func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
sched_feat_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
char buf[64];
char *cmp;
int neg = 0;
int i;
if (cnt > 63)
cnt = 63;
if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, cnt))
return -EFAULT;
buf[cnt] = 0;
cmp = strstrip(buf);
if (strncmp(buf, "NO_", 3) == 0) {
neg = 1;
cmp += 3;
}
for (i = 0; sched_feat_names[i]; i++) {
if (strcmp(cmp, sched_feat_names[i]) == 0) {
if (neg)
sysctl_sched_features &= ~(1UL << i);
else
sysctl_sched_features |= (1UL << i);
break;
}
}
if (!sched_feat_names[i])
return -EINVAL;
*ppos += cnt;
return cnt;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
| 245,367,001,628,276,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
gs_make_null_device(gx_device_null *dev_null, gx_device *dev,
gs_memory_t * mem)
{
gx_device_init((gx_device *)dev_null, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
mem, true);
gx_device_set_target((gx_device_forward *)dev_null, dev);
if (dev) {
/* The gx_device_copy_color_params() call below should
probably copy over these new-style color mapping procs, as
well as the old-style (map_rgb_color and friends). However,
the change was made here instead, to minimize the potential
impact of the patch.
*/
gx_device *dn = (gx_device *)dev_null;
set_dev_proc(dn, get_color_mapping_procs, gx_forward_get_color_mapping_procs);
set_dev_proc(dn, get_color_comp_index, gx_forward_get_color_comp_index);
set_dev_proc(dn, encode_color, gx_forward_encode_color);
set_dev_proc(dn, decode_color, gx_forward_decode_color);
set_dev_proc(dn, get_profile, gx_forward_get_profile);
set_dev_proc(dn, set_graphics_type_tag, gx_forward_set_graphics_type_tag);
set_dev_proc(dn, begin_transparency_group, gx_default_begin_transparency_group);
set_dev_proc(dn, end_transparency_group, gx_default_end_transparency_group);
set_dev_proc(dn, begin_transparency_mask, gx_default_begin_transparency_mask);
set_dev_proc(dn, end_transparency_mask, gx_default_end_transparency_mask);
set_dev_proc(dn, discard_transparency_layer, gx_default_discard_transparency_layer);
set_dev_proc(dn, pattern_manage, gx_default_pattern_manage);
set_dev_proc(dn, push_transparency_state, gx_default_push_transparency_state);
set_dev_proc(dn, pop_transparency_state, gx_default_pop_transparency_state);
set_dev_proc(dn, put_image, gx_default_put_image);
set_dev_proc(dn, copy_planes, gx_default_copy_planes);
set_dev_proc(dn, copy_alpha_hl_color, gx_default_no_copy_alpha_hl_color);
dn->graphics_type_tag = dev->graphics_type_tag; /* initialize to same as target */
gx_device_copy_color_params(dn, dev);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31
| 1,881,982,769,357,326,600,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
Bug 699654(2): preserve LockSafetyParams in the nulldevice
The nulldevice does not necessarily use the normal setpagedevice machinery,
but can be set using the nulldevice operator. In which case, we don't preserve
the settings from the original device (in the way setpagedevice does).
Since nulldevice does nothing, this is not generally a problem, but in the case
of LockSafetyParams it *is* important when we restore back to the original
device, when LockSafetyParams not being set is "preserved" into the post-
restore configuration.
We have to initialise the value to false because the nulldevice is used during
initialisation (before any other device exists), and *must* be writable for
that.
|
OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_tile_header(opj_jp2_t * p_jp2,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_tile_index,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_data_size,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tile_x0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tile_y0,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tile_x1,
OPJ_INT32 * p_tile_y1,
OPJ_UINT32 * p_nb_comps,
OPJ_BOOL * p_go_on,
opj_stream_private_t *p_stream,
opj_event_mgr_t * p_manager
)
{
return opj_j2k_read_tile_header(p_jp2->j2k,
p_tile_index,
p_data_size,
p_tile_x0, p_tile_y0,
p_tile_x1, p_tile_y1,
p_nb_comps,
p_go_on,
p_stream,
p_manager);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
openjpeg
|
4edb8c83374f52cd6a8f2c7c875e8ffacccb5fa5
| 93,976,259,371,183,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
Add support for generation of PLT markers in encoder
* -PLT switch added to opj_compress
* Add a opj_encoder_set_extra_options() function that
accepts a PLT=YES option, and could be expanded later
for other uses.
-------
Testing with a Sentinel2 10m band, T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2,
coming from S2A_MSIL1C_20160914T074612_N0204_R135_T36JTT_20160914T081456.SAFE
Decompress it to TIFF:
```
opj_uncompress -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif
```
Recompress it with similar parameters as original:
```
opj_compress -n 5 -c [256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256],[256,256] -t 1024,1024 -PLT -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.tif -o T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2
```
Dump codestream detail with GDAL dump_jp2.py utility (https://github.com/OSGeo/gdal/blob/master/gdal/swig/python/samples/dump_jp2.py)
```
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_ori.txt
python dump_jp2.py T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 > /tmp/dump_sentinel2_openjpeg_plt.txt
```
The diff between both show very similar structure, and identical number of packets in PLT markers
Now testing with Kakadu (KDU803_Demo_Apps_for_Linux-x86-64_200210)
Full file decompression:
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp.tif
Consumed 121 tile-part(s) from a total of 121 tile(s).
Consumed 80,318,806 codestream bytes (excluding any file format) = 5.329697
bits/pel.
Processed using the multi-threaded environment, with
8 parallel threads of execution
```
Partial decompresson (presumably using PLT markers):
```
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02.jp2 -o tmp.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
kdu_expand -i T36JTT_20160914T074612_B02_PLT.jp2 -o tmp2.pgm -region "{0.5,0.5},{0.01,0.01}"
diff tmp.pgm tmp2.pgm && echo "same !"
```
-------
Funded by ESA for S2-MPC project
|
PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(php_inet_pton)
{
int ret, af = AF_INET;
char *address;
int address_len;
char buffer[17];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &address, &address_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
if (strchr(address, ':')) {
af = AF_INET6;
} else
#endif
if (!strchr(address, '.')) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unrecognized address %s", address);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = inet_pton(af, address, buffer);
if (ret <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unrecognized address %s", address);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(buffer, af == AF_INET ? 4 : 16, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-19"
] |
php-src
|
be9b2a95adb504abd5acdc092d770444ad6f6854
| 102,334,728,588,331,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
Fixed bug #69418 - more s->p fixes for filenames
|
TEST(InMatchExpression, MatchesMinKey) {
BSONObj operand = BSON_ARRAY(MinKey);
InMatchExpression in("a");
std::vector<BSONElement> equalities{operand.firstElement()};
ASSERT_OK(in.setEqualities(std::move(equalities)));
ASSERT(in.matchesBSON(BSON("a" << MinKey), NULL));
ASSERT(!in.matchesBSON(BSON("a" << MaxKey), NULL));
ASSERT(!in.matchesBSON(BSON("a" << 4), NULL));
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
64095239f41e9f3841d8be9088347db56d35c891
| 65,711,962,331,854,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
SERVER-51083 Reject invalid UTF-8 from $regex match expressions
|
static void virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping(struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res)
{
virtio_gpu_cleanup_mapping_iov(res->iov, res->iov_cnt);
res->iov = NULL;
res->iov_cnt = 0;
g_free(res->addrs);
res->addrs = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772",
"CWE-401"
] |
qemu
|
dd248ed7e204ee8a1873914e02b8b526e8f1b80d
| 280,142,761,310,503,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
virtio-gpu: fix memory leak in set scanout
In virtio_gpu_set_scanout function, when creating the 'rect'
its refcount is set to 2, by pixman_image_create_bits and
qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman function. This can lead
a memory leak issues. This patch avoid this issue.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
|
virtual bool is_result_field() { return 0; }
| 0 |
[] |
mysql-server
|
f7316aa0c9a3909fc7498e7b95d5d3af044a7e21
| 312,170,997,676,397,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
Backport of Bug#19143243 fix.
NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments.
NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function.
In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is
created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding
array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE.
ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(),
so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator.
The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item.
|
LUALIB_API int luaopen_cmsgpack_safe(lua_State *L) {
int i;
luaopen_cmsgpack(L);
/* Wrap all functions in the safe handler */
for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(cmds)/sizeof(*cmds) - 1); i++) {
lua_getfield(L, -1, cmds[i].name);
lua_pushcclosure(L, mp_safe, 1);
lua_setfield(L, -2, cmds[i].name);
}
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 502
/* Register name globally for 5.1 */
lua_pushvalue(L, -1);
lua_setglobal(L, LUACMSGPACK_SAFE_NAME);
#endif
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
redis
|
52a00201fca331217c3b4b8b634f6a0f57d6b7d3
| 20,866,902,983,380,486,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Security: fix Lua cmsgpack library stack overflow.
During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered
a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis.
-- Description of the problem
Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at
the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull
Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c1, in 2014.
Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that
lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the
"pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results
into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to
the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values,
moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input.
This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable,
while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be
created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its
minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server.
-- Versions affected
Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected.
-- Reproducing
Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by
Apple security team):
https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a
-- Verification of the fix
The fix was tested in the following way:
1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger.
2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that
actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls.
3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items
in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow
even after the fix.
-- Credits
Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me
checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
|
void CLASS wavelet_denoise()
{
float *fimg=0, *temp, thold, mul[2], avg, diff;
int scale=1, size, lev, hpass, lpass, row, col, nc, c, i, wlast, blk[2];
ushort *window[4];
static const float noise[] =
{ 0.8002,0.2735,0.1202,0.0585,0.0291,0.0152,0.0080,0.0044 };
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
if (verbose) fprintf (stderr,_("Wavelet denoising...\n"));
#endif
while (maximum << scale < 0x10000) scale++;
maximum <<= --scale;
black <<= scale;
FORC4 cblack[c] <<= scale;
if ((size = iheight*iwidth) < 0x15550000)
fimg = (float *) malloc ((size*3 + iheight + iwidth) * sizeof *fimg);
merror (fimg, "wavelet_denoise()");
temp = fimg + size*3;
if ((nc = colors) == 3 && filters) nc++;
FORC(nc) { /* denoise R,G1,B,G3 individually */
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
fimg[i] = 256 * sqrt((double)(image[i][c] << scale));
for (hpass=lev=0; lev < 5; lev++) {
lpass = size*((lev & 1)+1);
for (row=0; row < iheight; row++) {
hat_transform (temp, fimg+hpass+row*iwidth, 1, iwidth, 1 << lev);
for (col=0; col < iwidth; col++)
fimg[lpass + row*iwidth + col] = temp[col] * 0.25;
}
for (col=0; col < iwidth; col++) {
hat_transform (temp, fimg+lpass+col, iwidth, iheight, 1 << lev);
for (row=0; row < iheight; row++)
fimg[lpass + row*iwidth + col] = temp[row] * 0.25;
}
thold = threshold * noise[lev];
for (i=0; i < size; i++) {
fimg[hpass+i] -= fimg[lpass+i];
if (fimg[hpass+i] < -thold) fimg[hpass+i] += thold;
else if (fimg[hpass+i] > thold) fimg[hpass+i] -= thold;
else fimg[hpass+i] = 0;
if (hpass) fimg[i] += fimg[hpass+i];
}
hpass = lpass;
}
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
image[i][c] = CLIP(SQR(fimg[i]+fimg[lpass+i])/0x10000);
}
if (filters && colors == 3) { /* pull G1 and G3 closer together */
for (row=0; row < 2; row++) {
mul[row] = 0.125 * pre_mul[FC(row+1,0) | 1] / pre_mul[FC(row,0) | 1];
blk[row] = cblack[FC(row,0) | 1];
}
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
window[i] = (ushort *) fimg + width*i;
for (wlast=-1, row=1; row < height-1; row++) {
while (wlast < row+1) {
for (wlast++, i=0; i < 4; i++)
window[(i+3) & 3] = window[i];
for (col = FC(wlast,1) & 1; col < width; col+=2)
window[2][col] = BAYER(wlast,col);
}
thold = threshold/512;
for (col = (FC(row,0) & 1)+1; col < width-1; col+=2) {
avg = ( window[0][col-1] + window[0][col+1] +
window[2][col-1] + window[2][col+1] - blk[~row & 1]*4 )
* mul[row & 1] + (window[1][col] + blk[row & 1]) * 0.5;
avg = avg < 0 ? 0 : sqrt(avg);
diff = sqrt((double)(BAYER(row,col))) - avg;
if (diff < -thold) diff += thold;
else if (diff > thold) diff -= thold;
else diff = 0;
BAYER(row,col) = CLIP(SQR(avg+diff) + 0.5);
}
}
}
free (fimg);
}
| 0 |
[] |
LibRaw
|
c4e374ea6c979a7d1d968f5082b7d0ea8cd27202
| 129,728,671,509,164,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 79 |
additional data checks backported from 0.15.4
|
static void srpt_drop_tport(struct se_wwn *wwn)
{
struct srpt_port *sport = container_of(wwn, struct srpt_port, port_wwn);
pr_debug("drop_tport(%s\n", config_item_name(&sport->port_wwn.wwn_group.cg_item));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
| 143,555,846,857,044,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
slapi_pblock_new()
{
Slapi_PBlock *pb;
pb = (Slapi_PBlock *)slapi_ch_calloc(1, sizeof(Slapi_PBlock));
#ifdef PBLOCK_ANALYTICS
pblock_analytics_init(pb);
#endif
return pb;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
389-ds-base
|
a3c298f8140d3e4fa1bd5a670f1bb965a21a9b7b
| 283,974,954,871,691,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Issue 5218 - double-free of the virtual attribute context in persistent search (#5219)
description:
A search is processed by a worker using a private pblock.
If the search is persistent, the worker spawn a thread
and kind of duplicate its private pblock so that the spawn
thread continue to process the persistent search.
Then worker ends the initial search, reinit (free) its private pblock,
and returns monitoring the wait_queue.
When the persistent search completes, it frees the duplicated
pblock.
The problem is that private pblock and duplicated pblock
are referring to a same structure (pb_vattr_context).
That can lead to a double free
Fix:
When cloning the pblock (slapi_pblock_clone) make sure
to transfert the references inside the original (private)
pblock to the target (cloned) one
That includes pb_vattr_context pointer.
Reviewed by: Mark Reynolds, James Chapman, Pierre Rogier (Thanks !)
Co-authored-by: Mark Reynolds <[email protected]>
|
GF_Box *totl_box_new()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TOTLBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TOTL);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
388ecce75d05e11fc8496aa4857b91245007d26e
| 156,726,263,276,561,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
fixed #1587
|
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_verify)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int err = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
char * signature;
size_t signature_len;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ssz|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &signature_len, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_OPENSSL_CHECK_SIZE_T_TO_UINT(signature_len, signature);
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 1, NULL, 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a public key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx == NULL ||
!EVP_VerifyInit (md_ctx, mdtype) ||
!EVP_VerifyUpdate (md_ctx, data, data_len) ||
(err = EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char *)signature, (unsigned int)signature_len, pkey)) < 0) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
RETURN_LONG(err);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-326"
] |
php-src
|
0216630ea2815a5789a24279a1211ac398d4de79
| 268,481,574,231,028,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
Fix bug #79601 (Wrong ciphertext/tag in AES-CCM encryption for a 12 bytes IV)
|
int fb_show_logo(struct fb_info *info, int rotate) { return 0; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
fc9bbca8f650e5f738af8806317c0a041a48ae4a
| 216,577,319,078,413,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
bool CoreNetwork::cipherUsesCBC(const QString &target)
{
CoreIrcChannel *c = qobject_cast<CoreIrcChannel*>(ircChannel(target));
if (c)
return c->cipher()->usesCBC();
CoreIrcUser *u = qobject_cast<CoreIrcUser*>(ircUser(target));
if (u)
return u->cipher()->usesCBC();
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
quassel
|
b5e38970ffd55e2dd9f706ce75af9a8d7730b1b8
| 139,564,916,506,729,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Improve the message-splitting algorithm for PRIVMSG and CTCP
This introduces a new message splitting algorithm based on
QTextBoundaryFinder. It works by first starting with the entire
message to be sent, encoding it, and checking to see if it is over
the maximum message length. If it is, it uses QTBF to find the
word boundary most immediately preceding the maximum length. If no
suitable boundary can be found, it falls back to searching for
grapheme boundaries. It repeats this process until the entire
message has been sent.
Unlike what it replaces, the new splitting code is not recursive
and cannot cause stack overflows. Additionally, if it is unable
to split a string, it will give up gracefully and not crash the
core or cause a thread to run away.
This patch fixes two bugs. The first is garbage characters caused
by accidentally splitting the string in the middle of a multibyte
character. Since the new code splits at a character level instead
of a byte level, this will no longer be an issue. The second is
the core crash caused by sending an overlength CTCP query ("/me")
containing only multibyte characters. This bug was caused by the
old CTCP splitter using the byte index from lastParamOverrun() as
a character index for a QString.
|
virtual bool is_bool_type() { return false; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772
| 64,661,891,688,124,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]>
|
int zuiLongLongFromValue(zsetopval *val) {
if (!(val->flags & OPVAL_DIRTY_LL)) {
val->flags |= OPVAL_DIRTY_LL;
if (val->ele != NULL) {
if (string2ll(val->ele,sdslen(val->ele),&val->ell))
val->flags |= OPVAL_VALID_LL;
} else if (val->estr != NULL) {
if (string2ll((char*)val->estr,val->elen,&val->ell))
val->flags |= OPVAL_VALID_LL;
} else {
/* The long long was already set, flag as valid. */
val->flags |= OPVAL_VALID_LL;
}
}
return val->flags & OPVAL_VALID_LL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
redis
|
f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3
| 140,383,312,615,382,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
|
testThread(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Specific platform thread support not detected\n");
return (-1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libxml2
|
a820dbeac29d330bae4be05d9ecd939ad6b4aa33
| 206,267,921,897,433,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Bug 758605: Heap-based buffer overread in xmlDictAddString <https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758605>
Reviewed by David Kilzer.
* HTMLparser.c:
(htmlParseName): Add bounds check.
(htmlParseNameComplex): Ditto.
* result/HTML/758605.html: Added.
* result/HTML/758605.html.err: Added.
* result/HTML/758605.html.sax: Added.
* runtest.c:
(pushParseTest): The input for the new test case was so small
(4 bytes) that htmlParseChunk() was never called after
htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(), thereby creating a false positive
test failure. Fixed by using a do-while loop so we always call
htmlParseChunk() at least once.
* test/HTML/758605.html: Added.
|
cmsPipeline* CMSEXPORT cmsPipelineDup(const cmsPipeline* lut)
{
cmsPipeline* NewLUT;
cmsStage *NewMPE, *Anterior = NULL, *mpe;
cmsBool First = TRUE;
if (lut == NULL) return NULL;
NewLUT = cmsPipelineAlloc(lut ->ContextID, lut ->InputChannels, lut ->OutputChannels);
for (mpe = lut ->Elements;
mpe != NULL;
mpe = mpe ->Next) {
NewMPE = cmsStageDup(mpe);
if (NewMPE == NULL) {
cmsPipelineFree(NewLUT);
return NULL;
}
if (First) {
NewLUT ->Elements = NewMPE;
First = FALSE;
}
else {
Anterior ->Next = NewMPE;
}
Anterior = NewMPE;
}
NewLUT ->Eval16Fn = lut ->Eval16Fn;
NewLUT ->EvalFloatFn = lut ->EvalFloatFn;
NewLUT ->DupDataFn = lut ->DupDataFn;
NewLUT ->FreeDataFn = lut ->FreeDataFn;
if (NewLUT ->DupDataFn != NULL)
NewLUT ->Data = NewLUT ->DupDataFn(lut ->ContextID, lut->Data);
NewLUT ->SaveAs8Bits = lut ->SaveAs8Bits;
BlessLUT(NewLUT);
return NewLUT;
}
| 1 |
[] |
Little-CMS
|
886e2f524268efe8a1c3aa838c28e446fda24486
| 320,532,601,666,313,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
Fixes from coverity check
|
void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
struct timeout_t *timeout_cap;
struct duration_t *duration_cap;
ssize_t rc;
u32 timeout;
unsigned int scale = 1;
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to determine the timeouts");
if (rc)
goto duration;
if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
!= sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 4 * sizeof(u32))
return;
timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout;
/* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a);
if (timeout && timeout < 1000) {
/* timeouts in msec rather usec */
scale = 1000;
chip->vendor.timeout_adjusted = true;
}
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout * scale);
duration:
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to determine the durations");
if (rc)
return;
if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code) != 0 ||
be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
!= sizeof(tpm_cmd.header.out) + sizeof(u32) + 3 * sizeof(u32))
return;
duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration;
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short));
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium));
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long));
/* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above
* value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we
* fix up the resulting too-small TPM_SHORT value to make things work.
* We also scale the TPM_MEDIUM and -_LONG values by 1000.
*/
if (chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] < (HZ / 100)) {
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = HZ;
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] *= 1000;
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] *= 1000;
chip->vendor.duration_adjusted = true;
dev_info(chip->dev, "Adjusting TPM timeout parameters.");
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
tpm
|
adfea973dfca35407de074ae2052be221e4b8956
| 4,897,984,027,911,187,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 81 |
TPM: Call tpm_transmit with correct size
This patch changes the call of tpm_transmit by supplying the size of the
userspace buffer instead of TPM_BUFSIZE.
This got assigned CVE-2011-1161.
[The first hunk didn't make much sense given one could expect
way less data than TPM_BUFSIZE, so added tpm_transmit boundary
check over bufsiz instead]
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned zlib_compress(unsigned char** out, size_t* outsize, const unsigned char* in,
size_t insize, const LodePNGCompressSettings* settings)
{
if (!settings->custom_zlib) return 87; /*no custom zlib function provided */
return settings->custom_zlib(out, outsize, in, insize, settings);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
FreeRDP
|
9fee4ae076b1ec97b97efb79ece08d1dab4df29a
| 220,095,069,074,580,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
|
Statement_Ptr Expand::operator()(Declaration_Ptr d)
{
Block_Obj ab = d->block();
String_Obj old_p = d->property();
Expression_Obj prop = old_p->perform(&eval);
String_Obj new_p = Cast<String>(prop);
// we might get a color back
if (!new_p) {
std::string str(prop->to_string(ctx.c_options));
new_p = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(String_Constant, old_p->pstate(), str);
}
Expression_Obj value = d->value()->perform(&eval);
Block_Obj bb = ab ? operator()(ab) : NULL;
if (!bb) {
if (!value || (value->is_invisible() && !d->is_important())) return 0;
}
Declaration_Ptr decl = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(Declaration,
d->pstate(),
new_p,
value,
d->is_important(),
d->is_custom_property(),
bb);
decl->tabs(d->tabs());
return decl;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
libsass
|
0bc35e3d26922229d5a3e3308860cf0fcee5d1cf
| 113,533,062,334,791,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
Fix segfault on empty custom properties
Originally reported in sass/sassc#225
Fixes sass/sassc#225
Spec sass/sass-spec#1249
|
ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(struct ofpbuf *openflow,
unsigned int actions_len,
enum ofp_version version,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
return ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__(
openflow, actions_len, version,
(1u << OVSINST_OFPIT11_APPLY_ACTIONS) | (1u << OVSINST_OFPIT13_METER),
ofpacts, 0, vl_mff_map, ofpacts_tlv_bitmap);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ovs
|
77cccc74deede443e8b9102299efc869a52b65b2
| 77,144,883,073,366,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
ofp-actions: Fix use-after-free while decoding RAW_ENCAP.
While decoding RAW_ENCAP action, decode_ed_prop() might re-allocate
ofpbuf if there is no enough space left. However, function
'decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP' continues to use old pointer to 'encap'
structure leading to write-after-free and incorrect decoding.
==3549105==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
0x60600000011a at pc 0x0000005f6cc6 bp 0x7ffc3a2d4410 sp 0x7ffc3a2d4408
WRITE of size 2 at 0x60600000011a thread T0
#0 0x5f6cc5 in decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP lib/ofp-actions.c:4461:20
#1 0x5f0551 in ofpact_decode ./lib/ofp-actions.inc2:4777:16
#2 0x5ed17c in ofpacts_decode lib/ofp-actions.c:7752:21
#3 0x5eba9a in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__ lib/ofp-actions.c:7791:13
#4 0x5eb9fc in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions lib/ofp-actions.c:7835:12
#5 0x64bb8b in ofputil_decode_packet_out lib/ofp-packet.c:1113:17
#6 0x65b6f4 in ofp_print_packet_out lib/ofp-print.c:148:13
#7 0x659e3f in ofp_to_string__ lib/ofp-print.c:1029:16
#8 0x659b24 in ofp_to_string lib/ofp-print.c:1244:21
#9 0x65a28c in ofp_print lib/ofp-print.c:1288:28
#10 0x540d11 in ofctl_ofp_parse utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:2814:9
#11 0x564228 in ovs_cmdl_run_command__ lib/command-line.c:247:17
#12 0x56408a in ovs_cmdl_run_command lib/command-line.c:278:5
#13 0x5391ae in main utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:179:9
#14 0x7f6911ce9081 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27081)
#15 0x461fed in _start (utilities/ovs-ofctl+0x461fed)
Fix that by getting a new pointer before using.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
Fuzzer regression test will fail only with AddressSanitizer enabled.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27851
Fixes: f839892a206a ("OF support and translation of generic encap and decap")
Acked-by: William Tu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
|
xfs_attr3_leaf_order(
struct xfs_buf *leaf1_bp,
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr *leaf1hdr,
struct xfs_buf *leaf2_bp,
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr *leaf2hdr)
{
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries1;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entries2;
entries1 = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf1_bp->b_addr);
entries2 = xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf2_bp->b_addr);
if (leaf1hdr->count > 0 && leaf2hdr->count > 0 &&
((be32_to_cpu(entries2[0].hashval) <
be32_to_cpu(entries1[0].hashval)) ||
(be32_to_cpu(entries2[leaf2hdr->count - 1].hashval) <
be32_to_cpu(entries1[leaf1hdr->count - 1].hashval)))) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-241",
"CWE-19"
] |
linux
|
8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59
| 93,488,332,072,739,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
static int read_param(link_ctx *ctx)
{
if (skip_ws(ctx) && read_chr(ctx, ';')) {
const char *name, *value = "";
if (read_pname(ctx, &name)) {
read_pvalue(ctx, &value); /* value is optional */
apr_table_setn(ctx->params, name, value);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-444"
] |
mod_h2
|
b8a8c5061eada0ce3339b24ba1d587134552bc0c
| 25,918,506,343,822,637,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
* Removing support for abandoned draft of http-wg regarding cache-digests.
|
static void sk_prot_free(struct proto *prot, struct sock *sk)
{
struct kmem_cache *slab;
struct module *owner;
owner = prot->owner;
slab = prot->slab;
cgroup_sk_free(&sk->sk_cgrp_data);
mem_cgroup_sk_free(sk);
security_sk_free(sk);
if (slab != NULL)
kmem_cache_free(slab, sk);
else
kfree(sk);
module_put(owner);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290
| 305,923,894,213,229,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
esis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *pptr, u_int length)
{
const uint8_t *optr;
u_int li,esis_pdu_type,source_address_length, source_address_number;
const struct esis_header_t *esis_header;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES-IS"));
if (length <= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_qflag ? "bad pkt!" : "no header at all!"));
return;
}
esis_header = (const struct esis_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*esis_header);
li = esis_header->length_indicator;
optr = pptr;
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (esis_header->nlpid != NLPID_ESIS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nlpid 0x%02x packet not supported", esis_header->nlpid));
return;
}
if (esis_header->version != ESIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " version %d packet not supported", esis_header->version));
return;
}
if (li > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator(%u) > PDU size (%u)!", li, length));
return;
}
if (li < sizeof(struct esis_header_t) + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator %u < min PDU size:", li));
while (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", *pptr++));
return;
}
esis_pdu_type = esis_header->type & ESIS_PDU_TYPE_MASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s, length %u",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type (%u)",esis_pdu_type),
length));
return;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u\n\t%s (%u)",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
length,
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type: %u", esis_pdu_type),
esis_pdu_type));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", v: %u%s", esis_header->version, esis_header->version == ESIS_VERSION ? "" : "unsupported" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, pptr, EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum), 7, li);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holding time: %us, length indicator: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->holdtime), li));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", sizeof(struct esis_header_t));
pptr += sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
li -= sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
switch (esis_pdu_type) {
case ESIS_PDU_REDIRECT: {
const uint8_t *dst, *snpa, *neta;
u_int dstl, snpal, netal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dstl = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, dstl);
if (li < dstl) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dst = pptr;
pptr += dstl;
li -= dstl;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, dst, dstl)));
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpal = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, snpal);
if (li < snpal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpa = pptr;
pptr += snpal;
li -= snpal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
netal = *pptr;
pptr++;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, netal);
if (li < netal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
neta = pptr;
pptr += netal;
li -= netal;
if (netal == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, snpa)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, neta, netal)));
break;
}
case ESIS_PDU_ESH:
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_number = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Number of Source Addresses: %u", source_address_number));
while (source_address_number > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
source_address_number--;
}
break;
case ESIS_PDU_ISH: {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s", source_address_length, isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
break;
}
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ndo->ndo_snapend - pptr);
}
return;
}
/* now walk the options */
while (li != 0) {
u_int op, opli;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (li < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opts/li"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
op = *pptr++;
opli = *pptr++;
li -= 2;
if (opli > li) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", opt (%d) too long", op));
return;
}
li -= opli;
tptr = pptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option #%u, length %u, value: ",
tok2str(esis_option_values,"Unknown",op),
op,
opli));
switch (op) {
case ESIS_OPTION_ES_CONF_TIME:
if (opli == 2) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(bad length)"));
break;
case ESIS_OPTION_PROTOCOLS:
while (opli>0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (opli>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
opli--;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined Options that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ESIS_OPTION_QOS_MAINTENANCE:
case ESIS_OPTION_SECURITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_PRIORITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_ADDRESS_MASK:
case ESIS_OPTION_SNPA_MASK:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", opli);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", opli);
pptr += opli;
}
trunc:
return;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
c177cb3800a9a68d79b2812f0ffcb9479abd6eb8
| 152,858,727,405,626,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 274 |
CVE-2017-13016/ES-IS: Fix printing of addresses in RD PDUs.
Always print the SNPA, and flag it as such; only print it as a MAC
address if it's 6 bytes long.
Identify the NET as such.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
|
get_time_t_min(void)
{
#if defined(TIME_T_MIN)
return TIME_T_MIN;
#else
if (((time_t)0) < ((time_t)-1)) {
/* Time_t is unsigned */
return (time_t)0;
} else {
/* Time_t is signed. */
if (sizeof(time_t) == sizeof(int64_t)) {
return (time_t)INT64_MIN;
} else {
return (time_t)INT32_MIN;
}
}
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] |
libarchive
|
a550daeecf6bc689ade371349892ea17b5b97c77
| 298,719,989,339,536,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
|
int oidc_auth_checker(request_rec *r) {
/* check for anonymous access and PASS mode */
if (r->user != NULL && strlen(r->user) == 0) {
r->user = NULL;
if (oidc_dir_cfg_unauth_action(r) == OIDC_UNAUTH_PASS)
return OK;
}
/* get the set of claims from the request state (they've been set in the authentication part earlier */
json_t *claims = NULL, *id_token = NULL;
oidc_authz_get_claims_and_idtoken(r, &claims, &id_token);
/* get the Require statements */
const apr_array_header_t * const reqs_arr = ap_requires(r);
/* see if we have any */
const require_line * const reqs =
reqs_arr ? (require_line *) reqs_arr->elts : NULL;
if (!reqs_arr) {
oidc_debug(r,
"no require statements found, so declining to perform authorization.");
return DECLINED;
}
/* merge id_token claims (e.g. "iss") in to claims json object */
if (claims)
oidc_util_json_merge(id_token, claims);
/* dispatch to the <2.4 specific authz routine */
int rc = oidc_authz_worker(r, claims ? claims : id_token, reqs,
reqs_arr->nelts);
/* cleanup */
if (claims)
json_decref(claims);
if (id_token)
json_decref(id_token);
if ((rc == HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED) && ap_auth_type(r)
&& (apr_strnatcasecmp((const char *) ap_auth_type(r), "oauth20")
== 0))
oidc_oauth_return_www_authenticate(r, "insufficient_scope",
"Different scope(s) or other claims required");
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mod_auth_openidc
|
612e309bfffd6f9b8ad7cdccda3019fc0865f3b4
| 233,246,613,439,240,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
don't echo query params on invalid requests to redirect URI; closes #212
thanks @LukasReschke; I'm sure there's some OWASP guideline that warns
against this
|
oui_to_struct_tok(uint32_t orgcode)
{
const struct tok *tok = null_values;
const struct oui_tok *otp;
for (otp = &oui_to_tok[0]; otp->tok != NULL; otp++) {
if (otp->oui == orgcode) {
tok = otp->tok;
break;
}
}
return (tok);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tcpdump
|
1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de
| 106,032,391,206,159,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
void encodeTrailers(const RequestTrailerMap& trailers) override { encodeTrailersBase(trailers); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c
| 69,178,258,720,740,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
explicit AdminHook(Monitor *m) : mon(m) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
| 339,448,893,241,427,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
|
static void vnc_client_cache_addr(VncState *client)
{
Error *err = NULL;
client->info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*client->info));
vnc_init_basic_info_from_remote_addr(client->sioc,
qapi_VncClientInfo_base(client->info),
&err);
if (err) {
qapi_free_VncClientInfo(client->info);
client->info = NULL;
error_free(err);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
qemu
|
d3b0db6dfea6b3a9ee0d96aceb796bdcafa84314
| 116,215,966,448,957,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
vnc: Set default kbd delay to 10ms
The current VNC default keyboard delay is 1ms. With that we're constantly
typing faster than the guest receives keyboard events from an XHCI attached
USB HID device.
The default keyboard delay time in the input layer however is 10ms. I don't know
how that number came to be, but empirical tests on some OpenQA driven ARM
systems show that 10ms really is a reasonable default number for the delay.
This patch moves the VNC delay also to 10ms. That way our default is much
safer (good!) and also consistent with the input layer default (also good!).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
|
const char *Field_iterator_view::name()
{
return ptr->name;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
4681b6f2d8c82b4ec5cf115e83698251963d80d5
| 299,447,893,660,742,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
MDEV-26281 ASAN use-after-poison when complex conversion is involved in blob
the bug was that in_vector array in Item_func_in was allocated in the
statement arena, not in the table->expr_arena.
revert part of the 5acd391e8b2d. Instead, change the arena correctly
in fix_all_session_vcol_exprs().
Remove TABLE_ARENA, that was introduced in 5acd391e8b2d to force
item tree changes to be rolled back (because they were allocated in the
wrong arena and didn't persist. now they do)
|
static void rtmsg_ifinfo_event(int type, struct net_device *dev,
unsigned int change, u32 event,
gfp_t flags, int *new_nsid)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
return;
skb = rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb(type, dev, change, event, flags, new_nsid);
if (skb)
rtmsg_ifinfo_send(skb, dev, flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
f428fe4a04cc339166c8bbd489789760de3a0cee
| 281,970,684,474,524,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
rtnetlink: give a user socket to get_target_net()
This function is used from two places: rtnl_dump_ifinfo and
rtnl_getlink. In rtnl_getlink(), we give a request skb into
get_target_net(), but in rtnl_dump_ifinfo, we give a response skb
into get_target_net().
The problem here is that NETLINK_CB() isn't initialized for the response
skb. In both cases we can get a user socket and give it instead of skb
into get_target_net().
This bug was found by syzkaller with this call-trace:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 3149 Comm: syzkaller140561 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc4-mm1+ #47
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__netlink_ns_capable+0x8b/0x120 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:868
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c880f348 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8443f900
RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: ffffffff86510f40 RDI: 00000000000003d8
RBP: ffff8801c880f360 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1ffff10039101e4f
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff86510f40
R13: 000000000000000c R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000011
FS: 0000000001a1a880(0000) GS:ffff8801db300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020151000 CR3: 00000001c9511005 CR4: 00000000001606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
netlink_ns_capable+0x26/0x30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:886
get_target_net+0x9d/0x120 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1765
rtnl_dump_ifinfo+0x2e5/0xee0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1806
netlink_dump+0x48c/0xce0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2222
__netlink_dump_start+0x4f0/0x6d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2319
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:214 [inline]
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7f0/0xb10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4485
netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2441
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4540
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1308 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4be/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1334
netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1897
Cc: Jiri Benc <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79e1ad148c84 ("rtnetlink: use netnsid to query interface")
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_sigprocmask, int, how, sigset_t __user *, nset,
sigset_t __user *, oset, size_t, sigsetsize)
{
sigset_t old_set, new_set;
int error;
/* XXX: Don't preclude handling different sized sigset_t's. */
if (sigsetsize != sizeof(sigset_t))
return -EINVAL;
old_set = current->blocked;
if (nset) {
if (copy_from_user(&new_set, nset, sizeof(sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
sigdelsetmask(&new_set, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
error = sigprocmask(how, &new_set, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
}
if (oset) {
if (copy_to_user(oset, &old_set, sizeof(sigset_t)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
linux-stable-rt
|
bcf6b1d78c0bde228929c388978ed3af9a623463
| 149,095,670,047,596,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
signal/x86: Delay calling signals in atomic
On x86_64 we must disable preemption before we enable interrupts
for stack faults, int3 and debugging, because the current task is using
a per CPU debug stack defined by the IST. If we schedule out, another task
can come in and use the same stack and cause the stack to be corrupted
and crash the kernel on return.
When CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL is enabled, spin_locks become mutexes, and
one of these is the spin lock used in signal handling.
Some of the debug code (int3) causes do_trap() to send a signal.
This function calls a spin lock that has been converted to a mutex
and has the possibility to sleep. If this happens, the above issues with
the corrupted stack is possible.
Instead of calling the signal right away, for PREEMPT_RT and x86_64,
the signal information is stored on the stacks task_struct and
TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is set. Then on exit of the trap, the signal resume
code will send the signal when preemption is enabled.
[ rostedt: Switched from #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL to
ARCH_RT_DELAYS_SIGNAL_SEND and added comments to the code. ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
ldns_str2rdf_selector(ldns_rdf **rd, const char *str)
{
return ldns_str2rdf_mnemonic4int8(ldns_tlsa_selectors, rd, str);
}
| 0 |
[] |
ldns
|
3bdeed02505c9bbacb3b64a97ddcb1de967153b7
| 292,534,761,658,643,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
bugfix #1257: Free after reallocing to 0 size
Thanks Stephan Zeisberg
|
CompilationInfo* info() { return info_; }
| 0 |
[] |
node
|
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21
| 4,664,823,125,998,047,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/172093002
git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@19475 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
fix #8070
|
get_filter_list( Operation *op, BerElement *ber,
Filter **f,
const char **text )
{
Filter **new;
int err;
ber_tag_t tag;
ber_len_t len;
char *last;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_FILTER, "begin get_filter_list\n", 0, 0, 0 );
new = f;
for ( tag = ber_first_element( ber, &len, &last );
tag != LBER_DEFAULT;
tag = ber_next_element( ber, &len, last ) )
{
err = get_filter( op, ber, new, text );
if ( err != LDAP_SUCCESS )
return( err );
new = &(*new)->f_next;
}
*new = NULL;
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_FILTER, "end get_filter_list\n", 0, 0, 0 );
return( LDAP_SUCCESS );
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-674"
] |
openldap
|
98464c11df8247d6a11b52e294ba5dd4f0380440
| 225,019,894,143,010,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
ITS#9202 limit depth of nested filters
Using a hardcoded limit for now; no reasonable apps
should ever run into it.
|
TYPED_TEST(MultiProtocolTest, FrozenStructA) {
FrozenStructA oldObject = makeFrozenStructALike<FrozenStructA>();
tablebased::FrozenStructA newObject =
makeFrozenStructALike<tablebased::FrozenStructA>();
EXPECT_COMPATIBLE_PROTOCOL(oldObject, newObject, TypeParam);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-763"
] |
fbthrift
|
bfda1efa547dce11a38592820916db01b05b9339
| 180,983,744,834,842,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix handling of invalid union data in table-based serializer
Summary:
Fix handling of invalid union data in the table-based serializer. Previously if the input contained duplicate union data, previous active member of the union was overwritten without calling the destructor of the old object, potentially causing a memory leak. In addition to that, if the second piece of data was incomplete the wrong destructor would be called during stack unwinding causing a segfault, data corruption or other undesirable effects.
Fix the issue by clearing the union if there is an active member.
Also fix the type of the data member that holds the active field id (it's `int`, not `FieldID`).
Reviewed By: yfeldblum
Differential Revision: D26440248
fbshipit-source-id: fae9ab96566cf07e14dabe9663b2beb680a01bb4
|
static int gfar_resume(struct device *dev)
{
struct gfar_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
struct net_device *ndev = priv->ndev;
struct gfar __iomem *regs = priv->gfargrp[0].regs;
u32 tempval;
u16 wol = priv->wol_opts;
if (!netif_running(ndev))
return 0;
if (wol & GFAR_WOL_MAGIC) {
/* Disable Magic Packet mode */
tempval = gfar_read(®s->maccfg2);
tempval &= ~MACCFG2_MPEN;
gfar_write(®s->maccfg2, tempval);
} else if (wol & GFAR_WOL_FILER_UCAST) {
/* need to stop rx only, tx is already down */
gfar_halt(priv);
gfar_filer_restore_table(priv);
} else {
phy_start(ndev->phydev);
}
gfar_start(priv);
netif_device_attach(ndev);
enable_napi(priv);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
d8861bab48b6c1fc3cdbcab8ff9d1eaea43afe7f
| 7,870,095,431,586,977,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
gianfar: fix jumbo packets+napi+rx overrun crash
When using jumbo packets and overrunning rx queue with napi enabled,
the following sequence is observed in gfar_add_rx_frag:
| lstatus | | skb |
t | lstatus, size, flags | first | len, data_len, *ptr |
---+--------------------------------------+-------+-----------------------+
13 | 18002348, 9032, INTERRUPT LAST | 0 | 9600, 8000, f554c12e |
12 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 8000, 6400, f554c12e |
11 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 6400, 4800, f554c12e |
10 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 4800, 3200, f554c12e |
09 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 3200, 1600, f554c12e |
08 | 14000640, 1600, INTERRUPT FIRST | 0 | 1600, 0, f554c12e |
07 | 14000640, 1600, INTERRUPT FIRST | 1 | 0, 0, f554c12e |
06 | 1c000080, 128, INTERRUPT LAST FIRST | 1 | 0, 0, abf3bd6e |
05 | 18002348, 9032, INTERRUPT LAST | 0 | 8000, 6400, c5a57780 |
04 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 6400, 4800, c5a57780 |
03 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 4800, 3200, c5a57780 |
02 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 3200, 1600, c5a57780 |
01 | 10000640, 1600, INTERRUPT | 0 | 1600, 0, c5a57780 |
00 | 14000640, 1600, INTERRUPT FIRST | 1 | 0, 0, c5a57780 |
So at t=7 a new packets is started but not finished, probably due to rx
overrun - but rx overrun is not indicated in the flags. Instead a new
packets starts at t=8. This results in skb->len to exceed size for the LAST
fragment at t=13 and thus a negative fragment size added to the skb.
This then crashes:
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2277!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
...
NIP [c04689f4] skb_pull+0x2c/0x48
LR [c03f62ac] gfar_clean_rx_ring+0x2e4/0x844
Call Trace:
[ec4bfd38] [c06a84c4] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x60/0x7c (unreliable)
[ec4bfda8] [c03f6a44] gfar_poll_rx_sq+0x48/0xe4
[ec4bfdc8] [c048d504] __napi_poll+0x54/0x26c
[ec4bfdf8] [c048d908] net_rx_action+0x138/0x2c0
[ec4bfe68] [c06a8f34] __do_softirq+0x3a4/0x4fc
[ec4bfed8] [c0040150] run_ksoftirqd+0x58/0x70
[ec4bfee8] [c0066ecc] smpboot_thread_fn+0x184/0x1cc
[ec4bff08] [c0062718] kthread+0x140/0x144
[ec4bff38] [c0012350] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c
This patch fixes this by checking for computed LAST fragment size, so a
negative sized fragment is never added.
In order to prevent the newer rx frame from getting corrupted, the FIRST
flag is checked to discard the incomplete older frame.
Signed-off-by: Michael Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void kill_ctx(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
int (*cancel)(struct kiocb *, struct io_event *);
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, tsk);
struct io_event res;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
ctx->dead = 1;
while (!list_empty(&ctx->active_reqs)) {
struct list_head *pos = ctx->active_reqs.next;
struct kiocb *iocb = list_kiocb(pos);
list_del_init(&iocb->ki_list);
cancel = iocb->ki_cancel;
kiocbSetCancelled(iocb);
if (cancel) {
iocb->ki_users++;
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
cancel(iocb, &res);
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
}
}
if (!ctx->reqs_active)
goto out;
add_wait_queue(&ctx->wait, &wait);
set_task_state(tsk, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
while (ctx->reqs_active) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
io_schedule();
set_task_state(tsk, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
}
__set_task_state(tsk, TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&ctx->wait, &wait);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->ctx_lock);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
a70b52ec1aaeaf60f4739edb1b422827cb6f3893
| 255,855,928,893,026,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int __perf_event_enable(void *info)
{
struct perf_event *event = info;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx->is_active))
return -EINVAL;
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
update_context_time(ctx);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto unlock;
/*
* set current task's cgroup time reference point
*/
perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(current, ctx);
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event);
if (!event_filter_match(event)) {
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_defer_enabled(event);
goto unlock;
}
/*
* If the event is in a group and isn't the group leader,
* then don't put it on unless the group is on.
*/
if (leader != event && leader->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
goto unlock;
if (!group_can_go_on(event, cpuctx, 1)) {
err = -EEXIST;
} else {
if (event == leader)
err = group_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
else
err = event_sched_in(event, cpuctx, ctx);
}
if (err) {
/*
* If this event can't go on and it's part of a
* group, then the whole group has to come off.
*/
if (leader != event)
group_sched_out(leader, cpuctx, ctx);
if (leader->attr.pinned) {
update_group_times(leader);
leader->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
unlock:
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
8176cced706b5e5d15887584150764894e94e02f
| 87,705,890,342,013,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 |
perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
u32 gf_isom_get_hevc_lhvc_type(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 DescriptionIndex)
{
u32 type;
GF_TrackBox *trak;
GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *entry;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, trackNumber);
if (!trak || !trak->Media || !DescriptionIndex) return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_NONE;
if (trak->Media->handler->handlerType != GF_ISOM_MEDIA_VISUAL) return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_NONE;
entry = (GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox*)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, DescriptionIndex-1);
if (!entry) return GF_ISOM_AVCTYPE_NONE;
type = entry->type;
if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ENCV) {
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *sinf = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *) gf_list_get(entry->protections, 0);
if (sinf && sinf->original_format) type = sinf->original_format->data_format;
}
else if (type == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_RESV) {
if (entry->rinf && entry->rinf->original_format) type = entry->rinf->original_format->data_format;
}
switch (type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVC1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HEV1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVC2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HEV2:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_LHV1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_LHE1:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVT1:
break;
default:
return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_NONE;
}
if (entry->hevc_config && !entry->lhvc_config) return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_ONLY;
if (entry->hevc_config && entry->lhvc_config) return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_HEVC_LHVC;
if (!entry->hevc_config && entry->lhvc_config) return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_LHVC_ONLY;
return GF_ISOM_HEVCTYPE_NONE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
| 82,012,705,491,791,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
|
TEST_P(Security, BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_PermissionsDisableDiscoveryDisableAccessEncrypt_validation_ok_disable_discovery_disable_access_encrypt)
// *INDENT-ON*
{
PubSubReader<HelloWorldType> reader(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
PubSubWriter<HelloWorldType> writer(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
std::string governance_file("governance_disable_discovery_disable_access_encrypt.smime");
BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_Permissions_validation_ok_common(reader, writer, governance_file);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
Fast-DDS
|
d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384
| 93,182,213,097,977,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]>
|
static RIOMapRef *_mapref_from_map(RIOMap *map) {
RIOMapRef *mapref = R_NEW (RIOMapRef);
if (mapref) {
mapref->id = map->id;
mapref->ts = map->ts;
}
return mapref;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
radare2
|
b5cb90b28ec71fda3504da04e3cc94a362807f5e
| 256,428,654,007,499,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Prefer memleak over usaf in io.bank's rbtree bug ##crash
* That's a workaround, proper fix will come later
* Reproducer: bins/fuzzed/iobank-crash
* Reported by Akyne Choi via huntr.dev
|
static int send_abort(struct iwch_ep *ep, struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct cpl_abort_req *req;
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
skb = get_skb(skb, sizeof(*req), gfp);
if (!skb) {
printk(KERN_ERR MOD "%s - failed to alloc skb.\n",
__func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb->priority = CPL_PRIORITY_DATA;
set_arp_failure_handler(skb, abort_arp_failure);
req = (struct cpl_abort_req *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*req));
memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
req->wr.wr_hi = htonl(V_WR_OP(FW_WROPCODE_OFLD_HOST_ABORT_CON_REQ));
req->wr.wr_lo = htonl(V_WR_TID(ep->hwtid));
OPCODE_TID(req) = htonl(MK_OPCODE_TID(CPL_ABORT_REQ, ep->hwtid));
req->cmd = CPL_ABORT_SEND_RST;
return iwch_l2t_send(ep->com.tdev, skb, ep->l2t);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3
| 239,444,724,767,152,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static int restore_vsx(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_VSX)) {
tsk->thread.used_vsr = 1;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
5d176f751ee3c6eededd984ad409bff201f436a7
| 326,942,953,660,167,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
powerpc: tm: Enable transactional memory (TM) lazily for userspace
Currently the MSR TM bit is always set if the hardware is TM capable.
This adds extra overhead as it means the TM SPRS (TFHAR, TEXASR and
TFAIR) must be swapped for each process regardless of if they use TM.
For processes that don't use TM the TM MSR bit can be turned off
allowing the kernel to avoid the expensive swap of the TM registers.
A TM unavailable exception will occur if a thread does use TM and the
kernel will enable MSR_TM and leave it so for some time afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
|
void rds6_inc_info_copy(struct rds_incoming *inc,
struct rds_info_iterator *iter,
struct in6_addr *saddr, struct in6_addr *daddr,
int flip)
{
struct rds6_info_message minfo6;
minfo6.seq = be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence);
minfo6.len = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
if (flip) {
minfo6.laddr = *daddr;
minfo6.faddr = *saddr;
minfo6.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
minfo6.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
} else {
minfo6.laddr = *saddr;
minfo6.faddr = *daddr;
minfo6.lport = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
minfo6.fport = inc->i_hdr.h_dport;
}
rds_info_copy(iter, &minfo6, sizeof(minfo6));
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-909"
] |
linux
|
7d0a06586b2686ba80c4a2da5f91cb10ffbea736
| 159,953,519,244,717,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
net/rds: Fix info leak in rds6_inc_info_copy()
The rds6_inc_info_copy() function has a couple struct members which
are leaking stack information. The ->tos field should hold actual
information and the ->flags field needs to be zeroed out.
Fixes: 3eb450367d08 ("rds: add type of service(tos) infrastructure")
Fixes: b7ff8b1036f0 ("rds: Extend RDS API for IPv6 support")
Reported-by: 黄ID蝴蝶 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ka-Cheong Poon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
v9fs_mmap_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
/*
* TODO: invalidate mmaps on filp's inode between
* offset and offset+count
*/
return v9fs_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
5e3cc1ee1405a7eb3487ed24f786dec01b4cbe1f
| 227,796,664,909,758,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
9p: use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write() under 32-bit
Use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write(), else i_size_read() in
generic_fillattr() may loop infinitely in read_seqcount_begin() when
multiple processes invoke v9fs_vfs_getattr() or v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl()
simultaneously under 32-bit SMP environment, and a soft lockup will be
triggered as show below:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 22s! [stat:2217]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at generic_fillattr+0x104/0x108
LR is at 0xec497f00
pc : [<802b8898>] lr : [<ec497f00>] psr: 200c0013
sp : ec497e20 ip : ed608030 fp : ec497e3c
r10: 00000000 r9 : ec497f00 r8 : ed608030
r7 : ec497ebc r6 : ec497f00 r5 : ee5c1550 r4 : ee005780
r3 : 0000052d r2 : 00000000 r1 : ec497f00 r0 : ed608030
Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 10c5387d Table: ac48006a DAC: 00000051
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Backtrace:
[<8010d974>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dc88>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<8010dc68>] (show_stack) from [<80a1d194>] (dump_stack+0xb0/0xdc)
[<80a1d0e4>] (dump_stack) from [<80109f34>] (show_regs+0x1c/0x20)
[<80109f18>] (show_regs) from [<801d0a80>] (watchdog_timer_fn+0x280/0x2f8)
[<801d0800>] (watchdog_timer_fn) from [<80198658>] (__hrtimer_run_queues+0x18c/0x380)
[<801984cc>] (__hrtimer_run_queues) from [<80198e60>] (hrtimer_run_queues+0xb8/0xf0)
[<80198da8>] (hrtimer_run_queues) from [<801973e8>] (run_local_timers+0x28/0x64)
[<801973c0>] (run_local_timers) from [<80197460>] (update_process_times+0x3c/0x6c)
[<80197424>] (update_process_times) from [<801ab2b8>] (tick_nohz_handler+0xe0/0x1bc)
[<801ab1d8>] (tick_nohz_handler) from [<80843050>] (arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x48)
[<80843018>] (arch_timer_handler_virt) from [<80180a64>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x8c/0x240)
[<801809d8>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq) from [<8017ac20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x44)
[<8017abec>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<8017b344>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc4)
[<8017b2d8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<801022e0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x88)
[<80102294>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80101a30>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98)
[<802b8794>] (generic_fillattr) from [<8056b284>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x74/0xa4)
[<8056b210>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl) from [<802b8904>] (vfs_getattr_nosec+0x68/0x7c)
[<802b889c>] (vfs_getattr_nosec) from [<802b895c>] (vfs_getattr+0x44/0x48)
[<802b8918>] (vfs_getattr) from [<802b8a74>] (vfs_statx+0x9c/0xec)
[<802b89d8>] (vfs_statx) from [<802b9428>] (sys_lstat64+0x48/0x78)
[<802b93e0>] (sys_lstat64) from [<80101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
[[email protected]: updated comment to not refer to a function
in another subsystem]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 7549ae3e81cc ("9p: Use the i_size_[read, write]() macros instead of using inode->i_size directly.")
Reported-by: Xing Gaopeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
|
eafnosupport_fib6_table_lookup(struct net *net, struct fib6_table *table,
int oif, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct fib6_result *res, int flags)
{
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
6c8991f41546c3c472503dff1ea9daaddf9331c2
| 908,234,200,232,273,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
net: ipv6_stub: use ip6_dst_lookup_flow instead of ip6_dst_lookup
ipv6_stub uses the ip6_dst_lookup function to allow other modules to
perform IPv6 lookups. However, this function skips the XFRM layer
entirely.
All users of ipv6_stub->ip6_dst_lookup use ip_route_output_flow (via the
ip_route_output_key and ip_route_output helpers) for their IPv4 lookups,
which calls xfrm_lookup_route(). This patch fixes this inconsistent
behavior by switching the stub to ip6_dst_lookup_flow, which also calls
xfrm_lookup_route().
This requires some changes in all the callers, as these two functions
take different arguments and have different return types.
Fixes: 5f81bd2e5d80 ("ipv6: export a stub for IPv6 symbols used by vxlan")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
gxps_archive_open (GXPSArchive *archive,
const gchar *path)
{
GXPSArchiveInputStream *stream;
gchar *first_piece_path = NULL;
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (path[0] == '/')
path++;
if (!g_hash_table_contains (archive->entries, path)) {
first_piece_path = g_build_path ("/", path, "[0].piece", NULL);
if (!g_hash_table_contains (archive->entries, first_piece_path)) {
g_free (first_piece_path);
return NULL;
}
path = first_piece_path;
}
stream = (GXPSArchiveInputStream *)g_object_new (GXPS_TYPE_ARCHIVE_INPUT_STREAM, NULL);
stream->zip = gxps_zip_archive_create (archive->filename);
stream->is_interleaved = first_piece_path != NULL;
while (gxps_zip_archive_iter_next (stream->zip, &stream->entry)) {
if (g_ascii_strcasecmp (path, archive_entry_pathname (stream->entry)) == 0)
break;
archive_read_data_skip (stream->zip->archive);
}
g_free (first_piece_path);
return G_INPUT_STREAM (stream);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libgxps
|
b458226e162fe1ffe7acb4230c114a52ada5131b
| 337,695,972,202,389,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
gxps-archive: Ensure gxps_archive_read_entry() fills the GError in case of failure
And fix the callers to not overwrite the GError.
|
static int mg_b64idx(int c) {
if (c < 26) {
return c + 'A';
} else if (c < 52) {
return c - 26 + 'a';
} else if (c < 62) {
return c - 52 + '0';
} else {
return c == 62 ? '+' : '/';
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-552"
] |
mongoose
|
c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945
| 314,442,217,996,812,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload()
|
static int ssd0323_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssd0323_state *s = (ssd0323_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->cmd_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->cmd_len < 0 || s->cmd_len > ARRAY_SIZE(s->cmd_data)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
s->cmd_data[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->row = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->row < 0 || s->row >= 80) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->row_start = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->row_start < 0 || s->row_start >= 80) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->row_end = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->row_end < 0 || s->row_end >= 80) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->col = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->col < 0 || s->col >= 64) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->col_start = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->col_start < 0 || s->col_start >= 64) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->col_end = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->col_end < 0 || s->col_end >= 64) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->redraw = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->remap = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->mode != SSD0323_CMD && s->mode != SSD0323_DATA) {
return -EINVAL;
}
qemu_get_buffer(f, s->framebuffer, sizeof(s->framebuffer));
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
ead7a57df37d2187813a121308213f41591bd811
| 278,403,764,330,573,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 |
ssd0323: fix buffer overun on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4538
s->cmd_len used as index in ssd0323_transfer() to store 32-bit field.
Possible this field might then be supplied by guest to overwrite a
return addr somewhere. Same for row/col fields, which are indicies into
framebuffer array.
To fix validate after load.
Additionally, validate that the row/col_start/end are within bounds;
otherwise the guest can provoke an overrun by either setting the _end
field so large that the row++ increments just walk off the end of the
array, or by setting the _start value to something bogus and then
letting the "we hit end of row" logic reset row to row_start.
For completeness, validate mode as well.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <[email protected]>
|
CUser* SafeGetUserFromParam(CWebSock& WebSock) {
return CZNC::Get().FindUser(SafeGetUserNameParam(WebSock));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
znc
|
2bd410ee5570cea127233f1133ea22f25174eb28
| 103,647,753,242,066,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix NULL pointer dereference in webadmin.
Triggerable by any non-admin, if webadmin is loaded.
The only affected version is 1.0
Thanks to ChauffeR (Simone Esposito) for reporting this.
|
xfs_bdstrat_cb(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(bp->b_target->bt_mount)) {
trace_xfs_bdstrat_shut(bp, _RET_IP_);
/*
* Metadata write that didn't get logged but
* written delayed anyway. These aren't associated
* with a transaction, and can be ignored.
*/
if (!bp->b_iodone && !XFS_BUF_ISREAD(bp))
return xfs_bioerror_relse(bp);
else
return xfs_bioerror(bp);
}
xfs_buf_iorequest(bp);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424
| 213,026,902,947,818,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
|
void callbacks_update_scrollbar_limits (void){
gerbv_render_info_t tempRenderInfo = {0, 0, 0, 0,
GERBV_RENDER_TYPE_CAIRO_HIGH_QUALITY,
screenRenderInfo.displayWidth,
screenRenderInfo.displayHeight};
GtkAdjustment *hAdjust = (GtkAdjustment *)screen.win.hAdjustment;
GtkAdjustment *vAdjust = (GtkAdjustment *)screen.win.vAdjustment;
gerbv_render_zoom_to_fit_display (mainProject, &tempRenderInfo);
hAdjust->lower = tempRenderInfo.lowerLeftX;
hAdjust->page_increment = hAdjust->page_size;
hAdjust->step_increment = hAdjust->page_size / 10.0;
vAdjust->lower = tempRenderInfo.lowerLeftY;
vAdjust->page_increment = vAdjust->page_size;
vAdjust->step_increment = vAdjust->page_size / 10.0;
hAdjust->upper = tempRenderInfo.lowerLeftX + (tempRenderInfo.displayWidth / tempRenderInfo.scaleFactorX);
hAdjust->page_size = screenRenderInfo.displayWidth / screenRenderInfo.scaleFactorX;
vAdjust->upper = tempRenderInfo.lowerLeftY + (tempRenderInfo.displayHeight / tempRenderInfo.scaleFactorY);
vAdjust->page_size = screenRenderInfo.displayHeight / screenRenderInfo.scaleFactorY;
callbacks_update_scrollbar_positions ();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
gerbv
|
319a8af890e4d0a5c38e6d08f510da8eefc42537
| 230,871,040,478,583,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Remove local alias to parameter array
Normalizing access to `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t::parameter` as a step to fix CVE-2021-40402
|
_asn1_extract_der_octet (asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der,
int der_len, unsigned flags)
{
int len2, len3;
int counter, counter_end;
int result;
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len3);
if (len2 < -1)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter = len3 + 1;
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
if (len2 == -1)
counter_end = der_len - 2;
else
counter_end = der_len;
while (counter < counter_end)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, 1);
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der + counter, der_len, &len3);
if (IS_ERR(len2, flags))
{
warn();
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
}
if (len2 >= 0)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, len2+len3);
_asn1_append_value (node, der + counter + len3, len2);
}
else
{ /* indefinite */
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
result =
_asn1_extract_der_octet (node, der + counter + len3,
der_len, flags);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
return result;
len2 = 0;
}
counter += len2 + len3 + 1;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
cleanup:
return result;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
libtasn1
|
f435825c0f527a8e52e6ffbc3ad0bc60531d537e
| 86,862,057,818,840,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
_asn1_extract_der_octet: catch invalid input cases early
That is, check the calculated lengths for validity prior
to entering a loop. This avoids an infinite recursion.
Reported by Pascal Cuoq.
|
static int set_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
vcpu->arch.mcg_status = data;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P))
return 1;
if (data != 0 && data != ~(u64)0)
return -1;
vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl = data;
break;
default:
if (msr >= MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL &&
msr < MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * bank_num) {
u32 offset = msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL;
/* only 0 or all 1s can be written to IA32_MCi_CTL
* some Linux kernels though clear bit 10 in bank 4 to
* workaround a BIOS/GART TBL issue on AMD K8s, ignore
* this to avoid an uncatched #GP in the guest
*/
if ((offset & 0x3) == 0 &&
data != 0 && (data | (1 << 10)) != ~(u64)0)
return -1;
vcpu->arch.mce_banks[offset] = data;
break;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
kvm
|
831d9d02f9522e739825a51a11e3bc5aa531a905
| 128,183,703,584,265,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
KVM: x86: fix information leak to userland
Structures kvm_vcpu_events, kvm_debugregs, kvm_pit_state2 and
kvm_clock_data are copied to userland with some padding and reserved
fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack
memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros
instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these
fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
ompl::base::PlannerStatus ompl::geometric::VFRRT::solve(const base::PlannerTerminationCondition &ptc)
{
checkValidity();
base::Goal *goal = pdef_->getGoal().get();
auto *goal_s = dynamic_cast<base::GoalSampleableRegion *>(goal);
if (!sampler_)
sampler_ = si_->allocStateSampler();
meanNorm_ = determineMeanNorm();
while (const base::State *st = pis_.nextStart())
{
auto *motion = new Motion(si_);
si_->copyState(motion->state, st);
nn_->add(motion);
}
if (nn_->size() == 0)
{
OMPL_ERROR("%s: There are no valid initial states!", getName().c_str());
return base::PlannerStatus::INVALID_START;
}
OMPL_INFORM("%s: Starting planning with %u states already in datastructure", getName().c_str(), nn_->size());
Motion *solution = nullptr;
Motion *approxsol = nullptr;
double approxdif = std::numeric_limits<double>::infinity();
auto *rmotion = new Motion(si_);
base::State *rstate = rmotion->state;
base::State *xstate = si_->allocState();
while (ptc == false)
{
// Sample random state (with goal biasing)
if (goal_s && rng_.uniform01() < goalBias_ && goal_s->canSample())
goal_s->sampleGoal(rstate);
else
sampler_->sampleUniform(rstate);
// Find closest state in the tree
Motion *nmotion = nn_->nearest(rmotion);
// Modify direction based on vector field before extending
Motion *motion = extendTree(nmotion, rstate, getNewDirection(nmotion->state, rstate));
if (!motion)
continue;
// Check if we can connect to the goal
double dist = 0;
bool sat = goal->isSatisfied(motion->state, &dist);
if (sat)
{
approxdif = dist;
solution = motion;
break;
}
if (dist < approxdif)
{
approxdif = dist;
approxsol = motion;
}
}
bool solved = false;
bool approximate = false;
if (solution == nullptr)
{
solution = approxsol;
approximate = true;
}
if (solution != nullptr)
{
lastGoalMotion_ = solution;
// Construct the solution path
std::vector<Motion *> mpath;
while (solution != nullptr)
{
mpath.push_back(solution);
solution = solution->parent;
}
// Set the solution path
auto path(std::make_shared<PathGeometric>(si_));
for (int i = mpath.size() - 1; i >= 0; --i)
path->append(mpath[i]->state);
pdef_->addSolutionPath(path, approximate, approxdif, name_);
solved = true;
}
si_->freeState(xstate);
if (rmotion->state)
si_->freeState(rmotion->state);
delete rmotion;
OMPL_INFORM("%s: Created %u states", getName().c_str(), nn_->size());
return {solved, approximate};
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
ompl
|
abb4fadcb4e4fe4c9cf41e5e7706143a66948eb7
| 101,485,675,536,105,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 102 |
fix memory leak in VFRRT. closes #839
|
process_button(struct parsed_tag *tag)
{
Str tmp = NULL;
char *p, *q, *r, *qq = "";
int qlen, v;
if (cur_form_id < 0) {
char *s = "<form_int method=internal action=none>";
tmp = process_form(parse_tag(&s, TRUE));
}
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = Strnew();
p = "submit";
parsedtag_get_value(tag, ATTR_TYPE, &p);
q = NULL;
parsedtag_get_value(tag, ATTR_VALUE, &q);
r = "";
parsedtag_get_value(tag, ATTR_NAME, &r);
v = formtype(p);
if (v == FORM_UNKNOWN)
return NULL;
if (!q) {
switch (v) {
case FORM_INPUT_SUBMIT:
case FORM_INPUT_BUTTON:
q = "SUBMIT";
break;
case FORM_INPUT_RESET:
q = "RESET";
break;
}
}
if (q) {
qq = html_quote(q);
qlen = strlen(q);
}
/* Strcat_charp(tmp, "<pre_int>"); */
Strcat(tmp, Sprintf("<input_alt hseq=\"%d\" fid=\"%d\" type=%s "
"name=\"%s\" value=\"%s\">",
cur_hseq++, cur_form_id, p, html_quote(r), qq));
return tmp;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
w3m
|
59b91cd8e30c86f23476fa81ae005cabff49ebb6
| 320,051,948,238,344,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
Prevent segfault with malformed input type
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/7
|
static void unit_tidy_watch_pids(Unit *u) {
pid_t except1, except2;
Iterator i;
void *e;
assert(u);
/* Cleans dead PIDs from our list */
except1 = unit_main_pid(u);
except2 = unit_control_pid(u);
SET_FOREACH(e, u->pids, i) {
pid_t pid = PTR_TO_PID(e);
if (pid == except1 || pid == except2)
continue;
if (!pid_is_unwaited(pid))
unit_unwatch_pid(u, pid);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
systemd
|
bf65b7e0c9fc215897b676ab9a7c9d1c688143ba
| 80,421,296,649,866,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
core: imply NNP and SUID/SGID restriction for DynamicUser=yes service
Let's be safe, rather than sorry. This way DynamicUser=yes services can
neither take benefit of, nor create SUID/SGID binaries.
Given that DynamicUser= is a recent addition only we should be able to
get away with turning this on, even though this is strictly speaking a
binary compatibility breakage.
|
virDomainDiskExpandGroupIoTune(virDomainDiskDefPtr disk,
const virDomainDef *def)
{
size_t i;
if (!disk->blkdeviotune.group_name ||
virDomainBlockIoTuneInfoHasAny(&disk->blkdeviotune))
return;
for (i = 0; i < def->ndisks; i++) {
virDomainDiskDefPtr d = def->disks[i];
if (STRNEQ_NULLABLE(disk->blkdeviotune.group_name, d->blkdeviotune.group_name) ||
!virDomainBlockIoTuneInfoHasAny(&d->blkdeviotune))
continue;
VIR_FREE(disk->blkdeviotune.group_name);
virDomainBlockIoTuneInfoCopy(&d->blkdeviotune, &disk->blkdeviotune);
return;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-212"
] |
libvirt
|
a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979
| 113,461,091,824,223,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <[email protected]>
|
static char *next_string(char *string, unsigned long *secsize)
{
/* Skip non-zero chars */
while (string[0]) {
string++;
if ((*secsize)-- <= 1)
return NULL;
}
/* Skip any zero padding. */
while (!string[0]) {
string++;
if ((*secsize)-- <= 1)
return NULL;
}
return string;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-347"
] |
linux
|
0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75
| 40,915,240,867,636,447,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
module: limit enabling module.sig_enforce
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t i, maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {
if (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Unpack summary info loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),
info, count, &maxcount) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
file
|
1140872578eedaeecf828f1841d17ff574372dba
| 153,284,141,002,568,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
- add float and double types
- fix debug printf formats
- fix short stream sizes
- don't fail if we don't know about a type
|
GF_Err writegen_configure_pid(GF_Filter *filter, GF_FilterPid *pid, Bool is_remove)
{
u32 cid, chan, sr, w, h, stype, pf, sfmt, av1mode, nb_bps;
const char *name, *mimetype;
char szExt[GF_4CC_MSIZE], szCodecExt[30], *sep;
const GF_PropertyValue *p;
GF_GenDumpCtx *ctx = gf_filter_get_udta(filter);
if (is_remove) {
ctx->ipid = NULL;
if (ctx->opid) {
gf_filter_pid_remove(ctx->opid);
ctx->opid = NULL;
}
return GF_OK;
}
if (! gf_filter_pid_check_caps(pid))
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_CODECID);
if (!p) return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
cid = p->value.uint;
ctx->codecid = cid;
if (!ctx->opid) {
ctx->opid = gf_filter_pid_new(filter);
ctx->first = GF_TRUE;
}
ctx->ipid = pid;
//copy properties at init or reconfig
gf_filter_pid_copy_properties(ctx->opid, pid);
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_DECODER_CONFIG, NULL);
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_STREAM_TYPE);
stype = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_SAMPLE_RATE);
sr = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_NUM_CHANNELS);
chan = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_AUDIO_FORMAT);
sfmt = p ? p->value.uint : GF_AUDIO_FMT_S16;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_AUDIO_BPS);
nb_bps = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_WIDTH);
ctx->w = w = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_HEIGHT);
ctx->h = h = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_PIXFMT);
pf = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
if (!pf) pf = GF_PIXEL_YUV;
//get DSI except for unframed streams
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_UNFRAMED);
if (!p ) p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_UNFRAMED_LATM);
if (!p || !p->value.boolean) {
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_DECODER_CONFIG);
if (p) {
ctx->dcfg = p->value.data.ptr;
ctx->dcfg_size = p->value.data.size;
}
}
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_DASH_MODE);
ctx->dash_mode = (p && p->value.uint) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_STREAM_TYPE, &PROP_UINT(GF_STREAM_FILE) );
//special case for xml text, override to xml
switch (cid) {
case GF_CODECID_META_XML:
case GF_CODECID_SUBS_XML:
strcpy(szCodecExt, "xml");
break;
default:
strncpy(szCodecExt, gf_codecid_file_ext(cid), 29);
szCodecExt[29]=0;
sep = strchr(szCodecExt, '|');
if (sep) sep[0] = 0;
break;
}
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING(szCodecExt) );
mimetype = gf_codecid_mime(cid);
switch (cid) {
case GF_CODECID_AAC_MPEG4:
case GF_CODECID_AAC_MPEG2_MP:
case GF_CODECID_AAC_MPEG2_LCP:
case GF_CODECID_AAC_MPEG2_SSRP:
//override extension to latm for aac if unframed latm data - NOT for usac
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_UNFRAMED_LATM);
if (p && p->value.boolean) {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING("latm") );
}
break;
case GF_CODECID_PNG:
case GF_CODECID_JPEG:
ctx->split = GF_TRUE;
break;
case GF_CODECID_J2K:
ctx->split = GF_TRUE;
ctx->is_mj2k = GF_TRUE;
break;
case GF_CODECID_AMR:
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
ctx->dcfg = "#!AMR\n";
ctx->dcfg_size = 6;
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_AMR_WB:
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
ctx->dcfg = "#!AMR-WB\n";
ctx->dcfg_size = 9;
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_SMV:
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
ctx->dcfg = "#!SMV\n";
ctx->dcfg_size = 6;
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_EVRC_PV:
case GF_CODECID_EVRC:
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
ctx->dcfg = "#!EVRC\n";
ctx->dcfg_size = 7;
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_FLAC:
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_SIMPLE_TEXT:
if (!gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_META_TEXT:
if (!gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_META_XML:
if (!gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_SUBS_TEXT:
if (!gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_SUBS_XML:
if (!gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
if (ctx->dash_mode) {
ctx->ttml_agg = GF_TRUE;
}
else if (!ctx->frame) {
ctx->ttml_agg = GF_TRUE;
} else {
ctx->split = GF_TRUE;
}
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_FIRST;
break;
case GF_CODECID_AV1:
av1mode = 0;
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property_str(ctx->ipid, "obu:mode");
if (p) av1mode = p->value.uint;
if (av1mode==1) {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING("av1b") );
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING("video/x-av1b") );
} else if (av1mode==2) {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING("ivf") );
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING("video/x-ivf") );
} else {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING("obu") );
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING("video/x-av1") );
}
break;
case GF_CODECID_RAW:
ctx->dcfg = NULL;
ctx->dcfg_size = 0;
if (stype==GF_STREAM_VISUAL) {
strcpy(szExt, gf_pixel_fmt_sname(ctx->target_pfmt ? ctx->target_pfmt : pf));
p = gf_filter_pid_caps_query(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT);
if (p) {
strncpy(szExt, p->value.string, GF_4CC_MSIZE-1);
szExt[GF_4CC_MSIZE-1] = 0;
if (!strcmp(szExt, "bmp")) {
ctx->is_bmp = GF_TRUE;
//request BGR
ctx->target_pfmt = GF_PIXEL_BGR;
ctx->split = GF_TRUE;
} else if (!strcmp(szExt, "y4m")) {
ctx->is_y4m = GF_TRUE;
ctx->target_pfmt = GF_PIXEL_YUV;
} else {
ctx->target_pfmt = gf_pixel_fmt_parse(szExt);
if (!ctx->target_pfmt) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_MEDIA, ("Cannot guess pixel format from extension type %s\n", szExt));
return GF_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
strcpy(szExt, gf_pixel_fmt_sname(ctx->target_pfmt));
}
//forcing pixel format regardless of extension
if (ctx->pfmt) {
if (pf != ctx->pfmt) {
gf_filter_pid_negociate_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_PIXFMT, &PROP_UINT(ctx->pfmt));
//make sure we reconfigure
ctx->codecid = 0;
pf = ctx->pfmt;
}
}
//use extension to derive pixel format
else if (pf != ctx->target_pfmt) {
gf_filter_pid_negociate_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_PIXFMT, &PROP_UINT(ctx->target_pfmt));
strcpy(szExt, gf_pixel_fmt_sname(ctx->target_pfmt));
//make sure we reconfigure
ctx->codecid = 0;
}
}
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_STRIDE);
ctx->stride = p ? p->value.uint : 0;
if (!ctx->stride) {
gf_pixel_get_size_info(ctx->target_pfmt ? ctx->target_pfmt : pf, ctx->w, ctx->h, NULL, &ctx->stride, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
} else if (stype==GF_STREAM_AUDIO) {
strcpy(szExt, gf_audio_fmt_sname(ctx->target_afmt ? ctx->target_afmt : sfmt));
p = gf_filter_pid_caps_query(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT);
if (p) {
strncpy(szExt, p->value.string, GF_4CC_MSIZE-1);
szExt[GF_4CC_MSIZE-1] = 0;
if (!strcmp(szExt, "wav")) {
ctx->is_wav = GF_TRUE;
//request PCMs16 ?
// ctx->target_afmt = GF_AUDIO_FMT_S16;
ctx->target_afmt = sfmt;
} else {
ctx->target_afmt = gf_audio_fmt_parse(szExt);
strcpy(szExt, gf_audio_fmt_sname(ctx->target_afmt));
}
//forcing sample format regardless of extension
if (ctx->afmt) {
if (sfmt != ctx->afmt) {
gf_filter_pid_negociate_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_AUDIO_FORMAT, &PROP_UINT(ctx->afmt));
//make sure we reconfigure
ctx->codecid = 0;
sfmt = ctx->afmt;
}
}
//use extension to derive sample format
else if (sfmt != ctx->target_afmt) {
gf_filter_pid_negociate_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_AUDIO_FORMAT, &PROP_UINT(ctx->target_afmt));
strcpy(szExt, gf_audio_fmt_sname(ctx->target_afmt));
//make sure we reconfigure
ctx->codecid = 0;
}
if (ctx->dur.num && ctx->dur.den && !gf_audio_fmt_is_planar(ctx->target_afmt ? ctx->target_afmt : ctx->afmt))
ctx->trunc_audio = GF_TRUE;
}
} else {
strcpy(szExt, gf_4cc_to_str(cid));
}
if (ctx->is_bmp) strcpy(szExt, "bmp");
else if (ctx->is_y4m) strcpy(szExt, "y4m");
else if (ctx->is_wav) {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_DISABLE_PROGRESSIVE, &PROP_UINT(GF_PID_FILE_PATCH_REPLACE) );
strcpy(szExt, "wav");
} else if (!strlen(szExt)) strcpy(szExt, "raw");
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING( szExt ) );
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING("application/octet-string") );
if (!ctx->codecid) return GF_OK;
break;
default:
if (!strcmp(szCodecExt, "raw")) {
strcpy(szExt, gf_4cc_to_str(cid));
if (!strlen(szExt)) strcpy(szExt, "raw");
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING( szExt ) );
} else {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_FILE_EXT, &PROP_STRING( szCodecExt ) );
}
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PID_MIME, &PROP_STRING(mimetype) );
break;
}
if (ctx->decinfo == DECINFO_AUTO)
ctx->decinfo = DECINFO_NO;
name = gf_codecid_name(cid);
if (ctx->exporter) {
if (w && h) {
if (cid==GF_CODECID_RAW) name = gf_pixel_fmt_name(pf);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_MEDIA, ("Exporting %s - Size %dx%d\n", name, w, h));
} else if (sr && chan) {
if (cid==GF_CODECID_RAW) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_MEDIA, ("Exporting PCM %s SampleRate %d %d channels %d bits per sample\n", gf_audio_fmt_name(sfmt), sr, chan, gf_audio_fmt_bit_depth(sfmt) ));
} else {
if (!nb_bps)
nb_bps = gf_audio_fmt_bit_depth(sfmt);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_MEDIA, ("Exporting %s - SampleRate %d %d channels %d bits per sample\n", name, sr, chan, nb_bps ));
}
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_INFO, GF_LOG_MEDIA, ("Exporting %s\n", name));
}
}
//avoid creating a file when dumping individual samples
if (ctx->split) {
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_NB_FRAMES);
if (!p || (p->value.uint>1))
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PCK_FILENUM, &PROP_UINT(0) );
else
ctx->split = GF_FALSE;
} else if (ctx->frame) {
gf_filter_pid_set_property(ctx->opid, GF_PROP_PCK_FILENUM, &PROP_UINT(0) );
}
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(pid, GF_PROP_PID_DURATION);
if (p) ctx->duration = p->value.lfrac;
gf_filter_pid_set_framing_mode(pid, GF_TRUE);
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0
| 94,278,145,992,839,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 347 |
fixed #2138
|
TEST_F(RenameCollectionTest, RenameCollectionForApplyOpsDropTargetEvenIfSourceDoesNotExist) {
_createCollectionWithUUID(_opCtx.get(), _targetNss);
auto missingSourceNss = NamespaceString("test.bar2");
auto uuidDoc = BSON("ui" << UUID::gen());
auto cmd =
BSON("renameCollection" << missingSourceNss.ns() << "to" << _targetNss.ns() << "dropTarget"
<< "true");
ASSERT_OK(renameCollectionForApplyOps(
_opCtx.get(), missingSourceNss.db().toString(), uuidDoc["ui"], cmd, {}));
ASSERT_FALSE(_collectionExists(_opCtx.get(), _targetNss));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
35c1b1f588f04926a958ad2fe4d9c59d79f81e8b
| 145,709,627,002,041,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
SERVER-35636 renameCollectionForApplyOps checks for complete namespace
|
void clear_outer_face_cycle_marks()
{
clear_outer_face_cycle_marks(typename Is_extended_kernel<Extended_kernel>::value_type());
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
cgal
|
618b409b0fbcef7cb536a4134ae3a424ef5aae45
| 80,954,468,061,828,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix Nef_2 and Nef_S2 IO
|
static int ssl_mt_error(int n)
{
int ret;
switch (n)
{
case SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER:
ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER;
break;
case SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE:
ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case SSL2_PE_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case SSL2_PE_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE:
ret=SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
break;
default:
ret=SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE;
break;
}
return(ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
270881316664396326c461ec7a124aec2c6cc081
| 107,510,825,424,950,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Add and use a constant-time memcmp.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
(cherry picked from commit dc406b59f3169fe191e58906df08dce97edb727c)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
|
void testMultiPartThreading (const std::string & tempDir)
{
try
{
cout << "Testing the multi part APIs for multi-thread use" << endl;
random_reseed(1);
int numThreads = ThreadPool::globalThreadPool().numThreads();
ThreadPool::globalThreadPool().setNumThreads(32);
testWriteRead ( 1, 1, 5, tempDir);
testWriteRead ( 2, 2, 10, tempDir);
testWriteRead ( 5, 5, 25, tempDir);
testWriteRead (50, 2, 250, tempDir);
ThreadPool::globalThreadPool().setNumThreads(numThreads);
cout << "ok\n" << endl;
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
cerr << "ERROR -- caught exception: " << e.what() << endl;
assert (false);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openexr
|
e79d2296496a50826a15c667bf92bdc5a05518b4
| 18,085,176,002,699,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
fix memory leaks and invalid memory accesses
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <[email protected]>
|
SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY RevertSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
return SEC_E_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
0773bb9303d24473fe1185d85a424dfe159aff53
| 117,806,938,001,085,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
|
grub_ext2_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data;
grub_disk_t disk = device->disk;
grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
data = grub_ext2_mount (disk);
if (data)
*label = grub_strndup (data->sblock.volume_name, 14);
else
*label = NULL;
grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
grub_free (data);
return grub_errno;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
796dd28aaa6b9fa76d99c42c4d5ff8b257cc2191
| 191,630,850,893,789,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
|
static inline struct sock *l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(struct l2cap_chan_list *l, u8 ident)
{
struct sock *s;
read_lock(&l->lock);
s = __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(l, ident);
if (s)
bh_lock_sock(s);
read_unlock(&l->lock);
return s;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe
| 287,131,284,440,456,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
|
i915_gem_userptr_init__mmu_notifier(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
unsigned flags)
{
struct i915_mmu_notifier *mn;
struct i915_mmu_object *mo;
if (flags & I915_USERPTR_UNSYNCHRONIZED)
return capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ? 0 : -EPERM;
if (WARN_ON(obj->userptr.mm == NULL))
return -EINVAL;
mn = i915_mmu_notifier_find(obj->userptr.mm);
if (IS_ERR(mn))
return PTR_ERR(mn);
mo = kzalloc(sizeof(*mo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mo)
return -ENOMEM;
mo->mn = mn;
mo->obj = obj;
mo->it.start = obj->userptr.ptr;
mo->it.last = obj->userptr.ptr + obj->base.size - 1;
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mo->it.rb);
obj->userptr.mmu_object = mo;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
17839856fd588f4ab6b789f482ed3ffd7c403e1f
| 41,628,665,108,955,744,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
gup: document and work around "COW can break either way" issue
Doing a "get_user_pages()" on a copy-on-write page for reading can be
ambiguous: the page can be COW'ed at any time afterwards, and the
direction of a COW event isn't defined.
Yes, whoever writes to it will generally do the COW, but if the thread
that did the get_user_pages() unmapped the page before the write (and
that could happen due to memory pressure in addition to any outright
action), the writer could also just take over the old page instead.
End result: the get_user_pages() call might result in a page pointer
that is no longer associated with the original VM, and is associated
with - and controlled by - another VM having taken it over instead.
So when doing a get_user_pages() on a COW mapping, the only really safe
thing to do would be to break the COW when getting the page, even when
only getting it for reading.
At the same time, some users simply don't even care.
For example, the perf code wants to look up the page not because it
cares about the page, but because the code simply wants to look up the
physical address of the access for informational purposes, and doesn't
really care about races when a page might be unmapped and remapped
elsewhere.
This adds logic to force a COW event by setting FOLL_WRITE on any
copy-on-write mapping when FOLL_GET (or FOLL_PIN) is used to get a page
pointer as a result.
The current semantics end up being:
- __get_user_pages_fast(): no change. If you don't ask for a write,
you won't break COW. You'd better know what you're doing.
- get_user_pages_fast(): the fast-case "look it up in the page tables
without anything getting mmap_sem" now refuses to follow a read-only
page, since it might need COW breaking. Which happens in the slow
path - the fast path doesn't know if the memory might be COW or not.
- get_user_pages() (including the slow-path fallback for gup_fast()):
for a COW mapping, turn on FOLL_WRITE for FOLL_GET/FOLL_PIN, with
very similar semantics to FOLL_FORCE.
If it turns out that we want finer granularity (ie "only break COW when
it might actually matter" - things like the zero page are special and
don't need to be broken) we might need to push these semantics deeper
into the lookup fault path. So if people care enough, it's possible
that we might end up adding a new internal FOLL_BREAK_COW flag to go
with the internal FOLL_COW flag we already have for tracking "I had a
COW".
Alternatively, if it turns out that different callers might want to
explicitly control the forced COW break behavior, we might even want to
make such a flag visible to the users of get_user_pages() instead of
using the above default semantics.
But for now, this is mostly commentary on the issue (this commit message
being a lot bigger than the patch, and that patch in turn is almost all
comments), with that minimal "enable COW breaking early" logic using the
existing FOLL_WRITE behavior.
[ It might be worth noting that we've always had this ambiguity, and it
could arguably be seen as a user-space issue.
You only get private COW mappings that could break either way in
situations where user space is doing cooperative things (ie fork()
before an execve() etc), but it _is_ surprising and very subtle, and
fork() is supposed to give you independent address spaces.
So let's treat this as a kernel issue and make the semantics of
get_user_pages() easier to understand. Note that obviously a true
shared mapping will still get a page that can change under us, so this
does _not_ mean that get_user_pages() somehow returns any "stable"
page ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t vfswrap_listxattr(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *path, char *list, size_t size)
{
return listxattr(path, list, size);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-665"
] |
samba
|
30e724cbff1ecd90e5a676831902d1e41ec1b347
| 22,146,261,642,361,303,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
FSCTL_GET_SHADOW_COPY_DATA: Initialize output array to zero
Otherwise num_volumes and the end marker can return uninitialized data
to the client.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool bio_integrity_endio(struct bio *bio)
{
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
c3e2219216c92919a6bd1711f340f5faa98695e6
| 269,116,501,786,768,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
block: free sched's request pool in blk_cleanup_queue
In theory, IO scheduler belongs to request queue, and the request pool
of sched tags belongs to the request queue too.
However, the current tags allocation interfaces are re-used for both
driver tags and sched tags, and driver tags is definitely host wide,
and doesn't belong to any request queue, same with its request pool.
So we need tagset instance for freeing request of sched tags.
Meantime, blk_mq_free_tag_set() often follows blk_cleanup_queue() in case
of non-BLK_MQ_F_TAG_SHARED, this way requires that request pool of sched
tags to be freed before calling blk_mq_free_tag_set().
Commit 47cdee29ef9d94e ("block: move blk_exit_queue into __blk_release_queue")
moves blk_exit_queue into __blk_release_queue for simplying the fast
path in generic_make_request(), then causes oops during freeing requests
of sched tags in __blk_release_queue().
Fix the above issue by move freeing request pool of sched tags into
blk_cleanup_queue(), this way is safe becasue queue has been frozen and no any
in-queue requests at that time. Freeing sched tags has to be kept in queue's
release handler becasue there might be un-completed dispatch activity
which might refer to sched tags.
Cc: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Fixes: 47cdee29ef9d94e485eb08f962c74943023a5271 ("block: move blk_exit_queue into __blk_release_queue")
Tested-by: Yi Zhang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
cdio_generic_init (void *user_data, int open_flags)
{
generic_img_private_t *p_env = user_data;
if (p_env->init) {
cdio_warn ("init called more than once");
return false;
}
p_env->fd = open (p_env->source_name, open_flags, 0);
if (p_env->fd < 0)
{
cdio_warn ("open (%s): %s", p_env->source_name, strerror (errno));
return false;
}
p_env->init = true;
p_env->toc_init = false;
p_env->cdtext = NULL;
p_env->scsi_tuple = NULL;
p_env->b_cdtext_error = false;
p_env->u_joliet_level = 0; /* Assume no Joliet extensions initally */
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
libcdio
|
dec2f876c2d7162da213429bce1a7140cdbdd734
| 117,332,565,740,058,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Removed wrong line
|
static void update_field_dependencies(THD *thd, Field *field, TABLE *table)
{
DBUG_ENTER("update_field_dependencies");
if (thd->mark_used_columns != MARK_COLUMNS_NONE)
{
MY_BITMAP *bitmap;
/*
We always want to register the used keys, as the column bitmap may have
been set for all fields (for example for view).
*/
table->covering_keys.intersect(field->part_of_key);
if (field->vcol_info)
table->mark_virtual_col(field);
if (thd->mark_used_columns == MARK_COLUMNS_READ)
bitmap= table->read_set;
else
bitmap= table->write_set;
/*
The test-and-set mechanism in the bitmap is not reliable during
multi-UPDATE statements under MARK_COLUMNS_READ mode
(thd->mark_used_columns == MARK_COLUMNS_READ), as this bitmap contains
only those columns that are used in the SET clause. I.e they are being
set here. See multi_update::prepare()
*/
if (bitmap_fast_test_and_set(bitmap, field->field_index))
{
if (thd->mark_used_columns == MARK_COLUMNS_WRITE)
{
DBUG_PRINT("warning", ("Found duplicated field"));
thd->dup_field= field;
}
else
{
DBUG_PRINT("note", ("Field found before"));
}
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
if (table->get_fields_in_item_tree)
field->flags|= GET_FIXED_FIELDS_FLAG;
table->used_fields++;
}
else if (table->get_fields_in_item_tree)
field->flags|= GET_FIXED_FIELDS_FLAG;
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
| 0 |
[] |
server
|
0168d1eda30dad4b517659422e347175eb89e923
| 12,277,685,338,507,984,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
MDEV-25766 Unused CTE lead to a crash in find_field_in_tables/find_order_in_list
Do not assume that subquery Item always present.
|
ldns_pkt_tsig_verify_next(ldns_pkt *pkt, const uint8_t *wire, size_t wirelen, const char* key_name,
const char *key_data, const ldns_rdf *orig_mac_rdf, int tsig_timers_only)
{
ldns_rdf *fudge_rdf;
ldns_rdf *algorithm_rdf;
ldns_rdf *time_signed_rdf;
ldns_rdf *orig_id_rdf;
ldns_rdf *error_rdf;
ldns_rdf *other_data_rdf;
ldns_rdf *pkt_mac_rdf;
ldns_rdf *my_mac_rdf;
ldns_rdf *key_name_rdf = ldns_rdf_new_frm_str(LDNS_RDF_TYPE_DNAME, key_name);
uint16_t pkt_id, orig_pkt_id;
ldns_status status;
uint8_t *prepared_wire = NULL;
size_t prepared_wire_size = 0;
ldns_rr *orig_tsig = ldns_pkt_tsig(pkt);
if (!orig_tsig || ldns_rr_rd_count(orig_tsig) <= 6) {
ldns_rdf_deep_free(key_name_rdf);
return false;
}
algorithm_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 0);
time_signed_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 1);
fudge_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 2);
pkt_mac_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 3);
orig_id_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 4);
error_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 5);
other_data_rdf = ldns_rr_rdf(orig_tsig, 6);
/* remove temporarily */
ldns_pkt_set_tsig(pkt, NULL);
/* temporarily change the id to the original id */
pkt_id = ldns_pkt_id(pkt);
orig_pkt_id = ldns_rdf2native_int16(orig_id_rdf);
ldns_pkt_set_id(pkt, orig_pkt_id);
prepared_wire = ldns_tsig_prepare_pkt_wire(wire, wirelen, &prepared_wire_size);
status = ldns_tsig_mac_new(&my_mac_rdf, prepared_wire, prepared_wire_size,
key_data, key_name_rdf, fudge_rdf, algorithm_rdf,
time_signed_rdf, error_rdf, other_data_rdf, orig_mac_rdf, tsig_timers_only);
LDNS_FREE(prepared_wire);
if (status != LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
ldns_rdf_deep_free(key_name_rdf);
return false;
}
/* Put back the values */
ldns_pkt_set_tsig(pkt, orig_tsig);
ldns_pkt_set_id(pkt, pkt_id);
ldns_rdf_deep_free(key_name_rdf);
if( ldns_rdf_size(pkt_mac_rdf) != ldns_rdf_size(my_mac_rdf)) {
ldns_rdf_deep_free(my_mac_rdf);
return false;
}
/* use time insensitive memory compare */
if(
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_MEMCMP
CRYPTO_memcmp
#else
memcmp
#endif
(ldns_rdf_data(pkt_mac_rdf), ldns_rdf_data(my_mac_rdf),
ldns_rdf_size(my_mac_rdf)) == 0) {
ldns_rdf_deep_free(my_mac_rdf);
return true;
} else {
ldns_rdf_deep_free(my_mac_rdf);
return false;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
ldns
|
f9073d9fc313b19f51a5aa160584f2bdccda637a
| 290,292,905,840,239,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 77 |
* Detect fixed time memory compare for openssl 0.9.8.
|
DequeueConsumable(qqueue_t *pThis, wti_t *pWti)
{
DEFiRet;
int iQueueSize = 0; /* keep the compiler happy... */
/* dequeue element batch (still protected from mutex) */
iRet = DequeueConsumableElements(pThis, pWti, &iQueueSize);
/* awake some flow-controlled sources if we can do this right now */
/* TODO: this could be done better from a performance point of view -- do it only if
* we have someone waiting for the condition (or only when we hit the watermark right
* on the nail [exact value]) -- rgerhards, 2008-03-14
* now that we dequeue batches of pointers, this is much less an issue...
* rgerhards, 2009-04-22
*/
if(iQueueSize < pThis->iFullDlyMrk / 2) {
pthread_cond_broadcast(&pThis->belowFullDlyWtrMrk);
}
if(iQueueSize < pThis->iLightDlyMrk / 2) {
pthread_cond_broadcast(&pThis->belowLightDlyWtrMrk);
}
// TODO: MULTI: check physical queue size?
pthread_cond_signal(&pThis->notFull);
/* WE ARE NO LONGER PROTECTED BY THE MUTEX */
if(iRet != RS_RET_OK && iRet != RS_RET_DISCARDMSG) {
DBGOPRINT((obj_t*) pThis, "error %d dequeueing element - ignoring, but strange things "
"may happen\n", iRet);
}
RETiRet;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
rsyslog
|
dfa88369d4ca4290db56b843f9eabdae1bfe0fd5
| 120,424,300,584,896,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
bugfix: memory leak when $RepeatedMsgReduction on was used
bug tracker: http://bugzilla.adiscon.com/show_bug.cgi?id=225
|
rsvg_render_image (RsvgDrawingCtx * ctx, GdkPixbuf * pb, double x, double y, double w, double h)
{
ctx->render->render_image (ctx, pb, x, y, w, h);
}
| 0 |
[] |
librsvg
|
34c95743ca692ea0e44778e41a7c0a129363de84
| 254,091,404,704,940,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Store node type separately in RsvgNode
The node name (formerly RsvgNode:type) cannot be used to infer
the sub-type of RsvgNode that we're dealing with, since for unknown
elements we put type = node-name. This lead to a (potentially exploitable)
crash e.g. when the element name started with "fe" which tricked
the old code into considering it as a RsvgFilterPrimitive.
CVE-2011-3146
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=658014
|
v9fs_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
{
struct p9_fid *fid = iocb->ki_filp->private_data;
int ret, err = 0;
p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_VFS, "count %zu offset %lld\n",
iov_iter_count(to), iocb->ki_pos);
ret = p9_client_read(fid, iocb->ki_pos, to, &err);
if (!ret)
return err;
iocb->ki_pos += ret;
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
linux
|
5e3cc1ee1405a7eb3487ed24f786dec01b4cbe1f
| 304,241,675,490,306,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
9p: use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write() under 32-bit
Use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write(), else i_size_read() in
generic_fillattr() may loop infinitely in read_seqcount_begin() when
multiple processes invoke v9fs_vfs_getattr() or v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl()
simultaneously under 32-bit SMP environment, and a soft lockup will be
triggered as show below:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 22s! [stat:2217]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at generic_fillattr+0x104/0x108
LR is at 0xec497f00
pc : [<802b8898>] lr : [<ec497f00>] psr: 200c0013
sp : ec497e20 ip : ed608030 fp : ec497e3c
r10: 00000000 r9 : ec497f00 r8 : ed608030
r7 : ec497ebc r6 : ec497f00 r5 : ee5c1550 r4 : ee005780
r3 : 0000052d r2 : 00000000 r1 : ec497f00 r0 : ed608030
Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 10c5387d Table: ac48006a DAC: 00000051
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Backtrace:
[<8010d974>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dc88>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<8010dc68>] (show_stack) from [<80a1d194>] (dump_stack+0xb0/0xdc)
[<80a1d0e4>] (dump_stack) from [<80109f34>] (show_regs+0x1c/0x20)
[<80109f18>] (show_regs) from [<801d0a80>] (watchdog_timer_fn+0x280/0x2f8)
[<801d0800>] (watchdog_timer_fn) from [<80198658>] (__hrtimer_run_queues+0x18c/0x380)
[<801984cc>] (__hrtimer_run_queues) from [<80198e60>] (hrtimer_run_queues+0xb8/0xf0)
[<80198da8>] (hrtimer_run_queues) from [<801973e8>] (run_local_timers+0x28/0x64)
[<801973c0>] (run_local_timers) from [<80197460>] (update_process_times+0x3c/0x6c)
[<80197424>] (update_process_times) from [<801ab2b8>] (tick_nohz_handler+0xe0/0x1bc)
[<801ab1d8>] (tick_nohz_handler) from [<80843050>] (arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x48)
[<80843018>] (arch_timer_handler_virt) from [<80180a64>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x8c/0x240)
[<801809d8>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq) from [<8017ac20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x44)
[<8017abec>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<8017b344>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc4)
[<8017b2d8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<801022e0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x88)
[<80102294>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80101a30>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98)
[<802b8794>] (generic_fillattr) from [<8056b284>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x74/0xa4)
[<8056b210>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl) from [<802b8904>] (vfs_getattr_nosec+0x68/0x7c)
[<802b889c>] (vfs_getattr_nosec) from [<802b895c>] (vfs_getattr+0x44/0x48)
[<802b8918>] (vfs_getattr) from [<802b8a74>] (vfs_statx+0x9c/0xec)
[<802b89d8>] (vfs_statx) from [<802b9428>] (sys_lstat64+0x48/0x78)
[<802b93e0>] (sys_lstat64) from [<80101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
[[email protected]: updated comment to not refer to a function
in another subsystem]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 7549ae3e81cc ("9p: Use the i_size_[read, write]() macros instead of using inode->i_size directly.")
Reported-by: Xing Gaopeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>
|
static struct tcf_proto *tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique(struct tcf_chain *chain,
struct tcf_proto *tp_new,
u32 protocol, u32 prio,
bool rtnl_held)
{
struct tcf_chain_info chain_info;
struct tcf_proto *tp;
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
if (tcf_proto_exists_destroying(chain, tp_new)) {
mutex_unlock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
tcf_proto_destroy(tp_new, rtnl_held, false, NULL);
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
tp = tcf_chain_tp_find(chain, &chain_info,
protocol, prio, false);
if (!tp)
err = tcf_chain_tp_insert(chain, &chain_info, tp_new);
mutex_unlock(&chain->filter_chain_lock);
if (tp) {
tcf_proto_destroy(tp_new, rtnl_held, false, NULL);
tp_new = tp;
} else if (err) {
tcf_proto_destroy(tp_new, rtnl_held, false, NULL);
tp_new = ERR_PTR(err);
}
return tp_new;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5
| 109,894,080,995,589,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter()
Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label,
we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again,
or risk use-after-free as in [1]
For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain()
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945
CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline]
tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386
tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline]
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059
RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1944:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline]
qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941
qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 3609:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754
slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline]
kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106
qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109
tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238
tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0
head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline]
new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004
___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787
devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618
inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278
inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698
veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250
zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline]
zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline]
zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline]
zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline]
unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561
unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606
unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638
exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178
__mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114
mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135
exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline]
do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
unsigned char *skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
skb->data -= len;
skb->len += len;
if (unlikely(skb->data<skb->head))
skb_under_panic(skb, len, __builtin_return_address(0));
return skb->data;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
net
|
36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c
| 318,382,583,613,764,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors
skb_zerocopy can copy elements of the frags array between skbs, but it doesn't
orphan them. Also, it doesn't handle errors, so this patch takes care of that
as well, and modify the callers accordingly. skb_tx_error() is also added to
the callers so they will signal the failed delivery towards the creator of the
skb.
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
/*
* We subtract one from sk_wmem_alloc and can know if
* some packets are still in some tx queue.
* If not null, sock_wfree() will call __sk_free(sk) later
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc))
__sk_free(sk);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290
| 135,872,164,155,454,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static double mp_ellipse(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
const unsigned int i_end = (unsigned int)mp.opcode[2];
unsigned int ind = (unsigned int)mp.opcode[3];
if (ind!=~0U) ind = (unsigned int)cimg::mod((int)_mp_arg(3),mp.listin.width());
CImg<T> &img = ind==~0U?mp.imgout:mp.listout[ind];
CImg<T> color(img._spectrum,1,1,1,0);
bool is_invalid_arguments = false, is_outlined = false;
float r1 = 0, r2 = 0, angle = 0, opacity = 1;
unsigned int i = 4, pattern = ~0U;
int x0 = 0, y0 = 0;
if (i>=i_end) is_invalid_arguments = true;
else {
x0 = (int)cimg::round(_mp_arg(i++));
if (i>=i_end) is_invalid_arguments = true;
else {
y0 = (int)cimg::round(_mp_arg(i++));
if (i>=i_end) is_invalid_arguments = true;
else {
r1 = (float)_mp_arg(i++);
if (i>=i_end) r2 = r1;
else {
r2 = (float)_mp_arg(i++);
if (i<i_end) {
angle = (float)_mp_arg(i++);
if (i<i_end) {
opacity = (float)_mp_arg(i++);
if (r1<0 && r2<0) {
pattern = (unsigned int)_mp_arg(i++);
is_outlined = true;
r1 = -r1; r2 = -r2;
}
if (i<i_end) {
cimg_forX(color,k) if (i<i_end) color[k] = (T)_mp_arg(i++);
else { color.resize(k,1,1,1,-1); break; }
color.resize(img._spectrum,1,1,1,0,2);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
if (!is_invalid_arguments) {
if (is_outlined) img.draw_ellipse(x0,y0,r1,r2,angle,color._data,opacity,pattern);
else img.draw_ellipse(x0,y0,r1,r2,angle,color._data,opacity);
} else {
CImg<doubleT> args(i_end - 4);
cimg_forX(args,k) args[k] = _mp_arg(4 + k);
if (ind==~0U)
throw CImgArgumentException("[" cimg_appname "_math_parser] CImg<%s>: Function 'ellipse()': "
"Invalid arguments '%s'. ",
mp.imgin.pixel_type(),args.value_string()._data);
else
throw CImgArgumentException("[" cimg_appname "_math_parser] CImg<%s>: Function 'ellipse()': "
"Invalid arguments '#%u%s%s'. ",
mp.imgin.pixel_type(),ind,args._width?",":"",args.value_string()._data);
}
return cimg::type<double>::nan();
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 114,619,085,217,211,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 |
.
|
void __init init_vdso_image(const struct vdso_image *image)
{
int i;
int npages = (image->size) / PAGE_SIZE;
BUG_ON(image->size % PAGE_SIZE != 0);
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
image->text_mapping.pages[i] =
virt_to_page(image->data + i*PAGE_SIZE);
apply_alternatives((struct alt_instr *)(image->data + image->alt),
(struct alt_instr *)(image->data + image->alt +
image->alt_len));
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
394f56fe480140877304d342dec46d50dc823d46
| 8,246,631,058,801,701,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
x86_64, vdso: Fix the vdso address randomization algorithm
The theory behind vdso randomization is that it's mapped at a random
offset above the top of the stack. To avoid wasting a page of
memory for an extra page table, the vdso isn't supposed to extend
past the lowest PMD into which it can fit. Other than that, the
address should be a uniformly distributed address that meets all of
the alignment requirements.
The current algorithm is buggy: the vdso has about a 50% probability
of being at the very end of a PMD. The current algorithm also has a
decent chance of failing outright due to incorrect handling of the
case where the top of the stack is near the top of its PMD.
This fixes the implementation. The paxtest estimate of vdso
"randomisation" improves from 11 bits to 18 bits. (Disclaimer: I
don't know what the paxtest code is actually calculating.)
It's worth noting that this algorithm is inherently biased: the vdso
is more likely to end up near the end of its PMD than near the
beginning. Ideally we would either nix the PMD sharing requirement
or jointly randomize the vdso and the stack to reduce the bias.
In the mean time, this is a considerable improvement with basically
no risk of compatibility issues, since the allowed outputs of the
algorithm are unchanged.
As an easy test, doing this:
for i in `seq 10000`
do grep -P vdso /proc/self/maps |cut -d- -f1
done |sort |uniq -d
used to produce lots of output (1445 lines on my most recent run).
A tiny subset looks like this:
7fffdfffe000
7fffe01fe000
7fffe05fe000
7fffe07fe000
7fffe09fe000
7fffe0bfe000
7fffe0dfe000
Note the suspicious fe000 endings. With the fix, I get a much more
palatable 76 repeated addresses.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
|
asmlinkage void sparc_breakpoint(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_SPARC_BREAKPOINT
printk ("TRAP: Entering kernel PC=%lx, nPC=%lx\n", regs->tpc, regs->tnpc);
#endif
info.si_signo = SIGTRAP;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = TRAP_BRKPT;
info.si_addr = (void __user *)regs->tpc;
info.si_trapno = 0;
force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, current);
#ifdef DEBUG_SPARC_BREAKPOINT
printk ("TRAP: Returning to space: PC=%lx nPC=%lx\n", regs->tpc, regs->tnpc);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
5a0efea09f42f7c92bd98a38d66b4dff9589266b
| 214,344,744,796,657,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
sparc64: Sharpen address space randomization calculations.
A recent patch to the x86 randomization code caused me to take
a quick look at what we do on sparc64, and in doing so I noticed
that we sometimes calculate a non-page-aligned randomization value
and stick it into mmap_base.
I also noticed that since I copied the logic over from PowerPC,
the powerpc code has tweaked the randomization ranges in ways that
would benefit us as well.
For one thing, we should allow up to at least 8MB of randomization
otherwise huge-page regions when HPAGE_SIZE is 4MB never randomize
at all.
And on the 64-bit side we were using up to 4GB. Tone it down to
1GB as 4GB can result in a lot of address space wastage.
Finally, make sure all computations are unsigned.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
bool send_result_set_metadata(List<Item> &list, uint flags) { return 0; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
4681b6f2d8c82b4ec5cf115e83698251963d80d5
| 24,411,046,369,725,553,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
MDEV-26281 ASAN use-after-poison when complex conversion is involved in blob
the bug was that in_vector array in Item_func_in was allocated in the
statement arena, not in the table->expr_arena.
revert part of the 5acd391e8b2d. Instead, change the arena correctly
in fix_all_session_vcol_exprs().
Remove TABLE_ARENA, that was introduced in 5acd391e8b2d to force
item tree changes to be rolled back (because they were allocated in the
wrong arena and didn't persist. now they do)
|
PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, isCRCChecked)
{
PHAR_ENTRY_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(entry_obj->ent.entry->is_crc_checked);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
13ad4d3e971807f9a58ab5933182907dc2958539
| 156,147,248,557,108,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix bug #71354 - remove UMR when size is 0
|
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
php-src
|
1248079be837808da4c97364fb3b4c96c8015fbf
| 276,586,210,940,896,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
Fix bug #72099: xml_parse_into_struct segmentation fault
|
static netdev_tx_t wanxl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
desc_t *desc;
spin_lock(&port->lock);
desc = &get_status(port)->tx_descs[port->tx_out];
if (desc->stat != PACKET_EMPTY) {
/* should never happen - previous xmit should stop queue */
#ifdef DEBUG_PKT
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: transmitter buffer full\n", dev->name);
#endif
netif_stop_queue(dev);
spin_unlock(&port->lock);
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY; /* request packet to be queued */
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PKT
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s TX(%i):", dev->name, skb->len);
debug_frame(skb);
#endif
port->tx_skbs[port->tx_out] = skb;
desc->address = pci_map_single(port->card->pdev, skb->data, skb->len,
PCI_DMA_TODEVICE);
desc->length = skb->len;
desc->stat = PACKET_FULL;
writel(1 << (DOORBELL_TO_CARD_TX_0 + port->node),
port->card->plx + PLX_DOORBELL_TO_CARD);
port->tx_out = (port->tx_out + 1) % TX_BUFFERS;
if (get_status(port)->tx_descs[port->tx_out].stat != PACKET_EMPTY) {
netif_stop_queue(dev);
#ifdef DEBUG_PKT
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: transmitter buffer full\n", dev->name);
#endif
}
spin_unlock(&port->lock);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
2b13d06c9584b4eb773f1e80bbaedab9a1c344e1
| 242,873,236,589,763,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void _cgsem_post(cgsem_t *cgsem, const char *file, const char *func, const int line)
{
const char buf = 1;
int ret;
retry:
ret = write(cgsem->pipefd[1], &buf, 1);
if (unlikely(ret == 0))
applog(LOG_WARNING, "Failed to write errno=%d" IN_FMT_FFL, errno, file, func, line);
else if (unlikely(ret < 0 && interrupted))
goto retry;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] |
sgminer
|
910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c
| 268,932,362,951,537,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
|
static int packet_do_bind(struct sock *sk, const char *name, int ifindex,
__be16 proto)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct net_device *dev_curr;
__be16 proto_curr;
bool need_rehook;
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int ret = 0;
bool unlisted = false;
lock_sock(sk);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
if (po->fanout) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (name) {
dev = dev_get_by_name_rcu(sock_net(sk), name);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (ifindex) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
if (!dev) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
dev_hold(dev);
proto_curr = po->prot_hook.type;
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
need_rehook = proto_curr != proto || dev_curr != dev;
if (need_rehook) {
if (po->running) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/* prevents packet_notifier() from calling
* register_prot_hook()
*/
WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0);
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, true);
rcu_read_lock();
dev_curr = po->prot_hook.dev;
if (dev)
unlisted = !dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
dev->ifindex);
}
BUG_ON(po->running);
WRITE_ONCE(po->num, proto);
po->prot_hook.type = proto;
if (unlikely(unlisted)) {
dev_put(dev);
po->prot_hook.dev = NULL;
WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, -1);
packet_cached_dev_reset(po);
} else {
po->prot_hook.dev = dev;
WRITE_ONCE(po->ifindex, dev ? dev->ifindex : 0);
packet_cached_dev_assign(po, dev);
}
}
dev_put(dev_curr);
if (proto == 0 || !need_rehook)
goto out_unlock;
if (!unlisted && (!dev || (dev->flags & IFF_UP))) {
register_prot_hook(sk);
} else {
sk->sk_err = ENETDOWN;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk_error_report(sk);
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
linux
|
ec6af094ea28f0f2dda1a6a33b14cd57e36a9755
| 147,927,606,986,697,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 90 |
net/packet: rx_owner_map depends on pg_vec
Packet sockets may switch ring versions. Avoid misinterpreting state
between versions, whose fields share a union. rx_owner_map is only
allocated with a packet ring (pg_vec) and both are swapped together.
If pg_vec is NULL, meaning no packet ring was allocated, then neither
was rx_owner_map. And the field may be old state from a tpacket_v3.
Fixes: 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition")
Reported-by: Syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
270881316664396326c461ec7a124aec2c6cc081
| 65,714,802,550,548,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Add and use a constant-time memcmp.
This change adds CRYPTO_memcmp, which compares two vectors of bytes in
an amount of time that's independent of their contents. It also changes
several MAC compares in the code to use this over the standard memcmp,
which may leak information about the size of a matching prefix.
(cherry picked from commit 2ee798880a246d648ecddadc5b91367bee4a5d98)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/t1_lib.c
(cherry picked from commit dc406b59f3169fe191e58906df08dce97edb727c)
Conflicts:
crypto/crypto.h
ssl/d1_pkt.c
ssl/s3_pkt.c
|
PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, getMetadata)
{
PHAR_ENTRY_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata) {
if (entry_obj->ent.entry->is_persistent) {
zval *ret;
char *buf = estrndup((char *) entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata, entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata_len);
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, &ret, entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata_len TSRMLS_CC);
efree(buf);
RETURN_ZVAL(ret, 0, 1);
}
RETURN_ZVAL(entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata, 1, 0);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
php-src
|
b2cf3f064b8f5efef89bb084521b61318c71781b
| 315,664,415,278,208,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Fixed bug #68901 (use after free)
|
static int propfind_schedtag(const xmlChar *name, xmlNsPtr ns,
struct propfind_ctx *fctx,
xmlNodePtr resp __attribute__((unused)),
struct propstat propstat[],
void *rock __attribute__((unused)))
{
struct caldav_data *cdata = (struct caldav_data *) fctx->data;
if (!cdata->sched_tag) return HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
/* add DQUOTEs */
buf_reset(&fctx->buf);
buf_printf(&fctx->buf, "\"%s\"", cdata->sched_tag);
xml_add_prop(HTTP_OK, fctx->ns[NS_DAV], &propstat[PROPSTAT_OK],
name, ns, BAD_CAST buf_cstring(&fctx->buf), 0);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
a5779db8163b99463e25e7c476f9cbba438b65f3
| 20,346,963,153,003,592,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
HTTP: don't overrun buffer when parsing strings with sscanf()
|
make_ks_from_key_data(krb5_context context, kadm5_key_data *key_data,
int n_key_data, krb5_key_salt_tuple **out)
{
int i;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks;
*out = NULL;
ks = calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(*ks));
if (ks == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
ks[i].ks_enctype = key_data[i].key.enctype;
ks[i].ks_salttype = key_data[i].salt.type;
}
*out = ks;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-90"
] |
krb5
|
e1caf6fb74981da62039846931ebdffed71309d1
| 2,265,319,747,938,208,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
|
void ConnectionImpl::StreamImpl::submitTrailers(const HeaderMap& trailers) {
std::vector<nghttp2_nv> final_headers;
buildHeaders(final_headers, trailers);
int rc = nghttp2_submit_trailer(parent_.session_, stream_id_, final_headers.data(),
final_headers.size());
ASSERT(rc == 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c
| 105,307,371,093,787,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
void
mono_reflection_initialize_generic_parameter (MonoReflectionGenericParam *gparam)
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mono
|
4905ef1130feb26c3150b28b97e4a96752e0d399
| 299,370,511,235,845,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.