func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static GF_Err gf_isom_set_edit_internal(GF_ISOFile *movie, u32 trackNumber, u64 EditTime, u64 EditDuration, u64 MediaTime, u32 media_rate, GF_ISOEditType EditMode)
{
GF_TrackBox *trak;
GF_EditBox *edts;
GF_EditListBox *elst;
GF_EdtsEntry *ent, *newEnt;
u32 i;
GF_Err e;
u64 startTime;
e = CanAccessMovie(movie, GF_ISOM_OPEN_WRITE);
if (e) return e;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(movie, trackNumber);
if (!trak) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
edts = trak->editBox;
if (! edts) {
edts = (GF_EditBox *) gf_isom_box_new_parent(&trak->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_EDTS);
if (!edts) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
trak_on_child_box((GF_Box*)trak, (GF_Box *)edts, GF_FALSE);
}
elst = edts->editList;
if (!elst) {
elst = (GF_EditListBox *) gf_isom_box_new_parent(&edts->child_boxes, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ELST);
if (!elst) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
edts_on_child_box((GF_Box*)edts, (GF_Box *)elst, GF_FALSE);
}
startTime = 0;
ent = NULL;
//get the prev entry to this startTime if any
i=0;
while ((ent = (GF_EdtsEntry *)gf_list_enum(elst->entryList, &i))) {
if ( (startTime <= EditTime) && (startTime + ent->segmentDuration > EditTime) )
goto found;
startTime += ent->segmentDuration;
}
//not found, add a new entry, insert empty one if gap
if (!ent) {
Bool empty_inserted = GF_FALSE;
if (startTime != EditTime) {
newEnt = CreateEditEntry(EditTime - startTime, 0, 0, GF_ISOM_EDIT_EMPTY);
if (!newEnt) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
empty_inserted = GF_TRUE;
gf_list_add(elst->entryList, newEnt);
}
newEnt = CreateEditEntry(EditDuration, MediaTime, media_rate, EditMode);
if (!newEnt) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
gf_list_add(elst->entryList, newEnt);
e = SetTrackDuration(trak);
if (e) return e;
return empty_inserted ? GF_EOS : GF_OK;
}
startTime -= ent->segmentDuration;
found:
//if same time, we erase the current one...
if (startTime == EditTime) {
ent->segmentDuration = EditDuration;
switch (EditMode) {
case GF_ISOM_EDIT_EMPTY:
ent->mediaRate = 0x10000;
ent->mediaTime = -1;
break;
case GF_ISOM_EDIT_DWELL:
ent->mediaRate = 0;
ent->mediaTime = MediaTime;
break;
default:
ent->mediaRate = media_rate;
ent->mediaTime = MediaTime;
break;
}
return SetTrackDuration(trak);
}
//adjust so that the prev ent leads to EntryTime
//Note: we don't change the next one as it is unknown to us in
//a lot of case (the author's changes)
ent->segmentDuration = EditTime - startTime;
newEnt = CreateEditEntry(EditDuration, MediaTime, media_rate, EditMode);
if (!newEnt) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
//is it the last entry ???
if (i >= gf_list_count(elst->entryList) - 1) {
//add the new entry at the end
gf_list_add(elst->entryList, newEnt);
return SetTrackDuration(trak);
} else {
//insert after the current entry (which is i)
gf_list_insert(elst->entryList, newEnt, i+1);
return SetTrackDuration(trak);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
gpac
|
586e817dcd531bb3e75438390f1f753cfe6e940a
| 264,903,762,518,844,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 |
fixed #2046
|
void Skip(cmsIT8* it8, SYMBOL sy)
{
if (it8->sy == sy && it8->sy != SEOF)
InSymbol(it8);
}
| 0 |
[] |
Little-CMS
|
65e2f1df3495edc984f7e0d7b7b24e29d851e240
| 285,313,160,948,587,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix some warnings from static analysis
|
index_build (p11_index *index,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle,
CK_ATTRIBUTE **attrs,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *merge)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE *extra = NULL;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *built;
p11_array *stack = NULL;
CK_ULONG count;
CK_ULONG nattrs;
CK_ULONG nmerge;
CK_ULONG nextra;
CK_RV rv;
int i;
rv = index->build (index->data, index, *attrs, merge, &extra);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return rv;
/* Short circuit when nothing to merge */
if (*attrs == NULL && extra == NULL) {
built = merge;
stack = NULL;
} else {
stack = p11_array_new (NULL);
nattrs = p11_attrs_count (*attrs);
nmerge = p11_attrs_count (merge);
nextra = p11_attrs_count (extra);
/* Make a shallow copy of the combined attributes for validation */
built = calloc (nmerge + nattrs + nextra + 1, sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE));
return_val_if_fail (built != NULL, CKR_GENERAL_ERROR);
count = nmerge;
memcpy (built, merge, sizeof (CK_ATTRIBUTE) * nmerge);
p11_array_push (stack, merge);
merge_attrs (built, &count, *attrs, nattrs, stack);
merge_attrs (built, &count, extra, nextra, stack);
/* The terminator attribute */
built[count].type = CKA_INVALID;
assert (p11_attrs_terminator (built + count));
}
rv = index->store (index->data, index, handle, &built);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
for (i = 0; stack && i < stack->num; i++)
free (stack->elem[i]);
*attrs = built;
} else {
p11_attrs_free (extra);
free (built);
}
p11_array_free (stack);
return rv;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
p11-kit
|
5307a1d21a50cacd06f471a873a018d23ba4b963
| 38,157,472,885,762,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 |
Check for arithmetic overflows before allocating
|
CURLcode Curl_http_resume(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
Curl_HttpReq httpreq)
{
if((HTTPREQ_POST == httpreq || HTTPREQ_PUT == httpreq) &&
data->state.resume_from) {
/**********************************************************************
* Resuming upload in HTTP means that we PUT or POST and that we have
* got a resume_from value set. The resume value has already created
* a Range: header that will be passed along. We need to "fast forward"
* the file the given number of bytes and decrease the assume upload
* file size before we continue this venture in the dark lands of HTTP.
* Resuming mime/form posting at an offset > 0 has no sense and is ignored.
*********************************************************************/
if(data->state.resume_from < 0) {
/*
* This is meant to get the size of the present remote-file by itself.
* We don't support this now. Bail out!
*/
data->state.resume_from = 0;
}
if(data->state.resume_from && !data->state.this_is_a_follow) {
/* do we still game? */
/* Now, let's read off the proper amount of bytes from the
input. */
int seekerr = CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK;
if(conn->seek_func) {
Curl_set_in_callback(data, true);
seekerr = conn->seek_func(conn->seek_client, data->state.resume_from,
SEEK_SET);
Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
}
if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK) {
curl_off_t passed = 0;
if(seekerr != CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK) {
failf(data, "Could not seek stream");
return CURLE_READ_ERROR;
}
/* when seekerr == CURL_SEEKFUNC_CANTSEEK (can't seek to offset) */
do {
size_t readthisamountnow =
(data->state.resume_from - passed > data->set.buffer_size) ?
(size_t)data->set.buffer_size :
curlx_sotouz(data->state.resume_from - passed);
size_t actuallyread =
data->state.fread_func(data->state.buffer, 1, readthisamountnow,
data->state.in);
passed += actuallyread;
if((actuallyread == 0) || (actuallyread > readthisamountnow)) {
/* this checks for greater-than only to make sure that the
CURL_READFUNC_ABORT return code still aborts */
failf(data, "Could only read %" CURL_FORMAT_CURL_OFF_T
" bytes from the input", passed);
return CURLE_READ_ERROR;
}
} while(passed < data->state.resume_from);
}
/* now, decrease the size of the read */
if(data->state.infilesize>0) {
data->state.infilesize -= data->state.resume_from;
if(data->state.infilesize <= 0) {
failf(data, "File already completely uploaded");
return CURLE_PARTIAL_FILE;
}
}
/* we've passed, proceed as normal */
}
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
| 0 |
[] |
curl
|
48d7064a49148f03942380967da739dcde1cdc24
| 103,460,146,676,619,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 79 |
cookie: apply limits
- Send no more than 150 cookies per request
- Cap the max length used for a cookie: header to 8K
- Cap the max number of received Set-Cookie: headers to 50
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32205.html
CVE-2022-32205
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Closes #9048
|
static struct mnt_namespace *create_mnt_ns(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(&init_user_ns);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
mnt->mnt_ns = new_ns;
new_ns->root = mnt;
list_add(&mnt->mnt_list, &new_ns->list);
} else {
mntput(m);
}
return new_ns;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498
| 72,825,772,552,645,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <[email protected]> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <[email protected]> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
int64 GetDnnWorkspaceLimit(const string& envvar_in_mb,
int64 default_value_in_bytes) {
const char* workspace_limit_in_mb_str = getenv(envvar_in_mb.c_str());
if (workspace_limit_in_mb_str != nullptr &&
strcmp(workspace_limit_in_mb_str, "") != 0) {
int64 scratch_limit_in_mb = -1;
if (strings::safe_strto64(workspace_limit_in_mb_str,
&scratch_limit_in_mb)) {
return scratch_limit_in_mb * (1 << 20);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Invalid value for env-var " << envvar_in_mb << ": "
<< workspace_limit_in_mb_str;
}
}
return default_value_in_bytes;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
tensorflow
|
b12aa1d44352de21d1a6faaf04172d8c2508b42b
| 224,057,565,147,497,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix one more FPE.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 369346568
Change-Id: I840fd575962adc879713a4c9cc59e6da3331caa7
|
GF_Err xtra_box_size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_XtraBox *ptr = (GF_XtraBox *)s;
u32 i, count = gf_list_count(ptr->tags);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_XtraTag *tag = gf_list_get(ptr->tags, i);
ptr->size += 18 + (u32) strlen(tag->name) + tag->prop_size;
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
77510778516803b7f7402d7423c6d6bef50254c3
| 142,153,465,602,443,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
fixed #2255
|
fr_archive_libarchive_paste_clipboard (FrArchive *archive,
GFile *archive_file,
char *password,
gboolean encrypt_header,
FrCompression compression,
guint volume_size,
FrClipboardOp op,
char *base_dir,
GList *files,
GFile *tmp_dir,
char *current_dir,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
AddData *add_data;
GList *scan;
g_return_if_fail (base_dir != NULL);
add_data = add_data_new ();
current_dir = current_dir + 1;
for (scan = files; scan; scan = scan->next) {
const char *old_name = (char *) scan->data;
char *new_name;
GFile *file;
new_name = g_build_filename (current_dir, old_name + strlen (base_dir) - 1, NULL);
file = _g_file_append_path (tmp_dir, old_name, NULL);
g_hash_table_insert (add_data->files_to_add, new_name, add_file_new (file, new_name));
add_data->n_files_to_add++;
g_object_unref (file);
}
_fr_archive_libarchive_save (archive,
FALSE,
password,
encrypt_header,
compression,
volume_size,
cancellable,
g_simple_async_result_new (G_OBJECT (archive),
callback,
user_data,
fr_archive_paste_clipboard),
_add_files_begin,
_add_files_end,
_add_files_entry_action,
add_data,
(GDestroyNotify) add_data_free);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
file-roller
|
b147281293a8307808475e102a14857055f81631
| 163,318,643,521,138,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 |
libarchive: sanitize filenames before extracting
|
static int spl_ptr_pqueue_zval_cmp(spl_ptr_heap_element a, spl_ptr_heap_element b, void* object TSRMLS_DC) { /* {{{ */
zval result;
zval **a_priority_pp = spl_pqueue_extract_helper((zval **)&a, SPL_PQUEUE_EXTR_PRIORITY);
zval **b_priority_pp = spl_pqueue_extract_helper((zval **)&b, SPL_PQUEUE_EXTR_PRIORITY);
if ((!a_priority_pp) || (!b_priority_pp)) {
zend_error(E_RECOVERABLE_ERROR, "Unable to extract from the PriorityQueue node");
return 0;
}
if (EG(exception)) {
return 0;
}
if (object) {
spl_heap_object *heap_object = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (heap_object->fptr_cmp) {
long lval = 0;
if (spl_ptr_heap_cmp_cb_helper((zval *)object, heap_object, *a_priority_pp, *b_priority_pp, &lval TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
/* exception or call failure */
return 0;
}
return lval;
}
}
INIT_ZVAL(result);
compare_function(&result, *a_priority_pp, *b_priority_pp TSRMLS_CC);
return Z_LVAL(result);
}
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
1cbd25ca15383394ffa9ee8601c5de4c0f2f90e1
| 113,587,060,893,034,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
Fix bug #69737 - Segfault when SplMinHeap::compare produces fatal error
|
struct snd_kcontrol *snd_ctl_find_id(struct snd_card *card,
struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !id))
return NULL;
if (id->numid != 0)
return snd_ctl_find_numid(card, id->numid);
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP
kctl = xa_load(&card->ctl_hash, get_ctl_id_hash(id));
if (kctl && elem_id_matches(kctl, id))
return kctl;
if (!card->ctl_hash_collision)
return NULL; /* we can rely on only hash table */
#endif
/* no matching in hash table - try all as the last resort */
list_for_each_entry(kctl, &card->controls, list)
if (elem_id_matches(kctl, id))
return kctl;
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
6ab55ec0a938c7f943a4edba3d6514f775983887
| 274,817,149,862,866,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
ALSA: control: Fix an out-of-bounds bug in get_ctl_id_hash()
Since the user can control the arguments provided to the kernel by the
ioctl() system call, an out-of-bounds bug occurs when the 'id->name'
provided by the user does not end with '\0'.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 10.002313] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.002895] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888109f5fe28 by task snd/439
[ 10.004934] Call Trace:
[ 10.007140] snd_ctl_find_id+0x36c/0x3a0
[ 10.007489] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x6cf/0x10e0
Fix this by checking the bound of 'id->name' in the loop.
Fixes: c27e1efb61c5 ("ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups")
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static void on_btn_repeat_cb(GtkButton *button)
{
g_auto_event_list = g_list_prepend(g_auto_event_list, g_event_selected);
g_event_selected = NULL;
show_next_step_button();
clear_warnings();
const gint current_page_no = gtk_notebook_get_current_page(g_assistant);
const int next_page_no = select_next_page_no(pages[PAGENO_SUMMARY].page_no, NULL);
if (current_page_no == next_page_no)
on_page_prepare(g_assistant, gtk_notebook_get_nth_page(g_assistant, next_page_no), NULL);
else
gtk_notebook_set_current_page(g_assistant, next_page_no);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
libreport
|
257578a23d1537a2d235aaa2b1488ee4f818e360
| 91,927,638,840,600,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <[email protected]>
|
static int __init ftrace_dyn_table_alloc(unsigned long num_to_init)
{
int cnt;
if (!num_to_init) {
pr_info("ftrace: No functions to be traced?\n");
return -1;
}
cnt = num_to_init / ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
pr_info("ftrace: allocating %ld entries in %d pages\n",
num_to_init, cnt + 1);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
| 122,602,902,387,030,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
Item_splocal_row_field(THD *thd,
const Sp_rcontext_handler *rh,
const LEX_CSTRING *sp_var_name,
const LEX_CSTRING *sp_field_name,
uint sp_var_idx, uint sp_field_idx,
const Type_handler *handler,
uint pos_in_q= 0, uint len_in_q= 0)
:Item_splocal(thd, rh, sp_var_name, sp_var_idx, handler, pos_in_q, len_in_q),
m_field_name(*sp_field_name),
m_field_idx(sp_field_idx)
{ }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
server
|
807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8
| 319,066,510,601,727,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item.
|
void show_help_default(const char *opt, const char *arg)
{
av_log_set_callback(log_callback_help);
show_usage();
show_help_options(options, "Main options:", 0, 0, 0);
printf("\n");
show_help_children(avformat_get_class(), AV_OPT_FLAG_DECODING_PARAM);
show_help_children(avcodec_get_class(), AV_OPT_FLAG_DECODING_PARAM);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
FFmpeg
|
837cb4325b712ff1aab531bf41668933f61d75d2
| 301,145,102,275,808,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
ffprobe: Fix null pointer dereference with color primaries
Found-by: AD-lab of venustech
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
void rtl8xxxu_gen2_disable_rf(struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv)
{
u32 val32;
val32 = rtl8xxxu_read32(priv, REG_RX_WAIT_CCA);
val32 &= ~(BIT(22) | BIT(23));
rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_RX_WAIT_CCA, val32);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
a2cdd07488e666aa93a49a3fc9c9b1299e27ef3c
| 53,484,721,703,799,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
rtl8xxxu: prevent leaking urb
In rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb if usb_submit_urb fails the allocated urb
should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chris Chiu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
|
static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
image2 = (Image *) NULL;
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image == NULL)
{
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
{
MATLAB_KO:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
if (filepos != (unsigned int) filepos)
break;
if(SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET) != filepos) break;
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += (MagickOffsetType) MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if (MATLAB_HDR.DataType != miMATRIX)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (image2 != image)
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
#endif
continue; /* skip another objects. */
}
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,
"MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,
"MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (AcquireMagickResource(ListLengthResource,Frames) == MagickFalse)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"ListLengthExceedsLimit");
}
break;
default:
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
{
if ((image2 != (Image*) NULL) && (image2 != image))
{
CloseBlob(image2);
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
}
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (((size_t) size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
/* data size */
if (ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size) != 4)
goto MATLAB_KO;
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
}
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
image->colors = GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned int)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
{
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) memset(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
DestroyBlob(rotated_image);
rotated_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
if(!EOFBlob(image) && TellBlob(image)<filepos)
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
}
END_OF_READING:
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
if (tmp == image2)
image2=(Image *) NULL;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader")
return(image);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ImageMagick6
|
5caef6e97f3f575cf7bea497865a4c1e624b8010
| 327,416,794,131,943,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 617 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1554
|
static UINT drive_process_irp_query_information(DRIVE_DEVICE* drive, IRP* irp)
{
DRIVE_FILE* file;
UINT32 FsInformationClass;
if (!drive || !irp || !irp->Complete)
return ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(irp->input) < 4)
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
Stream_Read_UINT32(irp->input, FsInformationClass);
file = drive_get_file_by_id(drive, irp->FileId);
if (!file)
{
irp->IoStatus = STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
else if (!drive_file_query_information(file, FsInformationClass, irp->output))
{
irp->IoStatus = drive_map_windows_err(GetLastError());
}
return irp->Complete(irp);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
6b485b146a1b9d6ce72dfd7b5f36456c166e7a16
| 118,095,259,644,824,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Fixed oob read in irp_write and similar
|
static float powf64(float a, float b) { return powf_lim(a, b, 64.f); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] |
LibRaw
|
d7c3d2cb460be10a3ea7b32e9443a83c243b2251
| 336,075,806,727,647,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns
|
CAMLprim value caml_alloc_dummy_float (value size)
{
mlsize_t wosize = Int_val(size) * Double_wosize;
if (wosize == 0) return Atom(0);
return caml_alloc (wosize, 0);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
ocaml
|
659615c7b100a89eafe6253e7a5b9d84d0e8df74
| 190,583,755,313,770,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
fix PR#7003 and a few other bugs caused by misuse of Int_val
git-svn-id: http://caml.inria.fr/svn/ocaml/trunk@16525 f963ae5c-01c2-4b8c-9fe0-0dff7051ff02
|
char *bitmap_list_string(char *buf, char *end, unsigned long *bitmap,
struct printf_spec spec, const char *fmt)
{
int nr_bits = max_t(int, spec.field_width, 0);
/* current bit is 'cur', most recently seen range is [rbot, rtop] */
int cur, rbot, rtop;
bool first = true;
rbot = cur = find_first_bit(bitmap, nr_bits);
while (cur < nr_bits) {
rtop = cur;
cur = find_next_bit(bitmap, nr_bits, cur + 1);
if (cur < nr_bits && cur <= rtop + 1)
continue;
if (!first) {
if (buf < end)
*buf = ',';
buf++;
}
first = false;
buf = number(buf, end, rbot, default_dec_spec);
if (rbot < rtop) {
if (buf < end)
*buf = '-';
buf++;
buf = number(buf, end, rtop, default_dec_spec);
}
rbot = cur;
}
return buf;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
91efafb1dd8f471177a3dddb4841d75d3df1cc46
| 321,867,259,995,876,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
lib/vsprintf: Replace space with '_' before crng is ready
Before crng is ready, output of "%p" composes of "(ptrval)" and
left padding spaces for alignment as no random address can be
generated. This seems a little strange when default string width
is larger than strlen("(ptrval)").
For example, when irq domain names are built with "%p", the nodes
under /sys/kernel/debug/irq/domains like this on AArch64 system,
[root@y irq]# ls domains/
default irqchip@ (ptrval)-2
irqchip@ (ptrval)-4 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC1 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC3
irqchip@ (ptrval) irqchip@ (ptrval)-3
\_SB_.TCS0.QIC0 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC2
The name "irqchip@ (ptrval)-2" is not so readable in console
output.
This patch replaces space with readable "_" when output needs padding.
Following is the output after applying the patch,
[root@y domains]# ls
default irqchip@(____ptrval____)-2
irqchip@(____ptrval____)-4 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC1 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC3
irqchip@(____ptrval____) irqchip@(____ptrval____)-3 \_SB_.TCS0.QIC0
\_SB_.TCS0.QIC2
There is same problem in some subsystem's dmesg output. Moreover,
someone may call "%p" in a similar case. In addition, the timing of
crng initialization done may vary on different system. So, the change
is made in vsprintf.c.
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
To: "Tobin C . Harding" <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
To: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
To: [email protected]
To: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Joey Zheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shunyong Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
|
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *ext4_init_dot_dotdot(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de,
int blocksize, int csum_size,
unsigned int parent_ino, int dotdot_real_len)
{
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
de->name_len = 1;
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len),
blocksize);
strcpy(de->name, ".");
ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR);
de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(parent_ino);
de->name_len = 2;
if (!dotdot_real_len)
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize -
(csum_size + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)),
blocksize);
else
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(
EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len), blocksize);
strcpy(de->name, "..");
ext4_set_de_type(inode->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR);
return ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
5872331b3d91820e14716632ebb56b1399b34fe1
| 293,249,186,579,148,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()
If for any reason a directory passed to do_split() does not have enough
active entries to exceed half the size of the block, we can end up
iterating over all "count" entries without finding a split point.
In this case, count == move, and split will be zero, and we will
attempt a negative index into map[].
Guard against this by detecting this case, and falling back to
split-to-half-of-count instead; in this case we will still have
plenty of space (> half blocksize) in each split block.
Fixes: ef2b02d3e617 ("ext34: ensure do_split leaves enough free space in both blocks")
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
static int llc_ui_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int rc = -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED))
goto out;
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (unlikely(sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM))
goto out;
rc = -EAGAIN;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
rc = 0;
if (!(unsigned int)backlog) /* BSDism */
backlog = 1;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = backlog;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) {
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
}
sk->sk_socket->flags |= __SO_ACCEPTCON;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
net
|
b8670c09f37bdf2847cc44f36511a53afc6161fd
| 246,930,501,331,765,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(vcpu))
return false;
if (!enable_vnmi && to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
return true;
return (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI |
GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
04c4f2ee3f68c9a4bf1653d15f1a9a435ae33f7a
| 309,082,876,102,750,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
KVM: VMX: Don't use vcpu->run->internal.ndata as an array index
__vmx_handle_exit() uses vcpu->run->internal.ndata as an index for
an array access. Since vcpu->run is (can be) mapped to a user address
space with a writer permission, the 'ndata' could be updated by the
user process at anytime (the user process can set it to outside the
bounds of the array).
So, it is not safe that __vmx_handle_exit() uses the 'ndata' that way.
Fixes: 1aa561b1a4c0 ("kvm: x86: Add "last CPU" to some KVM_EXIT information")
Signed-off-by: Reiji Watanabe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int prepare_uprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct file *file,
struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long vaddr)
{
int ret = 0;
if (test_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags))
return ret;
/* TODO: move this into _register, until then we abuse this sem. */
down_write(&uprobe->consumer_rwsem);
if (test_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags))
goto out;
ret = copy_insn(uprobe, file);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = -ENOTSUPP;
if (is_trap_insn((uprobe_opcode_t *)&uprobe->arch.insn))
goto out;
ret = arch_uprobe_analyze_insn(&uprobe->arch, mm, vaddr);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* uprobe_write_opcode() assumes we don't cross page boundary */
BUG_ON((uprobe->offset & ~PAGE_MASK) +
UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE);
smp_wmb(); /* pairs with rmb() in find_active_uprobe() */
set_bit(UPROBE_COPY_INSN, &uprobe->flags);
out:
up_write(&uprobe->consumer_rwsem);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
355627f518978b5167256d27492fe0b343aaf2f2
| 55,775,820,133,332,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
mm, uprobes: fix multiple free of ->uprobes_state.xol_area
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
the new mm_struct's ->uprobes_state.xol_area has been set to NULL after
being copied from the old mm_struct by the memcpy in dup_mm(). For a
task that has previously hit a uprobe tracepoint, this resulted in the
'struct xol_area' being freed multiple times if the task was killed at
just the right time while forking.
Fix it by setting ->uprobes_state.xol_area to NULL in mm_init() rather
than in uprobe_dup_mmap().
With CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y, the bug can be reproduced by the same C
program given by commit 2b7e8665b4ff ("fork: fix incorrect fput of
->exe_file causing use-after-free"), provided that a uprobe tracepoint
has been set on the fork_thread() function. For example:
$ gcc reproducer.c -o reproducer -lpthread
$ nm reproducer | grep fork_thread
0000000000400719 t fork_thread
$ echo "p $PWD/reproducer:0x719" > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/uprobe_events
$ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/uprobes/enable
$ ./reproducer
Here is the use-after-free reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800320a8b88 by task reproducer/198
CPU: 1 PID: 198 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.13.0-rc7-00015-g36fde05f3fb5 #255
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xdb/0x185
print_address_description+0x7e/0x290
kasan_report+0x23b/0x350
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20
uprobe_clear_state+0x1c4/0x200
mmput+0xd6/0x360
do_exit+0x740/0x1670
do_group_exit+0x13f/0x380
get_signal+0x597/0x17d0
do_signal+0x99/0x1df0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x166/0x1e0
syscall_return_slowpath+0x258/0x2c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xbc/0xbe
...
Allocated by task 199:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x180
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xf3/0x330
__create_xol_area+0x10f/0x780
uprobe_notify_resume+0x1674/0x2210
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x150/0x1e0
prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x14b/0x180
retint_user+0x8/0x20
Freed by task 199:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_slab_free+0xa8/0x1a0
kfree+0xba/0x210
uprobe_clear_state+0x151/0x200
mmput+0xd6/0x360
copy_process.part.8+0x605f/0x65d0
_do_fork+0x1a5/0xbd0
SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x22f/0x660
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a
Note: without KASAN, you may instead see a "Bad page state" message, or
simply a general protection fault.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a)
{
BN_ULONG t[8];
bn_sqr_normal(r,a,4,t);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
openssl
|
a7a44ba55cb4f884c6bc9ceac90072dea38e66d0
| 223,460,949,842,664,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <[email protected]>
|
spnego_gss_process_context_token(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_buffer_t token_buffer)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc = (spnego_gss_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* SPNEGO doesn't have its own context tokens. */
if (!sc->opened)
return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
ret = gss_process_context_token(minor_status,
sc->ctx_handle,
token_buffer);
return (ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-18",
"CWE-763"
] |
krb5
|
b51b33f2bc5d1497ddf5bd107f791c101695000d
| 166,933,982,573,921,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
const char *ll;
const char *uri;
const char *pro;
unsigned int major = 1, minor = 0; /* Assume HTTP/1.0 if non-"HTTP" protocol */
char http[5];
apr_size_t len;
int num_blank_lines = 0;
int max_blank_lines = r->server->limit_req_fields;
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
int strict = conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT;
int enforce_strict = !(conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_LOGONLY);
if (max_blank_lines <= 0) {
max_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_REQUEST_FIELDS;
}
/* Read past empty lines until we get a real request line,
* a read error, the connection closes (EOF), or we timeout.
*
* We skip empty lines because browsers have to tack a CRLF on to the end
* of POSTs to support old CERN webservers. But note that we may not
* have flushed any previous response completely to the client yet.
* We delay the flush as long as possible so that we can improve
* performance for clients that are pipelining requests. If a request
* is pipelined then we won't block during the (implicit) read() below.
* If the requests aren't pipelined, then the client is still waiting
* for the final buffer flush from us, and we will block in the implicit
* read(). B_SAFEREAD ensures that the BUFF layer flushes if it will
* have to block during a read.
*/
do {
apr_status_t rv;
/* ensure ap_rgetline allocates memory each time thru the loop
* if there are empty lines
*/
r->the_request = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&(r->the_request), (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_line + 2),
&len, r, 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
/* ap_rgetline returns APR_ENOSPC if it fills up the
* buffer before finding the end-of-line. This is only going to
* happen if it exceeds the configured limit for a request-line.
*/
if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_EINVAL(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
return 0;
}
} while ((len <= 0) && (++num_blank_lines < max_blank_lines));
if (APLOGrtrace5(r)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE5, 0, r,
"Request received from client: %s",
ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, r->the_request));
}
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
ll = r->the_request;
r->method = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
uri = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
/* Provide quick information about the request method as soon as known */
r->method_number = ap_method_number_of(r->method);
if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H') {
r->header_only = 1;
}
ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
if (ll[0]) {
r->assbackwards = 0;
pro = ll;
len = strlen(ll);
} else {
r->assbackwards = 1;
pro = "HTTP/0.9";
len = 8;
if (conf->http09_enable == AP_HTTP09_DISABLE) {
r->status = HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* If we deny 0.9, send error message with 1.x */
r->assbackwards = 0;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02401)
"HTTP/0.9 denied by server configuration");
return 0;
}
}
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* Avoid sscanf in the common case */
if (len == 8
&& pro[0] == 'H' && pro[1] == 'T' && pro[2] == 'T' && pro[3] == 'P'
&& pro[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(pro[5]) && pro[6] == '.'
&& apr_isdigit(pro[7])) {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(pro[5] - '0', pro[7] - '0');
}
else {
if (strict) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02418)
"Invalid protocol '%s'", r->protocol);
if (enforce_strict) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
}
if (3 == sscanf(r->protocol, "%4s/%u.%u", http, &major, &minor)
&& (strcasecmp("http", http) == 0)
&& (minor < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) ) { /* don't allow HTTP/0.1000 */
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(major, minor);
}
else {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
}
}
if (strict) {
int err = 0;
if (ap_has_cntrl(r->the_request)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02420)
"Request line must not contain control characters");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (r->parsed_uri.fragment) {
/* RFC3986 3.5: no fragment */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02421)
"URI must not contain a fragment");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->parsed_uri.user || r->parsed_uri.password) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02422)
"URI must not contain a username/password");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->method_number == M_INVALID) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02423)
"Invalid HTTP method string: %s", r->method);
err = HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
else if (r->assbackwards == 0 && r->proto_num < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02424)
"HTTP/0.x does not take a protocol");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (err && enforce_strict) {
r->status = err;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
httpd
|
be0f5335e3e73eb63253b050fdc23f252f5c8ae3
| 334,381,240,124,800,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 172 |
*) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static unsigned int macsec_extra_len(bool sci_present)
{
return macsec_sectag_len(sci_present) + sizeof(__be16);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
net
|
5294b83086cc1c35b4efeca03644cf9d12282e5b
| 132,466,264,884,338,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
macsec: dynamically allocate space for sglist
We call skb_cow_data, which is good anyway to ensure we can actually
modify the skb as such (another error from prior). Now that we have the
number of fragments required, we can safely allocate exactly that amount
of memory.
Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void open_project(char *project_filename)
{
/* TODO: check if layers is modified and show it to user. */
if (mainProject->last_loaded >= 0
&& !interface_get_alert_dialog_response (
_("Do you want to close any open layers and load "
"an existing project?"),
_("Loading a project will cause all currently open "
"layers to be closed. Any unsaved changes "
"will be lost."),
FALSE, NULL, GTK_STOCK_CLOSE, GTK_STOCK_CANCEL)) {
return;
}
/* Update the last folder */
g_free (mainProject->path);
mainProject->path = g_strdup(project_filename);
gerbv_unload_all_layers (mainProject);
main_open_project_from_filename (mainProject, project_filename);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
gerbv
|
319a8af890e4d0a5c38e6d08f510da8eefc42537
| 166,275,841,162,345,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
Remove local alias to parameter array
Normalizing access to `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t::parameter` as a step to fix CVE-2021-40402
|
bson_iter_find_case (bson_iter_t *iter, /* INOUT */
const char *key) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (key);
while (bson_iter_next (iter)) {
if (!bson_strcasecmp (key, bson_iter_key (iter))) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libbson
|
42900956dc461dfe7fb91d93361d10737c1602b3
| 309,140,193,859,384,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
CDRIVER-2269 Check for zero string length in codewscope
|
my_bool opt_flush_ok_packet(MYSQL *mysql, my_bool *is_ok_packet)
{
ulong packet_length= cli_safe_read(mysql);
if (packet_length == packet_error)
return TRUE;
/* cli_safe_read always reads a non-empty packet. */
DBUG_ASSERT(packet_length);
*is_ok_packet= mysql->net.read_pos[0] == 0;
if (*is_ok_packet)
{
uchar *pos= mysql->net.read_pos + 1;
net_field_length_ll(&pos); /* affected rows */
net_field_length_ll(&pos); /* insert id */
mysql->server_status=uint2korr(pos);
pos+=2;
if (protocol_41(mysql))
{
mysql->warning_count=uint2korr(pos);
pos+=2;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-254"
] |
mysql-server
|
13380bf81f6bc20d39549f531f9acebdfb5a8c37
| 156,841,840,909,114,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
Bug #22295186: CERTIFICATE VALIDATION BUG IN MYSQL MAY ALLOW MITM
|
snmp_fix_pdu(netsnmp_pdu *pdu, int command)
{
netsnmp_pdu *newpdu;
if ((pdu->command != SNMP_MSG_RESPONSE)
|| (pdu->errstat == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR)
|| (NULL == pdu->variables)
|| (pdu->errindex > (int)snmp_varbind_len(pdu))
|| (pdu->errindex <= 0)) {
return NULL; /* pre-condition tests fail */
}
newpdu = _clone_pdu(pdu, 1); /* copies all except errored variable */
if (!newpdu)
return NULL;
if (!newpdu->variables) {
snmp_free_pdu(newpdu);
return NULL; /* no variables. "should not happen" */
}
newpdu->command = command;
newpdu->reqid = snmp_get_next_reqid();
newpdu->msgid = snmp_get_next_msgid();
newpdu->errstat = SNMP_DEFAULT_ERRSTAT;
newpdu->errindex = SNMP_DEFAULT_ERRINDEX;
return newpdu;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
net-snmp
|
5f881d3bf24599b90d67a45cae7a3eb099cd71c9
| 180,116,869,278,057,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
libsnmp, USM: Introduce a reference count in struct usmStateReference
This patch fixes https://sourceforge.net/p/net-snmp/bugs/2956/.
|
int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
new->process_keyring = keyring;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-404"
] |
linux
|
c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b
| 105,329,037,171,485,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
static int get_reg_offset(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
enum reg_type type)
{
int regno = 0;
static const int regoff[] = {
offsetof(struct pt_regs, ax),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, cx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, dx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, bx),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, sp),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, bp),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, si),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, di),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r8),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r9),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r10),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r11),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r12),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r13),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r14),
offsetof(struct pt_regs, r15),
#endif
};
int nr_registers = ARRAY_SIZE(regoff);
/*
* Don't possibly decode a 32-bit instructions as
* reading a 64-bit-only register.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !insn->x86_64)
nr_registers -= 8;
switch (type) {
case REG_TYPE_RM:
regno = X86_MODRM_RM(insn->modrm.value);
/*
* ModRM.mod == 0 and ModRM.rm == 5 means a 32-bit displacement
* follows the ModRM byte.
*/
if (!X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) && regno == 5)
return -EDOM;
if (X86_REX_B(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
break;
case REG_TYPE_INDEX:
regno = X86_SIB_INDEX(insn->sib.value);
if (X86_REX_X(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
/*
* If ModRM.mod != 3 and SIB.index = 4 the scale*index
* portion of the address computation is null. This is
* true only if REX.X is 0. In such a case, the SIB index
* is used in the address computation.
*/
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) != 3 && regno == 4)
return -EDOM;
break;
case REG_TYPE_BASE:
regno = X86_SIB_BASE(insn->sib.value);
/*
* If ModRM.mod is 0 and SIB.base == 5, the base of the
* register-indirect addressing is 0. In this case, a
* 32-bit displacement follows the SIB byte.
*/
if (!X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) && regno == 5)
return -EDOM;
if (X86_REX_B(insn->rex_prefix.value))
regno += 8;
break;
default:
pr_err_ratelimited("invalid register type: %d\n", type);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (regno >= nr_registers) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "decoded an instruction with an invalid register");
return -EINVAL;
}
return regoff[regno];
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
de9f869616dd95e95c00bdd6b0fcd3421e8a4323
| 24,742,853,381,212,667,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 88 |
x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void TranslateSFWMarker(unsigned char *marker)
{
switch (marker[1])
{
case 0xc8: marker[1]=0xd8; break; /* soi */
case 0xd0: marker[1]=0xe0; break; /* app */
case 0xcb: marker[1]=0xdb; break; /* dqt */
case 0xa0: marker[1]=0xc0; break; /* sof */
case 0xa4: marker[1]=0xc4; break; /* sof */
case 0xca: marker[1]=0xda; break; /* sos */
case 0xc9: marker[1]=0xd9; break; /* eoi */
default: break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
ImageMagick
|
d4145e664aea3752ca6d3bf1ee825352b595dab5
| 259,880,778,978,260,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/682
|
decompilePUSHDUP (SWF_ACTION *act)
{
SanityCheck(SWF_PUSHDUP,
act->SWF_ACTIONRECORD.ActionCode == SWFACTION_PUSHDUP,
"not a PUSHDUP")
pushdup();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125"
] |
libming
|
da9d86eab55cbf608d5c916b8b690f5b76bca462
| 262,854,836,694,167,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
|
strlen16 (unsigned short *s)
{
int len = 0;
while (*s) {
s++;
len++;
}
return len;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
libgd
|
77f619d48259383628c3ec4654b1ad578e9eb40e
| 124,696,469,421,988,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
|
static inline void rb_event_discard(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
if (extended_time(event))
event = skip_time_extend(event);
/* array[0] holds the actual length for the discarded event */
event->array[0] = rb_event_data_length(event) - RB_EVNT_HDR_SIZE;
event->type_len = RINGBUF_TYPE_PADDING;
/* time delta must be non zero */
if (!event->time_delta)
event->time_delta = 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
bbeb97464eefc65f506084fd9f18f21653e01137
| 165,085,246,883,141,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
tracing: Fix race in trace_open and buffer resize call
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a07a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
|
run (const gchar *name,
gint nparams,
const GimpParam *param,
gint *nreturn_vals,
GimpParam **return_vals)
{
static GimpParam values[2];
GimpRunMode run_mode;
GimpPDBStatusType status = GIMP_PDB_SUCCESS;
gint32 image_ID;
gint32 drawable_ID;
GimpExportReturn export = GIMP_EXPORT_CANCEL;
GError *error = NULL;
INIT_I18N ();
gegl_init (NULL, NULL);
run_mode = param[0].data.d_int32;
*nreturn_vals = 1;
*return_vals = values;
values[0].type = GIMP_PDB_STATUS;
values[0].data.d_status = GIMP_PDB_EXECUTION_ERROR;
if (strcmp (name, LOAD_PROC) == 0)
{
image_ID = load_image (g_file_new_for_uri (param[1].data.d_string),
&error);
if (image_ID != -1)
{
*nreturn_vals = 2;
values[1].type = GIMP_PDB_IMAGE;
values[1].data.d_image = image_ID;
}
else
{
status = GIMP_PDB_EXECUTION_ERROR;
}
}
else if (strcmp (name, SAVE_PROC) == 0)
{
GFile *file;
GimpParasite *parasite;
gint32 orig_image_ID;
image_ID = param[1].data.d_int32;
drawable_ID = param[2].data.d_int32;
file = g_file_new_for_uri (param[3].data.d_string);
orig_image_ID = image_ID;
switch (run_mode)
{
case GIMP_RUN_INTERACTIVE:
case GIMP_RUN_WITH_LAST_VALS:
gimp_ui_init (PLUG_IN_BINARY, FALSE);
export = gimp_export_image (&image_ID, &drawable_ID, "GBR",
GIMP_EXPORT_CAN_HANDLE_GRAY |
GIMP_EXPORT_CAN_HANDLE_RGB |
GIMP_EXPORT_CAN_HANDLE_INDEXED |
GIMP_EXPORT_CAN_HANDLE_ALPHA);
if (export == GIMP_EXPORT_CANCEL)
{
values[0].data.d_status = GIMP_PDB_CANCEL;
return;
}
/* Possibly retrieve data */
gimp_get_data (SAVE_PROC, &info);
parasite = gimp_image_get_parasite (orig_image_ID,
"gimp-brush-name");
if (parasite)
{
strncpy (info.description,
gimp_parasite_data (parasite),
MIN (sizeof (info.description),
gimp_parasite_data_size (parasite)));
info.description[sizeof (info.description) - 1] = '\0';
gimp_parasite_free (parasite);
}
else
{
gchar *name = g_path_get_basename (gimp_file_get_utf8_name (file));
if (g_str_has_suffix (name, ".gbr"))
name[strlen (name) - 4] = '\0';
if (strlen (name))
{
strncpy (info.description, name, sizeof (info.description));
info.description[sizeof (info.description) - 1] = '\0';
}
g_free (name);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (run_mode)
{
case GIMP_RUN_INTERACTIVE:
if (! save_dialog ())
status = GIMP_PDB_CANCEL;
break;
case GIMP_RUN_NONINTERACTIVE:
if (nparams != 7)
{
status = GIMP_PDB_CALLING_ERROR;
}
else
{
info.spacing = (param[5].data.d_int32);
strncpy (info.description, param[6].data.d_string,
sizeof (info.description));
info.description[sizeof (info.description) - 1] = '\0';
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (status == GIMP_PDB_SUCCESS)
{
if (save_image (file, image_ID, drawable_ID, &error))
{
gimp_set_data (SAVE_PROC, &info, sizeof (info));
}
else
{
status = GIMP_PDB_EXECUTION_ERROR;
}
}
if (export == GIMP_EXPORT_EXPORT)
gimp_image_delete (image_ID);
if (strlen (info.description))
{
GimpParasite *parasite;
parasite = gimp_parasite_new ("gimp-brush-name",
GIMP_PARASITE_PERSISTENT,
strlen (info.description) + 1,
info.description);
gimp_image_attach_parasite (orig_image_ID, parasite);
gimp_parasite_free (parasite);
}
else
{
gimp_image_detach_parasite (orig_image_ID, "gimp-brush-name");
}
}
else
{
status = GIMP_PDB_CALLING_ERROR;
}
if (status != GIMP_PDB_SUCCESS && error)
{
*nreturn_vals = 2;
values[1].type = GIMP_PDB_STRING;
values[1].data.d_string = error->message;
}
values[0].data.d_status = status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
gimp
|
06d24a79af94837d615d0024916bb95a01bf3c59
| 324,154,281,999,626,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 177 |
Bug 790784 - (CVE-2017-17784) heap overread in gbr parser / load_image.
We were assuming the input name was well formed, hence was
nul-terminated. As any data coming from external input, this has to be
thorougly checked.
|
void CertDecoder::GetName(NameType nt)
{
if (source_.GetError().What()) return;
SHA sha;
word32 length = GetSequence(); // length of all distinguished names
if (length >= ASN_NAME_MAX)
return;
if (source_.IsLeft(length) == false) return;
length += source_.get_index();
char* ptr;
char* buf_end;
if (nt == ISSUER) {
ptr = issuer_;
buf_end = ptr + sizeof(issuer_) - 1; // 1 byte for trailing 0
}
else {
ptr = subject_;
buf_end = ptr + sizeof(subject_) - 1; // 1 byte for trailing 0
}
while (source_.get_index() < length) {
GetSet();
if (source_.GetError().What() == SET_E) {
source_.SetError(NO_ERROR_E); // extensions may only have sequence
source_.prev();
}
GetSequence();
byte b = source_.next();
if (b != OBJECT_IDENTIFIER) {
source_.SetError(OBJECT_ID_E);
return;
}
word32 oidSz = GetLength(source_);
if (source_.IsLeft(oidSz) == false) return;
byte joint[2];
if (source_.IsLeft(sizeof(joint)) == false) return;
memcpy(joint, source_.get_current(), sizeof(joint));
// v1 name types
if (joint[0] == 0x55 && joint[1] == 0x04) {
source_.advance(2);
byte id = source_.next();
b = source_.next(); // strType
word32 strLen = GetLength(source_);
if (source_.IsLeft(strLen) == false) return;
switch (id) {
case COMMON_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/CN=", 4, strLen)))
return;
break;
case SUR_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/SN=", 4, strLen)))
return;
break;
case COUNTRY_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/C=", 3, strLen)))
return;
break;
case LOCALITY_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/L=", 3, strLen)))
return;
break;
case STATE_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/ST=", 4, strLen)))
return;
break;
case ORG_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/O=", 3, strLen)))
return;
break;
case ORGUNIT_NAME:
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/OU=", 4, strLen)))
return;
break;
}
sha.Update(source_.get_current(), strLen);
source_.advance(strLen);
}
else {
bool email = false;
if (joint[0] == 0x2a && joint[1] == 0x86) // email id hdr
email = true;
source_.advance(oidSz + 1);
word32 length = GetLength(source_);
if (source_.IsLeft(length) == false) return;
if (email) {
if (!(ptr = AddTag(ptr, buf_end, "/emailAddress=", 14, length)))
return;
}
source_.advance(length);
}
}
*ptr = 0;
if (nt == ISSUER)
sha.Final(issuerHash_);
else
sha.Final(subjectHash_);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-254"
] |
mysql-server
|
e7061f7e5a96c66cb2e0bf46bec7f6ff35801a69
| 232,338,863,828,165,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 113 |
Bug #22738607: YASSL FUNCTION X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID IS NOT WORKING AS EXPECTED.
|
static int bad_inode_mknod (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
int mode, dev_t rdev)
{
return -EIO;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
be6aab0e9fa6d3c6d75aa1e38ac972d8b4ee82b8
| 151,512,264,163,497,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
[PATCH] fix memory corruption from misinterpreted bad_inode_ops return values
CVE-2006-5753 is for a case where an inode can be marked bad, switching
the ops to bad_inode_ops, which are all connected as:
static int return_EIO(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR ((void *) (return_EIO))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = bad_inode_create
...etc...
The problem here is that the void cast causes return types to not be
promoted, and for ops such as listxattr which expect more than 32 bits of
return value, the 32-bit -EIO is interpreted as a large positive 64-bit
number, i.e. 0x00000000fffffffa instead of 0xfffffffa.
This goes particularly badly when the return value is taken as a number of
bytes to copy into, say, a user's buffer for example...
I originally had coded up the fix by creating a return_EIO_<TYPE> macro
for each return type, like this:
static int return_EIO_int(void)
{
return -EIO;
}
#define EIO_ERROR_INT ((void *) (return_EIO_int))
static struct inode_operations bad_inode_ops =
{
.create = EIO_ERROR_INT,
...etc...
but Al felt that it was probably better to create an EIO-returner for each
actual op signature. Since so few ops share a signature, I just went ahead
& created an EIO function for each individual file & inode op that returns
a value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
*/
xmlNodePtr
xmlXPathNextDescendant(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr cur) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->context == NULL)) return(NULL);
if (cur == NULL) {
if (ctxt->context->node == NULL)
return(NULL);
if ((ctxt->context->node->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) ||
(ctxt->context->node->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL))
return(NULL);
if (ctxt->context->node == (xmlNodePtr) ctxt->context->doc)
return(ctxt->context->doc->children);
return(ctxt->context->node->children);
}
if (cur->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
return(NULL);
if (cur->children != NULL) {
/*
* Do not descend on entities declarations
*/
if (cur->children->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) {
cur = cur->children;
/*
* Skip DTDs
*/
if (cur->type != XML_DTD_NODE)
return(cur);
}
}
if (cur == ctxt->context->node) return(NULL);
while (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
if ((cur->type != XML_ENTITY_DECL) &&
(cur->type != XML_DTD_NODE))
return(cur);
}
do {
cur = cur->parent;
if (cur == NULL) break;
if (cur == ctxt->context->node) return(NULL);
if (cur->next != NULL) {
cur = cur->next;
return(cur);
}
} while (cur != NULL);
| 0 |
[] |
libxml2
|
03c6723043775122313f107695066e5744189a08
| 76,374,820,783,237,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
Handling of XPath function arguments in error case
The XPath engine tries to guarantee that every XPath function can pop
'nargs' non-NULL values off the stack. libxslt, for example, relies on
this assumption. But the check isn't thorough enough if there are errors
during the evaluation of arguments. This can lead to segfaults:
https://mail.gnome.org/archives/xslt/2013-December/msg00005.html
This commit makes the handling of function arguments more robust.
* Bail out early when evaluation of XPath function arguments fails.
* Make sure that there are 'nargs' arguments in the current call frame.
|
static int check_reqid(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int dir, int count, void *ptr)
{
int i;
u32 reqid = *(u32*)ptr;
for (i=0; i<xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
if (xp->xfrm_vec[i].reqid == reqid)
return -EEXIST;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
096f41d3a8fcbb8dde7f71379b1ca85fe213eded
| 23,343,429,592,050,593,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
af_key: Fix sadb_x_ipsecrequest parsing
The parsing of sadb_x_ipsecrequest is broken in a number of ways.
First of all we're not verifying sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len. This
is needed when the structure carries addresses at the end. Worse
we don't even look at the length when we parse those optional
addresses.
The migration code had similar parsing code that's better but
it also has some deficiencies. The length is overcounted first
of all as it includes the header itself. It also fails to check
the length before dereferencing the sa_family field.
This patch fixes those problems in parse_sockaddr_pair and then
uses it in parse_ipsecrequest.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
vol_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
int vol_op;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t))) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from volser/volint.xg
*/
vol_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vol call %s", tok2str(vol_req, "op#%d", vol_op)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (vol_op) {
case 100: /* Create volume */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partition"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " name"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " parent"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 101: /* Delete volume */
case 107: /* Get flags */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " trans"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 102: /* Restore */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " totrans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 103: /* Forward */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromtrans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromdate"));
DATEOUT();
DESTSERVEROUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " desttrans"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 104: /* End trans */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " trans"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 105: /* Clone */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " trans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " purgevol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newtype"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newname"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 106: /* Set flags */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " trans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 108: /* Trans create */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partition"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 109: /* Dump */
case 655537: /* Get size */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromtrans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromdate"));
DATEOUT();
break;
case 110: /* Get n-th volume */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " index"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 111: /* Set forwarding */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newsite"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 112: /* Get name */
case 113: /* Get status */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
break;
case 114: /* Signal restore */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " name"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " cloneid"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 116: /* List volumes */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partition"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 117: /* Set id types */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " name"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " type"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " clone"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 119: /* Partition info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " name"));
STROUT(AFSNAMEMAX);
break;
case 120: /* Reclone */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 121: /* List one volume */
case 122: /* Nuke volume */
case 124: /* Extended List volumes */
case 125: /* Extended List one volume */
case 65536: /* Convert RO to RW volume */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " volid"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 123: /* Set date */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " date"));
DATEOUT();
break;
case 126: /* Set info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 128: /* Forward multiple */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromtrans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromdate"));
DATEOUT();
{
unsigned long i, j;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
DESTSERVEROUT();
if (i != j - 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
if (j == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <none!>"));
}
break;
case 65538: /* Dump version 2 */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromtrans"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fromdate"));
DATEOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags"));
UINTOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|vol]"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
tcpdump
|
c24922e692a52121e853a84ead6b9337f4c08a94
| 302,540,800,248,122,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 196 |
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
Mat_PrintNumber(enum matio_types type, void *data)
{
switch ( type ) {
case MAT_T_DOUBLE:
printf("%g",*(double*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_SINGLE:
printf("%g",*(float*)data);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_MAT_INT64_T
case MAT_T_INT64:
#if HAVE_INTTYPES_H
printf("%" PRIi64,*(mat_int64_t*)data);
#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1200
printf("%I64i",*(mat_int64_t*)data);
#elif defined(HAVE_LONG_LONG_INT)
printf("%lld",(long long)(*(mat_int64_t*)data));
#else
printf("%ld",(long)(*(mat_int64_t*)data));
#endif
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAT_UINT64_T
case MAT_T_UINT64:
#if HAVE_INTTYPES_H
printf("%" PRIu64,*(mat_uint64_t*)data);
#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1200
printf("%I64u",*(mat_uint64_t*)data);
#elif defined(HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG_INT)
printf("%llu",(unsigned long long)(*(mat_uint64_t*)data));
#else
printf("%lu",(unsigned long)(*(mat_uint64_t*)data));
#endif
break;
#endif
case MAT_T_INT32:
printf("%d",*(mat_int32_t*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_UINT32:
printf("%u",*(mat_uint32_t*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_INT16:
printf("%hd",*(mat_int16_t*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_UINT16:
printf("%hu",*(mat_uint16_t*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_INT8:
printf("%hhd",*(mat_int8_t*)data);
break;
case MAT_T_UINT8:
printf("%hhu",*(mat_uint8_t*)data);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
matio
|
a47b7cd3aca70e9a0bddf8146eb4ab0cbd19c2c3
| 312,635,775,520,514,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
Fix memory leak
As reported by https://github.com/tbeu/matio/issues/131
|
static void iucv_sock_kill(struct sock *sk)
{
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || sk->sk_socket)
return;
iucv_sock_unlink(&iucv_sk_list, sk);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD);
sock_put(sk);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] |
linux
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
| 285,768,480,939,036,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OF_NET
static int of_dev_node_match(struct device *dev, const void *data)
{
int ret = 0;
if (dev->parent)
ret = dev->parent->of_node == data;
return ret == 0 ? dev->of_node == data : ret;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
895a5e96dbd6386c8e78e5b78e067dcc67b7f0ab
| 174,958,355,182,136,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
net-sysfs: Fix mem leak in netdev_register_kobject
syzkaller report this:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88837a71a500 (size 256):
comm "syz-executor.2", pid 9770, jiffies 4297825125 (age 17.843s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 20 c0 ef 86 ff ff ff ff ........ .......
backtrace:
[<00000000db12624b>] netdev_register_kobject+0x124/0x2e0 net/core/net-sysfs.c:1751
[<00000000dc49a994>] register_netdevice+0xcc1/0x1270 net/core/dev.c:8516
[<00000000e5f3fea0>] tun_set_iff drivers/net/tun.c:2649 [inline]
[<00000000e5f3fea0>] __tun_chr_ioctl+0x2218/0x3d20 drivers/net/tun.c:2883
[<000000001b8ac127>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
[<000000001b8ac127>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1a5/0x10e0 fs/ioctl.c:690
[<0000000079b269f8>] ksys_ioctl+0x89/0xa0 fs/ioctl.c:705
[<00000000de649beb>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:712 [inline]
[<00000000de649beb>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:710 [inline]
[<00000000de649beb>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x74/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:710
[<000000007ebded1e>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000db315d36>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000115be9bb>] 0xffffffffffffffff
It should call kset_unregister to free 'dev->queues_kset'
in error path of register_queue_kobjects, otherwise will cause a mem leak.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1d24eb4815d1 ("xps: Transmit Packet Steering")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
bool WebContents::SendIPCMessageToFrame(bool internal,
bool send_to_all,
int32_t frame_id,
const std::string& channel,
v8::Local<v8::Value> args) {
blink::CloneableMessage message;
if (!gin::ConvertFromV8(isolate(), args, &message)) {
isolate()->ThrowException(v8::Exception::Error(
gin::StringToV8(isolate(), "Failed to serialize arguments")));
return false;
}
auto frames = web_contents()->GetAllFrames();
auto iter = std::find_if(frames.begin(), frames.end(), [frame_id](auto* f) {
return f->GetRoutingID() == frame_id;
});
if (iter == frames.end())
return false;
if (!(*iter)->IsRenderFrameLive())
return false;
mojo::AssociatedRemote<mojom::ElectronRenderer> electron_renderer;
(*iter)->GetRemoteAssociatedInterfaces()->GetInterface(&electron_renderer);
electron_renderer->Message(internal, send_to_all, channel, std::move(message),
0 /* sender_id */);
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693"
] |
electron
|
18613925610ba319da7f497b6deed85ad712c59b
| 227,033,684,529,676,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 |
refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL (#25108)
* refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL (#25065)
* refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL
* spec: add test for x-site _top navigation
* chore: old code be old
|
int snd_seq_queue_alloc(int client, int locked, unsigned int info_flags)
{
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
q = queue_new(client, locked);
if (q == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
q->info_flags = info_flags;
if (queue_list_add(q) < 0) {
queue_delete(q);
return -ENOMEM;
}
snd_seq_queue_use(q->queue, client, 1); /* use this queue */
return q->queue;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3
| 147,462,164,742,929,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
DEFUN (clear_ip_bgp_peer_vpnv4_soft,
clear_ip_bgp_peer_vpnv4_soft_cmd,
"clear ip bgp A.B.C.D vpnv4 unicast soft",
CLEAR_STR
IP_STR
BGP_STR
"BGP neighbor address to clear\n"
"Address family\n"
"Address Family Modifier\n"
"Soft reconfig\n")
{
return bgp_clear_vty (vty, NULL, AFI_IP, SAFI_MPLS_VPN, clear_peer,
BGP_CLEAR_SOFT_BOTH, argv[0]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
frr
|
6d58272b4cf96f0daa846210dd2104877900f921
| 261,760,078,787,053,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
[bgpd] cleanup, compact and consolidate capability parsing code
2007-07-26 Paul Jakma <[email protected]>
* (general) Clean up and compact capability parsing slightly.
Consolidate validation of length and logging of generic TLV, and
memcpy of capability data, thus removing such from cap specifc
code (not always present or correct).
* bgp_open.h: Add structures for the generic capability TLV header
and for the data formats of the various specific capabilities we
support. Hence remove the badly named, or else misdefined, struct
capability.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_vty_out) Use struct capability_mp_data.
Do the length checks *before* memcpy()'ing based on that length
(stored capability - should have been validated anyway on input,
but..).
(bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices) new function to validate (afi,safi)
which is about to be used as index into arrays, consolidates
several instances of same, at least one of which appeared to be
incomplete..
(bgp_capability_mp) Much condensed.
(bgp_capability_orf_entry) New, process one ORF entry
(bgp_capability_orf) Condensed. Fixed to process all ORF entries.
(bgp_capability_restart) Condensed, and fixed to use a
cap-specific type, rather than abusing capability_mp.
(struct message capcode_str) added to aid generic logging.
(size_t cap_minsizes[]) added to aid generic validation of
capability length field.
(bgp_capability_parse) Generic logging and validation of TLV
consolidated here. Code compacted as much as possible.
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Capability parsers now use
streams, so no more need here to manually fudge the input stream
getp.
(bgp_capability_msg_parse) use struct capability_mp_data. Validate
lengths /before/ memcpy. Use bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices.
(bgp_capability_receive) Exported for use by test harness.
* bgp_vty.c: (bgp_show_summary) fix conversion warning
(bgp_show_peer) ditto
* bgp_debug.h: Fix storage 'extern' after type 'const'.
* lib/log.c: (mes_lookup) warning about code not being in
same-number array slot should be debug, not warning. E.g. BGP
has several discontigious number spaces, allocating from
different parts of a space is not uncommon (e.g. IANA
assigned versus vendor-assigned code points in some number
space).
|
xmlXIncludeErr(xmlXIncludeCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node, int error,
const char *msg, const xmlChar *extra)
{
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->nbErrors++;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, node, XML_FROM_XINCLUDE,
error, XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0,
(const char *) extra, NULL, NULL, 0, 0,
msg, (const char *) extra);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
libxml2
|
1098c30a040e72a4654968547f415be4e4c40fe7
| 44,096,514,450,161,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix user-after-free with `xmllint --xinclude --dropdtd`
The --dropdtd option can leave dangling pointers in entity reference
nodes. Make sure to skip these nodes when processing XIncludes.
This also avoids scanning entity declarations and even modifying
them inadvertently during XInclude processing.
Move from a block list to an allow list approach to avoid descending
into other node types that can't contain elements.
Fixes #237.
|
static void create_certinfo(struct curl_certinfo *ci, zval *listcode TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
if(ci) {
zval *certhash = NULL;
for(i=0; i<ci->num_of_certs; i++) {
struct curl_slist *slist;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(certhash);
array_init(certhash);
for(slist = ci->certinfo[i]; slist; slist = slist->next) {
int len;
char s[64];
char *tmp;
strncpy(s, slist->data, 64);
tmp = memchr(s, ':', 64);
if(tmp) {
*tmp = '\0';
len = strlen(s);
if(!strcmp(s, "Subject") || !strcmp(s, "Issuer")) {
zval *hash;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(hash);
array_init(hash);
split_certinfo(&slist->data[len+1], hash);
add_assoc_zval(certhash, s, hash);
} else {
add_assoc_string(certhash, s, &slist->data[len+1], 1);
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not extract hash key from certificate info");
}
}
add_next_index_zval(listcode, certhash);
}
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
php-src
|
0ea75af9be8a40836951fc89f723dd5390b8b46f
| 327,770,592,671,061,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Fixed bug #69316 (Use-after-free in php_curl related to CURLOPT_FILE/_INFILE/_WRITEHEADER)
|
ATTypedTableRecursion(List **wqueue, Relation rel, AlterTableCmd *cmd,
LOCKMODE lockmode)
{
ListCell *child;
List *children;
Assert(rel->rd_rel->relkind == RELKIND_COMPOSITE_TYPE);
children = find_typed_table_dependencies(rel->rd_rel->reltype,
RelationGetRelationName(rel),
cmd->behavior);
foreach(child, children)
{
Oid childrelid = lfirst_oid(child);
Relation childrel;
childrel = relation_open(childrelid, lockmode);
CheckTableNotInUse(childrel, "ALTER TABLE");
ATPrepCmd(wqueue, childrel, cmd, true, true, lockmode);
relation_close(childrel, NoLock);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
postgres
|
5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a
| 111,328,673,523,312,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062
|
*/
int skb_append_datato_frags(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*getfrag)(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length)
{
int frg_cnt = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
int copy;
int offset = 0;
int ret;
struct page_frag *pfrag = ¤t->task_frag;
do {
/* Return error if we don't have space for new frag */
if (frg_cnt >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
return -ENOMEM;
/* copy the user data to page */
copy = min_t(int, length, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
ret = getfrag(from, page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, 0, skb);
if (ret < 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* copy was successful so update the size parameters */
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, frg_cnt, pfrag->page, pfrag->offset,
copy);
frg_cnt++;
pfrag->offset += copy;
get_page(pfrag->page);
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
} while (length > 0);
return 0;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
| 40,780,009,290,012,727,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
flow_unwildcard_tp_ports(const struct flow *flow, struct flow_wildcards *wc)
{
if (flow->nw_proto != IPPROTO_ICMP) {
memset(&wc->masks.tp_src, 0xff, sizeof wc->masks.tp_src);
memset(&wc->masks.tp_dst, 0xff, sizeof wc->masks.tp_dst);
} else {
wc->masks.tp_src = htons(0xff);
wc->masks.tp_dst = htons(0xff);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
ovs
|
79349cbab0b2a755140eedb91833ad2760520a83
| 296,946,637,387,549,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
|
static int __init init_hw_perf_events(void)
{
u64 dfr = read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1);
switch ((dfr >> 8) & 0xf) {
case 0x1: /* PMUv3 */
cpu_pmu = armv8_pmuv3_pmu_init();
break;
}
if (cpu_pmu) {
pr_info("enabled with %s PMU driver, %d counters available\n",
cpu_pmu->name, cpu_pmu->num_events);
cpu_pmu_init(cpu_pmu);
armpmu_register(cpu_pmu, "cpu", PERF_TYPE_RAW);
} else {
pr_info("no hardware support available\n");
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071
| 294,034,899,134,002,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
|
static void runPcapLoop(u_int16_t thread_id) {
if((!shutdown_app) && (ndpi_thread_info[thread_id].workflow->pcap_handle != NULL))
if(pcap_loop(ndpi_thread_info[thread_id].workflow->pcap_handle, -1, &ndpi_process_packet, (u_char*)&thread_id) < 0)
printf("Error while reading pcap file: '%s'\n", pcap_geterr(ndpi_thread_info[thread_id].workflow->pcap_handle));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
nDPI
|
b7e666e465f138ae48ab81976726e67deed12701
| 204,961,100,344,487,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Added fix to avoid potential heap buffer overflow in H.323 dissector
Modified HTTP report information to make it closer to the HTTP field names
|
int _modbus_receive_msg(modbus_t *ctx, uint8_t *msg, msg_type_t msg_type)
{
int rc;
fd_set rset;
struct timeval tv;
struct timeval *p_tv;
int length_to_read;
int msg_length = 0;
_step_t step;
if (ctx->debug) {
if (msg_type == MSG_INDICATION) {
printf("Waiting for an indication...\n");
} else {
printf("Waiting for a confirmation...\n");
}
}
/* Add a file descriptor to the set */
FD_ZERO(&rset);
FD_SET(ctx->s, &rset);
/* We need to analyse the message step by step. At the first step, we want
* to reach the function code because all packets contain this
* information. */
step = _STEP_FUNCTION;
length_to_read = ctx->backend->header_length + 1;
if (msg_type == MSG_INDICATION) {
/* Wait for a message, we don't know when the message will be
* received */
if (ctx->indication_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && ctx->indication_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
/* By default, the indication timeout isn't set */
p_tv = NULL;
} else {
/* Wait for an indication (name of a received request by a server, see schema) */
tv.tv_sec = ctx->indication_timeout.tv_sec;
tv.tv_usec = ctx->indication_timeout.tv_usec;
p_tv = &tv;
}
} else {
tv.tv_sec = ctx->response_timeout.tv_sec;
tv.tv_usec = ctx->response_timeout.tv_usec;
p_tv = &tv;
}
while (length_to_read != 0) {
rc = ctx->backend->select(ctx, &rset, p_tv, length_to_read);
if (rc == -1) {
_error_print(ctx, "select");
if (ctx->error_recovery & MODBUS_ERROR_RECOVERY_LINK) {
int saved_errno = errno;
if (errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
_sleep_response_timeout(ctx);
modbus_flush(ctx);
} else if (errno == EBADF) {
modbus_close(ctx);
modbus_connect(ctx);
}
errno = saved_errno;
}
return -1;
}
rc = ctx->backend->recv(ctx, msg + msg_length, length_to_read);
if (rc == 0) {
errno = ECONNRESET;
rc = -1;
}
if (rc == -1) {
_error_print(ctx, "read");
if ((ctx->error_recovery & MODBUS_ERROR_RECOVERY_LINK) &&
(errno == ECONNRESET || errno == ECONNREFUSED ||
errno == EBADF)) {
int saved_errno = errno;
modbus_close(ctx);
modbus_connect(ctx);
/* Could be removed by previous calls */
errno = saved_errno;
}
return -1;
}
/* Display the hex code of each character received */
if (ctx->debug) {
int i;
for (i=0; i < rc; i++)
printf("<%.2X>", msg[msg_length + i]);
}
/* Sums bytes received */
msg_length += rc;
/* Computes remaining bytes */
length_to_read -= rc;
if (length_to_read == 0) {
switch (step) {
case _STEP_FUNCTION:
/* Function code position */
length_to_read = compute_meta_length_after_function(
msg[ctx->backend->header_length],
msg_type);
if (length_to_read != 0) {
step = _STEP_META;
break;
} /* else switches straight to the next step */
case _STEP_META:
length_to_read = compute_data_length_after_meta(
ctx, msg, msg_type);
if ((msg_length + length_to_read) > (int)ctx->backend->max_adu_length) {
errno = EMBBADDATA;
_error_print(ctx, "too many data");
return -1;
}
step = _STEP_DATA;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (length_to_read > 0 &&
(ctx->byte_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || ctx->byte_timeout.tv_usec > 0)) {
/* If there is no character in the buffer, the allowed timeout
interval between two consecutive bytes is defined by
byte_timeout */
tv.tv_sec = ctx->byte_timeout.tv_sec;
tv.tv_usec = ctx->byte_timeout.tv_usec;
p_tv = &tv;
}
/* else timeout isn't set again, the full response must be read before
expiration of response timeout (for CONFIRMATION only) */
}
if (ctx->debug)
printf("\n");
return ctx->backend->check_integrity(ctx, msg, msg_length);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libmodbus
|
5ccdf5ef79d742640355d1132fa9e2abc7fbaefc
| 137,090,617,354,726,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 141 |
Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
|
static void ctcp_msg_dcc_chat(IRC_SERVER_REC *server, const char *data,
const char *nick, const char *addr,
const char *target, CHAT_DCC_REC *chat)
{
CHAT_DCC_REC *dcc;
char **params;
int paramcount;
int passive, autoallow = FALSE;
/* CHAT <unused> <address> <port> */
/* CHAT <unused> <address> 0 <id> (DCC CHAT passive protocol) */
params = g_strsplit(data, " ", -1);
paramcount = g_strv_length(params);
if (paramcount < 3) {
g_strfreev(params);
return;
}
passive = paramcount == 4 && g_strcmp0(params[2], "0") == 0;
dcc = DCC_CHAT(dcc_find_request(DCC_CHAT_TYPE, nick, NULL));
if (dcc != NULL) {
if (dcc_is_listening(dcc)) {
/* we requested dcc chat, they requested
dcc chat from us .. allow it. */
dcc_destroy(DCC(dcc));
autoallow = TRUE;
} else if (!dcc_is_passive(dcc)) {
/* we already have one dcc chat request
from this nick, remove it. */
dcc_destroy(DCC(dcc));
} else if (passive) {
if (dcc->pasv_id != atoi(params[3])) {
/* IDs don't match! */
dcc_destroy(DCC(dcc));
} else {
/* IDs are ok! Update address and port and
connect! */
dcc->target = g_strdup(target);
dcc->port = atoi(params[2]);
dcc_str2ip(params[1], &dcc->addr);
net_ip2host(&dcc->addr, dcc->addrstr);
dcc_chat_connect(dcc);
g_strfreev(params);
return;
}
}
}
dcc = dcc_chat_create(server, chat, nick, params[0]);
dcc->target = g_strdup(target);
dcc->port = atoi(params[2]);
if (passive)
dcc->pasv_id = atoi(params[3]);
dcc_str2ip(params[1], &dcc->addr);
net_ip2host(&dcc->addr, dcc->addrstr);
signal_emit("dcc request", 2, dcc, addr);
if (autoallow || DCC_CHAT_AUTOACCEPT(dcc, server, nick, addr)) {
if (passive) {
/* Passive DCC... let's set up a listening socket
and send reply back */
dcc_chat_passive(dcc);
} else {
dcc_chat_connect(dcc);
}
}
g_strfreev(params);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
irssi
|
43e44d553d44e313003cee87e6ea5e24d68b84a1
| 270,273,807,209,694,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes GL#12, GL#13, GL#14, GL#15, GL#16
See merge request irssi/irssi!23
|
proto_tree_add_bitmask_list(proto_tree *tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, const guint offset,
const int len, int * const *fields, const guint encoding)
{
guint64 value;
if (tree) {
value = get_uint64_value(tree, tvb, offset, len, encoding);
proto_item_add_bitmask_tree(NULL, tvb, offset, len, -1, fields,
BMT_NO_APPEND, FALSE, TRUE, tree, value);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
wireshark
|
a9fc769d7bb4b491efb61c699d57c9f35269d871
| 129,199,440,931,788,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
epan: Fix a memory leak.
Make sure _proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val allocates a bits array using the
packet scope, otherwise we leak memory. Fixes #17032.
|
bool checkInboundFrameLimits() override { return true; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400"
] |
envoy
|
0e49a495826ea9e29134c1bd54fdeb31a034f40c
| 173,282,190,688,612,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
http/2: add stats and stream flush timeout (#139)
This commit adds a new stream flush timeout to guard against a
remote server that does not open window once an entire stream has
been buffered for flushing. Additional stats have also been added
to better understand the codecs view of active streams as well as
amount of data buffered.
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, void *from, size_t length,
struct rtable **rtp,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct iphdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int iphlen;
int err;
struct rtable *rt = *rtp;
if (length > rt->dst.dev->mtu) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, rt->rt_dst, inet->inet_dport,
rt->dst.dev->mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
goto out;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
length + LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + 15,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
skb_reserve(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev));
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
*rtp = NULL;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
skb_put(skb, length);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)iph, from, 0, length))
goto error_free;
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
/*
* We don't want to modify the ip header, but we do need to
* be sure that it won't cause problems later along the network
* stack. Specifically we want to make sure that iph->ihl is a
* sane value. If ihl points beyond the length of the buffer passed
* in, reject the frame as invalid
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
if (!iph->saddr)
iph->saddr = rt->rt_src;
iph->check = 0;
iph->tot_len = htons(length);
if (!iph->id)
ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->dst, NULL);
iph->check = ip_fast_csum((unsigned char *)iph, iph->ihl);
}
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP)
icmp_out_count(net, ((struct icmphdr *)
skb_transport_header(skb))->type);
err = NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, skb, NULL,
rt->dst.dev, dst_output);
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err)
goto error;
out:
return 0;
error_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
error:
IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
| 126,397,512,742,644,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 |
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline void ModulateLCHab(const double percent_luma,
const double percent_chroma,const double percent_hue,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
hue,
luma,
chroma;
/*
Increase or decrease color luma, chroma, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToLCHab(*red,*green,*blue,&luma,&chroma,&hue);
luma*=0.01*percent_luma;
chroma*=0.01*percent_chroma;
hue+=fmod((percent_hue-100.0),200.0)/200.0;
ConvertLCHabToRGB(luma,chroma,hue,red,green,blue);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
ImageMagick
|
1cc6f0ccc92c20c7cab6c4a7335daf29c91f0d8e
| 229,342,055,710,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
|
static void complete_format_list(THEME_SEARCH_REC *rec, const char *key, GList **list)
{
FORMAT_REC *formats;
int n, len;
formats = g_hash_table_lookup(default_formats, rec->name);
len = strlen(key);
for (n = 1; formats[n].def != NULL; n++) {
const char *item = formats[n].tag;
if (item != NULL && g_ascii_strncasecmp(item, key, len) == 0)
*list = g_list_append(*list, g_strdup(item));
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
irssi
|
43e44d553d44e313003cee87e6ea5e24d68b84a1
| 57,606,392,263,691,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes GL#12, GL#13, GL#14, GL#15, GL#16
See merge request irssi/irssi!23
|
MagickExport size_t ConcatenateMagickString(char *destination,
const char *source,const size_t length)
{
register char
*q;
register const char
*p;
register size_t
i;
size_t
count;
assert(destination != (char *) NULL);
assert(source != (const char *) NULL);
assert(length >= 1);
p=source;
q=destination;
i=length;
while ((i-- != 0) && (*q != '\0'))
q++;
count=(size_t) (q-destination);
i=length-count;
if (i == 0)
return(count+strlen(p));
while (*p != '\0')
{
if (i != 1)
{
*q++=(*p);
i--;
}
p++;
}
*q='\0';
return(count+(p-source));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
ImageMagick
|
be90a5395695f0d19479a5d46b06c678be7f7927
| 185,848,109,702,951,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1721
|
vte_sequence_handler_normal_keypad (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
_vte_debug_print(VTE_DEBUG_KEYBOARD,
"Leaving application keypad mode.\n");
terminal->pvt->keypad_mode = VTE_KEYMODE_NORMAL;
}
| 0 |
[] |
vte
|
58bc3a942f198a1a8788553ca72c19d7c1702b74
| 153,926,881,585,871,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
fix bug #548272
svn path=/trunk/; revision=2365
|
size_t HTTPSession::sendCertificateRequest(
std::unique_ptr<folly::IOBuf> certificateRequestContext,
std::vector<fizz::Extension> extensions) {
// Check if both sending and receiving peer have advertised valid
// SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH setting. Otherwise, the frames for secondary
// authentication should not be sent.
auto ingressSettings = codec_->getIngressSettings();
auto egressSettings = codec_->getEgressSettings();
if (ingressSettings && egressSettings) {
if (ingressSettings->getSetting(SettingsId::SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH, 0) ==
0 ||
egressSettings->getSetting(SettingsId::SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH, 0) ==
0) {
VLOG(4) << "Secondary certificate authentication is not supported.";
return 0;
}
}
auto authRequest = secondAuthManager_->createAuthRequest(
std::move(certificateRequestContext), std::move(extensions));
auto encodedSize = codec_->generateCertificateRequest(
writeBuf_, authRequest.first, std::move(authRequest.second));
if (encodedSize > 0) {
scheduleWrite();
} else {
VLOG(4) << "Failed to generate CERTIFICATE_REQUEST frame.";
}
return encodedSize;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
proxygen
|
0600ebe59c3e82cd012def77ca9ca1918da74a71
| 93,771,738,606,624,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Check that a secondary auth manager is set before dereferencing.
Summary: CVE-2018-6343
Reviewed By: mingtaoy
Differential Revision: D12994423
fbshipit-source-id: 9229ec11da8085f1fa153595e8e5353e19d06fb7
|
static bool cgroup_devices_has_allow_or_deny(struct cgfs_data *d,
char *v, bool for_allow)
{
char *path;
FILE *devices_list;
char *line = NULL;
size_t sz = 0;
bool ret = !for_allow;
const char *parts[3] = {
NULL,
"devices.list",
NULL
};
// XXX FIXME if users could use something other than 'lxc.devices.deny = a'.
// not sure they ever do, but they *could*
// right now, I'm assuming they do NOT
if (!for_allow && strcmp(v, "a") != 0 && strcmp(v, "a *:* rwm") != 0)
return false;
parts[0] = (const char *)lxc_cgroup_get_hierarchy_abs_path_data("devices", d);
if (!parts[0])
return false;
path = lxc_string_join("/", parts, false);
if (!path) {
free((void *)parts[0]);
return false;
}
devices_list = fopen_cloexec(path, "r");
if (!devices_list) {
free(path);
return false;
}
while (getline(&line, &sz, devices_list) != -1) {
size_t len = strlen(line);
if (len > 0 && line[len-1] == '\n')
line[len-1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(line, "a *:* rwm") == 0) {
ret = for_allow;
goto out;
} else if (for_allow && strcmp(line, v) == 0) {
ret = true;
goto out;
}
}
out:
fclose(devices_list);
free(line);
free(path);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
lxc
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
| 15,350,415,716,152,786,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
bool LEX::save_prep_leaf_tables()
{
if (!thd->save_prep_leaf_list)
return FALSE;
Query_arena *arena= thd->stmt_arena, backup;
arena= thd->activate_stmt_arena_if_needed(&backup);
//It is used for DETETE/UPDATE so top level has only one SELECT
DBUG_ASSERT(first_select_lex()->next_select() == NULL);
bool res= first_select_lex()->save_prep_leaf_tables(thd);
if (arena)
thd->restore_active_arena(arena, &backup);
if (res)
return TRUE;
thd->save_prep_leaf_list= FALSE;
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2
| 59,096,478,763,029,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused a crash of the server. This happened because the
outer context field in the Name_resolution_context structure was not set
to NULL for such references. Rather it pointed to the first element in
the select_stack.
Note that starting from 10.4 we cannot use the SELECT_LEX::outer_select()
method when parsing a SELECT construct.
Approved by Oleksandr Byelkin <[email protected]>
|
DEFUN (show_bgp_memory,
show_bgp_memory_cmd,
"show bgp memory",
SHOW_STR
BGP_STR
"Global BGP memory statistics\n")
{
char memstrbuf[MTYPE_MEMSTR_LEN];
unsigned long count;
/* RIB related usage stats */
count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_NODE);
vty_out (vty, "%ld RIB nodes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_node)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_ROUTE);
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP routes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_info)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_ROUTE_EXTRA)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP route ancillaries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_info_extra)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_STATIC)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Static routes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_static)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
/* Adj-In/Out */
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_ADJ_IN)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Adj-In entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_adj_in)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_ADJ_OUT)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Adj-Out entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_adj_out)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_NEXTHOP_CACHE)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Nexthop cache entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_nexthop_cache)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_DAMP_INFO)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Dampening entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct bgp_damp_info)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
/* Attributes */
count = attr_count();
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP attributes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof(struct attr)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_ATTR_EXTRA)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP extra attributes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof(struct attr_extra)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = attr_unknown_count()))
vty_out (vty, "%ld unknown attributes%s", count, VTY_NEWLINE);
/* AS_PATH attributes */
count = aspath_count ();
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP AS-PATH entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct aspath)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_AS_SEG);
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP AS-PATH segments, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct assegment)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
/* Other attributes */
if ((count = community_count ()))
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP community entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct community)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_ECOMMUNITY)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld BGP community entries, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct ecommunity)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_CLUSTER)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld Cluster lists, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct cluster_list)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
/* Peer related usage */
count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_PEER);
vty_out (vty, "%ld peers, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct peer)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_PEER_GROUP)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld peer groups, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct peer_group)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
/* Other */
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_HASH)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld hash tables, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct hash)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_HASH_BACKET)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld hash buckets, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (struct hash_backet)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
if ((count = mtype_stats_alloc (MTYPE_BGP_REGEXP)))
vty_out (vty, "%ld compiled regexes, using %s of memory%s", count,
mtype_memstr (memstrbuf, sizeof (memstrbuf),
count * sizeof (regex_t)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
return CMD_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
frr
|
6d58272b4cf96f0daa846210dd2104877900f921
| 79,615,494,172,040,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 135 |
[bgpd] cleanup, compact and consolidate capability parsing code
2007-07-26 Paul Jakma <[email protected]>
* (general) Clean up and compact capability parsing slightly.
Consolidate validation of length and logging of generic TLV, and
memcpy of capability data, thus removing such from cap specifc
code (not always present or correct).
* bgp_open.h: Add structures for the generic capability TLV header
and for the data formats of the various specific capabilities we
support. Hence remove the badly named, or else misdefined, struct
capability.
* bgp_open.c: (bgp_capability_vty_out) Use struct capability_mp_data.
Do the length checks *before* memcpy()'ing based on that length
(stored capability - should have been validated anyway on input,
but..).
(bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices) new function to validate (afi,safi)
which is about to be used as index into arrays, consolidates
several instances of same, at least one of which appeared to be
incomplete..
(bgp_capability_mp) Much condensed.
(bgp_capability_orf_entry) New, process one ORF entry
(bgp_capability_orf) Condensed. Fixed to process all ORF entries.
(bgp_capability_restart) Condensed, and fixed to use a
cap-specific type, rather than abusing capability_mp.
(struct message capcode_str) added to aid generic logging.
(size_t cap_minsizes[]) added to aid generic validation of
capability length field.
(bgp_capability_parse) Generic logging and validation of TLV
consolidated here. Code compacted as much as possible.
* bgp_packet.c: (bgp_open_receive) Capability parsers now use
streams, so no more need here to manually fudge the input stream
getp.
(bgp_capability_msg_parse) use struct capability_mp_data. Validate
lengths /before/ memcpy. Use bgp_afi_safi_valid_indices.
(bgp_capability_receive) Exported for use by test harness.
* bgp_vty.c: (bgp_show_summary) fix conversion warning
(bgp_show_peer) ditto
* bgp_debug.h: Fix storage 'extern' after type 'const'.
* lib/log.c: (mes_lookup) warning about code not being in
same-number array slot should be debug, not warning. E.g. BGP
has several discontigious number spaces, allocating from
different parts of a space is not uncommon (e.g. IANA
assigned versus vendor-assigned code points in some number
space).
|
void md5_update(MD5CTX c, const void *data, unsigned long len) {
MD5_Update(c, data, len);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
libssh
|
e99246246b4061f7e71463f8806b9dcad65affa0
| 320,578,162,222,556,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
security: fix for vulnerability CVE-2014-0017
When accepting a new connection, a forking server based on libssh forks
and the child process handles the request. The RAND_bytes() function of
openssl doesn't reset its state after the fork, but simply adds the
current process id (getpid) to the PRNG state, which is not guaranteed
to be unique.
This can cause several children to end up with same PRNG state which is
a security issue.
|
void sqlite3Pragma(
Parse *pParse,
Token *pId1, /* First part of [schema.]id field */
Token *pId2, /* Second part of [schema.]id field, or NULL */
Token *pValue, /* Token for <value>, or NULL */
int minusFlag /* True if a '-' sign preceded <value> */
){
char *zLeft = 0; /* Nul-terminated UTF-8 string <id> */
char *zRight = 0; /* Nul-terminated UTF-8 string <value>, or NULL */
const char *zDb = 0; /* The database name */
Token *pId; /* Pointer to <id> token */
char *aFcntl[4]; /* Argument to SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA */
int iDb; /* Database index for <database> */
int rc; /* return value form SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA */
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db; /* The database connection */
Db *pDb; /* The specific database being pragmaed */
Vdbe *v = sqlite3GetVdbe(pParse); /* Prepared statement */
const PragmaName *pPragma; /* The pragma */
if( v==0 ) return;
sqlite3VdbeRunOnlyOnce(v);
pParse->nMem = 2;
/* Interpret the [schema.] part of the pragma statement. iDb is the
** index of the database this pragma is being applied to in db.aDb[]. */
iDb = sqlite3TwoPartName(pParse, pId1, pId2, &pId);
if( iDb<0 ) return;
pDb = &db->aDb[iDb];
/* If the temp database has been explicitly named as part of the
** pragma, make sure it is open.
*/
if( iDb==1 && sqlite3OpenTempDatabase(pParse) ){
return;
}
zLeft = sqlite3NameFromToken(db, pId);
if( !zLeft ) return;
if( minusFlag ){
zRight = sqlite3MPrintf(db, "-%T", pValue);
}else{
zRight = sqlite3NameFromToken(db, pValue);
}
assert( pId2 );
zDb = pId2->n>0 ? pDb->zDbSName : 0;
if( sqlite3AuthCheck(pParse, SQLITE_PRAGMA, zLeft, zRight, zDb) ){
goto pragma_out;
}
/* Send an SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA file-control to the underlying VFS
** connection. If it returns SQLITE_OK, then assume that the VFS
** handled the pragma and generate a no-op prepared statement.
**
** IMPLEMENTATION-OF: R-12238-55120 Whenever a PRAGMA statement is parsed,
** an SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA file control is sent to the open sqlite3_file
** object corresponding to the database file to which the pragma
** statement refers.
**
** IMPLEMENTATION-OF: R-29875-31678 The argument to the SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA
** file control is an array of pointers to strings (char**) in which the
** second element of the array is the name of the pragma and the third
** element is the argument to the pragma or NULL if the pragma has no
** argument.
*/
aFcntl[0] = 0;
aFcntl[1] = zLeft;
aFcntl[2] = zRight;
aFcntl[3] = 0;
db->busyHandler.nBusy = 0;
rc = sqlite3_file_control(db, zDb, SQLITE_FCNTL_PRAGMA, (void*)aFcntl);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3VdbeSetNumCols(v, 1);
sqlite3VdbeSetColName(v, 0, COLNAME_NAME, aFcntl[0], SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
returnSingleText(v, aFcntl[0]);
sqlite3_free(aFcntl[0]);
goto pragma_out;
}
if( rc!=SQLITE_NOTFOUND ){
if( aFcntl[0] ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "%s", aFcntl[0]);
sqlite3_free(aFcntl[0]);
}
pParse->nErr++;
pParse->rc = rc;
goto pragma_out;
}
/* Locate the pragma in the lookup table */
pPragma = pragmaLocate(zLeft);
if( pPragma==0 ) goto pragma_out;
/* Make sure the database schema is loaded if the pragma requires that */
if( (pPragma->mPragFlg & PragFlg_NeedSchema)!=0 ){
if( sqlite3ReadSchema(pParse) ) goto pragma_out;
}
/* Register the result column names for pragmas that return results */
if( (pPragma->mPragFlg & PragFlg_NoColumns)==0
&& ((pPragma->mPragFlg & PragFlg_NoColumns1)==0 || zRight==0)
){
setPragmaResultColumnNames(v, pPragma);
}
/* Jump to the appropriate pragma handler */
switch( pPragma->ePragTyp ){
#if !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS) && !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_DEPRECATED)
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]default_cache_size
** PRAGMA [schema.]default_cache_size=N
**
** The first form reports the current persistent setting for the
** page cache size. The value returned is the maximum number of
** pages in the page cache. The second form sets both the current
** page cache size value and the persistent page cache size value
** stored in the database file.
**
** Older versions of SQLite would set the default cache size to a
** negative number to indicate synchronous=OFF. These days, synchronous
** is always on by default regardless of the sign of the default cache
** size. But continue to take the absolute value of the default cache
** size of historical compatibility.
*/
case PragTyp_DEFAULT_CACHE_SIZE: {
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList getCacheSize[] = {
{ OP_Transaction, 0, 0, 0}, /* 0 */
{ OP_ReadCookie, 0, 1, BTREE_DEFAULT_CACHE_SIZE}, /* 1 */
{ OP_IfPos, 1, 8, 0},
{ OP_Integer, 0, 2, 0},
{ OP_Subtract, 1, 2, 1},
{ OP_IfPos, 1, 8, 0},
{ OP_Integer, 0, 1, 0}, /* 6 */
{ OP_Noop, 0, 0, 0},
{ OP_ResultRow, 1, 1, 0},
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
sqlite3VdbeUsesBtree(v, iDb);
if( !zRight ){
pParse->nMem += 2;
sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoMallocRequired(v, ArraySize(getCacheSize));
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(getCacheSize), getCacheSize, iLn);
if( ONLY_IF_REALLOC_STRESS(aOp==0) ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p1 = iDb;
aOp[6].p1 = SQLITE_DEFAULT_CACHE_SIZE;
}else{
int size = sqlite3AbsInt32(sqlite3Atoi(zRight));
sqlite3BeginWriteOperation(pParse, 0, iDb);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_SetCookie, iDb, BTREE_DEFAULT_CACHE_SIZE, size);
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
pDb->pSchema->cache_size = size;
sqlite3BtreeSetCacheSize(pDb->pBt, pDb->pSchema->cache_size);
}
break;
}
#endif /* !SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS && !SQLITE_OMIT_DEPRECATED */
#if !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS)
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]page_size
** PRAGMA [schema.]page_size=N
**
** The first form reports the current setting for the
** database page size in bytes. The second form sets the
** database page size value. The value can only be set if
** the database has not yet been created.
*/
case PragTyp_PAGE_SIZE: {
Btree *pBt = pDb->pBt;
assert( pBt!=0 );
if( !zRight ){
int size = ALWAYS(pBt) ? sqlite3BtreeGetPageSize(pBt) : 0;
returnSingleInt(v, size);
}else{
/* Malloc may fail when setting the page-size, as there is an internal
** buffer that the pager module resizes using sqlite3_realloc().
*/
db->nextPagesize = sqlite3Atoi(zRight);
if( SQLITE_NOMEM==sqlite3BtreeSetPageSize(pBt, db->nextPagesize,-1,0) ){
sqlite3OomFault(db);
}
}
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]secure_delete
** PRAGMA [schema.]secure_delete=ON/OFF/FAST
**
** The first form reports the current setting for the
** secure_delete flag. The second form changes the secure_delete
** flag setting and reports the new value.
*/
case PragTyp_SECURE_DELETE: {
Btree *pBt = pDb->pBt;
int b = -1;
assert( pBt!=0 );
if( zRight ){
if( sqlite3_stricmp(zRight, "fast")==0 ){
b = 2;
}else{
b = sqlite3GetBoolean(zRight, 0);
}
}
if( pId2->n==0 && b>=0 ){
int ii;
for(ii=0; ii<db->nDb; ii++){
sqlite3BtreeSecureDelete(db->aDb[ii].pBt, b);
}
}
b = sqlite3BtreeSecureDelete(pBt, b);
returnSingleInt(v, b);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]max_page_count
** PRAGMA [schema.]max_page_count=N
**
** The first form reports the current setting for the
** maximum number of pages in the database file. The
** second form attempts to change this setting. Both
** forms return the current setting.
**
** The absolute value of N is used. This is undocumented and might
** change. The only purpose is to provide an easy way to test
** the sqlite3AbsInt32() function.
**
** PRAGMA [schema.]page_count
**
** Return the number of pages in the specified database.
*/
case PragTyp_PAGE_COUNT: {
int iReg;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iDb);
iReg = ++pParse->nMem;
if( sqlite3Tolower(zLeft[0])=='p' ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Pagecount, iDb, iReg);
}else{
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_MaxPgcnt, iDb, iReg,
sqlite3AbsInt32(sqlite3Atoi(zRight)));
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, iReg, 1);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]locking_mode
** PRAGMA [schema.]locking_mode = (normal|exclusive)
*/
case PragTyp_LOCKING_MODE: {
const char *zRet = "normal";
int eMode = getLockingMode(zRight);
if( pId2->n==0 && eMode==PAGER_LOCKINGMODE_QUERY ){
/* Simple "PRAGMA locking_mode;" statement. This is a query for
** the current default locking mode (which may be different to
** the locking-mode of the main database).
*/
eMode = db->dfltLockMode;
}else{
Pager *pPager;
if( pId2->n==0 ){
/* This indicates that no database name was specified as part
** of the PRAGMA command. In this case the locking-mode must be
** set on all attached databases, as well as the main db file.
**
** Also, the sqlite3.dfltLockMode variable is set so that
** any subsequently attached databases also use the specified
** locking mode.
*/
int ii;
assert(pDb==&db->aDb[0]);
for(ii=2; ii<db->nDb; ii++){
pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(db->aDb[ii].pBt);
sqlite3PagerLockingMode(pPager, eMode);
}
db->dfltLockMode = (u8)eMode;
}
pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(pDb->pBt);
eMode = sqlite3PagerLockingMode(pPager, eMode);
}
assert( eMode==PAGER_LOCKINGMODE_NORMAL
|| eMode==PAGER_LOCKINGMODE_EXCLUSIVE );
if( eMode==PAGER_LOCKINGMODE_EXCLUSIVE ){
zRet = "exclusive";
}
returnSingleText(v, zRet);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]journal_mode
** PRAGMA [schema.]journal_mode =
** (delete|persist|off|truncate|memory|wal|off)
*/
case PragTyp_JOURNAL_MODE: {
int eMode; /* One of the PAGER_JOURNALMODE_XXX symbols */
int ii; /* Loop counter */
if( zRight==0 ){
/* If there is no "=MODE" part of the pragma, do a query for the
** current mode */
eMode = PAGER_JOURNALMODE_QUERY;
}else{
const char *zMode;
int n = sqlite3Strlen30(zRight);
for(eMode=0; (zMode = sqlite3JournalModename(eMode))!=0; eMode++){
if( sqlite3StrNICmp(zRight, zMode, n)==0 ) break;
}
if( !zMode ){
/* If the "=MODE" part does not match any known journal mode,
** then do a query */
eMode = PAGER_JOURNALMODE_QUERY;
}
if( eMode==PAGER_JOURNALMODE_OFF && (db->flags & SQLITE_Defensive)!=0 ){
/* Do not allow journal-mode "OFF" in defensive since the database
** can become corrupted using ordinary SQL when the journal is off */
eMode = PAGER_JOURNALMODE_QUERY;
}
}
if( eMode==PAGER_JOURNALMODE_QUERY && pId2->n==0 ){
/* Convert "PRAGMA journal_mode" into "PRAGMA main.journal_mode" */
iDb = 0;
pId2->n = 1;
}
for(ii=db->nDb-1; ii>=0; ii--){
if( db->aDb[ii].pBt && (ii==iDb || pId2->n==0) ){
sqlite3VdbeUsesBtree(v, ii);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_JournalMode, ii, 1, eMode);
}
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, 1, 1);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]journal_size_limit
** PRAGMA [schema.]journal_size_limit=N
**
** Get or set the size limit on rollback journal files.
*/
case PragTyp_JOURNAL_SIZE_LIMIT: {
Pager *pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(pDb->pBt);
i64 iLimit = -2;
if( zRight ){
sqlite3DecOrHexToI64(zRight, &iLimit);
if( iLimit<-1 ) iLimit = -1;
}
iLimit = sqlite3PagerJournalSizeLimit(pPager, iLimit);
returnSingleInt(v, iLimit);
break;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS */
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]auto_vacuum
** PRAGMA [schema.]auto_vacuum=N
**
** Get or set the value of the database 'auto-vacuum' parameter.
** The value is one of: 0 NONE 1 FULL 2 INCREMENTAL
*/
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
case PragTyp_AUTO_VACUUM: {
Btree *pBt = pDb->pBt;
assert( pBt!=0 );
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleInt(v, sqlite3BtreeGetAutoVacuum(pBt));
}else{
int eAuto = getAutoVacuum(zRight);
assert( eAuto>=0 && eAuto<=2 );
db->nextAutovac = (u8)eAuto;
/* Call SetAutoVacuum() to set initialize the internal auto and
** incr-vacuum flags. This is required in case this connection
** creates the database file. It is important that it is created
** as an auto-vacuum capable db.
*/
rc = sqlite3BtreeSetAutoVacuum(pBt, eAuto);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && (eAuto==1 || eAuto==2) ){
/* When setting the auto_vacuum mode to either "full" or
** "incremental", write the value of meta[6] in the database
** file. Before writing to meta[6], check that meta[3] indicates
** that this really is an auto-vacuum capable database.
*/
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList setMeta6[] = {
{ OP_Transaction, 0, 1, 0}, /* 0 */
{ OP_ReadCookie, 0, 1, BTREE_LARGEST_ROOT_PAGE},
{ OP_If, 1, 0, 0}, /* 2 */
{ OP_Halt, SQLITE_OK, OE_Abort, 0}, /* 3 */
{ OP_SetCookie, 0, BTREE_INCR_VACUUM, 0}, /* 4 */
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
int iAddr = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v);
sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoMallocRequired(v, ArraySize(setMeta6));
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(setMeta6), setMeta6, iLn);
if( ONLY_IF_REALLOC_STRESS(aOp==0) ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p1 = iDb;
aOp[2].p2 = iAddr+4;
aOp[4].p1 = iDb;
aOp[4].p3 = eAuto - 1;
sqlite3VdbeUsesBtree(v, iDb);
}
}
break;
}
#endif
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]incremental_vacuum(N)
**
** Do N steps of incremental vacuuming on a database.
*/
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
case PragTyp_INCREMENTAL_VACUUM: {
int iLimit, addr;
if( zRight==0 || !sqlite3GetInt32(zRight, &iLimit) || iLimit<=0 ){
iLimit = 0x7fffffff;
}
sqlite3BeginWriteOperation(pParse, 0, iDb);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, iLimit, 1);
addr = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IncrVacuum, iDb); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_ResultRow, 1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_AddImm, 1, -1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IfPos, 1, addr); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addr);
break;
}
#endif
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]cache_size
** PRAGMA [schema.]cache_size=N
**
** The first form reports the current local setting for the
** page cache size. The second form sets the local
** page cache size value. If N is positive then that is the
** number of pages in the cache. If N is negative, then the
** number of pages is adjusted so that the cache uses -N kibibytes
** of memory.
*/
case PragTyp_CACHE_SIZE: {
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleInt(v, pDb->pSchema->cache_size);
}else{
int size = sqlite3Atoi(zRight);
pDb->pSchema->cache_size = size;
sqlite3BtreeSetCacheSize(pDb->pBt, pDb->pSchema->cache_size);
}
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]cache_spill
** PRAGMA cache_spill=BOOLEAN
** PRAGMA [schema.]cache_spill=N
**
** The first form reports the current local setting for the
** page cache spill size. The second form turns cache spill on
** or off. When turnning cache spill on, the size is set to the
** current cache_size. The third form sets a spill size that
** may be different form the cache size.
** If N is positive then that is the
** number of pages in the cache. If N is negative, then the
** number of pages is adjusted so that the cache uses -N kibibytes
** of memory.
**
** If the number of cache_spill pages is less then the number of
** cache_size pages, no spilling occurs until the page count exceeds
** the number of cache_size pages.
**
** The cache_spill=BOOLEAN setting applies to all attached schemas,
** not just the schema specified.
*/
case PragTyp_CACHE_SPILL: {
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleInt(v,
(db->flags & SQLITE_CacheSpill)==0 ? 0 :
sqlite3BtreeSetSpillSize(pDb->pBt,0));
}else{
int size = 1;
if( sqlite3GetInt32(zRight, &size) ){
sqlite3BtreeSetSpillSize(pDb->pBt, size);
}
if( sqlite3GetBoolean(zRight, size!=0) ){
db->flags |= SQLITE_CacheSpill;
}else{
db->flags &= ~(u64)SQLITE_CacheSpill;
}
setAllPagerFlags(db);
}
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]mmap_size(N)
**
** Used to set mapping size limit. The mapping size limit is
** used to limit the aggregate size of all memory mapped regions of the
** database file. If this parameter is set to zero, then memory mapping
** is not used at all. If N is negative, then the default memory map
** limit determined by sqlite3_config(SQLITE_CONFIG_MMAP_SIZE) is set.
** The parameter N is measured in bytes.
**
** This value is advisory. The underlying VFS is free to memory map
** as little or as much as it wants. Except, if N is set to 0 then the
** upper layers will never invoke the xFetch interfaces to the VFS.
*/
case PragTyp_MMAP_SIZE: {
sqlite3_int64 sz;
#if SQLITE_MAX_MMAP_SIZE>0
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, iDb, 0) );
if( zRight ){
int ii;
sqlite3DecOrHexToI64(zRight, &sz);
if( sz<0 ) sz = sqlite3GlobalConfig.szMmap;
if( pId2->n==0 ) db->szMmap = sz;
for(ii=db->nDb-1; ii>=0; ii--){
if( db->aDb[ii].pBt && (ii==iDb || pId2->n==0) ){
sqlite3BtreeSetMmapLimit(db->aDb[ii].pBt, sz);
}
}
}
sz = -1;
rc = sqlite3_file_control(db, zDb, SQLITE_FCNTL_MMAP_SIZE, &sz);
#else
sz = 0;
rc = SQLITE_OK;
#endif
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
returnSingleInt(v, sz);
}else if( rc!=SQLITE_NOTFOUND ){
pParse->nErr++;
pParse->rc = rc;
}
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA temp_store
** PRAGMA temp_store = "default"|"memory"|"file"
**
** Return or set the local value of the temp_store flag. Changing
** the local value does not make changes to the disk file and the default
** value will be restored the next time the database is opened.
**
** Note that it is possible for the library compile-time options to
** override this setting
*/
case PragTyp_TEMP_STORE: {
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleInt(v, db->temp_store);
}else{
changeTempStorage(pParse, zRight);
}
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA temp_store_directory
** PRAGMA temp_store_directory = ""|"directory_name"
**
** Return or set the local value of the temp_store_directory flag. Changing
** the value sets a specific directory to be used for temporary files.
** Setting to a null string reverts to the default temporary directory search.
** If temporary directory is changed, then invalidateTempStorage.
**
*/
case PragTyp_TEMP_STORE_DIRECTORY: {
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleText(v, sqlite3_temp_directory);
}else{
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_WSD
if( zRight[0] ){
int res;
rc = sqlite3OsAccess(db->pVfs, zRight, SQLITE_ACCESS_READWRITE, &res);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK || res==0 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "not a writable directory");
goto pragma_out;
}
}
if( SQLITE_TEMP_STORE==0
|| (SQLITE_TEMP_STORE==1 && db->temp_store<=1)
|| (SQLITE_TEMP_STORE==2 && db->temp_store==1)
){
invalidateTempStorage(pParse);
}
sqlite3_free(sqlite3_temp_directory);
if( zRight[0] ){
sqlite3_temp_directory = sqlite3_mprintf("%s", zRight);
}else{
sqlite3_temp_directory = 0;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_WSD */
}
break;
}
#if SQLITE_OS_WIN
/*
** PRAGMA data_store_directory
** PRAGMA data_store_directory = ""|"directory_name"
**
** Return or set the local value of the data_store_directory flag. Changing
** the value sets a specific directory to be used for database files that
** were specified with a relative pathname. Setting to a null string reverts
** to the default database directory, which for database files specified with
** a relative path will probably be based on the current directory for the
** process. Database file specified with an absolute path are not impacted
** by this setting, regardless of its value.
**
*/
case PragTyp_DATA_STORE_DIRECTORY: {
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleText(v, sqlite3_data_directory);
}else{
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_WSD
if( zRight[0] ){
int res;
rc = sqlite3OsAccess(db->pVfs, zRight, SQLITE_ACCESS_READWRITE, &res);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK || res==0 ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "not a writable directory");
goto pragma_out;
}
}
sqlite3_free(sqlite3_data_directory);
if( zRight[0] ){
sqlite3_data_directory = sqlite3_mprintf("%s", zRight);
}else{
sqlite3_data_directory = 0;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_WSD */
}
break;
}
#endif
#if SQLITE_ENABLE_LOCKING_STYLE
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]lock_proxy_file
** PRAGMA [schema.]lock_proxy_file = ":auto:"|"lock_file_path"
**
** Return or set the value of the lock_proxy_file flag. Changing
** the value sets a specific file to be used for database access locks.
**
*/
case PragTyp_LOCK_PROXY_FILE: {
if( !zRight ){
Pager *pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(pDb->pBt);
char *proxy_file_path = NULL;
sqlite3_file *pFile = sqlite3PagerFile(pPager);
sqlite3OsFileControlHint(pFile, SQLITE_GET_LOCKPROXYFILE,
&proxy_file_path);
returnSingleText(v, proxy_file_path);
}else{
Pager *pPager = sqlite3BtreePager(pDb->pBt);
sqlite3_file *pFile = sqlite3PagerFile(pPager);
int res;
if( zRight[0] ){
res=sqlite3OsFileControl(pFile, SQLITE_SET_LOCKPROXYFILE,
zRight);
} else {
res=sqlite3OsFileControl(pFile, SQLITE_SET_LOCKPROXYFILE,
NULL);
}
if( res!=SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "failed to set lock proxy file");
goto pragma_out;
}
}
break;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_ENABLE_LOCKING_STYLE */
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]synchronous
** PRAGMA [schema.]synchronous=OFF|ON|NORMAL|FULL|EXTRA
**
** Return or set the local value of the synchronous flag. Changing
** the local value does not make changes to the disk file and the
** default value will be restored the next time the database is
** opened.
*/
case PragTyp_SYNCHRONOUS: {
if( !zRight ){
returnSingleInt(v, pDb->safety_level-1);
}else{
if( !db->autoCommit ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse,
"Safety level may not be changed inside a transaction");
}else if( iDb!=1 ){
int iLevel = (getSafetyLevel(zRight,0,1)+1) & PAGER_SYNCHRONOUS_MASK;
if( iLevel==0 ) iLevel = 1;
pDb->safety_level = iLevel;
pDb->bSyncSet = 1;
setAllPagerFlags(db);
}
}
break;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_PAGER_PRAGMAS */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_FLAG_PRAGMAS
case PragTyp_FLAG: {
if( zRight==0 ){
setPragmaResultColumnNames(v, pPragma);
returnSingleInt(v, (db->flags & pPragma->iArg)!=0 );
}else{
u64 mask = pPragma->iArg; /* Mask of bits to set or clear. */
if( db->autoCommit==0 ){
/* Foreign key support may not be enabled or disabled while not
** in auto-commit mode. */
mask &= ~(SQLITE_ForeignKeys);
}
#if SQLITE_USER_AUTHENTICATION
if( db->auth.authLevel==UAUTH_User ){
/* Do not allow non-admin users to modify the schema arbitrarily */
mask &= ~(SQLITE_WriteSchema);
}
#endif
if( sqlite3GetBoolean(zRight, 0) ){
db->flags |= mask;
}else{
db->flags &= ~mask;
if( mask==SQLITE_DeferFKs ) db->nDeferredImmCons = 0;
}
/* Many of the flag-pragmas modify the code generated by the SQL
** compiler (eg. count_changes). So add an opcode to expire all
** compiled SQL statements after modifying a pragma value.
*/
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Expire);
setAllPagerFlags(db);
}
break;
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_FLAG_PRAGMAS */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SCHEMA_PRAGMAS
/*
** PRAGMA table_info(<table>)
**
** Return a single row for each column of the named table. The columns of
** the returned data set are:
**
** cid: Column id (numbered from left to right, starting at 0)
** name: Column name
** type: Column declaration type.
** notnull: True if 'NOT NULL' is part of column declaration
** dflt_value: The default value for the column, if any.
** pk: Non-zero for PK fields.
*/
case PragTyp_TABLE_INFO: if( zRight ){
Table *pTab;
pTab = sqlite3LocateTable(pParse, LOCATE_NOERR, zRight, zDb);
if( pTab ){
int iTabDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
int i, k;
int nHidden = 0;
Column *pCol;
Index *pPk = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pTab);
pParse->nMem = 7;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iTabDb);
sqlite3ViewGetColumnNames(pParse, pTab);
for(i=0, pCol=pTab->aCol; i<pTab->nCol; i++, pCol++){
int isHidden = 0;
if( pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_NOINSERT ){
if( pPragma->iArg==0 ){
nHidden++;
continue;
}
if( pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_VIRTUAL ){
isHidden = 2; /* GENERATED ALWAYS AS ... VIRTUAL */
}else if( pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_STORED ){
isHidden = 3; /* GENERATED ALWAYS AS ... STORED */
}else{ assert( pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_HIDDEN );
isHidden = 1; /* HIDDEN */
}
}
if( (pCol->colFlags & COLFLAG_PRIMKEY)==0 ){
k = 0;
}else if( pPk==0 ){
k = 1;
}else{
for(k=1; k<=pTab->nCol && pPk->aiColumn[k-1]!=i; k++){}
}
assert( pCol->pDflt==0 || pCol->pDflt->op==TK_SPAN || isHidden>=2 );
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, pPragma->iArg ? "issisii" : "issisi",
i-nHidden,
pCol->zName,
sqlite3ColumnType(pCol,""),
pCol->notNull ? 1 : 0,
pCol->pDflt && isHidden<2 ? pCol->pDflt->u.zToken : 0,
k,
isHidden);
}
}
}
break;
#ifdef SQLITE_DEBUG
case PragTyp_STATS: {
Index *pIdx;
HashElem *i;
pParse->nMem = 5;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iDb);
for(i=sqliteHashFirst(&pDb->pSchema->tblHash); i; i=sqliteHashNext(i)){
Table *pTab = sqliteHashData(i);
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "ssiii",
pTab->zName,
0,
pTab->szTabRow,
pTab->nRowLogEst,
pTab->tabFlags);
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 2, "siiiX",
pIdx->zName,
pIdx->szIdxRow,
pIdx->aiRowLogEst[0],
pIdx->hasStat1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, 1, 5);
}
}
}
break;
#endif
case PragTyp_INDEX_INFO: if( zRight ){
Index *pIdx;
Table *pTab;
pIdx = sqlite3FindIndex(db, zRight, zDb);
if( pIdx==0 ){
/* If there is no index named zRight, check to see if there is a
** WITHOUT ROWID table named zRight, and if there is, show the
** structure of the PRIMARY KEY index for that table. */
pTab = sqlite3LocateTable(pParse, LOCATE_NOERR, zRight, zDb);
if( pTab && !HasRowid(pTab) ){
pIdx = sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pTab);
}
}
if( pIdx ){
int iIdxDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pIdx->pSchema);
int i;
int mx;
if( pPragma->iArg ){
/* PRAGMA index_xinfo (newer version with more rows and columns) */
mx = pIdx->nColumn;
pParse->nMem = 6;
}else{
/* PRAGMA index_info (legacy version) */
mx = pIdx->nKeyCol;
pParse->nMem = 3;
}
pTab = pIdx->pTable;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iIdxDb);
assert( pParse->nMem<=pPragma->nPragCName );
for(i=0; i<mx; i++){
i16 cnum = pIdx->aiColumn[i];
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "iisX", i, cnum,
cnum<0 ? 0 : pTab->aCol[cnum].zName);
if( pPragma->iArg ){
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 4, "isiX",
pIdx->aSortOrder[i],
pIdx->azColl[i],
i<pIdx->nKeyCol);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, 1, pParse->nMem);
}
}
}
break;
case PragTyp_INDEX_LIST: if( zRight ){
Index *pIdx;
Table *pTab;
int i;
pTab = sqlite3FindTable(db, zRight, zDb);
if( pTab ){
int iTabDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
pParse->nMem = 5;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iTabDb);
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex, i=0; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext, i++){
const char *azOrigin[] = { "c", "u", "pk" };
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "isisi",
i,
pIdx->zName,
IsUniqueIndex(pIdx),
azOrigin[pIdx->idxType],
pIdx->pPartIdxWhere!=0);
}
}
}
break;
case PragTyp_DATABASE_LIST: {
int i;
pParse->nMem = 3;
for(i=0; i<db->nDb; i++){
if( db->aDb[i].pBt==0 ) continue;
assert( db->aDb[i].zDbSName!=0 );
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "iss",
i,
db->aDb[i].zDbSName,
sqlite3BtreeGetFilename(db->aDb[i].pBt));
}
}
break;
case PragTyp_COLLATION_LIST: {
int i = 0;
HashElem *p;
pParse->nMem = 2;
for(p=sqliteHashFirst(&db->aCollSeq); p; p=sqliteHashNext(p)){
CollSeq *pColl = (CollSeq *)sqliteHashData(p);
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "is", i++, pColl->zName);
}
}
break;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_INTROSPECTION_PRAGMAS
case PragTyp_FUNCTION_LIST: {
int i;
HashElem *j;
FuncDef *p;
pParse->nMem = 2;
for(i=0; i<SQLITE_FUNC_HASH_SZ; i++){
for(p=sqlite3BuiltinFunctions.a[i]; p; p=p->u.pHash ){
if( p->funcFlags & SQLITE_FUNC_INTERNAL ) continue;
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "si", p->zName, 1);
}
}
for(j=sqliteHashFirst(&db->aFunc); j; j=sqliteHashNext(j)){
p = (FuncDef*)sqliteHashData(j);
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "si", p->zName, 0);
}
}
break;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_VIRTUALTABLE
case PragTyp_MODULE_LIST: {
HashElem *j;
pParse->nMem = 1;
for(j=sqliteHashFirst(&db->aModule); j; j=sqliteHashNext(j)){
Module *pMod = (Module*)sqliteHashData(j);
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "s", pMod->zName);
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_VIRTUALTABLE */
case PragTyp_PRAGMA_LIST: {
int i;
for(i=0; i<ArraySize(aPragmaName); i++){
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "s", aPragmaName[i].zName);
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_INTROSPECTION_PRAGMAS */
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_SCHEMA_PRAGMAS */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_FOREIGN_KEY
case PragTyp_FOREIGN_KEY_LIST: if( zRight ){
FKey *pFK;
Table *pTab;
pTab = sqlite3FindTable(db, zRight, zDb);
if( pTab ){
pFK = pTab->pFKey;
if( pFK ){
int iTabDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
int i = 0;
pParse->nMem = 8;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iTabDb);
while(pFK){
int j;
for(j=0; j<pFK->nCol; j++){
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "iissssss",
i,
j,
pFK->zTo,
pTab->aCol[pFK->aCol[j].iFrom].zName,
pFK->aCol[j].zCol,
actionName(pFK->aAction[1]), /* ON UPDATE */
actionName(pFK->aAction[0]), /* ON DELETE */
"NONE");
}
++i;
pFK = pFK->pNextFrom;
}
}
}
}
break;
#endif /* !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_FOREIGN_KEY) */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_FOREIGN_KEY
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER
case PragTyp_FOREIGN_KEY_CHECK: {
FKey *pFK; /* A foreign key constraint */
Table *pTab; /* Child table contain "REFERENCES" keyword */
Table *pParent; /* Parent table that child points to */
Index *pIdx; /* Index in the parent table */
int i; /* Loop counter: Foreign key number for pTab */
int j; /* Loop counter: Field of the foreign key */
HashElem *k; /* Loop counter: Next table in schema */
int x; /* result variable */
int regResult; /* 3 registers to hold a result row */
int regKey; /* Register to hold key for checking the FK */
int regRow; /* Registers to hold a row from pTab */
int addrTop; /* Top of a loop checking foreign keys */
int addrOk; /* Jump here if the key is OK */
int *aiCols; /* child to parent column mapping */
regResult = pParse->nMem+1;
pParse->nMem += 4;
regKey = ++pParse->nMem;
regRow = ++pParse->nMem;
k = sqliteHashFirst(&db->aDb[iDb].pSchema->tblHash);
while( k ){
int iTabDb;
if( zRight ){
pTab = sqlite3LocateTable(pParse, 0, zRight, zDb);
k = 0;
}else{
pTab = (Table*)sqliteHashData(k);
k = sqliteHashNext(k);
}
if( pTab==0 || pTab->pFKey==0 ) continue;
iTabDb = sqlite3SchemaToIndex(db, pTab->pSchema);
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iTabDb);
sqlite3TableLock(pParse, iTabDb, pTab->tnum, 0, pTab->zName);
if( pTab->nCol+regRow>pParse->nMem ) pParse->nMem = pTab->nCol + regRow;
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, 0, iTabDb, pTab, OP_OpenRead);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, regResult, pTab->zName);
for(i=1, pFK=pTab->pFKey; pFK; i++, pFK=pFK->pNextFrom){
pParent = sqlite3FindTable(db, pFK->zTo, zDb);
if( pParent==0 ) continue;
pIdx = 0;
sqlite3TableLock(pParse, iTabDb, pParent->tnum, 0, pParent->zName);
x = sqlite3FkLocateIndex(pParse, pParent, pFK, &pIdx, 0);
if( x==0 ){
if( pIdx==0 ){
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, i, iTabDb, pParent, OP_OpenRead);
}else{
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_OpenRead, i, pIdx->tnum, iTabDb);
sqlite3VdbeSetP4KeyInfo(pParse, pIdx);
}
}else{
k = 0;
break;
}
}
assert( pParse->nErr>0 || pFK==0 );
if( pFK ) break;
if( pParse->nTab<i ) pParse->nTab = i;
addrTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_Rewind, 0); VdbeCoverage(v);
for(i=1, pFK=pTab->pFKey; pFK; i++, pFK=pFK->pNextFrom){
pParent = sqlite3FindTable(db, pFK->zTo, zDb);
pIdx = 0;
aiCols = 0;
if( pParent ){
x = sqlite3FkLocateIndex(pParse, pParent, pFK, &pIdx, &aiCols);
assert( x==0 );
}
addrOk = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
/* Generate code to read the child key values into registers
** regRow..regRow+n. If any of the child key values are NULL, this
** row cannot cause an FK violation. Jump directly to addrOk in
** this case. */
for(j=0; j<pFK->nCol; j++){
int iCol = aiCols ? aiCols[j] : pFK->aCol[j].iFrom;
sqlite3ExprCodeGetColumnOfTable(v, pTab, 0, iCol, regRow+j);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IsNull, regRow+j, addrOk); VdbeCoverage(v);
}
/* Generate code to query the parent index for a matching parent
** key. If a match is found, jump to addrOk. */
if( pIdx ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_MakeRecord, regRow, pFK->nCol, regKey,
sqlite3IndexAffinityStr(db,pIdx), pFK->nCol);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, OP_Found, i, addrOk, regKey, 0);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}else if( pParent ){
int jmp = sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v)+2;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_SeekRowid, i, jmp, regRow); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, addrOk);
assert( pFK->nCol==1 );
}
/* Generate code to report an FK violation to the caller. */
if( HasRowid(pTab) ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Rowid, 0, regResult+1);
}else{
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Null, 0, regResult+1);
}
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, regResult+2, "siX", pFK->zTo, i-1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, regResult, 4);
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, addrOk);
sqlite3DbFree(db, aiCols);
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Next, 0, addrTop+1); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addrTop);
}
}
break;
#endif /* !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_TRIGGER) */
#endif /* !defined(SQLITE_OMIT_FOREIGN_KEY) */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_CASE_SENSITIVE_LIKE_PRAGMA
/* Reinstall the LIKE and GLOB functions. The variant of LIKE
** used will be case sensitive or not depending on the RHS.
*/
case PragTyp_CASE_SENSITIVE_LIKE: {
if( zRight ){
sqlite3RegisterLikeFunctions(db, sqlite3GetBoolean(zRight, 0));
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_CASE_SENSITIVE_LIKE_PRAGMA */
#ifndef SQLITE_INTEGRITY_CHECK_ERROR_MAX
# define SQLITE_INTEGRITY_CHECK_ERROR_MAX 100
#endif
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_INTEGRITY_CHECK
/* PRAGMA integrity_check
** PRAGMA integrity_check(N)
** PRAGMA quick_check
** PRAGMA quick_check(N)
**
** Verify the integrity of the database.
**
** The "quick_check" is reduced version of
** integrity_check designed to detect most database corruption
** without the overhead of cross-checking indexes. Quick_check
** is linear time wherease integrity_check is O(NlogN).
*/
case PragTyp_INTEGRITY_CHECK: {
int i, j, addr, mxErr;
int isQuick = (sqlite3Tolower(zLeft[0])=='q');
/* If the PRAGMA command was of the form "PRAGMA <db>.integrity_check",
** then iDb is set to the index of the database identified by <db>.
** In this case, the integrity of database iDb only is verified by
** the VDBE created below.
**
** Otherwise, if the command was simply "PRAGMA integrity_check" (or
** "PRAGMA quick_check"), then iDb is set to 0. In this case, set iDb
** to -1 here, to indicate that the VDBE should verify the integrity
** of all attached databases. */
assert( iDb>=0 );
assert( iDb==0 || pId2->z );
if( pId2->z==0 ) iDb = -1;
/* Initialize the VDBE program */
pParse->nMem = 6;
/* Set the maximum error count */
mxErr = SQLITE_INTEGRITY_CHECK_ERROR_MAX;
if( zRight ){
sqlite3GetInt32(zRight, &mxErr);
if( mxErr<=0 ){
mxErr = SQLITE_INTEGRITY_CHECK_ERROR_MAX;
}
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, mxErr-1, 1); /* reg[1] holds errors left */
/* Do an integrity check on each database file */
for(i=0; i<db->nDb; i++){
HashElem *x; /* For looping over tables in the schema */
Hash *pTbls; /* Set of all tables in the schema */
int *aRoot; /* Array of root page numbers of all btrees */
int cnt = 0; /* Number of entries in aRoot[] */
int mxIdx = 0; /* Maximum number of indexes for any table */
if( OMIT_TEMPDB && i==1 ) continue;
if( iDb>=0 && i!=iDb ) continue;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, i);
/* Do an integrity check of the B-Tree
**
** Begin by finding the root pages numbers
** for all tables and indices in the database.
*/
assert( sqlite3SchemaMutexHeld(db, i, 0) );
pTbls = &db->aDb[i].pSchema->tblHash;
for(cnt=0, x=sqliteHashFirst(pTbls); x; x=sqliteHashNext(x)){
Table *pTab = sqliteHashData(x); /* Current table */
Index *pIdx; /* An index on pTab */
int nIdx; /* Number of indexes on pTab */
if( HasRowid(pTab) ) cnt++;
for(nIdx=0, pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext, nIdx++){ cnt++; }
if( nIdx>mxIdx ) mxIdx = nIdx;
}
aRoot = sqlite3DbMallocRawNN(db, sizeof(int)*(cnt+1));
if( aRoot==0 ) break;
for(cnt=0, x=sqliteHashFirst(pTbls); x; x=sqliteHashNext(x)){
Table *pTab = sqliteHashData(x);
Index *pIdx;
if( HasRowid(pTab) ) aRoot[++cnt] = pTab->tnum;
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
aRoot[++cnt] = pIdx->tnum;
}
}
aRoot[0] = cnt;
/* Make sure sufficient number of registers have been allocated */
pParse->nMem = MAX( pParse->nMem, 8+mxIdx );
sqlite3ClearTempRegCache(pParse);
/* Do the b-tree integrity checks */
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_IntegrityCk, 2, cnt, 1, (char*)aRoot,P4_INTARRAY);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, (u8)i);
addr = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_IsNull, 2); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_String8, 0, 3, 0,
sqlite3MPrintf(db, "*** in database %s ***\n", db->aDb[i].zDbSName),
P4_DYNAMIC);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Concat, 2, 3, 3);
integrityCheckResultRow(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addr);
/* Make sure all the indices are constructed correctly.
*/
for(x=sqliteHashFirst(pTbls); x; x=sqliteHashNext(x)){
Table *pTab = sqliteHashData(x);
Index *pIdx, *pPk;
Index *pPrior = 0;
int loopTop;
int iDataCur, iIdxCur;
int r1 = -1;
if( pTab->tnum<1 ) continue; /* Skip VIEWs or VIRTUAL TABLEs */
pPk = HasRowid(pTab) ? 0 : sqlite3PrimaryKeyIndex(pTab);
sqlite3OpenTableAndIndices(pParse, pTab, OP_OpenRead, 0,
1, 0, &iDataCur, &iIdxCur);
/* reg[7] counts the number of entries in the table.
** reg[8+i] counts the number of entries in the i-th index
*/
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, 0, 7);
for(j=0, pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext, j++){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, 0, 8+j); /* index entries counter */
}
assert( pParse->nMem>=8+j );
assert( sqlite3NoTempsInRange(pParse,1,7+j) );
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Rewind, iDataCur, 0); VdbeCoverage(v);
loopTop = sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_AddImm, 7, 1);
if( !isQuick ){
/* Sanity check on record header decoding */
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Column, iDataCur, pTab->nNVCol-1,3);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_TYPEOFARG);
}
/* Verify that all NOT NULL columns really are NOT NULL */
for(j=0; j<pTab->nCol; j++){
char *zErr;
int jmp2;
if( j==pTab->iPKey ) continue;
if( pTab->aCol[j].notNull==0 ) continue;
sqlite3ExprCodeGetColumnOfTable(v, pTab, iDataCur, j, 3);
if( sqlite3VdbeGetOp(v,-1)->opcode==OP_Column ){
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, OPFLAG_TYPEOFARG);
}
jmp2 = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_NotNull, 3); VdbeCoverage(v);
zErr = sqlite3MPrintf(db, "NULL value in %s.%s", pTab->zName,
pTab->aCol[j].zName);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_String8, 0, 3, 0, zErr, P4_DYNAMIC);
integrityCheckResultRow(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jmp2);
}
/* Verify CHECK constraints */
if( pTab->pCheck && (db->flags & SQLITE_IgnoreChecks)==0 ){
ExprList *pCheck = sqlite3ExprListDup(db, pTab->pCheck, 0);
if( db->mallocFailed==0 ){
int addrCkFault = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
int addrCkOk = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
char *zErr;
int k;
pParse->iSelfTab = iDataCur + 1;
for(k=pCheck->nExpr-1; k>0; k--){
sqlite3ExprIfFalse(pParse, pCheck->a[k].pExpr, addrCkFault, 0);
}
sqlite3ExprIfTrue(pParse, pCheck->a[0].pExpr, addrCkOk,
SQLITE_JUMPIFNULL);
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, addrCkFault);
pParse->iSelfTab = 0;
zErr = sqlite3MPrintf(db, "CHECK constraint failed in %s",
pTab->zName);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_String8, 0, 3, 0, zErr, P4_DYNAMIC);
integrityCheckResultRow(v);
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, addrCkOk);
}
sqlite3ExprListDelete(db, pCheck);
}
if( !isQuick ){ /* Omit the remaining tests for quick_check */
/* Validate index entries for the current row */
for(j=0, pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext, j++){
int jmp2, jmp3, jmp4, jmp5;
int ckUniq = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
if( pPk==pIdx ) continue;
r1 = sqlite3GenerateIndexKey(pParse, pIdx, iDataCur, 0, 0, &jmp3,
pPrior, r1);
pPrior = pIdx;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_AddImm, 8+j, 1);/* increment entry count */
/* Verify that an index entry exists for the current table row */
jmp2 = sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, OP_Found, iIdxCur+j, ckUniq, r1,
pIdx->nColumn); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 3, "row ");
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Concat, 7, 3, 3);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 4, " missing from index ");
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Concat, 4, 3, 3);
jmp5 = sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 4, pIdx->zName);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Concat, 4, 3, 3);
jmp4 = integrityCheckResultRow(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jmp2);
/* For UNIQUE indexes, verify that only one entry exists with the
** current key. The entry is unique if (1) any column is NULL
** or (2) the next entry has a different key */
if( IsUniqueIndex(pIdx) ){
int uniqOk = sqlite3VdbeMakeLabel(pParse);
int jmp6;
int kk;
for(kk=0; kk<pIdx->nKeyCol; kk++){
int iCol = pIdx->aiColumn[kk];
assert( iCol!=XN_ROWID && iCol<pTab->nCol );
if( iCol>=0 && pTab->aCol[iCol].notNull ) continue;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IsNull, r1+kk, uniqOk);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
jmp6 = sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_Next, iIdxCur+j); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, uniqOk);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jmp6);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4Int(v, OP_IdxGT, iIdxCur+j, uniqOk, r1,
pIdx->nKeyCol); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 3, "non-unique entry in index ");
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, jmp5);
sqlite3VdbeResolveLabel(v, uniqOk);
}
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, jmp4);
sqlite3ResolvePartIdxLabel(pParse, jmp3);
}
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Next, iDataCur, loopTop); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, loopTop-1);
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_BTREECOUNT
if( !isQuick ){
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 2, "wrong # of entries in index ");
for(j=0, pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext, j++){
if( pPk==pIdx ) continue;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Count, iIdxCur+j, 3);
addr = sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Eq, 8+j, 0, 3); VdbeCoverage(v);
sqlite3VdbeChangeP5(v, SQLITE_NOTNULL);
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 4, pIdx->zName);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Concat, 4, 2, 3);
integrityCheckResultRow(v);
sqlite3VdbeJumpHere(v, addr);
}
}
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_BTREECOUNT */
}
}
{
static const int iLn = VDBE_OFFSET_LINENO(2);
static const VdbeOpList endCode[] = {
{ OP_AddImm, 1, 0, 0}, /* 0 */
{ OP_IfNotZero, 1, 4, 0}, /* 1 */
{ OP_String8, 0, 3, 0}, /* 2 */
{ OP_ResultRow, 3, 1, 0}, /* 3 */
{ OP_Halt, 0, 0, 0}, /* 4 */
{ OP_String8, 0, 3, 0}, /* 5 */
{ OP_Goto, 0, 3, 0}, /* 6 */
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(endCode), endCode, iLn);
if( aOp ){
aOp[0].p2 = 1-mxErr;
aOp[2].p4type = P4_STATIC;
aOp[2].p4.z = "ok";
aOp[5].p4type = P4_STATIC;
aOp[5].p4.z = (char*)sqlite3ErrStr(SQLITE_CORRUPT);
}
sqlite3VdbeChangeP3(v, 0, sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v)-2);
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_INTEGRITY_CHECK */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_UTF16
/*
** PRAGMA encoding
** PRAGMA encoding = "utf-8"|"utf-16"|"utf-16le"|"utf-16be"
**
** In its first form, this pragma returns the encoding of the main
** database. If the database is not initialized, it is initialized now.
**
** The second form of this pragma is a no-op if the main database file
** has not already been initialized. In this case it sets the default
** encoding that will be used for the main database file if a new file
** is created. If an existing main database file is opened, then the
** default text encoding for the existing database is used.
**
** In all cases new databases created using the ATTACH command are
** created to use the same default text encoding as the main database. If
** the main database has not been initialized and/or created when ATTACH
** is executed, this is done before the ATTACH operation.
**
** In the second form this pragma sets the text encoding to be used in
** new database files created using this database handle. It is only
** useful if invoked immediately after the main database i
*/
case PragTyp_ENCODING: {
static const struct EncName {
char *zName;
u8 enc;
} encnames[] = {
{ "UTF8", SQLITE_UTF8 },
{ "UTF-8", SQLITE_UTF8 }, /* Must be element [1] */
{ "UTF-16le", SQLITE_UTF16LE }, /* Must be element [2] */
{ "UTF-16be", SQLITE_UTF16BE }, /* Must be element [3] */
{ "UTF16le", SQLITE_UTF16LE },
{ "UTF16be", SQLITE_UTF16BE },
{ "UTF-16", 0 }, /* SQLITE_UTF16NATIVE */
{ "UTF16", 0 }, /* SQLITE_UTF16NATIVE */
{ 0, 0 }
};
const struct EncName *pEnc;
if( !zRight ){ /* "PRAGMA encoding" */
if( sqlite3ReadSchema(pParse) ) goto pragma_out;
assert( encnames[SQLITE_UTF8].enc==SQLITE_UTF8 );
assert( encnames[SQLITE_UTF16LE].enc==SQLITE_UTF16LE );
assert( encnames[SQLITE_UTF16BE].enc==SQLITE_UTF16BE );
returnSingleText(v, encnames[ENC(pParse->db)].zName);
}else{ /* "PRAGMA encoding = XXX" */
/* Only change the value of sqlite.enc if the database handle is not
** initialized. If the main database exists, the new sqlite.enc value
** will be overwritten when the schema is next loaded. If it does not
** already exists, it will be created to use the new encoding value.
*/
if(
!(DbHasProperty(db, 0, DB_SchemaLoaded)) ||
DbHasProperty(db, 0, DB_Empty)
){
for(pEnc=&encnames[0]; pEnc->zName; pEnc++){
if( 0==sqlite3StrICmp(zRight, pEnc->zName) ){
SCHEMA_ENC(db) = ENC(db) =
pEnc->enc ? pEnc->enc : SQLITE_UTF16NATIVE;
break;
}
}
if( !pEnc->zName ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "unsupported encoding: %s", zRight);
}
}
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_UTF16 */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_SCHEMA_VERSION_PRAGMAS
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]schema_version
** PRAGMA [schema.]schema_version = <integer>
**
** PRAGMA [schema.]user_version
** PRAGMA [schema.]user_version = <integer>
**
** PRAGMA [schema.]freelist_count
**
** PRAGMA [schema.]data_version
**
** PRAGMA [schema.]application_id
** PRAGMA [schema.]application_id = <integer>
**
** The pragma's schema_version and user_version are used to set or get
** the value of the schema-version and user-version, respectively. Both
** the schema-version and the user-version are 32-bit signed integers
** stored in the database header.
**
** The schema-cookie is usually only manipulated internally by SQLite. It
** is incremented by SQLite whenever the database schema is modified (by
** creating or dropping a table or index). The schema version is used by
** SQLite each time a query is executed to ensure that the internal cache
** of the schema used when compiling the SQL query matches the schema of
** the database against which the compiled query is actually executed.
** Subverting this mechanism by using "PRAGMA schema_version" to modify
** the schema-version is potentially dangerous and may lead to program
** crashes or database corruption. Use with caution!
**
** The user-version is not used internally by SQLite. It may be used by
** applications for any purpose.
*/
case PragTyp_HEADER_VALUE: {
int iCookie = pPragma->iArg; /* Which cookie to read or write */
sqlite3VdbeUsesBtree(v, iDb);
if( zRight && (pPragma->mPragFlg & PragFlg_ReadOnly)==0 ){
/* Write the specified cookie value */
static const VdbeOpList setCookie[] = {
{ OP_Transaction, 0, 1, 0}, /* 0 */
{ OP_SetCookie, 0, 0, 0}, /* 1 */
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoMallocRequired(v, ArraySize(setCookie));
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(setCookie), setCookie, 0);
if( ONLY_IF_REALLOC_STRESS(aOp==0) ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p2 = iCookie;
aOp[1].p3 = sqlite3Atoi(zRight);
}else{
/* Read the specified cookie value */
static const VdbeOpList readCookie[] = {
{ OP_Transaction, 0, 0, 0}, /* 0 */
{ OP_ReadCookie, 0, 1, 0}, /* 1 */
{ OP_ResultRow, 1, 1, 0}
};
VdbeOp *aOp;
sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoMallocRequired(v, ArraySize(readCookie));
aOp = sqlite3VdbeAddOpList(v, ArraySize(readCookie),readCookie,0);
if( ONLY_IF_REALLOC_STRESS(aOp==0) ) break;
aOp[0].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p1 = iDb;
aOp[1].p3 = iCookie;
sqlite3VdbeReusable(v);
}
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_SCHEMA_VERSION_PRAGMAS */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_COMPILEOPTION_DIAGS
/*
** PRAGMA compile_options
**
** Return the names of all compile-time options used in this build,
** one option per row.
*/
case PragTyp_COMPILE_OPTIONS: {
int i = 0;
const char *zOpt;
pParse->nMem = 1;
while( (zOpt = sqlite3_compileoption_get(i++))!=0 ){
sqlite3VdbeLoadString(v, 1, zOpt);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, 1, 1);
}
sqlite3VdbeReusable(v);
}
break;
#endif /* SQLITE_OMIT_COMPILEOPTION_DIAGS */
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_WAL
/*
** PRAGMA [schema.]wal_checkpoint = passive|full|restart|truncate
**
** Checkpoint the database.
*/
case PragTyp_WAL_CHECKPOINT: {
int iBt = (pId2->z?iDb:SQLITE_MAX_ATTACHED);
int eMode = SQLITE_CHECKPOINT_PASSIVE;
if( zRight ){
if( sqlite3StrICmp(zRight, "full")==0 ){
eMode = SQLITE_CHECKPOINT_FULL;
}else if( sqlite3StrICmp(zRight, "restart")==0 ){
eMode = SQLITE_CHECKPOINT_RESTART;
}else if( sqlite3StrICmp(zRight, "truncate")==0 ){
eMode = SQLITE_CHECKPOINT_TRUNCATE;
}
}
pParse->nMem = 3;
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_Checkpoint, iBt, eMode, 1);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, 1, 3);
}
break;
/*
** PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint
** PRAGMA wal_autocheckpoint = N
**
** Configure a database connection to automatically checkpoint a database
** after accumulating N frames in the log. Or query for the current value
** of N.
*/
case PragTyp_WAL_AUTOCHECKPOINT: {
if( zRight ){
sqlite3_wal_autocheckpoint(db, sqlite3Atoi(zRight));
}
returnSingleInt(v,
db->xWalCallback==sqlite3WalDefaultHook ?
SQLITE_PTR_TO_INT(db->pWalArg) : 0);
}
break;
#endif
/*
** PRAGMA shrink_memory
**
** IMPLEMENTATION-OF: R-23445-46109 This pragma causes the database
** connection on which it is invoked to free up as much memory as it
** can, by calling sqlite3_db_release_memory().
*/
case PragTyp_SHRINK_MEMORY: {
sqlite3_db_release_memory(db);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA optimize
** PRAGMA optimize(MASK)
** PRAGMA schema.optimize
** PRAGMA schema.optimize(MASK)
**
** Attempt to optimize the database. All schemas are optimized in the first
** two forms, and only the specified schema is optimized in the latter two.
**
** The details of optimizations performed by this pragma are expected
** to change and improve over time. Applications should anticipate that
** this pragma will perform new optimizations in future releases.
**
** The optional argument is a bitmask of optimizations to perform:
**
** 0x0001 Debugging mode. Do not actually perform any optimizations
** but instead return one line of text for each optimization
** that would have been done. Off by default.
**
** 0x0002 Run ANALYZE on tables that might benefit. On by default.
** See below for additional information.
**
** 0x0004 (Not yet implemented) Record usage and performance
** information from the current session in the
** database file so that it will be available to "optimize"
** pragmas run by future database connections.
**
** 0x0008 (Not yet implemented) Create indexes that might have
** been helpful to recent queries
**
** The default MASK is and always shall be 0xfffe. 0xfffe means perform all
** of the optimizations listed above except Debug Mode, including new
** optimizations that have not yet been invented. If new optimizations are
** ever added that should be off by default, those off-by-default
** optimizations will have bitmasks of 0x10000 or larger.
**
** DETERMINATION OF WHEN TO RUN ANALYZE
**
** In the current implementation, a table is analyzed if only if all of
** the following are true:
**
** (1) MASK bit 0x02 is set.
**
** (2) The query planner used sqlite_stat1-style statistics for one or
** more indexes of the table at some point during the lifetime of
** the current connection.
**
** (3) One or more indexes of the table are currently unanalyzed OR
** the number of rows in the table has increased by 25 times or more
** since the last time ANALYZE was run.
**
** The rules for when tables are analyzed are likely to change in
** future releases.
*/
case PragTyp_OPTIMIZE: {
int iDbLast; /* Loop termination point for the schema loop */
int iTabCur; /* Cursor for a table whose size needs checking */
HashElem *k; /* Loop over tables of a schema */
Schema *pSchema; /* The current schema */
Table *pTab; /* A table in the schema */
Index *pIdx; /* An index of the table */
LogEst szThreshold; /* Size threshold above which reanalysis is needd */
char *zSubSql; /* SQL statement for the OP_SqlExec opcode */
u32 opMask; /* Mask of operations to perform */
if( zRight ){
opMask = (u32)sqlite3Atoi(zRight);
if( (opMask & 0x02)==0 ) break;
}else{
opMask = 0xfffe;
}
iTabCur = pParse->nTab++;
for(iDbLast = zDb?iDb:db->nDb-1; iDb<=iDbLast; iDb++){
if( iDb==1 ) continue;
sqlite3CodeVerifySchema(pParse, iDb);
pSchema = db->aDb[iDb].pSchema;
for(k=sqliteHashFirst(&pSchema->tblHash); k; k=sqliteHashNext(k)){
pTab = (Table*)sqliteHashData(k);
/* If table pTab has not been used in a way that would benefit from
** having analysis statistics during the current session, then skip it.
** This also has the effect of skipping virtual tables and views */
if( (pTab->tabFlags & TF_StatsUsed)==0 ) continue;
/* Reanalyze if the table is 25 times larger than the last analysis */
szThreshold = pTab->nRowLogEst + 46; assert( sqlite3LogEst(25)==46 );
for(pIdx=pTab->pIndex; pIdx; pIdx=pIdx->pNext){
if( !pIdx->hasStat1 ){
szThreshold = 0; /* Always analyze if any index lacks statistics */
break;
}
}
if( szThreshold ){
sqlite3OpenTable(pParse, iTabCur, iDb, pTab, OP_OpenRead);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_IfSmaller, iTabCur,
sqlite3VdbeCurrentAddr(v)+2+(opMask&1), szThreshold);
VdbeCoverage(v);
}
zSubSql = sqlite3MPrintf(db, "ANALYZE \"%w\".\"%w\"",
db->aDb[iDb].zDbSName, pTab->zName);
if( opMask & 0x01 ){
int r1 = sqlite3GetTempReg(pParse);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_String8, 0, r1, 0, zSubSql, P4_DYNAMIC);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_ResultRow, r1, 1);
}else{
sqlite3VdbeAddOp4(v, OP_SqlExec, 0, 0, 0, zSubSql, P4_DYNAMIC);
}
}
}
sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(v, OP_Expire);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA busy_timeout
** PRAGMA busy_timeout = N
**
** Call sqlite3_busy_timeout(db, N). Return the current timeout value
** if one is set. If no busy handler or a different busy handler is set
** then 0 is returned. Setting the busy_timeout to 0 or negative
** disables the timeout.
*/
/*case PragTyp_BUSY_TIMEOUT*/ default: {
assert( pPragma->ePragTyp==PragTyp_BUSY_TIMEOUT );
if( zRight ){
sqlite3_busy_timeout(db, sqlite3Atoi(zRight));
}
returnSingleInt(v, db->busyTimeout);
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA soft_heap_limit
** PRAGMA soft_heap_limit = N
**
** IMPLEMENTATION-OF: R-26343-45930 This pragma invokes the
** sqlite3_soft_heap_limit64() interface with the argument N, if N is
** specified and is a non-negative integer.
** IMPLEMENTATION-OF: R-64451-07163 The soft_heap_limit pragma always
** returns the same integer that would be returned by the
** sqlite3_soft_heap_limit64(-1) C-language function.
*/
case PragTyp_SOFT_HEAP_LIMIT: {
sqlite3_int64 N;
if( zRight && sqlite3DecOrHexToI64(zRight, &N)==SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3_soft_heap_limit64(N);
}
returnSingleInt(v, sqlite3_soft_heap_limit64(-1));
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA hard_heap_limit
** PRAGMA hard_heap_limit = N
**
** Invoke sqlite3_hard_heap_limit64() to query or set the hard heap
** limit. The hard heap limit can be activated or lowered by this
** pragma, but not raised or deactivated. Only the
** sqlite3_hard_heap_limit64() C-language API can raise or deactivate
** the hard heap limit. This allows an application to set a heap limit
** constraint that cannot be relaxed by an untrusted SQL script.
*/
case PragTyp_HARD_HEAP_LIMIT: {
sqlite3_int64 N;
if( zRight && sqlite3DecOrHexToI64(zRight, &N)==SQLITE_OK ){
sqlite3_int64 iPrior = sqlite3_hard_heap_limit64(-1);
if( N>0 && (iPrior==0 || iPrior>N) ) sqlite3_hard_heap_limit64(N);
}
returnSingleInt(v, sqlite3_hard_heap_limit64(-1));
break;
}
/*
** PRAGMA threads
** PRAGMA threads = N
**
** Configure the maximum number of worker threads. Return the new
** maximum, which might be less than requested.
*/
case PragTyp_THREADS: {
sqlite3_int64 N;
if( zRight
&& sqlite3DecOrHexToI64(zRight, &N)==SQLITE_OK
&& N>=0
){
sqlite3_limit(db, SQLITE_LIMIT_WORKER_THREADS, (int)(N&0x7fffffff));
}
returnSingleInt(v, sqlite3_limit(db, SQLITE_LIMIT_WORKER_THREADS, -1));
break;
}
#if defined(SQLITE_DEBUG) || defined(SQLITE_TEST)
/*
** Report the current state of file logs for all databases
*/
case PragTyp_LOCK_STATUS: {
static const char *const azLockName[] = {
"unlocked", "shared", "reserved", "pending", "exclusive"
};
int i;
pParse->nMem = 2;
for(i=0; i<db->nDb; i++){
Btree *pBt;
const char *zState = "unknown";
int j;
if( db->aDb[i].zDbSName==0 ) continue;
pBt = db->aDb[i].pBt;
if( pBt==0 || sqlite3BtreePager(pBt)==0 ){
zState = "closed";
}else if( sqlite3_file_control(db, i ? db->aDb[i].zDbSName : 0,
SQLITE_FCNTL_LOCKSTATE, &j)==SQLITE_OK ){
zState = azLockName[j];
}
sqlite3VdbeMultiLoad(v, 1, "ss", db->aDb[i].zDbSName, zState);
}
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef SQLITE_HAS_CODEC
/* Pragma iArg
** ---------- ------
** key 0
** rekey 1
** hexkey 2
** hexrekey 3
** textkey 4
** textrekey 5
*/
case PragTyp_KEY: {
if( zRight ){
char zBuf[40];
const char *zKey = zRight;
int n;
if( pPragma->iArg==2 || pPragma->iArg==3 ){
u8 iByte;
int i;
for(i=0, iByte=0; i<sizeof(zBuf)*2 && sqlite3Isxdigit(zRight[i]); i++){
iByte = (iByte<<4) + sqlite3HexToInt(zRight[i]);
if( (i&1)!=0 ) zBuf[i/2] = iByte;
}
zKey = zBuf;
n = i/2;
}else{
n = pPragma->iArg<4 ? sqlite3Strlen30(zRight) : -1;
}
if( (pPragma->iArg & 1)==0 ){
rc = sqlite3_key_v2(db, zDb, zKey, n);
}else{
rc = sqlite3_rekey_v2(db, zDb, zKey, n);
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && n!=0 ){
sqlite3VdbeSetNumCols(v, 1);
sqlite3VdbeSetColName(v, 0, COLNAME_NAME, "ok", SQLITE_STATIC);
returnSingleText(v, "ok");
}
}
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(SQLITE_HAS_CODEC) || defined(SQLITE_ENABLE_CEROD)
case PragTyp_ACTIVATE_EXTENSIONS: if( zRight ){
#ifdef SQLITE_HAS_CODEC
if( sqlite3StrNICmp(zRight, "see-", 4)==0 ){
sqlite3_activate_see(&zRight[4]);
}
#endif
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_CEROD
if( sqlite3StrNICmp(zRight, "cerod-", 6)==0 ){
sqlite3_activate_cerod(&zRight[6]);
}
#endif
}
break;
#endif
} /* End of the PRAGMA switch */
/* The following block is a no-op unless SQLITE_DEBUG is defined. Its only
** purpose is to execute assert() statements to verify that if the
** PragFlg_NoColumns1 flag is set and the caller specified an argument
** to the PRAGMA, the implementation has not added any OP_ResultRow
** instructions to the VM. */
if( (pPragma->mPragFlg & PragFlg_NoColumns1) && zRight ){
sqlite3VdbeVerifyNoResultRow(v);
}
pragma_out:
sqlite3DbFree(db, zLeft);
sqlite3DbFree(db, zRight);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-754"
] |
sqlite
|
ebd70eedd5d6e6a890a670b5ee874a5eae86b4dd
| 150,257,316,541,417,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1,905 |
Fix the NOT NULL verification logic in PRAGMA integrity_check so that it
works for generated columns whose value is the result of a comparison operator.
Ticket [bd8c280671ba44a7]
FossilOrigin-Name: f3b39c71b88cb6721f443de56cdce4c08252453a5e340b00a2bd88dc10c42400
|
TEST_F(QuotedString_ExtractFrom_Tests, EmptyDoubleQuotedString) {
whenInputIs("\"\"");
resultMustBe("");
trailingMustBe("");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415",
"CWE-119"
] |
ArduinoJson
|
5e7b9ec688d79e7b16ec7064e1d37e8481a31e72
| 207,936,348,729,426,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix buffer overflow (pull request #81)
|
static int copy_from_read_buf(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned char __user **b,
size_t *nr)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
int retval;
size_t n;
bool is_eof;
size_t head = smp_load_acquire(&ldata->commit_head);
size_t tail = ldata->read_tail & (N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - 1);
retval = 0;
n = min(head - ldata->read_tail, N_TTY_BUF_SIZE - tail);
n = min(*nr, n);
if (n) {
const unsigned char *from = read_buf_addr(ldata, tail);
retval = copy_to_user(*b, from, n);
n -= retval;
is_eof = n == 1 && *from == EOF_CHAR(tty);
tty_audit_add_data(tty, from, n);
smp_store_release(&ldata->read_tail, ldata->read_tail + n);
/* Turn single EOF into zero-length read */
if (L_EXTPROC(tty) && ldata->icanon && is_eof &&
(head == ldata->read_tail))
n = 0;
*b += n;
*nr -= n;
}
return retval;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-704"
] |
linux
|
966031f340185eddd05affcf72b740549f056348
| 299,378,636,736,764,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
unsigned BytecodeModuleGenerator::getIdentifierID(StringRef str) const {
return stringTable_.getIdentifierID(str);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
hermes
|
091835377369c8fd5917d9b87acffa721ad2a168
| 264,870,671,075,883,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Correctly restore whether or not a function is an inner generator
Summary:
If a generator was large enough to be lazily compiled, we would lose
that information when reconstituting the function's context. This meant
the function was generated as a regular function instead of a generator.
#utd-hermes-ignore-android
Reviewed By: tmikov
Differential Revision: D23580247
fbshipit-source-id: af5628bf322cbdc7c7cdfbb5f8d0756328518ea1
|
sequenceIsOwned(Oid seqId, char deptype, Oid *tableId, int32 *colId)
{
bool ret = false;
Relation depRel;
ScanKeyData key[2];
SysScanDesc scan;
HeapTuple tup;
depRel = table_open(DependRelationId, AccessShareLock);
ScanKeyInit(&key[0],
Anum_pg_depend_classid,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(RelationRelationId));
ScanKeyInit(&key[1],
Anum_pg_depend_objid,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(seqId));
scan = systable_beginscan(depRel, DependDependerIndexId, true,
NULL, 2, key);
while (HeapTupleIsValid((tup = systable_getnext(scan))))
{
Form_pg_depend depform = (Form_pg_depend) GETSTRUCT(tup);
if (depform->refclassid == RelationRelationId &&
depform->deptype == deptype)
{
*tableId = depform->refobjid;
*colId = depform->refobjsubid;
ret = true;
break; /* no need to keep scanning */
}
}
systable_endscan(scan);
table_close(depRel, AccessShareLock);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94"
] |
postgres
|
b9b21acc766db54d8c337d508d0fe2f5bf2daab0
| 92,297,799,477,061,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
In extensions, don't replace objects not belonging to the extension.
Previously, if an extension script did CREATE OR REPLACE and there was
an existing object not belonging to the extension, it would overwrite
the object and adopt it into the extension. This is problematic, first
because the overwrite is probably unintentional, and second because we
didn't change the object's ownership. Thus a hostile user could create
an object in advance of an expected CREATE EXTENSION command, and would
then have ownership rights on an extension object, which could be
modified for trojan-horse-type attacks.
Hence, forbid CREATE OR REPLACE of an existing object unless it already
belongs to the extension. (Note that we've always forbidden replacing
an object that belongs to some other extension; only the behavior for
previously-free-standing objects changes here.)
For the same reason, also fail CREATE IF NOT EXISTS when there is
an existing object that doesn't belong to the extension.
Our thanks to Sven Klemm for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2022-2625
|
static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
FFmpeg
|
a4e85b2e1c8d5b4bf0091157bbdeb0e457fb7b8f
| 151,855,178,391,715,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
avformat/mxfdec: Fix Sign error in mxf_read_primer_pack()
Fixes: 20170829B.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 9d00fb9d70ee8c0cc7002b89318c5be00f1bbdad)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFd(int fd, xmlCharEncoding enc) {
xmlParserInputBufferPtr ret;
if (fd < 0) return(NULL);
ret = xmlAllocParserInputBuffer(enc);
if (ret != NULL) {
ret->context = (void *) (long) fd;
ret->readcallback = xmlFdRead;
ret->closecallback = xmlFdClose;
}
return(ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 323,558,292,573,301,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
int sqlite3VdbeAddOp0(Vdbe *p, int op){
return sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(p, op, 0, 0, 0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-755"
] |
sqlite
|
8654186b0236d556aa85528c2573ee0b6ab71be3
| 2,639,822,107,341,082,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
When an error occurs while rewriting the parser tree for window functions
in the sqlite3WindowRewrite() routine, make sure that pParse->nErr is set,
and make sure that this shuts down any subsequent code generation that might
depend on the transformations that were implemented. This fixes a problem
discovered by the Yongheng and Rui fuzzer.
FossilOrigin-Name: e2bddcd4c55ba3cbe0130332679ff4b048630d0ced9a8899982edb5a3569ba7f
|
void input_set_abs_params(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int axis,
int min, int max, int fuzz, int flat)
{
struct input_absinfo *absinfo;
input_alloc_absinfo(dev);
if (!dev->absinfo)
return;
absinfo = &dev->absinfo[axis];
absinfo->minimum = min;
absinfo->maximum = max;
absinfo->fuzz = fuzz;
absinfo->flat = flat;
__set_bit(EV_ABS, dev->evbit);
__set_bit(axis, dev->absbit);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
cb222aed03d798fc074be55e59d9a112338ee784
| 53,362,303,417,859,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Input: add safety guards to input_set_keycode()
If we happen to have a garbage in input device's keycode table with values
too big we'll end up doing clear_bit() with offset way outside of our
bitmaps, damaging other objects within an input device or even outside of
it. Let's add sanity checks to the returned old keycodes.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191207212757.GA245964@dtor-ws
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
regcomp (preg, pattern, cflags)
regex_t *_Restrict_ preg;
const char *_Restrict_ pattern;
int cflags;
{
reg_errcode_t ret;
reg_syntax_t syntax = ((cflags & REG_EXTENDED) ? RE_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED
: RE_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC);
preg->buffer = NULL;
preg->allocated = 0;
preg->used = 0;
/* Try to allocate space for the fastmap. */
preg->fastmap = re_malloc (char, SBC_MAX);
if (BE (preg->fastmap == NULL, 0))
return REG_ESPACE;
syntax |= (cflags & REG_ICASE) ? RE_ICASE : 0;
/* If REG_NEWLINE is set, newlines are treated differently. */
if (cflags & REG_NEWLINE)
{ /* REG_NEWLINE implies neither . nor [^...] match newline. */
syntax &= ~RE_DOT_NEWLINE;
syntax |= RE_HAT_LISTS_NOT_NEWLINE;
/* It also changes the matching behavior. */
preg->newline_anchor = 1;
}
else
preg->newline_anchor = 0;
preg->no_sub = !!(cflags & REG_NOSUB);
preg->translate = NULL;
ret = re_compile_internal (preg, pattern, strlen (pattern), syntax);
/* POSIX doesn't distinguish between an unmatched open-group and an
unmatched close-group: both are REG_EPAREN. */
if (ret == REG_ERPAREN)
ret = REG_EPAREN;
/* We have already checked preg->fastmap != NULL. */
if (BE (ret == REG_NOERROR, 1))
/* Compute the fastmap now, since regexec cannot modify the pattern
buffer. This function never fails in this implementation. */
(void) re_compile_fastmap (preg);
else
{
/* Some error occurred while compiling the expression. */
re_free (preg->fastmap);
preg->fastmap = NULL;
}
return (int) ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-19"
] |
gnulib
|
5513b40999149090987a0341c018d05d3eea1272
| 336,244,779,230,974,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
Diagnose ERE '()|\1'
Problem reported by Hanno Böck in: http://bugs.gnu.org/21513
* lib/regcomp.c (parse_reg_exp): While parsing alternatives, keep
track of the set of previously-completed subexpressions available
before the first alternative, and restore this set just before
parsing each subsequent alternative. This lets us diagnose the
invalid back-reference in the ERE '()|\1'.
|
static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
int off, int size)
{
/* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
* can determine what type of data were returned. See
* check_stack_read().
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38
| 275,426,000,689,158,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
|
static int unix_mkname(struct sockaddr_un * sunaddr, int len, unsigned *hashp)
{
if (len <= sizeof(short) || len > sizeof(*sunaddr))
return -EINVAL;
if (!sunaddr || sunaddr->sun_family != AF_UNIX)
return -EINVAL;
if (sunaddr->sun_path[0]) {
/*
* This may look like an off by one error but it is a bit more
* subtle. 108 is the longest valid AF_UNIX path for a binding.
* sun_path[108] doesnt as such exist. However in kernel space
* we are guaranteed that it is a valid memory location in our
* kernel address buffer.
*/
((char *)sunaddr)[len]=0;
len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path)+1+sizeof(short);
return len;
}
*hashp = unix_hash_fold(csum_partial((char*)sunaddr, len, 0));
return len;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
6209344f5a3795d34b7f2c0061f49802283b6bdd
| 281,868,960,862,260,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
net: unix: fix inflight counting bug in garbage collector
Previously I assumed that the receive queues of candidates don't
change during the GC. This is only half true, nothing can be received
from the queues (see comment in unix_gc()), but buffers could be added
through the other half of the socket pair, which may still have file
descriptors referring to it.
This can result in inc_inflight_move_tail() erronously increasing the
"inflight" counter for a unix socket for which dec_inflight() wasn't
previously called. This in turn can trigger the "BUG_ON(total_refs <
inflight_refs)" in a later garbage collection run.
Fix this by only manipulating the "inflight" counter for sockets which
are candidates themselves. Duplicating the file references in
unix_attach_fds() is also needed to prevent a socket becoming a
candidate for GC while the skb that contains it is not yet queued.
Reported-by: Andrea Bittau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static const void *GetVirtualMetacontentFromCache(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
const void
*magick_restrict metacontent;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
metacontent=GetVirtualMetacontentFromNexus(cache_info,
cache_info->nexus_info[id]);
return(metacontent);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
ImageMagick
|
aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
| 307,421,358,266,924,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
NameValueParserStartElt(void * d, const char * name, int l)
{
struct NameValueParserData * data = (struct NameValueParserData *)d;
data->topelt = 1;
if(l>63)
l = 63;
memcpy(data->curelt, name, l);
data->curelt[l] = '\0';
data->cdata = NULL;
data->cdatalen = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
miniupnp
|
7aeb624b44f86d335841242ff427433190e7168a
| 276,067,605,382,209,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
properly initialize data structure for SOAP parsing in ParseNameValue()
topelt field was not properly initialized.
should fix #268
|
bool blk_get_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
if (likely(!blk_queue_dying(q))) {
__blk_get_queue(q);
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
54648cf1ec2d7f4b6a71767799c45676a138ca24
| 64,525,138,549,774,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
char* MACH0_(get_filetype)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
if (bin) {
return MACH0_(get_filetype_from_hdr) (&bin->hdr);
}
return strdup ("Unknown");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-415",
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
60208765887f5f008b3b9a883f3addc8bdb9c134
| 178,622,174,458,404,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
|
free_macro_sequence (void)
{
free_pattern_buffer (¯o_sequence_buf, ¯o_sequence_regs);
}
| 0 |
[] |
m4
|
5345bb49077bfda9fabd048e563f9e7077fe335d
| 118,102,376,482,329,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Minor security fix: Quote output of mkstemp.
* src/builtin.c (mkstemp_helper): Produce quoted output.
* doc/m4.texinfo (Mkstemp): Update the documentation and tests.
* NEWS: Document this change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bd9900d65eb9cd5add0f107e94b513fa267495ba)
|
ContentSettingsObserver::ContentSettingsObserver(
content::RenderFrame* render_frame,
extensions::Dispatcher* extension_dispatcher,
bool should_whitelist,
service_manager::BinderRegistry* registry)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
content::RenderFrameObserverTracker<ContentSettingsObserver>(
render_frame),
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extension_dispatcher_(extension_dispatcher),
#endif
content_settings_manager_(NULL),
allow_running_insecure_content_(false),
is_interstitial_page_(false),
current_request_id_(0),
should_whitelist_(should_whitelist) {
ClearBlockedContentSettings();
render_frame->GetWebFrame()->SetContentSettingsClient(this);
content::RenderFrame* main_frame =
render_frame->GetRenderView()->GetMainRenderFrame();
// TODO(nasko): The main frame is not guaranteed to be in the same process
// with this frame with --site-per-process. This code needs to be updated
// to handle this case. See https://crbug.com/496670.
if (main_frame && main_frame != render_frame) {
// Copy all the settings from the main render frame to avoid race conditions
// when initializing this data. See https://crbug.com/333308.
ContentSettingsObserver* parent = ContentSettingsObserver::Get(main_frame);
allow_running_insecure_content_ = parent->allow_running_insecure_content_;
temporarily_allowed_plugins_ = parent->temporarily_allowed_plugins_;
is_interstitial_page_ = parent->is_interstitial_page_;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-200"
] |
muon
|
c18663aa171c6cdf03da3e8c70df8663645b97c4
| 141,154,890,066,929,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
Issue: 15232 AllowScript should use atom::ContentSettingsManager like other Allow* methods in the observer
|
eap_chap_response(esp, id, hash, name, namelen)
eap_state *esp;
u_char id;
u_char *hash;
char *name;
int namelen;
{
u_char *outp;
int msglen;
outp = outpacket_buf;
MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP);
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
msglen = EAP_HEADERLEN + 2 * sizeof (u_char) + MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE +
namelen;
PUTSHORT(msglen, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_MD5CHAP, outp);
PUTCHAR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp);
BCOPY(hash, outp, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
INCPTR(MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE, outp);
if (namelen > 0) {
BCOPY(name, outp, namelen);
}
output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + msglen);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
ppp
|
8d7970b8f3db727fe798b65f3377fe6787575426
| 287,013,445,080,906,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
pppd: Fix bounds check in EAP code
Given that we have just checked vallen < len, it can never be the case
that vallen >= len + sizeof(rhostname). This fixes the check so we
actually avoid overflowing the rhostname array.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
|
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, NoBlockingSortsAllowedTest) {
params.options = QueryPlannerParams::NO_BLOCKING_SORT;
runQuerySortProj(BSONObj(), BSON("x" << 1), BSONObj());
assertNumSolutions(0U);
addIndex(BSON("x" << 1));
runQuerySortProj(BSONObj(), BSON("x" << 1), BSONObj());
assertNumSolutions(1U);
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: null, node: {ixscan: "
"{filter: null, pattern: {x: 1}}}}}");
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3
| 193,843,682,322,196,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr.
|
static void wake_up_sem_queue_do(struct list_head *pt)
{
struct sem_queue *q, *t;
int did_something;
did_something = !list_empty(pt);
list_for_each_entry_safe(q, t, pt, list) {
wake_up_process(q->sleeper);
/* q can disappear immediately after writing q->status. */
smp_wmb();
q->status = q->pid;
}
if (did_something)
preempt_enable();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] |
linux
|
6062a8dc0517bce23e3c2f7d2fea5e22411269a3
| 189,312,899,353,525,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
TRIO_PUBLIC int trio_vasprintf TRIO_ARGS3((result, format, args), char** result,
TRIO_CONST char* format, va_list args)
{
int status;
trio_string_t* info;
assert(VALID(format));
*result = NULL;
info = trio_xstring_duplicate("");
if (info == NULL)
{
status = TRIO_ERROR_RETURN(TRIO_ENOMEM, 0);
}
else
{
status = TrioFormat(info, 0, TrioOutStreamStringDynamic, format, args, NULL, NULL);
if (status >= 0)
{
trio_string_terminate(info);
*result = trio_string_extract(info);
}
trio_string_destroy(info);
}
return status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27
| 141,456,625,228,045,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this.
|
static void AuthNoneStartFunc(rfbClientPtr cl)
{
rfbClientAuthSucceeded(cl, rfbAuthNone);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
turbovnc
|
cea98166008301e614e0d36776bf9435a536136e
| 103,941,062,076,019,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Server: Fix two issues identified by ASan
1. If the TLSPlain and X509Plain security types were both disabled, then
rfbOptPamAuth() would overflow the name field in the secTypes
structure when testing the "none" security type, since the name of
that security type has less than five characters. This issue was
innocuous, since the overflow was fully contained within the secTypes
structure, but the ASan error caused Xvnc to abort, which made it
difficult to detect other errors.
2. If an ill-behaved RFB client sent the TurboVNC Server a fence
message with more than 64 bytes, then the TurboVNC Server would
try to read that message and subsequently overflow the stack before
it detected that the payload was too large. This could never have
occurred with any of the VNC viewers that currently support the RFB
flow control extensions (TigerVNC and TurboVNC, namely.) This issue
was also innocuous, since the stack overflow affected two variables
(newScreens and errMsg) that were never accessed before the function
returned.
|
void AuthorizationSessionImpl::grantInternalAuthorization(OperationContext* opCtx) {
grantInternalAuthorization(opCtx->getClient());
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-613"
] |
mongo
|
6dfb92b1299de04677d0bd2230e89a52eb01003c
| 108,585,660,486,847,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
SERVER-38984 Validate unique User ID on UserCache hit
(cherry picked from commit e55d6e2292e5dbe2f97153251d8193d1cc89f5d7)
|
static bool subj_alt_hostcheck(struct Curl_easy *data,
const char *match_pattern,
size_t matchlen,
const char *hostname,
size_t hostlen,
const char *dispname)
{
#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
(void)dispname;
(void)data;
#endif
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(match_pattern, matchlen, hostname, hostlen)) {
infof(data, " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"",
dispname, match_pattern);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
curl
|
139a54ed0a172adaaf1a78d6f4fff50b2c3f9e08
| 108,938,052,161,965,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
openssl: don't leak the SRP credentials in redirects either
Follow-up to 620ea21410030
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Closes #8751
|
explicit GetSessionTensorOp(OpKernelConstruction* context)
: OpKernel(context) {}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-369"
] |
tensorflow
|
ff70c47a396ef1e3cb73c90513da4f5cb71bebba
| 104,316,170,475,980,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 |
Fix `tf.raw_ops.GetSessionTensor` and `tf.raw_ops.DeleteSessionTensor` null pointer dereferences.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 368294154
Change-Id: Ie10f07a0a9a1c2b685e08153d48a0ca4b93f9fc9
|
bool skip( uint64_t sz ) {
_position += sz;
return _position < _maxLength;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mongo
|
6889d1658136c753998b4a408dc8d1a3ec28e3b9
| 78,947,693,338,962,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
SERVER-7769 - fast bson validate
|
static void trace_packet(const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int hook,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
const char *tablename,
const struct xt_table_info *private,
const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const void *table_base;
const struct ip6t_entry *root;
const char *hookname, *chainname, *comment;
const struct ip6t_entry *iter;
unsigned int rulenum = 0;
table_base = private->entries[smp_processor_id()];
root = get_entry(table_base, private->hook_entry[hook]);
hookname = chainname = hooknames[hook];
comment = comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RULE];
xt_entry_foreach(iter, root, private->size - private->hook_entry[hook])
if (get_chainname_rulenum(iter, e, hookname,
&chainname, &comment, &rulenum) != 0)
break;
nf_log_packet(AF_INET6, hook, skb, in, out, &trace_loginfo,
"TRACE: %s:%s:%s:%u ",
tablename, chainname, comment, rulenum);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54
| 328,690,783,291,655,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was
introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
R_API RList *retrieve_all_method_access_string_and_value() {
return retrieve_all_access_string_and_value (METHOD_ACCESS_FLAGS);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
radare2
|
e9ce0d64faf19fa4e9c260250fbdf25e3c11e152
| 168,879,201,774,388,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix #10498 - Fix crash in fuzzed java files (#10511)
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.