func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getPath)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = Z_SPLFILESYSTEM_P(getThis());
char *path;
size_t path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len);
RETURN_STRINGL(path, path_len);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-74"
] |
php-src
|
a5a15965da23c8e97657278fc8dfbf1dfb20c016
| 112,737,870,472,478,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Fix #78863: DirectoryIterator class silently truncates after a null byte
Since the constructor of DirectoryIterator and friends is supposed to
accepts paths (i.e. strings without NUL bytes), we must not accept
arbitrary strings.
|
void Item_param::reset()
{
DBUG_ENTER("Item_param::reset");
/* Shrink string buffer if it's bigger than max possible CHAR column */
if (str_value.alloced_length() > MAX_CHAR_WIDTH)
str_value.free();
else
str_value.length(0);
str_value_ptr.length(0);
/*
We must prevent all charset conversions until data has been written
to the binary log.
*/
str_value.set_charset(&my_charset_bin);
collation.set(&my_charset_bin, DERIVATION_COERCIBLE);
state= NO_VALUE;
maybe_null= 1;
null_value= 0;
fixed= false;
/*
Don't reset item_type to PARAM_ITEM: it's only needed to guard
us from item optimizations at prepare stage, when item doesn't yet
contain a literal of some kind.
In all other cases when this object is accessed its value is
set (this assumption is guarded by 'state' and
DBUG_ASSERTS(state != NO_VALUE) in all Item_param::get_*
methods).
*/
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-89"
] |
server
|
b5e16a6e0381b28b598da80b414168ce9a5016e5
| 59,223,990,083,194,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
MDEV-26061 MariaDB server crash at Field::set_default
* Item_default_value::fix_fields creates a copy of its argument's field.
* Field::default_value is changed when its expression is prepared in
unpack_vcol_info_from_frm()
This means we must unpack any vcol expression that includes DEFAULT(x)
strictly after unpacking x->default_value.
To avoid building and solving this dependency graph on every table open,
we update Item_default_value::field->default_value after all vcols
are unpacked and fixed.
|
TEST_P(ProtocolIntegrationTest, HeaderAndBodyWireBytesCountReuseUpstream) {
// We only care about the upstream protocol.
if (downstreamProtocol() != Http::CodecType::HTTP2) {
return;
}
useAccessLog("%UPSTREAM_WIRE_BYTES_SENT% %UPSTREAM_WIRE_BYTES_RECEIVED% "
"%UPSTREAM_HEADER_BYTES_SENT% %UPSTREAM_HEADER_BYTES_RECEIVED%");
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(makeClientConnection(lookupPort("http")));
auto second_client = makeHttpConnection(makeClientConnection(lookupPort("http")));
const int request_size = 100;
const int response_size = 100;
// Send to the same upstream from the two clients.
auto response_one = sendRequestAndWaitForResponse(default_request_headers_, request_size,
default_response_headers_, response_size, 0);
expectUpstreamBytesSentAndReceived(BytesCountExpectation(298, 158, 156, 27),
BytesCountExpectation(223, 122, 114, 13),
BytesCountExpectation(223, 108, 114, 3), 0);
// Swap clients so the other connection is used to send the request.
std::swap(codec_client_, second_client);
auto response_two = sendRequestAndWaitForResponse(default_request_headers_, request_size,
default_response_headers_, response_size, 0);
expectUpstreamBytesSentAndReceived(BytesCountExpectation(298, 158, 156, 27),
BytesCountExpectation(167, 119, 58, 10),
BytesCountExpectation(114, 108, 11, 3), 1);
second_client->close();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
envoy
|
148de954ed3585d8b4298b424aa24916d0de6136
| 150,349,321,144,914,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
CVE-2021-43825
Response filter manager crash
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
{
vcpu_load(vcpu);
/* make sure we have the latest values */
save_fpu_regs();
if (MACHINE_HAS_VX)
convert_vx_to_fp((freg_t *) fpu->fprs,
(__vector128 *) vcpu->run->s.regs.vrs);
else
memcpy(fpu->fprs, vcpu->run->s.regs.fprs, sizeof(fpu->fprs));
fpu->fpc = vcpu->run->s.regs.fpc;
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
0774a964ef561b7170d8d1b1bfe6f88002b6d219
| 163,384,429,405,321,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
KVM: Fix out of range accesses to memslots
Reset the LRU slot if it becomes invalid when deleting a memslot to fix
an out-of-bounds/use-after-free access when searching through memslots.
Explicitly check for there being no used slots in search_memslots(), and
in the caller of s390's approximation variant.
Fixes: 36947254e5f9 ("KVM: Dynamically size memslot array based on number of used slots")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
u32tochar (wc, s)
wchar_t wc;
char *s;
{
unsigned long x;
int l;
x = wc;
l = (x <= UCHAR_MAX) ? 1 : ((x <= USHORT_MAX) ? 2 : 4);
if (x <= UCHAR_MAX)
s[0] = x & 0xFF;
else if (x <= USHORT_MAX) /* assume unsigned short = 16 bits */
{
s[0] = (x >> 8) & 0xFF;
s[1] = x & 0xFF;
}
else
{
s[0] = (x >> 24) & 0xFF;
s[1] = (x >> 16) & 0xFF;
s[2] = (x >> 8) & 0xFF;
s[3] = x & 0xFF;
}
s[l] = '\0';
return l;
}
| 1 |
[] |
bash
|
863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5
| 208,772,396,360,100,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
commit bash-20120224 snapshot
|
static apr_byte_t oidc_session_pass_tokens_and_save(request_rec *r,
oidc_cfg *cfg, oidc_session_t *session, apr_byte_t needs_save) {
int pass_headers = oidc_cfg_dir_pass_info_in_headers(r);
int pass_envvars = oidc_cfg_dir_pass_info_in_envvars(r);
/* set the refresh_token in the app headers/variables, if enabled for this location/directory */
const char *refresh_token = NULL;
oidc_session_get(r, session, OIDC_REFRESHTOKEN_SESSION_KEY, &refresh_token);
if ((oidc_cfg_dir_pass_refresh_token(r) != 0) && (refresh_token != NULL)) {
/* pass it to the app in a header or environment variable */
oidc_util_set_app_info(r, "refresh_token", refresh_token,
OIDC_DEFAULT_HEADER_PREFIX, pass_headers, pass_envvars);
}
/* set the access_token in the app headers/variables */
const char *access_token = NULL;
oidc_session_get(r, session, OIDC_ACCESSTOKEN_SESSION_KEY, &access_token);
if (access_token != NULL) {
/* pass it to the app in a header or environment variable */
oidc_util_set_app_info(r, "access_token", access_token,
OIDC_DEFAULT_HEADER_PREFIX, pass_headers, pass_envvars);
}
/* set the expiry timestamp in the app headers/variables */
const char *access_token_expires = NULL;
oidc_session_get(r, session, OIDC_ACCESSTOKEN_EXPIRES_SESSION_KEY,
&access_token_expires);
if (access_token_expires != NULL) {
/* pass it to the app in a header or environment variable */
oidc_util_set_app_info(r, "access_token_expires", access_token_expires,
OIDC_DEFAULT_HEADER_PREFIX, pass_headers, pass_envvars);
}
/*
* reset the session inactivity timer
* but only do this once per 10% of the inactivity timeout interval (with a max to 60 seconds)
* for performance reasons
*
* now there's a small chance that the session ends 10% (or a minute) earlier than configured/expected
* cq. when there's a request after a recent save (so no update) and then no activity happens until
* a request comes in just before the session should expire
* ("recent" and "just before" refer to 10%-with-a-max-of-60-seconds of the inactivity interval after
* the start/last-update and before the expiry of the session respectively)
*
* this is be deemed acceptable here because of performance gain
*/
apr_time_t interval = apr_time_from_sec(cfg->session_inactivity_timeout);
apr_time_t now = apr_time_now();
apr_time_t slack = interval / 10;
if (slack > apr_time_from_sec(60))
slack = apr_time_from_sec(60);
if (session->expiry - now < interval - slack) {
session->expiry = now + interval;
needs_save = TRUE;
}
/* log message about session expiry */
oidc_log_session_expires(r, "session inactivity timeout", session->expiry);
/* check if something was updated in the session and we need to save it again */
if (needs_save)
if (oidc_session_save(r, session) == FALSE)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287"
] |
mod_auth_openidc
|
21e3728a825c41ab41efa75e664108051bb9665e
| 202,891,029,486,824,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 67 |
release 2.1.6 : security fix: scrub headers for "AuthType oauth20"
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <[email protected]>
|
rl_translate_keyseq (seq, array, len)
const char *seq;
char *array;
int *len;
{
register int i, c, l, temp;
for (i = l = 0; c = seq[i]; i++)
{
if (c == '\\')
{
c = seq[++i];
if (c == 0)
break;
/* Handle \C- and \M- prefixes. */
if ((c == 'C' || c == 'M') && seq[i + 1] == '-')
{
/* Handle special case of backwards define. */
if (strncmp (&seq[i], "C-\\M-", 5) == 0)
{
array[l++] = ESC; /* ESC is meta-prefix */
i += 5;
array[l++] = CTRL (_rl_to_upper (seq[i]));
if (seq[i] == '\0')
i--;
}
else if (c == 'M')
{
i++; /* seq[i] == '-' */
/* XXX - obey convert-meta setting */
if (_rl_convert_meta_chars_to_ascii && _rl_keymap[ESC].type == ISKMAP)
array[l++] = ESC; /* ESC is meta-prefix */
else if (seq[i+1] == '\\' && seq[i+2] == 'C' && seq[i+3] == '-')
{
i += 4;
temp = (seq[i] == '?') ? RUBOUT : CTRL (_rl_to_upper (seq[i]));
array[l++] = META (temp);
}
else
{
/* This doesn't yet handle things like \M-\a, which may
or may not have any reasonable meaning. You're
probably better off using straight octal or hex. */
i++;
array[l++] = META (seq[i]);
}
}
else if (c == 'C')
{
i += 2;
/* Special hack for C-?... */
array[l++] = (seq[i] == '?') ? RUBOUT : CTRL (_rl_to_upper (seq[i]));
}
continue;
}
/* Translate other backslash-escaped characters. These are the
same escape sequences that bash's `echo' and `printf' builtins
handle, with the addition of \d -> RUBOUT. A backslash
preceding a character that is not special is stripped. */
switch (c)
{
case 'a':
array[l++] = '\007';
break;
case 'b':
array[l++] = '\b';
break;
case 'd':
array[l++] = RUBOUT; /* readline-specific */
break;
case 'e':
array[l++] = ESC;
break;
case 'f':
array[l++] = '\f';
break;
case 'n':
array[l++] = NEWLINE;
break;
case 'r':
array[l++] = RETURN;
break;
case 't':
array[l++] = TAB;
break;
case 'v':
array[l++] = 0x0B;
break;
case '\\':
array[l++] = '\\';
break;
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3':
case '4': case '5': case '6': case '7':
i++;
for (temp = 2, c -= '0'; ISOCTAL ((unsigned char)seq[i]) && temp--; i++)
c = (c * 8) + OCTVALUE (seq[i]);
i--; /* auto-increment in for loop */
array[l++] = c & largest_char;
break;
case 'x':
i++;
for (temp = 2, c = 0; ISXDIGIT ((unsigned char)seq[i]) && temp--; i++)
c = (c * 16) + HEXVALUE (seq[i]);
if (temp == 2)
c = 'x';
i--; /* auto-increment in for loop */
array[l++] = c & largest_char;
break;
default: /* backslashes before non-special chars just add the char */
array[l++] = c;
break; /* the backslash is stripped */
}
continue;
}
array[l++] = c;
}
*len = l;
array[l] = '\0';
return (0);
}
| 0 |
[] |
bash
|
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
| 276,588,727,664,063,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 125 |
bash-4.4-rc2 release
|
static int __init init_sys32_ioctl(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ioctl_table_size; i++) {
if (ioctl_start[i].next != 0) {
printk("ioctl translation %d bad\n",i);
return -1;
}
ioctl32_insert_translation(&ioctl_start[i]);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
822191a2fa1584a29c3224ab328507adcaeac1ab
| 43,637,616,046,730,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
[PATCH] skip data conversion in compat_sys_mount when data_page is NULL
OpenVZ Linux kernel team has found a problem with mounting in compat mode.
Simple command "mount -t smbfs ..." on Fedora Core 5 distro in 32-bit mode
leads to oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: compat_sys_mount+0xd6/0x290
Process mount (pid: 14656, veid=300, threadinfo ffff810034d30000, task ffff810034c86bc0)
Call Trace: ia32_sysret+0x0/0xa
The problem is that data_page pointer can be NULL, so we should skip data
conversion in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Mirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int __sys_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, int __user *usockvec)
{
struct socket *sock1, *sock2;
int fd1, fd2, err;
struct file *newfile1, *newfile2;
int flags;
flags = type & ~SOCK_TYPE_MASK;
if (flags & ~(SOCK_CLOEXEC | SOCK_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
type &= SOCK_TYPE_MASK;
if (SOCK_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK && (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK))
flags = (flags & ~SOCK_NONBLOCK) | O_NONBLOCK;
/*
* reserve descriptors and make sure we won't fail
* to return them to userland.
*/
fd1 = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
if (unlikely(fd1 < 0))
return fd1;
fd2 = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
if (unlikely(fd2 < 0)) {
put_unused_fd(fd1);
return fd2;
}
err = put_user(fd1, &usockvec[0]);
if (err)
goto out;
err = put_user(fd2, &usockvec[1]);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Obtain the first socket and check if the underlying protocol
* supports the socketpair call.
*/
err = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock1);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto out;
err = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock2);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
sock_release(sock1);
goto out;
}
err = security_socket_socketpair(sock1, sock2);
if (unlikely(err)) {
sock_release(sock2);
sock_release(sock1);
goto out;
}
err = sock1->ops->socketpair(sock1, sock2);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
sock_release(sock2);
sock_release(sock1);
goto out;
}
newfile1 = sock_alloc_file(sock1, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(newfile1)) {
err = PTR_ERR(newfile1);
sock_release(sock2);
goto out;
}
newfile2 = sock_alloc_file(sock2, flags, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(newfile2)) {
err = PTR_ERR(newfile2);
fput(newfile1);
goto out;
}
audit_fd_pair(fd1, fd2);
fd_install(fd1, newfile1);
fd_install(fd2, newfile2);
return 0;
out:
put_unused_fd(fd2);
put_unused_fd(fd1);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14
| 311,600,599,136,691,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 |
socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <[email protected]>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
if (compat20) {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
} else {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
}
if (!no_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
}
for (;;)
monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-200"
] |
openssh-portable
|
d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b
| 52,429,805,456,127,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
|
QString Utility::ConvertLineEndings(const QString &text)
{
QString newtext(text);
return newtext.replace("\x0D\x0A", "\x0A").replace("\x0D", "\x0A");
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
Sigil
|
0979ba8d10c96ebca330715bfd4494ea0e019a8f
| 188,344,026,628,701,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
harden plugin unzipping to zip-slip attacks
|
_public_ int sd_bus_open_with_description(sd_bus **ret, const char *description) {
const char *e;
_cleanup_(bus_freep) sd_bus *b = NULL;
int r;
assert_return(ret, -EINVAL);
/* Let's connect to the starter bus if it is set, and
* otherwise to the bus that is appropriate for the scope
* we are running in */
e = secure_getenv("DBUS_STARTER_BUS_TYPE");
if (e) {
if (streq(e, "system"))
return sd_bus_open_system_with_description(ret, description);
else if (STR_IN_SET(e, "session", "user"))
return sd_bus_open_user_with_description(ret, description);
}
e = secure_getenv("DBUS_STARTER_ADDRESS");
if (!e) {
if (cg_pid_get_owner_uid(0, NULL) >= 0)
return sd_bus_open_user_with_description(ret, description);
else
return sd_bus_open_system_with_description(ret, description);
}
r = sd_bus_new(&b);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = sd_bus_set_address(b, e);
if (r < 0)
return r;
b->bus_client = true;
/* We don't know whether the bus is trusted or not, so better
* be safe, and authenticate everything */
b->trusted = false;
b->is_local = false;
b->creds_mask |= SD_BUS_CREDS_UID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EUID | SD_BUS_CREDS_EFFECTIVE_CAPS;
r = sd_bus_start(b);
if (r < 0)
return r;
*ret = TAKE_PTR(b);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
systemd
|
1068447e6954dc6ce52f099ed174c442cb89ed54
| 7,724,856,896,444,203,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueue_for_read() we have a
way to put an incoming message back into the read queue for this
purpose.
This might have other uses too, for example debugging.
|
int TDStretch::seekBestOverlapPositionFull(const SAMPLETYPE *refPos)
{
int bestOffs;
double bestCorr;
int i;
double norm;
bestCorr = -FLT_MAX;
bestOffs = 0;
// Scans for the best correlation value by testing each possible position
// over the permitted range.
bestCorr = calcCrossCorr(refPos, pMidBuffer, norm);
bestCorr = (bestCorr + 0.1) * 0.75;
#pragma omp parallel for
for (i = 1; i < seekLength; i ++)
{
double corr;
// Calculates correlation value for the mixing position corresponding to 'i'
#ifdef _OPENMP
// in parallel OpenMP mode, can't use norm accumulator version as parallel executor won't
// iterate the loop in sequential order
corr = calcCrossCorr(refPos + channels * i, pMidBuffer, norm);
#else
// In non-parallel version call "calcCrossCorrAccumulate" that is otherwise same
// as "calcCrossCorr", but saves time by reusing & updating previously stored
// "norm" value
corr = calcCrossCorrAccumulate(refPos + channels * i, pMidBuffer, norm);
#endif
// heuristic rule to slightly favour values close to mid of the range
double tmp = (double)(2 * i - seekLength) / (double)seekLength;
corr = ((corr + 0.1) * (1.0 - 0.25 * tmp * tmp));
// Checks for the highest correlation value
if (corr > bestCorr)
{
// For optimal performance, enter critical section only in case that best value found.
// in such case repeat 'if' condition as it's possible that parallel execution may have
// updated the bestCorr value in the mean time
#pragma omp critical
if (corr > bestCorr)
{
bestCorr = corr;
bestOffs = i;
}
}
}
#ifdef SOUNDTOUCH_INTEGER_SAMPLES
adaptNormalizer();
#endif
// clear cross correlation routine state if necessary (is so e.g. in MMX routines).
clearCrossCorrState();
return bestOffs;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
soundtouch
|
107f2c5d201a4dfea1b7f15c5957ff2ac9e5f260
| 194,754,641,762,578,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 |
Replaced illegal-number-of-channel assertions with run-time exception
|
Value ExpressionSubtract::evaluate(const Document& root, Variables* variables) const {
Value lhs = _children[0]->evaluate(root, variables);
Value rhs = _children[1]->evaluate(root, variables);
BSONType diffType = Value::getWidestNumeric(rhs.getType(), lhs.getType());
if (diffType == NumberDecimal) {
Decimal128 right = rhs.coerceToDecimal();
Decimal128 left = lhs.coerceToDecimal();
return Value(left.subtract(right));
} else if (diffType == NumberDouble) {
double right = rhs.coerceToDouble();
double left = lhs.coerceToDouble();
return Value(left - right);
} else if (diffType == NumberLong) {
long long right = rhs.coerceToLong();
long long left = lhs.coerceToLong();
return Value(left - right);
} else if (diffType == NumberInt) {
long long right = rhs.coerceToLong();
long long left = lhs.coerceToLong();
return Value::createIntOrLong(left - right);
} else if (lhs.nullish() || rhs.nullish()) {
return Value(BSONNULL);
} else if (lhs.getType() == Date) {
if (rhs.getType() == Date) {
return Value(durationCount<Milliseconds>(lhs.getDate() - rhs.getDate()));
} else if (rhs.numeric()) {
return Value(lhs.getDate() - Milliseconds(rhs.coerceToLong()));
} else {
uasserted(16613,
str::stream()
<< "cant $subtract a " << typeName(rhs.getType()) << " from a Date");
}
} else {
uasserted(16556,
str::stream() << "cant $subtract a" << typeName(rhs.getType()) << " from a "
<< typeName(lhs.getType()));
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
mongo
|
1772b9a0393b55e6a280a35e8f0a1f75c014f301
| 39,404,024,400,022,814,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
SERVER-49404 Enforce additional checks in $arrayToObject
|
virtual void clip(GfxState *state) { }
| 0 |
[] |
poppler
|
abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40
| 167,829,536,500,618,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518
|
static int compat_do_ebt_set_ctl(struct sock *sk,
int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_do_replace(net, user, len);
break;
case EBT_SO_SET_COUNTERS:
ret = compat_update_counters(net, user, len);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6
| 186,948,825,852,165,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl_context *ssl )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C)
int ret;
size_t n;
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char hash[64];
md5_context md5;
sha1_context sha1;
int hash_id = SIG_RSA_RAW;
unsigned int hashlen = 0;
#endif
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 &&
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(POLARSSL_DHM_C)
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "support for dhm in not available" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
#else
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", ssl->in_msg + 4, ssl->in_hslen - 4 );
/*
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
*
* struct {
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
* } ServerDHParams;
*/
p = ssl->in_msg + 4;
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
if( ( ret = dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, &p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "DHM Read Params returned -0x%x", -ret ) );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( p[1] != SSL_SIG_RSA )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", p[1] ) );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
switch( p[0] )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
case SSL_HASH_MD5:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_MD5;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
case SSL_HASH_SHA1:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA1;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
case SSL_HASH_SHA224:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA224;
break;
case SSL_HASH_SHA256:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA256;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
case SSL_HASH_SHA384:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA384;
break;
case SSL_HASH_SHA512:
hash_id = SIG_RSA_SHA512;
break;
#endif
default:
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", p[0] ) );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d", p[1] ) );
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d", p[0] ) );
p += 2;
}
n = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( end != p + n )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( (unsigned int)( end - p ) !=
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->rsa.len )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
if( ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len < 64 || ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len > 512 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
if( ssl->minor_ver != SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
/*
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque md5_hash[16];
* opaque sha_hash[20];
* };
*
* md5_hash
* MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random
* + ServerParams);
* sha_hash
* SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random
* + ServerParams);
*/
n = ssl->in_hslen - ( end - p ) - 6;
md5_starts( &md5 );
md5_update( &md5, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
md5_update( &md5, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
md5_finish( &md5, hash );
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha1_update( &sha1, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha1_finish( &sha1, hash + 16 );
hash_id = SIG_RSA_RAW;
hashlen = 36;
}
else
{
sha2_context sha2;
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
sha4_context sha4;
#endif
n = ssl->in_hslen - ( end - p ) - 8;
/*
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque client_random[32];
* opaque server_random[32];
* ServerDHParams params;
* };
*/
switch( hash_id )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_MD5_C)
case SIG_RSA_MD5:
md5_starts( &md5 );
md5_update( &md5, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
md5_update( &md5, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
md5_finish( &md5, hash );
hashlen = 16;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
sha1_starts( &sha1 );
sha1_update( &sha1, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha1_update( &sha1, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha1_finish( &sha1, hash );
hashlen = 20;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA2_C)
case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
sha2_starts( &sha2, 1 );
sha2_update( &sha2, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha2_update( &sha2, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha2_finish( &sha2, hash );
hashlen = 28;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
sha2_starts( &sha2, 0 );
sha2_update( &sha2, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha2_update( &sha2, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha2_finish( &sha2, hash );
hashlen = 32;
break;
#endif
#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA4_C)
case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
sha4_starts( &sha4, 1 );
sha4_update( &sha4, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha4_update( &sha4, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha4_finish( &sha4, hash );
hashlen = 48;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
sha4_starts( &sha4, 0 );
sha4_update( &sha4, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 );
sha4_update( &sha4, ssl->in_msg + 4, n );
sha4_finish( &sha4, hash );
hashlen = 64;
break;
#endif
}
}
SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
if( ( ret = rsa_pkcs1_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->rsa,
RSA_PUBLIC,
hash_id, hashlen, hash, p ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "rsa_pkcs1_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state++;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
#endif
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
polarssl
|
43f9799ce61c6392a014d0a2ea136b4b3a9ee194
| 297,244,236,391,647,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 268 |
RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks
|
seamless_init(void)
{
if (!g_seamless_rdp)
return False;
seamless_serial = 0;
seamless_channel =
channel_register("seamrdp", CHANNEL_OPTION_INITIALIZED | CHANNEL_OPTION_ENCRYPT_RDP,
seamless_process);
return (seamless_channel != NULL);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
rdesktop
|
766ebcf6f23ccfe8323ac10242ae6e127d4505d2
| 205,688,193,750,612,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
static int sas_ata_clear_pending(struct domain_device *dev, struct ex_phy *phy)
{
int res;
/* we weren't pending, so successfully end the reset sequence now */
if (dev->dev_type != SAS_SATA_PENDING)
return 1;
/* hmmm, if this succeeds do we need to repost the domain_device to the
* lldd so it can pick up new parameters?
*/
res = sas_get_ata_info(dev, phy);
if (res)
return 0; /* retry */
else
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
0558f33c06bb910e2879e355192227a8e8f0219d
| 187,646,559,742,610,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
SemanticValues &push() {
assert(value_stack_size <= value_stack.size());
if (value_stack_size == value_stack.size()) {
value_stack.emplace_back(std::make_shared<SemanticValues>());
} else {
auto &sv = *value_stack[value_stack_size];
if (!sv.empty()) {
sv.clear();
if (!sv.tags.empty()) { sv.tags.clear(); }
}
sv.s_ = nullptr;
sv.n_ = 0;
sv.choice_count_ = 0;
sv.choice_ = 0;
if (!sv.tokens.empty()) { sv.tokens.clear(); }
}
auto &sv = *value_stack[value_stack_size++];
sv.path = path;
sv.ss = s;
sv.source_line_index = &source_line_index;
return sv;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpp-peglib
|
b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e
| 248,117,301,232,510,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
Fix #122
|
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *op32_idx2desc(struct b43_dmaring *ring,
int slot,
struct b43_dmadesc_meta **meta)
{
struct b43_dmadesc32 *desc;
*meta = &(ring->meta[slot]);
desc = ring->descbase;
desc = &(desc[slot]);
return (struct b43_dmadesc_generic *)desc;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
c85ce65ecac078ab1a1835c87c4a6319cf74660a
| 86,222,563,503,540,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static int vxlan_fdb_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
const struct vxlan_fdb *fdb,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int type, unsigned int flags,
const struct vxlan_rdst *rdst)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
struct nda_cacheinfo ci;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct ndmsg *ndm;
bool send_ip, send_eth;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, type, sizeof(*ndm), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ndm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memset(ndm, 0, sizeof(*ndm));
send_eth = send_ip = true;
if (type == RTM_GETNEIGH) {
send_ip = !vxlan_addr_any(&rdst->remote_ip);
send_eth = !is_zero_ether_addr(fdb->eth_addr);
ndm->ndm_family = send_ip ? rdst->remote_ip.sa.sa_family : AF_INET;
} else
ndm->ndm_family = AF_BRIDGE;
ndm->ndm_state = fdb->state;
ndm->ndm_ifindex = vxlan->dev->ifindex;
ndm->ndm_flags = fdb->flags;
if (rdst->offloaded)
ndm->ndm_flags |= NTF_OFFLOADED;
ndm->ndm_type = RTN_UNICAST;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(vxlan->dev), vxlan->net) &&
nla_put_s32(skb, NDA_LINK_NETNSID,
peernet2id(dev_net(vxlan->dev), vxlan->net)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (send_eth && nla_put(skb, NDA_LLADDR, ETH_ALEN, &fdb->eth_addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (send_ip && vxlan_nla_put_addr(skb, NDA_DST, &rdst->remote_ip))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_port && rdst->remote_port != vxlan->cfg.dst_port &&
nla_put_be16(skb, NDA_PORT, rdst->remote_port))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_vni != vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni &&
nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_VNI, be32_to_cpu(rdst->remote_vni)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if ((vxlan->cfg.flags & VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA) && fdb->vni &&
nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_SRC_VNI,
be32_to_cpu(fdb->vni)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (rdst->remote_ifindex &&
nla_put_u32(skb, NDA_IFINDEX, rdst->remote_ifindex))
goto nla_put_failure;
ci.ndm_used = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->used);
ci.ndm_confirmed = 0;
ci.ndm_updated = jiffies_to_clock_t(now - fdb->updated);
ci.ndm_refcnt = 0;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_CACHEINFO, sizeof(ci), &ci))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
| 0 |
[] |
net
|
6c8991f41546c3c472503dff1ea9daaddf9331c2
| 135,230,931,081,847,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
net: ipv6_stub: use ip6_dst_lookup_flow instead of ip6_dst_lookup
ipv6_stub uses the ip6_dst_lookup function to allow other modules to
perform IPv6 lookups. However, this function skips the XFRM layer
entirely.
All users of ipv6_stub->ip6_dst_lookup use ip_route_output_flow (via the
ip_route_output_key and ip_route_output helpers) for their IPv4 lookups,
which calls xfrm_lookup_route(). This patch fixes this inconsistent
behavior by switching the stub to ip6_dst_lookup_flow, which also calls
xfrm_lookup_route().
This requires some changes in all the callers, as these two functions
take different arguments and have different return types.
Fixes: 5f81bd2e5d80 ("ipv6: export a stub for IPv6 symbols used by vxlan")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
virtual Key *clone(MEM_ROOT *mem_root) const
{ return new (mem_root) Key(*this, mem_root); }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
4681b6f2d8c82b4ec5cf115e83698251963d80d5
| 290,744,890,160,730,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 |
MDEV-26281 ASAN use-after-poison when complex conversion is involved in blob
the bug was that in_vector array in Item_func_in was allocated in the
statement arena, not in the table->expr_arena.
revert part of the 5acd391e8b2d. Instead, change the arena correctly
in fix_all_session_vcol_exprs().
Remove TABLE_ARENA, that was introduced in 5acd391e8b2d to force
item tree changes to be rolled back (because they were allocated in the
wrong arena and didn't persist. now they do)
|
static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
{
int n;
unsigned char *p;
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return 0;
}
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
l2n3(n, p);
i2d_X509(x, &p);
*l += n + 3;
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
openssl
|
00a4c1421407b6ac796688871b0a49a179c694d9
| 7,926,837,328,464,211,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.
The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.
However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.
Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.
So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.
An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.
I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.
A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.
The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.
Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.
As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.
Issue reported by Quan Luo.
CVE-2016-2179
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
|
static void line6_stop_listen(struct usb_line6 *line6)
{
usb_kill_urb(line6->urb_listen);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
0b074ab7fc0d575247b9cc9f93bb7e007ca38840
| 3,791,554,923,857,954,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ALSA: line6: Assure canceling delayed work at disconnection
The current code performs the cancel of a delayed work at the late
stage of disconnection procedure, which may lead to the access to the
already cleared state.
This patch assures to call cancel_delayed_work_sync() at the beginning
of the disconnection procedure for avoiding that race. The delayed
work object is now assigned in the common line6 object instead of its
derivative, so that we can call cancel_delayed_work_sync().
Along with the change, the startup function is called via the new
callback instead. This will make it easier to port other LINE6
drivers to use the delayed work for startup in later patches.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 7f84ff68be05 ("ALSA: line6: toneport: Fix broken usage of timer for delayed execution")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
nvmet_fc_rcv_fcp_abort(struct nvmet_fc_target_port *target_port,
struct nvmefc_tgt_fcp_req *fcpreq)
{
struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod = fcpreq->nvmet_fc_private;
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
unsigned long flags;
if (!fod || fod->fcpreq != fcpreq)
/* job appears to have already completed, ignore abort */
return;
queue = fod->queue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&queue->qlock, flags);
if (fod->active) {
/*
* mark as abort. The abort handler, invoked upon completion
* of any work, will detect the aborted status and do the
* callback.
*/
spin_lock(&fod->flock);
fod->abort = true;
fod->aborted = true;
spin_unlock(&fod->flock);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&queue->qlock, flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
0c319d3a144d4b8f1ea2047fd614d2149b68f889
| 4,380,746,386,274,564,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
ConnStateData::quitAfterError(HttpRequest *request)
{
// From HTTP p.o.v., we do not have to close after every error detected
// at the client-side, but many such errors do require closure and the
// client-side code is bad at handling errors so we play it safe.
if (request)
request->flags.proxyKeepalive = false;
flags.readMore = false;
debugs(33,4, HERE << "Will close after error: " << clientConnection);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-444"
] |
squid
|
fd68382860633aca92065e6c343cfd1b12b126e7
| 201,904,074,717,702,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Improve Transfer-Encoding handling (#702)
Reject messages containing Transfer-Encoding header with coding other
than chunked or identity. Squid does not support other codings.
For simplicity and security sake, also reject messages where
Transfer-Encoding contains unnecessary complex values that are
technically equivalent to "chunked" or "identity" (e.g., ",,chunked" or
"identity, chunked").
RFC 7230 formally deprecated and removed identity coding, but it is
still used by some agents.
|
static int set_msr_hyperv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE: {
unsigned long addr;
if (!(data & HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE_ENABLE)) {
vcpu->arch.hv_vapic = data;
break;
}
addr = gfn_to_hva(vcpu->kvm, data >>
HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE_ADDRESS_SHIFT);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return 1;
if (clear_user((void __user *)addr, PAGE_SIZE))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.hv_vapic = data;
break;
}
case HV_X64_MSR_EOI:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_EOI, data);
case HV_X64_MSR_ICR:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_ICR, data);
case HV_X64_MSR_TPR:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_TASKPRI, data);
default:
pr_unimpl(vcpu, "HYPER-V unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x "
"data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
kvm
|
831d9d02f9522e739825a51a11e3bc5aa531a905
| 108,751,909,670,355,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
KVM: x86: fix information leak to userland
Structures kvm_vcpu_events, kvm_debugregs, kvm_pit_state2 and
kvm_clock_data are copied to userland with some padding and reserved
fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack
memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros
instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these
fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int bio_zlib_new(BIO *bi)
{
BIO_ZLIB_CTX *ctx;
#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
(void)COMP_zlib();
if (!zlib_loaded)
{
COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, COMP_R_ZLIB_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
#endif
ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(BIO_ZLIB_CTX));
if(!ctx)
{
COMPerr(COMP_F_BIO_ZLIB_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ctx->ibuf = NULL;
ctx->obuf = NULL;
ctx->ibufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
ctx->obufsize = ZLIB_DEFAULT_BUFSIZE;
ctx->zin.zalloc = Z_NULL;
ctx->zin.zfree = Z_NULL;
ctx->zin.next_in = NULL;
ctx->zin.avail_in = 0;
ctx->zin.next_out = NULL;
ctx->zin.avail_out = 0;
ctx->zout.zalloc = Z_NULL;
ctx->zout.zfree = Z_NULL;
ctx->zout.next_in = NULL;
ctx->zout.avail_in = 0;
ctx->zout.next_out = NULL;
ctx->zout.avail_out = 0;
ctx->odone = 0;
ctx->comp_level = Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
bi->init = 1;
bi->ptr = (char *)ctx;
bi->flags = 0;
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
openssl
|
1b31b5ad560b16e2fe1cad54a755e3e6b5e778a3
| 173,229,646,041,124,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Modify compression code so it avoids using ex_data free functions. This
stops applications that call CRYPTO_free_all_ex_data() prematurely leaking
memory.
|
template<typename tc>
CImg<T>& draw_triangle(int x0, int y0,
int x1, int y1,
int x2, int y2,
const tc *const color,
float bs0,
float bs1,
float bs2,
const float opacity=1) {
if (is_empty()) return *this;
if (!color)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimg_instance
"draw_triangle(): Specified color is (null).",
cimg_instance);
if (y0>y1) cimg::swap(x0,x1,y0,y1,bs0,bs1);
if (y0>y2) cimg::swap(x0,x2,y0,y2,bs0,bs2);
if (y1>y2) cimg::swap(x1,x2,y1,y2,bs1,bs2);
if (y2<0 || y0>=height() || cimg::min(x0,x1,x2)>=width() || cimg::max(x0,x1,x2)<0 || !opacity) return *this;
const int
w1 = width() - 1, h1 = height() - 1,
dx01 = x1 - x0, dx02 = x2 - x0, dx12 = x2 - x1,
dy01 = std::max(1,y1 - y0), dy02 = std::max(1,y2 - y0), dy12 = std::max(1,y2 - y1),
cy0 = cimg::cut(y0,0,h1), cy2 = cimg::cut(y2,0,h1),
hdy01 = dy01*cimg::sign(dx01)/2, hdy02 = dy02*cimg::sign(dx02)/2, hdy12 = dy12*cimg::sign(dx12)/2;
const float dbs01 = bs1 - bs0, dbs02 = bs2 - bs0, dbs12 = bs2 - bs1;
cimg_init_scanline(opacity);
for (int y = cy0; y<=cy2; ++y) {
const int yy0 = y - y0, yy1 = y - y1;
int
xm = y<y1?x0 + (dx01*yy0 + hdy01)/dy01:x1 + (dx12*yy1 + hdy12)/dy12,
xM = x0 + (dx02*yy0 + hdy02)/dy02;
float
bsm = y<y1?(bs0 + dbs01*yy0/dy01):(bs1 + dbs12*yy1/dy12),
bsM = bs0 + dbs02*yy0/dy02;
if (xm>xM) cimg::swap(xm,xM,bsm,bsM);
if (xM>=0 || xm<=w1) {
const int
cxm = cimg::cut(xm,0,w1),
cxM = cimg::cut(xM,0,w1);
T *ptrd = data(cxm,y);
const int dxmM = std::max(1,xM - xm);
const float dbsmM = bsM - bsm;
for (int x = cxm; x<=cxM; ++x) {
const int xxm = x - xm;
const float cbs = cimg::cut(bsm + dbsmM*xxm/dxmM,0,2);
cimg_forC(*this,c) {
const Tfloat val = cbs<=1?color[c]*cbs:(2 - cbs)*color[c] + (cbs - 1)*_sc_maxval;
ptrd[c*_sc_whd] = (T)(opacity>=1?val:val*_sc_nopacity + ptrd[c*_sc_whd]*_sc_copacity);
}
++ptrd;
}
}
}
return *this;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 130,917,076,172,813,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 |
.
|
JPEGPostEncode(TIFF* tif)
{
JPEGState *sp = JState(tif);
if (sp->scancount > 0) {
/*
* Need to emit a partial bufferload of downsampled data.
* Pad the data vertically.
*/
int ci, ypos, n;
jpeg_component_info* compptr;
for (ci = 0, compptr = sp->cinfo.c.comp_info;
ci < sp->cinfo.c.num_components;
ci++, compptr++) {
int vsamp = compptr->v_samp_factor;
tmsize_t row_width = compptr->width_in_blocks * DCTSIZE
* sizeof(JSAMPLE);
for (ypos = sp->scancount * vsamp;
ypos < DCTSIZE * vsamp; ypos++) {
_TIFFmemcpy((void*)sp->ds_buffer[ci][ypos],
(void*)sp->ds_buffer[ci][ypos-1],
row_width);
}
}
n = sp->cinfo.c.max_v_samp_factor * DCTSIZE;
if (TIFFjpeg_write_raw_data(sp, sp->ds_buffer, n) != n)
return (0);
}
return (TIFFjpeg_finish_compress(JState(tif)));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
libtiff
|
47f2fb61a3a64667bce1a8398a8fcb1b348ff122
| 340,260,890,054,700,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
* libtiff/tif_jpeg.c: avoid integer division by zero in
JPEGSetupEncode() when horizontal or vertical sampling is set to 0.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2653
|
int compat_get_timespec64(struct timespec64 *ts, const void __user *uts)
{
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return copy_from_user(ts, uts, sizeof(*ts)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
else
return __compat_get_timespec64(ts, uts);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
0a0b98734479aa5b3c671d5190e86273372cab95
| 302,630,473,006,535,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct nlattr *attrs[CRYPTOCFGA_MAX+1];
const struct crypto_link *link;
int type, err;
type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
if (type > CRYPTO_MSG_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
type -= CRYPTO_MSG_BASE;
link = &crypto_dispatch[type];
if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type == (CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG - CRYPTO_MSG_BASE) &&
(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP))) {
struct crypto_alg *alg;
u16 dump_alloc = 0;
if (link->dump == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
list_for_each_entry(alg, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list)
dump_alloc += CRYPTO_REPORT_MAXSIZE;
{
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = link->dump,
.done = link->done,
.min_dump_alloc = dump_alloc,
};
return netlink_dump_start(crypto_nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
}
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, crypto_msg_min[type], attrs, CRYPTOCFGA_MAX,
crypto_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (link->doit == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return link->doit(skb, nlh, attrs);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
net
|
90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e
| 29,086,140,491,489,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
StringRef alloc_header_name(BlockAllocator &balloc, const StringRef &name) {
auto iov = make_byte_ref(balloc, name.size() + 1);
auto p = iov.base;
p = std::copy(std::begin(name), std::end(name), p);
util::inp_strlower(iov.base, p);
*p = '\0';
return StringRef{iov.base, p};
}
| 0 |
[] |
nghttp2
|
319d5ab1c6d916b6b8a0d85b2ae3f01b3ad04f2c
| 111,015,213,491,190,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
nghttpx: Fix request stall
Fix request stall if backend connection is reused and buffer is full.
|
extract_array_assignment_list (string, sindex)
char *string;
int *sindex;
{
int slen;
char *ret;
slen = strlen (string); /* ( */
if (string[slen - 1] == ')')
{
ret = substring (string, *sindex, slen - 1);
*sindex = slen - 1;
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
bash
|
955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c
| 330,940,614,315,151,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
bash-4.4-rc2 release
|
static int ctnetlink_stat_ct_cpu(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const cda[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = ctnetlink_ct_stat_cpu_dump,
};
return netlink_dump_start(ctnl, skb, nlh, &c);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
linux
|
1cc5ef91d2ff94d2bf2de3b3585423e8a1051cb6
| 272,228,707,052,859,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
netfilter: ctnetlink: add a range check for l3/l4 protonum
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.
Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
void __iscsi_get_task(struct iscsi_task *task)
{
refcount_inc(&task->refcount);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ec98ea7070e94cc25a422ec97d1421e28d97b7ee
| 139,092,123,083,094,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
scsi: iscsi: Ensure sysfs attributes are limited to PAGE_SIZE
As the iSCSI parameters are exported back through sysfs, it should be
enforcing that they never are more than PAGE_SIZE (which should be more
than enough) before accepting updates through netlink.
Change all iSCSI sysfs attributes to use sysfs_emit().
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Adam Nichols <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Leech <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
TRIO_PUBLIC_STRING char* trio_string_index_last TRIO_ARGS2((self, character), trio_string_t* self,
int character)
{
assert(self);
return trio_index_last(self->content, character);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27
| 72,468,306,471,131,925,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this.
|
static void addrconf_dad_start(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp, u32 flags)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev = ifp->idev;
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
unsigned long rand_num;
addrconf_join_solict(dev, &ifp->addr);
if (ifp->prefix_len != 128 && (ifp->flags&IFA_F_PERMANENT))
addrconf_prefix_route(&ifp->addr, ifp->prefix_len, dev, 0,
flags);
net_srandom(ifp->addr.s6_addr32[3]);
rand_num = net_random() % (idev->cnf.rtr_solicit_delay ? : 1);
read_lock_bh(&idev->lock);
if (ifp->dead)
goto out;
spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
if (dev->flags&(IFF_NOARP|IFF_LOOPBACK) ||
!(ifp->flags&IFA_F_TENTATIVE)) {
ifp->flags &= ~IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
addrconf_dad_completed(ifp);
return;
}
ifp->probes = idev->cnf.dad_transmits;
addrconf_mod_timer(ifp, AC_DAD, rand_num);
spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
out:
read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
8a47077a0b5aa2649751c46e7a27884e6686ccbf
| 116,485,924,549,874,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
[NETLINK]: Missing padding fields in dumped structures
Plug holes with padding fields and initialized them to zero.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tcg_commit(MemoryListener *listener)
{
CPUState *cpu;
/* since each CPU stores ram addresses in its TLB cache, we must
reset the modified entries */
/* XXX: slow ! */
CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
/* FIXME: Disentangle the cpu.h circular files deps so we can
directly get the right CPU from listener. */
if (cpu->tcg_as_listener != listener) {
continue;
}
cpu_reload_memory_map(cpu);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
qemu
|
c3c1bb99d1c11978d9ce94d1bdcf0705378c1459
| 13,773,743,693,796,672,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
exec: Respect as_tranlsate_internal length clamp
address_space_translate_internal will clamp the *plen length argument
based on the size of the memory region being queried. The iommu walker
logic in addresss_space_translate was ignoring this by discarding the
post fn call value of *plen. Fix by just always using *plen as the
length argument throughout the fn, removing the len local variable.
This fixes a bootloader bug when a single elf section spans multiple
QEMU memory regions.
Signed-off-by: Peter Crosthwaite <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
init_pfm_fs(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&pfm_fs_type);
if (!err) {
pfmfs_mnt = kern_mount(&pfm_fs_type);
err = PTR_ERR(pfmfs_mnt);
if (IS_ERR(pfmfs_mnt))
unregister_filesystem(&pfm_fs_type);
else
err = 0;
}
return err;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
41d5e5d73ecef4ef56b7b4cde962929a712689b4
| 171,467,089,035,238,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
[IA64] permon use-after-free fix
Perfmon associates vmalloc()ed memory with a file descriptor, and installs
a vma mapping that memory. Unfortunately, the vm_file field is not filled
in, so processes with mappings to that memory do not prevent the file from
being closed and the memory freed. This results in use-after-free bugs and
multiple freeing of pages, etc.
I saw this bug on an Altix on SLES9. Haven't reproduced upstream but it
looks like the same issue is there.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
|
// Custom random number generator (allow re-entrance).
inline cimg_ulong& rng() { // Used as a shared global number for rng
static cimg_ulong rng = 0xB16B00B5U;
return rng;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 46,269,674,631,438,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
.
|
void fs_basic_fs(void) {
uid_t uid = getuid();
// mount a new proc filesystem
if (arg_debug)
printf("Mounting /proc filesystem representing the PID namespace\n");
if (mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_REC, NULL) < 0)
errExit("mounting /proc");
EUID_USER();
if (arg_debug)
printf("Basic read-only filesystem:\n");
if (!arg_writable_etc) {
fs_remount("/etc", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
if (uid)
fs_remount("/etc", MOUNT_NOEXEC, 1);
}
if (!arg_writable_var) {
fs_remount("/var", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
if (uid)
fs_remount("/var", MOUNT_NOEXEC, 1);
}
fs_remount("/usr", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/bin", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/sbin", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/lib", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/lib64", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/lib32", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
fs_remount("/libx32", MOUNT_READONLY, 1);
EUID_ROOT();
// update /var directory in order to support multiple sandboxes running on the same root directory
fs_var_lock();
if (!arg_keep_var_tmp)
fs_var_tmp();
if (!arg_writable_var_log)
fs_var_log();
else
fs_remount("/var/log", MOUNT_RDWR_NOCHECK, 0);
fs_var_lib();
fs_var_cache();
fs_var_utmp();
fs_machineid();
// don't leak user information
restrict_users();
// when starting as root, firejail config is not disabled;
if (uid)
disable_config();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269",
"CWE-94"
] |
firejail
|
27cde3d7d1e4e16d4190932347c7151dc2a84c50
| 187,109,812,524,851,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 |
fixing CVE-2022-31214
|
static int get_options(int *argc_ptr, char ***argv_ptr)
{
int ho_error;
my_getopt_register_get_addr(mysql_getopt_value);
my_getopt_error_reporter= option_error_reporter;
/* prepare all_options array */
my_init_dynamic_array(&all_options, sizeof(my_option),
array_elements(my_long_options),
array_elements(my_long_options)/4);
for (my_option *opt= my_long_options;
opt < my_long_options + array_elements(my_long_options) - 1;
opt++)
insert_dynamic(&all_options, (uchar*) opt);
sys_var_add_options(&all_options, 0);
add_terminator(&all_options);
/* Skip unknown options so that they may be processed later by plugins */
my_getopt_skip_unknown= TRUE;
if ((ho_error= handle_options(argc_ptr, argv_ptr, (my_option*)(all_options.buffer),
mysqld_get_one_option)))
return ho_error;
if (!opt_help)
delete_dynamic(&all_options);
else
opt_abort= 1;
/* Add back the program name handle_options removes */
(*argc_ptr)++;
(*argv_ptr)--;
/*
Options have been parsed. Now some of them need additional special
handling, like custom value checking, checking of incompatibilites
between options, setting of multiple variables, etc.
Do them here.
*/
if ((opt_log_slow_admin_statements || opt_log_queries_not_using_indexes ||
opt_log_slow_slave_statements) &&
!opt_slow_log)
sql_print_warning("options --log-slow-admin-statements, --log-queries-not-using-indexes and --log-slow-slave-statements have no effect if --log_slow_queries is not set");
if (global_system_variables.net_buffer_length >
global_system_variables.max_allowed_packet)
{
sql_print_warning("net_buffer_length (%lu) is set to be larger "
"than max_allowed_packet (%lu). Please rectify.",
global_system_variables.net_buffer_length,
global_system_variables.max_allowed_packet);
}
if (log_error_file_ptr != disabled_my_option)
opt_error_log= 1;
else
log_error_file_ptr= const_cast<char*>("");
opt_init_connect.length=strlen(opt_init_connect.str);
opt_init_slave.length=strlen(opt_init_slave.str);
if (global_system_variables.low_priority_updates)
thr_upgraded_concurrent_insert_lock= TL_WRITE_LOW_PRIORITY;
if (ft_boolean_check_syntax_string((uchar*) ft_boolean_syntax))
{
sql_print_error("Invalid ft-boolean-syntax string: %s\n",
ft_boolean_syntax);
return 1;
}
if (opt_disable_networking)
mysqld_port= mysqld_extra_port= 0;
if (opt_skip_show_db)
opt_specialflag|= SPECIAL_SKIP_SHOW_DB;
if (myisam_flush)
flush_time= 0;
#ifdef HAVE_REPLICATION
if (opt_slave_skip_errors)
init_slave_skip_errors(opt_slave_skip_errors);
#endif
if (global_system_variables.max_join_size == HA_POS_ERROR)
global_system_variables.option_bits|= OPTION_BIG_SELECTS;
else
global_system_variables.option_bits&= ~OPTION_BIG_SELECTS;
// Synchronize @@global.autocommit on --autocommit
const ulonglong turn_bit_on= opt_autocommit ?
OPTION_AUTOCOMMIT : OPTION_NOT_AUTOCOMMIT;
global_system_variables.option_bits=
(global_system_variables.option_bits &
~(OPTION_NOT_AUTOCOMMIT | OPTION_AUTOCOMMIT)) | turn_bit_on;
global_system_variables.sql_mode=
expand_sql_mode(global_system_variables.sql_mode);
#if defined(HAVE_BROKEN_REALPATH)
my_use_symdir=0;
my_disable_symlinks=1;
have_symlink=SHOW_OPTION_NO;
#else
if (!my_use_symdir)
{
my_disable_symlinks=1;
have_symlink=SHOW_OPTION_DISABLED;
}
#endif
if (opt_debugging)
{
/* Allow break with SIGINT, no core or stack trace */
test_flags|= TEST_SIGINT;
opt_stack_trace= 1;
test_flags&= ~TEST_CORE_ON_SIGNAL;
}
/* Set global MyISAM variables from delay_key_write_options */
fix_delay_key_write(0, 0, OPT_GLOBAL);
#ifndef EMBEDDED_LIBRARY
if (mysqld_chroot)
set_root(mysqld_chroot);
#else
thread_handling = SCHEDULER_NO_THREADS;
max_allowed_packet= global_system_variables.max_allowed_packet;
net_buffer_length= global_system_variables.net_buffer_length;
#endif
if (fix_paths())
return 1;
/*
Set some global variables from the global_system_variables
In most cases the global variables will not be used
*/
my_disable_locking= myisam_single_user= test(opt_external_locking == 0);
my_default_record_cache_size=global_system_variables.read_buff_size;
/*
Log mysys errors when we don't have a thd or thd->log_all_errors is set
(recovery) to the log. This is mainly useful for debugging strange system
errors.
*/
if (global_system_variables.log_warnings >= 10)
my_global_flags= MY_WME | ME_JUST_INFO;
/* Log all errors not handled by thd->handle_error() to my_message_sql() */
if (global_system_variables.log_warnings >= 11)
my_global_flags|= ME_NOREFRESH;
if (my_assert_on_error)
debug_assert_if_crashed_table= 1;
global_system_variables.long_query_time= (ulonglong)
(global_system_variables.long_query_time_double * 1e6);
if (opt_short_log_format)
opt_specialflag|= SPECIAL_SHORT_LOG_FORMAT;
if (init_global_datetime_format(MYSQL_TIMESTAMP_DATE,
&global_date_format) ||
init_global_datetime_format(MYSQL_TIMESTAMP_TIME,
&global_time_format) ||
init_global_datetime_format(MYSQL_TIMESTAMP_DATETIME,
&global_datetime_format))
return 1;
#ifdef EMBEDDED_LIBRARY
one_thread_scheduler(thread_scheduler);
one_thread_scheduler(extra_thread_scheduler);
#else
#ifdef _WIN32
/* workaround: disable thread pool on XP */
if (GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32"),"CreateThreadpool") == 0 &&
thread_handling > SCHEDULER_NO_THREADS)
thread_handling = SCHEDULER_ONE_THREAD_PER_CONNECTION;
#endif
if (thread_handling <= SCHEDULER_ONE_THREAD_PER_CONNECTION)
one_thread_per_connection_scheduler(thread_scheduler, &max_connections,
&connection_count);
else if (thread_handling == SCHEDULER_NO_THREADS)
one_thread_scheduler(thread_scheduler);
else
pool_of_threads_scheduler(thread_scheduler, &max_connections,
&connection_count);
one_thread_per_connection_scheduler(extra_thread_scheduler,
&extra_max_connections,
&extra_connection_count);
#endif
global_system_variables.engine_condition_pushdown=
test(global_system_variables.optimizer_switch &
OPTIMIZER_SWITCH_ENGINE_CONDITION_PUSHDOWN);
opt_readonly= read_only;
/*
If max_long_data_size is not specified explicitly use
value of max_allowed_packet.
*/
if (!max_long_data_size_used)
max_long_data_size= global_system_variables.max_allowed_packet;
/* Rember if max_user_connections was 0 at startup */
max_user_connections_checking= global_system_variables.max_user_connections != 0;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
server
|
347eeefbfc658c8531878218487d729f4e020805
| 86,580,299,810,109,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 209 |
don't use my_copystat in the server
it was supposed to be used in command-line tools only.
Different fix for 4e5473862e:
Bug#24388746: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION AND RACE CONDITION USING CREATE TABLE
|
static bool spd_can_coalesce(const struct splice_pipe_desc *spd,
struct page *page,
unsigned int offset)
{
return spd->nr_pages &&
spd->pages[spd->nr_pages - 1] == page &&
(spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].offset +
spd->partial[spd->nr_pages - 1].len == offset);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
net
|
36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c
| 1,129,746,107,362,003,900,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors
skb_zerocopy can copy elements of the frags array between skbs, but it doesn't
orphan them. Also, it doesn't handle errors, so this patch takes care of that
as well, and modify the callers accordingly. skb_tx_error() is also added to
the callers so they will signal the failed delivery towards the creator of the
skb.
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void __fastcall TConsoleRunner::ScriptTerminalPromptUser(TTerminal * /*Terminal*/,
TPromptKind /*Kind*/, UnicodeString Name, UnicodeString Instructions, TStrings * Prompts,
TStrings * Results, bool & Result, void * /*Arg*/)
{
if (!Instructions.IsEmpty())
{
PrintMessage(Instructions);
}
// if there are no prompts, success is default
Result = true;
for (int Index = 0; Index < Prompts->Count; Index++)
{
UnicodeString Prompt = Prompts->Strings[Index];
if (!Prompt.IsEmpty() && (Prompt[Prompt.Length()] != L' '))
{
Prompt += L' ';
}
int P = Prompt.Pos(L'&');
if (P > 0)
{
Prompt.Delete(P, 1);
}
Print(Prompt);
UnicodeString AResult = Results->Strings[Index]; // useless
bool Echo = FLAGSET(int(Prompts->Objects[Index]), pupEcho);
Result = DoInput(AResult, Echo, InputTimeout(), true);
Results->Strings[Index] = AResult;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
winscp
|
faa96e8144e6925a380f94a97aa382c9427f688d
| 150,805,580,090,328,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
Bug 1943: Prevent loading session settings that can lead to remote code execution from handled URLs
https://winscp.net/tracker/1943
(cherry picked from commit ec584f5189a856cd79509f754722a6898045c5e0)
Source commit: 0f4be408b3f01132b00682da72d925d6c4ee649b
|
static int get_swift_account_settings(req_state * const s,
RGWRados * const store,
RGWAccessControlPolicy_SWIFTAcct * const policy,
bool * const has_policy)
{
*has_policy = false;
const char * const acl_attr = s->info.env->get("HTTP_X_ACCOUNT_ACCESS_CONTROL");
if (acl_attr) {
RGWAccessControlPolicy_SWIFTAcct swift_acct_policy(s->cct);
const bool r = swift_acct_policy.create(store,
s->user->user_id,
s->user->display_name,
string(acl_attr));
if (r != true) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*policy = swift_acct_policy;
*has_policy = true;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
ceph
|
f44a8ae8aa27ecef69528db9aec220f12492810e
| 173,860,213,732,039,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
rgw: RGWSwiftWebsiteHandler::is_web_dir checks empty subdir_name
checking for empty name avoids later assertion in RGWObjectCtx::set_atomic
Fixes: CVE-2021-3531
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 7196a469b4470f3c8628489df9a41ec8b00a5610)
|
void swap(String &inout, bool set_read_value)
{
if (set_read_value)
read_value.swap(inout);
else
value.swap(inout);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 246,077,817,369,029,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
mymono_metadata_type_hash (MonoType *t1)
{
guint hash;
hash = t1->type;
hash |= t1->byref << 6; /* do not collide with t1->type values */
switch (t1->type) {
case MONO_TYPE_VALUETYPE:
case MONO_TYPE_CLASS:
case MONO_TYPE_SZARRAY:
/* check if the distribution is good enough */
return ((hash << 5) - hash) ^ mono_aligned_addr_hash (t1->data.klass);
case MONO_TYPE_PTR:
return ((hash << 5) - hash) ^ mymono_metadata_type_hash (t1->data.type);
case MONO_TYPE_GENERICINST: {
int i;
MonoGenericInst *inst = t1->data.generic_class->context.class_inst;
hash += g_str_hash (t1->data.generic_class->container_class->name);
hash *= 13;
for (i = 0; i < inst->type_argc; ++i) {
hash += mymono_metadata_type_hash (inst->type_argv [i]);
hash *= 13;
}
return hash;
}
case MONO_TYPE_VAR:
case MONO_TYPE_MVAR:
return ((hash << 5) - hash) ^ GPOINTER_TO_UINT (t1->data.generic_param);
}
return hash;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
mono
|
65292a69c837b8a5f7a392d34db63de592153358
| 110,168,896,293,198,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
Handle invalid instantiation of generic methods.
* verify.c: Add new function to internal verifier API to check
method instantiations.
* reflection.c (mono_reflection_bind_generic_method_parameters):
Check the instantiation before returning it.
Fixes #655847
|
static ulonglong read_rand_seed(THD *thd)
{
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mysql-server
|
48bd8b16fe382be302c6f0b45931be5aa6f29a0e
| 279,028,344,501,754,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Bug#24388753: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING MYSQLD_SAFE
[This is the 5.5/5.6 version of the bugfix].
The problem was that it was possible to write log files ending
in .ini/.cnf that later could be parsed as an options file.
This made it possible for users to specify startup options
without the permissions to do so.
This patch fixes the problem by disallowing general query log
and slow query log to be written to files ending in .ini and .cnf.
|
static void ieee80211_set_wakeup(struct wiphy *wiphy, bool enabled)
{
drv_set_wakeup(wiphy_priv(wiphy), enabled);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287"
] |
linux
|
3e493173b7841259a08c5c8e5cbe90adb349da7e
| 133,163,752,536,865,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ves_icall_System_Reflection_AssemblyName_ParseName (MonoReflectionAssemblyName *name, MonoString *assname)
{
MonoAssemblyName aname;
MonoDomain *domain = mono_object_domain (name);
char *val;
gboolean is_version_defined;
gboolean is_token_defined;
aname.public_key = NULL;
val = mono_string_to_utf8 (assname);
if (!mono_assembly_name_parse_full (val, &aname, TRUE, &is_version_defined, &is_token_defined)) {
g_free ((guint8*) aname.public_key);
g_free (val);
return FALSE;
}
fill_reflection_assembly_name (domain, name, &aname, "", is_version_defined,
FALSE, is_token_defined);
mono_assembly_name_free (&aname);
g_free ((guint8*) aname.public_key);
g_free (val);
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mono
|
035c8587c0d8d307e45f1b7171a0d337bb451f1e
| 176,269,501,837,740,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Allow only primitive types/enums in RuntimeHelpers.InitializeArray ().
|
int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req,
const char *attrname, int type,
const unsigned char *bytes, int len)
{
if (X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(&req->req_info->attributes, attrname,
type, bytes, len))
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
28a00bcd8e318da18031b2ac8778c64147cd54f9
| 51,172,662,309,785,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Check public key is not NULL.
CVE-2015-0288
PR#3708
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
|
CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_Duplicate(const cJSON *item, cJSON_bool recurse)
{
cJSON *newitem = NULL;
cJSON *child = NULL;
cJSON *next = NULL;
cJSON *newchild = NULL;
/* Bail on bad ptr */
if (!item)
{
goto fail;
}
/* Create new item */
newitem = cJSON_New_Item(&global_hooks);
if (!newitem)
{
goto fail;
}
/* Copy over all vars */
newitem->type = item->type & (~cJSON_IsReference);
newitem->valueint = item->valueint;
newitem->valuedouble = item->valuedouble;
if (item->valuestring)
{
newitem->valuestring = (char*)cJSON_strdup((unsigned char*)item->valuestring, &global_hooks);
if (!newitem->valuestring)
{
goto fail;
}
}
if (item->string)
{
newitem->string = (item->type&cJSON_StringIsConst) ? item->string : (char*)cJSON_strdup((unsigned char*)item->string, &global_hooks);
if (!newitem->string)
{
goto fail;
}
}
/* If non-recursive, then we're done! */
if (!recurse)
{
return newitem;
}
/* Walk the ->next chain for the child. */
child = item->child;
while (child != NULL)
{
newchild = cJSON_Duplicate(child, true); /* Duplicate (with recurse) each item in the ->next chain */
if (!newchild)
{
goto fail;
}
if (next != NULL)
{
/* If newitem->child already set, then crosswire ->prev and ->next and move on */
next->next = newchild;
newchild->prev = next;
next = newchild;
}
else
{
/* Set newitem->child and move to it */
newitem->child = newchild;
next = newchild;
}
child = child->next;
}
return newitem;
fail:
if (newitem != NULL)
{
cJSON_Delete(newitem);
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-754",
"CWE-787"
] |
cJSON
|
be749d7efa7c9021da746e685bd6dec79f9dd99b
| 253,138,147,419,965,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 78 |
Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
|
static inline int sock_recvmsg_nosec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int flags)
{
return sock->ops->recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-241",
"CWE-19"
] |
linux
|
34b88a68f26a75e4fded796f1a49c40f82234b7d
| 158,091,488,800,486,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <[email protected]>
Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
valid_civil_sub(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE klass, int need_jd)
{
VALUE nth, y;
int m, d, ry, rm, rd;
double sg;
y = argv[0];
m = NUM2INT(argv[1]);
d = NUM2INT(argv[2]);
sg = NUM2DBL(argv[3]);
valid_sg(sg);
if (!need_jd && (guess_style(y, sg) < 0)) {
if (!valid_gregorian_p(y, m, d,
&nth, &ry,
&rm, &rd))
return Qnil;
return INT2FIX(0); /* dummy */
}
else {
int rjd, ns;
VALUE rjd2;
if (!valid_civil_p(y, m, d, sg,
&nth, &ry,
&rm, &rd, &rjd,
&ns))
return Qnil;
if (!need_jd)
return INT2FIX(0); /* dummy */
encode_jd(nth, rjd, &rjd2);
return rjd2;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
date
|
3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0
| 87,802,291,435,684,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301
|
static int ext4_mb_seq_groups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct super_block *sb = seq->private;
ext4_group_t group = (ext4_group_t) ((unsigned long) v);
int i;
int err, buddy_loaded = 0;
struct ext4_buddy e4b;
struct ext4_group_info *grinfo;
unsigned char blocksize_bits = min_t(unsigned char,
sb->s_blocksize_bits,
EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE);
struct sg {
struct ext4_group_info info;
ext4_grpblk_t counters[EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_LOG_SIZE + 2];
} sg;
group--;
if (group == 0)
seq_puts(seq, "#group: free frags first ["
" 2^0 2^1 2^2 2^3 2^4 2^5 2^6 "
" 2^7 2^8 2^9 2^10 2^11 2^12 2^13 ]\n");
i = (blocksize_bits + 2) * sizeof(sg.info.bb_counters[0]) +
sizeof(struct ext4_group_info);
grinfo = ext4_get_group_info(sb, group);
/* Load the group info in memory only if not already loaded. */
if (unlikely(EXT4_MB_GRP_NEED_INIT(grinfo))) {
err = ext4_mb_load_buddy(sb, group, &e4b);
if (err) {
seq_printf(seq, "#%-5u: I/O error\n", group);
return 0;
}
buddy_loaded = 1;
}
memcpy(&sg, ext4_get_group_info(sb, group), i);
if (buddy_loaded)
ext4_mb_unload_buddy(&e4b);
seq_printf(seq, "#%-5u: %-5u %-5u %-5u [", group, sg.info.bb_free,
sg.info.bb_fragments, sg.info.bb_first_free);
for (i = 0; i <= 13; i++)
seq_printf(seq, " %-5u", i <= blocksize_bits + 1 ?
sg.info.bb_counters[i] : 0);
seq_printf(seq, " ]\n");
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
8844618d8aa7a9973e7b527d038a2a589665002c
| 93,445,435,879,169,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 |
ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid
The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the
uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled. We were not
consistently looking at this field; fix this.
Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps,
or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other
special inodes are set up. Check for these conditions and mark the
file system as corrupted if they are detected.
This addresses CVE-2018-10876.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
xmlSetEntityReferenceFunc(xmlEntityReferenceFunc func)
{
xmlEntityRefFunc = func;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libxml2
|
77404b8b69bc122d12231807abf1a837d121b551
| 82,374,666,445,300,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Make sure the parser returns when getting a Stop order
patch backported from chromiun bug fixes, assuming author is Chris
|
pthread_once(pthread_once_t *once, void (*cb) (void))
{
BOOL rc = InitOnceExecuteOnce(&once->once, _pthread_once_win32_cb, cb, NULL);
if (rc == 0)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
portable
|
17c88164016df821df2dff4b2b1291291ec4f28a
| 316,508,688,537,506,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Make pthread_mutex static initialisation work on Windows.
This takes the dynamic initialisation code added to CRYPTO_lock() in e5081719
and applies it to the Window's pthread_mutex implementation. This allows for
PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER to be used on Windows.
bcook has agreed to place this code in the public domain (as per the rest of
the code in pthread.h).
|
static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
{
size_t i;
size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
return( 0 );
for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
{
if( cn[i] == '.' )
{
cn_idx = i;
break;
}
}
if( cn_idx == 0 )
return( -1 );
if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] |
mbedtls
|
d15795acd5074e0b44e71f7ede8bdfe1b48591fc
| 235,466,675,074,510,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
|
module_from_sym(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *klass, mrb_sym id)
{
mrb_value c = mrb_const_get(mrb, mrb_obj_value(klass), id);
mrb_check_type(mrb, c, MRB_TT_MODULE);
return mrb_class_ptr(c);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476",
"CWE-415"
] |
mruby
|
faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
| 15,697,245,050,179,706,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
`mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
|
MagickExport unsigned char *GetStringInfoDatum(const StringInfo *string_info)
{
assert(string_info != (StringInfo *) NULL);
assert(string_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(string_info->datum);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
ImageMagick
|
be90a5395695f0d19479a5d46b06c678be7f7927
| 207,361,252,778,315,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1721
|
const char *crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot, size_t *key_size)
{
const char *cipher;
if (!cd || !isLUKS(cd->type) || !key_size)
return NULL;
if (isLUKS1(cd->type)) {
if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT &&
LUKS_keyslot_info(&cd->u.luks1.hdr, keyslot) < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
return NULL;
*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
return cd->u.luks1.cipher_spec;
}
if (keyslot != CRYPT_ANY_SLOT)
return LUKS2_get_keyslot_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, keyslot, key_size);
/* Keyslot encryption was set through crypt_keyslot_set_encryption() */
if (cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher) {
*key_size = cd->u.luks2.keyslot_key_size;
return cd->u.luks2.keyslot_cipher;
}
/* Try to reuse volume encryption parameters */
cipher = LUKS2_get_cipher(&cd->u.luks2.hdr, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
if (!LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(cd, cipher)) {
*key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
if (*key_size)
return cipher;
}
/* Fallback to default LUKS2 keyslot encryption */
*key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
return DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-345"
] |
cryptsetup
|
0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c
| 125,548,204,825,461,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.
This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.
The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.
The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.
The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0.
|
TfLiteStatus Prepare(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {
TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, NumInputs(node) == 1 || NumInputs(node) == 2);
TF_LITE_ENSURE_EQ(context, NumOutputs(node), 1);
// Always postpone sizing string tensors, even if we could in principle
// calculate their shapes now. String tensors don't benefit from having their
// shapes precalculated because the actual memory can only be allocated after
// we know all the content.
TfLiteTensor* output;
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context,
GetOutputSafe(context, node, kOutputTensor, &output));
if (output->type != kTfLiteString) {
if (NumInputs(node) == 1 ||
IsConstantTensor(GetInput(context, node, kShapeTensor))) {
TF_LITE_ENSURE_OK(context, ResizeOutput(context, node));
} else {
SetTensorToDynamic(output);
}
}
return kTfLiteOk;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
tensorflow
|
1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35
| 156,789,231,000,335,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
[tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56
|
static int register_leaf_sysctl_tables(const char *path, char *pos,
struct ctl_table_header ***subheader, struct ctl_table_set *set,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct ctl_table *ctl_table_arg = NULL;
struct ctl_table *entry, *files;
int nr_files = 0;
int nr_dirs = 0;
int err = -ENOMEM;
for (entry = table; entry->procname; entry++) {
if (entry->child)
nr_dirs++;
else
nr_files++;
}
files = table;
/* If there are mixed files and directories we need a new table */
if (nr_dirs && nr_files) {
struct ctl_table *new;
files = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ctl_table) * (nr_files + 1),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!files)
goto out;
ctl_table_arg = files;
for (new = files, entry = table; entry->procname; entry++) {
if (entry->child)
continue;
*new = *entry;
new++;
}
}
/* Register everything except a directory full of subdirectories */
if (nr_files || !nr_dirs) {
struct ctl_table_header *header;
header = __register_sysctl_table(set, path, files);
if (!header) {
kfree(ctl_table_arg);
goto out;
}
/* Remember if we need to free the file table */
header->ctl_table_arg = ctl_table_arg;
**subheader = header;
(*subheader)++;
}
/* Recurse into the subdirectories. */
for (entry = table; entry->procname; entry++) {
char *child_pos;
if (!entry->child)
continue;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
child_pos = append_path(path, pos, entry->procname);
if (!child_pos)
goto out;
err = register_leaf_sysctl_tables(path, child_pos, subheader,
set, entry->child);
pos[0] = '\0';
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out:
/* On failure our caller will unregister all registered subheaders */
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939
| 52,242,753,930,892,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
|
void Magick::Image::orientation(const Magick::OrientationType orientation_)
{
modifyImage();
image()->orientation=orientation_;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ImageMagick
|
8c35502217c1879cb8257c617007282eee3fe1cc
| 265,878,243,562,911,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Added missing return to avoid use after free.
|
u16 capi20_get_manufacturer(u32 contr, u8 buf[CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN])
{
struct capi_ctr *ctr;
u16 ret;
if (contr == 0) {
strncpy(buf, capi_manufakturer, CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN);
return CAPI_NOERROR;
}
mutex_lock(&capi_controller_lock);
ctr = get_capi_ctr_by_nr(contr);
if (ctr && ctr->state == CAPI_CTR_RUNNING) {
strncpy(buf, ctr->manu, CAPI_MANUFACTURER_LEN);
ret = CAPI_NOERROR;
} else
ret = CAPI_REGNOTINSTALLED;
mutex_unlock(&capi_controller_lock);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
1f3e2e97c003f80c4b087092b225c8787ff91e4d
| 57,355,320,483,749,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
isdn: cpai: check ctr->cnr to avoid array index out of bound
The cmtp_add_connection() would add a cmtp session to a controller
and run a kernel thread to process cmtp.
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
session->task = kthread_run(cmtp_session, session, "kcmtpd_ctr_%d",
session->num);
During this process, the kernel thread would call detach_capi_ctr()
to detach a register controller. if the controller
was not attached yet, detach_capi_ctr() would
trigger an array-index-out-bounds bug.
[ 46.866069][ T6479] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/isdn/capi/kcapi.c:483:21
[ 46.867196][ T6479] index -1 is out of range for type 'capi_ctr *[32]'
[ 46.867982][ T6479] CPU: 1 PID: 6479 Comm: kcmtpd_ctr_0 Not tainted
5.15.0-rc2+ #8
[ 46.869002][ T6479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX,
1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
[ 46.870107][ T6479] Call Trace:
[ 46.870473][ T6479] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 46.870974][ T6479] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
[ 46.871458][ T6479] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x43/0x48
[ 46.872135][ T6479] detach_capi_ctr+0x64/0xc0
[ 46.872639][ T6479] cmtp_session+0x5c8/0x5d0
[ 46.873131][ T6479] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x60/0x60
[ 46.873712][ T6479] ? cmtp_add_msgpart+0x120/0x120
[ 46.874256][ T6479] kthread+0x147/0x170
[ 46.874709][ T6479] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
[ 46.875248][ T6479] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 46.875773][ T6479]
Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
static char *oidc_make_sid_iss_unique(request_rec *r, const char *sid,
const char *issuer) {
return apr_psprintf(r->pool, "%s@%s", sid, issuer);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-601"
] |
mod_auth_openidc
|
5c15dfb08106c2451c2c44ce7ace6813c216ba75
| 326,905,977,568,244,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
improve validation of the post-logout URL; closes #449
- to avoid an open redirect; thanks AIMOTO Norihito
- release 2.4.0.1
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <[email protected]>
|
static int ModuleInfoCompare(const void *x,const void *y)
{
const ModuleInfo
**p,
**q;
p=(const ModuleInfo **) x,
q=(const ModuleInfo **) y;
if (LocaleCompare((*p)->path,(*q)->path) == 0)
return(LocaleCompare((*p)->tag,(*q)->tag));
return(LocaleCompare((*p)->path,(*q)->path));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-362"
] |
ImageMagick
|
01faddbe2711a4156180c4a92837e2f23683cc68
| 63,817,263,523,530,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Use the correct rights.
|
static apr_status_t ap_session_set(request_rec * r, session_rec * z,
const char *key, const char *value)
{
if (!z) {
apr_status_t rv;
rv = ap_session_load(r, &z);
if (APR_SUCCESS != rv) {
return rv;
}
}
if (z) {
if (value) {
apr_table_set(z->entries, key, value);
}
else {
apr_table_unset(z->entries, key);
}
z->dirty = 1;
}
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
httpd
|
67bd9bfe6c38831e14fe7122f1d84391472498f8
| 70,572,836,848,518,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
mod_session: save one apr_strtok() in session_identity_decode().
When the encoding is invalid (missing '='), no need to parse further.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1887050 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static void rose_destroy_timer(unsigned long data)
{
rose_destroy_socket((struct sock *)data);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
17ac2e9c58b69a1e25460a568eae1b0dc0188c25
| 34,214,554,152,433,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
rose: Fix rose_getname() leak
rose_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
gdata_service_class_init (GDataServiceClass *klass)
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class = G_OBJECT_CLASS (klass);
g_type_class_add_private (klass, sizeof (GDataServicePrivate));
gobject_class->set_property = gdata_service_set_property;
gobject_class->get_property = gdata_service_get_property;
gobject_class->dispose = gdata_service_dispose;
gobject_class->finalize = gdata_service_finalize;
klass->api_version = "2";
klass->feed_type = GDATA_TYPE_FEED;
klass->append_query_headers = real_append_query_headers;
klass->parse_error_response = real_parse_error_response;
klass->get_authorization_domains = NULL; /* equivalent to returning an empty list of domains */
/**
* GDataService:proxy-uri:
*
* The proxy URI used internally for all network requests.
*
* Note that if a #GDataAuthorizer is being used with this #GDataService, the authorizer might also need its proxy URI setting.
*
* Since: 0.2.0
**/
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class, PROP_PROXY_URI,
g_param_spec_boxed ("proxy-uri",
"Proxy URI", "The proxy URI used internally for all network requests.",
SOUP_TYPE_URI,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS));
/**
* GDataService:timeout:
*
* A timeout, in seconds, for network operations. If the timeout is exceeded, the operation will be cancelled and
* %GDATA_SERVICE_ERROR_NETWORK_ERROR will be returned.
*
* If the timeout is <code class="literal">0</code>, operations will never time out.
*
* Note that if a #GDataAuthorizer is being used with this #GDataService, the authorizer might also need its timeout setting.
*
* Since: 0.7.0
**/
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class, PROP_TIMEOUT,
g_param_spec_uint ("timeout",
"Timeout", "A timeout, in seconds, for network operations.",
0, G_MAXUINT, 0,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS));
/**
* GDataService:locale:
*
* The locale to use for network requests, in Unix locale format. (e.g. "en_GB", "cs", "de_DE".) Use %NULL for the default "C" locale
* (typically "en_US").
*
* Typically, this locale will be used by the server-side software to localise results, such as by translating category names, or by choosing
* geographically relevant search results. This will vary from service to service.
*
* The server-side behaviour is undefined if it doesn't support a given locale.
*
* Since: 0.7.0
**/
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class, PROP_LOCALE,
g_param_spec_string ("locale",
"Locale", "The locale to use for network requests, in Unix locale format.",
NULL,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS));
/**
* GDataService:authorizer:
*
* An object which implements #GDataAuthorizer. This should have previously been authenticated authorized against this service type (and
* potentially other service types). The service will use the authorizer to add an authorization token to each request it performs.
*
* Your application should call methods on the #GDataAuthorizer object itself in order to authenticate with the Google accounts service and
* authorize against this service type. See the documentation for the particular #GDataAuthorizer implementation being used for more details.
*
* The authorizer for a service can be changed at runtime for a different #GDataAuthorizer object or %NULL without affecting ongoing requests
* and operations.
*
* Note that it's only necessary to set an authorizer on the service if your application is going to make requests of the service which
* require authorization. For example, listing the current most popular videos on YouTube does not require authorization, but uploading a
* video to YouTube does. It's an unnecessary overhead to require the user to authorize against a service when not strictly required.
*
* Since: 0.9.0
**/
g_object_class_install_property (gobject_class, PROP_AUTHORIZER,
g_param_spec_object ("authorizer",
"Authorizer", "An authorizer object to provide an authorization token for each request.",
GDATA_TYPE_AUTHORIZER,
G_PARAM_READWRITE | G_PARAM_STATIC_STRINGS));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libgdata
|
6799f2c525a584dc998821a6ce897e463dad7840
| 305,148,381,969,344,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 93 |
core: Validate SSL certificates for all connections
This prevents MitM attacks which use spoofed SSL certificates.
Note that this bumps our libsoup requirement to 2.37.91.
Closes: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671535
|
static void test_store_result2()
{
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
int rc;
int nData;
ulong length;
MYSQL_BIND my_bind[1];
char query[MAX_TEST_QUERY_LENGTH];
myheader("test_store_result2");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "DROP TABLE IF EXISTS test_store_result");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "CREATE TABLE test_store_result(col1 int , col2 varchar(50))");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "INSERT INTO test_store_result VALUES(10, 'venu'), (20, 'mysql')");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "INSERT INTO test_store_result(col2) VALUES('monty')");
myquery(rc);
rc= mysql_commit(mysql);
myquery(rc);
/*
We need to bzero bind structure because mysql_stmt_bind_param checks all
its members.
*/
bzero((char*) my_bind, sizeof(my_bind));
my_bind[0].buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
my_bind[0].buffer= (void *) &nData; /* integer data */
my_bind[0].length= &length;
my_bind[0].is_null= 0;
strmov((char *)query , "SELECT col1 FROM test_store_result where col1= ?");
stmt= mysql_simple_prepare(mysql, query);
check_stmt(stmt);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_param(stmt, my_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, my_bind);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 10; length= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_store_result(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
if (!opt_silent)
fprintf(stdout, "\n row 1: %d", nData);
DIE_UNLESS(nData == 10);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
nData= 20;
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
nData= 0;
rc= mysql_stmt_store_result(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
if (!opt_silent)
fprintf(stdout, "\n row 1: %d", nData);
DIE_UNLESS(nData == 20);
rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == MYSQL_NO_DATA);
mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
eef21014898d61e77890359d6546d4985d829ef6
| 31,078,837,527,073,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 |
MDEV-11933 Wrong usage of linked list in mysql_prune_stmt_list
mysql_prune_stmt_list() was walking the list following
element->next pointers, but inside the loop it was invoking
list_add(element) that modified element->next. So, mysql_prune_stmt_list()
failed to visit and reset all elements, and some of them were left
with pointers to invalid MYSQL.
|
void ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStream::traceRequest() {
Tracing::Decision tracing_decision =
Tracing::HttpTracerUtility::isTracing(stream_info_, *request_headers_);
ConnectionManagerImpl::chargeTracingStats(tracing_decision.reason,
connection_manager_.config_.tracingStats());
active_span_ = connection_manager_.tracer().startSpan(*this, *request_headers_, stream_info_,
tracing_decision);
if (!active_span_) {
return;
}
// TODO: Need to investigate the following code based on the cached route, as may
// be broken in the case a filter changes the route.
// If a decorator has been defined, apply it to the active span.
if (hasCachedRoute() && cached_route_.value()->decorator()) {
cached_route_.value()->decorator()->apply(*active_span_);
// Cache decorated operation.
if (!cached_route_.value()->decorator()->getOperation().empty()) {
decorated_operation_ = &cached_route_.value()->decorator()->getOperation();
}
}
if (connection_manager_.config_.tracingConfig()->operation_name_ ==
Tracing::OperationName::Egress) {
// For egress (outbound) requests, pass the decorator's operation name (if defined)
// as a request header to enable the receiving service to use it in its server span.
if (decorated_operation_) {
request_headers_->insertEnvoyDecoratorOperation().value(*decorated_operation_);
}
} else {
const HeaderEntry* req_operation_override = request_headers_->EnvoyDecoratorOperation();
// For ingress (inbound) requests, if a decorator operation name has been provided, it
// should be used to override the active span's operation.
if (req_operation_override) {
if (!req_operation_override->value().empty()) {
active_span_->setOperation(req_operation_override->value().getStringView());
// Clear the decorated operation so won't be used in the response header, as
// it has been overridden by the inbound decorator operation request header.
decorated_operation_ = nullptr;
}
// Remove header so not propagated to service
request_headers_->removeEnvoyDecoratorOperation();
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
envoy
|
afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014
| 246,963,321,179,590,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]>
|
and_code_range_buf(BBuf* bbuf1, int not1, BBuf* bbuf2, int not2, BBuf** pbuf, ScanEnv* env)
{
int r;
OnigCodePoint i, j, n1, n2, *data1, *data2;
OnigCodePoint from, to, from1, to1, from2, to2;
*pbuf = (BBuf* )NULL;
if (IS_NULL(bbuf1)) {
if (not1 != 0 && IS_NOT_NULL(bbuf2)) /* not1 != 0 -> not2 == 0 */
return bbuf_clone(pbuf, bbuf2);
return 0;
}
else if (IS_NULL(bbuf2)) {
if (not2 != 0)
return bbuf_clone(pbuf, bbuf1);
return 0;
}
if (not1 != 0)
SWAP_BBUF_NOT(bbuf1, not1, bbuf2, not2);
data1 = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf1->p);
data2 = (OnigCodePoint* )(bbuf2->p);
GET_CODE_POINT(n1, data1);
GET_CODE_POINT(n2, data2);
data1++;
data2++;
if (not2 == 0 && not1 == 0) { /* 1 AND 2 */
for (i = 0; i < n1; i++) {
from1 = data1[i*2];
to1 = data1[i*2+1];
for (j = 0; j < n2; j++) {
from2 = data2[j*2];
to2 = data2[j*2+1];
if (from2 > to1) break;
if (to2 < from1) continue;
from = MAX(from1, from2);
to = MIN(to1, to2);
r = add_code_range_to_buf(pbuf, env, from, to);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
}
else if (not1 == 0) { /* 1 AND (not 2) */
for (i = 0; i < n1; i++) {
from1 = data1[i*2];
to1 = data1[i*2+1];
r = and_code_range1(pbuf, env, from1, to1, data2, n2);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
Onigmo
|
00cc7e28a3ed54b3b512ef3b58ea737a57acf1f9
| 134,727,828,308,209,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
When onig_new(ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL) fails with ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME,
onig_error_code_to_str() crashes.
onig_scan_env_set_error_string() should have been used when returning
ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME.
|
int ssl_set_hostname( ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname )
{
if( hostname == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ssl->hostname_len = strlen( hostname );
if( ssl->hostname_len + 1 == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ssl->hostname = polarssl_malloc( ssl->hostname_len + 1 );
if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_MALLOC_FAILED );
memcpy( ssl->hostname, (const unsigned char *) hostname,
ssl->hostname_len );
ssl->hostname[ssl->hostname_len] = '\0';
return( 0 );
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
mbedtls
|
c988f32adde62a169ba340fee0da15aecd40e76e
| 17,760,485,365,085,817,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
Added max length checking of hostname
|
xfs_vn_getattr(
const struct path *path,
struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask,
unsigned int query_flags)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
trace_xfs_getattr(ip);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return -EIO;
stat->size = XFS_ISIZE(ip);
stat->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
stat->mode = inode->i_mode;
stat->nlink = inode->i_nlink;
stat->uid = inode->i_uid;
stat->gid = inode->i_gid;
stat->ino = ip->i_ino;
stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
stat->blocks =
XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, ip->i_d.di_nblocks + ip->i_delayed_blks);
if (ip->i_d.di_version == 3) {
if (request_mask & STATX_BTIME) {
stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME;
stat->btime.tv_sec = ip->i_d.di_crtime.t_sec;
stat->btime.tv_nsec = ip->i_d.di_crtime.t_nsec;
}
}
/*
* Note: If you add another clause to set an attribute flag, please
* update attributes_mask below.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE;
if (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_APPEND)
stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_APPEND;
if (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_NODUMP)
stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_NODUMP;
stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE |
STATX_ATTR_APPEND |
STATX_ATTR_NODUMP);
switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
stat->blksize = BLKDEV_IOSIZE;
stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
break;
default:
if (XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip)) {
/*
* If the file blocks are being allocated from a
* realtime volume, then return the inode's realtime
* extent size or the realtime volume's extent size.
*/
stat->blksize =
xfs_get_extsz_hint(ip) << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
} else
stat->blksize = xfs_preferred_iosize(mp);
stat->rdev = 0;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-399",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
1fb254aa983bf190cfd685d40c64a480a9bafaee
| 138,886,160,463,989,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 74 |
xfs: fix missing ILOCK unlock when xfs_setattr_nonsize fails due to EDQUOT
Benjamin Moody reported to Debian that XFS partially wedges when a chgrp
fails on account of being out of disk quota. I ran his reproducer
script:
# adduser dummy
# adduser dummy plugdev
# dd if=/dev/zero bs=1M count=100 of=test.img
# mkfs.xfs test.img
# mount -t xfs -o gquota test.img /mnt
# mkdir -p /mnt/dummy
# chown -c dummy /mnt/dummy
# xfs_quota -xc 'limit -g bsoft=100k bhard=100k plugdev' /mnt
(and then as user dummy)
$ dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=50 of=/mnt/dummy/foo
$ chgrp plugdev /mnt/dummy/foo
and saw:
================================================
WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
5.3.0-rc5 #rc5 Tainted: G W
------------------------------------------------
chgrp/47006 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
1 lock held by chgrp/47006:
#0: 000000006664ea2d (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at: xfs_ilock+0xd2/0x290 [xfs]
...which is clearly caused by xfs_setattr_nonsize failing to unlock the
ILOCK after the xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve call fails. Add the missing
unlock.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 253f4911f297 ("xfs: better xfs_trans_alloc interface")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <[email protected]>
|
void nfs_retry_commit(struct list_head *page_list,
struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg,
struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo)
{
struct nfs_page *req;
while (!list_empty(page_list)) {
req = nfs_list_entry(page_list->next);
nfs_list_remove_request(req);
nfs_mark_request_commit(req, lseg, cinfo);
if (!cinfo->dreq) {
dec_zone_page_state(req->wb_page, NR_UNSTABLE_NFS);
dec_bdi_stat(page_file_mapping(req->wb_page)->backing_dev_info,
BDI_RECLAIMABLE);
}
nfs_unlock_and_release_request(req);
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
c7559663e42f4294ffe31fe159da6b6a66b35d61
| 119,747,259,383,663,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
NFS: Allow nfs_updatepage to extend a write under additional circumstances
Currently nfs_updatepage allows a write to be extended to cover a full
page only if we don't have a byte range lock lock on the file... but if
we have a write delegation on the file or if we have the whole file
locked for writing then we should be allowed to extend the write as
well.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
[Trond: fix up call to nfs_have_delegation()]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
ecb_ews_get_timezone_from_ical_component (ECalBackendEws *cbews,
icalcomponent *icalcomp)
{
ETimezoneCache *timezone_cache;
icalproperty *prop = NULL;
const gchar *tzid = NULL;
timezone_cache = E_TIMEZONE_CACHE (cbews);
prop = icalcomponent_get_first_property (icalcomp, ICAL_DTSTART_PROPERTY);
if (prop != NULL) {
icalparameter *param = NULL;
param = icalproperty_get_first_parameter (prop, ICAL_TZID_PARAMETER);
if (param) {
tzid = icalparameter_get_tzid (param);
} else {
struct icaltimetype dtstart;
dtstart = icalproperty_get_dtstart (prop);
if (icaltime_is_utc (dtstart))
tzid = "UTC";
}
}
if (tzid)
return e_timezone_cache_get_timezone (timezone_cache, tzid);
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 82,290,324,826,346,995,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
__recover_probed_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *buf, unsigned long addr)
{
struct kprobe *kp;
unsigned long faddr;
kp = get_kprobe((void *)addr);
faddr = ftrace_location(addr);
/*
* Addresses inside the ftrace location are refused by
* arch_check_ftrace_location(). Something went terribly wrong
* if such an address is checked here.
*/
if (WARN_ON(faddr && faddr != addr))
return 0UL;
/*
* Use the current code if it is not modified by Kprobe
* and it cannot be modified by ftrace.
*/
if (!kp && !faddr)
return addr;
/*
* Basically, kp->ainsn.insn has an original instruction.
* However, RIP-relative instruction can not do single-stepping
* at different place, __copy_instruction() tweaks the displacement of
* that instruction. In that case, we can't recover the instruction
* from the kp->ainsn.insn.
*
* On the other hand, in case on normal Kprobe, kp->opcode has a copy
* of the first byte of the probed instruction, which is overwritten
* by int3. And the instruction at kp->addr is not modified by kprobes
* except for the first byte, we can recover the original instruction
* from it and kp->opcode.
*
* In case of Kprobes using ftrace, we do not have a copy of
* the original instruction. In fact, the ftrace location might
* be modified at anytime and even could be in an inconsistent state.
* Fortunately, we know that the original code is the ideal 5-byte
* long NOP.
*/
memcpy(buf, (void *)addr, MAX_INSN_SIZE * sizeof(kprobe_opcode_t));
if (faddr)
memcpy(buf, ideal_nops[NOP_ATOMIC5], 5);
else
buf[0] = kp->opcode;
return (unsigned long)buf;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
548acf19234dbda5a52d5a8e7e205af46e9da840
| 184,438,315,573,344,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 |
x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling options
Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to
produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the
exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed
out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field.
Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with:
' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space
in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. '
The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a
handler that executes the actions.
We start out with three handlers:
1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP
2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code
3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static LogInfo *GetLogInfo(const char *name,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register LogInfo
*p;
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (IsLogCacheInstantiated(exception) == MagickFalse)
return((LogInfo *) NULL);
/*
Search for log tag.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(log_semaphore);
ResetLinkedListIterator(log_cache);
p=(LogInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(log_cache);
if ((name == (const char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,"*") == 0))
{
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(log_semaphore);
return(p);
}
while (p != (LogInfo *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(name,p->name) == 0)
break;
p=(LogInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(log_cache);
}
if (p != (LogInfo *) NULL)
(void) InsertValueInLinkedList(log_cache,0,
RemoveElementByValueFromLinkedList(log_cache,p));
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(log_semaphore);
return(p);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
ImageMagick
|
107ce8577e818cf4801e5a59641cb769d645cc95
| 177,372,921,790,326,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1224
|
static int sieve_duplicate_track(void *dc,
void *ic __attribute__((unused)),
void *sc,
void *mc __attribute__((unused)),
const char **errmsg __attribute__((unused)))
{
sieve_duplicate_context_t *dtc = (sieve_duplicate_context_t *) dc;
script_data_t *sd = (script_data_t *) sc;
time_t now = time(NULL);
duplicate_key_t dkey = DUPLICATE_INITIALIZER;
dkey.id = dtc->id;
dkey.to = make_sieve_db(mbname_userid(sd->mbname));
dkey.date = ""; /* no date on these, ID is custom */
duplicate_mark(&dkey, now + dtc->seconds, 0);
return SIEVE_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
cyrus-imapd
|
673ebd96e2efbb8895d08648983377262f35b3f7
| 139,281,509,965,111,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
lmtp_sieve: don't create mailbox with admin for sieve autocreate
|
routerset_union(routerset_t *target, const routerset_t *source)
{
char *s;
tor_assert(target);
if (!source || !source->list)
return;
s = routerset_to_string(source);
routerset_parse(target, s, "other routerset");
tor_free(s);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
tor
|
308f6dad20675c42b29862f4269ad1fbfb00dc9a
| 14,869,194,185,642,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Mitigate a side-channel leak of which relays Tor chooses for a circuit
Tor's and OpenSSL's current design guarantee that there are other leaks,
but this one is likely to be more easily exploitable, and is easy to fix.
|
static bool shadow_copy2_find_slashes(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *str,
size_t **poffsets,
unsigned *pnum_offsets)
{
unsigned num_offsets;
size_t *offsets;
const char *p;
num_offsets = 0;
p = str;
while ((p = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) {
num_offsets += 1;
p += 1;
}
offsets = talloc_array(mem_ctx, size_t, num_offsets);
if (offsets == NULL) {
return false;
}
p = str;
num_offsets = 0;
while ((p = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) {
offsets[num_offsets] = p-str;
num_offsets += 1;
p += 1;
}
*poffsets = offsets;
*pnum_offsets = num_offsets;
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
samba
|
675fd8d771f9d43e354dba53ddd9b5483ae0a1d7
| 96,212,642,726,534,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 |
CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on snapdir
Fix originally from <[email protected]>
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <[email protected]>
|
CtPtr ProtocolV2::handle_frame_payload() {
ceph_assert(!rx_segments_data.empty());
auto& payload = rx_segments_data.back();
ldout(cct, 30) << __func__ << "\n";
payload.hexdump(*_dout);
*_dout << dendl;
switch (next_tag) {
case Tag::HELLO:
return handle_hello(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_REQUEST:
return handle_auth_request(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_BAD_METHOD:
return handle_auth_bad_method(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_REPLY_MORE:
return handle_auth_reply_more(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_REQUEST_MORE:
return handle_auth_request_more(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_DONE:
return handle_auth_done(payload);
case Tag::AUTH_SIGNATURE:
return handle_auth_signature(payload);
case Tag::CLIENT_IDENT:
return handle_client_ident(payload);
case Tag::SERVER_IDENT:
return handle_server_ident(payload);
case Tag::IDENT_MISSING_FEATURES:
return handle_ident_missing_features(payload);
case Tag::SESSION_RECONNECT:
return handle_reconnect(payload);
case Tag::SESSION_RESET:
return handle_session_reset(payload);
case Tag::SESSION_RETRY:
return handle_session_retry(payload);
case Tag::SESSION_RETRY_GLOBAL:
return handle_session_retry_global(payload);
case Tag::SESSION_RECONNECT_OK:
return handle_reconnect_ok(payload);
case Tag::KEEPALIVE2:
return handle_keepalive2(payload);
case Tag::KEEPALIVE2_ACK:
return handle_keepalive2_ack(payload);
case Tag::ACK:
return handle_message_ack(payload);
case Tag::WAIT:
return handle_wait(payload);
default:
ceph_abort();
}
return nullptr;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-323"
] |
ceph
|
20b7bb685c5ea74c651ca1ea547ac66b0fee7035
| 158,258,190,830,288,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 |
msg/async/ProtocolV2: avoid AES-GCM nonce reuse vulnerabilities
The secure mode uses AES-128-GCM with 96-bit nonces consisting of a
32-bit counter followed by a 64-bit salt. The counter is incremented
after processing each frame, the salt is fixed for the duration of
the session. Both are initialized from the session key generated
during session negotiation, so the counter starts with essentially
a random value. It is allowed to wrap, and, after 2**32 frames, it
repeats, resulting in nonce reuse (the actual sequence numbers that
the messenger works with are 64-bit, so the session continues on).
Because of how GCM works, this completely breaks both confidentiality
and integrity aspects of the secure mode. A single nonce reuse reveals
the XOR of two plaintexts and almost completely reveals the subkey
used for producing authentication tags. After a few nonces get used
twice, all confidentiality and integrity goes out the window and the
attacker can potentially encrypt-authenticate plaintext of their
choice.
We can't easily change the nonce format to extend the counter to
64 bits (and possibly XOR it with a longer salt). Instead, just
remember the initial nonce and cut the session before it repeats,
forcing renegotiation.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Radoslaw Zarzynski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
Conflicts:
src/msg/async/ProtocolV2.h [ context: commit ed3ec4c01d17
("msg: Build target 'common' without using namespace in
headers") not in octopus ]
|
static bool fix_server_id(sys_var *self, THD *thd, enum_var_type type)
{
server_id_supplied = 1;
thd->server_id= server_id;
return false;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mysql-server
|
48bd8b16fe382be302c6f0b45931be5aa6f29a0e
| 179,556,702,429,566,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Bug#24388753: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING MYSQLD_SAFE
[This is the 5.5/5.6 version of the bugfix].
The problem was that it was possible to write log files ending
in .ini/.cnf that later could be parsed as an options file.
This made it possible for users to specify startup options
without the permissions to do so.
This patch fixes the problem by disallowing general query log
and slow query log to be written to files ending in .ini and .cnf.
|
sbni_get_stats( struct net_device *dev )
{
return &((struct net_local *) dev->priv)->stats;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux-2.6
|
f2455eb176ac87081bbfc9a44b21c7cd2bc1967e
| 49,894,935,740,525,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
wan: Missing capability checks in sbni_ioctl()
There are missing capability checks in the following code:
1300 static int
1301 sbni_ioctl( struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
1302 {
[...]
1319 case SIOCDEVRESINSTATS :
1320 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1321 return -EPERM;
[...]
1336 case SIOCDEVSHWSTATE :
1337 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1338 return -EPERM;
[...]
1357 case SIOCDEVENSLAVE :
1358 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1359 return -EPERM;
[...]
1372 case SIOCDEVEMANSIPATE :
1373 if( current->euid != 0 ) /* root only */
1374 return -EPERM;
Here's my proposed fix:
Missing capability checks.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Teo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
sc_pkcs15emu_oberthur_add_cert(struct sc_pkcs15_card *p15card, unsigned int file_id)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = p15card->card->ctx;
struct sc_pkcs15_cert_info cinfo;
struct sc_pkcs15_object cobj;
unsigned char *info_blob, *cert_blob;
size_t info_len, cert_len, len, offs;
unsigned flags;
int rv;
char ch_tmp[0x20];
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "add certificate(file-id:%04X)", file_id);
memset(&cinfo, 0, sizeof(cinfo));
memset(&cobj, 0, sizeof(cobj));
snprintf(ch_tmp, sizeof(ch_tmp), "%s%04X", AWP_OBJECTS_DF_PUB, file_id | 0x100);
rv = sc_oberthur_read_file(p15card, ch_tmp, &info_blob, &info_len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Failed to add certificate: read oberthur file error");
if (info_len < 2)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "Failed to add certificate: no 'tag'");
flags = *(info_blob + 0) * 0x100 + *(info_blob + 1);
offs = 2;
/* Label */
if (offs + 2 > info_len)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "Failed to add certificate: no 'CN'");
len = *(info_blob + offs + 1) + *(info_blob + offs) * 0x100;
if (len) {
if (len > sizeof(cobj.label) - 1)
len = sizeof(cobj.label) - 1;
memcpy(cobj.label, info_blob + offs + 2, len);
}
offs += 2 + len;
/* ID */
if (offs > info_len)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED, "Failed to add certificate: no 'ID'");
len = *(info_blob + offs + 1) + *(info_blob + offs) * 0x100;
if (len > sizeof(cinfo.id.value))
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA, "Failed to add certificate: invalid 'ID' length");
memcpy(cinfo.id.value, info_blob + offs + 2, len);
cinfo.id.len = len;
/* Ignore subject, issuer and serial */
snprintf(ch_tmp, sizeof(ch_tmp), "%s%04X", AWP_OBJECTS_DF_PUB, file_id);
sc_format_path(ch_tmp, &cinfo.path);
rv = sc_oberthur_read_file(p15card, ch_tmp, &cert_blob, &cert_len, 1);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Failed to add certificate: read certificate error");
cinfo.value.value = cert_blob;
cinfo.value.len = cert_len;
rv = sc_oberthur_get_certificate_authority(&cinfo.value, &cinfo.authority);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Failed to add certificate: get certificate attributes error");
if (flags & OBERTHUR_ATTR_MODIFIABLE)
cobj.flags |= SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE;
rv = sc_pkcs15emu_add_x509_cert(p15card, &cobj, &cinfo);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(p15card->card->ctx, rv);
}
| 1 |
[] |
OpenSC
|
40c50a3a4219308aae90f6efd7b10213794a8d86
| 305,479,436,409,453,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 |
oberthur: Handle more memory issues during initialization
Thanks oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=31540
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=31448
|
int blkid_partlist_numof_partitions(blkid_partlist ls)
{
return ls->nparts;
}
| 0 |
[] |
util-linux
|
50d1594c2e6142a3b51d2143c74027480df082e0
| 192,311,774,170,730,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
libblkid: avoid non-empty recursion in EBR
This is extension to the patch 7164a1c34d18831ac61c6744ad14ce916d389b3f.
We also need to detect non-empty recursion in the EBR chain. It's
possible to create standard valid logical partitions and in the last one
points back to the EBR chain. In this case all offsets will be non-empty.
Unfortunately, it's valid to create logical partitions that are not in
the "disk order" (sorted by start offset). So link somewhere back is
valid, but this link cannot points to already existing partition
(otherwise we will see recursion).
This patch forces libblkid to ignore duplicate logical partitions, the
duplicate chain segment is interpreted as non-data segment, after 100
iterations with non-data segments it will break the loop -- no memory
is allocated in this case by the loop.
Addresses: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1349536
References: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q3/40
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
|
static int ipa_blob_seek(void* wand,long position)
{
return (int)SeekBlob((Image*)wand,(MagickOffsetType) position,SEEK_SET);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
ImageMagick
|
b2b48d50300a9fbcd0aa0d9230fd6d7a08f7671e
| 314,739,521,019,674,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/544
|
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageSetClip (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2)
{
if (x1 < 0)
{
x1 = 0;
}
if (x1 >= im->sx)
{
x1 = im->sx - 1;
}
if (x2 < 0)
{
x2 = 0;
}
if (x2 >= im->sx)
{
x2 = im->sx - 1;
}
if (y1 < 0)
{
y1 = 0;
}
if (y1 >= im->sy)
{
y1 = im->sy - 1;
}
if (y2 < 0)
{
y2 = 0;
}
if (y2 >= im->sy)
{
y2 = im->sy - 1;
}
im->cx1 = x1;
im->cy1 = y1;
im->cx2 = x2;
im->cy2 = y2;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
libgd
|
cfee163a5e848fc3e3fb1d05a30d7557cdd36457
| 106,001,433,400,872,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
- #18, Removed invalid gdFree call when overflow2 fails
- #17, Free im->pixels as well on error
|
void *zmalloc_usable(size_t size, size_t *usable) {
void *ptr = malloc(size+PREFIX_SIZE);
if (!ptr) zmalloc_oom_handler(size);
#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_SIZE
update_zmalloc_stat_alloc(*usable = zmalloc_size(ptr));
return ptr;
#else
*((size_t*)ptr) = *usable = size;
update_zmalloc_stat_alloc(size+PREFIX_SIZE);
return (char*)ptr+PREFIX_SIZE;
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
redis
|
9824fe3e392caa04dc1b4071886e9ac402dd6d95
| 10,176,998,440,229,533,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Fix wrong zmalloc_size() assumption. (#7963)
When using a system with no malloc_usable_size(), zmalloc_size() assumed
that the heap allocator always returns blocks that are long-padded.
This may not always be the case, and will result with zmalloc_size()
returning a size that is bigger than allocated. At least in one case
this leads to out of bound write, process crash and a potential security
vulnerability.
Effectively this does not affect the vast majority of users, who use
jemalloc or glibc.
This problem along with a (different) fix was reported by Drew DeVault.
|
PHP_FUNCTION(imagefilledarc)
{
zval *IM;
long cx, cy, w, h, ST, E, col, style;
gdImagePtr im;
int e, st;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rllllllll", &IM, &cx, &cy, &w, &h, &ST, &E, &col, &style) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
e = E;
if (e < 0) {
e %= 360;
}
st = ST;
if (st < 0) {
st %= 360;
}
gdImageFilledArc(im, cx, cy, w, h, st, e, col, style);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
php-src
|
f7d7befae8bcc2db0093f8adaa9f72eeb7ad891e
| 146,617,952,183,993,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
Fix #69719 - more checks for nulls in paths
|
int usb_device_alloc_streams(USBDevice *dev, USBEndpoint **eps, int nr_eps,
int streams)
{
USBDeviceClass *klass = USB_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(dev);
if (klass->alloc_streams) {
return klass->alloc_streams(dev, eps, nr_eps, streams);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a
| 165,978,042,123,805,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
CVE-2013-4541
s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.
setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <[email protected]>
|
static int ldb_match_scope(struct ldb_context *ldb,
struct ldb_dn *base,
struct ldb_dn *dn,
enum ldb_scope scope)
{
int ret = 0;
if (base == NULL || dn == NULL) {
return 1;
}
switch (scope) {
case LDB_SCOPE_BASE:
if (ldb_dn_compare(base, dn) == 0) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
case LDB_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
if (ldb_dn_get_comp_num(dn) == (ldb_dn_get_comp_num(base) + 1)) {
if (ldb_dn_compare_base(base, dn) == 0) {
ret = 1;
}
}
break;
case LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
default:
if (ldb_dn_compare_base(base, dn) == 0) {
ret = 1;
}
break;
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-189"
] |
samba
|
ec504dbf69636a554add1f3d5703dd6c3ad450b8
| 325,721,361,574,410,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
CVE-2015-3223: lib: ldb: Cope with canonicalise_fn returning string "", length 0.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11325
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
|
const Cues* Segment::GetCues() const { return m_pCues; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
34d54b04e98dd0bac32e9aab0fbda0bf501bc742
| 144,850,662,458,060,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
changelog:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/libwebm-1.0.0.27-351-g9f23fbc..libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
Change-Id: I28a6b3ae02a53fb1f2029eee11e9449afb94c8e3
|
rsvg_clip_path_parse (const RsvgDefs * defs, const char *str)
{
char *name;
name = rsvg_get_url_string (str);
if (name) {
RsvgNode *val;
val = rsvg_defs_lookup (defs, name);
g_free (name);
if (val && RSVG_NODE_TYPE (val) == RSVG_NODE_TYPE_CLIP_PATH)
return val;
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[] |
librsvg
|
34c95743ca692ea0e44778e41a7c0a129363de84
| 179,579,014,189,406,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
Store node type separately in RsvgNode
The node name (formerly RsvgNode:type) cannot be used to infer
the sub-type of RsvgNode that we're dealing with, since for unknown
elements we put type = node-name. This lead to a (potentially exploitable)
crash e.g. when the element name started with "fe" which tricked
the old code into considering it as a RsvgFilterPrimitive.
CVE-2011-3146
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=658014
|
void CoreUserInputHandler::handleBan(const BufferInfo &bufferInfo, const QString &msg)
{
banOrUnban(bufferInfo, msg, true);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
quassel
|
b5e38970ffd55e2dd9f706ce75af9a8d7730b1b8
| 189,657,943,536,958,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Improve the message-splitting algorithm for PRIVMSG and CTCP
This introduces a new message splitting algorithm based on
QTextBoundaryFinder. It works by first starting with the entire
message to be sent, encoding it, and checking to see if it is over
the maximum message length. If it is, it uses QTBF to find the
word boundary most immediately preceding the maximum length. If no
suitable boundary can be found, it falls back to searching for
grapheme boundaries. It repeats this process until the entire
message has been sent.
Unlike what it replaces, the new splitting code is not recursive
and cannot cause stack overflows. Additionally, if it is unable
to split a string, it will give up gracefully and not crash the
core or cause a thread to run away.
This patch fixes two bugs. The first is garbage characters caused
by accidentally splitting the string in the middle of a multibyte
character. Since the new code splits at a character level instead
of a byte level, this will no longer be an issue. The second is
the core crash caused by sending an overlength CTCP query ("/me")
containing only multibyte characters. This bug was caused by the
old CTCP splitter using the byte index from lastParamOverrun() as
a character index for a QString.
|
JVM_TraceInstructions(jboolean on)
{
Trc_SC_TraceInstructions(on);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
openj9
|
0971f22d88f42cf7332364ad7430e9bd8681c970
| 87,384,883,032,652,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Clean up jio_snprintf and jio_vfprintf
Fixes https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=543659
Signed-off-by: Peter Bain <[email protected]>
|
static DNLI_t dnlInitIterator(rpmfiles fi, rpmfs fs, int reverse)
{
DNLI_t dnli;
int i, j;
int dc;
if (fi == NULL)
return NULL;
dc = rpmfilesDC(fi);
dnli = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*dnli));
dnli->fi = fi;
dnli->reverse = reverse;
dnli->i = (reverse ? dc : 0);
if (dc) {
dnli->active = xcalloc(dc, sizeof(*dnli->active));
int fc = rpmfilesFC(fi);
/* Identify parent directories not skipped. */
for (i = 0; i < fc; i++)
if (!XFA_SKIPPING(rpmfsGetAction(fs, i)))
dnli->active[rpmfilesDI(fi, i)] = 1;
/* Exclude parent directories that are explicitly included. */
for (i = 0; i < fc; i++) {
int dil;
size_t dnlen, bnlen;
if (!S_ISDIR(rpmfilesFMode(fi, i)))
continue;
dil = rpmfilesDI(fi, i);
dnlen = strlen(rpmfilesDN(fi, dil));
bnlen = strlen(rpmfilesBN(fi, i));
for (j = 0; j < dc; j++) {
const char * dnl;
size_t jlen;
if (!dnli->active[j] || j == dil)
continue;
dnl = rpmfilesDN(fi, j);
jlen = strlen(dnl);
if (jlen != (dnlen+bnlen+1))
continue;
if (!rstreqn(dnl, rpmfilesDN(fi, dil), dnlen))
continue;
if (!rstreqn(dnl+dnlen, rpmfilesBN(fi, i), bnlen))
continue;
if (dnl[dnlen+bnlen] != '/' || dnl[dnlen+bnlen+1] != '\0')
continue;
/* This directory is included in the package. */
dnli->active[j] = 0;
break;
}
}
/* Print only once per package. */
if (!reverse) {
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < dc; i++) {
if (!dnli->active[i]) continue;
if (j == 0) {
j = 1;
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG,
"========== Directories not explicitly included in package:\n");
}
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, "%10d %s\n", i, rpmfilesDN(fi, i));
}
if (j)
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, "==========\n");
}
}
return dnli;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
rpm
|
f2d3be2a8741234faaa96f5fd05fdfdc75779a79
| 141,136,472,753,518,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 |
Restrict following symlinks to directories by ownership (CVE-2017-7500)
Only follow directory symlinks owned by target directory owner or root.
This prevents privilege escalation from user-writable directories via
directory symlinks to privileged directories on package upgrade, while
still allowing admin to arrange disk usage with symlinks.
The rationale is that if you can create symlinks owned by user X you *are*
user X (or root), and if you also own directory Y you can do whatever with
it already, including change permissions. So when you create a symlink to
that directory, the link ownership acts as a simple stamp of authority that
you indeed want rpm to treat this symlink as it were the directory that
you own. Such a permission can only be given by you or root, which
is just the way we want it. Plus it's almost ridiculously simple as far
as rules go, compared to trying to calculate something from the
source vs destination directory permissions etc.
In the normal case, the user arranging diskspace with symlinks is indeed
root so nothing changes, the only real change here is to links created by
non-privileged users which should be few and far between in practise.
Unfortunately our test-suite runs as a regular user via fakechroot and
thus the testcase for this fails under the new rules. Adjust the testcase
to get the ownership straight and add a second case for the illegal
behavior, basically the same as the old one but with different expectations.
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.