func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
process_cookie(ns_client_t *client, isc_buffer_t *buf, size_t optlen) {
ns_altsecret_t *altsecret;
unsigned char dbuf[COOKIE_SIZE];
unsigned char *old;
isc_stdtime_t now;
uint32_t when;
uint32_t nonce;
isc_buffer_t db;
/*
* If we have already seen a cookie option skip this cookie option.
*/
if ((!client->sctx->answercookie) ||
(client->attributes & NS_CLIENTATTR_WANTCOOKIE) != 0)
{
isc_buffer_forward(buf, (unsigned int)optlen);
return;
}
client->attributes |= NS_CLIENTATTR_WANTCOOKIE;
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats, ns_statscounter_cookiein);
if (optlen != COOKIE_SIZE) {
/*
* Not our token.
*/
INSIST(optlen >= 8U);
memmove(client->cookie, isc_buffer_current(buf), 8);
isc_buffer_forward(buf, (unsigned int)optlen);
if (optlen == 8U) {
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookienew);
} else {
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookiebadsize);
}
return;
}
/*
* Process all of the incoming buffer.
*/
old = isc_buffer_current(buf);
memmove(client->cookie, old, 8);
isc_buffer_forward(buf, 8);
nonce = isc_buffer_getuint32(buf);
when = isc_buffer_getuint32(buf);
isc_buffer_forward(buf, 8);
/*
* Allow for a 5 minute clock skew between servers sharing a secret.
* Only accept COOKIE if we have talked to the client in the last hour.
*/
isc_stdtime_get(&now);
if (isc_serial_gt(when, (now + 300)) || /* In the future. */
isc_serial_lt(when, (now - 3600)))
{ /* In the past. */
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookiebadtime);
return;
}
isc_buffer_init(&db, dbuf, sizeof(dbuf));
compute_cookie(client, when, nonce, client->sctx->secret, &db);
if (isc_safe_memequal(old, dbuf, COOKIE_SIZE)) {
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookiematch);
client->attributes |= NS_CLIENTATTR_HAVECOOKIE;
return;
}
for (altsecret = ISC_LIST_HEAD(client->sctx->altsecrets);
altsecret != NULL; altsecret = ISC_LIST_NEXT(altsecret, link))
{
isc_buffer_init(&db, dbuf, sizeof(dbuf));
compute_cookie(client, when, nonce, altsecret->secret, &db);
if (isc_safe_memequal(old, dbuf, COOKIE_SIZE)) {
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookiematch);
client->attributes |= NS_CLIENTATTR_HAVECOOKIE;
return;
}
}
ns_stats_increment(client->sctx->nsstats,
ns_statscounter_cookienomatch);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
bind9
|
15996f0cb15631b95a801e3e88928494a69ad6ee
| 69,563,406,695,543,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 90 |
ns_client_error() could assert if rcode was overridden to NOERROR
The client->rcode_override was originally created to force the server
to send SERVFAIL in some cases when it would normally have sent FORMERR.
More recently, it was used in a3ba95116ed04594ea59a8124bf781b30367a7a2
commit (part of GL #2790) to force the sending of a TC=1 NOERROR
response, triggering a retry via TCP, when a UDP packet could not be
sent due to ISC_R_MAXSIZE.
This ran afoul of a pre-existing INSIST in ns_client_error() when
RRL was in use. the INSIST was based on the assumption that
ns_client_error() could never result in a non-error rcode. as
that assumption is no longer valid, the INSIST has been removed.
|
static Bool parse_short_term_ref_pic_set(GF_BitStream *bs, HEVC_SPS *sps, u32 idx_rps)
{
u32 i;
Bool inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = 0;
if (idx_rps != 0)
inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
if (inter_ref_pic_set_prediction_flag ) {
HEVC_ReferencePictureSets *ref_ps, *rps;
u32 delta_idx_minus1 = 0;
u32 ref_idx;
u32 delta_rps_sign;
u32 abs_delta_rps_minus1, nb_ref_pics;
s32 deltaRPS;
u32 k = 0, k0 = 0, k1 = 0;
if (idx_rps == sps->num_short_term_ref_pic_sets)
delta_idx_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
assert(delta_idx_minus1 <= idx_rps - 1);
ref_idx = idx_rps - 1 - delta_idx_minus1;
delta_rps_sign = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
abs_delta_rps_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
deltaRPS = (1 - (delta_rps_sign<<1)) * (abs_delta_rps_minus1 + 1);
rps = &sps->rps[idx_rps];
ref_ps = &sps->rps[ref_idx];
nb_ref_pics = ref_ps->num_negative_pics + ref_ps->num_positive_pics;
for (i=0; i<=nb_ref_pics; i++) {
s32 ref_idc;
s32 used_by_curr_pic_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ref_idc = used_by_curr_pic_flag ? 1 : 0;
if ( !used_by_curr_pic_flag ) {
used_by_curr_pic_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ref_idc = used_by_curr_pic_flag << 1;
}
if ((ref_idc==1) || (ref_idc== 2)) {
s32 deltaPOC = deltaRPS;
if (i < nb_ref_pics)
deltaPOC += ref_ps->delta_poc[i];
rps->delta_poc[k] = deltaPOC;
if (deltaPOC < 0) k0++;
else k1++;
k++;
}
}
rps->num_negative_pics = k0;
rps->num_positive_pics = k1;
} else {
s32 prev = 0, poc = 0;
sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics = bs_get_ue(bs);
sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics = bs_get_ue(bs);
if (sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics>16)
return GF_FALSE;
if (sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics>16)
return GF_FALSE;
for (i=0; i<sps->rps[idx_rps].num_negative_pics; i++) {
u32 delta_poc_s0_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
poc = prev - delta_poc_s0_minus1 - 1;
prev = poc;
sps->rps[idx_rps].delta_poc[i] = poc;
/*used_by_curr_pic_s1_flag[ i ] = */gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
for (i=0; i<sps->rps[idx_rps].num_positive_pics; i++) {
u32 delta_poc_s1_minus1 = bs_get_ue(bs);
poc = prev + delta_poc_s1_minus1 + 1;
prev = poc;
sps->rps[idx_rps].delta_poc[i] = poc;
/*used_by_curr_pic_s1_flag[ i ] = */gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
}
}
return GF_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4
| 234,712,170,647,460,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 |
fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
|
kvm_eventfd_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQFD
spin_lock_init(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->irqfds.items);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_list);
mutex_init(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_lock);
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->ioeventfds);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] |
linux
|
36ae3c0a36b7456432fedce38ae2f7bd3e01a563
| 138,333,823,523,632,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
ecEncCtx* wc_ecc_ctx_new_ex(int flags, WC_RNG* rng, void* heap)
{
int ret = 0;
ecEncCtx* ctx = (ecEncCtx*)XMALLOC(sizeof(ecEncCtx), heap,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_ECC);
if (ctx) {
ctx->protocol = (byte)flags;
ctx->heap = heap;
}
ret = wc_ecc_ctx_reset(ctx, rng);
if (ret != 0) {
wc_ecc_ctx_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
return ctx;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-326",
"CWE-203"
] |
wolfssl
|
1de07da61f0c8e9926dcbd68119f73230dae283f
| 310,745,095,536,365,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Constant time EC map to affine for private operations
For fast math, use a constant time modular inverse when mapping to
affine when operation involves a private key - key gen, calc shared
secret, sign.
|
xsltParseStylesheetImport(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr cur) {
int ret = -1;
xmlDocPtr import = NULL;
xmlChar *base = NULL;
xmlChar *uriRef = NULL;
xmlChar *URI = NULL;
xsltStylesheetPtr res;
xsltSecurityPrefsPtr sec;
if ((cur == NULL) || (style == NULL))
return (ret);
uriRef = xmlGetNsProp(cur, (const xmlChar *)"href", NULL);
if (uriRef == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:import : missing href attribute\n");
goto error;
}
base = xmlNodeGetBase(style->doc, cur);
URI = xmlBuildURI(uriRef, base);
if (URI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:import : invalid URI reference %s\n", uriRef);
goto error;
}
res = style;
while (res != NULL) {
if (res->doc == NULL)
break;
if (xmlStrEqual(res->doc->URL, URI)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:import : recursion detected on imported URL %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
res = res->parent;
}
/*
* Security framework check
*/
sec = xsltGetDefaultSecurityPrefs();
if (sec != NULL) {
int secres;
secres = xsltCheckRead(sec, NULL, URI);
if (secres == 0) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsl:import: read rights for %s denied\n",
URI);
goto error;
}
}
import = xsltDocDefaultLoader(URI, style->dict, XSLT_PARSE_OPTIONS,
(void *) style, XSLT_LOAD_STYLESHEET);
if (import == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, cur,
"xsl:import : unable to load %s\n", URI);
goto error;
}
res = xsltParseStylesheetImportedDoc(import, style);
if (res != NULL) {
res->next = style->imports;
style->imports = res;
if (style->parent == NULL) {
xsltFixImportedCompSteps(style, res);
}
ret = 0;
} else {
xmlFreeDoc(import);
}
error:
if (uriRef != NULL)
xmlFree(uriRef);
if (base != NULL)
xmlFree(base);
if (URI != NULL)
xmlFree(URI);
return (ret);
}
| 1 |
[] |
libxslt
|
e03553605b45c88f0b4b2980adfbbb8f6fca2fd6
| 42,538,628,651,514,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 |
Fix security framework bypass
xsltCheckRead and xsltCheckWrite return -1 in case of error but callers
don't check for this condition and allow access. With a specially
crafted URL, xsltCheckRead could be tricked into returning an error
because of a supposedly invalid URL that would still be loaded
succesfully later on.
Fixes #12.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report.
|
int mg_http_parse(const char *s, size_t len, struct mg_http_message *hm) {
int is_response, req_len = mg_http_get_request_len((unsigned char *) s, len);
const char *end = s + req_len, *qs;
struct mg_str *cl;
memset(hm, 0, sizeof(*hm));
if (req_len <= 0) return req_len;
hm->message.ptr = hm->head.ptr = s;
hm->body.ptr = end;
hm->head.len = (size_t) req_len;
hm->chunk.ptr = end;
hm->message.len = hm->body.len = (size_t) ~0; // Set body length to infinite
// Parse request line
s = skip(s, end, " ", &hm->method);
s = skip(s, end, " ", &hm->uri);
s = skip(s, end, "\r\n", &hm->proto);
// Sanity check. Allow protocol/reason to be empty
if (hm->method.len == 0 || hm->uri.len == 0) return -1;
// If URI contains '?' character, setup query string
if ((qs = (const char *) memchr(hm->uri.ptr, '?', hm->uri.len)) != NULL) {
hm->query.ptr = qs + 1;
hm->query.len = (size_t) (&hm->uri.ptr[hm->uri.len] - (qs + 1));
hm->uri.len = (size_t) (qs - hm->uri.ptr);
}
mg_http_parse_headers(s, end, hm->headers,
sizeof(hm->headers) / sizeof(hm->headers[0]));
if ((cl = mg_http_get_header(hm, "Content-Length")) != NULL) {
hm->body.len = (size_t) mg_to64(*cl);
hm->message.len = (size_t) req_len + hm->body.len;
}
// mg_http_parse() is used to parse both HTTP requests and HTTP
// responses. If HTTP response does not have Content-Length set, then
// body is read until socket is closed, i.e. body.len is infinite (~0).
//
// For HTTP requests though, according to
// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-8.1.3,
// only POST and PUT methods have defined body semantics.
// Therefore, if Content-Length is not specified and methods are
// not one of PUT or POST, set body length to 0.
//
// So, if it is HTTP request, and Content-Length is not set,
// and method is not (PUT or POST) then reset body length to zero.
is_response = mg_ncasecmp(hm->method.ptr, "HTTP/", 5) == 0;
if (hm->body.len == (size_t) ~0 && !is_response &&
mg_vcasecmp(&hm->method, "PUT") != 0 &&
mg_vcasecmp(&hm->method, "POST") != 0) {
hm->body.len = 0;
hm->message.len = (size_t) req_len;
}
// The 204 (No content) responses also have 0 body length
if (hm->body.len == (size_t) ~0 && is_response &&
mg_vcasecmp(&hm->uri, "204") == 0) {
hm->body.len = 0;
hm->message.len = (size_t) req_len;
}
return req_len;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-552"
] |
mongoose
|
c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945
| 280,732,794,883,911,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 |
Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload()
|
static void ConvertVectorsToMatrices(
const OpInputList bucketized_features_list,
std::vector<tensorflow::TTypes<int32>::ConstMatrix>& bucketized_features) {
for (const Tensor& tensor : bucketized_features_list) {
if (tensor.dims() == 1) {
const auto v = tensor.vec<int32>();
bucketized_features.emplace_back(
TTypes<int32>::ConstMatrix(v.data(), v.size(), 1));
} else {
bucketized_features.emplace_back(tensor.matrix<int32>());
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-197"
] |
tensorflow
|
ca8c013b5e97b1373b3bb1c97ea655e69f31a575
| 144,598,157,356,585,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Prevent integer truncation from 64 to 32 bits.
The `tensorflow::Shard` functions last argument must be a 2 argument function where both arguments are `int64` (`long long`, 64 bits). However, there are usages where code passes in a function where arguments are `int` or `int32` (32 bits). In these cases, it is possible that the integer truncation would later cause a segfault or other unexpected behavior.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332560414
Change-Id: Ief649406babc8d4f60b3e7a9d573cbcc5ce5b767
|
void _map_window() {
Display *const dpy = cimg::X11_attr().display;
bool is_exposed = false, is_mapped = false;
XWindowAttributes attr;
XEvent event;
XMapRaised(dpy,_window);
do { // Wait for the window to be mapped
XWindowEvent(dpy,_window,StructureNotifyMask | ExposureMask,&event);
switch (event.type) {
case MapNotify : is_mapped = true; break;
case Expose : is_exposed = true; break;
}
} while (!is_exposed || !is_mapped);
do { // Wait for the window to be visible
XGetWindowAttributes(dpy,_window,&attr);
if (attr.map_state!=IsViewable) { XSync(dpy,0); cimg::sleep(10); }
} while (attr.map_state!=IsViewable);
_window_x = attr.x;
_window_y = attr.y;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 58,284,481,412,935,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
.
|
snmp_synch_response_cb(netsnmp_session * ss,
netsnmp_pdu *pdu,
netsnmp_pdu **response, snmp_callback pcb)
{
struct synch_state lstate, *state;
snmp_callback cbsav;
void *cbmagsav;
int numfds, count;
netsnmp_large_fd_set fdset;
struct timeval timeout, *tvp;
int block;
memset((void *) &lstate, 0, sizeof(lstate));
state = &lstate;
cbsav = ss->callback;
cbmagsav = ss->callback_magic;
ss->callback = pcb;
ss->callback_magic = (void *) state;
netsnmp_large_fd_set_init(&fdset, FD_SETSIZE);
if (snmp_send(ss, pdu) == 0) {
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
state->status = STAT_ERROR;
} else {
state->reqid = pdu->reqid;
state->waiting = 1;
}
while (state->waiting) {
numfds = 0;
NETSNMP_LARGE_FD_ZERO(&fdset);
block = NETSNMP_SNMPBLOCK;
tvp = &timeout;
timerclear(tvp);
snmp_sess_select_info2_flags(NULL, &numfds, &fdset, tvp, &block,
NETSNMP_SELECT_NOALARMS);
if (block == 1)
tvp = NULL; /* block without timeout */
count = netsnmp_large_fd_set_select(numfds, &fdset, NULL, NULL, tvp);
if (count > 0) {
snmp_read2(&fdset);
} else {
switch (count) {
case 0:
snmp_timeout();
break;
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR) {
continue;
} else {
snmp_errno = SNMPERR_GENERR; /*MTCRITICAL_RESOURCE */
/*
* CAUTION! if another thread closed the socket(s)
* waited on here, the session structure was freed.
* It would be nice, but we can't rely on the pointer.
* ss->s_snmp_errno = SNMPERR_GENERR;
* ss->s_errno = errno;
*/
snmp_set_detail(strerror(errno));
}
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
state->status = STAT_ERROR;
state->waiting = 0;
}
}
if ( ss->flags & SNMP_FLAGS_RESP_CALLBACK ) {
void (*cb)(void);
cb = (void (*)(void))(ss->myvoid);
cb(); /* Used to invoke 'netsnmp_check_outstanding_agent_requests();'
on internal AgentX queries. */
}
}
*response = state->pdu;
ss->callback = cbsav;
ss->callback_magic = cbmagsav;
netsnmp_large_fd_set_cleanup(&fdset);
return state->status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
net-snmp
|
5f881d3bf24599b90d67a45cae7a3eb099cd71c9
| 282,234,886,353,338,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 |
libsnmp, USM: Introduce a reference count in struct usmStateReference
This patch fixes https://sourceforge.net/p/net-snmp/bugs/2956/.
|
TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedSlong8Array(TIFF* tif, uint32* ndir, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 tag, uint32 count, int64* value)
{
assert(count<0x20000000);
assert(sizeof(int64)==8);
assert(tif->tif_flags&TIFF_BIGTIFF);
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong8((uint64*)value,count);
return(TIFFWriteDirectoryTagData(tif,ndir,dir,tag,TIFF_SLONG8,count,count*8,value));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libtiff
|
3144e57770c1e4d26520d8abee750f8ac8b75490
| 173,218,067,503,924,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
* libtiff/tif_dir.c, tif_dirread.c, tif_dirwrite.c: implement various clampings
of double to other data types to avoid undefined behaviour if the output range
isn't big enough to hold the input value.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2643
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2642
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2646
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2647
|
static struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_get_group(
struct net_bridge *br, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int hash)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct hlist_node *p;
unsigned count = 0;
unsigned max;
int elasticity;
int err;
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
hlist_for_each_entry(mp, p, &mdb->mhash[hash], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
count++;
if (unlikely(br_ip_equal(group, &mp->addr)))
return mp;
}
elasticity = 0;
max = mdb->max;
if (unlikely(count > br->hash_elasticity && count)) {
if (net_ratelimit())
br_info(br, "Multicast hash table "
"chain limit reached: %s\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name);
elasticity = br->hash_elasticity;
}
if (mdb->size >= max) {
max *= 2;
if (unlikely(max >= br->hash_max)) {
br_warn(br, "Multicast hash table maximum "
"reached, disabling snooping: %s, %d\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name, max);
err = -E2BIG;
disable:
br->multicast_disabled = 1;
goto err;
}
}
if (max > mdb->max || elasticity) {
if (mdb->old) {
if (net_ratelimit())
br_info(br, "Multicast hash table "
"on fire: %s\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name);
err = -EEXIST;
goto err;
}
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, max, elasticity);
if (err) {
br_warn(br, "Cannot rehash multicast "
"hash table, disabling snooping: %s, %d, %d\n",
port ? port->dev->name : br->dev->name,
mdb->size, err);
goto disable;
}
err = -EAGAIN;
goto err;
}
return NULL;
err:
mp = ERR_PTR(err);
return mp;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
| 15,284,612,578,552,806,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int propfind_restype(const xmlChar *name, xmlNsPtr ns,
struct propfind_ctx *fctx,
xmlNodePtr resp,
struct propstat propstat[],
void *rock __attribute__((unused)))
{
xmlNodePtr node = xml_add_prop(HTTP_OK, fctx->ns[NS_DAV],
&propstat[PROPSTAT_OK], name, ns, NULL, 0);
if (!fctx->record) {
xmlNewChild(node, NULL, BAD_CAST "collection", NULL);
if (fctx->req_tgt->collection) {
ensure_ns(fctx->ns, NS_CALDAV, resp->parent, XML_NS_CALDAV, "C");
if (!strcmp(fctx->req_tgt->collection, SCHED_INBOX)) {
xmlNewChild(node, fctx->ns[NS_CALDAV],
BAD_CAST "schedule-inbox", NULL);
}
else if (!strcmp(fctx->req_tgt->collection, SCHED_OUTBOX)) {
xmlNewChild(node, fctx->ns[NS_CALDAV],
BAD_CAST "schedule-outbox", NULL);
}
else {
xmlNewChild(node, fctx->ns[NS_CALDAV],
BAD_CAST "calendar", NULL);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
a5779db8163b99463e25e7c476f9cbba438b65f3
| 77,664,367,494,400,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
HTTP: don't overrun buffer when parsing strings with sscanf()
|
BOOL nego_recv_response(rdpNego* nego)
{
int status;
wStream* s;
s = Stream_New(NULL, 1024);
if (!s)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "Stream_New failed!");
return FALSE;
}
status = transport_read_pdu(nego->transport, s);
if (status < 0)
{
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return FALSE;
}
status = nego_recv(nego->transport, s, nego);
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
if (status < 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
6b485b146a1b9d6ce72dfd7b5f36456c166e7a16
| 268,050,299,352,231,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Fixed oob read in irp_write and similar
|
static int nfp_flower_sriov_enable(struct nfp_app *app, int num_vfs)
{
struct nfp_flower_priv *priv = app->priv;
if (!priv->nn)
return 0;
return nfp_flower_spawn_vnic_reprs(app,
NFP_FLOWER_CMSG_PORT_VNIC_TYPE_VF,
NFP_REPR_TYPE_VF, num_vfs);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
8572cea1461a006bce1d06c0c4b0575869125fa4
| 38,951,482,155,560,894,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
nfp: flower: prevent memory leak in nfp_flower_spawn_phy_reprs
In nfp_flower_spawn_phy_reprs, in the for loop over eth_tbl if any of
intermediate allocations or initializations fail memory is leaked.
requiered releases are added.
Fixes: b94524529741 ("nfp: flower: add per repr private data for LAG offload")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
int op_flag,
unsigned int size,
unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
int change = 0;
void *new_data;
if (op_flag > 0) {
if (size > 1024 * 128) /* sane value */
return -EINVAL;
new_data = memdup_user(tlv, size);
if (IS_ERR(new_data))
return PTR_ERR(new_data);
change = ue->tlv_data_size != size;
if (!change)
change = memcmp(ue->tlv_data, new_data, size);
kfree(ue->tlv_data);
ue->tlv_data = new_data;
ue->tlv_data_size = size;
} else {
if (! ue->tlv_data_size || ! ue->tlv_data)
return -ENXIO;
if (size < ue->tlv_data_size)
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_to_user(tlv, ue->tlv_data, ue->tlv_data_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return change;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
07f4d9d74a04aa7c72c5dae0ef97565f28f17b92
| 275,738,377,376,799,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int bpf_btf_load(const union bpf_attr *attr)
{
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_BTF_LOAD))
return -EINVAL;
if (!bpf_capable())
return -EPERM;
return btf_new_fd(attr);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-307"
] |
linux
|
350a5c4dd2452ea999cc5e1d4a8dbf12de2f97ef
| 289,415,696,704,985,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
bpf: Dont allow vmlinux BTF to be used in map_create and prog_load.
The syzbot got FD of vmlinux BTF and passed it into map_create which caused
crash in btf_type_id_size() when it tried to access resolved_ids. The vmlinux
BTF doesn't have 'resolved_ids' and 'resolved_sizes' initialized to save
memory. To avoid such issues disallow using vmlinux BTF in prog_load and
map_create commands.
Fixes: 5329722057d4 ("bpf: Assign ID to vmlinux BTF and return extra info for BTF in GET_OBJ_INFO")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
|
static void print_line(char* line)
{
while (*line && *line != '\n')
{
fputc(*line, stderr);
line++;
}
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] |
mysql-server
|
3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390
| 277,817,600,994,043,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options
|
do_dcs(void)
{
// Implemented:
// DECRQSS (Request Status String)
// DECAUPSS (Assign User-Preferred Supplemental Set)
// DECSIXEL
// No DECUDK (User-Defined Keys) or xterm termcap/terminfo data.
char *s = term.cmd_buf;
if (!term.cmd_len)
*s = 0;
switch (term.dcs_cmd) {
when CPAIR('!', 'u'): // DECAUPSS
if (term.state == DCS_ESCAPE) {
ushort nrc_code = 0;
if (term.cmd_len == 1)
nrc_code = *s;
else if (term.cmd_len == 2)
nrc_code = CPAIR(s[0], s[1]);
term_cset cs = lookup_cset(nrc_code, 7, false);
if (cs) {
term.curs.decsupp = cs;
term_update_cs();
return;
}
}
when 'q': {
sixel_state_t * st = (sixel_state_t *)term.imgs.parser_state;
int status = -1;
switch (term.state) {
when DCS_PASSTHROUGH:
if (!st)
return;
status = sixel_parser_parse(st, (unsigned char *)s, term.cmd_len);
if (status < 0) {
sixel_parser_deinit(st);
//printf("free state 1 %p\n", term.imgs.parser_state);
free(term.imgs.parser_state);
term.imgs.parser_state = NULL;
term.state = DCS_IGNORE;
return;
}
when DCS_ESCAPE:
if (!st)
return;
status = sixel_parser_parse(st, (unsigned char *)s, term.cmd_len);
if (status < 0) {
sixel_parser_deinit(st);
//printf("free state 2 %p\n", term.imgs.parser_state);
free(term.imgs.parser_state);
term.imgs.parser_state = NULL;
return;
}
unsigned char * pixels = sixel_parser_finalize(st);
//printf("sixel_parser_finalize %p\n", pixels);
sixel_parser_deinit(st);
if (!pixels) {
//printf("free state 3 %p\n", term.imgs.parser_state);
free(term.imgs.parser_state);
term.imgs.parser_state = NULL;
return;
}
short left = term.curs.x;
short top = term.virtuallines + (term.sixel_display ? 0: term.curs.y);
int width = (st->image.width -1 ) / st->grid_width + 1;
int height = (st->image.height -1 ) / st->grid_height + 1;
int pixelwidth = st->image.width;
int pixelheight = st->image.height;
//printf("w %d/%d %d h %d/%d %d\n", pixelwidth, st->grid_width, width, pixelheight, st->grid_height, height);
imglist * img;
if (!winimg_new(&img, 0, pixels, 0, left, top, width, height, pixelwidth, pixelheight, false, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
free(pixels);
sixel_parser_deinit(st);
//printf("free state 4 %p\n", term.imgs.parser_state);
free(term.imgs.parser_state);
term.imgs.parser_state = NULL;
return;
}
img->cwidth = st->max_x;
img->cheight = st->max_y;
fill_image_space(img);
// add image to image list;
// replace previous for optimisation in some cases
if (term.imgs.first == NULL) {
term.imgs.first = term.imgs.last = img;
} else {
// try some optimization: replace existing images if overwritten
#ifdef debug_sixel_list
printf("do_dcs checking imglist\n");
#endif
#ifdef replace_images
#warning do not replace images in the list anymore
// with new flicker-reduce strategy of rendering overlapped images,
// new images should always be added to the end of the queue;
// completely overlayed images should be collected for removal
// during the rendering loop (winimgs_paint),
// or latest when they are scrolled out of the scrollback buffer
for (imglist * cur = term.imgs.first; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (cur->pixelwidth == cur->width * st->grid_width &&
cur->pixelheight == cur->height * st->grid_height)
{
// if same size, replace
if (img->top == cur->top && img->left == cur->left &&
img->width == cur->width &&
img->height == cur->height)
{
#ifdef debug_sixel_list
printf("img replace\n");
#endif
memcpy(cur->pixels, img->pixels, img->pixelwidth * img->pixelheight * 4);
cur->imgi = img->imgi;
winimg_destroy(img);
return;
}
// if new image within area of previous image, ...
#ifdef handle_overlay_images
#warning this creates some crash conditions...
if (img->top >= cur->top && img->left >= cur->left &&
img->left + img->width <= cur->left + cur->width &&
img->top + img->height <= cur->top + cur->height)
{
// inject new img into old structure;
// copy img data in stripes, for unknown reason
for (y = 0; y < img->pixelheight; ++y) {
memcpy(cur->pixels +
((img->top - cur->top) * st->grid_height + y) * cur->pixelwidth * 4 +
(img->left - cur->left) * st->grid_width * 4,
img->pixels + y * img->pixelwidth * 4,
img->pixelwidth * 4);
}
cur->imgi = img->imgi;
winimg_destroy(img);
return;
}
#endif
}
}
#endif
// append image to list
img->prev = term.imgs.last;
term.imgs.last->next = img;
term.imgs.last = img;
}
otherwise: {
/* parser status initialization */
colour fg = win_get_colour(FG_COLOUR_I);
colour bg = win_get_colour(BG_COLOUR_I);
if (!st) {
st = term.imgs.parser_state = calloc(1, sizeof(sixel_state_t));
//printf("alloc state %d -> %p\n", (int)sizeof(sixel_state_t), st);
sixel_parser_set_default_color(st);
}
status = sixel_parser_init(st, fg, bg, term.private_color_registers);
if (status < 0)
return;
}
}
}
when CPAIR('$', 'q'):
switch (term.state) {
when DCS_ESCAPE: { // DECRQSS
cattr attr = term.curs.attr;
if (!strcmp(s, "m")) { // SGR
char buf[90], *p = buf;
p += sprintf(p, "\eP1$r0");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_BOLD)
p += sprintf(p, ";1");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_DIM)
p += sprintf(p, ";2");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_SHADOW)
p += sprintf(p, ";1:2");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_ITALIC)
p += sprintf(p, ";3");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_BROKENUND)
if (attr.attr & ATTR_DOUBLYUND)
p += sprintf(p, ";4:5");
else
p += sprintf(p, ";4:4");
else if ((attr.attr & UNDER_MASK) == ATTR_CURLYUND)
p += sprintf(p, ";4:3");
else if (attr.attr & ATTR_UNDER)
p += sprintf(p, ";4");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_BLINK)
p += sprintf(p, ";5");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_BLINK2)
p += sprintf(p, ";6");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_REVERSE)
p += sprintf(p, ";7");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_INVISIBLE)
p += sprintf(p, ";8");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_OVERSTRIKE)
p += sprintf(p, ";8:7");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_STRIKEOUT)
p += sprintf(p, ";9");
if ((attr.attr & UNDER_MASK) == ATTR_DOUBLYUND)
p += sprintf(p, ";21");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_FRAMED)
p += sprintf(p, ";51;52");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_OVERL)
p += sprintf(p, ";53");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_SUPERSCR)
p += sprintf(p, ";73");
if (attr.attr & ATTR_SUBSCR)
p += sprintf(p, ";74");
if (term.curs.oem_acs)
p += sprintf(p, ";%u", 10 + term.curs.oem_acs);
else {
uint ff = (attr.attr & FONTFAM_MASK) >> ATTR_FONTFAM_SHIFT;
if (ff)
p += sprintf(p, ";%u", 10 + ff);
}
uint fg = (attr.attr & ATTR_FGMASK) >> ATTR_FGSHIFT;
if (fg != FG_COLOUR_I) {
if (fg >= TRUE_COLOUR)
//p += sprintf(p, ";38;2;%u;%u;%u", attr.truefg & 0xFF,
// (attr.truefg >> 8) & 0xFF, (attr.truefg >> 16) & 0xFF);
p += sprintf(p, ";38:2::%u:%u:%u", attr.truefg & 0xFF,
(attr.truefg >> 8) & 0xFF, (attr.truefg >> 16) & 0xFF);
else if (fg < 16)
p += sprintf(p, ";%u", (fg < 8 ? 30 : 90) + (fg & 7));
else
//p += sprintf(p, ";38;5;%u", fg);
p += sprintf(p, ";38:5:%u", fg);
}
uint bg = (attr.attr & ATTR_BGMASK) >> ATTR_BGSHIFT;
if (bg != BG_COLOUR_I) {
if (bg >= TRUE_COLOUR)
//p += sprintf(p, ";48;2;%u;%u;%u", attr.truebg & 0xFF,
// (attr.truebg >> 8) & 0xFF, (attr.truebg >> 16) & 0xFF);
p += sprintf(p, ";48:2::%u:%u:%u", attr.truebg & 0xFF,
(attr.truebg >> 8) & 0xFF, (attr.truebg >> 16) & 0xFF);
else if (bg < 16)
p += sprintf(p, ";%u", (bg < 8 ? 40 : 100) + (bg & 7));
else
//p += sprintf(p, ";48;5;%u", bg);
p += sprintf(p, ";48:5:%u", bg);
}
if (attr.attr & ATTR_ULCOLOUR) {
p += sprintf(p, ";58:2::%u:%u:%u", attr.ulcolr & 0xFF,
(attr.ulcolr >> 8) & 0xFF, (attr.ulcolr >> 16) & 0xFF);
}
p += sprintf(p, "m\e\\"); // m for SGR, followed by ST
child_write(buf, p - buf);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "r")) { // DECSTBM (scrolling region margins)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u;%ur\e\\", term.marg_top + 1, term.marg_bot + 1);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "s")) { // DECSLRM (left and right margins)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u;%us\e\\", term.marg_left + 1, term.marg_right + 1);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "\"p")) { // DECSCL (conformance level)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u;%u\"p\e\\", 65, 1); // report as VT500 S7C1T
} else if (!strcmp(s, "\"q")) { // DECSCA (protection attribute)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u\"q\e\\", (attr.attr & ATTR_PROTECTED) != 0);
} else if (!strcmp(s, " q")) { // DECSCUSR (cursor style)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u q\e\\",
(term.cursor_type >= 0 ? term.cursor_type * 2 : 0) + 1
+ !(term.cursor_blinks & 1));
} else if (!strcmp(s, "t") && term.rows >= 24) { // DECSLPP (lines)
child_printf("\eP1$r%ut\e\\", term.rows);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "$|")) { // DECSCPP (columns)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u$|\e\\", term.cols);
} else if (!strcmp(s, "*|")) { // DECSNLS (lines)
child_printf("\eP1$r%u*|\e\\", term.rows);
} else {
child_printf("\eP0$r%s\e\\", s);
}
}
otherwise:
return;
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-770"
] |
mintty
|
bd52109993440b6996760aaccb66e68e782762b9
| 179,499,562,271,018,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 292 |
tame some window operations, just in case
|
attach_pending_entry_connections_cb(mainloop_event_t *ev, void *arg)
{
(void)ev;
(void)arg;
connection_ap_attach_pending(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-532"
] |
tor
|
80c404c4b79f3bcba3fc4585d4c62a62a04f3ed9
| 171,846,604,982,342,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Log warning when connecting to soon-to-be-deprecated v2 onions.
|
static gboolean udp4_listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct listener_data *ifdata = user_data;
return udp_listener_event(channel, condition, ifdata, AF_INET,
&ifdata->udp4_listener_watch);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
connman
|
5c281d182ecdd0a424b64f7698f32467f8f67b71
| 336,248,983,432,195,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
dnsproxy: Fix crash on malformed DNS response
If the response query string is malformed, we might access memory
pass the end of "name" variable in parse_response().
|
const Hashes& sslHashes::get_certVerify() const
{
return certVerify_;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-254"
] |
mysql-server
|
e7061f7e5a96c66cb2e0bf46bec7f6ff35801a69
| 245,921,591,440,358,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Bug #22738607: YASSL FUNCTION X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID IS NOT WORKING AS EXPECTED.
|
DeepScanLineInputFile::~DeepScanLineInputFile ()
{
if (_data->_deleteStream)
delete _data->_streamData->is;
if (_data)
{
if (!_data->memoryMapped)
for (size_t i = 0; i < _data->lineBuffers.size(); i++)
delete [] _data->lineBuffers[i]->buffer;
//
// Unless this file was opened via the multipart API, delete the streamdata
// object too.
// (TODO) it should be "isMultiPart(data->version)", but when there is only
// single part,
// (see the above constructor) the version field is not set.
//
// (TODO) we should have a way to tell if the stream data is owned by this
// file or by a parent multipart file.
//
if (_data->partNumber == -1 && _data->_streamData)
delete _data->_streamData;
delete _data;
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
openexr
|
e79d2296496a50826a15c667bf92bdc5a05518b4
| 294,344,434,220,212,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
fix memory leaks and invalid memory accesses
Signed-off-by: Peter Hillman <[email protected]>
|
long long ustime(void) {
struct timeval tv;
long long ust;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ust = ((long long)tv.tv_sec)*1000000;
ust += tv.tv_usec;
return ust;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
redis
|
5674b0057ff2903d43eaff802017eddf37c360f8
| 51,894,437,171,416,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Prevent unauthenticated client from easily consuming lots of memory (CVE-2021-32675)
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
|
xmlSchemaSAXHandleStartElementNs(void *ctx,
const xmlChar * localname,
const xmlChar * prefix ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar * URI,
int nb_namespaces,
const xmlChar ** namespaces,
int nb_attributes,
int nb_defaulted ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const xmlChar ** attributes)
{
xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt = (xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr) ctx;
int ret;
xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr ielem;
int i, j;
/*
* SAX VAL TODO: What to do with nb_defaulted?
*/
/*
* Skip elements if inside a "skip" wildcard or invalid.
*/
vctxt->depth++;
if ((vctxt->skipDepth != -1) && (vctxt->depth >= vctxt->skipDepth))
return;
/*
* Push the element.
*/
if (xmlSchemaValidatorPushElem(vctxt) == -1) {
VERROR_INT("xmlSchemaSAXHandleStartElementNs",
"calling xmlSchemaValidatorPushElem()");
goto internal_error;
}
ielem = vctxt->inode;
/*
* TODO: Is this OK?
*/
ielem->nodeLine = xmlSAX2GetLineNumber(vctxt->parserCtxt);
ielem->localName = localname;
ielem->nsName = URI;
ielem->flags |= XML_SCHEMA_ELEM_INFO_EMPTY;
/*
* Register namespaces on the elem info.
*/
if (nb_namespaces != 0) {
/*
* Although the parser builds its own namespace list,
* we have no access to it, so we'll use an own one.
*/
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < nb_namespaces; i++, j += 2) {
/*
* Store prefix and namespace name.
*/
if (ielem->nsBindings == NULL) {
ielem->nsBindings =
(const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 *
sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (ielem->nsBindings == NULL) {
xmlSchemaVErrMemory(vctxt,
"allocating namespace bindings for SAX validation",
NULL);
goto internal_error;
}
ielem->nbNsBindings = 0;
ielem->sizeNsBindings = 5;
} else if (ielem->sizeNsBindings <= ielem->nbNsBindings) {
ielem->sizeNsBindings *= 2;
ielem->nsBindings =
(const xmlChar **) xmlRealloc(
(void *) ielem->nsBindings,
ielem->sizeNsBindings * 2 * sizeof(const xmlChar *));
if (ielem->nsBindings == NULL) {
xmlSchemaVErrMemory(vctxt,
"re-allocating namespace bindings for SAX validation",
NULL);
goto internal_error;
}
}
ielem->nsBindings[ielem->nbNsBindings * 2] = namespaces[j];
if (namespaces[j+1][0] == 0) {
/*
* Handle xmlns="".
*/
ielem->nsBindings[ielem->nbNsBindings * 2 + 1] = NULL;
} else
ielem->nsBindings[ielem->nbNsBindings * 2 + 1] =
namespaces[j+1];
ielem->nbNsBindings++;
}
}
/*
* Register attributes.
* SAX VAL TODO: We are not adding namespace declaration
* attributes yet.
*/
if (nb_attributes != 0) {
xmlChar *value;
for (j = 0, i = 0; i < nb_attributes; i++, j += 5) {
/*
* Duplicate the value, changing any & to a literal ampersand.
*
* libxml2 differs from normal SAX here in that it escapes all ampersands
* as & instead of delivering the raw converted string. Changing the
* behavior at this point would break applications that use this API, so
* we are forced to work around it. There is no danger of accidentally
* decoding some entity other than & in this step because without
* unescaped ampersands there can be no other entities in the string.
*/
value = xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(vctxt->parserCtxt, attributes[j+3],
attributes[j+4] - attributes[j+3], XML_SUBSTITUTE_REF, 0, 0, 0);
/*
* TODO: Set the node line.
*/
ret = xmlSchemaValidatorPushAttribute(vctxt,
NULL, ielem->nodeLine, attributes[j], attributes[j+2], 0,
value, 1);
if (ret == -1) {
VERROR_INT("xmlSchemaSAXHandleStartElementNs",
"calling xmlSchemaValidatorPushAttribute()");
goto internal_error;
}
}
}
/*
* Validate the element.
*/
ret = xmlSchemaValidateElem(vctxt);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ret == -1) {
VERROR_INT("xmlSchemaSAXHandleStartElementNs",
"calling xmlSchemaValidateElem()");
goto internal_error;
}
goto exit;
}
exit:
return;
internal_error:
vctxt->err = -1;
xmlStopParser(vctxt->parserCtxt);
return;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 182,894,037,550,523,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 144 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
msg_puts_title(char *s)
{
msg_puts_attr(s, HL_ATTR(HLF_T));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
vim
|
9f1a39a5d1cd7989ada2d1cb32f97d84360e050f
| 338,321,489,813,187,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
patch 8.2.4040: keeping track of allocated lines is too complicated
Problem: Keeping track of allocated lines in user functions is too
complicated.
Solution: Instead of freeing individual lines keep them all until the end.
|
int luaRedisSha1hexCommand(lua_State *lua) {
int argc = lua_gettop(lua);
char digest[41];
size_t len;
char *s;
if (argc != 1) {
lua_pushstring(lua, "wrong number of arguments");
return lua_error(lua);
}
s = (char*)lua_tolstring(lua,1,&len);
sha1hex(digest,s,len);
lua_pushstring(lua,digest);
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
redis
|
6ac3c0b7abd35f37201ed2d6298ecef4ea1ae1dd
| 131,199,443,083,203,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (CVE-2021-32672)
The protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (LUA debugging)
Assumed protocol correctness. This means that if the following
is given:
*1
$100
test
The parser will try to read additional 94 unallocated bytes after
the client buffer.
This commit fixes this issue by validating that there are actually enough
bytes to read. It also limits the amount of data that can be sent by
the debugger client to 1M so the client will not be able to explode
the memory.
|
reverse_nat_packet(struct dp_packet *pkt, const struct conn *conn)
{
char *tail = dp_packet_tail(pkt);
uint8_t pad = dp_packet_l2_pad_size(pkt);
struct conn_key inner_key;
const char *inner_l4 = NULL;
uint16_t orig_l3_ofs = pkt->l3_ofs;
uint16_t orig_l4_ofs = pkt->l4_ofs;
if (conn->key.dl_type == htons(ETH_TYPE_IP)) {
struct ip_header *nh = dp_packet_l3(pkt);
struct icmp_header *icmp = dp_packet_l4(pkt);
struct ip_header *inner_l3 = (struct ip_header *) (icmp + 1);
/* This call is already verified to succeed during the code path from
* 'conn_key_extract()' which calls 'extract_l4_icmp()'. */
extract_l3_ipv4(&inner_key, inner_l3, tail - ((char *)inner_l3) - pad,
&inner_l4, false);
pkt->l3_ofs += (char *) inner_l3 - (char *) nh;
pkt->l4_ofs += inner_l4 - (char *) icmp;
if (conn->nat_info->nat_action & NAT_ACTION_SRC) {
packet_set_ipv4_addr(pkt, &inner_l3->ip_src,
conn->key.src.addr.ipv4_aligned);
} else if (conn->nat_info->nat_action & NAT_ACTION_DST) {
packet_set_ipv4_addr(pkt, &inner_l3->ip_dst,
conn->key.dst.addr.ipv4_aligned);
}
reverse_pat_packet(pkt, conn);
icmp->icmp_csum = 0;
icmp->icmp_csum = csum(icmp, tail - (char *) icmp - pad);
} else {
struct ovs_16aligned_ip6_hdr *nh6 = dp_packet_l3(pkt);
struct icmp6_error_header *icmp6 = dp_packet_l4(pkt);
struct ovs_16aligned_ip6_hdr *inner_l3_6 =
(struct ovs_16aligned_ip6_hdr *) (icmp6 + 1);
/* This call is already verified to succeed during the code path from
* 'conn_key_extract()' which calls 'extract_l4_icmp6()'. */
extract_l3_ipv6(&inner_key, inner_l3_6,
tail - ((char *)inner_l3_6) - pad,
&inner_l4);
pkt->l3_ofs += (char *) inner_l3_6 - (char *) nh6;
pkt->l4_ofs += inner_l4 - (char *) icmp6;
if (conn->nat_info->nat_action & NAT_ACTION_SRC) {
packet_set_ipv6_addr(pkt, conn->key.nw_proto,
inner_l3_6->ip6_src.be32,
&conn->key.src.addr.ipv6_aligned,
true);
} else if (conn->nat_info->nat_action & NAT_ACTION_DST) {
packet_set_ipv6_addr(pkt, conn->key.nw_proto,
inner_l3_6->ip6_dst.be32,
&conn->key.dst.addr.ipv6_aligned,
true);
}
reverse_pat_packet(pkt, conn);
icmp6->icmp6_base.icmp6_cksum = 0;
icmp6->icmp6_base.icmp6_cksum = packet_csum_upperlayer6(nh6, icmp6,
IPPROTO_ICMPV6, tail - (char *) icmp6 - pad);
}
pkt->l3_ofs = orig_l3_ofs;
pkt->l4_ofs = orig_l4_ofs;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ovs
|
35c280072c1c3ed58202745b7d27fbbd0736999b
| 243,784,179,096,545,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 |
flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
|
TPMI_ALG_ECC_SCHEME_Unmarshal(TPMI_ALG_ECC_SCHEME *target, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size, BOOL allowNull)
{
TPM_RC rc = TPM_RC_SUCCESS;
TPMI_ALG_ECC_SCHEME orig_target = *target; // libtpms added
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
rc = TPM_ALG_ID_Unmarshal(target, buffer, size);
}
if (rc == TPM_RC_SUCCESS) {
switch (*target) {
#if ALG_ECDSA
case TPM_ALG_ECDSA:
#endif
#if ALG_SM2
case TPM_ALG_SM2:
#endif
#if ALG_ECDAA
case TPM_ALG_ECDAA:
#endif
#if ALG_ECSCHNORR
case TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR:
#endif
#if ALG_ECDH
case TPM_ALG_ECDH:
#endif
#if ALG_ECMQV
case TPM_ALG_ECMQV:
#endif
break;
case TPM_ALG_NULL:
if (allowNull) {
break;
}
default:
rc = TPM_RC_SCHEME;
*target = orig_target; // libtpms added
}
}
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libtpms
|
5cc98a62dc6f204dcf5b87c2ee83ac742a6a319b
| 61,617,175,963,765,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
tpm2: Restore original value if unmarshalled value was illegal
Restore the original value of the memory location where data from
a stream was unmarshalled and the unmarshalled value was found to
be illegal. The goal is to not keep illegal values in memory.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
|
void ConnectionImpl::onResetStreamBase(StreamResetReason reason) {
ASSERT(!reset_stream_called_);
reset_stream_called_ = true;
onResetStream(reason);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014
| 220,577,967,067,008,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]>
|
void remove_from_page_cache(struct page *page)
{
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
spin_lock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
__remove_from_page_cache(page);
spin_unlock_irq(&mapping->tree_lock);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-193"
] |
linux-2.6
|
94ad374a0751f40d25e22e036c37f7263569d24c
| 241,249,323,538,195,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix off-by-one error in iov_iter_advance()
The iov_iter_advance() function would look at the iov->iov_len entry
even though it might have iterated over the whole array, and iov was
pointing past the end. This would cause DEBUG_PAGEALLOC to trigger a
kernel page fault if the allocation was at the end of a page, and the
next page was unallocated.
The quick fix is to just change the order of the tests: check that there
is any iovec data left before we check the iov entry itself.
Thanks to Alexey Dobriyan for finding this case, and testing the fix.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.25.x, 2.6.26.x]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
bytes_fromhex_impl(PyTypeObject *type, PyObject *string)
/*[clinic end generated code: output=0973acc63661bb2e input=bf4d1c361670acd3]*/
{
PyObject *newstring;
char *buf;
Py_ssize_t hexlen, byteslen, i, j;
int top, bot;
void *data;
unsigned int kind;
assert(PyUnicode_Check(string));
if (PyUnicode_READY(string))
return NULL;
kind = PyUnicode_KIND(string);
data = PyUnicode_DATA(string);
hexlen = PyUnicode_GET_LENGTH(string);
byteslen = hexlen/2; /* This overestimates if there are spaces */
newstring = PyBytes_FromStringAndSize(NULL, byteslen);
if (!newstring)
return NULL;
buf = PyBytes_AS_STRING(newstring);
for (i = j = 0; i < hexlen; i += 2) {
/* skip over spaces in the input */
while (PyUnicode_READ(kind, data, i) == ' ')
i++;
if (i >= hexlen)
break;
top = hex_digit_to_int(PyUnicode_READ(kind, data, i));
bot = hex_digit_to_int(PyUnicode_READ(kind, data, i+1));
if (top == -1 || bot == -1) {
PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
"non-hexadecimal number found in "
"fromhex() arg at position %zd", i);
goto error;
}
buf[j++] = (top << 4) + bot;
}
if (j != byteslen && _PyBytes_Resize(&newstring, j) < 0)
goto error;
return newstring;
error:
Py_XDECREF(newstring);
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
cpython
|
fd8614c5c5466a14a945db5b059c10c0fb8f76d9
| 56,819,761,174,125,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
bpo-30657: Fix CVE-2017-1000158 (#4664)
Fixes possible integer overflow in PyBytes_DecodeEscape.
Co-Authored-By: Jay Bosamiya <[email protected]>
|
Linker* PackLinuxElf32x86::newLinker() const
{
return new ElfLinkerX86;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
upx
|
ef336dbcc6dc8344482f8cf6c909ae96c3286317
| 146,174,642,242,806,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Protect against bad crafted input.
https://github.com/upx/upx/issues/128
modified: p_lx_elf.cpp
|
void PlayerGeneric::setMasterVolume(mp_sint32 vol)
{
masterVolume = vol;
if (player)
player->setMasterVolume(vol);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
MilkyTracker
|
7afd55c42ad80d01a339197a2d8b5461d214edaf
| 244,420,812,152,325,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix use-after-free in PlayerGeneric destructor
|
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
(s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
* (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. Maybe
* this optional behaviour should always have been the default, but we
* cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications might
* be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with an earlier
* library version)
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
ret = 2;
}
p += cookie_len;
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
== NULL)) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = p;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned long Time;
unsigned char *pos;
Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
pos = s->s3->server_random;
l2n(Time, pos);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - 4) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (ret < 0)
ret = 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return (ret);
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
1392c238657ec745af6a40def03d67d4ce02a082
| 181,428,057,863,667,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 526 |
Fix PSK handling.
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).
Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3c66a669dfc7b3792f7af0758ea26fe8502ce70c)
|
virDomainSetTime(virDomainPtr dom,
long long seconds,
unsigned int nseconds,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom, "seconds=%lld, nseconds=%u, flags=%x",
seconds, nseconds, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(dom->conn->flags, error);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainSetTime) {
int ret = dom->conn->driver->domainSetTime(dom, seconds,
nseconds, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-254"
] |
libvirt
|
506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
| 110,293,873,954,293,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
|
read_cups_files_conf(cups_file_t *fp) /* I - File to read from */
{
int i, /* Looping var */
linenum; /* Current line number */
char line[HTTP_MAX_BUFFER], /* Line from file */
*value; /* Value from line */
struct group *group; /* Group */
static const char * const prohibited_env[] =
{ /* Prohibited environment variables */
"APPLE_LANGUAGE",
"AUTH_DOMAIN",
"AUTH_INFO_REQUIRED",
"AUTH_NEGOTIATE",
"AUTH_PASSWORD",
"AUTH_UID",
"AUTH_USERNAME",
"CHARSET",
"CLASS",
"CLASSIFICATION",
"CONTENT_TYPE",
"CUPS_CACHEDIR",
"CUPS_DATADIR",
"CUPS_DOCROOT",
"CUPS_FILETYPE",
"CUPS_FONTPATH",
"CUPS_MAX_MESSAGE",
"CUPS_REQUESTROOT",
"CUPS_SERVERBIN",
"CUPS_SERVERROOT",
"CUPS_STATEDIR",
"DEVICE_URI",
"FINAL_CONTENT_TYPE",
"HOME",
"LANG",
"PPD",
"PRINTER",
"PRINTER_INFO",
"PRINTER_LOCATION",
"PRINTER_STATE_REASONS",
"RIP_CACHE",
"SERVER_ADMIN",
"SOFTWARE",
"TMPDIR",
"USER"
};
/*
* Loop through each line in the file...
*/
linenum = 0;
while (cupsFileGetConf(fp, line, sizeof(line), &value, &linenum))
{
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "FatalErrors"))
FatalErrors = parse_fatal_errors(value);
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Group") && value)
{
/*
* Group ID to run as...
*/
if (isdigit(value[0]))
Group = (gid_t)atoi(value);
else
{
endgrent();
group = getgrnam(value);
if (group != NULL)
Group = group->gr_gid;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown Group \"%s\" on line %d of %s.", value,
linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PassEnv") && value)
{
/*
* PassEnv variable [... variable]
*/
int valuelen; /* Length of variable name */
for (; *value;)
{
for (valuelen = 0; value[valuelen]; valuelen ++)
if (_cups_isspace(value[valuelen]) || value[valuelen] == ',')
break;
if (value[valuelen])
{
value[valuelen] = '\0';
valuelen ++;
}
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(prohibited_env) / sizeof(prohibited_env[0])); i ++)
{
if (!strcmp(value, prohibited_env[i]))
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Environment variable \"%s\" cannot be passed through on line %d of %s.", value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
else
break;
}
}
if (i >= (int)(sizeof(prohibited_env) / sizeof(prohibited_env[0])))
cupsdSetEnv(value, NULL);
for (value += valuelen; *value; value ++)
if (!_cups_isspace(*value) || *value != ',')
break;
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "PrintcapFormat") && value)
{
/*
* Format of printcap file?
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "bsd"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_BSD;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "plist"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_PLIST;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "solaris"))
PrintcapFormat = PRINTCAP_SOLARIS;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown PrintcapFormat \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "Sandboxing") && value)
{
/*
* Level of sandboxing?
*/
if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "off") && getuid())
{
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_OFF;
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_WARN, "Disabling sandboxing is not recommended (line %d of %s)", linenum, CupsFilesFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "relaxed"))
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_RELAXED;
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(value, "strict"))
Sandboxing = CUPSD_SANDBOXING_STRICT;
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown Sandboxing \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SetEnv") && value)
{
/*
* SetEnv variable value
*/
char *valueptr; /* Pointer to environment variable value */
for (valueptr = value; *valueptr && !isspace(*valueptr & 255); valueptr ++);
if (*valueptr)
{
/*
* Found a value...
*/
while (isspace(*valueptr & 255))
*valueptr++ = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < (int)(sizeof(prohibited_env) / sizeof(prohibited_env[0])); i ++)
{
if (!strcmp(value, prohibited_env[i]))
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR, "Environment variable \"%s\" cannot be set on line %d of %s.", value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
else
break;
}
}
if (i >= (int)(sizeof(prohibited_env) / sizeof(prohibited_env[0])))
cupsdSetEnv(value, valueptr);
}
else
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Missing value for SetEnv directive on line %d of %s.",
linenum, ConfigurationFile);
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "SystemGroup") && value)
{
/*
* SystemGroup (admin) group(s)...
*/
if (!parse_groups(value, linenum))
{
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "User") && value)
{
/*
* User ID to run as...
*/
if (isdigit(value[0] & 255))
{
int uid = atoi(value);
if (!uid)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Will not use User 0 as specified on line %d of %s "
"for security reasons. You must use a non-"
"privileged account instead.",
linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
else
User = (uid_t)atoi(value);
}
else
{
struct passwd *p; /* Password information */
endpwent();
p = getpwnam(value);
if (p)
{
if (!p->pw_uid)
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Will not use User %s (UID=0) as specified on line "
"%d of %s for security reasons. You must use a "
"non-privileged account instead.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
else
User = p->pw_uid;
}
else
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_ERROR,
"Unknown User \"%s\" on line %d of %s.",
value, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
if (FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG)
return (0);
}
}
}
else if (!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerCertificate") ||
!_cups_strcasecmp(line, "ServerKey"))
{
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_INFO,
"The \"%s\" directive on line %d of %s is no longer "
"supported; this will become an error in a future "
"release.",
line, linenum, CupsFilesFile);
}
else if (!parse_variable(CupsFilesFile, linenum, line, value,
sizeof(cupsfiles_vars) / sizeof(cupsfiles_vars[0]),
cupsfiles_vars) &&
(FatalErrors & CUPSD_FATAL_CONFIG))
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
| 0 |
[] |
cups
|
d47f6aec436e0e9df6554436e391471097686ecc
| 39,830,376,392,441,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 293 |
Fix local privilege escalation to root and sandbox bypasses in scheduler
(rdar://37836779, rdar://37836995, rdar://37837252, rdar://37837581)
|
GC_INNER void GC_setpagesize(void)
{
# if defined(MPROTECT_VDB) || defined(PROC_VDB) || defined(USE_MMAP)
GC_page_size = GETPAGESIZE();
if (!GC_page_size) ABORT("getpagesize failed");
# else
/* It's acceptable to fake it. */
GC_page_size = HBLKSIZE;
# endif
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
bdwgc
|
7292c02fac2066d39dd1bcc37d1a7054fd1e32ee
| 48,184,684,668,835,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix malloc routines to prevent size value wrap-around
See issue #135 on Github.
* allchblk.c (GC_allochblk, GC_allochblk_nth): Use
OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS_CHECKED instead of OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS.
* malloc.c (GC_alloc_large): Likewise.
* alloc.c (GC_expand_hp_inner): Type of "bytes" local variable changed
from word to size_t; cast ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE argument to size_t; prevent
overflow when computing GC_heapsize+bytes > GC_max_heapsize.
* dbg_mlc.c (GC_debug_malloc, GC_debug_malloc_ignore_off_page,
GC_debug_malloc_atomic_ignore_off_page, GC_debug_generic_malloc,
GC_debug_generic_malloc_inner,
GC_debug_generic_malloc_inner_ignore_off_page,
GC_debug_malloc_stubborn, GC_debug_malloc_atomic,
GC_debug_malloc_uncollectable, GC_debug_malloc_atomic_uncollectable):
Use SIZET_SAT_ADD (instead of "+" operator) to add extra bytes to lb
value.
* fnlz_mlc.c (GC_finalized_malloc): Likewise.
* gcj_mlc.c (GC_debug_gcj_malloc): Likewise.
* include/private/gc_priv.h (ROUNDUP_GRANULE_SIZE, ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES,
ADD_SLOP, ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE): Likewise.
* include/private/gcconfig.h (GET_MEM): Likewise.
* mallocx.c (GC_malloc_many, GC_memalign): Likewise.
* os_dep.c (GC_wince_get_mem, GC_win32_get_mem): Likewise.
* typd_mlc.c (GC_malloc_explicitly_typed,
GC_malloc_explicitly_typed_ignore_off_page,
GC_calloc_explicitly_typed): Likewise.
* headers.c (GC_scratch_alloc): Change type of bytes_to_get from word
to size_t (because ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE_IF_MMAP result type changed).
* include/private/gc_priv.h: Include limits.h (unless SIZE_MAX already
defined).
* include/private/gc_priv.h (GC_SIZE_MAX, GC_SQRT_SIZE_MAX): Move from
malloc.c file.
* include/private/gc_priv.h (SIZET_SAT_ADD): New macro (defined before
include gcconfig.h).
* include/private/gc_priv.h (EXTRA_BYTES, GC_page_size): Change type
to size_t.
* os_dep.c (GC_page_size): Likewise.
* include/private/gc_priv.h (ROUNDUP_GRANULE_SIZE, ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES,
ADD_SLOP, ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE): Add comment about the argument.
* include/private/gcconfig.h (GET_MEM): Likewise.
* include/private/gc_priv.h (ROUNDUP_GRANULE_SIZE, ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES,
ADD_SLOP, OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS, ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE,
ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE_IF_MMAP): Rename argument to "lb".
* include/private/gc_priv.h (OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS_CHECKED): New macro.
* include/private/gcconfig.h (GC_win32_get_mem, GC_wince_get_mem,
GC_unix_get_mem): Change argument type from word to int.
* os_dep.c (GC_unix_mmap_get_mem, GC_unix_get_mem,
GC_unix_sbrk_get_mem, GC_wince_get_mem, GC_win32_get_mem): Likewise.
* malloc.c (GC_alloc_large_and_clear): Call OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS only
if no value wrap around is guaranteed.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Do not check for lb_rounded < lb case
(because ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES and GRANULES_TO_BYTES guarantees no value
wrap around).
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise.
* misc.c (GC_init_size_map): Change "i" local variable type from int
to size_t.
* os_dep.c (GC_write_fault_handler, catch_exception_raise): Likewise.
* misc.c (GC_envfile_init): Cast len to size_t when passed to
ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE_IF_MMAP.
* os_dep.c (GC_setpagesize): Cast GC_sysinfo.dwPageSize and
GETPAGESIZE() to size_t (when setting GC_page_size).
* os_dep.c (GC_unix_mmap_get_mem, GC_unmap_start, GC_remove_protection):
Expand ROUNDUP_PAGESIZE macro but without value wrap-around checking
(the argument is of word type).
* os_dep.c (GC_unix_mmap_get_mem): Replace -GC_page_size with
~GC_page_size+1 (because GC_page_size is unsigned); remove redundant
cast to size_t.
* os_dep.c (GC_unix_sbrk_get_mem): Add explicit cast of GC_page_size
to SBRK_ARG_T.
* os_dep.c (GC_wince_get_mem): Change type of res_bytes local variable
to size_t.
* typd_mlc.c: Do not include limits.h.
* typd_mlc.c (GC_SIZE_MAX, GC_SQRT_SIZE_MAX): Remove (as defined in
gc_priv.h now).
|
int read_super_2(squashfs_operations **s_ops, void *s)
{
squashfs_super_block_3 *sBlk_3 = s;
if(sBlk_3->s_magic != SQUASHFS_MAGIC || sBlk_3->s_major != 2 ||
sBlk_3->s_minor > 1)
return -1;
sBlk.s.s_magic = sBlk_3->s_magic;
sBlk.s.inodes = sBlk_3->inodes;
sBlk.s.mkfs_time = sBlk_3->mkfs_time;
sBlk.s.block_size = sBlk_3->block_size;
sBlk.s.fragments = sBlk_3->fragments;
sBlk.s.block_log = sBlk_3->block_log;
sBlk.s.flags = sBlk_3->flags;
sBlk.s.s_major = sBlk_3->s_major;
sBlk.s.s_minor = sBlk_3->s_minor;
sBlk.s.root_inode = sBlk_3->root_inode;
sBlk.s.bytes_used = sBlk_3->bytes_used_2;
sBlk.s.inode_table_start = sBlk_3->inode_table_start;
sBlk.s.directory_table_start = sBlk_3->directory_table_start_2;
sBlk.s.fragment_table_start = sBlk_3->fragment_table_start_2;
sBlk.s.inode_table_start = sBlk_3->inode_table_start_2;
sBlk.no_uids = sBlk_3->no_uids;
sBlk.no_guids = sBlk_3->no_guids;
sBlk.uid_start = sBlk_3->uid_start_2;
sBlk.guid_start = sBlk_3->guid_start_2;
sBlk.s.xattr_id_table_start = SQUASHFS_INVALID_BLK;
*s_ops = &ops;
/*
* 2.x filesystems use gzip compression.
*/
comp = lookup_compressor("gzip");
return TRUE;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-22"
] |
squashfs-tools
|
e0485802ec72996c20026da320650d8362f555bd
| 8,840,025,808,340,767,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
Unsquashfs: additional write outside destination directory exploit fix
An issue on github (https://github.com/plougher/squashfs-tools/issues/72)
showed how some specially crafted Squashfs filesystems containing
invalid file names (with '/' and '..') can cause Unsquashfs to write
files outside of the destination directory.
Since then it has been shown that specially crafted Squashfs filesystems
that contain a symbolic link pointing outside of the destination directory,
coupled with an identically named file within the same directory, can
cause Unsquashfs to write files outside of the destination directory.
Specifically the symbolic link produces a pathname pointing outside
of the destination directory, which is then followed when writing the
duplicate identically named file within the directory.
This commit fixes this exploit by explictly checking for duplicate
filenames within a directory. As directories in v2.1, v3.x, and v4.0
filesystems are sorted, this is achieved by checking for consecutively
identical filenames. Additionally directories are checked to
ensure they are sorted, to avoid attempts to evade the duplicate
check.
Version 1.x and 2.0 filesystems (where the directories were unsorted)
are sorted and then the above duplicate filename check is applied.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
|
JSObject *create(JSContext *cx, HandleObject self, Mode mode, HandleObject owner,
HandleValue initv) {
RootedObject headers(cx, create(cx, self, mode, owner));
if (!headers)
return nullptr;
bool consumed = false;
if (!maybe_consume_sequence_or_record<detail::append_header_value>(cx, initv, headers, &consumed,
"Headers")) {
return nullptr;
}
if (!consumed) {
report_sequence_or_record_arg_error(cx, "Headers", "");
return nullptr;
}
return headers;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94"
] |
js-compute-runtime
|
65524ffc962644e9fc39f4b368a326b6253912a9
| 63,327,196,906,957,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
use rangom_get instead of arc4random as arc4random does not work correctly with wizer
wizer causes the seed in arc4random to be the same between executions which is not random
|
static Image *ReadPICTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowPICTException(exception,message) \
{ \
if (tile_image != (Image *) NULL) \
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image); \
if (read_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL) \
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info); \
ThrowReaderException((exception),(message)); \
}
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
header_ole[4];
Image
*image,
*tile_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
IndexPacket
index;
int
c,
code;
MagickBooleanType
jpeg,
status;
PICTRectangle
frame;
PICTPixmap
pixmap;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
flags,
j,
version,
y;
StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read PICT header.
*/
read_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
tile_image=(Image *) NULL;
pixmap.bits_per_pixel=0;
pixmap.component_count=0;
/*
Skip header : 512 for standard PICT and 4, ie "PICT" for OLE2
*/
header_ole[0]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[1]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[2]=ReadBlobByte(image);
header_ole[3]=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!((header_ole[0] == 0x50) && (header_ole[1] == 0x49) &&
(header_ole[2] == 0x43) && (header_ole[3] == 0x54)))
for (i=0; i < 508; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); /* skip picture size */
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
while ((c=ReadBlobByte(image)) == 0) ;
if (c != 0x11)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
version=(ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (version == 2)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c != 0xff)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
else
if (version != 1)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((frame.left < 0) || (frame.right < 0) || (frame.top < 0) ||
(frame.bottom < 0) || (frame.left >= frame.right) ||
(frame.top >= frame.bottom))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Create black canvas.
*/
flags=0;
image->depth=8;
image->columns=(unsigned int) (frame.right-frame.left);
image->rows=(unsigned int) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
image->x_resolution=DefaultResolution;
image->y_resolution=DefaultResolution;
image->units=UndefinedResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ResetImagePixels(image,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Interpret PICT opcodes.
*/
jpeg=MagickFalse;
for (code=0; EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse; )
{
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if ((version == 1) || ((TellBlob(image) % 2) != 0))
code=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (version == 2)
code=ReadBlobMSBSignedShort(image);
if (code < 0)
break;
if (code == 0)
continue;
if (code > 0xa1)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%04X:",code);
}
else
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" %04X %s: %s",code,codes[code].name,codes[code].description);
switch (code)
{
case 0x01:
{
/*
Clipping rectangle.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (length != 0x000a)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((frame.left & 0x8000) != 0) || ((frame.top & 0x8000) != 0))
break;
image->columns=(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left);
image->rows=(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ResetImagePixels(image,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
break;
}
case 0x12:
case 0x13:
case 0x14:
{
ssize_t
pattern;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Skip pattern definition.
*/
pattern=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
if (pattern == 2)
{
for (i=0; i < 5; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
if (pattern != 1)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"UnknownPatternType");
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (ReadPixmap(image,&pixmap) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->depth=(size_t) pixmap.component_size;
image->x_resolution=1.0*pixmap.horizontal_resolution;
image->y_resolution=1.0*pixmap.vertical_resolution;
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
flags=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) length; i++)
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
width=(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top);
height=(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left);
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel <= 8)
length&=0x7fff;
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel == 16)
width<<=1;
if (length == 0)
length=width;
if (length < 8)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length*height); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) height; i++)
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
if (length > 200)
{
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image); j++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
else
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) ReadBlobByte(image); j++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
break;
}
case 0x1b:
{
/*
Initialize image background color.
*/
image->background_color.red=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
image->background_color.green=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
image->background_color.blue=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
break;
}
case 0x70:
case 0x71:
case 0x72:
case 0x73:
case 0x74:
case 0x75:
case 0x76:
case 0x77:
{
/*
Skip polygon or region.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
break;
}
case 0x90:
case 0x91:
case 0x98:
case 0x99:
case 0x9a:
case 0x9b:
{
ssize_t
bytes_per_line;
PICTRectangle
source,
destination;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
j;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Pixmap clipped by a rectangle.
*/
bytes_per_line=0;
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b))
bytes_per_line=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
else
{
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
}
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Initialize tile image.
*/
tile_image=CloneImage(image,(size_t) (frame.right-frame.left),
(size_t) (frame.bottom-frame.top),MagickTrue,exception);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((code == 0x9a) || (code == 0x9b) ||
((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0))
{
if (ReadPixmap(image,&pixmap) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
tile_image->depth=(size_t) pixmap.component_size;
tile_image->matte=pixmap.component_count == 4 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
tile_image->x_resolution=(double) pixmap.horizontal_resolution;
tile_image->y_resolution=(double) pixmap.vertical_resolution;
tile_image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (tile_image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(tile_image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
}
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b))
{
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tile_image->colors=2;
if ((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0)
{
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
flags=(ssize_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
tile_image->colors=1UL*ReadBlobMSBShort(image)+1;
}
status=AcquireImageColormap(tile_image,tile_image->colors);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tile_image->colors; i++)
{
j=ReadBlobMSBShort(image) % tile_image->colors;
if ((flags & 0x8000) != 0)
j=(size_t) i;
tile_image->colormap[j].red=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
tile_image->colormap[j].green=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
tile_image->colormap[j].blue=(Quantum)
ScaleShortToQuantum(ReadBlobMSBShort(image));
}
}
else
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) tile_image->colors; i++)
{
tile_image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].red);
tile_image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].green);
tile_image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) (QuantumRange-
tile_image->colormap[i].blue);
}
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (ReadRectangle(image,&source) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (ReadRectangle(image,&destination) == MagickFalse)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((code == 0x91) || (code == 0x99) || (code == 0x9b))
{
/*
Skip region.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-2); i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
if ((code != 0x9a) && (code != 0x9b) &&
(bytes_per_line & 0x8000) == 0)
pixels=DecodeImage(image,tile_image,(size_t) bytes_per_line,1,
&extent);
else
pixels=DecodeImage(image,tile_image,(unsigned int) bytes_per_line,
(unsigned int) pixmap.bits_per_pixel,&extent);
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToUncompressImage");
/*
Convert PICT tile image to pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+image->columns))
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughPixelData");
}
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(tile_image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
if (tile_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(tile_image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRed(q,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].red);
SetPixelGreen(q,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].green);
SetPixelBlue(q,
tile_image->colormap[(ssize_t) index].blue);
}
else
{
if (pixmap.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
i=(ssize_t) (*p++);
j=(*p);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ((i & 0x7c) << 1)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) (((i & 0x03) << 6) |
((j & 0xe0) >> 2))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) ((j & 0x1f) << 3)));
}
else
if (tile_image->matte == MagickFalse)
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+2*image->columns))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"NotEnoughPixelData");
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+tile_image->columns)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+2*tile_image->columns)));
}
else
{
if (p > (pixels+extent+3*image->columns))
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,
"NotEnoughPixelData");
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+tile_image->columns)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+2*tile_image->columns)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(
*(p+3*tile_image->columns)));
}
}
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(tile_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if ((tile_image->storage_class == DirectClass) &&
(pixmap.bits_per_pixel != 16))
{
p+=(pixmap.component_count-1)*tile_image->columns;
if (p < pixels)
break;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
tile_image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if ((jpeg == MagickFalse) && (EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse))
if ((code == 0x9a) || (code == 0x9b) ||
((bytes_per_line & 0x8000) != 0))
(void) CompositeImage(image,CopyCompositeOp,tile_image,
(ssize_t) destination.left,(ssize_t) destination.top);
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
break;
}
case 0xa1:
{
unsigned char
*info;
size_t
type;
/*
Comment.
*/
type=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (length == 0)
break;
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length-=MagickMin(length,4);
if (length == 0)
break;
info=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*info));
if (info == (unsigned char *) NULL)
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,length,info);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
switch (type)
{
case 0xe0:
{
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,info);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case 0x1f2:
{
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
SetStringInfoDatum(profile,info);
status=SetImageProfile(image,"iptc",profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
ThrowPICTException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
info=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(info);
break;
}
default:
{
/*
Skip to next op code.
*/
if (codes[code].length == -1)
(void) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) codes[code].length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
}
}
}
if (code == 0xc00)
{
/*
Skip header.
*/
for (i=0; i < 24; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
if (((code >= 0xb0) && (code <= 0xcf)) ||
((code >= 0x8000) && (code <= 0x80ff)))
continue;
if (code == 0x8200)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
int
unique_file;
/*
Embedded JPEG.
*/
jpeg=MagickTrue;
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"jpeg:%s",
filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,read_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
ThrowPICTException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
}
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length > 154)
{
for (i=0; i < 6; i++)
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (ReadRectangle(image,&frame) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) fclose(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowPICTException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < 122; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-154); i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
}
(void) fclose(file);
(void) close(unique_file);
tile_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (tile_image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) MagickMax(image->columns,tile_image->columns),
(double) MagickMax(image->rows,tile_image->rows));
(void) SetImageExtent(image,
MagickMax(image->columns,tile_image->columns),
MagickMax(image->rows,tile_image->rows));
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,tile_image->colorspace);
(void) CompositeImage(image,CopyCompositeOp,tile_image,(ssize_t)
frame.left,(ssize_t) frame.right);
image->compression=tile_image->compression;
tile_image=DestroyImage(tile_image);
continue;
}
if ((code == 0xff) || (code == 0xffff))
break;
if (((code >= 0xd0) && (code <= 0xfe)) ||
((code >= 0x8100) && (code <= 0xffff)))
{
/*
Skip reserved.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
if ((code >= 0x100) && (code <= 0x7fff))
{
/*
Skip reserved.
*/
length=(size_t) ((code >> 7) & 0xff);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (ReadBlobByte(image) == EOF)
break;
continue;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-252"
] |
ImageMagick6
|
11d9dac3d991c62289d1ef7a097670166480e76c
| 8,549,124,370,999,496,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 724 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
|
static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
const struct pid_entry *ents, unsigned int nents)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
const struct pid_entry *p;
if (!task)
return -ENOENT;
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
goto out;
if (ctx->pos >= nents + 2)
goto out;
for (p = ents + (ctx->pos - 2); p < ents + nents; p++) {
if (!proc_fill_cache(file, ctx, p->name, p->len,
proc_pident_instantiate, task, p))
break;
ctx->pos++;
}
out:
put_task_struct(task);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux
|
7f7ccc2ccc2e70c6054685f5e3522efa81556830
| 307,987,316,801,387,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas
proc_pid_cmdline_read() and environ_read() directly access the target
process' VM to retrieve the command line and environment. If this
process remaps these areas onto a file via mmap(), the requesting
process may experience various issues such as extra delays if the
underlying device is slow to respond.
Let's simply refuse to access file-backed areas in these functions.
For this we add a new FOLL_ANON gup flag that is passed to all calls
to access_remote_vm(). The code already takes care of such failures
(including unmapped areas). Accesses via /proc/pid/mem were not
changed though.
This was assigned CVE-2018-1120.
Note for stable backports: the patch may apply to kernels prior to 4.11
but silently miss one location; it must be checked that no call to
access_remote_vm() keeps zero as the last argument.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t acpi_table_oem_table_id_show(struct config_item *cfg, char *str)
{
struct acpi_table_header *h = get_header(cfg);
if (!h)
return -EINVAL;
return sprintf(str, "%.*s\n", ACPI_OEM_TABLE_ID_SIZE, h->oem_table_id);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862"
] |
linux
|
75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354
| 293,429,847,349,226,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
ACPI: configfs: Disallow loading ACPI tables when locked down
Like other vectors already patched, this one here allows the root
user to load ACPI tables, which enables arbitrary physical address
writes, which in turn makes it possible to disable lockdown.
Prevents this by checking the lockdown status before allowing a new
ACPI table to be installed. The link in the trailer shows a PoC of
how this might be used.
Link: https://git.zx2c4.com/american-unsigned-language/tree/american-unsigned-language-2.sh
Cc: 5.4+ <[email protected]> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
|
static void js_defvar(js_State *J, const char *name)
{
jsR_defproperty(J, J->E->variables, name, JS_DONTENUM | JS_DONTCONF, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
mujs
|
77ab465f1c394bb77f00966cd950650f3f53cb24
| 264,005,704,300,937,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix 697401: Error when dropping extra arguments to lightweight functions.
|
g_file_real_set_attributes_async (GFile *file,
GFileInfo *info,
GFileQueryInfoFlags flags,
int io_priority,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
GTask *task;
SetInfoAsyncData *data;
data = g_new0 (SetInfoAsyncData, 1);
data->info = g_file_info_dup (info);
data->flags = flags;
task = g_task_new (file, cancellable, callback, user_data);
g_task_set_source_tag (task, g_file_real_set_attributes_async);
g_task_set_task_data (task, data, (GDestroyNotify)set_info_data_free);
g_task_set_priority (task, io_priority);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, set_info_async_thread);
g_object_unref (task);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
glib
|
d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174
| 66,043,660,217,081,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
gfile: Limit access to files when copying
file_copy_fallback creates new files with default permissions and
set the correct permissions after the operation is finished. This
might cause that the files can be accessible by more users during
the operation than expected. Use G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE for the new
files to limit access to those files.
|
static int process_text(ASS_Track *track, char *str)
{
char *p = str;
while (1) {
char *q;
while (1) {
if ((*p == '\r') || (*p == '\n'))
++p;
else if (p[0] == '\xef' && p[1] == '\xbb' && p[2] == '\xbf')
p += 3; // U+FFFE (BOM)
else
break;
}
for (q = p; ((*q != '\0') && (*q != '\r') && (*q != '\n')); ++q) {
};
if (q == p)
break;
if (*q != '\0')
*(q++) = '\0';
process_line(track, p);
if (*q == '\0')
break;
p = q;
}
// there is no explicit end-of-font marker in ssa/ass
if (track->parser_priv->fontname)
decode_font(track);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369",
"CWE-787"
] |
libass
|
017137471d0043e0321e377ed8da48e45a3ec632
| 140,979,223,776,216,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
decode_font: fix subtraction broken by change to unsigned type
This caused a one-byte buffer overwrite and an assertion failure.
Regression in commit 910211f1c0078e37546f73e95306724358b89be2.
Discovered by OSS-Fuzz.
Fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=26674.
Fixes https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=26678.
|
ZEND_VM_HANDLER(96, ZEND_FETCH_DIM_UNSET, VAR|CV, CONST|TMPVAR|CV)
{
USE_OPLINE
zend_free_op free_op1, free_op2;
zval *container;
SAVE_OPLINE();
container = GET_OP1_ZVAL_PTR_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_UNSET);
zend_fetch_dimension_address_UNSET(container, GET_OP2_ZVAL_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_R), OP2_TYPE OPLINE_CC EXECUTE_DATA_CC);
FREE_OP2();
if (OP1_TYPE == IS_VAR) {
zval *result = EX_VAR(opline->result.var);
FREE_VAR_PTR_AND_EXTRACT_RESULT_IF_NECESSARY(free_op1, result);
}
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE_CHECK_EXCEPTION();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
f1ce8d5f5839cb2069ea37ff424fb96b8cd6932d
| 105,743,517,961,228,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix #73122: Integer Overflow when concatenating strings
We must avoid integer overflows in memory allocations, so we introduce
an additional check in the VM, and bail out in the rare case of an
overflow. Since the recent fix for bug #74960 still doesn't catch all
possible overflows, we fix that right away.
|
main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int last_argc = -1;
gpg_error_t err;
int rc; parsed_uri_t uri;
uri_tuple_t r;
http_t hd;
int c;
unsigned int my_http_flags = 0;
int no_out = 0;
int tls_dbg = 0;
int no_crl = 0;
const char *cafile = NULL;
http_session_t session = NULL;
unsigned int timeout = 0;
gpgrt_init ();
log_set_prefix (PGM, GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PREFIX | GPGRT_LOG_WITH_PID);
if (argc)
{ argc--; argv++; }
while (argc && last_argc != argc )
{
last_argc = argc;
if (!strcmp (*argv, "--"))
{
argc--; argv++;
break;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--help"))
{
fputs ("usage: " PGM " URL\n"
"Options:\n"
" --verbose print timings etc.\n"
" --debug flyswatter\n"
" --tls-debug N use TLS debug level N\n"
" --cacert FNAME expect CA certificate in file FNAME\n"
" --timeout MS timeout for connect in MS\n"
" --no-verify do not verify the certificate\n"
" --force-tls use HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TLS\n"
" --force-tor use HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR\n"
" --no-out do not print the content\n"
" --no-crl do not consuilt a CRL\n",
stdout);
exit (0);
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--verbose"))
{
verbose++;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--debug"))
{
verbose += 2;
debug++;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--tls-debug"))
{
argc--; argv++;
if (argc)
{
tls_dbg = atoi (*argv);
argc--; argv++;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--cacert"))
{
argc--; argv++;
if (argc)
{
cafile = *argv;
argc--; argv++;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--timeout"))
{
argc--; argv++;
if (argc)
{
timeout = strtoul (*argv, NULL, 10);
argc--; argv++;
}
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--no-verify"))
{
no_verify = 1;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--force-tls"))
{
my_http_flags |= HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TLS;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--force-tor"))
{
my_http_flags |= HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--no-out"))
{
no_out = 1;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strcmp (*argv, "--no-crl"))
{
no_crl = 1;
argc--; argv++;
}
else if (!strncmp (*argv, "--", 2))
{
fprintf (stderr, PGM ": unknown option '%s'\n", *argv);
exit (1);
}
}
if (argc != 1)
{
fprintf (stderr, PGM ": no or too many URLS given\n");
exit (1);
}
if (!cafile)
cafile = prepend_srcdir ("tls-ca.pem");
if (verbose)
my_http_flags |= HTTP_FLAG_LOG_RESP;
if (verbose || debug)
http_set_verbose (verbose, debug);
/* http.c makes use of the assuan socket wrapper. */
assuan_sock_init ();
if ((my_http_flags & HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR))
{
enable_dns_tormode (1);
if (assuan_sock_set_flag (ASSUAN_INVALID_FD, "tor-mode", 1))
{
log_error ("error enabling Tor mode: %s\n", strerror (errno));
log_info ("(is your Libassuan recent enough?)\n");
}
}
#if HTTP_USE_NTBTLS
log_info ("new session.\n");
err = http_session_new (&session, NULL,
((no_crl? HTTP_FLAG_NO_CRL : 0)
| HTTP_FLAG_TRUST_DEF),
my_http_tls_verify_cb, NULL);
if (err)
log_error ("http_session_new failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
ntbtls_set_debug (tls_dbg, NULL, NULL);
#elif HTTP_USE_GNUTLS
rc = gnutls_global_init ();
if (rc)
log_error ("gnutls_global_init failed: %s\n", gnutls_strerror (rc));
http_register_tls_callback (verify_callback);
http_register_tls_ca (cafile);
err = http_session_new (&session, NULL,
((no_crl? HTTP_FLAG_NO_CRL : 0)
| HTTP_FLAG_TRUST_DEF),
NULL, NULL);
if (err)
log_error ("http_session_new failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
/* rc = gnutls_dh_params_init(&dh_params); */
/* if (rc) */
/* log_error ("gnutls_dh_params_init failed: %s\n", gnutls_strerror (rc)); */
/* read_dh_params ("dh_param.pem"); */
/* rc = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file */
/* (certcred, "ca.pem", GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM); */
/* if (rc) */
/* log_error ("gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file failed: %s\n", */
/* gnutls_strerror (rc)); */
/* gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params (certcred, dh_params); */
gnutls_global_set_log_function (my_gnutls_log);
if (tls_dbg)
gnutls_global_set_log_level (tls_dbg);
#else
(void)err;
(void)tls_dbg;
(void)no_crl;
#endif /*HTTP_USE_GNUTLS*/
rc = http_parse_uri (&uri, *argv, 1);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("'%s': %s\n", *argv, gpg_strerror (rc));
return 1;
}
printf ("Scheme: %s\n", uri->scheme);
if (uri->opaque)
printf ("Value : %s\n", uri->path);
else
{
printf ("Auth : %s\n", uri->auth? uri->auth:"[none]");
printf ("Host : %s (off=%hu)\n", uri->host, uri->off_host);
printf ("Port : %u\n", uri->port);
printf ("Path : %s (off=%hu)\n", uri->path, uri->off_path);
for (r = uri->params; r; r = r->next)
{
printf ("Params: %s", r->name);
if (!r->no_value)
{
printf ("=%s", r->value);
if (strlen (r->value) != r->valuelen)
printf (" [real length=%d]", (int) r->valuelen);
}
putchar ('\n');
}
for (r = uri->query; r; r = r->next)
{
printf ("Query : %s", r->name);
if (!r->no_value)
{
printf ("=%s", r->value);
if (strlen (r->value) != r->valuelen)
printf (" [real length=%d]", (int) r->valuelen);
}
putchar ('\n');
}
printf ("Flags :%s%s%s%s\n",
uri->is_http? " http":"",
uri->opaque? " opaque":"",
uri->v6lit? " v6lit":"",
uri->onion? " onion":"");
printf ("TLS : %s\n",
uri->use_tls? "yes":
(my_http_flags&HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TLS)? "forced" : "no");
printf ("Tor : %s\n",
(my_http_flags&HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TOR)? "yes" : "no");
}
fflush (stdout);
http_release_parsed_uri (uri);
uri = NULL;
if (session)
http_session_set_timeout (session, timeout);
rc = http_open_document (&hd, *argv, NULL, my_http_flags,
NULL, session, NULL, NULL);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("can't get '%s': %s\n", *argv, gpg_strerror (rc));
return 1;
}
log_info ("open_http_document succeeded; status=%u\n",
http_get_status_code (hd));
{
const char **names;
int i;
names = http_get_header_names (hd);
if (!names)
log_fatal ("http_get_header_names failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (gpg_error_from_syserror ()));
for (i = 0; names[i]; i++)
printf ("HDR: %s: %s\n", names[i], http_get_header (hd, names[i]));
xfree (names);
}
fflush (stdout);
switch (http_get_status_code (hd))
{
case 200:
case 400:
case 401:
case 403:
case 404:
{
unsigned long count = 0;
while ((c = es_getc (http_get_read_ptr (hd))) != EOF)
{
count++;
if (!no_out)
putchar (c);
}
log_info ("Received bytes: %lu\n", count);
}
break;
case 301:
case 302:
case 307:
log_info ("Redirected to: %s\n", http_get_header (hd, "Location"));
break;
}
http_close (hd, 0);
http_session_release (session);
#ifdef HTTP_USE_GNUTLS
gnutls_global_deinit ();
#endif /*HTTP_USE_GNUTLS*/
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-352"
] |
gnupg
|
4a4bb874f63741026bd26264c43bb32b1099f060
| 135,775,384,681,152,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 305 |
dirmngr: Avoid possible CSRF attacks via http redirects.
* dirmngr/http.h (parsed_uri_s): Add fields off_host and off_path.
(http_redir_info_t): New.
* dirmngr/http.c (do_parse_uri): Set new fields.
(same_host_p): New.
(http_prepare_redirect): New.
* dirmngr/t-http-basic.c: New test.
* dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c (send_request): Use http_prepare_redirect
instead of the open code.
* dirmngr/ks-engine-http.c (ks_http_fetch): Ditto.
--
With this change a http query will not follow a redirect unless the
Location header gives the same host. If the host is different only
the host and port is taken from the Location header and the original
path and query parts are kept.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit fa1b1eaa4241ff3f0634c8bdf8591cbc7c464144)
|
static void k_shift(struct vc_data *vc, unsigned char value, char up_flag)
{
int old_state = shift_state;
if (rep)
return;
/*
* Mimic typewriter:
* a CapsShift key acts like Shift but undoes CapsLock
*/
if (value == KVAL(K_CAPSSHIFT)) {
value = KVAL(K_SHIFT);
if (!up_flag)
clr_vc_kbd_led(kbd, VC_CAPSLOCK);
}
if (up_flag) {
/*
* handle the case that two shift or control
* keys are depressed simultaneously
*/
if (shift_down[value])
shift_down[value]--;
} else
shift_down[value]++;
if (shift_down[value])
shift_state |= (1 << value);
else
shift_state &= ~(1 << value);
/* kludge */
if (up_flag && shift_state != old_state && npadch != -1) {
if (kbd->kbdmode == VC_UNICODE)
to_utf8(vc, npadch);
else
put_queue(vc, npadch & 0xff);
npadch = -1;
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
linux
|
b86dab054059b970111b5516ae548efaae5b3aae
| 198,264,764,006,323,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
vt: keyboard: avoid signed integer overflow in k_ascii
When k_ascii is invoked several times in a row there is a potential for
signed integer overflow:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888:19 signed integer overflow:
10 * 1111111111 cannot be represented in type 'int'
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x30 lib/ubsan.c:154
handle_overflow+0xdc/0xf0 lib/ubsan.c:184
__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow+0x2a/0x40 lib/ubsan.c:205
k_ascii+0xbf/0xd0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:888
kbd_keycode drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1477 [inline]
kbd_event+0x888/0x3be0 drivers/tty/vt/keyboard.c:1495
While it can be worked around by using check_mul_overflow()/
check_add_overflow(), it is better to introduce a separate flag to
signal that number pad is being used to compose a symbol, and
change type of the accumulator from signed to unsigned, thus
avoiding undefined behavior when it overflows.
Reported-by: Kyungtae Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200525232740.GA262061@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
virtual bool maintenanceOk() const {
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
5c7c6729c37514760fd34da462b6961a2e385417
| 275,211,029,182,359,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
SERVER-38275 ban explain with UUID
|
struct sk_buff *sctp_skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, int flags,
int noblock, int *err)
{
int error;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
pr_debug("%s: timeo:%ld, max:%ld\n", __func__, timeo,
MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
do {
/* Again only user level code calls this function,
* so nothing interrupt level
* will suddenly eat the receive_queue.
*
* Look at current nfs client by the way...
* However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
*/
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
} else {
skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
}
if (skb)
return skb;
/* Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before calling. */
error = sock_error(sk);
if (error)
goto no_packet;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk_can_busy_loop(sk) &&
sk_busy_loop(sk, noblock))
continue;
/* User doesn't want to wait. */
error = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto no_packet;
} while (sctp_wait_for_packet(sk, err, &timeo) == 0);
return NULL;
no_packet:
*err = error;
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
2d45a02d0166caf2627fe91897c6ffc3b19514c4
| 162,629,754,220,409,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ImagingDestroyArray(Imaging im)
{
int y;
if (im->image)
for (y = 0; y < im->ysize; y++)
if (im->image[y])
free(im->image[y]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
Pillow
|
5d8a0be45aad78c5a22c8d099118ee26ef8144af
| 311,032,314,840,410,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Memory error in Storage.c when accepting negative image size arguments
|
void *Pipe::DelayedDelivery::entry()
{
Mutex::Locker locker(delay_lock);
lgeneric_subdout(pipe->msgr->cct, ms, 20) << *pipe << "DelayedDelivery::entry start" << dendl;
while (!stop_delayed_delivery) {
if (delay_queue.empty()) {
lgeneric_subdout(pipe->msgr->cct, ms, 30) << *pipe << "DelayedDelivery::entry sleeping on delay_cond because delay queue is empty" << dendl;
delay_cond.Wait(delay_lock);
continue;
}
utime_t release = delay_queue.front().first;
Message *m = delay_queue.front().second;
string delay_msg_type = pipe->msgr->cct->_conf->ms_inject_delay_msg_type;
if (!flush_count &&
(release > ceph_clock_now() &&
(delay_msg_type.empty() || m->get_type_name() == delay_msg_type))) {
lgeneric_subdout(pipe->msgr->cct, ms, 10) << *pipe << "DelayedDelivery::entry sleeping on delay_cond until " << release << dendl;
delay_cond.WaitUntil(delay_lock, release);
continue;
}
lgeneric_subdout(pipe->msgr->cct, ms, 10) << *pipe << "DelayedDelivery::entry dequeuing message " << m << " for delivery, past " << release << dendl;
delay_queue.pop_front();
if (flush_count > 0) {
--flush_count;
active_flush = true;
}
if (pipe->in_q->can_fast_dispatch(m)) {
if (!stop_fast_dispatching_flag) {
delay_dispatching = true;
delay_lock.Unlock();
pipe->in_q->fast_dispatch(m);
delay_lock.Lock();
delay_dispatching = false;
if (stop_fast_dispatching_flag) {
// we need to let the stopping thread proceed
delay_cond.Signal();
delay_lock.Unlock();
delay_lock.Lock();
}
}
} else {
pipe->in_q->enqueue(m, m->get_priority(), pipe->conn_id);
}
active_flush = false;
}
lgeneric_subdout(pipe->msgr->cct, ms, 20) << *pipe << "DelayedDelivery::entry stop" << dendl;
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
ceph
|
5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468
| 158,706,031,177,861,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random()
|
static int insert_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
int retval;
pte_t *pte, entry;
spinlock_t *ptl;
retval = -ENOMEM;
pte = get_locked_pte(mm, addr, &ptl);
if (!pte)
goto out;
retval = -EBUSY;
if (!pte_none(*pte))
goto out_unlock;
/* Ok, finally just insert the thing.. */
entry = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, entry);
update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry); /* XXX: why not for insert_page? */
retval = 0;
out_unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
out:
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux-2.6
|
89f5b7da2a6bad2e84670422ab8192382a5aeb9f
| 203,031,341,165,556,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Reinstate ZERO_PAGE optimization in 'get_user_pages()' and fix XIP
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki and Oleg Nesterov point out that since the commit
557ed1fa2620dc119adb86b34c614e152a629a80 ("remove ZERO_PAGE") removed
the ZERO_PAGE from the VM mappings, any users of get_user_pages() will
generally now populate the VM with real empty pages needlessly.
We used to get the ZERO_PAGE when we did the "handle_mm_fault()", but
since fault handling no longer uses ZERO_PAGE for new anonymous pages,
we now need to handle that special case in follow_page() instead.
In particular, the removal of ZERO_PAGE effectively removed the core
file writing optimization where we would skip writing pages that had not
been populated at all, and increased memory pressure a lot by allocating
all those useless newly zeroed pages.
This reinstates the optimization by making the unmapped PTE case the
same as for a non-existent page table, which already did this correctly.
While at it, this also fixes the XIP case for follow_page(), where the
caller could not differentiate between the case of a page that simply
could not be used (because it had no "struct page" associated with it)
and a page that just wasn't mapped.
We do that by simply returning an error pointer for pages that could not
be turned into a "struct page *". The error is arbitrarily picked to be
EFAULT, since that was what get_user_pages() already used for the
equivalent IO-mapped page case.
[ Also removed an impossible test for pte_offset_map_lock() failing:
that's not how that function works ]
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
TEST(QueryProjectionTest, InvalidPositionalProjectionDefaultPathMatchExpression) {
QueryTestServiceContext serviceCtx;
auto opCtx = serviceCtx.makeOperationContext();
const boost::intrusive_ptr<ExpressionContext> expCtx(
new ExpressionContext(opCtx.get(), nullptr, kTestNss));
unique_ptr<MatchExpression> queryMatchExpr(new AlwaysFalseMatchExpression());
ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, queryMatchExpr->path().rawData());
BSONObj projObj = fromjson("{'a.$': 1}");
ASSERT_THROWS(projection_ast::parse(
expCtx, projObj, queryMatchExpr.get(), BSONObj(), ProjectionPolicies{}),
DBException);
// Projecting onto empty field should fail.
BSONObj emptyFieldProjObj = fromjson("{'.$': 1}");
ASSERT_THROWS(
projection_ast::parse(
expCtx, emptyFieldProjObj, queryMatchExpr.get(), BSONObj(), ProjectionPolicies{}),
DBException);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-732"
] |
mongo
|
cd583b6c4d8aa2364f255992708b9bb54e110cf4
| 164,421,914,102,528,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
SERVER-53929 Add stricter parser checks around positional projection
|
RateLimit *ClientHandler::get_rlimit() { return &conn_.rlimit; }
| 0 |
[] |
nghttp2
|
95efb3e19d174354ca50c65d5d7227d92bcd60e1
| 155,403,242,450,772,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Don't read too greedily
|
ReportLedBadType(CompatInfo *info, LedInfo *ledi, const char *field,
const char *wanted)
{
return ReportBadType(info->ctx, "indicator map", field,
xkb_atom_text(info->ctx, ledi->led.name),
wanted);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
libxkbcommon
|
96df3106d49438e442510c59acad306e94f3db4d
| 45,901,630,547,395,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <[email protected]>
|
virDomainHostdevDefCheckABIStability(virDomainHostdevDefPtr src,
virDomainHostdevDefPtr dst)
{
if (src->mode != dst->mode) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Target host device mode %s does not match source %s"),
virDomainHostdevModeTypeToString(dst->mode),
virDomainHostdevModeTypeToString(src->mode));
return false;
}
if (src->mode == VIR_DOMAIN_HOSTDEV_MODE_SUBSYS &&
src->source.subsys.type != dst->source.subsys.type) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_CONFIG_UNSUPPORTED,
_("Target host device subsystem %s does not match source %s"),
virDomainHostdevSubsysTypeToString(dst->source.subsys.type),
virDomainHostdevSubsysTypeToString(src->source.subsys.type));
return false;
}
if (!virDomainDeviceInfoCheckABIStability(src->info, dst->info))
return false;
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-212"
] |
libvirt
|
a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979
| 156,426,285,909,933,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <[email protected]>
|
static int chmd_read_headers(struct mspack_system *sys, struct mspack_file *fh,
struct mschmd_header *chm, int entire)
{
unsigned int section, name_len, x, errors, num_chunks;
unsigned char buf[0x54], *chunk = NULL, *name, *p, *end;
struct mschmd_file *fi, *link = NULL;
off_t offset, length;
int num_entries;
/* initialise pointers */
chm->files = NULL;
chm->sysfiles = NULL;
chm->chunk_cache = NULL;
chm->sec0.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec0.base.id = 0;
chm->sec1.base.chm = chm;
chm->sec1.base.id = 1;
chm->sec1.content = NULL;
chm->sec1.control = NULL;
chm->sec1.spaninfo = NULL;
chm->sec1.rtable = NULL;
/* read the first header */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhead_SIZEOF) != chmhead_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* check ITSF signature */
if (EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Signature]) != 0x46535449) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
/* check both header GUIDs */
if (mspack_memcmp(&buf[chmhead_GUID1], &guids[0], 32L) != 0) {
D(("incorrect GUIDs"))
return MSPACK_ERR_SIGNATURE;
}
chm->version = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_Version]);
chm->timestamp = EndGetM32(&buf[chmhead_Timestamp]);
chm->language = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhead_LanguageID]);
if (chm->version > 3) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; CHM version > 3");
}
/* read the header section table */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhst3_SIZEOF) != chmhst3_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* chmhst3_OffsetCS0 does not exist in version 1 or 2 CHM files.
* The offset will be corrected later, once HS1 is read.
*/
if (read_off64(&offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS0], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->dir_offset, &buf[chmhst_OffsetHS1], sys, fh) ||
read_off64(&chm->sec0.offset, &buf[chmhst3_OffsetCS0], sys, fh))
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 0 */
if (sys->seek(fh, offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 0 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs0_SIZEOF) != chmhs0_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
if (read_off64(&chm->length, &buf[chmhs0_FileLen], sys, fh)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* seek to header section 1 */
if (sys->seek(fh, chm->dir_offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* read header section 1 */
if (sys->read(fh, &buf[0], chmhs1_SIZEOF) != chmhs1_SIZEOF) {
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
chm->dir_offset = sys->tell(fh);
chm->chunk_size = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_ChunkSize]);
chm->density = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Density]);
chm->depth = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_Depth]);
chm->index_root = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_IndexRoot]);
chm->num_chunks = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_NumChunks]);
chm->first_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_FirstPMGL]);
chm->last_pmgl = EndGetI32(&buf[chmhs1_LastPMGL]);
if (chm->version < 3) {
/* versions before 3 don't have chmhst3_OffsetCS0 */
chm->sec0.offset = chm->dir_offset + (chm->chunk_size * chm->num_chunks);
}
/* check if content offset or file size is wrong */
if (chm->sec0.offset > chm->length) {
D(("content section begins after file has ended"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* ensure there are chunks and that chunk size is
* large enough for signature and num_entries */
if (chm->chunk_size < (pmgl_Entries + 2)) {
D(("chunk size not large enough"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->num_chunks == 0) {
D(("no chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* The chunk_cache data structure is not great; large values for num_chunks
* or num_chunks*chunk_size can exhaust all memory. Until a better chunk
* cache is implemented, put arbitrary limits on num_chunks and chunk size.
*/
if (chm->num_chunks > 100000) {
D(("more than 100,000 chunks"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if ((off_t)chm->chunk_size * (off_t)chm->num_chunks > chm->length) {
D(("chunks larger than entire file"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* common sense checks on header section 1 fields */
if ((chm->chunk_size & (chm->chunk_size - 1)) != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; chunk size is not a power of two");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl != 0) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; first PMGL chunk is not zero");
}
if (chm->first_pmgl > chm->last_pmgl) {
D(("first pmgl chunk is after last pmgl chunk"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (chm->index_root != 0xFFFFFFFF && chm->index_root >= chm->num_chunks) {
D(("index_root outside valid range"))
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* if we are doing a quick read, stop here! */
if (!entire) {
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
/* seek to the first PMGL chunk, and reduce the number of chunks to read */
if ((x = chm->first_pmgl) != 0) {
if (sys->seek(fh,(off_t) (x * chm->chunk_size), MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_CUR)) {
return MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
}
num_chunks = chm->last_pmgl - x + 1;
if (!(chunk = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t)chm->chunk_size))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* read and process all chunks from FirstPMGL to LastPMGL */
errors = 0;
while (num_chunks--) {
/* read next chunk */
if (sys->read(fh, chunk, (int)chm->chunk_size) != (int)chm->chunk_size) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_READ;
}
/* process only directory (PMGL) chunks */
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_Signature]) != 0x4C474D50) continue;
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) < 2) {
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too small");
}
if (EndGetI32(&chunk[pmgl_QuickRefSize]) >
((int)chm->chunk_size - pmgl_Entries))
{
sys->message(fh, "WARNING; PMGL quickref area is too large");
}
p = &chunk[pmgl_Entries];
end = &chunk[chm->chunk_size - 2];
num_entries = EndGetI16(end);
while (num_entries--) {
READ_ENCINT(name_len);
if (name_len > (unsigned int) (end - p)) goto chunk_end;
name = p; p += name_len;
READ_ENCINT(section);
READ_ENCINT(offset);
READ_ENCINT(length);
/* ignore blank or one-char (e.g. "/") filenames we'd return as blank */
if (name_len < 2 || !name[0] || !name[1]) continue;
/* empty files and directory names are stored as a file entry at
* offset 0 with length 0. We want to keep empty files, but not
* directory names, which end with a "/" */
if ((offset == 0) && (length == 0)) {
if ((name_len > 0) && (name[name_len-1] == '/')) continue;
}
if (section > 1) {
sys->message(fh, "invalid section number '%u'.", section);
continue;
}
if (!(fi = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct mschmd_file) + name_len + 1))) {
sys->free(chunk);
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
fi->next = NULL;
fi->filename = (char *) &fi[1];
fi->section = ((section == 0) ? (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec0)
: (struct mschmd_section *) (&chm->sec1));
fi->offset = offset;
fi->length = length;
sys->copy(name, fi->filename, (size_t) name_len);
fi->filename[name_len] = '\0';
if (name[0] == ':' && name[1] == ':') {
/* system file */
if (mspack_memcmp(&name[2], &content_name[2], 31L) == 0) {
if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &content_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.content = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &control_name[33], 11L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.control = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &spaninfo_name[33], 8L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.spaninfo = fi;
}
else if (mspack_memcmp(&name[33], &rtable_name[33], 72L) == 0) {
chm->sec1.rtable = fi;
}
}
fi->next = chm->sysfiles;
chm->sysfiles = fi;
}
else {
/* normal file */
if (link) link->next = fi; else chm->files = fi;
link = fi;
}
}
/* this is reached either when num_entries runs out, or if
* reading data from the chunk reached a premature end of chunk */
chunk_end:
if (num_entries >= 0) {
D(("chunk ended before all entries could be read"))
errors++;
}
}
sys->free(chunk);
return (errors > 0) ? MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT : MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
libmspack
|
8759da8db6ec9e866cb8eb143313f397f925bb4f
| 37,544,985,868,185,216,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 260 |
Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
|
static bool is_class_idx_in_code_classes(RBinDexObj *bin, int class_idx) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.class_size; i++) {
if (class_idx == bin->classes[i].class_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
ead645853a63bf83d8386702cad0cf23b31d7eeb
| 131,816,987,618,313,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
fix #6857
|
static int mwifiex_write_reg(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, int reg, u32 data)
{
struct pcie_service_card *card = adapter->card;
iowrite32(data, card->pci_mmap1 + reg);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-200",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
d10dcb615c8e29d403a24d35f8310a7a53e3050c
| 107,275,804,385,202,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
mwifiex: pcie: Fix memory leak in mwifiex_pcie_init_evt_ring
In mwifiex_pcie_init_evt_ring, a new skb is allocated which should be
released if mwifiex_map_pci_memory() fails. The release for skb and
card->evtbd_ring_vbase is added.
Fixes: 0732484b47b5 ("mwifiex: separate ring initialization and ring creation routines")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
void Context::onLog() {
if (in_vm_context_created_ && wasm_->onLog_) {
wasm_->onLog_(this, id_);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
envoy
|
8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153
| 249,399,499,636,023,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
|
static int wanxl_attach(struct net_device *dev, unsigned short encoding,
unsigned short parity)
{
port_t *port = dev_to_port(dev);
if (encoding != ENCODING_NRZ &&
encoding != ENCODING_NRZI)
return -EINVAL;
if (parity != PARITY_NONE &&
parity != PARITY_CRC32_PR1_CCITT &&
parity != PARITY_CRC16_PR1_CCITT &&
parity != PARITY_CRC32_PR0_CCITT &&
parity != PARITY_CRC16_PR0_CCITT)
return -EINVAL;
get_status(port)->encoding = encoding;
get_status(port)->parity = parity;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
2b13d06c9584b4eb773f1e80bbaedab9a1c344e1
| 124,717,719,172,057,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void unfold_ifblk(struct block **blk)
{
struct ifblock *ifblk;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
u_int32 a = vlabel++;
u_int32 b = vlabel++;
u_int32 c = vlabel++;
/*
* the virtual labels represent the three points of an if block:
*
* if (conds) {
* a ->
* ...
* jmp c;
* b ->
* } else {
* ...
* }
* c ->
*
* if the conds are true, jump to 'a'
* if the conds are false, jump to 'b'
* 'c' is used to skip the else if the conds were true
*/
/* the progress bar */
ef_debug(1, "#");
/* cast the if block */
ifblk = (*blk)->un.ifb;
/* compile the conditions */
unfold_conds(ifblk->conds, a, b);
/* if the conditions are match, jump here */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
ue->label = a;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
/* check if the block is empty. i.e. { } */
if (ifblk->blk != NULL) {
/* recursively compile the main block */
unfold_blk(&ifblk->blk);
}
/*
* if there is the else block, we have to skip it
* if the condition was true
*/
if (ifblk->elseblk != NULL) {
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
ue->fop.opcode = FOP_JMP;
ue->fop.op.jmp = c;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
}
/* if the conditions are NOT match, jump here (after the block) */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
ue->label = b;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
/* recursively compile the else block */
if (ifblk->elseblk != NULL) {
unfold_blk(&ifblk->elseblk);
/* this is the label to skip the else if the condition was true */
SAFE_CALLOC(ue, 1, sizeof(struct unfold_elm));
ue->label = c;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&unfolded_tree, ue, next);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
ettercap
|
626dc56686f15f2dda13c48f78c2a666cb6d8506
| 164,094,646,373,499,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 |
Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
|
ebb_ews_gal_store_contact (EContact *contact,
goffset offset,
const gchar *sha1,
guint percent,
gpointer user_data,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
struct _db_data *data = (struct _db_data *) user_data;
if (contact) {
const gchar *uid = e_contact_get_const (contact, E_CONTACT_UID);
EBookMetaBackendInfo *nfo;
ebews_populate_rev (contact, NULL);
e_vcard_util_set_x_attribute (E_VCARD (contact), X_EWS_GAL_SHA1, sha1);
if (data->fetch_gal_photos && !g_cancellable_is_cancelled (cancellable)) {
GError *local_error = NULL;
if (!ebb_ews_fetch_gal_photo_sync (data->bbews, contact, cancellable, &local_error))
ebb_ews_store_photo_check_date (contact, NULL);
/* The server can kick-off the flood of photo requests, then better stop it */
if (g_error_matches (local_error, EWS_CONNECTION_ERROR, EWS_CONNECTION_ERROR_SERVERBUSY))
data->fetch_gal_photos = FALSE;
g_clear_error (&local_error);
}
nfo = e_book_meta_backend_info_new (uid, e_contact_get_const (contact, E_CONTACT_REV), NULL, NULL);
nfo->object = e_vcard_to_string (E_VCARD (contact), EVC_FORMAT_VCARD_30);
if (g_hash_table_remove (data->uids, uid)) {
data->changed++;
data->modified_objects = g_slist_prepend (data->modified_objects, nfo);
} else {
data->added++;
data->created_objects = g_slist_prepend (data->created_objects, nfo);
}
}
if (data->percent != percent) {
data->percent = percent;
d (printf ("GAL processing contacts, %d%% complete (%d added, %d changed, %d unchanged\n",
percent, data->added, data->changed, data->unchanged));
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 113,375,346,797,309,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
inline SegmentReader::SegmentReader(Arena* arena, SegmentId id, kj::ArrayPtr<const word> ptr,
ReadLimiter* readLimiter)
: arena(arena), id(id), ptr(ptr), readLimiter(readLimiter) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
capnproto
|
104870608fde3c698483fdef6b97f093fc15685d
| 32,338,081,387,954,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
SECURITY: CPU usage amplification attack.
Details: https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/tree/master/security-advisories/2014-03-02-0-all-cpu-amplification.md
|
inline void FurnaceGUI::patternRow(int i, bool isPlaying, float lineHeight, int chans, int ord, const DivPattern** patCache) {
static char id[32];
bool selectedRow=(i>=sel1.y && i<=sel2.y);
ImGui::TableNextRow(0,lineHeight);
ImGui::TableNextColumn();
float cursorPosY=ImGui::GetCursorPos().y-ImGui::GetScrollY();
// check if the row is visible
if (cursorPosY<-lineHeight || cursorPosY>ImGui::GetWindowSize().y) {
return;
}
// check if we are in range
if (ord<0 || ord>=e->song.ordersLen) {
return;
}
if (i<0 || i>=e->song.patLen) {
return;
}
bool isPushing=false;
ImVec4 activeColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ACTIVE];
ImVec4 inactiveColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INACTIVE];
ImVec4 rowIndexColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ROW_INDEX];
if (e->song.hilightB>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightB)) {
activeColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ACTIVE_HI2];
inactiveColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INACTIVE_HI2];
rowIndexColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ROW_INDEX_HI2];
} else if (e->song.hilightA>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightA)) {
activeColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ACTIVE_HI1];
inactiveColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INACTIVE_HI1];
rowIndexColor=uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_ROW_INDEX_HI1];
}
// check overflow highlight
if (settings.overflowHighlight) {
if (edit && cursor.y==i) {
ImGui::TableSetBgColor(ImGuiTableBgTarget_RowBg0,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_EDITING]));
} else if (isPlaying && oldRow==i) {
ImGui::TableSetBgColor(ImGuiTableBgTarget_RowBg0,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_PLAY_HEAD]));
} else if (e->song.hilightB>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightB)) {
ImGui::TableSetBgColor(ImGuiTableBgTarget_RowBg0,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_HI_2]));
} else if (e->song.hilightA>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightA)) {
ImGui::TableSetBgColor(ImGuiTableBgTarget_RowBg0,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_HI_1]));
}
} else {
isPushing=true;
if (edit && cursor.y==i) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_EDITING]));
} else if (isPlaying && oldRow==i) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_PLAY_HEAD]));
} else if (e->song.hilightB>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightB)) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_HI_2]));
} else if (e->song.hilightA>0 && !(i%e->song.hilightA)) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,ImGui::GetColorU32(uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_HI_1]));
} else {
isPushing=false;
}
}
// row number
if (settings.patRowsBase==1) {
ImGui::TextColored(rowIndexColor," %.2X ",i);
} else {
ImGui::TextColored(rowIndexColor,"%3d ",i);
}
// for each column
for (int j=0; j<chans; j++) {
// check if channel is not hidden
if (!e->song.chanShow[j]) {
patChanX[j]=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
continue;
}
int chanVolMax=e->getMaxVolumeChan(j);
if (chanVolMax<1) chanVolMax=1;
const DivPattern* pat=patCache[j];
ImGui::TableNextColumn();
patChanX[j]=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
// selection highlight flags
int sel1XSum=sel1.xCoarse*32+sel1.xFine;
int sel2XSum=sel2.xCoarse*32+sel2.xFine;
int j32=j*32;
bool selectedNote=selectedRow && (j32>=sel1XSum && j32<=sel2XSum);
bool selectedIns=selectedRow && (j32+1>=sel1XSum && j32+1<=sel2XSum);
bool selectedVol=selectedRow && (j32+2>=sel1XSum && j32+2<=sel2XSum);
bool cursorNote=(cursor.y==i && cursor.xCoarse==j && cursor.xFine==0);
bool cursorIns=(cursor.y==i && cursor.xCoarse==j && cursor.xFine==1);
bool cursorVol=(cursor.y==i && cursor.xCoarse==j && cursor.xFine==2);
// note
sprintf(id,"%s##PN_%d_%d",noteName(pat->data[i][0],pat->data[i][1]),i,j);
if (pat->data[i][0]==0 && pat->data[i][1]==0) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,inactiveColor);
} else {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,activeColor);
}
if (cursorNote) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderActive,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_ACTIVE]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderHovered,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_HOVER]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,true,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,threeChars);
demandX=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
ImGui::PopStyleColor(3);
} else {
if (selectedNote) ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_SELECTION]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,isPushing || selectedNote,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,threeChars);
if (selectedNote) ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
if (ImGui::IsItemClicked()) {
startSelection(j,0,i);
}
if (ImGui::IsItemHovered(ImGuiHoveredFlags_AllowWhenBlockedByActiveItem)) {
updateSelection(j,0,i);
}
ImGui::PopStyleColor();
// the following is only visible when the channel is not collapsed
if (!e->song.chanCollapse[j]) {
// instrument
if (pat->data[i][2]==-1) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,inactiveColor);
sprintf(id,"..##PI_%d_%d",i,j);
} else {
if (pat->data[i][2]<0 || pat->data[i][2]>=e->song.insLen) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INS_ERROR]);
} else {
DivInstrumentType t=e->song.ins[pat->data[i][2]]->type;
if (t!=DIV_INS_AMIGA && t!=e->getPreferInsType(j)) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INS_WARN]);
} else {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_INS]);
}
}
sprintf(id,"%.2X##PI_%d_%d",pat->data[i][2],i,j);
}
ImGui::SameLine(0.0f,0.0f);
if (cursorIns) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderActive,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_ACTIVE]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderHovered,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_HOVER]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,true,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
demandX=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
ImGui::PopStyleColor(3);
} else {
if (selectedIns) ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_SELECTION]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,isPushing || selectedIns,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
if (selectedIns) ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
if (ImGui::IsItemClicked()) {
startSelection(j,1,i);
}
if (ImGui::IsItemHovered(ImGuiHoveredFlags_AllowWhenBlockedByActiveItem)) {
updateSelection(j,1,i);
}
ImGui::PopStyleColor();
// volume
if (pat->data[i][3]==-1) {
sprintf(id,"..##PV_%d_%d",i,j);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,inactiveColor);
} else {
int volColor=(pat->data[i][3]*127)/chanVolMax;
if (volColor>127) volColor=127;
if (volColor<0) volColor=0;
sprintf(id,"%.2X##PV_%d_%d",pat->data[i][3],i,j);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,volColors[volColor]);
}
ImGui::SameLine(0.0f,0.0f);
if (cursorVol) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderActive,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_ACTIVE]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderHovered,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_HOVER]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,true,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
demandX=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
ImGui::PopStyleColor(3);
} else {
if (selectedVol) ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_SELECTION]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,isPushing || selectedVol,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
if (selectedVol) ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
if (ImGui::IsItemClicked()) {
startSelection(j,2,i);
}
if (ImGui::IsItemHovered(ImGuiHoveredFlags_AllowWhenBlockedByActiveItem)) {
updateSelection(j,2,i);
}
ImGui::PopStyleColor();
// effects
for (int k=0; k<e->song.pat[j].effectRows; k++) {
int index=4+(k<<1);
bool selectedEffect=selectedRow && (j32+index-1>=sel1XSum && j32+index-1<=sel2XSum);
bool selectedEffectVal=selectedRow && (j32+index>=sel1XSum && j32+index<=sel2XSum);
bool cursorEffect=(cursor.y==i && cursor.xCoarse==j && cursor.xFine==index-1);
bool cursorEffectVal=(cursor.y==i && cursor.xCoarse==j && cursor.xFine==index);
// effect
if (pat->data[i][index]==-1) {
sprintf(id,"..##PE%d_%d_%d",k,i,j);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,inactiveColor);
} else {
sprintf(id,"%.2X##PE%d_%d_%d",pat->data[i][index],k,i,j);
if (pat->data[i][index]<0x10) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[fxColors[pat->data[i][index]]]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0x20) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_SYS_PRIMARY]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0x30) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_SYS_SECONDARY]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0x48) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_SYS_PRIMARY]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0x90) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_INVALID]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0xa0) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_MISC]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0xc0) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_INVALID]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0xd0) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_SPEED]);
} else if (pat->data[i][index]<0xe0) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_EFFECT_INVALID]);
} else {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Text,uiColors[extFxColors[pat->data[i][index]-0xe0]]);
}
}
ImGui::SameLine(0.0f,0.0f);
if (cursorEffect) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderActive,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_ACTIVE]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderHovered,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_HOVER]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,true,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
demandX=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
ImGui::PopStyleColor(3);
} else {
if (selectedEffect) ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_SELECTION]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,isPushing || selectedEffect,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
if (selectedEffect) ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
if (ImGui::IsItemClicked()) {
startSelection(j,index-1,i);
}
if (ImGui::IsItemHovered(ImGuiHoveredFlags_AllowWhenBlockedByActiveItem)) {
updateSelection(j,index-1,i);
}
// effect value
if (pat->data[i][index+1]==-1) {
sprintf(id,"..##PF%d_%d_%d",k,i,j);
} else {
sprintf(id,"%.2X##PF%d_%d_%d",pat->data[i][index+1],k,i,j);
}
ImGui::SameLine(0.0f,0.0f);
if (cursorEffectVal) {
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderActive,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_ACTIVE]);
ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_HeaderHovered,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_CURSOR_HOVER]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,true,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
demandX=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
ImGui::PopStyleColor(3);
} else {
if (selectedEffectVal) ImGui::PushStyleColor(ImGuiCol_Header,uiColors[GUI_COLOR_PATTERN_SELECTION]);
ImGui::Selectable(id,isPushing || selectedEffectVal,ImGuiSelectableFlags_NoPadWithHalfSpacing,twoChars);
if (selectedEffectVal) ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
if (ImGui::IsItemClicked()) {
startSelection(j,index,i);
}
if (ImGui::IsItemHovered(ImGuiHoveredFlags_AllowWhenBlockedByActiveItem)) {
updateSelection(j,index,i);
}
ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
}
}
if (isPushing) {
ImGui::PopStyleColor();
}
ImGui::TableNextColumn();
patChanX[chans]=ImGui::GetCursorPosX();
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
furnace
|
0eb02422d5161767e9983bdaa5c429762d3477ce
| 136,686,899,264,564,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 275 |
fix possible pattern crash
issue #325
|
int ncp_dirhandle_free(struct ncp_server* server, __u8 dirhandle) {
int result;
ncp_init_request_s(server, 20);
ncp_add_byte(server, dirhandle);
result = ncp_request(server, 22);
ncp_unlock_server(server);
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
staging
|
4c41aa24baa4ed338241d05494f2c595c885af8f
| 169,165,948,226,001,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
staging: ncpfs: memory corruption in ncp_read_kernel()
If the server is malicious then *bytes_read could be larger than the
size of the "target" buffer. It would lead to memory corruption when we
do the memcpy().
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <Silvio Cesare <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void sdl_serialize_key(zend_string *key, smart_str *out)
{
if (key) {
WSDL_CACHE_PUT_INT(ZSTR_LEN(key), out);
WSDL_CACHE_PUT_N(ZSTR_VAL(key), ZSTR_LEN(key), out);
} else {
WSDL_CACHE_PUT_INT(WSDL_NO_STRING_MARKER, out);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
php-src
|
3c939e3f69955d087e0bb671868f7267dfb2a502
| 239,233,758,368,533,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Fix bug #80672 - Null Dereference in SoapClient
|
PHP_FUNCTION(utf8_decode)
{
char *arg;
size_t arg_len;
zend_string *decoded;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &arg, &arg_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
decoded = xml_utf8_decode((XML_Char*)arg, arg_len, (XML_Char*)"ISO-8859-1");
if (decoded == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STR(decoded);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
php-src
|
57b997ebf99e0eb9a073e0dafd2ab100bd4a112d
| 208,309,066,478,322,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix bug #71637: Multiple Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
|
inline MetadataType StreamType2MetadataType(StreamType type) {
return static_cast<MetadataType>(type);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
envoy
|
8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153
| 186,733,749,645,562,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
|
gss_sign (minor_status,
context_handle,
qop_req,
message_buffer,
msg_token)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int qop_req;
gss_buffer_t message_buffer;
gss_buffer_t msg_token;
{
return (gss_get_mic(minor_status, context_handle, (gss_qop_t) qop_req,
message_buffer, msg_token));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
krb5
|
56f7b1bc95a2a3eeb420e069e7655fb181ade5cf
| 9,033,848,565,011,629,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
|
**/
static const CImg<Tuchar>& lines_LUT256() {
static const unsigned char pal[] = {
0,255,255,0,0,28,125,125,235,210,186,182,36,0,125,255,
53,32,255,210,89,186,65,45,125,210,210,97,130,194,0,125,
206,53,190,89,255,146,20,190,154,73,255,36,130,215,0,138,
101,210,61,194,206,0,77,45,255,154,174,0,190,239,89,125,
16,36,158,223,117,0,97,69,223,255,40,239,0,0,255,0,
97,170,93,255,138,40,117,210,0,170,53,158,186,255,0,121,
227,121,186,40,20,190,89,255,77,57,130,142,255,73,186,85,
210,8,32,166,243,130,210,40,255,45,61,142,223,49,121,255,
20,162,158,73,89,255,53,138,210,190,57,235,36,73,255,49,
210,0,210,85,57,97,255,121,85,174,40,255,162,178,0,121,
166,125,53,146,166,255,97,121,65,89,235,231,12,170,36,190,
85,255,166,97,198,77,20,146,109,166,255,28,40,202,121,81,
247,0,210,255,49,0,65,255,36,166,93,77,255,85,251,0,
170,178,0,182,255,0,162,16,154,142,162,223,223,0,0,81,
215,4,215,162,215,125,77,206,121,36,125,231,101,16,255,121,
0,57,190,215,65,125,89,142,255,101,73,53,146,223,125,125,
0,255,0,255,0,206,93,138,49,255,0,202,154,85,45,219,
251,53,0,255,40,130,219,158,16,117,186,130,202,49,65,239,
89,202,49,28,247,134,150,0,255,117,202,4,215,81,186,57,
202,89,73,210,40,93,45,251,206,28,223,142,40,134,162,125,
32,247,97,170,0,255,57,134,73,247,162,0,251,40,142,142,
8,166,206,81,154,194,93,89,125,243,28,109,227,0,190,65,
194,186,0,255,53,45,109,186,186,0,255,130,49,170,69,210,
154,0,109,227,45,255,125,105,81,81,255,0,219,134,170,85,
146,28,170,89,223,97,8,210,255,158,49,40,125,174,174,125,
0,227,166,28,219,130,0,93,239,0,85,255,81,178,125,49,
89,255,53,206,73,113,146,255,0,150,36,219,162,0,210,125,
69,134,255,85,40,89,235,49,215,121,0,206,36,223,174,69,
40,182,178,130,69,45,255,210,85,77,215,0,231,146,0,194,
125,174,0,255,40,89,121,206,57,0,206,170,231,150,81,0,
125,255,4,174,4,190,121,255,4,166,109,130,49,239,170,93,
16,174,210,0,255,16,105,158,93,255,0,125,0,255,158,85,
0,255,0,0,255,170,166,61,121,28,198,215,45,243,61,97,
255,53,81,130,109,255,8,117,235,121,40,178,174,0,182,49,
162,121,255,69,206,0,219,125,0,101,255,239,121,32,210,130,
36,231,32,125,81,142,215,158,4,178,255,0,40,251,125,125,
219,89,130,0,166,255,24,65,194,125,255,125,77,125,93,125,
202,24,138,174,178,32,255,85,194,40,85,36,174,174,125,210,
85,255,53,16,93,206,40,130,170,202,93,255,0,24,117,255,
97,113,105,81,255,186,194,57,69,206,57,53,223,190,4,255,
85,97,130,255,85,0,125,223,85,219,0,215,146,77,40,239,
89,36,142,154,227,0,255,85,162,0,162,0,235,178,45,166,
0,247,255,20,69,210,89,142,53,255,40,146,166,255,69,0,
174,154,142,130,162,0,215,255,0,89,40,255,166,61,146,69,
162,40,255,32,121,255,117,178,0,186,206,0,57,215,215,81,
158,77,166,210,77,89,210,0,24,202,150,186,0,255,20,97,
57,170,235,251,16,73,142,251,93,0,202,0,255,121,219,4,
73,219,8,162,206,16,219,93,117,0,255,8,130,174,223,45 };
static const CImg<Tuchar> colormap(pal,1,256,1,3,false);
return colormap;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 284,560,327,455,937,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 |
.
|
bool has_int_value() const
{
return state == SHORT_DATA_VALUE &&
value.type_handler()->cmp_type() == INT_RESULT;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
| 205,905,049,443,590,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
|
static void php_stream_apply_filter_list(php_stream *stream, char *filterlist, int read_chain, int write_chain TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *p, *token;
php_stream_filter *temp_filter;
p = php_strtok_r(filterlist, "|", &token);
while (p) {
php_url_decode(p, strlen(p));
if (read_chain) {
if ((temp_filter = php_stream_filter_create(p, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(stream) TSRMLS_CC))) {
php_stream_filter_append(&stream->readfilters, temp_filter);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create filter (%s)", p);
}
}
if (write_chain) {
if ((temp_filter = php_stream_filter_create(p, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(stream) TSRMLS_CC))) {
php_stream_filter_append(&stream->writefilters, temp_filter);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create filter (%s)", p);
}
}
p = php_strtok_r(NULL, "|", &token);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
2438490addfbfba51e12246a74588b2382caa08a
| 160,027,849,059,151,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
slim post data
|
static void init_gro_hash(struct napi_struct *napi)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < GRO_HASH_BUCKETS; i++) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&napi->gro_hash[i].list);
napi->gro_hash[i].count = 0;
}
napi->gro_bitmask = 0;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a4270d6795b0580287453ea55974d948393e66ef
| 225,770,147,666,052,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
net-gro: fix use-after-free read in napi_gro_frags()
If a network driver provides to napi_gro_frags() an
skb with a page fragment of exactly 14 bytes, the call
to gro_pull_from_frag0() will 'consume' the fragment
by calling skb_frag_unref(skb, 0), and the page might
be freed and reused.
Reading eth->h_proto at the end of napi_frags_skb() might
read mangled data, or crash under specific debugging features.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in napi_frags_skb net/core/dev.c:5833 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in napi_gro_frags+0xc6f/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5841
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88809366840c by task syz-executor599/8957
CPU: 1 PID: 8957 Comm: syz-executor599 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1+ #32
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614
__asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:142
napi_frags_skb net/core/dev.c:5833 [inline]
napi_gro_frags+0xc6f/0xd10 net/core/dev.c:5841
tun_get_user+0x2f3c/0x3ff0 drivers/net/tun.c:1991
tun_chr_write_iter+0xbd/0x156 drivers/net/tun.c:2037
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1872 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x5f8/0x8f0 fs/read_write.c:693
do_iter_write fs/read_write.c:970 [inline]
do_iter_write+0x184/0x610 fs/read_write.c:951
vfs_writev+0x1b3/0x2f0 fs/read_write.c:1015
do_writev+0x15b/0x330 fs/read_write.c:1058
Fixes: a50e233c50db ("net-gro: restore frag0 optimization")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int LUKS2_keyslot_for_segment(struct luks2_hdr *hdr, int keyslot, int segment)
{
int r = -EINVAL;
/* no need to check anything */
if (segment == CRYPT_ANY_SEGMENT)
return 0; /* ok */
if (segment == CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT) {
segment = LUKS2_get_default_segment(hdr);
if (segment < 0)
return segment;
}
r = _keyslot_for_segment(hdr, keyslot, segment);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return r >= 1 ? 0 : -ENOENT;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-345"
] |
cryptsetup
|
0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c
| 55,227,386,064,018,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.
This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.
The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.
The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.
The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
|
static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
IPAddressOrRanges *child, int length)
{
unsigned char p_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], p_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
unsigned char c_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], c_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
int p, c;
if (child == NULL || parent == child)
return 1;
if (parent == NULL)
return 0;
p = 0;
for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
c_min, c_max, length))
return -1;
for (;; p++) {
if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
return 0;
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
p_min, p_max, length))
return 0;
if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
continue;
if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
return 0;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
openssl
|
068b963bb7afc57f5bdd723de0dd15e7795d5822
| 74,487,212,512,330,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
Avoid out-of-bounds read
Fixes CVE 2017-3735
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4276)
(cherry picked from commit b23171744b01e473ebbfd6edad70c1c3825ffbcd)
|
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
const unsigned char *q,*p;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != (p+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
p=q;
}
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
sc->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
sk=NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
? 0 : 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
if (need_cert && i < 0)
{
x=NULL;
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (need_cert)
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer=x;
}
else
{
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
sc->peer_key= NULL;
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=NULL;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
ee2ffc279417f15fef3b1073c7dc81a908991516
| 40,966,642,144,390,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 185 |
Add Next Protocol Negotiation.
|
static int fsl_lpspi_dma_configure(struct spi_controller *controller)
{
int ret;
enum dma_slave_buswidth buswidth;
struct dma_slave_config rx = {}, tx = {};
struct fsl_lpspi_data *fsl_lpspi =
spi_controller_get_devdata(controller);
switch (fsl_lpspi_bytes_per_word(fsl_lpspi->config.bpw)) {
case 4:
buswidth = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES;
break;
case 2:
buswidth = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_2_BYTES;
break;
case 1:
buswidth = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_1_BYTE;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
tx.direction = DMA_MEM_TO_DEV;
tx.dst_addr = fsl_lpspi->base_phys + IMX7ULP_TDR;
tx.dst_addr_width = buswidth;
tx.dst_maxburst = 1;
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(controller->dma_tx, &tx);
if (ret) {
dev_err(fsl_lpspi->dev, "TX dma configuration failed with %d\n",
ret);
return ret;
}
rx.direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
rx.src_addr = fsl_lpspi->base_phys + IMX7ULP_RDR;
rx.src_addr_width = buswidth;
rx.src_maxburst = 1;
ret = dmaengine_slave_config(controller->dma_rx, &rx);
if (ret) {
dev_err(fsl_lpspi->dev, "RX dma configuration failed with %d\n",
ret);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
057b8945f78f76d0b04eeb5c27cd9225e5e7ad86
| 156,241,198,000,015,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 |
spi: lpspi: fix memory leak in fsl_lpspi_probe
In fsl_lpspi_probe an SPI controller is allocated either via
spi_alloc_slave or spi_alloc_master. In all but one error cases this
controller is put by going to error handling code. This commit fixes the
case when pm_runtime_get_sync fails and it should go to the error
handling path.
Fixes: 944c01a889d9 ("spi: lpspi: enable runtime pm for lpspi")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
|
static void kvm_machine_check(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_MCE) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
struct pt_regs regs = {
.cs = 3, /* Fake ring 3 no matter what the guest ran on */
.flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF,
};
do_machine_check(®s, 0);
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493
| 265,567,153,254,354,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
Status V2UserDocumentParser::parseRoleVector(const BSONArray& rolesArray,
std::vector<RoleName>* result) {
std::vector<RoleName> roles;
for (BSONObjIterator it(rolesArray); it.more(); it.next()) {
if ((*it).type() != Object) {
return Status(ErrorCodes::TypeMismatch, "Roles must be objects.");
}
RoleName role;
Status status = parseRoleName((*it).Obj(), &role);
if (!status.isOK())
return status;
roles.push_back(role);
}
std::swap(*result, roles);
return Status::OK();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-613"
] |
mongo
|
e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7
| 97,682,726,723,940,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit
|
static int oidc_handle_logout(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *c,
oidc_session_t *session) {
oidc_provider_t *provider = NULL;
/* pickup the command or URL where the user wants to go after logout */
char *url = NULL;
char *error_str = NULL;
char *error_description = NULL;
oidc_util_get_request_parameter(r, OIDC_REDIRECT_URI_REQUEST_LOGOUT, &url);
oidc_debug(r, "enter (url=%s)", url);
if (oidc_is_front_channel_logout(url)) {
return oidc_handle_logout_request(r, c, session, url);
} else if (oidc_is_back_channel_logout(url)) {
return oidc_handle_logout_backchannel(r, c);
}
if ((url == NULL) || (apr_strnatcmp(url, "") == 0)) {
url = c->default_slo_url;
} else {
/* do input validation on the logout parameter value */
if (oidc_validate_redirect_url(r, c, url, TRUE, &error_str,
&error_description) == FALSE) {
return oidc_util_html_send_error(r, c->error_template, error_str,
error_description,
HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
}
}
oidc_get_provider_from_session(r, c, session, &provider);
if ((provider != NULL) && (provider->end_session_endpoint != NULL)) {
const char *id_token_hint = oidc_session_get_idtoken(r, session);
char *logout_request = apr_pstrdup(r->pool,
provider->end_session_endpoint);
if (id_token_hint != NULL) {
logout_request = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s%sid_token_hint=%s",
logout_request, strchr(logout_request ? logout_request : "",
OIDC_CHAR_QUERY) != NULL ?
OIDC_STR_AMP :
OIDC_STR_QUERY,
oidc_util_escape_string(r, id_token_hint));
}
if (url != NULL) {
logout_request = apr_psprintf(r->pool,
"%s%spost_logout_redirect_uri=%s", logout_request,
strchr(logout_request ? logout_request : "",
OIDC_CHAR_QUERY) != NULL ?
OIDC_STR_AMP :
OIDC_STR_QUERY,
oidc_util_escape_string(r, url));
}
url = logout_request;
}
return oidc_handle_logout_request(r, c, session, url);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-79"
] |
mod_auth_openidc
|
55ea0a085290cd2c8cdfdd960a230cbc38ba8b56
| 254,763,731,751,258,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 |
Add a function to escape Javascript characters
|
int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
unsigned int depth = bprm->recursion_depth;
int try,retval;
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
pid_t old_pid, old_vpid;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
if (depth > 5)
return -ELOOP;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = audit_bprm(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* Need to fetch pid before load_binary changes it */
old_pid = current->pid;
rcu_read_lock();
old_vpid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, task_active_pid_ns(current->parent));
rcu_read_unlock();
retval = -ENOENT;
for (try=0; try<2; try++) {
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
int (*fn)(struct linux_binprm *) = fmt->load_binary;
if (!fn)
continue;
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
bprm->recursion_depth = depth + 1;
retval = fn(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth = depth;
if (retval >= 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
trace_sched_process_exec(current, old_pid, bprm);
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC, old_vpid);
}
put_binfmt(fmt);
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
if (bprm->file)
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
current->did_exec = 1;
proc_exec_connector(current);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL)
break;
if (!bprm->file) {
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
return retval;
}
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
if (retval != -ENOEXEC || bprm->mm == NULL) {
break;
} else {
#define printable(c) (((c)=='\t') || ((c)=='\n') || (0x20<=(c) && (c)<=0x7e))
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[3]))
break; /* -ENOEXEC */
if (try)
break; /* -ENOEXEC */
request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(unsigned short *)(&bprm->buf[2]));
}
#else
break;
#endif
}
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
b66c5984017533316fd1951770302649baf1aa33
| 129,248,715,759,501,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 82 |
exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: halfdog <[email protected]>
Cc: P J P <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void nft_fwd_netdev_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
struct nft_regs *regs,
const struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
{
struct nft_fwd_netdev *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
int oif = regs->data[priv->sreg_dev];
struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb;
/* This is used by ifb only. */
skb->skb_iif = skb->dev->ifindex;
skb_set_redirected(skb, nft_hook(pkt) == NF_NETDEV_INGRESS);
nf_fwd_netdev_egress(pkt, oif);
regs->verdict.code = NF_STOLEN;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
nf
|
b1a5983f56e371046dcf164f90bfaf704d2b89f6
| 202,565,483,239,757,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
netfilter: nf_tables_offload: incorrect flow offload action array size
immediate verdict expression needs to allocate one slot in the flow offload
action array, however, immediate data expression does not need to do so.
fwd and dup expression need to allocate one slot, this is missing.
Add a new offload_action interface to report if this expression needs to
allocate one slot in the flow offload action array.
Fixes: be2861dc36d7 ("netfilter: nft_{fwd,dup}_netdev: add offload support")
Reported-and-tested-by: Nick Gregory <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static void sas_scsi_clear_queue_port(struct list_head *error_q,
struct asd_sas_port *port)
{
struct scsi_cmnd *cmd, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, n, error_q, eh_entry) {
struct domain_device *dev = cmd_to_domain_dev(cmd);
struct asd_sas_port *x = dev->port;
if (x == port)
sas_eh_finish_cmd(cmd);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
318aaf34f1179b39fa9c30fa0f3288b645beee39
| 52,232,986,869,252,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata
When ata device doing EH, some commands still attached with tasks are
not passed to libata when abort failed or recover failed, so libata did
not handle these commands. After these commands done, sas task is freed,
but ata qc is not freed. This will cause ata qc leak and trigger a
warning like below:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28512 at drivers/ata/libata-eh.c:4037
ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
CPU: 0 PID: 28512 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Tainted: G W OE 4.14.0#1
......
Call trace:
[<ffff0000088b7bd0>] ata_eh_finish+0xb4/0xcc
[<ffff0000088b8420>] ata_do_eh+0xc4/0xd8
[<ffff0000088b8478>] ata_std_error_handler+0x44/0x8c
[<ffff0000088b8068>] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x480/0x694
[<ffff000008875fc4>] async_sas_ata_eh+0x4c/0x80
[<ffff0000080f6be8>] async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x170
[<ffff0000080ebd70>] process_one_work+0x144/0x390
[<ffff0000080ec100>] worker_thread+0x144/0x418
[<ffff0000080f2c98>] kthread+0x10c/0x138
[<ffff0000080855dc>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
If ata qc leaked too many, ata tag allocation will fail and io blocked
for ever.
As suggested by Dan Williams, defer ata device commands to libata and
merge sas_eh_finish_cmd() with sas_eh_defer_cmd(). libata will handle
ata qcs correctly after this.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: Xiaofei Tan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
static void fixup_inode_flags(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_inode *b_dir = BTRFS_I(dir);
struct btrfs_inode *b_inode = BTRFS_I(inode);
if (b_dir->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW)
b_inode->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW;
else
b_inode->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NODATACOW;
if (b_dir->flags & BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS) {
b_inode->flags |= BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS;
b_inode->flags &= ~BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS;
} else {
b_inode->flags &= ~(BTRFS_INODE_COMPRESS |
BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89
| 201,290,330,167,052,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <[email protected]>
|
int af_alg_make_sg(struct af_alg_sgl *sgl, struct iov_iter *iter, int len)
{
size_t off;
ssize_t n;
int npages, i;
n = iov_iter_get_pages(iter, sgl->pages, len, ALG_MAX_PAGES, &off);
if (n < 0)
return n;
npages = (off + n + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (WARN_ON(npages == 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* Add one extra for linking */
sg_init_table(sgl->sg, npages + 1);
for (i = 0, len = n; i < npages; i++) {
int plen = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
sg_set_page(sgl->sg + i, sgl->pages[i], plen, off);
off = 0;
len -= plen;
}
sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + npages - 1);
sgl->npages = npages;
return n;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
9060cb719e61b685ec0102574e10337fa5f445ea
| 96,856,754,790,956,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
net: crypto set sk to NULL when af_alg_release.
KASAN has found use-after-free in sockfs_setattr.
The existed commit 6d8c50dcb029 ("socket: close race condition between sock_close()
and sockfs_setattr()") is to fix this simillar issue, but it seems to ignore
that crypto module forgets to set the sk to NULL after af_alg_release.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88837b956128 by task syz-executor0/4186
CPU: 2 PID: 4186 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted xxx + #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xca/0x13e
print_address_description+0x79/0x330
? vprintk_func+0x5e/0xf0
kasan_report+0x18a/0x2e0
? sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
sockfs_setattr+0x120/0x150
? sock_register+0x2d0/0x2d0
notify_change+0x90c/0xd40
? chown_common+0x2ef/0x510
chown_common+0x2ef/0x510
? chmod_common+0x3b0/0x3b0
? __lock_is_held+0xbc/0x160
? __sb_start_write+0x13d/0x2b0
? __mnt_want_write+0x19a/0x250
do_fchownat+0x15c/0x190
? __ia32_sys_chmod+0x80/0x80
? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
__x64_sys_fchownat+0xbf/0x160
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x39a/0x5e0
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462589
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89
ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3
48 c7 c1 bc ff ff
ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb4b2c83c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000104
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000072bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462589
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb4b2c846bc
R13: 00000000004bc733 R14: 00000000006f5138 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 4185:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x14a/0x350
sk_prot_alloc+0xf6/0x290
sk_alloc+0x3d/0xc00
af_alg_accept+0x9e/0x670
hash_accept+0x4a3/0x650
__sys_accept4+0x306/0x5c0
__x64_sys_accept4+0x98/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 4184:
__kasan_slab_free+0x12e/0x180
kfree+0xeb/0x2f0
__sk_destruct+0x4e6/0x6a0
sk_destruct+0x48/0x70
__sk_free+0xa9/0x270
sk_free+0x2a/0x30
af_alg_release+0x5c/0x70
__sock_release+0xd3/0x280
sock_close+0x1a/0x20
__fput+0x27f/0x7f0
task_work_run+0x136/0x1b0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x1a7/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x461/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Syzkaller reproducer:
r0 = perf_event_open(&(0x7f0000000000)={0x0, 0x70, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0,
0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, @perf_config_ext}, 0x0, 0x0,
0xffffffffffffffff, 0x0)
r1 = socket$alg(0x26, 0x5, 0x0)
getrusage(0x0, 0x0)
bind(r1, &(0x7f00000001c0)=@alg={0x26, 'hash\x00', 0x0, 0x0,
'sha256-ssse3\x00'}, 0x80)
r2 = accept(r1, 0x0, 0x0)
r3 = accept4$unix(r2, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)
r4 = dup3(r3, r0, 0x0)
fchownat(r4, &(0x7f00000000c0)='\x00', 0x0, 0x0, 0x1000)
Fixes: 6d8c50dcb029 ("socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()")
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void extract_nonewprivs(ProcessHandle sandbox) {
struct stat s;
if (process_rootfs_stat(sandbox, RUN_NONEWPRIVS_CFG, &s) == 0)
arg_nonewprivs = 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269",
"CWE-94"
] |
firejail
|
27cde3d7d1e4e16d4190932347c7151dc2a84c50
| 163,570,683,727,811,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
fixing CVE-2022-31214
|
IOBuf::IOBuf(CreateOp, std::size_t capacity)
: next_(this),
prev_(this),
data_(nullptr),
length_(0),
flagsAndSharedInfo_(0) {
SharedInfo* info;
allocExtBuffer(capacity, &buf_, &info, &capacity_);
setSharedInfo(info);
data_ = buf_;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
folly
|
4f304af1411e68851bdd00ef6140e9de4616f7d3
| 59,633,191,805,228,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
[folly] Add additional overflow checks to IOBuf - CVE-2021-24036
Summary:
As per title
CVE-2021-24036
Reviewed By: jan
Differential Revision: D27938605
fbshipit-source-id: 7481c54ae6fbb7b67b15b3631d5357c2f7043f9c
|
static bool checkreturn pb_dec_varint(pb_istream_t *stream, const pb_field_t *field, void *dest)
{
uint64_t value;
if (!pb_decode_varint(stream, &value))
return false;
switch (field->data_size)
{
case 1: *(int8_t*)dest = (int8_t)value; break;
case 2: *(int16_t*)dest = (int16_t)value; break;
case 4: *(int32_t*)dest = (int32_t)value; break;
case 8: *(int64_t*)dest = (int64_t)value; break;
default: PB_RETURN_ERROR(stream, "invalid data_size");
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
nanopb
|
7b396821ddd06df8e39143f16e1dc0a4645b89a3
| 83,107,385,871,670,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Fix invalid free() after failed realloc() (GHSA-gcx3-7m76-287p)
|
void HGraphBuilder::GenerateIsRegExp(CallRuntime* call) {
ASSERT(call->arguments()->length() == 1);
CHECK_ALIVE(VisitForValue(call->arguments()->at(0)));
HValue* value = Pop();
HHasInstanceTypeAndBranch* result =
new(zone()) HHasInstanceTypeAndBranch(value, JS_REGEXP_TYPE);
return ast_context()->ReturnControl(result, call->id());
}
| 0 |
[] |
node
|
fd80a31e0697d6317ce8c2d289575399f4e06d21
| 124,976,755,026,110,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
deps: backport 5f836c from v8 upstream
Original commit message:
Fix Hydrogen bounds check elimination
When combining bounds checks, they must all be moved before the first load/store
that they are guarding.
BUG=chromium:344186
LOG=y
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/172093002
git-svn-id: https://v8.googlecode.com/svn/branches/bleeding_edge@19475 ce2b1a6d-e550-0410-aec6-3dcde31c8c00
fix #8070
|
static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
if (!enable_vnmi) {
/*
* Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
* finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
* well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
* least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
* cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
* highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
*/
vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
}
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
return;
}
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
04c4f2ee3f68c9a4bf1653d15f1a9a435ae33f7a
| 92,266,066,420,362,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
KVM: VMX: Don't use vcpu->run->internal.ndata as an array index
__vmx_handle_exit() uses vcpu->run->internal.ndata as an index for
an array access. Since vcpu->run is (can be) mapped to a user address
space with a writer permission, the 'ndata' could be updated by the
user process at anytime (the user process can set it to outside the
bounds of the array).
So, it is not safe that __vmx_handle_exit() uses the 'ndata' that way.
Fixes: 1aa561b1a4c0 ("kvm: x86: Add "last CPU" to some KVM_EXIT information")
Signed-off-by: Reiji Watanabe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t mon_text_read_t(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct mon_reader_text *rp = file->private_data;
struct mon_event_text *ep;
struct mon_text_ptr ptr;
ssize_t ret;
mutex_lock(&rp->printf_lock);
if (rp->printf_togo == 0) {
ep = mon_text_read_wait(rp, file);
if (IS_ERR(ep)) {
mutex_unlock(&rp->printf_lock);
return PTR_ERR(ep);
}
ptr.cnt = 0;
ptr.pbuf = rp->printf_buf;
ptr.limit = rp->printf_size;
mon_text_read_head_t(rp, &ptr, ep);
mon_text_read_statset(rp, &ptr, ep);
ptr.cnt += snprintf(ptr.pbuf + ptr.cnt, ptr.limit - ptr.cnt,
" %d", ep->length);
mon_text_read_data(rp, &ptr, ep);
rp->printf_togo = ptr.cnt;
rp->printf_offset = 0;
kmem_cache_free(rp->e_slab, ep);
}
ret = mon_text_copy_to_user(rp, buf, nbytes);
mutex_unlock(&rp->printf_lock);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
a5f596830e27e15f7a0ecd6be55e433d776986d8
| 226,882,409,573,894,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
usb: usbmon: Read text within supplied buffer size
This change fixes buffer overflows and silent data corruption with the
usbmon device driver text file read operations.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Noring <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int airspy_set_mixer_gain(struct airspy *s)
{
int ret;
u8 u8tmp;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "mixer auto=%d->%d val=%d->%d\n",
s->mixer_gain_auto->cur.val, s->mixer_gain_auto->val,
s->mixer_gain->cur.val, s->mixer_gain->val);
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_SET_MIXER_AGC, 0, s->mixer_gain_auto->val,
&u8tmp, 1);
if (ret)
goto err;
if (s->mixer_gain_auto->val == false) {
ret = airspy_ctrl_msg(s, CMD_SET_MIXER_GAIN, 0,
s->mixer_gain->val, &u8tmp, 1);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
err:
if (ret)
dev_dbg(s->dev, "failed=%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
media_tree
|
aa93d1fee85c890a34f2510a310e55ee76a27848
| 78,759,142,985,736,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
return NULL;
return master_drbg;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-330"
] |
openssl
|
1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be
| 22,985,913,611,822,387,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handler
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd095, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)
|
static inline int do_tuner_callback(struct dvb_frontend *fe, int cmd, int arg)
{
struct xc2028_data *priv = fe->tuner_priv;
/* analog side (tuner-core) uses i2c_adap->algo_data.
* digital side is not guaranteed to have algo_data defined.
*
* digital side will always have fe->dvb defined.
* analog side (tuner-core) doesn't (yet) define fe->dvb.
*/
return (!fe->callback) ? -EINVAL :
fe->callback(((fe->dvb) && (fe->dvb->priv)) ?
fe->dvb->priv : priv->i2c_props.adap->algo_data,
DVB_FRONTEND_COMPONENT_TUNER, cmd, arg);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18
| 276,834,652,686,565,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
[media] xc2028: avoid use after free
If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name,
the following trouble may happen:
[11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner
[11009.907491] ==================================================================
[11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40
[11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992
[11009.907994] =============================================================================
[11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected
[11009.907999] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0
[11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90
[11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350
[11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd]
[11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60
[11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200
[11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0
[11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0
[11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560
[11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0
[11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900
[11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830
[11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5
[11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550
[11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992
[11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460
[11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280
[11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080
[11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001
[11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(......
[11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j....
[11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43
[11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015
[11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80
[11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280
[11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4
[11009.908158] Call Trace:
[11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64
[11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150
[11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550
[11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50
[11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0
[11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0
[11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30
[11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028]
[11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x]
[11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10
[11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80
[11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0
[11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0
[11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0
[11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0
[11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360
[11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0
[11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0
[11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300
[11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290
[11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400
[11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300
[11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
[11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70
[11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx]
[11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000
[11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300
[11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40
[11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590
[11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50
[11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0
[11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad
[11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0
[11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50
[11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb]
[11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50
[11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0
[11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130
[11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0
[11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14
[11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76
[11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address:
[11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908405] ^
[11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[11009.908411] ==================================================================
In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware
name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if
the memory allocation fails.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static inline cputime_t cputime_div_non_zero(cputime_t time, unsigned long div)
{
cputime_t res = cputime_div(time, div);
return max_t(cputime_t, res, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
| 297,885,766,771,935,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int check_certificate_expiration (X509 *peercert, int silent)
{
if (option (OPTSSLVERIFYDATES) != MUTT_NO)
{
if (X509_cmp_current_time (X509_get0_notBefore (peercert)) >= 0)
{
if (!silent)
{
dprint (2, (debugfile, "Server certificate is not yet valid\n"));
mutt_error (_("Server certificate is not yet valid"));
mutt_sleep (2);
}
return 0;
}
if (X509_cmp_current_time (X509_get0_notAfter (peercert)) <= 0)
{
if (!silent)
{
dprint (2, (debugfile, "Server certificate has expired\n"));
mutt_error (_("Server certificate has expired"));
mutt_sleep (2);
}
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-74"
] |
mutt
|
c547433cdf2e79191b15c6932c57f1472bfb5ff4
| 336,165,923,395,599,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Fix STARTTLS response injection attack.
Thanks again to Damian Poddebniak and Fabian Ising from the Münster
University of Applied Sciences for reporting this issue. Their
summary in ticket 248 states the issue clearly:
We found another STARTTLS-related issue in Mutt. Unfortunately, it
affects SMTP, POP3 and IMAP.
When the server responds with its "let's do TLS now message", e.g. A
OK begin TLS\r\n in IMAP or +OK begin TLS\r\n in POP3, Mutt will
also read any data after the \r\n and save it into some internal
buffer for later processing. This is problematic, because a MITM
attacker can inject arbitrary responses.
There is a nice blogpost by Wietse Venema about a "command
injection" in postfix (http://www.postfix.org/CVE-2011-0411.html).
What we have here is the problem in reverse, i.e. not a command
injection, but a "response injection."
This commit fixes the issue by clearing the CONNECTION input buffer in
mutt_ssl_starttls().
To make backporting this fix easier, the new functions only clear the
top-level CONNECTION buffer; they don't handle nested buffering in
mutt_zstrm.c or mutt_sasl.c. However both of those wrap the
connection *after* STARTTLS, so this is currently okay. mutt_tunnel.c
occurs before connecting, but it does not perform any nesting.
|
measured_bw_line_apply(measured_bw_line_t *parsed_line,
smartlist_t *routerstatuses)
{
vote_routerstatus_t *rs = NULL;
if (!routerstatuses)
return 0;
rs = smartlist_bsearch(routerstatuses, parsed_line->node_id,
compare_digest_to_vote_routerstatus_entry);
if (rs) {
rs->has_measured_bw = 1;
rs->measured_bw_kb = (uint32_t)parsed_line->bw_kb;
} else {
log_info(LD_DIRSERV, "Node ID %s not found in routerstatus list",
parsed_line->node_hex);
}
return rs != NULL;
}
| 0 |
[] |
tor
|
02e05bd74dbec614397b696cfcda6525562a4675
| 107,891,025,617,698,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
When examining descriptors as a dirserver, reject ones with bad versions
This is an extra fix for bug 21278: it ensures that these
descriptors and platforms will never be listed in a legit consensus.
|
static int vfs_rename_dir(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
int error = 0;
struct inode *target;
/*
* If we are going to change the parent - check write permissions,
* we'll need to flip '..'.
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
error = permission(old_dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
if (error)
return error;
}
error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
if (error)
return error;
target = new_dentry->d_inode;
if (target) {
mutex_lock(&target->i_mutex);
dentry_unhash(new_dentry);
}
if (d_mountpoint(old_dentry)||d_mountpoint(new_dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else
error = old_dir->i_op->rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
if (target) {
if (!error)
target->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
mutex_unlock(&target->i_mutex);
if (d_unhashed(new_dentry))
d_rehash(new_dentry);
dput(new_dentry);
}
if (!error)
if (!(old_dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE))
d_move(old_dentry,new_dentry);
return error;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux-2.6
|
d70b67c8bc72ee23b55381bd6a884f4796692f77
| 143,741,278,809,206,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
[patch] vfs: fix lookup on deleted directory
Lookup can install a child dentry for a deleted directory. This keeps
the directory dentry alive, and the inode pinned in the cache and on
disk, even after all external references have gone away.
This isn't a big problem normally, since memory pressure or umount
will clear out the directory dentry and its children, releasing the
inode. But for UBIFS this causes problems because its orphan area can
overflow.
Fix this by returning ENOENT for all lookups on a S_DEAD directory
before creating a child dentry.
Thanks to Zoltan Sogor for noticing this while testing UBIFS, and
Artem for the excellent analysis of the problem and testing.
Reported-by: Artem Bityutskiy <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Artem Bityutskiy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
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Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.