398a4c1f1db1471848
| 17,681,189,136,782,895,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
psi: Fix uaf issue when psi trigger is destroyed while being polled
With write operation on psi files replacing old trigger with a new one,
the lifetime of its waitqueue is totally arbitrary. Overwriting an
existing trigger causes its waitqueue to be freed and pending poll()
will stumble on trigger->event_wait which was destroyed.
Fix this by disallowing to redefine an existing psi trigger. If a write
operation is used on a file descriptor with an already existing psi
trigger, the operation will fail with EBUSY error.
Also bypass a check for psi_disabled in the psi_trigger_destroy as the
flag can be flipped after the trigger is created, leading to a memory
leak.
Fixes: 0e94682b73bf ("psi: introduce psi monitor")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
void GetElapsedTimeInit (LARGE_INTEGER *lastPerfCounter)
{
*lastPerfCounter = KeQueryPerformanceCounter (NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
VeraCrypt
|
f30f9339c9a0b9bbcc6f5ad38804af39db1f479e
| 334,187,032,840,596,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
|
evdev_accel_config_get_speed(struct libinput_device *device)
{
struct evdev_device *dev = evdev_device(device);
return filter_get_speed(dev->pointer.filter);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libinput
|
a423d7d3269dc32a87384f79e29bb5ac021c83d1
| 214,937,128,539,986,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
evdev: strip the device name of format directives
This fixes a format string vulnerabilty.
evdev_log_message() composes a format string consisting of a fixed
prefix (including the rendered device name) and the passed-in format
buffer. This format string is then passed with the arguments to the
actual log handler, which usually and eventually ends up being printf.
If the device name contains a printf-style format directive, these ended
up in the format string and thus get interpreted correctly, e.g. for a
device "Foo%sBar" the log message vs printf invocation ends up being:
evdev_log_message(device, "some message %s", "some argument");
printf("event9 - Foo%sBar: some message %s", "some argument");
This can enable an attacker to execute malicious code with the
privileges of the process using libinput.
To exploit this, an attacker needs to be able to create a kernel device
with a malicious name, e.g. through /dev/uinput or a Bluetooth device.
To fix this, convert any potential format directives in the device name
by duplicating percentages.
Pre-rendering the device to avoid the issue altogether would be nicer
but the current log level hooks do not easily allow for this. The device
name is the only user-controlled part of the format string.
A second potential issue is the sysname of the device which is also
sanitized.
This issue was found by Albin Eldstål-Ahrens and Benjamin Svensson from
Assured AB, and independently by Lukas Lamster.
Fixes #752
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]>
|
static const char *_php_mb_regex_mbctype2name(OnigEncoding mbctype)
{
php_mb_regex_enc_name_map_t *mapping;
for (mapping = enc_name_map; mapping->names != NULL; mapping++) {
if (mapping->code == mbctype) {
return mapping->names;
}
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
php-src
|
5b597a2e5b28e2d5a52fc1be13f425f08f47cb62
| 220,744,262,329,006,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
|
camel_ews_store_get_ooo_alert_state (const CamelEwsStore *ews_store)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (
CAMEL_IS_EWS_STORE (ews_store),
CAMEL_EWS_STORE_OOO_ALERT_STATE_UNKNOWN);
return ews_store->priv->ooo_alert_state;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 304,454,896,769,198,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
void Http2Handler::remove_settings_timer() {
ev_timer_stop(sessions_->get_loop(), &settings_timerev_);
}
| 0 |
[] |
nghttp2
|
95efb3e19d174354ca50c65d5d7227d92bcd60e1
| 197,073,158,341,636,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Don't read too greedily
|
static int hw_perf_cache_event(u64 config, u64 *eventp)
{
unsigned long type, op, result;
u64 ev;
if (!ppmu->cache_events)
return -EINVAL;
/* unpack config */
type = config & 0xff;
op = (config >> 8) & 0xff;
result = (config >> 16) & 0xff;
if (type >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX ||
op >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX ||
result >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
ev = (*ppmu->cache_events)[type][op][result];
if (ev == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ev == -1)
return -EINVAL;
*eventp = ev;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
60b7ed54a41b550d50caf7f2418db4a7e75b5bdc
| 65,451,487,626,710,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
powerpc/perf: Fix crash in perf_instruction_pointer() when ppmu is not set
On systems without any specific PMU driver support registered, running
perf record causes Oops.
The relevant portion from call trace:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000040
Faulting instruction address: 0xc0021f0c
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=4K PREEMPT CMPCPRO
SAF3000 DIE NOTIFICATION
CPU: 0 PID: 442 Comm: null_syscall Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-s3k-dev-01645-g7649ee3d2957 #5164
NIP: c0021f0c LR: c00e8ad8 CTR: c00d8a5c
NIP perf_instruction_pointer+0x10/0x60
LR perf_prepare_sample+0x344/0x674
Call Trace:
perf_prepare_sample+0x7c/0x674 (unreliable)
perf_event_output_forward+0x3c/0x94
__perf_event_overflow+0x74/0x14c
perf_swevent_hrtimer+0xf8/0x170
__hrtimer_run_queues.constprop.0+0x160/0x318
hrtimer_interrupt+0x148/0x3b0
timer_interrupt+0xc4/0x22c
Decrementer_virt+0xb8/0xbc
During perf record session, perf_instruction_pointer() is called to
capture the sample IP. This function in core-book3s accesses
ppmu->flags. If a platform specific PMU driver is not registered, ppmu
is set to NULL and accessing its members results in a crash. Fix this
crash by checking if ppmu is set.
Fixes: 2ca13a4cc56c ("powerpc/perf: Use regs->nip when SIAR is zero")
Cc: [email protected] # v5.11+
Reported-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
static bool is_mips_o32(Elf_(Ehdr) *h) {
if (h->e_ident[EI_CLASS] != ELFCLASS32) {
return false;
}
if ((h->e_flags & EF_MIPS_ABI2) != 0) {
return false;
}
if (((h->e_flags & EF_MIPS_ABI) != 0) &&
((h->e_flags & EF_MIPS_ABI) != EF_MIPS_ABI_O32)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
3ecdbf8e21186a9c5a4d3cfa3b1e9fd27045340e
| 255,831,199,840,796,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Fix 4 byte oobread in msp430 disassembler ##crash
* Only crashes with asan builds
* Add missing =SN register
* Reported by cnitlrt via huntrdev
* BountyID: 1c22055b-b015-47a8-a57b-4982978751d0
|
static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet = NULL;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *abort;
packet = sctp_ootb_pkt_new(net, asoc, chunk);
if (packet) {
/* Make an ABORT. The T bit will be set if the asoc
* is NULL.
*/
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk, 0);
if (!abort) {
sctp_ootb_pkt_free(packet);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
/* Reflect vtag if T-Bit is set */
if (sctp_test_T_bit(abort))
packet->vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
/* Set the skb to the belonging sock for accounting. */
abort->skb->sk = ep->base.sk;
sctp_packet_append_chunk(packet, abort);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT,
SCTP_PACKET(packet));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);
sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
196d67593439b03088913227093e374235596e33
| 328,905,011,221,657,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call
The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association
statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris'
SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS.
Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on
this.
V4:
- Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons
- Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid
returning bogus RTO values
- return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed
V3:
- Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well
- Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push()
- return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call
V2:
- Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion
- Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway
- Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out
of sequence unexpected TSNs
- Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts
- Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check
- Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks
- Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0)
- Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs
- Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API
- Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for
future struct growth
- Move association statistics in their own struct
- Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs
- return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the
transport when max_rto last changed.
Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int __get_v4l2_format32(struct v4l2_format *kp, struct v4l2_format32 __user *up)
{
if (get_user(kp->type, &up->type))
return -EFAULT;
switch (kp->type) {
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.pix, &up->fmt.pix,
sizeof(kp->fmt.pix)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.pix_mp, &up->fmt.pix_mp,
sizeof(kp->fmt.pix_mp)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OVERLAY:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_OVERLAY:
return get_v4l2_window32(&kp->fmt.win, &up->fmt.win);
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_CAPTURE:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VBI_OUTPUT:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.vbi, &up->fmt.vbi,
sizeof(kp->fmt.vbi)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_CAPTURE:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SLICED_VBI_OUTPUT:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.sliced, &up->fmt.sliced,
sizeof(kp->fmt.sliced)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SDR_CAPTURE:
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_SDR_OUTPUT:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.sdr, &up->fmt.sdr,
sizeof(kp->fmt.sdr)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case V4L2_BUF_TYPE_META_CAPTURE:
return copy_from_user(&kp->fmt.meta, &up->fmt.meta,
sizeof(kp->fmt.meta)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
a1dfb4c48cc1e64eeb7800a27c66a6f7e88d075a
| 243,170,391,623,155,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
media: v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c: refactor compat ioctl32 logic
The 32-bit compat v4l2 ioctl handling is implemented based on its 64-bit
equivalent. It converts 32-bit data structures into its 64-bit
equivalents and needs to provide the data to the 64-bit ioctl in user
space memory which is commonly allocated using
compat_alloc_user_space().
However, due to how that function is implemented, it can only be called
a single time for every syscall invocation.
Supposedly to avoid this limitation, the existing code uses a mix of
memory from the kernel stack and memory allocated through
compat_alloc_user_space().
Under normal circumstances, this would not work, because the 64-bit
ioctl expects all pointers to point to user space memory. As a
workaround, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is called to temporarily disable this
extra safety check and allow kernel pointers. However, this might
introduce a security vulnerability: The result of the 32-bit to 64-bit
conversion is writeable by user space because the output buffer has been
allocated via compat_alloc_user_space(). A malicious user space process
could then manipulate pointers inside this output buffer, and due to the
previous set_fs(KERNEL_DS) call, functions like get_user() or put_user()
no longer prevent kernel memory access.
The new approach is to pre-calculate the total amount of user space
memory that is needed, allocate it using compat_alloc_user_space() and
then divide up the allocated memory to accommodate all data structures
that need to be converted.
An alternative approach would have been to retain the union type karg
that they allocated on the kernel stack in do_video_ioctl(), copy all
data from user space into karg and then back to user space. However, we
decided against this approach because it does not align with other
compat syscall implementations. Instead, we tried to replicate the
get_user/put_user pairs as found in other places in the kernel:
if (get_user(clipcount, &up->clipcount) ||
put_user(clipcount, &kp->clipcount)) return -EFAULT;
Notes from [email protected]:
This patch was taken from:
https://github.com/LineageOS/android_kernel_samsung_apq8084/commit/97b733953c06e4f0398ade18850f0817778255f7
Clearly nobody could be bothered to upstream this patch or at minimum
tell us :-( We only heard about this a week ago.
This patch was rebased and cleaned up. Compared to the original I
also swapped the order of the convert_in_user arguments so that they
matched copy_in_user. It was hard to review otherwise. I also replaced
the ALLOC_USER_SPACE/ALLOC_AND_GET by a normal function.
Fixes: 6b5a9492ca ("v4l: introduce string control support.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # for v4.15 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
soup_filter_input_stream_read_until (SoupFilterInputStream *fstream,
void *buffer,
gsize length,
const void *boundary,
gsize boundary_length,
gboolean blocking,
gboolean include_boundary,
gboolean *got_boundary,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
gssize nread, read_length;
guint8 *p, *buf, *end;
gboolean eof = FALSE;
GError *my_error = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail (SOUP_IS_FILTER_INPUT_STREAM (fstream), -1);
g_return_val_if_fail (!include_boundary || (boundary_length < length), -1);
*got_boundary = FALSE;
fstream->priv->need_more = FALSE;
if (!fstream->priv->buf || fstream->priv->buf->len < boundary_length) {
guint prev_len;
fill_buffer:
if (!fstream->priv->buf)
fstream->priv->buf = g_byte_array_new ();
prev_len = fstream->priv->buf->len;
g_byte_array_set_size (fstream->priv->buf, length);
buf = fstream->priv->buf->data;
fstream->priv->in_read_until = TRUE;
nread = g_pollable_stream_read (G_INPUT_STREAM (fstream),
buf + prev_len, length - prev_len,
blocking,
cancellable, &my_error);
fstream->priv->in_read_until = FALSE;
if (nread <= 0) {
if (prev_len)
fstream->priv->buf->len = prev_len;
else {
g_byte_array_free (fstream->priv->buf, TRUE);
fstream->priv->buf = NULL;
}
if (nread == 0 && prev_len)
eof = TRUE;
else {
if (g_error_matches (my_error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_WOULD_BLOCK))
fstream->priv->need_more = TRUE;
if (my_error)
g_propagate_error (error, my_error);
return nread;
}
if (my_error)
g_propagate_error (error, my_error);
} else
fstream->priv->buf->len = prev_len + nread;
} else
buf = fstream->priv->buf->data;
/* Scan for the boundary within the range we can possibly return. */
if (include_boundary)
end = buf + MIN (fstream->priv->buf->len, length) - boundary_length;
else
end = buf + MIN (fstream->priv->buf->len - boundary_length, length);
for (p = buf; p <= end; p++) {
if (*p == *(guint8*)boundary &&
!memcmp (p, boundary, boundary_length)) {
if (include_boundary)
p += boundary_length;
*got_boundary = TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!*got_boundary && fstream->priv->buf->len < length && !eof)
goto fill_buffer;
if (eof && !*got_boundary)
read_length = MIN (fstream->priv->buf->len, length);
else
read_length = p - buf;
return read_from_buf (fstream, buffer, read_length);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libsoup
|
03c91c76daf70ee227f38304c5e45a155f45073d
| 78,875,052,172,399,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 88 |
Fix chunked decoding buffer overrun (CVE-2017-2885)
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=785774
|
static int hardware_enable(void *garbage)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
u64 old, test_bits;
if (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
return -EBUSY;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(vcpus_on_cpu, cpu));
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old);
test_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
if (tboot_enabled())
test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
if ((old & test_bits) != test_bits) {
/* enable and lock */
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old | test_bits);
}
write_cr4(read_cr4() | X86_CR4_VMXE); /* FIXME: not cpu hotplug safe */
if (vmm_exclusive) {
kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
ept_sync_global();
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[] |
linux
|
3444d7da1839b851eefedd372978d8a982316c36
| 69,023,022,111,890,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
KVM: VMX: Fix host GDT.LIMIT corruption
vmx does not restore GDT.LIMIT to the host value, instead it sets it to 64KB.
This means host userspace can learn a few bits of host memory.
Fix by reloading GDTR when we load other host state.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static netdev_features_t hns_nic_fix_features(
struct net_device *netdev, netdev_features_t features)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev);
switch (priv->enet_ver) {
case AE_VERSION_1:
features &= ~(NETIF_F_TSO | NETIF_F_TSO6 |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER);
break;
default:
break;
}
return features;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
| 80,336,858,742,958,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
scan_unsigned_hexadecimal_number(UChar** src, UChar* end, int minlen,
int maxlen, OnigEncoding enc)
{
OnigCodePoint c;
unsigned int num, val;
int n;
UChar* p = *src;
PFETCH_READY;
num = 0;
n = 0;
while (! PEND && n < maxlen) {
PFETCH(c);
if (IS_CODE_XDIGIT_ASCII(enc, c)) {
n++;
val = (unsigned int )XDIGITVAL(enc,c);
if ((INT_MAX_LIMIT - val) / 16UL < num)
return ONIGERR_TOO_BIG_NUMBER; /* overflow */
num = (num << 4) + XDIGITVAL(enc,c);
}
else {
PUNFETCH;
break;
}
}
if (n < minlen)
return ONIGERR_INVALID_CODE_POINT_VALUE;
*src = p;
return num;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-674"
] |
oniguruma
|
4097828d7cc87589864fecf452f2cd46c5f37180
| 139,681,868,252,759,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
|
struct razer_report razer_chroma_standard_matrix_set_custom_frame(unsigned char row_index, unsigned char start_col, unsigned char stop_col, unsigned char *rgb_data)
{
size_t row_length = (size_t) (((stop_col + 1) - start_col) * 3);
struct razer_report report = get_razer_report(0x03, 0x0B, 0x46); // In theory should be able to leave data size at max as we have start/stop
// printk(KERN_ALERT "razerkbd: Row ID: %d, Start: %d, Stop: %d, row length: %d\n", row_index, start_col, stop_col, (unsigned char)row_length);
report.arguments[0] = 0xFF; // Frame ID
report.arguments[1] = row_index;
report.arguments[2] = start_col;
report.arguments[3] = stop_col;
memcpy(&report.arguments[4], rgb_data, row_length);
return report;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
openrazer
|
7e8a04feb378a679f1bcdcae079a5100cc45663b
| 121,661,139,970,634,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Fix oob memcpy in matrix_custom_frame methods
Adjust row_length if it exeeds the arguments array
|
bool AddListener(CWebSock& WebSock, CTemplate& Tmpl) {
unsigned short uPort = WebSock.GetParam("port").ToUShort();
CString sHost = WebSock.GetParam("host");
if (sHost == "*") sHost = "";
bool bSSL = WebSock.GetParam("ssl").ToBool();
bool bIPv4 = WebSock.GetParam("ipv4").ToBool();
bool bIPv6 = WebSock.GetParam("ipv6").ToBool();
bool bIRC = WebSock.GetParam("irc").ToBool();
bool bWeb = WebSock.GetParam("web").ToBool();
EAddrType eAddr = ADDR_ALL;
if (bIPv4) {
if (bIPv6) {
eAddr = ADDR_ALL;
} else {
eAddr = ADDR_IPV4ONLY;
}
} else {
if (bIPv6) {
eAddr = ADDR_IPV6ONLY;
} else {
WebSock.GetSession()->AddError("Choose either IPv4 or IPv6 or both.");
return SettingsPage(WebSock, Tmpl);
}
}
CListener::EAcceptType eAccept;
if (bIRC) {
if (bWeb) {
eAccept = CListener::ACCEPT_ALL;
} else {
eAccept = CListener::ACCEPT_IRC;
}
} else {
if (bWeb) {
eAccept = CListener::ACCEPT_HTTP;
} else {
WebSock.GetSession()->AddError("Choose either IRC or Web or both.");
return SettingsPage(WebSock, Tmpl);
}
}
CString sMessage;
if (CZNC::Get().AddListener(uPort, sHost, bSSL, eAddr, eAccept, sMessage)) {
if (!sMessage.empty()) {
WebSock.GetSession()->AddSuccess(sMessage);
}
if (!CZNC::Get().WriteConfig()) {
WebSock.GetSession()->AddError("Port changed, but config was not written");
}
} else {
WebSock.GetSession()->AddError(sMessage);
}
return SettingsPage(WebSock, Tmpl);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
znc
|
2bd410ee5570cea127233f1133ea22f25174eb28
| 294,785,884,054,124,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 |
Fix NULL pointer dereference in webadmin.
Triggerable by any non-admin, if webadmin is loaded.
The only affected version is 1.0
Thanks to ChauffeR (Simone Esposito) for reporting this.
|
static void sctp_packet_append_data(struct sctp_packet *packet,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport = packet->transport;
size_t datasize = sctp_data_size(chunk);
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
u32 rwnd = asoc->peer.rwnd;
/* Keep track of how many bytes are in flight over this transport. */
transport->flight_size += datasize;
/* Keep track of how many bytes are in flight to the receiver. */
asoc->outqueue.outstanding_bytes += datasize;
/* Update our view of the receiver's rwnd. */
if (datasize < rwnd)
rwnd -= datasize;
else
rwnd = 0;
asoc->peer.rwnd = rwnd;
/* Has been accepted for transmission. */
if (!asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
chunk->msg->can_abandon = 0;
sctp_chunk_assign_tsn(chunk);
sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(chunk);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
196d67593439b03088913227093e374235596e33
| 73,197,938,365,967,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
sctp: Add support to per-association statistics via a new SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS call
The current SCTP stack is lacking a mechanism to have per association
statistics. This is an implementation modeled after OpenSolaris'
SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS.
Userspace part will follow on lksctp if/when there is a general ACK on
this.
V4:
- Move ipackets++ before q->immediate.func() for consistency reasons
- Move sctp_max_rto() at the end of sctp_transport_update_rto() to avoid
returning bogus RTO values
- return asoc->rto_min when max_obs_rto value has not changed
V3:
- Increase ictrlchunks in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() as well
- Move ipackets++ to sctp_inq_push()
- return 0 when no rto updates took place since the last call
V2:
- Implement partial retrieval of stat struct to cope for future expansion
- Kill the rtxpackets counter as it cannot be precise anyway
- Rename outseqtsns to outofseqtsns to make it clearer that these are out
of sequence unexpected TSNs
- Move asoc->ipackets++ under a lock to avoid potential miscounts
- Fold asoc->opackets++ into the already existing asoc check
- Kill unneeded (q->asoc) test when increasing rtxchunks
- Do not count octrlchunks if sending failed (SCTP_XMIT_OK != 0)
- Don't count SHUTDOWNs as SACKs
- Move SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS to the private space API
- Adjust the len check in sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats() to allow for
future struct growth
- Move association statistics in their own struct
- Update idupchunks when we send a SACK with dup TSNs
- return min_rto in max_rto when RTO has not changed. Also return the
transport when max_rto last changed.
Signed-off: Michele Baldessari <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int ipv6_defrag(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
int err;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK)
/* Previously seen (loopback)? */
if (skb->nfct && !nf_ct_is_template((struct nf_conn *)skb->nfct))
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
err = nf_ct_frag6_gather(state->net, skb,
nf_ct6_defrag_user(state->hook, skb));
/* queued */
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
return NF_STOLEN;
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
9b57da0630c9fd36ed7a20fc0f98dc82cc0777fa
| 155,327,537,767,366,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
f_max(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
max_min(argvars, rettv, TRUE);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075
| 50,805,061,564,351,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others.
|
sldns_bget_token_par(sldns_buffer *b, char *token, const char *delim,
size_t limit, int* par, const char* skipw)
{
int c, lc;
int p; /* 0 -> no parentheses seen, >0 nr of ( seen */
int com, quoted;
char *t;
size_t i;
const char *d;
const char *del;
/* standard delimiters */
if (!delim) {
/* from isspace(3) */
del = LDNS_PARSE_NORMAL;
} else {
del = delim;
}
p = (par?*par:0);
i = 0;
com = 0;
quoted = 0;
t = token;
lc = 0;
if (del[0] == '"') {
quoted = 1;
}
while ((c = sldns_bgetc(b)) != EOF) {
if (c == '\r') /* carriage return */
c = ' ';
if (c == '(' && lc != '\\' && !quoted) {
/* this only counts for non-comments */
if (com == 0) {
if(par) (*par)++;
p++;
}
lc = c;
continue;
}
if (c == ')' && lc != '\\' && !quoted) {
/* this only counts for non-comments */
if (com == 0) {
if(par) (*par)--;
p--;
}
lc = c;
continue;
}
if (p < 0) {
/* more ) then ( */
*t = '\0';
return 0;
}
/* do something with comments ; */
if (c == ';' && quoted == 0) {
if (lc != '\\') {
com = 1;
}
}
if (c == '"' && com == 0 && lc != '\\') {
quoted = 1 - quoted;
}
if (c == '\n' && com != 0) {
/* comments */
com = 0;
*t = ' ';
lc = c;
continue;
}
if (com == 1) {
*t = ' ';
lc = c;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n' && p != 0) {
/* in parentheses */
/* do not write ' ' if we want to skip spaces */
if(!(skipw && (strchr(skipw, c)||strchr(skipw, ' ')))) {
/* check for space for the space character */
if (limit > 0 && (i >= limit || (size_t)(t-token) >= limit)) {
*t = '\0';
return -1;
}
*t++ = ' ';
}
lc = c;
continue;
}
/* check to skip whitespace at start, but also after ( */
if(skipw && i==0 && !com && !quoted && lc != '\\') {
if(strchr(skipw, c)) {
lc = c;
continue;
}
}
/* check if we hit the delim */
for (d = del; *d; d++) {
/* we can only exit if no parens or user tracks them */
if (c == *d && lc != '\\' && (p == 0 || par)) {
goto tokenread;
}
}
i++;
if (limit > 0 && (i >= limit || (size_t)(t-token) >= limit)) {
*t = '\0';
return -1;
}
*t++ = c;
if (c == '\\' && lc == '\\') {
lc = 0;
} else {
lc = c;
}
}
*t = '\0';
if (i == 0) {
/* nothing read */
return -1;
}
if (!par && p != 0) {
return -1;
}
return (ssize_t)i;
tokenread:
if(*del == '"')
/* do not skip over quotes after the string, they are part
* of the next string. But skip over whitespace (if needed)*/
sldns_bskipcs(b, del+1);
else sldns_bskipcs(b, del);
*t = '\0';
if (!par && p != 0) {
return -1;
}
return (ssize_t)i;
}
| 1 |
[] |
unbound
|
05a5dc2d0d7d1c9054af48913079abebff06a5a1
| 73,738,170,288,021,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 149 |
- Fix out-of-bounds null-byte write in sldns_bget_token_par while
parsing type WKS, reported by Luis Merino from X41 D-Sec.
|
assert_beeps(typval_T *argvars, int no_beep)
{
char_u *cmd;
garray_T ga;
int ret = 0;
if (in_vim9script() && check_for_string_arg(argvars, 0) == FAIL)
return 0;
cmd = tv_get_string_chk(&argvars[0]);
called_vim_beep = FALSE;
suppress_errthrow = TRUE;
emsg_silent = FALSE;
do_cmdline_cmd(cmd);
if (no_beep ? called_vim_beep : !called_vim_beep)
{
prepare_assert_error(&ga);
if (no_beep)
ga_concat(&ga, (char_u *)"command did beep: ");
else
ga_concat(&ga, (char_u *)"command did not beep: ");
ga_concat(&ga, cmd);
assert_error(&ga);
ga_clear(&ga);
ret = 1;
}
suppress_errthrow = FALSE;
emsg_on_display = FALSE;
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-121",
"CWE-787"
] |
vim
|
34f8117dec685ace52cd9e578e2729db278163fc
| 278,654,975,789,317,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
patch 8.2.4397: crash when using many composing characters in error message
Problem: Crash when using many composing characters in error message.
Solution: Use mb_cptr2char_adv() instead of mb_ptr2char_adv().
|
const Network::Address::InstanceConstSharedPtr& localAddress() const override {
return StreamInfoImpl::downstreamAddressProvider().localAddress();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
envoy
|
148de954ed3585d8b4298b424aa24916d0de6136
| 20,851,560,867,288,912,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
CVE-2021-43825
Response filter manager crash
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
static void ext4_inode_csum_set(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_inode *raw,
struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
{
__u32 csum;
if (EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_creator_os !=
cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_LINUX) ||
!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb))
return;
csum = ext4_inode_csum(inode, raw, ei);
raw->i_checksum_lo = cpu_to_le16(csum & 0xFFFF);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw, ei, i_checksum_hi))
raw->i_checksum_hi = cpu_to_le16(csum >> 16);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b
| 89,854,187,088,632,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
list_contains_unique_index(TABLE *table,
bool (*find_func) (Field *, void *), void *data)
{
for (uint keynr= 0; keynr < table->s->keys; keynr++)
{
if (keynr == table->s->primary_key ||
(table->key_info[keynr].flags & HA_NOSAME))
{
KEY *keyinfo= table->key_info + keynr;
KEY_PART_INFO *key_part, *key_part_end;
for (key_part=keyinfo->key_part,
key_part_end=key_part+ keyinfo->user_defined_key_parts;
key_part < key_part_end;
key_part++)
{
if (key_part->field->maybe_null() ||
!find_func(key_part->field, data))
break;
}
if (key_part == key_part_end)
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
server
|
ff77a09bda884fe6bf3917eb29b9d3a2f53f919b
| 326,022,654,580,808,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
MDEV-22464 Server crash on UPDATE with nested subquery
Uninitialized ref_pointer_array[] because setup_fields() got empty
fields list. mysql_multi_update() for some reason does that by
substituting the fields list with empty total_list for the
mysql_select() call (looks like wrong merge since total_list is not
used anywhere else and is always empty). The fix would be to return
back the original fields list. But this fails update_use_source.test
case:
--error ER_BAD_FIELD_ERROR
update v1 set t1c1=2 order by 1;
Actually not failing the above seems to be ok.
The other fix would be to keep resolve_in_select_list false (and that
keeps outer context from being resolved in
Item_ref::fix_fields()). This fix is more consistent with how SELECT
behaves:
--error ER_SUBQUERY_NO_1_ROW
select a from t1 where a= (select 2 from t1 having (a = 3));
So this patch implements this fix.
|
static void dequeue_task_fair(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq;
struct sched_entity *se = &p->se;
int task_sleep = flags & DEQUEUE_SLEEP;
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
dequeue_entity(cfs_rq, se, flags);
/*
* end evaluation on encountering a throttled cfs_rq
*
* note: in the case of encountering a throttled cfs_rq we will
* post the final h_nr_running decrement below.
*/
if (cfs_rq_throttled(cfs_rq))
break;
cfs_rq->h_nr_running--;
/* Don't dequeue parent if it has other entities besides us */
if (cfs_rq->load.weight) {
/* Avoid re-evaluating load for this entity: */
se = parent_entity(se);
/*
* Bias pick_next to pick a task from this cfs_rq, as
* p is sleeping when it is within its sched_slice.
*/
if (task_sleep && se && !throttled_hierarchy(cfs_rq))
set_next_buddy(se);
break;
}
flags |= DEQUEUE_SLEEP;
}
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
cfs_rq->h_nr_running--;
if (cfs_rq_throttled(cfs_rq))
break;
update_load_avg(cfs_rq, se, UPDATE_TG);
update_cfs_group(se);
}
if (!se)
sub_nr_running(rq, 1);
util_est_dequeue(&rq->cfs, p, task_sleep);
hrtick_update(rq);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
| 99,274,440,483,018,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 |
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
TEST_P(Security, BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_PermissionsEnableDiscoveryDisableAccessNone_validation_ok_enable_discovery_disable_access_none)
// *INDENT-ON*
{
PubSubReader<HelloWorldType> reader(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
PubSubWriter<HelloWorldType> writer(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
std::string governance_file("governance_enable_discovery_disable_access_none.smime");
BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_Permissions_validation_ok_common(reader, writer, governance_file);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
Fast-DDS
|
d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384
| 231,383,974,062,046,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]>
|
static void opj_j2k_tcp_data_destroy (opj_tcp_t *p_tcp)
{
if (p_tcp->m_data) {
opj_free(p_tcp->m_data);
p_tcp->m_data = NULL;
p_tcp->m_data_size = 0;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
openjpeg
|
940100c28ae28931722290794889cf84a92c5f6f
| 248,852,217,411,443,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Fix potential use-after-free in opj_j2k_write_mco function
Fixes #563
|
static void welcome_page(void)
{
if (file_exist("help/welcome.html")) {
include_html("help/welcome.html");
} else {
include_html("help/welcome-no-samba-doc.html");
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
samba
|
71225948a249f079120282740fcc39fd6faa880e
| 68,664,751,059,290,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
swat: Use X-Frame-Options header to avoid clickjacking
Jann Horn reported a potential clickjacking vulnerability in SWAT where
the SWAT page could be embedded into an attacker's page using a frame or
iframe and then used to trick the user to change Samba settings.
Avoid this by telling the browser to refuse the frame embedding via the
X-Frame-Options: DENY header.
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <[email protected]>
Fix bug #9576 - CVE-2013-0213: Clickjacking issue in SWAT.
|
void sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(struct crypto_hash *auth_hmacs[])
{
int i;
if (!auth_hmacs)
return;
for (i = 0; i < SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS; i++)
{
if (auth_hmacs[i])
crypto_free_hash(auth_hmacs[i]);
}
kfree(auth_hmacs);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux-2.6
|
30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246
| 310,798,335,386,668,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
sctp: add verification checks to SCTP_AUTH_KEY option
The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a
length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow
conditions. Spoted by Eugene Teo <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void ati_remote2_complete_mouse(struct urb *urb)
{
struct ati_remote2 *ar2 = urb->context;
int r;
switch (urb->status) {
case 0:
usb_mark_last_busy(ar2->udev);
ati_remote2_input_mouse(ar2);
break;
case -ENOENT:
case -EILSEQ:
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&ar2->intf[0]->dev,
"%s(): urb status = %d\n", __func__, urb->status);
return;
default:
usb_mark_last_busy(ar2->udev);
dev_err(&ar2->intf[0]->dev,
"%s(): urb status = %d\n", __func__, urb->status);
}
r = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r)
dev_err(&ar2->intf[0]->dev,
"%s(): usb_submit_urb() = %d\n", __func__, r);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
950336ba3e4a1ffd2ca60d29f6ef386dd2c7351d
| 172,430,112,524,948,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
void WebContents::DOMContentLoaded(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
auto* web_frame = WebFrameMain::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host);
if (web_frame)
web_frame->DOMContentLoaded();
if (!render_frame_host->GetParent())
Emit("dom-ready");
}
| 0 |
[] |
electron
|
e9fa834757f41c0b9fe44a4dffe3d7d437f52d34
| 160,125,629,107,853,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to appropriate render frames (#33344)
* fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to authorized render frames
Notes: no-notes
* refactor: extract electron API IPC to its own mojo interface
* fix: just check main frame not primary main frame
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]>
|
static void nasm_verror_common(int severity, const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
char msg[1024];
const char *pfx;
switch (severity & (ERR_MASK|ERR_NO_SEVERITY)) {
case ERR_WARNING:
pfx = "warning: ";
break;
case ERR_NONFATAL:
pfx = "error: ";
break;
case ERR_FATAL:
pfx = "fatal: ";
break;
case ERR_PANIC:
pfx = "panic: ";
break;
case ERR_DEBUG:
pfx = "debug: ";
break;
default:
pfx = "";
break;
}
vsnprintf(msg, sizeof msg - 64, fmt, args);
if (is_valid_warning(severity) && WARN_IDX(severity) != ERR_WARN_OTHER) {
char *p = strchr(msg, '\0');
snprintf(p, 64, " [-w+%s]", warnings[WARN_IDX(severity)].name);
}
if (!skip_this_pass(severity))
fprintf(error_file, "%s%s\n", pfx, msg);
/* Are we recursing from error_list_macros? */
if (severity & ERR_PP_LISTMACRO)
return;
/*
* Don't suppress this with skip_this_pass(), or we don't get
* pass1 or preprocessor warnings in the list file
*/
lfmt->error(severity, pfx, msg);
if (skip_this_pass(severity))
return;
if (severity & ERR_USAGE)
want_usage = true;
preproc->error_list_macros(severity);
switch (severity & ERR_MASK) {
case ERR_DEBUG:
/* no further action, by definition */
break;
case ERR_WARNING:
/* Treat warnings as errors */
if (warning_is_error(severity))
terminate_after_phase = true;
break;
case ERR_NONFATAL:
terminate_after_phase = true;
break;
case ERR_FATAL:
if (ofile) {
fclose(ofile);
if (!keep_all)
remove(outname);
ofile = NULL;
}
if (want_usage)
usage();
exit(1); /* instantly die */
break; /* placate silly compilers */
case ERR_PANIC:
fflush(NULL);
if (abort_on_panic)
abort(); /* halt, catch fire, dump core/stop debugger */
if (ofile) {
fclose(ofile);
if (!keep_all)
remove(outname);
ofile = NULL;
}
exit(3);
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
nasm
|
e996d28c70d45008085322b442b44a9224308548
| 144,628,025,537,600,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 |
labels: Don't nil dereference if no label provided
An equ without label may cause nil dereference
| equ 0x100
Fixes 98578071b9d71ecaa2344dd9c185237c1765041e
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
|
static void arcmsr_iop_message_read(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_DRIVER_DATA_READ_OK, ®->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
writel(ARCMSR_DRV2IOP_DATA_READ_OK, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = acb->pmuC;
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_DRV2IOP_DATA_READ_OK, ®->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D: {
struct MessageUnit_D *reg = acb->pmuD;
writel(ARCMSR_ARC1214_DRV2IOP_DATA_OUT_READ,
reg->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167
| 167,179,230,664,346,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
static void mp_send_xchar(struct tty_struct *tty, char ch)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
unsigned long flags;
if (port->ops->send_xchar)
port->ops->send_xchar(port, ch);
else {
port->x_char = ch;
if (ch) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags);
port->ops->start_tx(port);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&port->lock, flags);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427
| 93,992,255,374,594,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
njs_promise_invoke_then(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_value_t *promise, njs_value_t *args,
njs_int_t nargs)
{
njs_int_t ret;
njs_value_t function;
static const njs_value_t string_then = njs_string("then");
ret = njs_value_property(vm, promise, njs_value_arg(&string_then),
&function);
if (njs_slow_path(ret != NJS_OK)) {
if (ret == NJS_DECLINED) {
goto failed;
}
return NJS_ERROR;
}
if (njs_fast_path(njs_is_function(&function))) {
return njs_function_call(vm, njs_function(&function), promise, args,
nargs, &vm->retval);
}
failed:
njs_type_error(vm, "is not a function");
return NJS_ERROR;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
njs
|
31ed93a5623f24ca94e6d47e895ba735d9d97d46
| 130,985,053,439,856,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
Fixed aggregation methods of Promise ctor with array-like object.
Previously, while iterating over an array-like object the methods may be
resolved with INVALID values. INVALID value is a special internal type which
should never be visible by ordinary functions.
The fix is to ensure that absent elements are represented by undefined value.
The following methods were fixed Promise.all(), Promise.allSettled(),
Promise.any(), Promise.race().
This closes #483 issue on Github.
|
int bus_attach_inotify_event(sd_bus *bus) {
int r;
assert(bus);
if (bus->inotify_fd < 0)
return 0;
if (!bus->event)
return 0;
if (!bus->inotify_event_source) {
r = sd_event_add_io(bus->event, &bus->inotify_event_source, bus->inotify_fd, EPOLLIN, io_callback, bus);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = sd_event_source_set_priority(bus->inotify_event_source, bus->event_priority);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = sd_event_source_set_description(bus->inotify_event_source, "bus-inotify");
} else
r = sd_event_source_set_io_fd(bus->inotify_event_source, bus->inotify_fd);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
systemd
|
1068447e6954dc6ce52f099ed174c442cb89ed54
| 103,985,232,568,901,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueue_for_read() we have a
way to put an incoming message back into the read queue for this
purpose.
This might have other uses too, for example debugging.
|
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext %s\n",s->session->tlsext_hostname?s->session->tlsext_hostname:"NULL");
#endif
s->servername_done = 0;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
return 1;
n2s(data,len);
if (data > (d+n-len))
return 1;
while (data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
return 1;
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
- Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
the value of the Host: field.
- Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int servname_type;
int dsize = size-3 ;
if (dsize > 0 )
{
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata,len);
if (len != dsize)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (servname_type)
{
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
{
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_hostname %s\n",s->session->tlsext_hostname);
#endif
}
else
s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
data+=size;
}
*p = data;
return 1;
}
| 1 |
[] |
openssl
|
36ca4ba63d083da6f9d4598f18f17a8c32c8eca2
| 106,125,072,201,219,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 108 |
Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites
Submitted by: Douglas Stebila
|
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_new_encap_port(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_new_encap_port_hdr nep;
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_abort(asoc, chunk,
sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) + sizeof(nep));
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
sctp_init_cause(retval, SCTP_ERROR_NEW_ENCAP_PORT, sizeof(nep));
nep.cur_port = SCTP_INPUT_CB(chunk->skb)->encap_port;
nep.new_port = chunk->transport->encap_port;
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(nep), &nep);
nodata:
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-704"
] |
linux
|
a2d859e3fc97e79d907761550dbc03ff1b36479c
| 9,262,049,474,070,553,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
sctp: account stream padding length for reconf chunk
sctp_make_strreset_req() makes repeated calls to sctp_addto_chunk()
which will automatically account for padding on each call. inreq and
outreq are already 4 bytes aligned, but the payload is not and doing
SCTP_PAD4(a + b) (which _sctp_make_chunk() did implicitly here) is
different from SCTP_PAD4(a) + SCTP_PAD4(b) and not enough. It led to
possible attempt to use more buffer than it was allocated and triggered
a BUG_ON.
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Cc: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Fixes: cc16f00f6529 ("sctp: add support for generating stream reconf ssn reset request chunk")
Reported-by: Eiichi Tsukata <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b97c1f8b0c7ff79ac4ed206fc2c49d3612e0850c.1634156849.git.mleitner@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
static void mb86a20s_reset_frontend_cache(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct mb86a20s_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
dev_dbg(&state->i2c->dev, "%s called.\n", __func__);
/* Fixed parameters */
c->delivery_system = SYS_ISDBT;
c->bandwidth_hz = 6000000;
/* Initialize values that will be later autodetected */
c->isdbt_layer_enabled = 0;
c->transmission_mode = TRANSMISSION_MODE_AUTO;
c->guard_interval = GUARD_INTERVAL_AUTO;
c->isdbt_sb_mode = 0;
c->isdbt_sb_segment_count = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
media_tree
|
eca2d34b9d2ce70165a50510659838e28ca22742
| 25,730,008,863,285,884,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
[media] mb86a20s: apply mask to val after checking for read failure
Appling the mask 0x0f to the immediate return of the call to
mb86a20s_readreg will always result in a positive value, meaning that the
check of ret < 0 will never work. Instead, check for a -ve return value
first, and then mask val with 0x0f.
Kudos to Mauro Carvalho Chehab for spotting the mistake in my original fix.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
PackLinuxElf64::getbrk(const Elf64_Phdr *phdr, int nph) const
{
off_t brka = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < nph; ++phdr, ++j) {
if (PT_LOAD64 == get_te32(&phdr->p_type)) {
off_t b = get_te64(&phdr->p_vaddr) + get_te64(&phdr->p_memsz);
if (b > brka)
brka = b;
}
}
return brka;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
upx
|
ef336dbcc6dc8344482f8cf6c909ae96c3286317
| 172,845,269,295,297,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Protect against bad crafted input.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/128
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp
|
__gfn_to_pfn_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, bool atomic,
bool *async, bool write_fault, bool *writable)
{
unsigned long addr = __gfn_to_hva_many(slot, gfn, NULL, write_fault);
if (addr == KVM_HVA_ERR_RO_BAD)
return KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT;
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return KVM_PFN_ERR_BAD;
/* Do not map writable pfn in the readonly memslot. */
if (writable && memslot_is_readonly(slot)) {
*writable = false;
writable = NULL;
}
return hva_to_pfn(addr, atomic, async, write_fault,
writable);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
12d6e7538e2d418c08f082b1b44ffa5fb7270ed8
| 314,637,675,185,415,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
static uint32_t get_lease(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
{
uint8_t *option;
uint32_t lease_seconds;
option = dhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
if (!option)
return 3600;
lease_seconds = get_be32(option);
if (lease_seconds < 10)
lease_seconds = 10;
return lease_seconds;
}
| 1 |
[] |
connman
|
58d397ba74873384aee449690a9070bacd5676fa
| 303,677,984,874,336,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
gdhcp: Avoid reading invalid data in dhcp_get_option
|
int sm2_ciphertext_size(const EC_KEY *key, const EVP_MD *digest, size_t msg_len,
size_t *ct_size)
{
const size_t field_size = ec_field_size(EC_KEY_get0_group(key));
const int md_size = EVP_MD_size(digest);
size_t sz;
if (field_size == 0 || md_size < 0)
return 0;
/* Integer and string are simple type; set constructed = 0, means primitive and definite length encoding. */
sz = 2 * ASN1_object_size(0, field_size + 1, V_ASN1_INTEGER)
+ ASN1_object_size(0, md_size, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ ASN1_object_size(0, msg_len, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
/* Sequence is structured type; set constructed = 1, means constructed and definite length encoding. */
*ct_size = ASN1_object_size(1, sz, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
openssl
|
59f5e75f3bced8fc0e130d72a3f582cf7b480b46
| 176,110,781,639,201,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Correctly calculate the length of SM2 plaintext given the ciphertext
Previously the length of the SM2 plaintext could be incorrectly calculated.
The plaintext length was calculated by taking the ciphertext length and
taking off an "overhead" value.
The overhead value was assumed to have a "fixed" element of 10 bytes.
This is incorrect since in some circumstances it can be more than 10 bytes.
Additionally the overhead included the length of two integers C1x and C1y,
which were assumed to be the same length as the field size (32 bytes for
the SM2 curve). However in some cases these integers can have an additional
padding byte when the msb is set, to disambiguate them from negative
integers. Additionally the integers can also be less than 32 bytes in
length in some cases.
If the calculated overhead is incorrect and larger than the actual value
this can result in the calculated plaintext length being too small.
Applications are likely to allocate buffer sizes based on this and therefore
a buffer overrun can occur.
CVE-2021-3711
Issue reported by John Ouyang.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <[email protected]>
|
static void rbd_handle_released_lock(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, u8 struct_v,
void **p)
{
struct rbd_client_id cid = { 0 };
if (struct_v >= 2) {
cid.gid = ceph_decode_64(p);
cid.handle = ceph_decode_64(p);
}
dout("%s rbd_dev %p cid %llu-%llu\n", __func__, rbd_dev, cid.gid,
cid.handle);
if (!rbd_cid_equal(&cid, &rbd_empty_cid)) {
down_write(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
if (!rbd_cid_equal(&cid, &rbd_dev->owner_cid)) {
dout("%s rbd_dev %p unexpected owner, cid %llu-%llu != owner_cid %llu-%llu\n",
__func__, rbd_dev, cid.gid, cid.handle,
rbd_dev->owner_cid.gid, rbd_dev->owner_cid.handle);
up_write(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
return;
}
rbd_set_owner_cid(rbd_dev, &rbd_empty_cid);
downgrade_write(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
} else {
down_read(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
}
maybe_kick_acquire(rbd_dev);
up_read(&rbd_dev->lock_rwsem);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-863"
] |
linux
|
f44d04e696feaf13d192d942c4f14ad2e117065a
| 184,551,856,994,105,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
rbd: require global CAP_SYS_ADMIN for mapping and unmapping
It turns out that currently we rely only on sysfs attribute
permissions:
$ ll /sys/bus/rbd/{add*,remove*}
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/add_single_major
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:37 /sys/bus/rbd/remove
--w------- 1 root root 4096 Sep 3 20:38 /sys/bus/rbd/remove_single_major
This means that images can be mapped and unmapped (i.e. block devices
can be created and deleted) by a UID 0 process even after it drops all
privileges or by any process with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE in its user namespace
as long as UID 0 is mapped into that user namespace.
Be consistent with other virtual block devices (loop, nbd, dm, md, etc)
and require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace for mapping and
unmapping, and also for dumping the configuration string and refreshing
the image header.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
|
vte_sequence_handler_erase_in_line (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
GValue *value;
long param;
guint i;
/* The default parameter is 0. */
param = 0;
/* Pull out a parameter. */
for (i = 0; (params != NULL) && (i < params->n_values); i++) {
value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i);
if (!G_VALUE_HOLDS_LONG(value)) {
continue;
}
param = g_value_get_long(value);
}
/* Clear the right area. */
switch (param) {
case 0:
/* Clear to end of the line. */
vte_sequence_handler_ce (terminal, NULL);
break;
case 1:
/* Clear to start of the line. */
vte_sequence_handler_cb (terminal, NULL);
break;
case 2:
/* Clear the entire line. */
_vte_terminal_clear_current_line (terminal);
break;
default:
break;
}
/* We've modified the display. Make a note of it. */
terminal->pvt->text_deleted_flag = TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
vte
|
58bc3a942f198a1a8788553ca72c19d7c1702b74
| 222,845,519,928,955,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
fix bug #548272
svn path=/trunk/; revision=2365
|
static uint32_t rtl8139_IntrStatus_read(RTL8139State *s)
{
uint32_t ret = s->IntrStatus;
DPRINTF("IntrStatus read(w) val=0x%04x\n", ret);
#if 0
/* reading ISR clears all interrupts */
s->IntrStatus = 0;
rtl8139_update_irq(s);
#endif
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
qemu
|
5311fb805a4403bba024e83886fa0e7572265de4
| 249,291,343,886,715,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
rtl8139: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for loopback
This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
reentrancy and return early.
This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
Cc: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1910826
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
|
read_r2007_init (Dwg_Data *restrict dwg)
{
if (dwg->opts)
loglevel = dwg->opts & DWG_OPTS_LOGLEVEL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libredwg
|
45d2a290c65ed691be0901ba2b2ef51044e07a16
| 239,134,254,588,417,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
decode_r2007: fix for invalid section size
See GH #350. With fuzzing section->data_size might not fit
section_page->uncomp_size.
|
static int ipip6_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
#ifndef I_WISH_WORLD_WERE_PERFECT
/* It is not :-( All the routers (except for Linux) return only
8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.
*/
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr*)skb->data;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
int err;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
return 0;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return 0;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
return 0;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return 0;
break;
}
err = -ENOENT;
read_lock(&ipip6_lock);
t = ipip6_tunnel_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), iph->daddr, iph->saddr);
if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
goto out;
if (jiffies - t->err_time < IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO)
t->err_count++;
else
t->err_count = 1;
t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
read_unlock(&ipip6_lock);
return err;
#else
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr*)dp;
int hlen = iph->ihl<<2;
struct ipv6hdr *iph6;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
int rel_type = 0;
int rel_code = 0;
int rel_info = 0;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct rt6_info *rt6i;
if (len < hlen + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))
return;
iph6 = (struct ipv6hdr*)(dp + hlen);
switch (type) {
default:
return;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
if (icmp_hdr(skb)->un.gateway < hlen)
return;
/* So... This guy found something strange INSIDE encapsulated
packet. Well, he is fool, but what can we do ?
*/
rel_type = ICMPV6_PARAMPROB;
rel_info = icmp_hdr(skb)->un.gateway - hlen;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Too complicated case ... */
return;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe, it is just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
rel_type = ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH;
rel_code = ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH;
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return;
rel_type = ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED;
rel_code = ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT;
break;
}
/* Prepare fake skb to feed it to icmpv6_send */
skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb2 == NULL)
return 0;
dst_release(skb2->dst);
skb2->dst = NULL;
skb_pull(skb2, skb->data - (u8*)iph6);
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
/* Try to guess incoming interface */
rt6i = rt6_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), &iph6->saddr, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (rt6i && rt6i->rt6i_dev) {
skb2->dev = rt6i->rt6i_dev;
rt6i = rt6_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev),
&iph6->daddr, &iph6->saddr, NULL, 0);
if (rt6i && rt6i->rt6i_dev && rt6i->rt6i_dev->type == ARPHRD_SIT) {
struct ip_tunnel *t = netdev_priv(rt6i->rt6i_dev);
if (rel_type == ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED && t->parms.iph.ttl) {
rel_type = ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH;
rel_code = ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH;
}
icmpv6_send(skb2, rel_type, rel_code, rel_info, skb2->dev);
}
}
kfree_skb(skb2);
return 0;
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux-2.6
|
36ca34cc3b8335eb1fe8bd9a1d0a2592980c3f02
| 334,050,186,226,782,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 148 |
sit: Add missing kfree_skb() on pskb_may_pull() failure.
Noticed by Paul Marks <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
gs_id get_mem_hdr_id (void *ptr)
{
return (*((hdr_id_t *)((byte *)ptr) - HDR_ID_OFFSET));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
ghostpdl
|
cfde94be1d4286bc47633c6e6eaf4e659bd78066
| 287,552,581,539,709,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Bug 697985: bounds check the array allocations methods
The clump allocator has four allocation functions that use 'number of elements'
and 'size of elements' parameters (rather than a simple 'number of bytes').
Those need specific bounds checking.
|
add_all_files_to_work_queue (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
GList *node;
NautilusFile *file;
for (node = directory->details->file_list; node != NULL; node = node->next) {
file = NAUTILUS_FILE (node->data);
nautilus_directory_add_file_to_work_queue (directory, file);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
nautilus
|
7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983
| 84,491,354,475,620,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf_attr __user *, uattr, unsigned int, size)
{
union bpf_attr attr = {};
int err;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
return -EPERM;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uattr, 1))
return -EFAULT;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE) /* silly large */
return -E2BIG;
/* If we're handed a bigger struct than we know of,
* ensure all the unknown bits are 0 - i.e. new
* user-space does not rely on any kernel feature
* extensions we dont know about yet.
*/
if (size > sizeof(attr)) {
unsigned char __user *addr;
unsigned char __user *end;
unsigned char val;
addr = (void __user *)uattr + sizeof(attr);
end = (void __user *)uattr + size;
for (; addr < end; addr++) {
err = get_user(val, addr);
if (err)
return err;
if (val)
return -E2BIG;
}
size = sizeof(attr);
}
/* copy attributes from user space, may be less than sizeof(bpf_attr) */
if (copy_from_user(&attr, uattr, size) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
switch (cmd) {
case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
err = map_create(&attr);
break;
case BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM:
err = map_lookup_elem(&attr);
break;
case BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM:
err = map_update_elem(&attr);
break;
case BPF_MAP_DELETE_ELEM:
err = map_delete_elem(&attr);
break;
case BPF_MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY:
err = map_get_next_key(&attr);
break;
case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
err = bpf_prog_load(&attr);
break;
case BPF_OBJ_PIN:
err = bpf_obj_pin(&attr);
break;
case BPF_OBJ_GET:
err = bpf_obj_get(&attr);
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e
| 93,887,331,681,496,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void HGraphBuilder::VisitConditional(Conditional* expr) {
ASSERT(!HasStackOverflow());
ASSERT(current_block() != NULL);
ASSERT(current_block()->HasPredecessor());
HBasicBlock* cond_true = graph()->CreateBasicBlock();
HBasicBlock* cond_false = graph()->CreateBasicBlock();
CHECK_BAILOUT(VisitForControl(expr->condition(), cond_true, cond_false));
// Visit the true and false subexpressions in the same AST context as the
// whole expression.
if (cond_true->HasPredecessor()) {
cond_true->SetJoinId(expr->ThenId());
set_current_block(cond_true);
CHECK_BAILOUT(Visit(expr->then_expression()));
cond_true = current_block();
} else {
cond_true = NULL;
}
if (cond_false->HasPredecessor()) {
cond_false->SetJoinId(expr->ElseId());
set_current_block(cond_false);
CHECK_BAILOUT(Visit(expr->else_expression()));
cond_false = current_block();
} else {
cond_false = NULL;
}
if (!ast_context()->IsTest()) {
HBasicBlock* join = CreateJoin(cond_true, cond_false, expr->id());
set_current_block(join);
if (join != NULL && !ast_context()->IsEffect()) {
return ast_context()->ReturnValue(Pop());
}
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
node
|
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21
| 40,039,957,435,727,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/172093002
git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@19475 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
fix #8070
|
f_getchar(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
varnumber_T n;
int error = FALSE;
#ifdef MESSAGE_QUEUE
// vpeekc() used to check for messages, but that caused problems, invoking
// a callback where it was not expected. Some plugins use getchar(1) in a
// loop to await a message, therefore make sure we check for messages here.
parse_queued_messages();
#endif
/* Position the cursor. Needed after a message that ends in a space. */
windgoto(msg_row, msg_col);
++no_mapping;
++allow_keys;
for (;;)
{
if (argvars[0].v_type == VAR_UNKNOWN)
/* getchar(): blocking wait. */
n = plain_vgetc();
else if (tv_get_number_chk(&argvars[0], &error) == 1)
/* getchar(1): only check if char avail */
n = vpeekc_any();
else if (error || vpeekc_any() == NUL)
/* illegal argument or getchar(0) and no char avail: return zero */
n = 0;
else
/* getchar(0) and char avail: return char */
n = plain_vgetc();
if (n == K_IGNORE)
continue;
break;
}
--no_mapping;
--allow_keys;
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_WIN, 0);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_WINID, 0);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_LNUM, 0);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_COL, 0);
rettv->vval.v_number = n;
if (IS_SPECIAL(n) || mod_mask != 0)
{
char_u temp[10]; /* modifier: 3, mbyte-char: 6, NUL: 1 */
int i = 0;
/* Turn a special key into three bytes, plus modifier. */
if (mod_mask != 0)
{
temp[i++] = K_SPECIAL;
temp[i++] = KS_MODIFIER;
temp[i++] = mod_mask;
}
if (IS_SPECIAL(n))
{
temp[i++] = K_SPECIAL;
temp[i++] = K_SECOND(n);
temp[i++] = K_THIRD(n);
}
else if (has_mbyte)
i += (*mb_char2bytes)(n, temp + i);
else
temp[i++] = n;
temp[i++] = NUL;
rettv->v_type = VAR_STRING;
rettv->vval.v_string = vim_strsave(temp);
#ifdef FEAT_MOUSE
if (is_mouse_key(n))
{
int row = mouse_row;
int col = mouse_col;
win_T *win;
linenr_T lnum;
win_T *wp;
int winnr = 1;
if (row >= 0 && col >= 0)
{
/* Find the window at the mouse coordinates and compute the
* text position. */
win = mouse_find_win(&row, &col);
if (win == NULL)
return;
(void)mouse_comp_pos(win, &row, &col, &lnum);
for (wp = firstwin; wp != win; wp = wp->w_next)
++winnr;
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_WIN, winnr);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_WINID, win->w_id);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_LNUM, lnum);
set_vim_var_nr(VV_MOUSE_COL, col + 1);
}
}
#endif
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
vim
|
8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075
| 298,796,274,933,692,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 100 |
patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others.
|
static int rgb2hsb(float *RGB)
{
float HSB[3], v, diff;
int i, j=0;
v = 1.0;
for (i=0;i<3;i++)
HSB[i] = 0.0;
for (i=0;i<3;i++) {
if (RGB[i] > HSB[2]) {
HSB[2] = RGB[i];
j = i;
}
if (RGB[i] < v)
v = RGB[i];
}
if (HSB[2] != 0) {
diff = HSB[2] - v;
HSB[1] = diff / HSB[2];
switch (j) {
case 0 : /* R == Brightness */
/* diff can only be zero if r == br, so we need to make sure here we
* don't divide by zero
*/
if (diff)
HSB[0] = ((RGB[1] - RGB[2]) / (6.0 * diff)) + (RGB[2] > RGB[1] ? 1.0 : 0.0);
else
HSB[0] = (RGB[1] - RGB[2]) + (RGB[2] > RGB[1] ? 1.0 : 0.0);
break;
case 1 : /* G == Brightness */
HSB[0] = (1.0 / 3.0) + (RGB[2] - RGB[0]) / (6.0 * diff);
break;
case 2 : /* B == Brightness */
HSB[0] = (2.0 / 3.0) + (RGB[0] - RGB[1]) / (6.0 * diff);
break;
}
}
for (i=0;i<3;i++) {
if (HSB[i] < 0)
HSB[i] = 0;
if (RGB[i] > 1)
HSB[i] = 1;
RGB[i] = HSB[i];
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498
| 285,019,640,864,683,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
Bug 699655: Properly check the return value....
...when getting a value from a dictionary
|
next_trim (void *nxdata, uint32_t count, uint64_t offset, uint32_t flags,
int *err)
{
struct b_conn *b_conn = nxdata;
return b_conn->b->trim (b_conn->b, b_conn->conn, count, offset, flags, err);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-406"
] |
nbdkit
|
b2bc6683ea3cd1f6be694e8a681dfa411b7d15f3
| 261,275,913,010,340,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
server: Fix regression for NBD_OPT_INFO before NBD_OPT_GO
Most known NBD clients do not bother with NBD_OPT_INFO (except for
clients like 'qemu-nbd --list' that don't ever intend to connect), but
go straight to NBD_OPT_GO. However, it's not too hard to hack up qemu
to add in an extra client step (whether info on the same name, or more
interestingly, info on a different name), as a patch against qemu
commit 6f214b30445:
| diff --git i/nbd/client.c w/nbd/client.c
| index f6733962b49b..425292ac5ea9 100644
| --- i/nbd/client.c
| +++ w/nbd/client.c
| @@ -1038,6 +1038,14 @@ int nbd_receive_negotiate(AioContext *aio_context, QIOChannel *ioc,
| * TLS). If it is not available, fall back to
| * NBD_OPT_LIST for nicer error messages about a missing
| * export, then use NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME. */
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]++;
| + result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_INFO, info, errp);
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]--;
| + if (result < 0) {
| + return -EINVAL;
| + }
| result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_GO, info, errp);
| if (result < 0) {
| return -EINVAL;
This works just fine in 1.14.0, where we call .open only once (so the
INFO and GO repeat calls into the same plugin handle), but in 1.14.1
it regressed into causing an assertion failure: we are now calling
.open a second time on a connection that is already opened:
$ nbdkit -rfv null &
$ hacked-qemu-io -f raw -r nbd://localhost -c quit
...
nbdkit: null[1]: debug: null: open readonly=1
nbdkit: backend.c:179: backend_open: Assertion `h->handle == NULL' failed.
Worse, on the mainline development, we have recently made it possible
for plugins to actively report different information for different
export names; for example, a plugin may choose to report different
answers for .can_write on export A than for export B; but if we share
cached handles, then an NBD_OPT_INFO on one export prevents correct
answers for NBD_OPT_GO on the second export name. (The HACK envvar in
my qemu modifications can be used to demonstrate cross-name requests,
which are even less likely in a real client).
The solution is to call .close after NBD_OPT_INFO, coupled with enough
glue logic to reset cached connection handles back to the state
expected by .open. This in turn means factoring out another backend_*
function, but also gives us an opportunity to change
backend_set_handle to no longer accept NULL.
The assertion failure is, to some extent, a possible denial of service
attack (one client can force nbdkit to exit by merely sending OPT_INFO
before OPT_GO, preventing the next client from connecting), although
this is mitigated by using TLS to weed out untrusted clients. Still,
the fact that we introduced a potential DoS attack while trying to fix
a traffic amplification security bug is not very nice.
Sadly, as there are no known clients that easily trigger this mode of
operation (OPT_INFO before OPT_GO), there is no easy way to cover this
via a testsuite addition. I may end up hacking something into libnbd.
Fixes: c05686f957
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a6b88b195a959b17524d1c8353fd425d4891dc5f)
Conflicts:
server/backend.c
server/connections.c
server/filters.c
server/internal.h
server/plugins.c
No backend.c in the stable branch, and less things to reset, so instead
ode that logic into filter_close.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
|
ofputil_pull_queue_get_config_reply10(struct ofpbuf *msg,
struct ofputil_queue_config *queue)
{
const struct ofp_header *oh = msg->header;
unsigned int opq_len; /* Length of protocol-specific queue header. */
unsigned int len; /* Total length of queue + properties. */
/* Obtain the port number from the message header. */
if (oh->version == OFP10_VERSION) {
const struct ofp10_queue_get_config_reply *oqgcr10 = msg->msg;
queue->port = u16_to_ofp(ntohs(oqgcr10->port));
} else {
const struct ofp11_queue_get_config_reply *oqgcr11 = msg->msg;
enum ofperr error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(oqgcr11->port,
&queue->port);
if (error) {
return error;
}
}
/* Pull off the queue header and get the queue number and length. */
if (oh->version < OFP12_VERSION) {
const struct ofp10_packet_queue *opq10;
opq10 = ofpbuf_try_pull(msg, sizeof *opq10);
if (!opq10) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
queue->queue = ntohl(opq10->queue_id);
len = ntohs(opq10->len);
opq_len = sizeof *opq10;
} else {
const struct ofp12_packet_queue *opq12;
opq12 = ofpbuf_try_pull(msg, sizeof *opq12);
if (!opq12) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
queue->queue = ntohl(opq12->queue_id);
len = ntohs(opq12->len);
opq_len = sizeof *opq12;
}
/* Length check. */
if (len < opq_len || len > msg->size + opq_len || len % 8) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
len -= opq_len;
/* Pull properties. The format of these properties differs from used in
* OF1.4+ so we can't use the common property functions. */
while (len > 0) {
const struct ofp10_queue_prop_header *hdr;
unsigned int property;
unsigned int prop_len;
enum ofperr error = 0;
hdr = ofpbuf_at_assert(msg, 0, sizeof *hdr);
prop_len = ntohs(hdr->len);
if (prop_len < sizeof *hdr || prop_len > len || prop_len % 8) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_LEN;
}
property = ntohs(hdr->property);
switch (property) {
case OFPQT10_MIN_RATE:
error = parse_ofp10_queue_rate(hdr, &queue->min_rate);
break;
case OFPQT11_MAX_RATE:
error = parse_ofp10_queue_rate(hdr, &queue->max_rate);
break;
default:
VLOG_INFO_RL(&bad_ofmsg_rl, "unknown queue property %u", property);
break;
}
if (error) {
return error;
}
ofpbuf_pull(msg, prop_len);
len -= prop_len;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
ovs
|
77ad4225d125030420d897c873e4734ac708c66b
| 220,325,115,354,649,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 |
ofp-util: Fix memory leaks on error cases in ofputil_decode_group_mod().
Found by libFuzzer.
Reported-by: Bhargava Shastry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
msPostGISRetrieveVersion(PGconn *pgconn)
{
static char* sql = "SELECT postgis_version()";
int version = 0;
size_t strSize;
char *strVersion = NULL;
char *ptr;
char *strParts[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
int i = 0, j = 0;
int factor = 10000;
PGresult *pgresult = NULL;
if ( ! pgconn ) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "No open connection.", "msPostGISRetrieveVersion()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
pgresult = PQexecParams(pgconn, sql,0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if ( !pgresult || PQresultStatus(pgresult) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error executing SQL: %s", "msPostGISRetrieveVersion()", sql);
return MS_FAILURE;
}
if (PQgetisnull(pgresult, 0, 0)) {
PQclear(pgresult);
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR,"Null result returned.","msPostGISRetrieveVersion()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
strSize = PQgetlength(pgresult, 0, 0) + 1;
strVersion = (char*)msSmallMalloc(strSize);
strlcpy(strVersion, PQgetvalue(pgresult, 0, 0), strSize);
PQclear(pgresult);
ptr = strVersion;
strParts[j++] = strVersion;
while( ptr != '\0' && j < 3 ) {
if ( *ptr == '.' ) {
*ptr = '\0';
strParts[j++] = ptr + 1;
}
if ( *ptr == ' ' ) {
*ptr = '\0';
break;
}
ptr++;
}
for( i = 0; i < j; i++ ) {
version += factor * atoi(strParts[i]);
factor = factor / 100;
}
free(strVersion);
return version;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-89"
] |
mapserver
|
3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed
| 66,552,455,693,155,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
|
static double mp_diag(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
const unsigned int i_end = (unsigned int)mp.opcode[2], siz = mp.opcode[2] - 3;
double *ptrd = &_mp_arg(1) + 1;
std::memset(ptrd,0,siz*siz*sizeof(double));
for (unsigned int i = 3; i<i_end; ++i) { *(ptrd++) = _mp_arg(i); ptrd+=siz; }
return cimg::type<double>::nan();
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 264,684,898,092,066,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
.
|
static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct rt6_info *rt,
struct nl_info *info)
{
struct rt6_info *iter = NULL;
struct rt6_info **ins;
int replace = (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE));
int add = (!info->nlh ||
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE));
int found = 0;
ins = &fn->leaf;
for (iter = fn->leaf; iter; iter = iter->dst.rt6_next) {
/*
* Search for duplicates
*/
if (iter->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
/*
* Same priority level
*/
if (info->nlh &&
(info->nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL))
return -EEXIST;
if (replace) {
found++;
break;
}
if (iter->dst.dev == rt->dst.dev &&
iter->rt6i_idev == rt->rt6i_idev &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&iter->rt6i_gateway,
&rt->rt6i_gateway)) {
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings)
rt->rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
if (!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
return -EEXIST;
if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt6_clean_expires(iter);
else
rt6_set_expires(iter, rt->dst.expires);
return -EEXIST;
}
/* If we have the same destination and the same metric,
* but not the same gateway, then the route we try to
* add is sibling to this route, increment our counter
* of siblings, and later we will add our route to the
* list.
* Only static routes (which don't have flag
* RTF_EXPIRES) are used for ECMPv6.
*
* To avoid long list, we only had siblings if the
* route have a gateway.
*/
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY &&
!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES) &&
!(iter->rt6i_flags & RTF_EXPIRES))
rt->rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
if (iter->rt6i_metric > rt->rt6i_metric)
break;
ins = &iter->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* Reset round-robin state, if necessary */
if (ins == &fn->leaf)
fn->rr_ptr = NULL;
/* Link this route to others same route. */
if (rt->rt6i_nsiblings) {
unsigned int rt6i_nsiblings;
struct rt6_info *sibling, *temp_sibling;
/* Find the first route that have the same metric */
sibling = fn->leaf;
while (sibling) {
if (sibling->rt6i_metric == rt->rt6i_metric) {
list_add_tail(&rt->rt6i_siblings,
&sibling->rt6i_siblings);
break;
}
sibling = sibling->dst.rt6_next;
}
/* For each sibling in the list, increment the counter of
* siblings. BUG() if counters does not match, list of siblings
* is broken!
*/
rt6i_nsiblings = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, temp_sibling,
&rt->rt6i_siblings, rt6i_siblings) {
sibling->rt6i_nsiblings++;
BUG_ON(sibling->rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
rt6i_nsiblings++;
}
BUG_ON(rt6i_nsiblings != rt->rt6i_nsiblings);
}
/*
* insert node
*/
if (!replace) {
if (!add)
pr_warn("NLM_F_CREATE should be set when creating new route\n");
add:
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter;
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_entries++;
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
} else {
if (!found) {
if (add)
goto add;
pr_warn("NLM_F_REPLACE set, but no existing node found!\n");
return -ENOENT;
}
*ins = rt;
rt->rt6i_node = fn;
rt->dst.rt6_next = iter->dst.rt6_next;
atomic_inc(&rt->rt6i_ref);
inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info);
rt6_release(iter);
if (!(fn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO)) {
info->nl_net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_route_nodes++;
fn->fn_flags |= RTN_RTINFO;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
307f2fb95e9b96b3577916e73d92e104f8f26494
| 293,468,838,943,813,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 141 |
ipv6: only static routes qualify for equal cost multipathing
Static routes in this case are non-expiring routes which did not get
configured by autoconf or by icmpv6 redirects.
To make sure we actually get an ecmp route while searching for the first
one in this fib6_node's leafs, also make sure it matches the ecmp route
assumptions.
v2:
a) Removed RTF_EXPIRE check in dst.from chain. The check of RTF_ADDRCONF
already ensures that this route, even if added again without
RTF_EXPIRES (in case of a RA announcement with infinite timeout),
does not cause the rt6i_nsiblings logic to go wrong if a later RA
updates the expiration time later.
v3:
a) Allow RTF_EXPIRES routes to enter the ecmp route set. We have to do so,
because an pmtu event could update the RTF_EXPIRES flag and we would
not count this route, if another route joins this set. We now filter
only for RTF_GATEWAY|RTF_ADDRCONF|RTF_DYNAMIC, which are flags that
don't get changed after rt6_info construction.
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
print_module_info (CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR module)
{
CK_SLOT_ID slot_list[256];
CK_ULONG i, count;
CK_INFO info;
char *value;
CK_RV rv;
rv = (module->C_GetInfo) (&info);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
p11_message ("couldn't load module info: %s", p11_kit_strerror (rv));
return;
}
value = p11_kit_space_strdup (info.libraryDescription,
sizeof (info.libraryDescription));
printf (" library-description: %s\n", value);
free (value);
value = p11_kit_space_strdup (info.manufacturerID,
sizeof (info.manufacturerID));
printf (" library-manufacturer: %s\n", value);
free (value);
printf (" library-version: %d.%d\n",
info.libraryVersion.major,
info.libraryVersion.minor);
count = sizeof (slot_list) / sizeof (slot_list[0]);
rv = (module->C_GetSlotList) (CK_TRUE, slot_list, &count);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
p11_message ("couldn't load module info: %s", p11_kit_strerror (rv));
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
print_token_info (module, slot_list[i]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
p11-kit
|
5307a1d21a50cacd06f471a873a018d23ba4b963
| 252,264,926,068,156,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 |
Check for arithmetic overflows before allocating
|
int get_signal_to_deliver(siginfo_t *info, struct k_sigaction *return_ka,
struct pt_regs *regs, void *cookie)
{
struct sighand_struct *sighand = current->sighand;
struct signal_struct *signal = current->signal;
int signr;
relock:
/*
* We'll jump back here after any time we were stopped in TASK_STOPPED.
* While in TASK_STOPPED, we were considered "frozen enough".
* Now that we woke up, it's crucial if we're supposed to be
* frozen that we freeze now before running anything substantial.
*/
try_to_freeze();
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
* Every stopped thread goes here after wakeup. Check to see if
* we should notify the parent, prepare_signal(SIGCONT) encodes
* the CLD_ si_code into SIGNAL_CLD_MASK bits.
*/
if (unlikely(signal->flags & SIGNAL_CLD_MASK)) {
struct task_struct *leader;
int why;
if (signal->flags & SIGNAL_CLD_CONTINUED)
why = CLD_CONTINUED;
else
why = CLD_STOPPED;
signal->flags &= ~SIGNAL_CLD_MASK;
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
* Notify the parent that we're continuing. This event is
* always per-process and doesn't make whole lot of sense
* for ptracers, who shouldn't consume the state via
* wait(2) either, but, for backward compatibility, notify
* the ptracer of the group leader too unless it's gonna be
* a duplicate.
*/
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
do_notify_parent_cldstop(current, false, why);
leader = current->group_leader;
if (task_ptrace(leader) && !real_parent_is_ptracer(leader))
do_notify_parent_cldstop(leader, true, why);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
goto relock;
}
for (;;) {
struct k_sigaction *ka;
/*
* Tracing can induce an artificial signal and choose sigaction.
* The return value in @signr determines the default action,
* but @info->si_signo is the signal number we will report.
*/
signr = tracehook_get_signal(current, regs, info, return_ka);
if (unlikely(signr < 0))
goto relock;
if (unlikely(signr != 0))
ka = return_ka;
else {
if (unlikely(current->group_stop &
GROUP_STOP_PENDING) && do_signal_stop(0))
goto relock;
signr = dequeue_signal(current, ¤t->blocked,
info);
if (!signr)
break; /* will return 0 */
if (signr != SIGKILL) {
signr = ptrace_signal(signr, info,
regs, cookie);
if (!signr)
continue;
}
ka = &sighand->action[signr-1];
}
/* Trace actually delivered signals. */
trace_signal_deliver(signr, info, ka);
if (ka->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) /* Do nothing. */
continue;
if (ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) {
/* Run the handler. */
*return_ka = *ka;
if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_ONESHOT)
ka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
break; /* will return non-zero "signr" value */
}
/*
* Now we are doing the default action for this signal.
*/
if (sig_kernel_ignore(signr)) /* Default is nothing. */
continue;
/*
* Global init gets no signals it doesn't want.
* Container-init gets no signals it doesn't want from same
* container.
*
* Note that if global/container-init sees a sig_kernel_only()
* signal here, the signal must have been generated internally
* or must have come from an ancestor namespace. In either
* case, the signal cannot be dropped.
*/
if (unlikely(signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE) &&
!sig_kernel_only(signr))
continue;
if (sig_kernel_stop(signr)) {
/*
* The default action is to stop all threads in
* the thread group. The job control signals
* do nothing in an orphaned pgrp, but SIGSTOP
* always works. Note that siglock needs to be
* dropped during the call to is_orphaned_pgrp()
* because of lock ordering with tasklist_lock.
* This allows an intervening SIGCONT to be posted.
* We need to check for that and bail out if necessary.
*/
if (signr != SIGSTOP) {
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/* signals can be posted during this window */
if (is_current_pgrp_orphaned())
goto relock;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
if (likely(do_signal_stop(info->si_signo))) {
/* It released the siglock. */
goto relock;
}
/*
* We didn't actually stop, due to a race
* with SIGCONT or something like that.
*/
continue;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
/*
* Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump.
*/
current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED;
if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) {
if (print_fatal_signals)
print_fatal_signal(regs, info->si_signo);
/*
* If it was able to dump core, this kills all
* other threads in the group and synchronizes with
* their demise. If we lost the race with another
* thread getting here, it set group_exit_code
* first and our do_group_exit call below will use
* that value and ignore the one we pass it.
*/
do_coredump(info->si_signo, info->si_signo, regs);
}
/*
* Death signals, no core dump.
*/
do_group_exit(info->si_signo);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
return signr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
linux-stable-rt
|
bcf6b1d78c0bde228929c388978ed3af9a623463
| 284,632,051,814,667,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 188 |
signal/x86: Delay calling signals in atomic
On x86_64 we must disable preemption before we enable interrupts
for stack faults, int3 and debugging, because the current task is using
a per CPU debug stack defined by the IST. If we schedule out, another task
can come in and use the same stack and cause the stack to be corrupted
and crash the kernel on return.
When CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL is enabled, spin_locks become mutexes, and
one of these is the spin lock used in signal handling.
Some of the debug code (int3) causes do_trap() to send a signal.
This function calls a spin lock that has been converted to a mutex
and has the possibility to sleep. If this happens, the above issues with
the corrupted stack is possible.
Instead of calling the signal right away, for PREEMPT_RT and x86_64,
the signal information is stored on the stacks task_struct and
TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is set. Then on exit of the trap, the signal resume
code will send the signal when preemption is enabled.
[ rostedt: Switched from #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL to
ARCH_RT_DELAYS_SIGNAL_SEND and added comments to the code. ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool __io_fill_cqe(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, u64 user_data,
s32 res, u32 cflags)
{
struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
/*
* If we can't get a cq entry, userspace overflowed the
* submission (by quite a lot). Increment the overflow count in
* the ring.
*/
cqe = io_get_cqe(ctx);
if (likely(cqe)) {
WRITE_ONCE(cqe->user_data, user_data);
WRITE_ONCE(cqe->res, res);
WRITE_ONCE(cqe->flags, cflags);
return true;
}
return io_cqring_event_overflow(ctx, user_data, res, cflags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
e677edbcabee849bfdd43f1602bccbecf736a646
| 324,838,657,485,051,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
io_uring: fix race between timeout flush and removal
io_flush_timeouts() assumes the timeout isn't in progress of triggering
or being removed/canceled, so it unconditionally removes it from the
timeout list and attempts to cancel it.
Leave it on the list and let the normal timeout cancelation take care
of it.
Cc: [email protected] # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
struct dce_i2c_hw *dcn20_i2c_hw_create(
struct dc_context *ctx,
uint32_t inst)
{
struct dce_i2c_hw *dce_i2c_hw =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct dce_i2c_hw), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dce_i2c_hw)
return NULL;
dcn2_i2c_hw_construct(dce_i2c_hw, ctx, inst,
&i2c_hw_regs[inst], &i2c_shifts, &i2c_masks);
return dce_i2c_hw;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
055e547478a11a6360c7ce05e2afc3e366968a12
| 183,927,792,775,715,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
drm/amd/display: memory leak
In dcn*_clock_source_create when dcn20_clk_src_construct fails allocated
clk_src needs release.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
|
page_objects_insert(fz_context *ctx, page_objects **ppo, int i)
{
page_objects *po;
/* Make a page_objects if we don't have one */
if (*ppo == NULL)
*ppo = page_objects_create(ctx);
po = *ppo;
/* page_objects insertion: extend the page_objects by 1, and put us on the end */
if (po->len == po->cap)
{
po = fz_resize_array(ctx, po, 1, sizeof(page_objects) + (po->cap*2 - 1)*sizeof(int));
po->cap *= 2;
*ppo = po;
}
po->object[po->len++] = i;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
mupdf
|
520cc26d18c9ee245b56e9e91f9d4fcae02be5f0
| 212,551,386,045,421,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Bug 689699: Avoid buffer overrun.
When cleaning a pdf file, various lists (of pdf_xref_len length) are
defined early on.
If we trigger a repair during the clean, this can cause pdf_xref_len
to increase causing an overrun.
Fix this by watching for changes in the length, and checking accesses
to the list for validity.
This also appears to fix bugs 698700-698703.
|
void shm_delete(XShmSegmentInfo *shm) {
#if HAVE_XSHM
if (getenv("X11VNC_SHM_DEBUG")) fprintf(stderr, "shm_delete: %p\n", (void *) shm);
if (shm != NULL && shm->shmaddr != (char *) -1) {
shmdt(shm->shmaddr);
}
if (shm != NULL && shm->shmid != -1) {
shmctl(shm->shmid, IPC_RMID, 0);
}
if (shm != NULL) {
shm->shmaddr = (char *) -1;
shm->shmid = -1;
}
#else
if (!shm) {}
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-732"
] |
x11vnc
|
69eeb9f7baa14ca03b16c9de821f9876def7a36a
| 288,537,298,062,668,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
scan: limit access to shared memory segments to current user
|
smb3_set_integrity(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
struct cifsFileInfo *cfile)
{
struct fsctl_set_integrity_information_req integr_info;
unsigned int ret_data_len;
integr_info.ChecksumAlgorithm = cpu_to_le16(CHECKSUM_TYPE_UNCHANGED);
integr_info.Flags = 0;
integr_info.Reserved = 0;
return SMB2_ioctl(xid, tcon, cfile->fid.persistent_fid,
cfile->fid.volatile_fid,
FSCTL_SET_INTEGRITY_INFORMATION,
true /* is_fsctl */,
(char *)&integr_info,
sizeof(struct fsctl_set_integrity_information_req),
CIFSMaxBufSize, NULL,
&ret_data_len);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
d6f5e358452479fa8a773b5c6ccc9e4ec5a20880
| 117,482,494,013,192,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
cifs: fix NULL ptr dereference in smb2_ioctl_query_info()
When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid
smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying
to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array.
This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init()
which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them.
Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#define die(s) perror(s), exit(1)
#define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
if (argc < 2)
exit(1);
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
die("open");
if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1)
die("ioctl");
close(fd);
return 0;
}
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...
gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0
[ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4
[ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2
[ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs]
[ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48
[ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256
[ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d
[ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0
[ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800
[ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8
[ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 1832.132801] Call Trace:
[ 1832.132962] <TASK>
[ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs]
[ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs]
[ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs]
[ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs]
[ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs]
[ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs]
[ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs]
[ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0
[ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710
[ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0
[ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
[ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
[ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df
[ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df
[ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e
[ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48
[ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000
[ 1832.142851] </TASK>
[ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err schi_box_read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
gpac
|
f19668964bf422cf5a63e4dbe1d3c6c75edadcbb
| 167,776,565,928,743,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
fixed #1879
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.