func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
int dissolve_free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
int rc = -EBUSY;
/* Not to disrupt normal path by vainly holding hugetlb_lock */
if (!PageHuge(page))
return 0;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!PageHuge(page)) {
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
if (!page_count(page)) {
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(head);
int nid = page_to_nid(head);
if (h->free_huge_pages - h->resv_huge_pages == 0)
goto out;
/*
* Move PageHWPoison flag from head page to the raw error page,
* which makes any subpages rather than the error page reusable.
*/
if (PageHWPoison(head) && page != head) {
SetPageHWPoison(page);
ClearPageHWPoison(head);
}
list_del(&head->lru);
h->free_huge_pages--;
h->free_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
h->max_huge_pages--;
update_and_free_page(h, head);
rc = 0;
}
out:
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 17743798d81238ab13050e8e2833699b54e15467 | 16,453,855,090,395,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | mm/hugetlb: fix a race between hugetlb sysctl handlers
There is a race between the assignment of `table->data` and write value
to the pointer of `table->data` in the __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax() on
the other thread.
CPU0: CPU1:
proc_sys_write
hugetlb_sysctl_handler proc_sys_call_handler
hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common hugetlb_sysctl_handler
table->data = &tmp; hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common
table->data = &tmp;
proc_doulongvec_minmax
do_proc_doulongvec_minmax sysctl_head_finish
__do_proc_doulongvec_minmax unuse_table
i = table->data;
*i = val; // corrupt CPU1's stack
Fix this by duplicating the `table`, and only update the duplicate of
it. And introduce a helper of proc_hugetlb_doulongvec_minmax() to
simplify the code.
The following oops was seen:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
Code: Bad RIP value.
...
Call Trace:
? set_max_huge_pages+0x3da/0x4f0
? alloc_pool_huge_page+0x150/0x150
? proc_doulongvec_minmax+0x46/0x60
? hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0x1c7/0x200
? nr_hugepages_store+0x20/0x20
? copy_fd_bitmaps+0x170/0x170
? hugetlb_sysctl_handler+0x1e/0x20
? proc_sys_call_handler+0x2f1/0x300
? unregister_sysctl_table+0xb0/0xb0
? __fd_install+0x78/0x100
? proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
? __vfs_write+0x4d/0x90
? vfs_write+0xef/0x240
? ksys_write+0xc0/0x160
? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
? __close_fd+0x129/0x150
? __x64_sys_write+0x43/0x50
? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200
? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: e5ff215941d5 ("hugetlb: multiple hstates for multiple page sizes")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static void cbs_jpeg_free_comment(void *unit, uint8_t *content)
{
JPEGRawComment *comment = (JPEGRawComment*)content;
av_buffer_unref(&comment->Cm_ref);
av_freep(&content);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | FFmpeg | a3a3730b5456ca00587455004d40c047f7b20a99 | 271,666,422,008,633,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | avcodec/cbs_jpeg: Check length for SOS
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 19734/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_BSF_TRACE_HEADERS_fuzzer-5673507031875584
Fixes: 19353/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_BSF_TRACE_HEADERS_fuzzer-5703944462663680
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1812352d767ccf5431aa440123e2e260a4db2726)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static void qxl_update_irq_bh(void *opaque)
{
PCIQXLDevice *d = opaque;
qxl_update_irq(d);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | qemu | d52680fc932efb8a2f334cc6993e705ed1e31e99 | 82,844,638,886,538,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | qxl: check release info object
When releasing spice resources in release_resource() routine,
if release info object 'ext.info' is null, it leads to null
pointer dereference. Add check to avoid it.
Reported-by: Bugs SysSec <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> |
static int alloc_profile_is_valid(u64 flags, int extended)
{
u64 mask = (extended ? BTRFS_EXTENDED_PROFILE_MASK :
BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_PROFILE_MASK);
flags &= ~BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TYPE_MASK;
/* 1) check that all other bits are zeroed */
if (flags & ~mask)
return 0;
/* 2) see if profile is reduced */
if (flags == 0)
return !extended; /* "0" is valid for usual profiles */
/* true if exactly one bit set */
return is_power_of_2(flags);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1 | 159,625,154,008,947,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> |
httpHeaderFieldStatDumper(StoreEntry * sentry, int, double val, double, int count)
{
const int id = static_cast<int>(val);
const bool valid_id = Http::any_valid_header(static_cast<Http::HdrType>(id));
const char *name = valid_id ? Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(static_cast<Http::HdrType>(id)).name : "INVALID";
int visible = count > 0;
/* for entries with zero count, list only those that belong to current type of message */
if (!visible && valid_id && dump_stat->owner_mask)
visible = CBIT_TEST(*dump_stat->owner_mask, id);
if (visible)
storeAppendPrintf(sentry, "%2d\t %-20s\t %5d\t %6.2f\n",
id, name, count, xdiv(count, dump_stat->busyDestroyedCount));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-444"
] | squid | 9c8e2a71aa1d3c159a319d9365c346c48dc783a5 | 227,230,106,587,128,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Enforce token characters for field-name (#700)
RFC 7230 defines field-name as a token. Request splitting and cache
poisoning attacks have used non-token characters to fool broken HTTP
agents behind or in front of Squid for years. This change should
significantly reduce that abuse.
If we discover exceptional situations that need special treatment, the
relaxed parser can allow them on a case-by-case basis (while being extra
careful about framing-related header fields), just like we already
tolerate some header whitespace (e.g., between the response header
field-name and colon). |
netsnmp_set_mib_directory(const char *dir)
{
const char *newdir;
char *olddir, *tmpdir = NULL;
DEBUGTRACE;
if (NULL == dir) {
return;
}
olddir = netsnmp_ds_get_string(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID,
NETSNMP_DS_LIB_MIBDIRS);
if (olddir) {
if ((*dir == '+') || (*dir == '-')) {
/** New dir starts with '+', thus we add it. */
tmpdir = (char *)malloc(strlen(dir) + strlen(olddir) + 2);
if (!tmpdir) {
DEBUGMSGTL(("read_config:initmib", "set mibdir malloc failed"));
return;
}
if (*dir++ == '+')
sprintf(tmpdir, "%s%c%s", olddir, ENV_SEPARATOR_CHAR, dir);
else
sprintf(tmpdir, "%s%c%s", dir, ENV_SEPARATOR_CHAR, olddir);
newdir = tmpdir;
} else {
newdir = dir;
}
} else {
/** If dir starts with '+' skip '+' it. */
newdir = ((*dir == '+') ? ++dir : dir);
}
netsnmp_ds_set_string(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_MIBDIRS,
newdir);
/** set_string calls strdup, so if we allocated memory, free it */
if (tmpdir == newdir) {
SNMP_FREE(tmpdir);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | net-snmp | 4fd9a450444a434a993bc72f7c3486ccce41f602 | 158,293,417,139,742,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | CHANGES: snmpd: Stop reading and writing the mib_indexes/* files
Caching directory contents is something the operating system should do
and is not something Net-SNMP should do. Instead of storing a copy of
the directory contents in ${tmp_dir}/mib_indexes/${n}, always scan a
MIB directory. |
static int __init slab_sysfs_init(void)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
int err;
slab_kset = kset_create_and_add("slab", &slab_uevent_ops, kernel_kobj);
if (!slab_kset) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Cannot register slab subsystem.\n");
return -ENOSYS;
}
slab_state = SYSFS;
list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
err = sysfs_slab_add(s);
if (err)
printk(KERN_ERR "SLUB: Unable to add boot slab %s"
" to sysfs\n", s->name);
}
while (alias_list) {
struct saved_alias *al = alias_list;
alias_list = alias_list->next;
err = sysfs_slab_alias(al->s, al->name);
if (err)
printk(KERN_ERR "SLUB: Unable to add boot slab alias"
" %s to sysfs\n", s->name);
kfree(al);
}
resiliency_test();
return 0; | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | 128,998,871,219,643,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static bool is_finite(const unsigned short) { return true; } | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 176,471,314,587,885,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
SrcList *sqlite3SrcListAppendFromTerm(
Parse *pParse, /* Parsing context */
SrcList *p, /* The left part of the FROM clause already seen */
Token *pTable, /* Name of the table to add to the FROM clause */
Token *pDatabase, /* Name of the database containing pTable */
Token *pAlias, /* The right-hand side of the AS subexpression */
Select *pSubquery, /* A subquery used in place of a table name */
Expr *pOn, /* The ON clause of a join */
IdList *pUsing /* The USING clause of a join */
){
struct SrcList_item *pItem;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
if( !p && (pOn || pUsing) ){
sqlite3ErrorMsg(pParse, "a JOIN clause is required before %s",
(pOn ? "ON" : "USING")
);
goto append_from_error;
}
p = sqlite3SrcListAppend(pParse, p, pTable, pDatabase);
if( p==0 ){
goto append_from_error;
}
assert( p->nSrc>0 );
pItem = &p->a[p->nSrc-1];
assert( (pTable==0)==(pDatabase==0) );
assert( pItem->zName==0 || pDatabase!=0 );
if( IN_RENAME_OBJECT && pItem->zName ){
Token *pToken = (ALWAYS(pDatabase) && pDatabase->z) ? pDatabase : pTable;
sqlite3RenameTokenMap(pParse, pItem->zName, pToken);
}
assert( pAlias!=0 );
if( pAlias->n ){
pItem->zAlias = sqlite3NameFromToken(db, pAlias);
}
pItem->pSelect = pSubquery;
pItem->pOn = pOn;
pItem->pUsing = pUsing;
return p;
append_from_error:
assert( p==0 );
sqlite3ExprDelete(db, pOn);
sqlite3IdListDelete(db, pUsing);
sqlite3SelectDelete(db, pSubquery);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-674",
"CWE-787"
] | sqlite | 38096961c7cd109110ac21d3ed7dad7e0cb0ae06 | 310,283,435,141,257,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 | Avoid infinite recursion in the ALTER TABLE code when a view contains an unused CTE that references, directly or indirectly, the view itself.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1d2e53a39b87e364685e21de137655b6eee725e4c6d27fc90865072d7c5892b5 |
static void atfork_parent(struct atfork_state *as)
{
#ifdef NO_PTHREADS
if (sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &as->old, NULL))
die_errno("sigprocmask");
#else
bug_die(pthread_setcancelstate(as->cs, NULL),
"re-enabling cancellation");
bug_die(pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, &as->old, NULL),
"restoring signal mask");
#endif
} | 0 | [] | git | 321fd82389742398d2924640ce3a61791fd27d60 | 334,044,068,987,855,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | run-command: mark path lookup errors with ENOENT
Since commit e3a434468f (run-command: use the
async-signal-safe execv instead of execvp, 2017-04-19),
prepare_cmd() does its own PATH lookup for any commands we
run (on non-Windows platforms).
However, its logic does not match the old execvp call when
we fail to find a matching entry in the PATH. Instead of
feeding the name directly to execv, execvp would consider
that an ENOENT error. By continuing and passing the name
directly to execv, we effectively behave as if "." was
included at the end of the PATH. This can have confusing and
even dangerous results.
The fix itself is pretty straight-forward. There's a new
test in t0061 to cover this explicitly, and I've also added
a duplicate of the ENOENT test to ensure that we return the
correct errno for this case.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]> |
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
{
unsigned long rflags;
int i, r;
if (dbg->control & (KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB | KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_BP)) {
r = -EBUSY;
if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending)
goto out;
if (dbg->control & KVM_GUESTDBG_INJECT_DB)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
else
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, BP_VECTOR);
}
/*
* Read rflags as long as potentially injected trace flags are still
* filtered out.
*/
rflags = kvm_get_rflags(vcpu);
vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE))
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; ++i)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = dbg->arch.debugreg[i];
vcpu->arch.guest_debug_dr7 = dbg->arch.debugreg[7];
} else {
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
}
kvm_update_dr7(vcpu);
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vcpu->arch.singlestep_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu) +
get_segment_base(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS);
/*
* Trigger an rflags update that will inject or remove the trace
* flags.
*/
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
kvm_x86_ops->update_db_bp_intercept(vcpu);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 6d1068b3a98519247d8ba4ec85cd40ac136dbdf9 | 226,782,399,087,240,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | KVM: x86: invalid opcode oops on SET_SREGS with OSXSAVE bit set (CVE-2012-4461)
On hosts without the XSAVE support unprivileged local user can trigger
oops similar to the one below by setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit in guest
cr4 register using KVM_SET_SREGS ioctl and later issuing KVM_RUN
ioctl.
invalid opcode: 0000 [#2] SMP
Modules linked in: tun ip6table_filter ip6_tables ebtable_nat ebtables
...
Pid: 24935, comm: zoog_kvm_monito Tainted: G D 3.2.0-3-686-pae
EIP: 0060:[<f8b9550c>] EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 0
EIP is at kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm]
EAX: 00000001 EBX: 000f387e ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: ef5a0060 ESP: d7c63e70
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process zoog_kvm_monito (pid: 24935, ti=d7c62000 task=ed84a0c0
task.ti=d7c62000)
Stack:
00000001 f70a1200 f8b940a9 ef5a0060 00000000 00200202 f8769009 00000000
ef5a0060 000f387e eda5c020 8722f9c8 00015bae 00000000 ed84a0c0 ed84a0c0
c12bf02d 0000ae80 ef7f8740 fffffffb f359b740 ef5a0060 f8b85dc1 0000ae80
Call Trace:
[<f8b940a9>] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs+0x2fe/0x308 [kvm]
...
[<c12bfb44>] ? syscall_call+0x7/0xb
Code: 89 e8 e8 14 ee ff ff ba 00 00 04 00 89 e8 e8 98 48 ff ff 85 c0 74
1e 83 7d 48 00 75 18 8b 85 08 07 00 00 31 c9 8b 95 0c 07 00 00 <0f> 01
d1 c7 45 48 01 00 00 00 c7 45 1c 01 00 00 00 0f ae f0 89
EIP: [<f8b9550c>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x92a/0xd13 [kvm] SS:ESP
0068:d7c63e70
QEMU first retrieves the supported features via KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
and then sets them later. So guest's X86_FEATURE_XSAVE should be masked
out on hosts without X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, making kvm_set_cr4 with
X86_CR4_OSXSAVE fail. Userspaces that allow specifying guest cpuid with
X86_FEATURE_XSAVE even on hosts that do not support it, might be
susceptible to this attack from inside the guest as well.
Allow setting X86_CR4_OSXSAVE bit only if host has XSAVE support.
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> |
static void theme_real_destroy(THEME_REC *rec)
{
g_hash_table_foreach(rec->abstracts, (GHFunc) theme_abstract_destroy, NULL);
g_hash_table_destroy(rec->abstracts);
g_hash_table_foreach(rec->modules, (GHFunc) theme_module_destroy, NULL);
g_hash_table_destroy(rec->modules);
g_slist_foreach(rec->replace_values, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_slist_free(rec->replace_values);
g_free(rec->path);
g_free(rec->name);
g_free(rec);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | irssi | 43e44d553d44e313003cee87e6ea5e24d68b84a1 | 67,794,722,592,182,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes GL#12, GL#13, GL#14, GL#15, GL#16
See merge request irssi/irssi!23 |
static bool is_topic_in_criterias(
const char* topic_name,
const std::vector<Criteria>& criterias)
{
bool returned_value = false;
for (auto criteria_it = criterias.begin(); !returned_value &&
criteria_it != criterias.end(); ++criteria_it)
{
for (auto topic : (*criteria_it).topics)
{
if (StringMatching::matchString(topic.c_str(), topic_name))
{
returned_value = true;
break;
}
}
}
return returned_value;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-284"
] | Fast-DDS | d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384 | 267,661,843,802,009,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]> |
*/
struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb,
int newheadroom, int newtailroom,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
/*
* Allocate the copy buffer
*/
struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom,
gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb),
NUMA_NO_NODE);
int oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb);
int head_copy_len, head_copy_off;
if (!n)
return NULL;
skb_reserve(n, newheadroom);
/* Set the tail pointer and length */
skb_put(n, skb->len);
head_copy_len = oldheadroom;
head_copy_off = 0;
if (newheadroom <= head_copy_len)
head_copy_len = newheadroom;
else
head_copy_off = newheadroom - head_copy_len;
/* Copy the linear header and data. */
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, -head_copy_len, n->head + head_copy_off,
skb->len + head_copy_len))
BUG();
copy_skb_header(n, skb);
skb_headers_offset_update(n, newheadroom - oldheadroom);
return n; | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc | 68,550,861,706,011,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
_outNotifyStmt(StringInfo str, const NotifyStmt *node)
{
WRITE_NODE_TYPE("NOTIFY");
WRITE_STRING_FIELD(conditionname);
WRITE_STRING_FIELD(payload);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | postgres | 5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a | 133,450,413,031,834,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062 |
xps_tifsDummyMapProc(thandle_t fd, void** pbase, toff_t* psize)
{
(void)fd;
(void)pbase;
(void)psize;
return (0);
} | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | 94d8955cb7725eb5f3557ddc02310c76124fdd1a | 225,730,007,934,330,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Bug 701818: better handling of error during PS/PDF image
In the xps device, if an error occurred after xps_begin_image() but before
xps_image_end_image(), *if* the Postscript had called 'restore' as part of the
error handling, the image enumerator would have been freed (by the restore)
despite the xps device still holding a reference to it.
Simply changing to an allocator unaffected save/restore doesn't work because
the enumerator holds references to other objects (graphics state, color space,
possibly others) whose lifespans are inherently controlled by save/restore.
So, add a finalize method for the XPS device's image enumerator
(xps_image_enum_finalize()) which takes over cleaning up the memory it allocates
and also deals with cleaning up references from the device to the enumerator
and from the enumerator to the device. |
static void coroutine_fn v9fs_statfs(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
ssize_t retval = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
struct statfs stbuf;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
retval = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "d", &fid);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
retval = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
retval = v9fs_co_statfs(pdu, &fidp->path, &stbuf);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
retval = v9fs_fill_statfs(s, pdu, &stbuf);
if (retval < 0) {
goto out;
}
retval += offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, retval);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | qemu | 89fbea8737e8f7b954745a1ffc4238d377055305 | 219,870,113,080,765,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | 9pfs: Fully restart unreclaim loop (CVE-2021-20181)
Depending on the client activity, the server can be asked to open a huge
number of file descriptors and eventually hit RLIMIT_NOFILE. This is
currently mitigated using a reclaim logic : the server closes the file
descriptors of idle fids, based on the assumption that it will be able
to re-open them later. This assumption doesn't hold of course if the
client requests the file to be unlinked. In this case, we loop on the
entire fid list and mark all related fids as unreclaimable (the reclaim
logic will just ignore them) and, of course, we open or re-open their
file descriptors if needed since we're about to unlink the file.
This is the purpose of v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(). Since the actual
opening of a file can cause the coroutine to yield, another client
request could possibly add a new fid that we may want to mark as
non-reclaimable as well. The loop is thus restarted if the re-open
request was actually transmitted to the backend. This is achieved
by keeping a reference on the first fid (head) before traversing
the list.
This is wrong in several ways:
- a potential clunk request from the client could tear the first
fid down and cause the reference to be stale. This leads to a
use-after-free error that can be detected with ASAN, using a
custom 9p client
- fids are added at the head of the list : restarting from the
previous head will always miss fids added by a some other
potential request
All these problems could be avoided if fids were being added at the
end of the list. This can be achieved with a QSIMPLEQ, but this is
probably too much change for a bug fix. For now let's keep it
simple and just restart the loop from the current head.
Fixes: CVE-2021-20181
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1911666
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christian Schoenebeck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> |
xcf_load_layer_mask (XcfInfo *info,
GimpImage *image)
{
GimpLayerMask *layer_mask;
GimpChannel *channel;
GList *iter;
goffset hierarchy_offset;
gint width;
gint height;
gboolean is_fs_drawable;
gchar *name;
GimpRGB color = { 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, GIMP_OPACITY_OPAQUE };
/* check and see if this is the drawable the floating selection
* is attached to. if it is then we'll do the attachment in our caller.
*/
is_fs_drawable = (info->cp == info->floating_sel_offset);
/* read in the layer width, height and name */
xcf_read_int32 (info, (guint32 *) &width, 1);
xcf_read_int32 (info, (guint32 *) &height, 1);
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0)
return NULL;
xcf_read_string (info, &name, 1);
/* create a new layer mask */
layer_mask = gimp_layer_mask_new (image, width, height, name, &color);
g_free (name);
if (! layer_mask)
return NULL;
/* read in the layer_mask properties */
channel = GIMP_CHANNEL (layer_mask);
if (! xcf_load_channel_props (info, image, &channel))
goto error;
xcf_progress_update (info);
/* read the hierarchy and layer mask offsets */
xcf_read_offset (info, &hierarchy_offset, 1);
/* read in the hierarchy */
if (! xcf_seek_pos (info, hierarchy_offset, NULL))
goto error;
if (! xcf_load_buffer (info,
gimp_drawable_get_buffer (GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer_mask))))
goto error;
xcf_progress_update (info);
/* attach the floating selection... */
if (is_fs_drawable)
info->floating_sel_drawable = GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer_mask);
return layer_mask;
error:
for (iter = info->selected_channels; iter; iter = iter->next)
if (layer_mask == iter->data)
{
info->selected_channels = g_list_delete_link (info->selected_channels, iter);
break;
}
if (info->floating_sel_drawable == GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer_mask))
info->floating_sel_drawable = NULL;
g_object_unref (layer_mask);
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | gimp | 4f99f1fcfd892ead19831b5adcd38a99d71214b6 | 297,370,673,568,352,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 | app: fix #8120 GIMP 2.10.30 crashed when allocate large memory
GIMP could crash if the information regarding old path properties read
from XCF was incorrect. It did not check if xcf_old_path succeeded and
kept trying to load more paths even if the last one failed to load.
Instead we now stop loading paths as soon as that function fails.
In case we have a failure here we also try to skip to the next property
based on the size of the path property, in hopes that the only problem
was this property. |
ZipStreamBuf::ZipStreamBuf(std::istream& istr, const ZipLocalFileHeader& fileEntry, bool reposition):
Poco::BufferedStreamBuf(STREAM_BUFFER_SIZE, std::ios::in),
_pIstr(&istr),
_pOstr(0),
_ptrBuf(),
_ptrOBuf(),
_ptrHelper(),
_ptrOHelper(),
_crc32(Poco::Checksum::TYPE_CRC32),
_expectedCrc32(0),
_checkCRC(true),
_bytesWritten(0),
_pHeader(0)
{
if (fileEntry.isDirectory())
return;
_expectedCrc32 = fileEntry.getCRC();
std::streamoff start = fileEntry.getDataStartPos();
std::streamoff end = fileEntry.getDataEndPos();
_checkCRC = !fileEntry.searchCRCAndSizesAfterData();
if (fileEntry.getCompressionMethod() == ZipCommon::CM_DEFLATE)
{
// Fake init bytes at beginning of stream
std::string init = ZipUtil::fakeZLibInitString(fileEntry.getCompressionLevel());
// Fake adler at end of stream: just some dummy value, not checked anway
std::string crc(4, ' ');
if (fileEntry.searchCRCAndSizesAfterData())
{
_ptrHelper = new AutoDetectInputStream(istr, init, crc, reposition, static_cast<Poco::UInt32>(start), fileEntry.needsZip64());
}
else
{
_ptrHelper = new PartialInputStream(istr, start, end, reposition, init, crc);
}
_ptrBuf = new Poco::InflatingInputStream(*_ptrHelper, Poco::InflatingStreamBuf::STREAM_ZIP);
}
else if (fileEntry.getCompressionMethod() == ZipCommon::CM_STORE)
{
if (fileEntry.searchCRCAndSizesAfterData())
{
_ptrBuf = new AutoDetectInputStream(istr, "", "", reposition, static_cast<Poco::UInt32>(start), fileEntry.needsZip64());
}
else
{
_ptrBuf = new PartialInputStream(istr, start, end, reposition);
}
}
else throw Poco::NotImplementedException("Unsupported compression method");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | poco | bb7e5feece68ccfd8660caee93da25c5c39a4707 | 120,036,967,978,423,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | merge zip entry absolute path vulnerability fix (#1968) from develop |
void Http2Stream::StartHeaders(nghttp2_headers_category category) {
Debug(this, "starting headers, category: %d", id_, category);
CHECK(!this->IsDestroyed());
session_->DecrementCurrentSessionMemory(current_headers_length_);
current_headers_length_ = 0;
current_headers_.clear();
current_headers_category_ = category;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | node | 7f178663ebffc82c9f8a5a1b6bf2da0c263a30ed | 249,355,228,509,504,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | src: use unique_ptr for WriteWrap
This commit attempts to avoid a use-after-free error by using unqiue_ptr
and passing a reference to it.
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/238
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <[email protected]> |
void sqlite3VdbeFrameMemDel(void *pArg){
VdbeFrame *pFrame = (VdbeFrame*)pArg;
assert( sqlite3VdbeFrameIsValid(pFrame) );
pFrame->pParent = pFrame->v->pDelFrame;
pFrame->v->pDelFrame = pFrame;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-755"
] | sqlite | 8654186b0236d556aa85528c2573ee0b6ab71be3 | 245,530,553,041,072,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | When an error occurs while rewriting the parser tree for window functions
in the sqlite3WindowRewrite() routine, make sure that pParse->nErr is set,
and make sure that this shuts down any subsequent code generation that might
depend on the transformations that were implemented. This fixes a problem
discovered by the Yongheng and Rui fuzzer.
FossilOrigin-Name: e2bddcd4c55ba3cbe0130332679ff4b048630d0ced9a8899982edb5a3569ba7f |
static s32 avc_parse_pic_timing_sei(GF_BitStream *bs, AVCState *avc)
{
int sps_id = avc->sps_active_idx;
const char NumClockTS[] = { 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 3 };
AVCSeiPicTiming *pt = &avc->sei.pic_timing;
if (sps_id < 0) {
/*sps_active_idx equals -1 when no sps has been detected. In this case SEI should not be decoded.*/
assert(0);
return 1;
}
if (avc->sps[sps_id].vui.nal_hrd_parameters_present_flag || avc->sps[sps_id].vui.vcl_hrd_parameters_present_flag) { /*CpbDpbDelaysPresentFlag, see 14496-10(2003) E.11*/
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1 + avc->sps[sps_id].vui.hrd.cpb_removal_delay_length_minus1, "cpb_removal_delay_minus1");
gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 1 + avc->sps[sps_id].vui.hrd.dpb_output_delay_length_minus1, "dpb_output_delay_minus1");
}
/*ISO 14496-10 (2003), D.8.2: we need to get pic_struct in order to know if we display top field first or bottom field first*/
if (avc->sps[sps_id].vui.pic_struct_present_flag) {
int i;
pt->pic_struct = gf_bs_read_int_log(bs, 4, "pic_struct");
if (pt->pic_struct > 8) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CODING, ("[avc-h264] invalid pic_struct value %d\n", pt->pic_struct));
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < NumClockTS[pt->pic_struct]; i++) {
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "clock_timestamp_flag", i)) {
Bool full_timestamp_flag;
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 2, "ct_type", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "nuit_field_based_flag", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 5, "counting_type", i);
full_timestamp_flag = gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "full_timestamp_flag", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "discontinuity_flag", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "cnt_dropped_flag", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 8, "n_frames", i);
if (full_timestamp_flag) {
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 6, "seconds_value", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 6, "minutes_value", i);
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 5, "hours_value", i);
}
else {
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "seconds_flag", i)) {
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 6, "seconds_value", i);
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "minutes_flag", i)) {
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 6, "minutes_value", i);
if (gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 1, "hours_flag", i)) {
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, 5, "hours_value", i);
}
}
}
if (avc->sps[sps_id].vui.hrd.time_offset_length > 0)
gf_bs_read_int_log_idx(bs, avc->sps[sps_id].vui.hrd.time_offset_length, "time_offset", i);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 51cdb67ff7c5f1242ac58c5aa603ceaf1793b788 | 211,319,188,185,759,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | add safety in avc/hevc/vvc sps/pps/vps ID check - cf #1720 #1721 #1722 |
tcl_global_eval(interp, cmd)
Tcl_Interp *interp;
const char *cmd; /* don't have to be writable */
#endif
{
char *buf = strdup(cmd);
int ret;
Tcl_AllowExceptions(interp);
ret = Tcl_GlobalEval(interp, buf);
free(buf);
return ret;
} | 0 | [] | tk | ebd0fc80d62eeb7b8556522256f8d035e013eb65 | 253,514,539,435,998,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | tcltklib.c: check argument
* ext/tk/tcltklib.c (ip_cancel_eval_core): check argument type and
length.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@51468 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
char *ad_get_entry(const struct adouble *ad, int eid)
{
off_t off = ad_getentryoff(ad, eid);
size_t len = ad_getentrylen(ad, eid);
if (off == 0 || len == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return ad->ad_data + off;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | samba | 0e2b3fb982d1f53d111e10d9197ed2ec2e13712c | 149,428,417,400,046,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden parsing code
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]> |
static inline int ape_decode_value_3990(APEContext *ctx, APERice *rice)
{
unsigned int x, overflow;
int base, pivot;
pivot = rice->ksum >> 5;
if (pivot == 0)
pivot = 1;
overflow = range_get_symbol(ctx, counts_3980, counts_diff_3980);
if (overflow == (MODEL_ELEMENTS - 1)) {
overflow = range_decode_bits(ctx, 16) << 16;
overflow |= range_decode_bits(ctx, 16);
}
if (pivot < 0x10000) {
base = range_decode_culfreq(ctx, pivot);
range_decode_update(ctx, 1, base);
} else {
int base_hi = pivot, base_lo;
int bbits = 0;
while (base_hi & ~0xFFFF) {
base_hi >>= 1;
bbits++;
}
base_hi = range_decode_culfreq(ctx, base_hi + 1);
range_decode_update(ctx, 1, base_hi);
base_lo = range_decode_culfreq(ctx, 1 << bbits);
range_decode_update(ctx, 1, base_lo);
base = (base_hi << bbits) + base_lo;
}
x = base + overflow * pivot;
update_rice(rice, x);
/* Convert to signed */
if (x & 1)
return (x >> 1) + 1;
else
return -(x >> 1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FFmpeg | 96349da5ec8eda9f0368446e557fe0c8ba0e66b7 | 231,001,598,582,996,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static SLJIT_INLINE sljit_u32 max_fast_forward_char_pair_sse2_offset(void)
{
#if PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 8
return 15;
#elif PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 16
return 7;
#elif PCRE2_CODE_UNIT_WIDTH == 32
return 3;
#else
#error "Unsupported unit width"
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | php-src | 8947fd9e9fdce87cd6c59817b1db58e789538fe9 | 90,197,799,762,916,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix #78338: Array cross-border reading in PCRE
We backport r1092 from pcre2. |
static void fscrypt_destroy(void)
{
struct fscrypt_ctx *pos, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &fscrypt_free_ctxs, free_list)
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, pos);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fscrypt_free_ctxs);
mempool_destroy(fscrypt_bounce_page_pool);
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d | 184,165,843,558,834,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]> |
INST_HANDLER (std) { // ST Y, Rr ST Z, Rr
// ST Y+, Rr ST Z+, Rr
// ST -Y, Rr ST -Z, Rr
// ST Y+q, Rr ST Z+q, Rr
// load register
ESIL_A ("r%d,", ((buf[1] & 1) << 4) | ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf));
// write in memory
__generic_ld_st (
op, "ram",
buf[0] & 0x8 ? 'y' : 'z', // index register Y/Z
0, // no use RAMP* registers
!(buf[1] & 0x10)
? 0 // no increment
: buf[0] & 0x1
? 1 // post incremented
: -1, // pre decremented
!(buf[1] & 0x10)
? (buf[1] & 0x20) // offset
| ((buf[1] & 0xc) << 1)
| (buf[0] & 0x7)
: 0, // no offset
1); // load operation (!st)
// // cycles
// op->cycles =
// buf[1] & 0x1 == 0
// ? !(offset ? 1 : 3) // LDD
// : buf[0] & 0x3 == 0
// ? 1 // LD Rd, X
// : buf[0] & 0x3 == 1
// ? 2 // LD Rd, X+
// : 3; // LD Rd, -X
// if (!STR_BEGINS (cpu->model, "ATxmega") && op->cycles > 1) {
// // AT*mega optimizes 1 cycle!
// op->cycles--;
// }
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68 | 204,818,608,601,402,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | Fix crash in anal.avr |
static void io_flush_timeouts(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
{
u32 seq = ctx->cached_cq_tail - atomic_read(&ctx->cq_timeouts);
while (!list_empty(&ctx->timeout_list)) {
u32 events_needed, events_got;
struct io_kiocb *req = list_first_entry(&ctx->timeout_list,
struct io_kiocb, timeout.list);
if (io_is_timeout_noseq(req))
break;
/*
* Since seq can easily wrap around over time, subtract
* the last seq at which timeouts were flushed before comparing.
* Assuming not more than 2^31-1 events have happened since,
* these subtractions won't have wrapped, so we can check if
* target is in [last_seq, current_seq] by comparing the two.
*/
events_needed = req->timeout.target_seq - ctx->cq_last_tm_flush;
events_got = seq - ctx->cq_last_tm_flush;
if (events_got < events_needed)
break;
list_del_init(&req->timeout.list);
io_kill_timeout(req, 0);
}
ctx->cq_last_tm_flush = seq;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 89c2b3b74918200e46699338d7bcc19b1ea12110 | 210,115,770,405,870,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | io_uring: reexpand under-reexpanded iters
[ 74.211232] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x809/0x900
[ 74.212778] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025dc78b8 by task
syz-executor.0/828
[ 74.214756] CPU: 0 PID: 828 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
5.14.0-rc3-next-20210730 #1
[ 74.216525] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 74.219033] Call Trace:
[ 74.219683] dump_stack_lvl+0x8b/0xb3
[ 74.220706] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
[ 74.224226] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[ 74.226085] iov_iter_revert+0x809/0x900
[ 74.227960] io_write+0x57d/0xe40
[ 74.232647] io_issue_sqe+0x4da/0x6a80
[ 74.242578] __io_queue_sqe+0x1ac/0xe60
[ 74.245358] io_submit_sqes+0x3f6e/0x76a0
[ 74.248207] __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0x90c/0x1a20
[ 74.257167] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 74.257984] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
old_size = iov_iter_count();
...
iov_iter_revert(old_size - iov_iter_count());
If iov_iter_revert() is done base on the initial size as above, and the
iter is truncated and not reexpanded in the middle, it miscalculates
borders causing problems. This trace is due to no one reexpanding after
generic_write_checks().
Now iters store how many bytes has been truncated, so reexpand them to
the initial state right before reverting.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Palash Oswal <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
_mpegts_section_get_event (GstMpegtsSection * section)
{
GstStructure *structure;
GstEvent *event;
structure = _mpegts_section_get_structure (section);
event = gst_event_new_custom (GST_EVENT_CUSTOM_DOWNSTREAM, structure);
return event;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gst-plugins-bad | d58f668ece8795bddb3316832e1848c7b7cf38ac | 172,707,692,970,176,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | mpegtssection: Add more section size checks
The smallest section ever needs to be at least 3 bytes (i.e. just the short
header).
Non-short headers need to be at least 11 bytes long (3 for the minimum header,
5 for the non-short header, and 4 for the CRC).
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775048 |
Item *get_copy(THD *thd, MEM_ROOT *mem_root)
{ return get_item_copy<Item_cache_temporal>(thd, mem_root, this); } | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 2e7891080667c59ac80f788eef4d59d447595772 | 243,734,821,603,640,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 | MDEV-25635 Assertion failure when pushing from HAVING into WHERE of view
This bug could manifest itself after pushing a where condition over a
mergeable derived table / view / CTE DT into a grouping view / derived
table / CTE V whose item list contained set functions with constant
arguments such as MIN(2), SUM(1) etc. In such cases the field references
used in the condition pushed into the view V that correspond set functions
are wrapped into Item_direct_view_ref wrappers. Due to a wrong implementation
of the virtual method const_item() for the class Item_direct_view_ref the
wrapped set functions with constant arguments could be erroneously taken
for constant items. This could lead to a wrong result set returned by the
main select query in 10.2. In 10.4 where a possibility of pushing condition
from HAVING into WHERE had been added this could cause a crash.
Approved by Sergey Petrunya <[email protected]> |
BOOL security_decrypt(BYTE* data, size_t length, rdpRdp* rdp)
{
if (rdp->rc4_decrypt_key == NULL)
return FALSE;
if (rdp->decrypt_use_count >= 4096)
{
if (!security_key_update(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->decrypt_update_key, rdp->rc4_key_len, rdp))
return FALSE;
winpr_RC4_Free(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key);
rdp->rc4_decrypt_key = winpr_RC4_New(rdp->decrypt_key, rdp->rc4_key_len);
if (!rdp->rc4_decrypt_key)
return FALSE;
rdp->decrypt_use_count = 0;
}
if (!winpr_RC4_Update(rdp->rc4_decrypt_key, length, data, data))
return FALSE;
rdp->decrypt_use_count += 1;
rdp->decrypt_checksum_use_count++;
return TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | FreeRDP | d6cd14059b257318f176c0ba3ee0a348826a9ef8 | 56,221,087,951,663,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | Fixed GHSL-2020-101 missing NULL check
(cherry picked from commit b207dbba35c505bbc3ad5aadc10b34980c6b7e8e) |
//! Return minimal path in a graph, using the Dijkstra algorithm \newinstance.
CImg<Tfloat> get_dijkstra(const unsigned int starting_node, const unsigned int ending_node=~0U) const {
CImg<uintT> foo;
return get_dijkstra(starting_node,ending_node,foo); | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 151,545,586,066,950,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
static bool generic_pkt_to_tuple(const struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff,
struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
{
tuple->src.u.all = 0;
tuple->dst.u.all = 0;
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-254",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b | 313,373,440,414,336,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
void ieee80211_send_eosp_nullfunc(struct ieee80211_sta *pubsta, int tid)
{
struct sta_info *sta = container_of(pubsta, struct sta_info, sta);
enum ieee80211_frame_release_type reason;
bool more_data;
trace_api_send_eosp_nullfunc(sta->local, pubsta, tid);
reason = IEEE80211_FRAME_RELEASE_UAPSD;
more_data = ieee80211_sta_ps_more_data(sta, ~sta->sta.uapsd_queues,
reason, 0);
ieee80211_send_null_response(sta, tid, reason, false, more_data);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287"
] | linux | 3e493173b7841259a08c5c8e5cbe90adb349da7e | 180,795,150,855,259,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | mac80211: Do not send Layer 2 Update frame before authorization
The Layer 2 Update frame is used to update bridges when a station roams
to another AP even if that STA does not transmit any frames after the
reassociation. This behavior was described in IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 as
something that would happen based on MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication, i.e.,
before completing 4-way handshake. However, this IEEE trial-use
recommended practice document was published before RSN (IEEE Std
802.11i-2004) and as such, did not consider RSN use cases. Furthermore,
IEEE Std 802.11F-2003 was withdrawn in 2006 and as such, has not been
maintained amd should not be used anymore.
Sending out the Layer 2 Update frame immediately after association is
fine for open networks (and also when using SAE, FT protocol, or FILS
authentication when the station is actually authenticated by the time
association completes). However, it is not appropriate for cases where
RSN is used with PSK or EAP authentication since the station is actually
fully authenticated only once the 4-way handshake completes after
authentication and attackers might be able to use the unauthenticated
triggering of Layer 2 Update frame transmission to disrupt bridge
behavior.
Fix this by postponing transmission of the Layer 2 Update frame from
station entry addition to the point when the station entry is marked
authorized. Similarly, send out the VLAN binding update only if the STA
entry has already been authorized.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
uint32_t resolveQueueForTest(absl::string_view vm_id, absl::string_view queue_name) {
return global_shared_data.resolveQueue(vm_id, queue_name);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | envoy | 8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153 | 312,824,088,727,826,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | 1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]> |
int crypto_check_attr_type(struct rtattr **tb, u32 type)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return PTR_ERR(algt);
if ((algt->type ^ type) & algt->mask)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | 4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560 | 237,535,779,750,915,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
zfilenamesplit(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
check_read_type(*op, t_string);
/****** NOT IMPLEMENTED YET ******/
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | ghostpdl | ab109aaeb3ddba59518b036fb288402a65cf7ce8 | 102,410,694,354,468,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Bug 694724: Have filenameforall and getenv honor SAFER |
TEST_P(DnsImplTest, Cancel) {
server_->addHosts("some.good.domain", {"201.134.56.7"}, RecordType::A);
ActiveDnsQuery* query =
resolveWithUnreferencedParameters("some.domain", DnsLookupFamily::Auto, false);
EXPECT_NE(nullptr, resolveWithExpectations("some.good.domain", DnsLookupFamily::Auto,
DnsResolver::ResolutionStatus::Success,
{"201.134.56.7"}, {}, absl::nullopt));
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, query);
query->cancel();
dispatcher_->run(Event::Dispatcher::RunType::Block);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | 542f84c66e9f6479bc31c6f53157c60472b25240 | 66,627,496,041,684,845,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | overload: Runtime configurable global connection limits (#147)
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]> |
body_file_send (int sock, const char *file_name, wgint promised_size, FILE *warc_tmp)
{
static char chunk[8192];
wgint written = 0;
int write_error;
FILE *fp;
DEBUGP (("[writing BODY file %s ... ", file_name));
fp = fopen (file_name, "rb");
if (!fp)
return -1;
while (!feof (fp) && written < promised_size)
{
int towrite;
int length = fread (chunk, 1, sizeof (chunk), fp);
if (length == 0)
break;
towrite = MIN (promised_size - written, length);
write_error = fd_write (sock, chunk, towrite, -1);
if (write_error < 0)
{
fclose (fp);
return -1;
}
if (warc_tmp != NULL)
{
/* Write a copy of the data to the WARC record. */
int warc_tmp_written = fwrite (chunk, 1, towrite, warc_tmp);
if (warc_tmp_written != towrite)
{
fclose (fp);
return -2;
}
}
written += towrite;
}
fclose (fp);
/* If we've written less than was promised, report a (probably
nonsensical) error rather than break the promise. */
if (written < promised_size)
{
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
assert (written == promised_size);
DEBUGP (("done]\n"));
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | wget | d892291fb8ace4c3b734ea5125770989c215df3f | 145,282,464,276,954,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Fix stack overflow in HTTP protocol handling (CVE-2017-13089)
* src/http.c (skip_short_body): Return error on negative chunk size
Reported-by: Antti Levomäki, Christian Jalio, Joonas Pihlaja from Forcepoint
Reported-by: Juhani Eronen from Finnish National Cyber Security Centre |
REGEXP *mutt_compile_regexp (const char *s, int flags)
{
REGEXP *pp = safe_calloc (sizeof (REGEXP), 1);
pp->pattern = safe_strdup (s);
pp->rx = safe_calloc (sizeof (regex_t), 1);
if (REGCOMP (pp->rx, NONULL(s), flags) != 0)
mutt_free_regexp (&pp);
return pp;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-668"
] | mutt | 6d0624411a979e2e1d76af4dd97d03f47679ea4a | 184,380,590,964,689,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | use a 64-bit random value in temporary filenames.
closes #3158 |
ves_icall_System_Threading_Thread_VolatileWriteIntPtr (void *ptr, void *value)
{
*((volatile void **) ptr) = value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-264"
] | mono | 722f9890f09aadfc37ae479e7d946d5fc5ef7b91 | 336,085,034,320,668,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix access to freed members of a dead thread
* threads.c: Fix access to freed members of a dead thread. Found
and fixed by Rodrigo Kumpera <[email protected]>
Ref: CVE-2011-0992 |
static inline int UT64_ADD(ut64 *r, ut64 a, ut64 b) {
if (UT64_MAX - a < b) {
return 0;
}
if (r) {
*r = a + b;
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | radare2 | 1ea23bd6040441a21fbcfba69dce9a01af03f989 | 206,506,018,487,195,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix #6816 - null deref in r_read_* |
newh6namemem(netdissect_options *ndo)
{
register struct h6namemem *p;
static struct h6namemem *ptr = NULL;
static u_int num = 0;
if (num <= 0) {
num = 64;
ptr = (struct h6namemem *)calloc(num, sizeof (*ptr));
if (ptr == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "newh6namemem: calloc");
}
--num;
p = ptr++;
return (p);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tcpdump | 730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51 | 121,305,555,067,146,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). |
void Item_cond::neg_arguments(THD *thd)
{
List_iterator<Item> li(list);
Item *item;
while ((item= li++)) /* Apply not transformation to the arguments */
{
Item *new_item= item->neg_transformer(thd);
if (!new_item)
{
if (!(new_item= new (thd->mem_root) Item_func_not(thd, item)))
return; // Fatal OEM error
}
(void) li.replace(new_item);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | server | 807945f2eb5fa22e6f233cc17b85a2e141efe2c8 | 249,403,002,115,199,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | MDEV-26402: A SEGV in Item_field::used_tables/update_depend_map_for_order...
When doing condition pushdown from HAVING into WHERE,
Item_equal::create_pushable_equalities() calls
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL) for constant items.
Then, Item::cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor() checks for this flag
to see if it should call item->cleanup() or leave the item as-is.
The failure happens when a constant item has a non-constant one inside it,
like:
(tbl.col=0 AND impossible_cond)
item->walk(cleanup_excluding_immutables_processor) works in a bottom-up
way so it
1. will call Item_func_eq(tbl.col=0)->cleanup()
2. will not call Item_cond_and->cleanup (as the AND is constant)
This creates an item tree where a fixed Item has an un-fixed Item inside
it which eventually causes an assertion failure.
Fixed by introducing this rule: instead of just calling
item->set_extraction_flag(IMMUTABLE_FL);
we call Item::walk() to set the flag for all sub-items of the item. |
command_substitute (string, quoted)
char *string;
int quoted;
{
pid_t pid, old_pid, old_pipeline_pgrp, old_async_pid;
char *istring, *s;
int result, fildes[2], function_value, pflags, rc, tflag;
WORD_DESC *ret;
istring = (char *)NULL;
/* Don't fork () if there is no need to. In the case of no command to
run, just return NULL. */
#if 1
for (s = string; s && *s && (shellblank (*s) || *s == '\n'); s++)
;
if (s == 0 || *s == 0)
return ((WORD_DESC *)NULL);
#else
if (!string || !*string || (string[0] == '\n' && !string[1]))
return ((WORD_DESC *)NULL);
#endif
if (wordexp_only && read_but_dont_execute)
{
last_command_exit_value = EX_WEXPCOMSUB;
jump_to_top_level (EXITPROG);
}
/* We're making the assumption here that the command substitution will
eventually run a command from the file system. Since we'll run
maybe_make_export_env in this subshell before executing that command,
the parent shell and any other shells it starts will have to remake
the environment. If we make it before we fork, other shells won't
have to. Don't bother if we have any temporary variable assignments,
though, because the export environment will be remade after this
command completes anyway, but do it if all the words to be expanded
are variable assignments. */
if (subst_assign_varlist == 0 || garglist == 0)
maybe_make_export_env (); /* XXX */
/* Flags to pass to parse_and_execute() */
pflags = (interactive && sourcelevel == 0) ? SEVAL_RESETLINE : 0;
/* Pipe the output of executing STRING into the current shell. */
if (pipe (fildes) < 0)
{
sys_error ("%s", _("cannot make pipe for command substitution"));
goto error_exit;
}
old_pid = last_made_pid;
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
old_pipeline_pgrp = pipeline_pgrp;
/* Don't reset the pipeline pgrp if we're already a subshell in a pipeline. */
if ((subshell_environment & SUBSHELL_PIPE) == 0)
pipeline_pgrp = shell_pgrp;
cleanup_the_pipeline ();
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
old_async_pid = last_asynchronous_pid;
pid = make_child ((char *)NULL, subshell_environment&SUBSHELL_ASYNC);
last_asynchronous_pid = old_async_pid;
if (pid == 0)
{
/* Reset the signal handlers in the child, but don't free the
trap strings. Set a flag noting that we have to free the
trap strings if we run trap to change a signal disposition. */
reset_signal_handlers ();
if (ISINTERRUPT)
{
kill (getpid (), SIGINT);
CLRINTERRUPT; /* if we're ignoring SIGINT somehow */
}
QUIT; /* catch any interrupts we got post-fork */
subshell_environment |= SUBSHELL_RESETTRAP;
}
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
/* XXX DO THIS ONLY IN PARENT ? XXX */
set_sigchld_handler ();
stop_making_children ();
if (pid != 0)
pipeline_pgrp = old_pipeline_pgrp;
#else
stop_making_children ();
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
if (pid < 0)
{
sys_error (_("cannot make child for command substitution"));
error_exit:
last_made_pid = old_pid;
FREE (istring);
close (fildes[0]);
close (fildes[1]);
return ((WORD_DESC *)NULL);
}
if (pid == 0)
{
/* The currently executing shell is not interactive. */
interactive = 0;
set_sigint_handler (); /* XXX */
free_pushed_string_input ();
/* Discard buffered stdio output before replacing the underlying file
descriptor. */
fpurge (stdout);
if (dup2 (fildes[1], 1) < 0)
{
sys_error ("%s", _("command_substitute: cannot duplicate pipe as fd 1"));
exit (EXECUTION_FAILURE);
}
/* If standard output is closed in the parent shell
(such as after `exec >&-'), file descriptor 1 will be
the lowest available file descriptor, and end up in
fildes[0]. This can happen for stdin and stderr as well,
but stdout is more important -- it will cause no output
to be generated from this command. */
if ((fildes[1] != fileno (stdin)) &&
(fildes[1] != fileno (stdout)) &&
(fildes[1] != fileno (stderr)))
close (fildes[1]);
if ((fildes[0] != fileno (stdin)) &&
(fildes[0] != fileno (stdout)) &&
(fildes[0] != fileno (stderr)))
close (fildes[0]);
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
/* Let stdio know the fd may have changed from text to binary mode, and
make sure to preserve stdout line buffering. */
freopen (NULL, "w", stdout);
sh_setlinebuf (stdout);
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
/* This is a subshell environment. */
subshell_environment |= SUBSHELL_COMSUB;
/* Many shells do not appear to inherit the -v option for command
substitutions. */
change_flag ('v', FLAG_OFF);
/* When inherit_errexit option is not enabled, command substitution does
not inherit the -e flag. It is enabled when Posix mode is enabled */
if (inherit_errexit == 0)
{
builtin_ignoring_errexit = 0;
change_flag ('e', FLAG_OFF);
}
set_shellopts ();
/* If we are expanding a redirection, we can dispose of any temporary
environment we received, since redirections are not supposed to have
access to the temporary environment. We will have to see whether this
affects temporary environments supplied to `eval', but the temporary
environment gets copied to builtin_env at some point. */
if (expanding_redir)
{
flush_temporary_env ();
expanding_redir = 0;
}
remove_quoted_escapes (string);
startup_state = 2; /* see if we can avoid a fork */
/* Give command substitution a place to jump back to on failure,
so we don't go back up to main (). */
result = setjmp_nosigs (top_level);
/* If we're running a command substitution inside a shell function,
trap `return' so we don't return from the function in the subshell
and go off to never-never land. */
if (result == 0 && return_catch_flag)
function_value = setjmp_nosigs (return_catch);
else
function_value = 0;
if (result == ERREXIT)
rc = last_command_exit_value;
else if (result == EXITPROG)
rc = last_command_exit_value;
else if (result)
rc = EXECUTION_FAILURE;
else if (function_value)
rc = return_catch_value;
else
{
subshell_level++;
rc = parse_and_execute (string, "command substitution", pflags|SEVAL_NOHIST);
subshell_level--;
}
last_command_exit_value = rc;
rc = run_exit_trap ();
#if defined (PROCESS_SUBSTITUTION)
unlink_fifo_list ();
#endif
exit (rc);
}
else
{
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL) && defined (PGRP_PIPE)
close_pgrp_pipe ();
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL && PGRP_PIPE */
close (fildes[1]);
tflag = 0;
istring = read_comsub (fildes[0], quoted, &tflag);
close (fildes[0]);
current_command_subst_pid = pid;
last_command_exit_value = wait_for (pid);
last_command_subst_pid = pid;
last_made_pid = old_pid;
#if defined (JOB_CONTROL)
/* If last_command_exit_value > 128, then the substituted command
was terminated by a signal. If that signal was SIGINT, then send
SIGINT to ourselves. This will break out of loops, for instance. */
if (last_command_exit_value == (128 + SIGINT) && last_command_exit_signal == SIGINT)
kill (getpid (), SIGINT);
/* wait_for gives the terminal back to shell_pgrp. If some other
process group should have it, give it away to that group here.
pipeline_pgrp is non-zero only while we are constructing a
pipeline, so what we are concerned about is whether or not that
pipeline was started in the background. A pipeline started in
the background should never get the tty back here. We duplicate
the conditions that wait_for tests to make sure we only give
the terminal back to pipeline_pgrp under the conditions that wait_for
gave it to shell_pgrp. If wait_for doesn't mess with the terminal
pgrp, we should not either. */
if (interactive && pipeline_pgrp != (pid_t)0 && running_in_background == 0 &&
(subshell_environment & (SUBSHELL_ASYNC|SUBSHELL_PIPE)) == 0)
give_terminal_to (pipeline_pgrp, 0);
#endif /* JOB_CONTROL */
ret = alloc_word_desc ();
ret->word = istring;
ret->flags = tflag;
return ret;
}
} | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 226,618,007,373,956,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 255 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
psutil_aix_clear(PyObject *m) {
Py_CLEAR(GETSTATE(m)->error);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | psutil | 7d512c8e4442a896d56505be3e78f1156f443465 | 315,318,470,162,443,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Use Py_CLEAR instead of Py_DECREF to also set the variable to NULL (#1616)
These files contain loops that convert system data into python objects
and during the process they create objects and dereference their
refcounts after they have been added to the resulting list.
However, in case of errors during the creation of those python objects,
the refcount to previously allocated objects is dropped again with
Py_XDECREF, which should be a no-op in case the paramater is NULL. Even
so, in most of these loops the variables pointing to the objects are
never set to NULL, even after Py_DECREF is called at the end of the loop
iteration. This means, after the first iteration, if an error occurs
those python objects will get their refcount dropped two times,
resulting in a possible double-free. |
static unsigned long __init early_calculate_totalpages(void)
{
unsigned long totalpages = 0;
unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
int i, nid;
for_each_mem_pfn_range(i, MAX_NUMNODES, &start_pfn, &end_pfn, &nid) {
unsigned long pages = end_pfn - start_pfn;
totalpages += pages;
if (pages)
node_set_state(nid, N_MEMORY);
}
return totalpages;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 400e22499dd92613821374c8c6c88c7225359980 | 20,927,893,715,653,454,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | mm: don't warn about allocations which stall for too long
Commit 63f53dea0c98 ("mm: warn about allocations which stall for too
long") was a great step for reducing possibility of silent hang up
problem caused by memory allocation stalls. But this commit reverts it,
for it is possible to trigger OOM lockup and/or soft lockups when many
threads concurrently called warn_alloc() (in order to warn about memory
allocation stalls) due to current implementation of printk(), and it is
difficult to obtain useful information due to limitation of synchronous
warning approach.
Current printk() implementation flushes all pending logs using the
context of a thread which called console_unlock(). printk() should be
able to flush all pending logs eventually unless somebody continues
appending to printk() buffer.
Since warn_alloc() started appending to printk() buffer while waiting
for oom_kill_process() to make forward progress when oom_kill_process()
is processing pending logs, it became possible for warn_alloc() to force
oom_kill_process() loop inside printk(). As a result, warn_alloc()
significantly increased possibility of preventing oom_kill_process()
from making forward progress.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
Before warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
}
goto retry;
After warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else if (waited_for_10seconds()) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
Although waited_for_10seconds() becomes true once per 10 seconds,
unbounded number of threads can call waited_for_10seconds() at the same
time. Also, since threads doing waited_for_10seconds() keep doing
almost busy loop, the thread doing print_one_log() can use little CPU
resource. Therefore, this situation can be simplified like
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
when printk() is called faster than print_one_log() can process a log.
One of possible mitigation would be to introduce a new lock in order to
make sure that no other series of printk() (either oom_kill_process() or
warn_alloc()) can append to printk() buffer when one series of printk()
(either oom_kill_process() or warn_alloc()) is already in progress.
Such serialization will also help obtaining kernel messages in readable
form.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
mutex_lock(&oom_printk_lock);
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_printk_lock)) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
}
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
But this commit does not go that direction, for we don't want to
introduce a new lock dependency, and we unlikely be able to obtain
useful information even if we serialized oom_kill_process() and
warn_alloc().
Synchronous approach is prone to unexpected results (e.g. too late [1],
too frequent [2], overlooked [3]). As far as I know, warn_alloc() never
helped with providing information other than "something is going wrong".
I want to consider asynchronous approach which can obtain information
during stalls with possibly relevant threads (e.g. the owner of
oom_lock and kswapd-like threads) and serve as a trigger for actions
(e.g. turn on/off tracepoints, ask libvirt daemon to take a memory dump
of stalling KVM guest for diagnostic purpose).
This commit temporarily loses ability to report e.g. OOM lockup due to
unable to invoke the OOM killer due to !__GFP_FS allocation request.
But asynchronous approach will be able to detect such situation and emit
warning. Thus, let's remove warn_alloc().
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192981
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAM_iQpWuPVGc2ky8M-9yukECtS+zKjiDasNymX7rMcBjBFyM_A@mail.gmail.com
[3] commit db73ee0d46379922 ("mm, vmscan: do not loop on too_many_isolated for ever"))
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509017339-4802-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: yuwang.yuwang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
decode_NXAST_RAW_EXIT(struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_EXIT(out);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ovs | 9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | 330,329,779,557,478,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]> |
static MagickBooleanType WriteTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*mode,
*option;
CompressionType
compression;
EndianType
endian_type;
MagickBooleanType
adjoin,
debug,
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
imageListLength,
length;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFInfo
tiff_info;
uint16
bits_per_sample,
compress_tag,
endian,
photometric,
predictor;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open TIFF file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
endian_type=(HOST_FILLORDER == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB) ? LSBEndian : MSBEndian;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:endian");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian_type=MSBEndian;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian_type=LSBEndian;
}
mode=endian_type == LSBEndian ? "wl" : "wb";
#if defined(TIFF_VERSION_BIG)
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"TIFF64") == 0)
mode=endian_type == LSBEndian ? "wl8" : "wb8";
#endif
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,mode,(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (exception->severity > ErrorException)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) DeleteImageProfile(image,"tiff:37724");
scene=0;
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
adjoin=image_info->adjoin;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
/*
Initialize TIFF fields.
*/
if ((image_info->type != UndefinedType) &&
(image_info->type != OptimizeType))
(void) SetImageType(image,image_info->type,exception);
compression=UndefinedCompression;
if (image->compression != JPEGCompression)
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
case Group4Compression:
{
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,1,exception);
break;
}
case JPEGCompression:
{
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8,exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((image->storage_class != PseudoClass) && (image->depth >= 32) &&
(quantum_info->format == UndefinedQuantumFormat) &&
(IsHighDynamicRangeImage(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") == 0) &&
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_REDUCEDIMAGE);
if ((image->columns != (uint32) image->columns) ||
(image->rows != (uint32) image->rows))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,(uint32) image->rows);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,(uint32) image->columns);
switch (compression)
{
case FaxCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"quantum:polarity");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
case Group4Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"quantum:polarity");
if (option == (const char *) NULL)
SetQuantumMinIsWhite(quantum_info,MagickTrue);
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_JBIG)
case JBIG1Compression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JBIG;
break;
}
#endif
case JPEGCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_JPEG;
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case LZMACompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZMA;
break;
}
#endif
case LZWCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_LZW;
break;
}
case RLECompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_PACKBITS;
break;
}
case ZipCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE;
break;
}
#if defined(COMPRESSION_ZSTD)
case ZstdCompression:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_ZSTD;
break;
}
#endif
case NoCompression:
default:
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
break;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
compression=NoCompression;
}
#else
switch (compress_tag)
{
#if defined(CCITT_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
#endif
#if defined(YCBCR_SUPPORT) && defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
#endif
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
#endif
#if defined(LZW_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
#endif
#if defined(PACKBITS_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_PACKBITS:
#endif
#if defined(ZIP_SUPPORT)
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
#endif
case COMPRESSION_NONE:
break;
default:
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"CompressionNotSupported","`%s'",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,(ssize_t) compression));
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
compression=NoCompression;
break;
}
}
#endif
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,4);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_INKSET,INKSET_CMYK);
}
else
{
/*
Full color TIFF raster.
*/
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB;
EncodeLabImage(image,exception);
}
else
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
{
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,1,1);
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
(void) SetImageDepth(image,8,exception);
}
else
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_RGB;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,3);
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image_info->type != TrueColorAlphaType))
{
if ((image_info->type != PaletteType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
photometric=(uint16) (quantum_info->min_is_white !=
MagickFalse ? PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE :
PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
if ((image->depth == 1) &&
(image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait))
SetImageMonochrome(image,exception);
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
depth;
/*
Colormapped TIFF raster.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,1);
photometric=PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE;
depth=1;
while ((GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < image->colors)
depth<<=1;
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,depth);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian);
if ((compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3) ||
(compress_tag == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4))
{
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK))
{
compress_tag=COMPRESSION_NONE;
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
}
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:fill-order");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"msb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_MSB2LSB;
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"lsb",3) == 0)
endian=FILLORDER_LSB2MSB;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,compress_tag);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,endian);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,quantum_info->depth);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
uint16
extra_samples,
sample_info[1],
samples_per_pixel;
/*
TIFF has a matte channel.
*/
extra_samples=1;
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:alpha");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(option,"associated") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA;
else
if (LocaleCompare(option,"unspecified") == 0)
sample_info[0]=EXTRASAMPLE_UNSPECIFIED;
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,samples_per_pixel+1);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (sample_info[0] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,AssociatedQuantumAlpha);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,photometric);
switch (quantum_info->format)
{
case FloatingPointQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMINSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->minimum);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SMAXSAMPLEVALUE,quantum_info->maximum);
break;
}
case SignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_INT);
break;
}
case UnsignedQuantumFormat:
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB)
if ((image_info->interlace == PlaneInterlace) ||
(image_info->interlace == PartitionInterlace))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE);
predictor=0;
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
if (image_info->quality != UndefinedCompressionQuality)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,image_info->quality);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*value;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE,JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
{
const char
*sampling_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
sampling_factor=(const char *) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",exception);
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
sampling_factor=value;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Input sampling-factors=%s",sampling_factor);
}
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
sampling_factor=image_info->sampling_factor;
if (sampling_factor != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(sampling_factor,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,(uint16)
geometry_info.rho,(uint16) geometry_info.sigma);
}
}
}
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (bits_per_sample == 12)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE,JPEGTABLESMODE_QUANT);
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
predictor=PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
{
/*
Byte-aligned EOL.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS,4);
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
break;
#if defined(LZMA_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
{
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
predictor=PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_LZMAPRESET,(long) (
image_info->quality == UndefinedCompressionQuality ? 7 :
MagickMin((ssize_t) image_info->quality/10,9)));
break;
}
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
predictor=PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL;
break;
}
#if defined(WEBP_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_WEBP)
case COMPRESSION_WEBP:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
predictor=PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WEBP_LEVEL,image_info->quality);
if (image_info->quality >= 100)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WEBP_LOSSLESS,1);
break;
}
#endif
#if defined(ZSTD_SUPPORT) && defined(COMPRESSION_ZSTD)
case COMPRESSION_ZSTD:
{
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,
&bits_per_sample);
if (((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK)) &&
((bits_per_sample == 8) || (bits_per_sample == 16)))
predictor=PREDICTOR_HORIZONTAL;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ZSTD_LEVEL,22*image_info->quality/
100.0);
break;
}
#endif
default:
break;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:predictor");
if (option != (const char * ) NULL)
predictor=(uint16) strtol(option,(char **) NULL,10);
if (predictor != 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,predictor);
if ((image->resolution.x != 0.0) && (image->resolution.y != 0.0))
{
unsigned short
units;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=RESUNIT_NONE;
if (image->units == PixelsPerInchResolution)
units=RESUNIT_INCH;
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
units=RESUNIT_CENTIMETER;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,(uint16) units);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,image->resolution.x);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,image->resolution.y);
if ((image->page.x < 0) || (image->page.y < 0))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"TIFF: negative image positions unsupported","%s",image->filename);
if ((image->page.x > 0) && (image->resolution.x > 0.0))
{
/*
Set horizontal image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,(float) image->page.x/
image->resolution.x);
}
if ((image->page.y > 0) && (image->resolution.y > 0.0))
{
/*
Set vertical image position.
*/
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,(float) image->page.y/
image->resolution.y);
}
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
float
chromaticity[6];
/*
Set image chromaticity.
*/
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.red_primary.y;
chromaticity[2]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
chromaticity[3]=(float) image->chromaticity.green_primary.y;
chromaticity[4]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
chromaticity[5]=(float) image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,chromaticity);
chromaticity[0]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
chromaticity[1]=(float) image->chromaticity.white_point.y;
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,chromaticity);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:write-layers");
if (IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) TIFFWritePhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,endian_type,exception);
adjoin=MagickFalse;
}
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(adjoin != MagickFalse) && (imageListLength > 1))
{
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
if (image->scene != 0)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,(uint16) image->scene,
imageListLength);
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,(uint16) image->orientation);
else
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT);
TIFFSetProfiles(tiff,image);
{
uint16
page,
pages;
page=(uint16) scene;
pages=(uint16) imageListLength;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PTIF") != 0) &&
(adjoin != MagickFalse) && (pages > 1))
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,FILETYPE_PAGE);
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,page,pages);
}
(void) TIFFSetProperties(tiff,adjoin,image,exception);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0)
RestoreMSCWarning
(void) TIFFSetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
/*
Write image scanlines.
*/
if (GetTIFFInfo(image_info,tiff,&tiff_info) == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
tiff_info.scanline=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
/*
RGB TIFF image.
*/
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) length;
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: RRRRRR...GGGGGG...BBBBBB...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
RedQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,100,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GreenQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,1,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,200,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
BlueQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,2,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,300,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,3,image) == -1)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,400,400);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
/*
CMYK TIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
uint16
*blue,
*green,
*red;
/*
Colormapped TIFF image.
*/
red=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*red));
green=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*green));
blue=(uint16 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(65536,sizeof(*blue));
if ((red == (uint16 *) NULL) || (green == (uint16 *) NULL) ||
(blue == (uint16 *) NULL))
{
if (red != (uint16 *) NULL)
red=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(red);
if (green != (uint16 *) NULL)
green=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(green);
if (blue != (uint16 *) NULL)
blue=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blue);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/*
Initialize TIFF colormap.
*/
(void) memset(red,0,65536*sizeof(*red));
(void) memset(green,0,65536*sizeof(*green));
(void) memset(blue,0,65536*sizeof(*blue));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
red[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].red);
green[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].green);
blue[i]=ScaleQuantumToShort(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) TIFFSetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,red,green,blue);
red=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(red);
green=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(green);
blue=(uint16 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blue);
}
default:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packets to contiguous grayscale scanlines.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayAlphaQuantum;
else
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
}
else
if (photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE)
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (TIFFWritePixels(tiff,&tiff_info,y,0,image) == -1)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
DestroyTIFFInfo(&tiff_info);
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
RestoreMSCWarning
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
(void) TIFFWriteDirectory(tiff);
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (adjoin != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
return(MagickTrue);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | f06925afeabe3f01045db33d5a33d55e64378ebc | 308,553,004,386,214,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 903 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1555 |
static void netjoin_remove(NETJOIN_SERVER_REC *server, NETJOIN_REC *rec)
{
server->netjoins = g_slist_remove(server->netjoins, rec);
g_slist_foreach(rec->old_channels, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_slist_foreach(rec->now_channels, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_slist_free(rec->old_channels);
g_slist_free(rec->now_channels);
g_free(rec->nick);
g_free(rec);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | irssi | a6cae91cecba2e8cf11ed779c5da5a229472575c | 185,448,758,111,059,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Merge pull request #812 from ailin-nemui/tape-netsplit
revert netsplit print optimisation
(cherry picked from commit 7de1378dab8081932d9096e19ae3d0921e560230) |
TEST_P(WasmTest, EmscriptenVersion) {
Stats::IsolatedStoreImpl stats_store;
Api::ApiPtr api = Api::createApiForTest(stats_store);
Upstream::MockClusterManager cluster_manager;
Event::DispatcherPtr dispatcher(api->allocateDispatcher());
auto scope = Stats::ScopeSharedPtr(stats_store.createScope("wasm."));
NiceMock<LocalInfo::MockLocalInfo> local_info;
auto name = "";
auto root_id = "";
auto vm_id = "";
auto vm_configuration = "";
auto plugin = std::make_shared<Extensions::Common::Wasm::Plugin>(
name, root_id, vm_id, envoy::api::v2::core::TrafficDirection::UNSPECIFIED, local_info,
nullptr);
auto wasm = std::make_unique<Extensions::Common::Wasm::Wasm>(
absl::StrCat("envoy.wasm.runtime.", GetParam()), vm_id, vm_configuration, plugin, scope,
cluster_manager, *dispatcher);
EXPECT_NE(wasm, nullptr);
const auto code = TestEnvironment::readFileToStringForTest(TestEnvironment::substitute(
"{{ test_rundir }}/test/extensions/wasm/test_data/segv_cpp.wasm"));
EXPECT_FALSE(code.empty());
auto context = std::make_unique<TestContext>(wasm.get());
EXPECT_TRUE(wasm->initialize(code, false));
uint32_t major = 9, minor = 9, abi_major = 9, abi_minor = 9;
EXPECT_TRUE(wasm->getEmscriptenVersion(&major, &minor, &abi_major, &abi_minor));
EXPECT_EQ(major, 0);
EXPECT_LE(minor, 3);
// Up to (at least) emsdk 1.39.0.
EXPECT_EQ(abi_major, 0);
EXPECT_LE(abi_minor, 19);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | envoy | 8788a3cf255b647fd14e6b5e2585abaaedb28153 | 128,341,522,276,619,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | 1.4 - Do not call into the VM unless the VM Context has been created. (#24)
* Ensure that the in VM Context is created before onDone is called.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Update as per offline discussion.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Set in_vm_context_created_ in onNetworkNewConnection.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Add guards to other network calls.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Fix common/wasm tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Patch tests.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]>
* Remove unecessary file from cherry-pick.
Signed-off-by: John Plevyak <[email protected]> |
bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
/*
* Foreign mounts (accessed via fchdir or through /proc
* symlinks) are always treated as if they are nosuid. This
* prevents namespaces from trusting potentially unsafe
* suid/sgid bits, file caps, or security labels that originate
* in other namespaces.
*/
return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
current_in_userns(mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631 | 16,171,160,194,673,306,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as
well:
- verify that the mount is in the current namespace
- verify that there are no locked children
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager <[email protected]>
Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.18
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> |
static int get_deep_fifo(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
int afr_status = 0;
afr_status = sb1054_get_register(port, PAGE_4, SB105X_AFR);
return afr_status;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427 | 73,214,243,569,687,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
link_prefix_patterns(apr_array_header_t *array)
{
int i;
if (!array)
return;
for (i = 1; i < array->nelts; ++i)
{
sorted_pattern_t *prev
= &APR_ARRAY_IDX(array, i - 1, sorted_pattern_t);
sorted_pattern_t *pattern
= &APR_ARRAY_IDX(array, i, sorted_pattern_t);
/* Does PATTERN potentially have a prefix in ARRAY?
* If so, at least the first char must match with the predecessor's
* because the array is sorted by that string. */
if (prev->node->segment.data[0] != pattern->node->segment.data[0])
continue;
/* Only the predecessor or any of its prefixes can be the closest
* prefix to PATTERN. */
for ( ; prev; prev = prev->next)
if ( prev->node->segment.len < pattern->node->segment.len
&& !memcmp(prev->node->segment.data,
pattern->node->segment.data,
prev->node->segment.len))
{
pattern->next = prev;
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | subversion | e1b615840932fb46aefe1cd90d2115720af4600e | 162,236,002,489,652,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | Fix issue #4880 "Use-after-free of object-pools when used as httpd module"
Ensure that we initialize authz again if the pool which our authz
caches depend on is cleared. Apache HTTPD may run pre/post config
hooks multiple times and clear its global configuration pool which
our authz caching pools depend on.
Reported-by: Thomas Weißschuh (thomas {at} t-8ch dot de)
Thomas has also confirmed that this patch fixes the problem.
* subversion/libsvn_repos/authz.c
(deinit_authz): New pool cleanup handler which resets authz initialization
in case the parent pool of our authz caches is cleared.
(synchronized_authz_initialize): Register new pool cleanup handler.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/subversion/trunk@1894734 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 |
static void *neigh_stat_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = seq->private;
struct neigh_table *tbl = pde->data;
int cpu;
for (cpu = *pos; cpu < NR_CPUS; ++cpu) {
if (!cpu_possible(cpu))
continue;
*pos = cpu+1;
return per_cpu_ptr(tbl->stats, cpu);
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux-2.6 | 9ef1d4c7c7aca1cd436612b6ca785b726ffb8ed8 | 334,603,379,156,399,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | [NETLINK]: Missing initializations in dumped data
Mostly missing initialization of padding fields of 1 or 2 bytes length,
two instances of uninitialized nlmsgerr->msg of 16 bytes length.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
RGWOp *RGWHandler_REST_Service_S3::op_head()
{
return new RGWListBuckets_ObjStore_S3;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | ceph | 8f90658c731499722d5f4393c8ad70b971d05f77 | 110,395,458,319,606,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400) |
static int _query(netsnmp_variable_list *list,
int request,
netsnmp_session *session) {
netsnmp_pdu *pdu;
netsnmp_pdu *response = NULL;
netsnmp_variable_list *vb1, *vb2, *vtmp;
int ret, count;
DEBUGMSGTL(("iquery", "query on session %p\n", session));
if (NULL == list) {
snmp_log(LOG_ERR, "empty variable list in _query\n");
return SNMP_ERR_GENERR;
}
pdu = snmp_pdu_create( request );
if (NULL == pdu) {
snmp_log(LOG_ERR, "could not allocate pdu\n");
return SNMP_ERR_GENERR;
}
/*
* Clone the varbind list into the request PDU...
*/
pdu->variables = snmp_clone_varbind( list );
if (NULL == pdu->variables) {
snmp_log(LOG_ERR, "could not clone variable list\n");
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
return SNMP_ERR_GENERR;
}
#ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT
retry:
#endif
if ( session )
ret = snmp_synch_response( session, pdu, &response );
else if (_def_query_session)
ret = snmp_synch_response( _def_query_session, pdu, &response );
else {
/* No session specified */
snmp_free_pdu(pdu);
return SNMP_ERR_GENERR;
}
DEBUGMSGTL(("iquery", "query returned %d\n", ret));
/*
* ....then copy the results back into the
* list (assuming the request succeeded!).
* This avoids having to worry about how this
* list was originally allocated.
*/
if ( ret == SNMP_ERR_NOERROR ) {
if ( response->errstat != SNMP_ERR_NOERROR ) {
DEBUGMSGT(("iquery", "Error in packet: %s\n",
snmp_errstring(response->errstat)));
/*
* If the request failed, then remove the
* offending varbind and try again.
* (all except SET requests)
*
* XXX - implement a library version of
* NETSNMP_DS_APP_DONT_FIX_PDUS ??
*/
ret = response->errstat;
if (response->errindex != 0) {
DEBUGMSGT(("iquery:result", "Failed object:\n"));
for (count = 1, vtmp = response->variables;
vtmp && count != response->errindex;
vtmp = vtmp->next_variable, count++)
/*EMPTY*/;
if (vtmp)
DEBUGMSGVAR(("iquery:result", vtmp));
DEBUGMSG(("iquery:result", "\n"));
}
#ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT
if (request != SNMP_MSG_SET &&
response->errindex != 0) {
DEBUGMSGTL(("iquery", "retrying query (%d, %ld)\n", ret, response->errindex));
pdu = snmp_fix_pdu( response, request );
snmp_free_pdu( response );
response = NULL;
if ( pdu != NULL )
goto retry;
}
#endif /* !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT */
} else {
for (vb1 = response->variables, vb2 = list;
vb1;
vb1 = vb1->next_variable, vb2 = vb2->next_variable) {
DEBUGMSGVAR(("iquery:result", vb1));
DEBUGMSG(("iquery:results", "\n"));
if ( !vb2 ) {
ret = SNMP_ERR_GENERR;
break;
}
vtmp = vb2->next_variable;
snmp_free_var_internals( vb2 );
snmp_clone_var( vb1, vb2 ); /* xxx: check return? */
vb2->next_variable = vtmp;
}
}
} else {
/* Distinguish snmp_send errors from SNMP errStat errors */
ret = -ret;
}
snmp_free_pdu( response );
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | net-snmp | 5f881d3bf24599b90d67a45cae7a3eb099cd71c9 | 294,681,117,413,364,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 109 | libsnmp, USM: Introduce a reference count in struct usmStateReference
This patch fixes https://sourceforge.net/p/net-snmp/bugs/2956/. |
static int netlink_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
"sk Eth Pid Groups "
"Rmem Wmem Dump Locks Drops Inode\n");
} else {
struct sock *s = v;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(s);
seq_printf(seq, "%pK %-3d %-6d %08x %-8d %-8d %pK %-8d %-8d %-8lu\n",
s,
s->sk_protocol,
nlk->pid,
nlk->groups ? (u32)nlk->groups[0] : 0,
sk_rmem_alloc_get(s),
sk_wmem_alloc_get(s),
nlk->cb,
atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
atomic_read(&s->sk_drops),
sock_i_ino(s)
);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea | 273,972,852,313,508,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
u32 sid, osid;
int atsecure = 0;
sid = tsec->sid;
osid = tsec->osid;
if (osid != sid) {
/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
the noatsecure permission is granted between
the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}
return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 56,462,996,007,891,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> |
get_seckey_byfprint (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte * fprint, size_t fprint_len)
{
gpg_error_t err;
if (fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16)
{
struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
kbnode_t kb = NULL;
memset (&ctx, 0, sizeof ctx);
ctx.exact = 1;
ctx.not_allocated = 1;
ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new ();
ctx.nitems = 1;
ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len == 16 ? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
: KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
memcpy (ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len);
err = lookup (&ctx, &kb, 1);
if (!err && pk)
pk_from_block (&ctx, pk, kb);
release_kbnode (kb);
get_pubkey_end (&ctx);
}
else
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUG);
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | gnupg | 4bde12206c5bf199dc6e12a74af8da4558ba41bf | 199,618,617,467,471,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | gpg: Distinguish between missing and cleared key flags.
* include/cipher.h (PUBKEY_USAGE_NONE): New.
* g10/getkey.c (parse_key_usage): Set new flag.
--
We do not want to use the default capabilities (derived from the
algorithm) if any key flags are given in a signature. Thus if key
flags are used in any way, the default key capabilities are never
used.
This allows to create a key with key flags set to all zero so it can't
be used. This better reflects common sense. |
add_ctype_to_cc_by_range(CClassNode* cc, int ctype ARG_UNUSED, int not,
OnigEncoding enc ARG_UNUSED,
OnigCodePoint sb_out, const OnigCodePoint mbr[])
{
int i, r;
OnigCodePoint j;
int n = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_NUM(mbr);
if (not == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
for (j = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i);
j <= ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i); j++) {
if (j >= sb_out) {
if (j == ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i)) i++;
else if (j > ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i)) {
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), j,
ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i));
if (r != 0) return r;
i++;
}
goto sb_end;
}
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
}
sb_end:
for ( ; i < n; i++) {
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf),
ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i),
ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i));
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
else {
OnigCodePoint prev = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
for (j = prev;
j < ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i); j++) {
if (j >= sb_out) {
goto sb_end2;
}
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
prev = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i) + 1;
}
for (j = prev; j < sb_out; j++) {
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
sb_end2:
prev = sb_out;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (prev < ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i)) {
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), prev,
ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i) - 1);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
prev = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i) + 1;
}
if (prev < 0x7fffffff) {
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), prev, 0x7fffffff);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | oniguruma | 65a9b1aa03c9bc2dc01b074295b9603232cb3b78 | 38,806,118,639,097,644,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | onig-5.9.2 |
bool tr_variantDictFindDict(tr_variant* dict, tr_quark const key, tr_variant** setme)
{
return tr_variantDictFindType(dict, key, TR_VARIANT_TYPE_DICT, setme);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | transmission | 2123adf8e5e1c2b48791f9d22fc8c747e974180e | 86,368,812,576,027,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CVE-2018-10756: Fix heap-use-after-free in tr_variantWalk
In libtransmission/variant.c, function tr_variantWalk, when the variant
stack is reallocated, a pointer to the previously allocated memory
region is kept. This address is later accessed (heap use-after-free)
while walking back down the stack, causing the application to crash.
The application can be any application which uses libtransmission, such
as transmission-daemon, transmission-gtk, transmission-show, etc.
Reported-by: Tom Richards <[email protected]> |
LZWFixupTags(TIFF* tif)
{
(void) tif;
return (1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | libtiff | 58a898cb4459055bb488ca815c23b880c242a27d | 245,727,912,673,559,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | LZWDecodeCompat(): fix potential index-out-of-bounds write. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2780 / CVE-2018-8905
The fix consists in using the similar code LZWDecode() to validate we
don't write outside of the output buffer. |
/* {{{ proto DateTimeImmutable::setTimestamp()
*/
PHP_METHOD(DateTimeImmutable, setTimestamp)
{
zval *object, *new_object;
long timestamp;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Ol", &object, date_ce_immutable, ×tamp) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
new_object = date_clone_immutable(object TSRMLS_CC);
php_date_timestamp_set(new_object, timestamp, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
| 0 | [] | php-src | bb057498f7457e8b2eba98332a3bad434de4cf12 | 200,618,175,717,082,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix #70277: new DateTimeZone($foo) is ignoring text after null byte
The DateTimeZone constructors are not binary safe. They're parsing the timezone
as string, but discard the length when calling timezone_initialize(). This
patch adds a tz_len parameter and a respective check to timezone_initialize(). |
static inline size_t GetPixelMetacontentExtent(
const Image *magick_restrict image)
{
return(image->metacontent_extent);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | 8187d2d8fd010d2d6b1a3a8edd935beec404dddc | 332,858,005,193,346,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1610 |
char *recv_line(struct pool *pool)
{
ssize_t len, buflen;
char *tok, *sret = NULL;
if (!strstr(pool->sockbuf, "\n")) {
struct timeval rstart, now;
gettimeofday(&rstart, NULL);
if (!socket_full(pool, true)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for data on socket_full");
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&pool->stratum_lock);
do {
char s[RBUFSIZE];
size_t slen, n;
memset(s, 0, RBUFSIZE);
n = recv(pool->sock, s, RECVSIZE, 0);
if (n < 1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to recv sock in recv_line");
break;
}
slen = strlen(s);
recalloc_sock(pool, slen);
strcat(pool->sockbuf, s);
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
} while (tdiff(&now, &rstart) < 60 && !strstr(pool->sockbuf, "\n"));
mutex_unlock(&pool->stratum_lock);
}
buflen = strlen(pool->sockbuf);
tok = strtok(pool->sockbuf, "\n");
if (!tok) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to parse a \\n terminated string in recv_line");
goto out;
}
sret = strdup(tok);
len = strlen(sret);
/* Copy what's left in the buffer after the \n, including the
* terminating \0 */
if (buflen > len + 1)
memmove(pool->sockbuf, pool->sockbuf + len + 1, buflen - len + 1);
else
strcpy(pool->sockbuf, "");
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.times_received++;
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.bytes_received += len;
total_bytes_xfer += len;
pool->cgminer_pool_stats.net_bytes_received += len;
out:
if (!sret)
clear_sock(pool);
else if (opt_protocol)
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "RECVD: %s", sret);
return sret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | bfgminer | c80ad8548251eb0e15329fc240c89070640c9d79 | 64,984,840,260,591,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 61 | Stratum: extract_sockaddr: Truncate overlong addresses rather than stack overflow
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <[email protected]> for finding this! |
l_id(void)
{
return (unsigned long)pthread_self();
} | 0 | [] | pound | a0c52c542ca9620a96750f9877b26bf4c84aef1b | 233,763,675,789,355,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | SSL Compression Disable patch for 2.6f
This patch disables SSL/TLS compression entirely. There is no config option.
This prevents CRIME attacks against SSL. Note that HTTP compression is still
an option.
Test your server at https://www.ssllabs.com/ssldb/
Original patch by Hereward Cooper <[email protected]>
Openssl 0.9.8 disabling ideas borrowed from Igor Sysoev's code in nginx. |
static int customRsaPrivEnc(
int flen,
const unsigned char* from,
unsigned char* to,
RSA* rsa,
int padding) {
LOG(INFO) << "rsa_priv_enc";
EventBase* asyncJobEvb =
reinterpret_cast<EventBase*>(RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, kRSAEvbExIndex));
CHECK(asyncJobEvb);
RSA* actualRSA = reinterpret_cast<RSA*>(RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, kRSAExIndex));
CHECK(actualRSA);
AsyncSSLSocket* socket = reinterpret_cast<AsyncSSLSocket*>(
RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, kRSASocketExIndex));
ASYNC_JOB* job = ASYNC_get_current_job();
if (job == nullptr) {
throw std::runtime_error("Expected call in job context");
}
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX* waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job);
OSSL_ASYNC_FD pipefds[2] = {0, 0};
makeNonBlockingPipe(pipefds);
if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(
waitctx, kEngineId.data(), pipefds[0], nullptr, nullptr)) {
throw std::runtime_error("Cannot set wait fd");
}
int ret = 0;
int* retptr = &ret;
auto hand = folly::NetworkSocket::native_handle_type(pipefds[1]);
auto asyncPipeWriter = folly::AsyncPipeWriter::newWriter(
asyncJobEvb, folly::NetworkSocket(hand));
asyncJobEvb->runInEventBaseThread([retptr = retptr,
flen = flen,
from = from,
to = to,
padding = padding,
actualRSA = actualRSA,
writer = std::move(asyncPipeWriter),
socket = socket]() {
LOG(INFO) << "Running job";
if (socket) {
LOG(INFO) << "Got a socket passed in, closing it...";
socket->closeNow();
}
*retptr = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(
flen, from, to, actualRSA, padding);
LOG(INFO) << "Finished job, writing to pipe";
uint8_t byte = *retptr > 0 ? 1 : 0;
writer->write(nullptr, &byte, 1);
});
LOG(INFO) << "About to pause job";
ASYNC_pause_job();
LOG(INFO) << "Resumed job with ret: " << ret;
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | folly | c321eb588909646c15aefde035fd3133ba32cdee | 92,870,852,150,251,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 61 | Handle close_notify as standard writeErr in AsyncSSLSocket.
Summary: Fixes CVE-2019-11934
Reviewed By: mingtaoy
Differential Revision: D18020613
fbshipit-source-id: db82bb250e53f0d225f1280bd67bc74abd417836 |
static void Ins_NOT( INS_ARG )
{ (void)exc;
if ( args[0] != 0 )
args[0] = 0;
else
args[0] = 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ghostpdl | c7c55972758a93350882c32147801a3485b010fe | 312,735,563,386,179,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Bug 698024: bounds check zone pointer in Ins_MIRP() |
static int __init sched_debug_setup(char *str)
{
sched_debug_enabled = 1;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df | 222,252,535,186,159,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | sched: panic on corrupted stack end
Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g. via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).
Just panic directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
void BytecodeFunctionGenerator::addDebugSourceLocation(
const DebugSourceLocation &info) {
// If an address is repeated, it means no actual bytecode was emitted for the
// previous source location.
if (!debugLocations_.empty() &&
debugLocations_.back().address == info.address) {
debugLocations_.back() = info;
} else {
debugLocations_.push_back(info);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | hermes | 091835377369c8fd5917d9b87acffa721ad2a168 | 139,105,830,269,879,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Correctly restore whether or not a function is an inner generator
Summary:
If a generator was large enough to be lazily compiled, we would lose
that information when reconstituting the function's context. This meant
the function was generated as a regular function instead of a generator.
#utd-hermes-ignore-android
Reviewed By: tmikov
Differential Revision: D23580247
fbshipit-source-id: af5628bf322cbdc7c7cdfbb5f8d0756328518ea1 |
static RzBinInfo *info(RzBinFile *bf) {
if (!bf) {
return NULL;
}
LuacBinInfo *bin_info_obj = GET_INTERNAL_BIN_INFO_OBJ(bf);
if (!bin_info_obj) {
return NULL;
}
return bin_info_obj->general_info;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-787"
] | rizin | 05bbd147caccc60162d6fba9baaaf24befa281cd | 32,107,109,887,770,846,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Fix oob read on _luac_build_info and luac memleaks |
QString PostgreSqlStorage::awayMessage(UserId user, NetworkId networkId)
{
QSqlQuery query(logDb());
query.prepare(queryString("select_network_awaymsg"));
query.bindValue(":userid", user.toInt());
query.bindValue(":networkid", networkId.toInt());
safeExec(query);
watchQuery(query);
QString awayMsg;
if (query.first())
awayMsg = query.value(0).toString();
return awayMsg;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | quassel | aa1008be162cb27da938cce93ba533f54d228869 | 184,693,193,050,259,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fixing security vulnerability with Qt 4.8.5+ and PostgreSQL.
Properly detects whether Qt performs slash escaping in SQL queries or
not, and then configures PostgreSQL accordingly. This bug was a
introduced due to a bugfix in Qt 4.8.5 disables slash escaping when
binding queries: https://bugreports.qt-project.org/browse/QTBUG-30076
Thanks to brot and Tucos.
[Fixes #1244] |
std::string PngChunk::zlibCompress(const std::string& text)
{
uLongf compressedLen = static_cast<uLongf>(text.size() * 2); // just a starting point
int zlibResult;
DataBuf arr;
do {
arr.alloc(compressedLen);
zlibResult = compress2((Bytef*)arr.pData_, &compressedLen,
(const Bytef*)text.data(), static_cast<uLong>(text.size()),
Z_BEST_COMPRESSION);
switch (zlibResult) {
case Z_OK:
assert((uLongf)arr.size_ >= compressedLen);
arr.size_ = compressedLen;
break;
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
// The compressed array needs to be larger
#ifdef DEBUG
std::cout << "Exiv2::PngChunk::parsePngChunk: doubling size for compression.\n";
#endif
compressedLen *= 2;
// DoS protection. Cap max compressed size
if ( compressedLen > 131072 ) throw Error(kerFailedToReadImageData);
break;
default:
// Something bad happened
throw Error(kerFailedToReadImageData);
}
} while (zlibResult == Z_BUF_ERROR);
return std::string((const char*)arr.pData_, arr.size_);
} // PngChunk::zlibCompress | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | exiv2 | 35b3e596edacd2437c2c5d3dd2b5c9502626163d | 135,246,796,817,241,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | Add overflow & overread checks to PngChunk::parseTXTChunk()
This function was creating a lot of new pointers and strings without
properly checking the array bounds. This commit adds several calls
to enforce(), making sure that the pointers stay within bounds.
Strings are now created using the helper function
string_from_unterminated() to prevent overreads in the constructor of
std::string.
This fixes #400 |
static void debug_handler(int level, const char *format, va_list ap)
{
if (verbose) {
vprintf(format, ap);
} else {
char buf[4096], *tmp;
int len;
if (vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap) >= sizeof(buf)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Increase temporary log buffer size!\n");
return;
}
if (pthread_mutex_lock(&log_mutex) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "pthread_mutex_lock failed!\n");
return;
}
len = (log_buffer != NULL) ? strlen(log_buffer) : 0;
tmp = realloc(log_buffer, len + strlen(buf) + 1);
if (tmp != NULL) {
log_buffer = tmp;
strcpy(log_buffer + len, buf);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory for log buffer!\n");
}
if (pthread_mutex_unlock(&log_mutex) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "pthread_mutex_unlock failed!\n");
failure();
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | libgadu | d882b15661ee94949919ebbbc43edf0db5f619cb | 7,269,473,357,736,428,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | Odkąd biblioteka weryfikuje certyfikaty ciężko testować z self-signed. |
static struct db_sys_list *_db_rule_gen_64(const struct arch_def *arch,
const struct db_api_rule_list *rule)
{
unsigned int iter;
struct db_sys_list *s_new;
const struct db_api_arg *chain = rule->args;
struct db_arg_chain_tree *c_iter[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
struct db_arg_chain_tree *c_prev[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
enum scmp_compare op_prev = _SCMP_CMP_MIN;
unsigned int arg;
scmp_datum_t mask;
scmp_datum_t datum;
s_new = zmalloc(sizeof(*s_new));
if (s_new == NULL)
return NULL;
s_new->num = rule->syscall;
s_new->valid = true;
/* run through the argument chain */
for (iter = 0; iter < ARG_COUNT_MAX; iter++) {
if (chain[iter].valid == 0)
continue;
/* TODO: handle the case were either hi or lo isn't needed */
/* skip generating instruction which are no-ops */
if (!_db_arg_cmp_need_hi(&chain[iter]) &&
!_db_arg_cmp_need_lo(&chain[iter]))
continue;
c_iter[0] = zmalloc(sizeof(*c_iter[0]));
if (c_iter[0] == NULL)
goto gen_64_failure;
c_iter[1] = zmalloc(sizeof(*c_iter[1]));
if (c_iter[1] == NULL) {
free(c_iter[0]);
goto gen_64_failure;
}
c_iter[2] = NULL;
arg = chain[iter].arg;
mask = chain[iter].mask;
datum = chain[iter].datum;
/* NOTE: with the idea that a picture is worth a thousand
* words, i'm presenting the following diagrams which
* show how we should compare 64-bit syscall arguments
* using 32-bit comparisons.
*
* in the diagrams below "A(x)" is the syscall argument
* being evaluated and "R(x)" is the syscall argument
* value specified in the libseccomp rule. the "ACCEPT"
* verdict indicates a rule match and processing should
* continue on to the rest of the rule, or the final rule
* action should be triggered. the "REJECT" verdict
* indicates that the rule does not match and processing
* should continue to the next rule or the default
* action.
*
* SCMP_CMP_GT:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) > Rh(x) |------+
* | +------------------+ |
* FALSE TRUE A
* | | C
* +-----------+ +----> C
* v +----> E
* +------------------+ | P
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+ | T
* R | +------------------+ | |
* E FALSE TRUE |
* J <----+ | |
* E <----+ +------------+ |
* C FALSE v |
* T | +------------------+ |
* +--| Al(x) > Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
* SCMP_CMP_GE:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) > Rh(x) |------+
* | +------------------+ |
* FALSE TRUE A
* | | C
* +-----------+ +----> C
* v +----> E
* +------------------+ | P
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+ | T
* R | +------------------+ | |
* E FALSE TRUE |
* J <----+ | |
* E <----+ +------------+ |
* C FALSE v |
* T | +------------------+ |
* +--| Al(x) >= Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
* SCMP_CMP_LT:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) > Rh(x) |------+
* | +------------------+ |
* FALSE TRUE R
* | | E
* +-----------+ +----> J
* v +----> E
* +------------------+ | C
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+ | T
* A | +------------------+ | |
* C FALSE TRUE |
* C <----+ | |
* E <----+ +------------+ |
* P FALSE v |
* T | +------------------+ |
* +--| Al(x) >= Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
* SCMP_CMP_LE:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) > Rh(x) |------+
* | +------------------+ |
* FALSE TRUE R
* | | E
* +-----------+ +----> J
* v +----> E
* +------------------+ | C
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+ | T
* A | +------------------+ | |
* C FALSE TRUE |
* C <----+ | |
* E <----+ +------------+ |
* P FALSE v |
* T | +------------------+ |
* +--| Al(x) > Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
* SCMP_CMP_EQ:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+
* R | +------------------+ | A
* E FALSE TRUE C
* J <----+ | C
* E <----+ +------------+ +----> E
* C FALSE v | P
* T | +------------------+ | T
* +--| Al(x) == Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
* SCMP_CMP_NE:
* +------------------+
* +--| Ah(x) == Rh(x) |--+
* A | +------------------+ | R
* C FALSE TRUE E
* C <----+ | J
* E <----+ +------------+ +----> E
* P FALSE v | C
* T | +------------------+ | T
* +--| Al(x) == Rl(x) |------+
* +------------------+
*
*/
/* setup the level */
switch (chain[iter].op) {
case SCMP_CMP_GT:
case SCMP_CMP_GE:
case SCMP_CMP_LE:
case SCMP_CMP_LT:
c_iter[2] = zmalloc(sizeof(*c_iter[2]));
if (c_iter[2] == NULL) {
free(c_iter[0]);
free(c_iter[1]);
goto gen_64_failure;
}
c_iter[0]->arg = arg;
c_iter[1]->arg = arg;
c_iter[2]->arg = arg;
c_iter[0]->arg_h_flg = true;
c_iter[1]->arg_h_flg = true;
c_iter[2]->arg_h_flg = false;
c_iter[0]->arg_offset = arch_arg_offset_hi(arch, arg);
c_iter[1]->arg_offset = arch_arg_offset_hi(arch, arg);
c_iter[2]->arg_offset = arch_arg_offset_lo(arch, arg);
c_iter[0]->mask = D64_HI(mask);
c_iter[1]->mask = D64_HI(mask);
c_iter[2]->mask = D64_LO(mask);
c_iter[0]->datum = D64_HI(datum);
c_iter[1]->datum = D64_HI(datum);
c_iter[2]->datum = D64_LO(datum);
c_iter[0]->datum_full = datum;
c_iter[1]->datum_full = datum;
c_iter[2]->datum_full = datum;
_db_node_mask_fixup(c_iter[0]);
_db_node_mask_fixup(c_iter[1]);
_db_node_mask_fixup(c_iter[2]);
c_iter[0]->op = SCMP_CMP_GT;
c_iter[1]->op = SCMP_CMP_EQ;
switch (chain[iter].op) {
case SCMP_CMP_GT:
case SCMP_CMP_LE:
c_iter[2]->op = SCMP_CMP_GT;
break;
case SCMP_CMP_GE:
case SCMP_CMP_LT:
c_iter[2]->op = SCMP_CMP_GE;
break;
default:
/* we should never get here */
goto gen_64_failure;
}
c_iter[0]->op_orig = chain[iter].op;
c_iter[1]->op_orig = chain[iter].op;
c_iter[2]->op_orig = chain[iter].op;
c_iter[0]->nxt_f = _db_node_get(c_iter[1]);
c_iter[1]->nxt_t = _db_node_get(c_iter[2]);
break;
case SCMP_CMP_EQ:
case SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ:
case SCMP_CMP_NE:
c_iter[0]->arg = arg;
c_iter[1]->arg = arg;
c_iter[0]->arg_h_flg = true;
c_iter[1]->arg_h_flg = false;
c_iter[0]->arg_offset = arch_arg_offset_hi(arch, arg);
c_iter[1]->arg_offset = arch_arg_offset_lo(arch, arg);
c_iter[0]->mask = D64_HI(mask);
c_iter[1]->mask = D64_LO(mask);
c_iter[0]->datum = D64_HI(datum);
c_iter[1]->datum = D64_LO(datum);
c_iter[0]->datum_full = datum;
c_iter[1]->datum_full = datum;
_db_node_mask_fixup(c_iter[0]);
_db_node_mask_fixup(c_iter[1]);
switch (chain[iter].op) {
case SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ:
c_iter[0]->op = SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ;
c_iter[1]->op = SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ;
break;
default:
c_iter[0]->op = SCMP_CMP_EQ;
c_iter[1]->op = SCMP_CMP_EQ;
}
c_iter[0]->op_orig = chain[iter].op;
c_iter[1]->op_orig = chain[iter].op;
c_iter[0]->nxt_t = _db_node_get(c_iter[1]);
break;
default:
/* we should never get here */
goto gen_64_failure;
}
/* link this level to the previous level */
if (c_prev[0] != NULL) {
switch (op_prev) {
case SCMP_CMP_GT:
case SCMP_CMP_GE:
c_prev[0]->nxt_t = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
c_prev[2]->nxt_t = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
break;
case SCMP_CMP_EQ:
case SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ:
c_prev[1]->nxt_t = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
break;
case SCMP_CMP_LE:
case SCMP_CMP_LT:
c_prev[1]->nxt_f = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
c_prev[2]->nxt_f = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
break;
case SCMP_CMP_NE:
c_prev[0]->nxt_f = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
c_prev[1]->nxt_f = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
break;
default:
/* we should never get here */
goto gen_64_failure;
}
} else
s_new->chains = _db_node_get(c_iter[0]);
/* update the node count */
switch (chain[iter].op) {
case SCMP_CMP_NE:
case SCMP_CMP_EQ:
case SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ:
s_new->node_cnt += 2;
break;
default:
s_new->node_cnt += 3;
}
/* keep pointers to this level */
c_prev[0] = c_iter[0];
c_prev[1] = c_iter[1];
c_prev[2] = c_iter[2];
op_prev = chain[iter].op;
}
if (c_iter[0] != NULL) {
/* set the actions on the last layer */
switch (op_prev) {
case SCMP_CMP_GT:
case SCMP_CMP_GE:
c_iter[0]->act_t_flg = true;
c_iter[0]->act_t = rule->action;
c_iter[2]->act_t_flg = true;
c_iter[2]->act_t = rule->action;
break;
case SCMP_CMP_LE:
case SCMP_CMP_LT:
c_iter[1]->act_f_flg = true;
c_iter[1]->act_f = rule->action;
c_iter[2]->act_f_flg = true;
c_iter[2]->act_f = rule->action;
break;
case SCMP_CMP_EQ:
case SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ:
c_iter[1]->act_t_flg = true;
c_iter[1]->act_t = rule->action;
break;
case SCMP_CMP_NE:
c_iter[0]->act_f_flg = true;
c_iter[0]->act_f = rule->action;
c_iter[1]->act_f_flg = true;
c_iter[1]->act_f = rule->action;
break;
default:
/* we should never get here */
goto gen_64_failure;
}
} else
s_new->action = rule->action;
return s_new;
gen_64_failure:
/* free the new chain and its syscall struct */
_db_tree_put(&s_new->chains);
free(s_new);
return NULL;
} | 0 | [] | libseccomp | c5bf78de480b32b324e0f511c88ce533ed280b37 | 206,646,964,921,989,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 347 | db: fix 64-bit argument comparisons
Our approach to doing 64-bit comparisons using 32-bit operators was
just plain wrong, leading to a number of potential problems with
filters that used the LT, GT, LE, or GE operators. This patch fixes
this problem and a few other related issues that came to light in
the course of fixing the core problem.
A special thanks to Jann Horn for bringing this problem to our
attention.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> |
int wait_for_beacon(unsigned char *bssid, unsigned char *capa, char *essid)
{
int len = 0, chan = 0, taglen = 0, tagtype = 0, pos = 0;
unsigned char pkt_sniff[4096];
struct timeval tv,tv2;
char essid2[33];
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
while (1)
{
len = 0;
while (len < 22)
{
len = read_packet(pkt_sniff, sizeof(pkt_sniff), NULL);
gettimeofday(&tv2, NULL);
if(((tv2.tv_sec-tv.tv_sec)*1000000) + (tv2.tv_usec-tv.tv_usec) > 10000*1000) //wait 10sec for beacon frame
{
return -1;
}
if(len <= 0) usleep(1);
}
if (! memcmp(pkt_sniff, "\x80", 1))
{
pos = 0;
taglen = 22; //initial value to get the fixed tags parsing started
taglen+= 12; //skip fixed tags in frames
do
{
pos += taglen + 2;
tagtype = pkt_sniff[pos];
taglen = pkt_sniff[pos+1];
} while(tagtype != 3 && pos < len-2);
if(tagtype != 3) continue;
if(taglen != 1) continue;
if(pos+2+taglen > len) continue;
chan = pkt_sniff[pos+2];
if(essid)
{
pos = 0;
taglen = 22; //initial value to get the fixed tags parsing started
taglen+= 12; //skip fixed tags in frames
do
{
pos += taglen + 2;
tagtype = pkt_sniff[pos];
taglen = pkt_sniff[pos+1];
} while(tagtype != 0 && pos < len-2);
if(tagtype != 0) continue;
if(taglen <= 1)
{
if (memcmp(bssid, pkt_sniff+10, 6) == 0) break;
else continue;
}
if(pos+2+taglen > len) continue;
if(taglen > 32)taglen = 32;
if((pkt_sniff+pos+2)[0] < 32 && memcmp(bssid, pkt_sniff+10, 6) == 0)
{
break;
}
/* if bssid is given, copy essid */
if(bssid != NULL && memcmp(bssid, pkt_sniff+10, 6) == 0 && strlen(essid) == 0)
{
memset(essid, 0, 33);
memcpy(essid, pkt_sniff+pos+2, taglen);
break;
}
/* if essid is given, copy bssid AND essid, so we can handle case insensitive arguments */
if(bssid != NULL && memcmp(bssid, NULL_MAC, 6) == 0 && strncasecmp(essid, (char*)pkt_sniff+pos+2, taglen) == 0 && strlen(essid) == (unsigned)taglen)
{
memset(essid, 0, 33);
memcpy(essid, pkt_sniff+pos+2, taglen);
memcpy(bssid, pkt_sniff+10, 6);
printf("Found BSSID \"%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X\" to given ESSID \"%s\".\n", bssid[0], bssid[1], bssid[2], bssid[3], bssid[4], bssid[5], essid);
break;
}
/* if essid and bssid are given, check both */
if(bssid != NULL && memcmp(bssid, pkt_sniff+10, 6) == 0 && strlen(essid) > 0)
{
memset(essid2, 0, 33);
memcpy(essid2, pkt_sniff+pos+2, taglen);
if(strncasecmp(essid, essid2, taglen) == 0 && strlen(essid) == (unsigned)taglen)
break;
else
{
printf("For the given BSSID \"%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X\", there is an ESSID mismatch!\n", bssid[0], bssid[1], bssid[2], bssid[3], bssid[4], bssid[5]);
printf("Found ESSID \"%s\" vs. specified ESSID \"%s\"\n", essid2, essid);
printf("Using the given one, double check it to be sure its correct!\n");
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if(capa) memcpy(capa, pkt_sniff+34, 2);
return chan;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | aircrack-ng | 091b153f294b9b695b0b2831e65936438b550d7b | 81,012,280,315,248,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 108 | Aireplay-ng: Fixed tcp_test stack overflow (Closes #14 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2417 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab |
TEST_P(DownstreamProtocolIntegrationTest, InvalidContentLengthAllowed) {
config_helper_.addConfigModifier(
[](envoy::config::filter::network::http_connection_manager::v2::HttpConnectionManager& hcm)
-> void {
hcm.mutable_http2_protocol_options()->set_stream_error_on_invalid_http_messaging(true);
});
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
auto encoder_decoder =
codec_client_->startRequest(Http::TestHeaderMapImpl{{":method", "POST"},
{":path", "/test/long/url"},
{":authority", "host"},
{"content-length", "-1"}});
auto response = std::move(encoder_decoder.second);
if (downstream_protocol_ == Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP1) {
codec_client_->waitForDisconnect();
} else {
response->waitForReset();
codec_client_->close();
}
if (downstream_protocol_ == Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP1) {
ASSERT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("400", response->headers().Status()->value().getStringView());
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(response->reset());
EXPECT_EQ(Http::StreamResetReason::RemoteReset, response->reset_reason());
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 81,626,776,897,051,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
jbig2_decode_symbol_dict(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2SymbolDictParams *params, const byte *data, size_t size, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats, Jbig2ArithCx *GR_stats)
{
Jbig2SymbolDict *SDNEWSYMS = NULL;
Jbig2SymbolDict *SDEXSYMS = NULL;
uint32_t HCHEIGHT;
uint32_t NSYMSDECODED;
uint32_t SYMWIDTH, TOTWIDTH;
uint32_t HCFIRSTSYM;
uint32_t *SDNEWSYMWIDTHS = NULL;
int SBSYMCODELEN = 0;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanState *hs = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanTable *SDHUFFRDX = NULL;
Jbig2HuffmanTable *SBHUFFRSIZE = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IADH = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IADW = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IAEX = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IAAI = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIaidCtx *IAID = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IARDX = NULL;
Jbig2ArithIntCtx *IARDY = NULL;
int code = 0;
Jbig2SymbolDict **refagg_dicts = NULL;
int n_refagg_dicts = 1;
Jbig2TextRegionParams *tparams = NULL;
/* 6.5.5 (3) */
HCHEIGHT = 0;
NSYMSDECODED = 0;
ws = jbig2_word_stream_buf_new(ctx, data, size);
if (ws == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate ws in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
return NULL;
}
as = jbig2_arith_new(ctx, ws);
if (as == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate as in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
return NULL;
}
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
IADH = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IADW = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IAEX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IAAI = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
if ((IADH == NULL) || (IADW == NULL) || (IAEX == NULL) || (IAAI == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup1;
}
if (params->SDREFAGG) {
int64_t tmp = params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS;
for (SBSYMCODELEN = 0; ((int64_t) 1 << SBSYMCODELEN) < tmp; SBSYMCODELEN++);
IAID = jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_new(ctx, SBSYMCODELEN);
IARDX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
IARDY = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
if ((IAID == NULL) || (IARDX == NULL) || (IARDY == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup2;
}
}
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "huffman coded symbol dictionary");
hs = jbig2_huffman_new(ctx, ws);
SDHUFFRDX = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O);
SBHUFFRSIZE = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_A);
if ((hs == NULL) || (SDHUFFRDX == NULL) || (SBHUFFRSIZE == NULL)) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "failed to allocate storage for symbol bitmap");
goto cleanup2;
}
if (!params->SDREFAGG) {
SDNEWSYMWIDTHS = jbig2_new(ctx, uint32_t, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (SDNEWSYMWIDTHS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "could not allocate storage for (%u) symbol widths", params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
goto cleanup2;
}
}
}
SDNEWSYMS = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (SDNEWSYMS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "could not allocate storage for (%u) new symbols", params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
goto cleanup2;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4a) */
while (NSYMSDECODED < params->SDNUMNEWSYMS) {
int32_t HCDH, DW;
/* 6.5.6 */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
HCDH = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFDH, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IADH, as, &HCDH);
}
if (code != 0) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number, "error or OOB decoding height class delta (%d)\n", code);
}
if (!params->SDHUFF && jbig2_arith_has_reached_marker(as)) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "prevent DOS while decoding height classes");
goto cleanup2;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4b) */
HCHEIGHT = HCHEIGHT + HCDH;
SYMWIDTH = 0;
TOTWIDTH = 0;
HCFIRSTSYM = NSYMSDECODED;
if ((int32_t) HCHEIGHT < 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Invalid HCHEIGHT value");
goto cleanup2;
}
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "HCHEIGHT = %d", HCHEIGHT);
#endif
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "decoding height class %d with %d syms decoded", HCHEIGHT, NSYMSDECODED);
for (;;) {
/* 6.5.7 */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
DW = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFDW, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IADW, as, &DW);
}
if (code < 0)
goto cleanup4;
/* 6.5.5 (4c.i) */
if (code == 1) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, " OOB signals end of height class %d", HCHEIGHT);
break;
}
/* check for broken symbol table */
if (NSYMSDECODED >= params->SDNUMNEWSYMS) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "No OOB signalling end of height class %d", HCHEIGHT);
goto cleanup4;
}
SYMWIDTH = SYMWIDTH + DW;
TOTWIDTH = TOTWIDTH + SYMWIDTH;
if ((int32_t) SYMWIDTH < 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Invalid SYMWIDTH value (%d) at symbol %d", SYMWIDTH, NSYMSDECODED + 1);
goto cleanup4;
}
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "SYMWIDTH = %d TOTWIDTH = %d", SYMWIDTH, TOTWIDTH);
#endif
/* 6.5.5 (4c.ii) */
if (!params->SDHUFF || params->SDREFAGG) {
#ifdef JBIG2_DEBUG
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "SDHUFF = %d; SDREFAGG = %d", params->SDHUFF, params->SDREFAGG);
#endif
/* 6.5.8 */
if (!params->SDREFAGG) {
Jbig2GenericRegionParams region_params;
int sdat_bytes;
Jbig2Image *image;
/* Table 16 */
region_params.MMR = 0;
region_params.GBTEMPLATE = params->SDTEMPLATE;
region_params.TPGDON = 0;
region_params.USESKIP = 0;
sdat_bytes = params->SDTEMPLATE == 0 ? 8 : 2;
memcpy(region_params.gbat, params->sdat, sdat_bytes);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate image in jbig2_decode_symbol_dict");
goto cleanup4;
}
code = jbig2_decode_generic_region(ctx, segment, ®ion_params, as, image, GB_stats);
if (code < 0) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
} else {
/* 6.5.8.2 refinement/aggregate symbol */
uint32_t REFAGGNINST;
if (params->SDHUFF) {
REFAGGNINST = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFAGGINST, &code);
} else {
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IAAI, as, (int32_t *) & REFAGGNINST);
}
if (code || (int32_t) REFAGGNINST <= 0) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "invalid number of symbols or OOB in aggregate glyph");
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "aggregate symbol coding (%d instances)", REFAGGNINST);
if (REFAGGNINST > 1) {
Jbig2Image *image;
uint32_t i;
if (tparams == NULL) {
/* First time through, we need to initialise the */
/* various tables for Huffman or adaptive encoding */
/* as well as the text region parameters structure */
refagg_dicts = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2SymbolDict *, n_refagg_dicts);
if (refagg_dicts == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory allocating dictionary array");
goto cleanup4;
}
refagg_dicts[0] = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS);
if (refagg_dicts[0] == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory allocating symbol dictionary");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, refagg_dicts);
goto cleanup4;
}
for (i = 0; i < params->SDNUMINSYMS; i++) {
refagg_dicts[0]->glyphs[i] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[i]);
}
tparams = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2TextRegionParams, 1);
if (tparams == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating text region params");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
/* Values from Table 17, section 6.5.8.2 (2) */
tparams->IADT = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IAFS = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IADS = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IAIT = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
/* Table 31 */
for (SBSYMCODELEN = 0; (1 << SBSYMCODELEN) < (int)(params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS); SBSYMCODELEN++);
tparams->IAID = jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_new(ctx, SBSYMCODELEN);
tparams->IARI = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDW = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDH = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDX = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
tparams->IARDY = jbig2_arith_int_ctx_new(ctx);
} else {
tparams->SBHUFFFS = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_F); /* Table B.6 */
tparams->SBHUFFDS = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_H); /* Table B.8 */
tparams->SBHUFFDT = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_K); /* Table B.11 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDW = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDH = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDX = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
tparams->SBHUFFRDY = jbig2_build_huffman_table(ctx, &jbig2_huffman_params_O); /* Table B.15 */
}
tparams->SBHUFF = params->SDHUFF;
tparams->SBREFINE = 1;
tparams->SBSTRIPS = 1;
tparams->SBDEFPIXEL = 0;
tparams->SBCOMBOP = JBIG2_COMPOSE_OR;
tparams->TRANSPOSED = 0;
tparams->REFCORNER = JBIG2_CORNER_TOPLEFT;
tparams->SBDSOFFSET = 0;
tparams->SBRTEMPLATE = params->SDRTEMPLATE;
}
tparams->SBNUMINSTANCES = REFAGGNINST;
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating symbol image");
goto cleanup4;
}
/* multiple symbols are handled as a text region */
jbig2_decode_text_region(ctx, segment, tparams, (const Jbig2SymbolDict * const *)refagg_dicts,
n_refagg_dicts, image, data, size, GR_stats, as, ws);
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
refagg_dicts[0]->glyphs[params->SDNUMINSYMS + NSYMSDECODED] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED]);
} else {
/* 6.5.8.2.2 */
/* bool SBHUFF = params->SDHUFF; */
Jbig2RefinementRegionParams rparams;
Jbig2Image *image;
uint32_t ID;
int32_t RDX, RDY;
int BMSIZE = 0;
uint32_t ninsyms = params->SDNUMINSYMS;
int code1 = 0;
int code2 = 0;
int code3 = 0;
int code4 = 0;
/* 6.5.8.2.2 (2, 3, 4, 5) */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
ID = jbig2_huffman_get_bits(hs, SBSYMCODELEN, &code4);
RDX = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SDHUFFRDX, &code1);
RDY = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SDHUFFRDX, &code2);
BMSIZE = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SBHUFFRSIZE, &code3);
jbig2_huffman_skip(hs);
} else {
code1 = jbig2_arith_iaid_decode(IAID, as, (int32_t *) & ID);
code2 = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IARDX, as, &RDX);
code3 = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IARDY, as, &RDY);
}
if ((code1 < 0) || (code2 < 0) || (code3 < 0) || (code4 < 0)) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to decode data");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (ID >= ninsyms + NSYMSDECODED) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "refinement references unknown symbol %d", ID);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"symbol is a refinement of id %d with the " "refinement applied at (%d,%d)", ID, RDX, RDY);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "Out of memory creating symbol image");
goto cleanup4;
}
/* Table 18 */
rparams.GRTEMPLATE = params->SDRTEMPLATE;
rparams.reference = (ID < ninsyms) ? params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[ID] : SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[ID - ninsyms];
/* SumatraPDF: fail on missing glyphs */
if (rparams.reference == NULL) {
code = jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "missing glyph %d/%d!", ID, ninsyms);
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
rparams.DX = RDX;
rparams.DY = RDY;
rparams.TPGRON = 0;
memcpy(rparams.grat, params->sdrat, 4);
code = jbig2_decode_refinement_region(ctx, segment, &rparams, as, image, GR_stats);
if (code < 0)
goto cleanup4;
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED] = image;
/* 6.5.8.2.2 (7) */
if (params->SDHUFF) {
if (BMSIZE == 0)
BMSIZE = image->height * image->stride;
jbig2_huffman_advance(hs, BMSIZE);
}
}
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
{
char name[64];
FILE *out;
snprintf(name, 64, "sd.%04d.%04d.pbm", segment->number, NSYMSDECODED);
out = fopen(name, "wb");
jbig2_image_write_pbm(SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[NSYMSDECODED], out);
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "writing out glyph as '%s' ...", name);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
}
/* 6.5.5 (4c.iii) */
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[NSYMSDECODED] = SYMWIDTH;
}
/* 6.5.5 (4c.iv) */
NSYMSDECODED = NSYMSDECODED + 1;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number, "decoded symbol %u of %u (%ux%u)", NSYMSDECODED, params->SDNUMNEWSYMS, SYMWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
} /* end height class decode loop */
/* 6.5.5 (4d) */
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
/* 6.5.9 */
Jbig2Image *image;
uint32_t BMSIZE = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, params->SDHUFFBMSIZE, &code);
uint32_t j;
int x;
if (code) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error decoding size of collective bitmap!");
goto cleanup4;
}
/* skip any bits before the next byte boundary */
jbig2_huffman_skip(hs);
image = jbig2_image_new(ctx, TOTWIDTH, HCHEIGHT);
if (image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "could not allocate collective bitmap image!");
goto cleanup4;
}
if (BMSIZE == 0) {
/* if BMSIZE == 0 bitmap is uncompressed */
const byte *src = data + jbig2_huffman_offset(hs);
const int stride = (image->width >> 3) + ((image->width & 7) ? 1 : 0);
byte *dst = image->data;
/* SumatraPDF: prevent read access violation */
if ((size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs) < image->height * stride) || (size < jbig2_huffman_offset(hs))) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "not enough data for decoding (%d/%d)", image->height * stride,
size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs));
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
BMSIZE = image->height * stride;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"reading %dx%d uncompressed bitmap" " for %d symbols (%d bytes)", image->width, image->height, NSYMSDECODED - HCFIRSTSYM, BMSIZE);
for (j = 0; j < image->height; j++) {
memcpy(dst, src, stride);
dst += image->stride;
src += stride;
}
} else {
Jbig2GenericRegionParams rparams;
/* SumatraPDF: prevent read access violation */
if (size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs) < BMSIZE) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "not enough data for decoding (%d/%d)", BMSIZE, size - jbig2_huffman_offset(hs));
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, segment->number,
"reading %dx%d collective bitmap for %d symbols (%d bytes)", image->width, image->height, NSYMSDECODED - HCFIRSTSYM, BMSIZE);
rparams.MMR = 1;
code = jbig2_decode_generic_mmr(ctx, segment, &rparams, data + jbig2_huffman_offset(hs), BMSIZE, image);
if (code) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "error decoding MMR bitmap image!");
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
}
/* advance past the data we've just read */
jbig2_huffman_advance(hs, BMSIZE);
/* copy the collective bitmap into the symbol dictionary */
x = 0;
for (j = HCFIRSTSYM; j < NSYMSDECODED; j++) {
Jbig2Image *glyph;
glyph = jbig2_image_new(ctx, SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[j], HCHEIGHT);
if (glyph == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to copy the collective bitmap into symbol dictionary");
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
goto cleanup4;
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, glyph, image, -x, 0, JBIG2_COMPOSE_REPLACE);
x += SDNEWSYMWIDTHS[j];
SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[j] = glyph;
}
jbig2_image_release(ctx, image);
}
} /* end of symbol decode loop */
/* 6.5.10 */
SDEXSYMS = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, params->SDNUMEXSYMS);
if (SDEXSYMS == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate symbols exported from symbols dictionary");
goto cleanup4;
} else {
uint32_t i = 0;
uint32_t j = 0;
uint32_t k;
int exflag = 0;
uint32_t limit = params->SDNUMINSYMS + params->SDNUMNEWSYMS;
uint32_t exrunlength;
int zerolength = 0;
while (i < limit) {
if (params->SDHUFF)
exrunlength = jbig2_huffman_get(hs, SBHUFFRSIZE, &code);
else
code = jbig2_arith_int_decode(IAEX, as, (int32_t *)&exrunlength);
/* prevent infinite loop */
zerolength = exrunlength > 0 ? 0 : zerolength + 1;
if (code || (exrunlength > limit - i) || (zerolength > 4) || (exflag && (exrunlength + j > params->SDNUMEXSYMS))) {
if (code)
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to decode exrunlength for exported symbols");
else if (exrunlength <= 0)
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "runlength too small in export symbol table (%d <= 0)\n", exrunlength);
else
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number,
"runlength too large in export symbol table (%d > %d - %d)\n", exrunlength, params->SDNUMEXSYMS, j);
/* skip to the cleanup code and return SDEXSYMS = NULL */
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, SDEXSYMS);
SDEXSYMS = NULL;
break;
}
for (k = 0; k < exrunlength; k++) {
if (exflag) {
SDEXSYMS->glyphs[j++] = (i < params->SDNUMINSYMS) ?
jbig2_image_clone(ctx, params->SDINSYMS->glyphs[i]) : jbig2_image_clone(ctx, SDNEWSYMS->glyphs[i - params->SDNUMINSYMS]);
}
i++;
}
exflag = !exflag;
}
}
cleanup4:
if (tparams != NULL) {
if (!params->SDHUFF) {
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IADT);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAFS);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IADS);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAIT);
jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IAID);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARI);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDW);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDH);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, tparams->IARDY);
} else {
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFFS);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFDS);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFDT);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDX);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDY);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDW);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, tparams->SBHUFFRDH);
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, tparams);
}
if (refagg_dicts != NULL) {
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, refagg_dicts[0]);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, refagg_dicts);
}
cleanup2:
jbig2_sd_release(ctx, SDNEWSYMS);
if (params->SDHUFF && !params->SDREFAGG) {
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, SDNEWSYMWIDTHS);
}
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, SDHUFFRDX);
jbig2_release_huffman_table(ctx, SBHUFFRSIZE);
jbig2_huffman_free(ctx, hs);
jbig2_arith_iaid_ctx_free(ctx, IAID);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IARDX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IARDY);
cleanup1:
jbig2_word_stream_buf_free(ctx, ws);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, as);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IADH);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IADW);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IAEX);
jbig2_arith_int_ctx_free(ctx, IAAI);
return SDEXSYMS;
} | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | b184e783702246e154294326d03d9abda669fcfa | 263,544,315,846,066,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 568 | Bug 697703: Prevent integer overflow vulnerability.
Add extra check for the offset being greater than the size
of the image and hence reading off the end of the buffer.
Thank you to Dai Ge for finding this issue and suggesting a patch. |
static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
u8 opcode)
{
if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
return;
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
* true then we know for sure.
*/
__mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
break;
case BPF_JNE:
/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
* we know the value for sure;
*/
__mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
break;
case BPF_JSET:
false_reg->var_off = tnum_and(false_reg->var_off,
tnum_const(~val));
if (is_power_of_2(val))
true_reg->var_off = tnum_or(true_reg->var_off,
tnum_const(val));
break;
case BPF_JGT:
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JSGT:
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JLT:
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JSLT:
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JGE:
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
break;
case BPF_JSGE:
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
break;
case BPF_JLE:
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
break;
case BPF_JSLE:
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
break;
default:
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
__reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
* slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
* then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
*/
__update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | 979d63d50c0c0f7bc537bf821e056cc9fe5abd38 | 194,294,391,194,709,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 | bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
static void fuse_lib_statfs(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino)
{
struct fuse *f = req_fuse_prepare(req);
struct statvfs buf;
char *path;
int err;
memset(&buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&f->tree_lock);
if (!ino) {
err = -ENOMEM;
path = strdup("/");
} else {
err = -ENOENT;
path = get_path(f, ino);
}
if (path) {
struct fuse_intr_data d;
fuse_prepare_interrupt(f, req, &d);
err = fuse_fs_statfs(f->fs, path, &buf);
fuse_finish_interrupt(f, req, &d);
free(path);
}
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&f->tree_lock);
if (!err)
fuse_reply_statfs(req, &buf);
else
reply_err(req, err);
} | 0 | [] | ntfs-3g | fb28eef6f1c26170566187c1ab7dc913a13ea43c | 24,996,920,184,557,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Hardened the checking of directory offset requested by a readdir
When asked for the next directory entries, make sure the chunk offset
is within valid values, otherwise return no more entries in chunk. |
static inline void vmcs_init(struct vmcs *vmcs)
{
u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id()));
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
vmcs_clear(vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | 9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493 | 217,928,491,743,109,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> |
buf_charidx_to_byteidx(buf_T *buf, int lnum, int charidx)
{
char_u *str;
char_u *t;
if (buf == NULL || buf->b_ml.ml_mfp == NULL)
return -1;
if (lnum > buf->b_ml.ml_line_count)
lnum = buf->b_ml.ml_line_count;
str = ml_get_buf(buf, lnum, FALSE);
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
// Convert the character offset to a byte offset
t = str;
while (*t != NUL && --charidx > 0)
t += mb_ptr2len(t);
return t - str;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 605ec91e5a7330d61be313637e495fa02a6dc264 | 189,782,033,330,578,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | patch 8.2.3847: illegal memory access when using a lambda with an error
Problem: Illegal memory access when using a lambda with an error.
Solution: Avoid skipping over the NUL after a string. |
apdu_disconnect (int slot)
{
int sw;
if (DBG_READER)
log_debug ("enter: apdu_disconnect: slot=%d\n", slot);
if (slot < 0 || slot >= MAX_READER || !reader_table[slot].used )
{
if (DBG_READER)
log_debug ("leave: apdu_disconnect => SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER\n");
return SW_HOST_NO_DRIVER;
}
if (reader_table[slot].disconnect_card)
{
sw = lock_slot (slot);
if (!sw)
{
sw = reader_table[slot].disconnect_card (slot);
unlock_slot (slot);
}
}
else
sw = 0;
if (DBG_READER)
log_debug ("leave: apdu_disconnect => sw=0x%x\n", sw);
return sw;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | gnupg | 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392 | 281,301,188,279,638,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> |
static void iriap_disconnect_indication(void *instance, void *sap,
LM_REASON reason,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iriap_cb *self;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), reason=%s\n", __func__, irlmp_reasons[reason]);
self = (struct iriap_cb *) instance;
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(iriap != NULL, return;);
del_timer(&self->watchdog_timer);
/* Not needed */
if (skb)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
if (self->mode == IAS_CLIENT) {
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), disconnect as client\n", __func__);
iriap_do_client_event(self, IAP_LM_DISCONNECT_INDICATION,
NULL);
/*
* Inform service user that the request failed by sending
* it a NULL value. Warning, the client might close us, so
* remember no to use self anymore after calling confirm
*/
if (self->confirm)
self->confirm(IAS_DISCONNECT, 0, NULL, self->priv);
} else {
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s(), disconnect as server\n", __func__);
iriap_do_server_event(self, IAP_LM_DISCONNECT_INDICATION,
NULL);
iriap_close(self);
}
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 | 126,602,714,164,098,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
if (!md)
md = EVP_sha1();
cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md);
if (!cms)
return NULL;
if(!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
return cms;
CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-703"
] | openssl | cd30f03ac5bf2962f44bd02ae8d88245dff2f12c | 298,241,976,962,536,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify. |
int cfg80211_vendor_cmd_reply(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = ((void **)skb->cb)[0];
void *hdr = ((void **)skb->cb)[1];
struct nlattr *data = ((void **)skb->cb)[2];
/* clear CB data for netlink core to own from now on */
memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(skb->cb));
if (WARN_ON(!rdev->cur_cmd_info)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, data);
genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
return genlmsg_reply(skb, rdev->cur_cmd_info);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | linux | f88eb7c0d002a67ef31aeb7850b42ff69abc46dc | 104,961,648,185,367,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | nl80211: validate beacon head
We currently don't validate the beacon head, i.e. the header,
fixed part and elements that are to go in front of the TIM
element. This means that the variable elements there can be
malformed, e.g. have a length exceeding the buffer size, but
most downstream code from this assumes that this has already
been checked.
Add the necessary checks to the netlink policy.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: ed1b6cc7f80f ("cfg80211/nl80211: add beacon settings")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1569009255-I7ac7fbe9436e9d8733439eab8acbbd35e55c74ef@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> |
static int htc_issue_send(struct htc_target *target, struct sk_buff* skb,
u16 len, u8 flags, u8 epid)
{
struct htc_frame_hdr *hdr;
struct htc_endpoint *endpoint = &target->endpoint[epid];
int status;
hdr = skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct htc_frame_hdr));
hdr->endpoint_id = epid;
hdr->flags = flags;
hdr->payload_len = cpu_to_be16(len);
status = target->hif->send(target->hif_dev, endpoint->ul_pipeid, skb);
return status;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 853acf7caf10b828102d92d05b5c101666a6142b | 260,590,983,907,987,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | ath9k_htc: release allocated buffer if timed out
In htc_config_pipe_credits, htc_setup_complete, and htc_connect_service
if time out happens, the allocated buffer needs to be released.
Otherwise there will be memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> |
static unsigned int mntns_inum(void *ns)
{
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns = ns;
return mnt_ns->proc_inum;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-269"
] | user-namespace | a6138db815df5ee542d848318e5dae681590fccd | 246,774,381,540,583,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <[email protected]> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> |
void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
{
int i;
if (domain) {
if (!domain->table)
return;
for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
kzfree(domain->table[i]);
kzfree(domain->table);
domain->table = NULL;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 259e5e6c75a910f3b5e656151dc602f53f9d7548 | 281,306,616,520,325,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> |
static GF_Err gf_m4v_parse_frame_mpeg4(GF_M4VParser *m4v, GF_M4VDecSpecInfo dsi, u8 *frame_type, u32 *time_inc, u64 *size, u64 *start, Bool *is_coded)
{
u8 go, hasVOP, firstObj, secs;
s32 o_type;
u32 vop_inc = 0;
if (!m4v || !size || !start || !frame_type) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
*size = 0;
firstObj = 1;
hasVOP = 0;
*is_coded = 0;
m4v->current_object_type = (u32) -1;
*frame_type = 0;
M4V_Reset(m4v, m4v->current_object_start);
go = 1;
while (go) {
o_type = M4V_LoadObject(m4v);
switch (o_type) {
case M4V_VOP_START_CODE:
/*done*/
if (hasVOP) {
go = 0;
break;
}
if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
hasVOP = 1;
/*coding type*/
*frame_type = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 2);
/*modulo time base*/
secs = 0;
while (gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1) != 0)
secs ++;
/*no support for B frames in parsing*/
secs += (dsi.enh_layer || *frame_type!=2) ? m4v->tc_dec : m4v->tc_disp;
/*marker*/
gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
/*vop_time_inc*/
if (dsi.NumBitsTimeIncrement)
vop_inc = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, dsi.NumBitsTimeIncrement);
m4v->prev_tc_dec = m4v->tc_dec;
m4v->prev_tc_disp = m4v->tc_disp;
if (dsi.enh_layer || *frame_type!=2) {
m4v->tc_disp = m4v->tc_dec;
m4v->tc_dec = secs;
}
*time_inc = secs * dsi.clock_rate + vop_inc;
/*marker*/
gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
/*coded*/
*is_coded = gf_bs_read_int(m4v->bs, 1);
gf_bs_align(m4v->bs);
break;
case M4V_GOV_START_CODE:
if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
if (hasVOP) go = 0;
break;
case M4V_VOS_START_CODE:
case M4V_VOL_START_CODE:
if (hasVOP) {
go = 0;
} else if (firstObj) {
*start = m4v->current_object_start;
firstObj = 0;
}
break;
case M4V_VO_START_CODE:
default:
break;
case -1:
*size = gf_bs_get_position(m4v->bs) - *start;
return GF_EOS;
}
}
*size = m4v->current_object_start - *start;
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 90dc7f853d31b0a4e9441cba97feccf36d8b69a4 | 28,593,605,037,660,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 | fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997) |
void *CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL *key)
{
if (*key >= OPENSSL_CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL_KEY_MAX)
return NULL;
return thread_local_storage[*key];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-330"
] | openssl | 1b0fe00e2704b5e20334a16d3c9099d1ba2ef1be | 137,271,634,917,875,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handler
When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.
The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd095, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.
This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.
To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.
CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802) |
void *xt_copy_counters(sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len,
struct xt_counters_info *info)
{
size_t offset;
void *mem;
u64 size;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (in_compat_syscall()) {
/* structures only differ in size due to alignment */
struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
if (len <= sizeof(compat_tmp))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
len -= sizeof(compat_tmp);
if (copy_from_sockptr(&compat_tmp, arg, sizeof(compat_tmp)) != 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
memcpy(info->name, compat_tmp.name, sizeof(info->name) - 1);
info->num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
offset = sizeof(compat_tmp);
} else
#endif
{
if (len <= sizeof(*info))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
len -= sizeof(*info);
if (copy_from_sockptr(info, arg, sizeof(*info)) != 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
offset = sizeof(*info);
}
info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] = '\0';
size = sizeof(struct xt_counters);
size *= info->num_counters;
if (size != (u64)len)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
mem = vmalloc(len);
if (!mem)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (copy_from_sockptr_offset(mem, arg, offset, len) == 0)
return mem;
vfree(mem);
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
} | 0 | [] | linux | 175e476b8cdf2a4de7432583b49c871345e4f8a1 | 51,966,627,837,171,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | netfilter: x_tables: Use correct memory barriers.
When a new table value was assigned, it was followed by a write memory
barrier. This ensured that all writes before this point would complete
before any writes after this point. However, to determine whether the
rules are unused, the sequence counter is read. To ensure that all
writes have been done before these reads, a full memory barrier is
needed, not just a write memory barrier. The same argument applies when
incrementing the counter, before the rules are read.
Changing to using smp_mb() instead of smp_wmb() fixes the kernel panic
reported in cc00bcaa5899 (which is still present), while still
maintaining the same speed of replacing tables.
The smb_mb() barriers potentially slow the packet path, however testing
has shown no measurable change in performance on a 4-core MIPS64
platform.
Fixes: 7f5c6d4f665b ("netfilter: get rid of atomic ops in fast path")
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
struct buffer_head *udf_expand_dir_adinicb(struct inode *inode,
udf_pblk_t *block, int *err)
{
udf_pblk_t newblock;
struct buffer_head *dbh = NULL;
struct kernel_lb_addr eloc;
uint8_t alloctype;
struct extent_position epos;
struct udf_fileident_bh sfibh, dfibh;
loff_t f_pos = udf_ext0_offset(inode);
int size = udf_ext0_offset(inode) + inode->i_size;
struct fileIdentDesc cfi, *sfi, *dfi;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_USE_SHORT_AD))
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT;
else
alloctype = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG;
if (!inode->i_size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return NULL;
}
/* alloc block, and copy data to it */
*block = udf_new_block(inode->i_sb, inode,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
iinfo->i_location.logicalBlockNum, err);
if (!(*block))
return NULL;
newblock = udf_get_pblock(inode->i_sb, *block,
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum,
0);
if (!newblock)
return NULL;
dbh = udf_tgetblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!dbh)
return NULL;
lock_buffer(dbh);
memset(dbh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(dbh);
unlock_buffer(dbh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
sfibh.soffset = sfibh.eoffset =
f_pos & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1);
sfibh.sbh = sfibh.ebh = NULL;
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset = 0;
dfibh.sbh = dfibh.ebh = dbh;
while (f_pos < size) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
sfi = udf_fileident_read(inode, &f_pos, &sfibh, &cfi, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!sfi) {
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
iinfo->i_alloc_type = alloctype;
sfi->descTag.tagLocation = cpu_to_le32(*block);
dfibh.soffset = dfibh.eoffset;
dfibh.eoffset += (sfibh.eoffset - sfibh.soffset);
dfi = (struct fileIdentDesc *)(dbh->b_data + dfibh.soffset);
if (udf_write_fi(inode, sfi, dfi, &dfibh, sfi->impUse,
udf_get_fi_ident(sfi))) {
iinfo->i_alloc_type = ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB;
brelse(dbh);
return NULL;
}
}
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(dbh, inode);
memset(iinfo->i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr, 0, iinfo->i_lenAlloc);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
eloc.logicalBlockNum = *block;
eloc.partitionReferenceNum =
iinfo->i_location.partitionReferenceNum;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
epos.bh = NULL;
epos.block = iinfo->i_location;
epos.offset = udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode);
udf_add_aext(inode, &epos, &eloc, inode->i_size, 0);
/* UniqueID stuff */
brelse(epos.bh);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
return dbh;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 7fc3b7c2981bbd1047916ade327beccb90994eee | 280,042,409,720,784,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 | udf: Fix NULL ptr deref when converting from inline format
udf_expand_file_adinicb() calls directly ->writepage to write data
expanded into a page. This however misses to setup inode for writeback
properly and so we can crash on inode->i_wb dereference when submitting
page for IO like:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
...
<TASK>
__folio_start_writeback+0x2ac/0x350
__block_write_full_page+0x37d/0x490
udf_expand_file_adinicb+0x255/0x400 [udf]
udf_file_write_iter+0xbe/0x1b0 [udf]
new_sync_write+0x125/0x1c0
vfs_write+0x28e/0x400
Fix the problem by marking the page dirty and going through the standard
writeback path to write the page. Strictly speaking we would not even
have to write the page but we want to catch e.g. ENOSPC errors early.
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Fixes: 52ebea749aae ("writeback: make backing_dev_info host cgroup-specific bdi_writebacks")
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> |
static struct epitem *ep_find(struct eventpoll *ep, struct file *file, int fd)
{
int kcmp;
struct rb_node *rbp;
struct epitem *epi, *epir = NULL;
struct epoll_filefd ffd;
ep_set_ffd(&ffd, file, fd);
for (rbp = ep->rbr.rb_root.rb_node; rbp; ) {
epi = rb_entry(rbp, struct epitem, rbn);
kcmp = ep_cmp_ffd(&ffd, &epi->ffd);
if (kcmp > 0)
rbp = rbp->rb_right;
else if (kcmp < 0)
rbp = rbp->rb_left;
else {
epir = epi;
break;
}
}
return epir;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | a9ed4a6560b8562b7e2e2bed9527e88001f7b682 | 83,603,355,461,681,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | epoll: Keep a reference on files added to the check list
When adding a new fd to an epoll, and that this new fd is an
epoll fd itself, we recursively scan the fds attached to it
to detect cycles, and add non-epool files to a "check list"
that gets subsequently parsed.
However, this check list isn't completely safe when deletions
can happen concurrently. To sidestep the issue, make sure that
a struct file placed on the check list sees its f_count increased,
ensuring that a concurrent deletion won't result in the file
disapearing from under our feet.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
static inline void *index_to_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache, struct page *page,
unsigned int idx)
{
return page->s_mem + cache->size * idx;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | c4e490cf148e85ead0d1b1c2caaba833f1d5b29f | 293,763,420,580,339,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
new_string(const char *s, Py_ssize_t len, struct tok_state *tok)
{
char* result = (char *)PyMem_MALLOC(len + 1);
if (!result) {
tok->done = E_NOMEM;
return NULL;
}
memcpy(result, s, len);
result[len] = '\0';
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | cpython | dcfcd146f8e6fc5c2fc16a4c192a0c5f5ca8c53c | 169,029,024,572,322,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | bpo-35766: Merge typed_ast back into CPython (GH-11645) |
ConnStateData::parseProxyProtocolHeader()
{
// http://www.haproxy.org/download/1.5/doc/proxy-protocol.txt
// detect and parse PROXY/2.0 protocol header
if (inBuf.startsWith(Proxy2p0magic))
return parseProxy2p0();
// detect and parse PROXY/1.0 protocol header
if (inBuf.startsWith(Proxy1p0magic))
return parseProxy1p0();
// detect and terminate other protocols
if (inBuf.length() >= Proxy2p0magic.length()) {
// PROXY/1.0 magic is shorter, so we know that
// the input does not start with any PROXY magic
return proxyProtocolError("PROXY protocol error: invalid header");
}
// TODO: detect short non-magic prefixes earlier to avoid
// waiting for more data which may never come
// not enough bytes to parse yet.
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-444"
] | squid | fd68382860633aca92065e6c343cfd1b12b126e7 | 332,970,134,384,283,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Improve Transfer-Encoding handling (#702)
Reject messages containing Transfer-Encoding header with coding other
than chunked or identity. Squid does not support other codings.
For simplicity and security sake, also reject messages where
Transfer-Encoding contains unnecessary complex values that are
technically equivalent to "chunked" or "identity" (e.g., ",,chunked" or
"identity, chunked").
RFC 7230 formally deprecated and removed identity coding, but it is
still used by some agents. |
ether_hdr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
register const struct ether_header *ep;
uint16_t length_type;
ep = (const struct ether_header *)bp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ESRC(ep)),
etheraddr_string(ndo, EDST(ep))));
length_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ep->ether_length_type);
if (!ndo->ndo_qflag) {
if (length_type <= ETHERMTU) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 802.3"));
length = length_type;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ethertype %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(ethertype_values,"Unknown", length_type),
length_type));
} else {
if (length_type <= ETHERMTU) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 802.3"));
length = length_type;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", tok2str(ethertype_values,"Unknown Ethertype (0x%04x)", length_type)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u: ", length));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tcpdump | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | 266,935,015,801,571,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). |
Subsets and Splits