CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-4623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4623/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
|
void ssl_set_session( ssl_context *ssl, const ssl_session *session )
{
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, session, sizeof(ssl_session) );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
}
|
void ssl_set_session( ssl_context *ssl, const ssl_session *session )
{
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, session, sizeof(ssl_session) );
ssl->handshake->resume = 1;
}
|
C
|
polarssl
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3520/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
e0e3cea46d31d23dc40df0a49a7a2c04fe8edfea
|
af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
int copied = 0;
int check_creds = 0;
int target;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
int skip;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
* while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
*/
if (!siocb->scm) {
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unix_state_lock(sk);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
again:
if (skb == NULL) {
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0;
if (copied >= target)
goto unlock;
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)
|| mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
continue;
unlock:
unix_state_unlock(sk);
break;
}
if (skip >= skb->len) {
skip -= skb->len;
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
goto again;
}
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
(UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred))
break;
} else {
/* Copy credentials */
scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
check_creds = 1;
}
/* Copy address just once */
if (sunaddr) {
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
sunaddr = NULL;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len - skip, size);
if (memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, skb->data + skip, chunk)) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
skb_pull(skb, chunk);
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, chunk);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
if (skb->len)
break;
skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
consume_skb(skb);
if (siocb->scm->fp)
break;
} else {
/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
siocb->scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
break;
}
} while (size);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
scm_recv(sock, msg, siocb->scm, flags);
out:
return copied ? : err;
}
|
static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
int copied = 0;
int check_creds = 0;
int target;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
int skip;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
* while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
*/
if (!siocb->scm) {
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unix_state_lock(sk);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
again:
if (skb == NULL) {
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0;
if (copied >= target)
goto unlock;
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)
|| mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
continue;
unlock:
unix_state_unlock(sk);
break;
}
if (skip >= skb->len) {
skip -= skb->len;
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
goto again;
}
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
(UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred))
break;
} else {
/* Copy credentials */
scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
check_creds = 1;
}
/* Copy address just once */
if (sunaddr) {
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
sunaddr = NULL;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len - skip, size);
if (memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, skb->data + skip, chunk)) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
skb_pull(skb, chunk);
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, chunk);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
if (skb->len)
break;
skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
consume_skb(skb);
if (siocb->scm->fp)
break;
} else {
/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
siocb->scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
break;
}
} while (size);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
scm_recv(sock, msg, siocb->scm, flags);
out:
return copied ? : err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
|
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_proc_unlink_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *dir)
{
struct nfs_removeres *res = task->tk_msg.rpc_resp;
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, res->server, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
update_changeattr(dir, &res->cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, &res->dir_attr);
return 1;
}
|
static int nfs4_proc_unlink_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct inode *dir)
{
struct nfs_removeres *res = task->tk_msg.rpc_resp;
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, res->server, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
update_changeattr(dir, &res->cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, &res->dir_attr);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5199
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5199/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
c995d4fe5e96f4d6d4a88b7867279b08e72d2579
|
Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
GURL ReplaceURLHostAndPath(const GURL& url,
const std::string& host,
const std::string& path) {
url::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.SetHost(host.c_str(), url::Component(0, host.length()));
replacements.SetPath(path.c_str(), url::Component(0, path.length()));
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
|
GURL ReplaceURLHostAndPath(const GURL& url,
const std::string& host,
const std::string& path) {
url::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.SetHost(host.c_str(), url::Component(0, host.length()));
replacements.SetPath(path.c_str(), url::Component(0, path.length()));
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1639
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1639/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
c66b1fc49870c514b1c1e8b53498153176d7ec2b
|
cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
|
UserSelectionScreen::~UserSelectionScreen() {
proximity_auth::ScreenlockBridge::Get()->SetLockHandler(nullptr);
ui::UserActivityDetector* activity_detector = ui::UserActivityDetector::Get();
if (activity_detector && activity_detector->HasObserver(this))
activity_detector->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
UserSelectionScreen::~UserSelectionScreen() {
proximity_auth::ScreenlockBridge::Get()->SetLockHandler(nullptr);
ui::UserActivityDetector* activity_detector = ui::UserActivityDetector::Get();
if (activity_detector && activity_detector->HasObserver(this))
activity_detector->RemoveObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11171/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/gnome-session/commit/b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
[gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
gsm_xsmp_client_init (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
client->priv = GSM_XSMP_CLIENT_GET_PRIVATE (client);
client->priv->props = g_ptr_array_new ();
client->priv->current_save_yourself = -1;
client->priv->next_save_yourself = -1;
client->priv->next_save_yourself_allow_interact = FALSE;
}
|
gsm_xsmp_client_init (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
client->priv = GSM_XSMP_CLIENT_GET_PRIVATE (client);
client->priv->props = g_ptr_array_new ();
client->priv->current_save_yourself = -1;
client->priv->next_save_yourself = -1;
client->priv->next_save_yourself_allow_interact = FALSE;
}
|
C
|
gnome-session
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void OmniboxViewViews::Init() {
SetController(this);
SetTextInputType(DetermineTextInputType());
SetBackgroundColor(location_bar_view_->GetColor(
ToolbarModel::NONE, LocationBarView::BACKGROUND));
if (popup_window_mode_)
SetReadOnly(true);
if (chrome::ShouldDisplayOriginChip())
set_placeholder_text(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_OMNIBOX_EMPTY_HINT));
popup_view_.reset(OmniboxPopupContentsView::Create(
GetFontList(), this, model(), location_bar_view_));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager::Get()->
AddCandidateWindowObserver(this);
#endif
}
|
void OmniboxViewViews::Init() {
SetController(this);
SetTextInputType(DetermineTextInputType());
SetBackgroundColor(location_bar_view_->GetColor(
ToolbarModel::NONE, LocationBarView::BACKGROUND));
if (popup_window_mode_)
SetReadOnly(true);
if (chrome::ShouldDisplayOriginChip())
set_placeholder_text(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_OMNIBOX_EMPTY_HINT));
popup_view_.reset(OmniboxPopupContentsView::Create(
GetFontList(), this, model(), location_bar_view_));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager::Get()->
AddCandidateWindowObserver(this);
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void perf_event_disable_inatomic(struct perf_event *event)
{
event->pending_disable = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
}
|
void perf_event_disable_inatomic(struct perf_event *event)
{
event->pending_disable = 1;
irq_work_queue(&event->pending);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2206/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
f2815633504b442ca0b0605c16bf3d88a3a0fcea
|
sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = NULL;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
__u32 serial;
int length;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)addr_param, commands);
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
(void *)chunk->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
* the endpoint stored in a new association variable
* 'Peer-Serial-Number'.
*/
if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* If this is the first instance of ASCONF in the packet,
* we can clean our old ASCONF-ACKs.
*/
if (!chunk->has_asconf)
sctp_assoc_clean_asconf_ack_cache(asoc);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E4) When the Sequence Number matches the next one
* expected, process the ASCONF as described below and after
* processing the ASCONF Chunk, append an ASCONF-ACK Chunk to
* the response packet and cache a copy of it (in the event it
* later needs to be retransmitted).
*
* Essentially, do V1-V5.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_process_asconf((struct sctp_association *)
asoc, chunk);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
} else if (serial < asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E2)
* If the value found in the Sequence Number is less than the
* ('Peer- Sequence-Number' + 1), simply skip to the next
* ASCONF, and include in the outbound response packet
* any previously cached ASCONF-ACK response that was
* sent and saved that matches the Sequence Number of the
* ASCONF. Note: It is possible that no cached ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk exists. This will occur when an older ASCONF
* arrives out of order. In such a case, the receiver
* should skip the ASCONF Chunk and not include ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk for that chunk.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(asoc, hdr->serial);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
/* Reset the transport so that we select the correct one
* this time around. This is to make sure that we don't
* accidentally use a stale transport that's been removed.
*/
asconf_ack->transport = NULL;
} else {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E5) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
* it must be either a stale packet or from an attacker.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* ADDIP 5.2 E6) The destination address of the SCTP packet
* containing the ASCONF-ACK Chunks MUST be the source address of
* the SCTP packet that held the ASCONF Chunks.
*
* To do this properly, we'll set the destination address of the chunk
* and at the transmit time, will try look up the transport to use.
* Since ASCONFs may be bundled, the correct transport may not be
* created until we process the entire packet, thus this workaround.
*/
asconf_ack->dest = chunk->source;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(asconf_ack));
if (asoc->new_transport) {
sctp_sf_heartbeat(ep, asoc, type, asoc->new_transport,
commands);
((struct sctp_association *)asoc)->new_transport = NULL;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
|
sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = NULL;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
__u32 serial;
int length;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)addr_param, commands);
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
(void *)chunk->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
* the endpoint stored in a new association variable
* 'Peer-Serial-Number'.
*/
if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* If this is the first instance of ASCONF in the packet,
* we can clean our old ASCONF-ACKs.
*/
if (!chunk->has_asconf)
sctp_assoc_clean_asconf_ack_cache(asoc);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E4) When the Sequence Number matches the next one
* expected, process the ASCONF as described below and after
* processing the ASCONF Chunk, append an ASCONF-ACK Chunk to
* the response packet and cache a copy of it (in the event it
* later needs to be retransmitted).
*
* Essentially, do V1-V5.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_process_asconf((struct sctp_association *)
asoc, chunk);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
} else if (serial < asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E2)
* If the value found in the Sequence Number is less than the
* ('Peer- Sequence-Number' + 1), simply skip to the next
* ASCONF, and include in the outbound response packet
* any previously cached ASCONF-ACK response that was
* sent and saved that matches the Sequence Number of the
* ASCONF. Note: It is possible that no cached ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk exists. This will occur when an older ASCONF
* arrives out of order. In such a case, the receiver
* should skip the ASCONF Chunk and not include ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk for that chunk.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(asoc, hdr->serial);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
/* Reset the transport so that we select the correct one
* this time around. This is to make sure that we don't
* accidentally use a stale transport that's been removed.
*/
asconf_ack->transport = NULL;
} else {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E5) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
* it must be either a stale packet or from an attacker.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* ADDIP 5.2 E6) The destination address of the SCTP packet
* containing the ASCONF-ACK Chunks MUST be the source address of
* the SCTP packet that held the ASCONF Chunks.
*
* To do this properly, we'll set the destination address of the chunk
* and at the transmit time, will try look up the transport to use.
* Since ASCONFs may be bundled, the correct transport may not be
* created until we process the entire packet, thus this workaround.
*/
asconf_ack->dest = chunk->source;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(asconf_ack));
if (asoc->new_transport) {
sctp_sf_heartbeat(ep, asoc, type, asoc->new_transport,
commands);
((struct sctp_association *)asoc)->new_transport = NULL;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6031
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6031/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2
|
[pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
|
pp::VarArray PDFiumEngine::GetBookmarks() {
pp::VarDictionary dict = TraverseBookmarks(nullptr, 0);
return pp::VarArray(dict.Get(pp::Var("children")));
}
|
pp::VarArray PDFiumEngine::GetBookmarks() {
pp::VarDictionary dict = TraverseBookmarks(nullptr, 0);
return pp::VarArray(dict.Get(pp::Var("children")));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
static void rgb_to_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *rgb, float *cmyk)
{
float c, m, y, k;
c = 1 - rgb[0];
m = 1 - rgb[1];
y = 1 - rgb[2];
k = fz_min(c, fz_min(m, y));
cmyk[0] = c - k;
cmyk[1] = m - k;
cmyk[2] = y - k;
cmyk[3] = k;
}
|
static void rgb_to_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *rgb, float *cmyk)
{
float c, m, y, k;
c = 1 - rgb[0];
m = 1 - rgb[1];
y = 1 - rgb[2];
k = fz_min(c, fz_min(m, y));
cmyk[0] = c - k;
cmyk[1] = m - k;
cmyk[2] = y - k;
cmyk[3] = k;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17113
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17113/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
[Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_NumPatterns(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_num_patterns(file->mod);
}
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_NumPatterns(ModPlugFile* file)
{
if(!file) return 0;
return openmpt_module_get_num_patterns(file->mod);
}
|
C
|
openmpt
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6623/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9fd9d629fcf836bb0d6210015d33a299cf6bca34
|
9fd9d629fcf836bb0d6210015d33a299cf6bca34
|
Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::FetchPolicyOAuthTokenUsingSigninProfile() {
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> signin_context;
Profile* signin_profile = chromeos::ProfileHelper::GetSigninProfile();
if (signin_profile)
signin_context = signin_profile->GetRequestContext();
if (!signin_context.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No signin Profile for policy oauth token fetch!";
OnOAuth2PolicyTokenFetched(
std::string(), GoogleServiceAuthError(GoogleServiceAuthError::NONE));
return;
}
token_fetcher_.reset(new PolicyOAuth2TokenFetcher(
signin_context.get(),
g_browser_process->system_request_context(),
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnOAuth2PolicyTokenFetched,
base::Unretained(this))));
token_fetcher_->Start();
}
|
void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::FetchPolicyOAuthTokenUsingSigninProfile() {
scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter> signin_context;
Profile* signin_profile = chromeos::ProfileHelper::GetSigninProfile();
if (signin_profile)
signin_context = signin_profile->GetRequestContext();
if (!signin_context.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No signin Profile for policy oauth token fetch!";
OnOAuth2PolicyTokenFetched(
std::string(), GoogleServiceAuthError(GoogleServiceAuthError::NONE));
return;
}
token_fetcher_.reset(new PolicyOAuth2TokenFetcher(
signin_context.get(),
g_browser_process->system_request_context(),
base::Bind(&UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::OnOAuth2PolicyTokenFetched,
base::Unretained(this))));
token_fetcher_->Start();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9806/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *nladdr = (struct sockaddr_nl *)addr;
int err;
long unsigned int groups = nladdr->nl_groups;
bool bound;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl))
return -EINVAL;
if (nladdr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK)
return -EINVAL;
/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */
if (groups) {
if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
}
bound = nlk->bound;
if (bound) {
/* Ensure nlk->portid is up-to-date. */
smp_rmb();
if (nladdr->nl_pid != nlk->portid)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nlk->netlink_bind && groups) {
int group;
for (group = 0; group < nlk->ngroups; group++) {
if (!test_bit(group, &groups))
continue;
err = nlk->netlink_bind(net, group + 1);
if (!err)
continue;
netlink_undo_bind(group, groups, sk);
return err;
}
}
/* No need for barriers here as we return to user-space without
* using any of the bound attributes.
*/
if (!bound) {
err = nladdr->nl_pid ?
netlink_insert(sk, nladdr->nl_pid) :
netlink_autobind(sock);
if (err) {
netlink_undo_bind(nlk->ngroups, groups, sk);
return err;
}
}
if (!groups && (nlk->groups == NULL || !(u32)nlk->groups[0]))
return 0;
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_subscriptions(sk, nlk->subscriptions +
hweight32(groups) -
hweight32(nlk->groups[0]));
nlk->groups[0] = (nlk->groups[0] & ~0xffffffffUL) | groups;
netlink_update_listeners(sk);
netlink_table_ungrab();
return 0;
}
|
static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *nladdr = (struct sockaddr_nl *)addr;
int err;
long unsigned int groups = nladdr->nl_groups;
bool bound;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl))
return -EINVAL;
if (nladdr->nl_family != AF_NETLINK)
return -EINVAL;
/* Only superuser is allowed to listen multicasts */
if (groups) {
if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
return -EPERM;
err = netlink_realloc_groups(sk);
if (err)
return err;
}
bound = nlk->bound;
if (bound) {
/* Ensure nlk->portid is up-to-date. */
smp_rmb();
if (nladdr->nl_pid != nlk->portid)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (nlk->netlink_bind && groups) {
int group;
for (group = 0; group < nlk->ngroups; group++) {
if (!test_bit(group, &groups))
continue;
err = nlk->netlink_bind(net, group + 1);
if (!err)
continue;
netlink_undo_bind(group, groups, sk);
return err;
}
}
/* No need for barriers here as we return to user-space without
* using any of the bound attributes.
*/
if (!bound) {
err = nladdr->nl_pid ?
netlink_insert(sk, nladdr->nl_pid) :
netlink_autobind(sock);
if (err) {
netlink_undo_bind(nlk->ngroups, groups, sk);
return err;
}
}
if (!groups && (nlk->groups == NULL || !(u32)nlk->groups[0]))
return 0;
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_subscriptions(sk, nlk->subscriptions +
hweight32(groups) -
hweight32(nlk->groups[0]));
nlk->groups[0] = (nlk->groups[0] & ~0xffffffffUL) | groups;
netlink_update_listeners(sk);
netlink_table_ungrab();
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0281/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93
|
High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
|
print_xml_status(pe_working_set_t * data_set)
{
FILE *stream = stdout;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
node_t *dc = NULL;
xmlNode *stack = NULL;
xmlNode *quorum_node = NULL;
const char *quorum_votes = "unknown";
dc = data_set->dc_node;
fprintf(stream, "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<crm_mon version=\"%s\">\n", VERSION);
/*** SUMMARY ***/
fprintf(stream, " <summary>\n");
if (print_last_updated) {
time_t now = time(NULL);
char *now_str = ctime(&now);
now_str[24] = EOS; /* replace the newline */
fprintf(stream, " <last_update time=\"%s\" />\n", now_str);
}
if (print_last_change) {
const char *last_written = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_CIB_ATTR_WRITTEN);
const char *user = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_USER);
const char *client = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_CLIENT);
const char *origin = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_ORIG);
fprintf(stream, " <last_change time=\"%s\" user=\"%s\" client=\"%s\" origin=\"%s\" />\n",
last_written ? last_written : "",
user ? user : "",
client ? client : "",
origin ? origin : "");
}
stack = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='cluster-infrastructure']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
if (stack) {
fprintf(stream, " <stack type=\"%s\" />\n", crm_element_value(stack, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE));
}
if (!dc) {
fprintf(stream, " <current_dc present=\"false\" />\n");
} else {
const char *quorum = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_HAVE_QUORUM);
const char *uname = dc->details->uname;
const char *id = dc->details->id;
xmlNode *dc_version = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='dc-version']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
fprintf(stream, " <current_dc present=\"true\" version=\"%s\" name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" with_quorum=\"%s\" />\n",
dc_version ? crm_element_value(dc_version, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE) : "",
uname,
id,
quorum ? (crm_is_true(quorum) ? "true" : "false") : "false");
}
quorum_node = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='" XML_ATTR_EXPECTED_VOTES "']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
if (quorum_node) {
quorum_votes = crm_element_value(quorum_node, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE);
}
fprintf(stream, " <nodes_configured number=\"%d\" expected_votes=\"%s\" />\n",
g_list_length(data_set->nodes),
quorum_votes);
fprintf(stream, " <resources_configured number=\"%d\" />\n", count_resources(data_set, NULL));
fprintf(stream, " </summary>\n");
/*** NODES ***/
fprintf(stream, " <nodes>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->nodes; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
node_t *node = (node_t *) gIter->data;
const char *node_type = "unknown";
switch (node->details->type) {
case node_member:
node_type = "member";
break;
case node_ping:
node_type = "ping";
break;
}
fprintf(stream, " <node name=\"%s\" ", node->details->uname);
fprintf(stream, "id=\"%s\" ", node->details->id);
fprintf(stream, "online=\"%s\" ", node->details->online ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "standby=\"%s\" ", node->details->standby ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "standby_onfail=\"%s\" ", node->details->standby_onfail ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "pending=\"%s\" ", node->details->pending ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "unclean=\"%s\" ", node->details->unclean ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "shutdown=\"%s\" ", node->details->shutdown ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "expected_up=\"%s\" ", node->details->expected_up ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "is_dc=\"%s\" ", node->details->is_dc ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "resources_running=\"%d\" ", g_list_length(node->details->running_rsc));
fprintf(stream, "type=\"%s\" ", node_type);
if (group_by_node) {
GListPtr lpc2 = NULL;
fprintf(stream, ">\n");
for (lpc2 = node->details->running_rsc; lpc2 != NULL; lpc2 = lpc2->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) lpc2->data;
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml | pe_print_rsconly, stream);
}
fprintf(stream, " </node>\n");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "/>\n");
}
}
fprintf(stream, " </nodes>\n");
/*** RESOURCES ***/
if (group_by_node == FALSE || inactive_resources) {
fprintf(stream, " <resources>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->resources; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) gIter->data;
gboolean is_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, TRUE);
gboolean partially_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, FALSE);
if (is_set(rsc->flags, pe_rsc_orphan) && is_active == FALSE) {
continue;
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
if (partially_active || inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml, stream);
}
} else if (is_active == FALSE && inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml, stream);
}
}
fprintf(stream, " </resources>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</crm_mon>\n");
fflush(stream);
fclose(stream);
return 0;
}
|
print_xml_status(pe_working_set_t * data_set)
{
FILE *stream = stdout;
GListPtr gIter = NULL;
node_t *dc = NULL;
xmlNode *stack = NULL;
xmlNode *quorum_node = NULL;
const char *quorum_votes = "unknown";
dc = data_set->dc_node;
fprintf(stream, "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n");
fprintf(stream, "<crm_mon version=\"%s\">\n", VERSION);
/*** SUMMARY ***/
fprintf(stream, " <summary>\n");
if (print_last_updated) {
time_t now = time(NULL);
char *now_str = ctime(&now);
now_str[24] = EOS; /* replace the newline */
fprintf(stream, " <last_update time=\"%s\" />\n", now_str);
}
if (print_last_change) {
const char *last_written = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_CIB_ATTR_WRITTEN);
const char *user = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_USER);
const char *client = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_CLIENT);
const char *origin = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_UPDATE_ORIG);
fprintf(stream, " <last_change time=\"%s\" user=\"%s\" client=\"%s\" origin=\"%s\" />\n",
last_written ? last_written : "",
user ? user : "",
client ? client : "",
origin ? origin : "");
}
stack = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='cluster-infrastructure']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
if (stack) {
fprintf(stream, " <stack type=\"%s\" />\n", crm_element_value(stack, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE));
}
if (!dc) {
fprintf(stream, " <current_dc present=\"false\" />\n");
} else {
const char *quorum = crm_element_value(data_set->input, XML_ATTR_HAVE_QUORUM);
const char *uname = dc->details->uname;
const char *id = dc->details->id;
xmlNode *dc_version = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='dc-version']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
fprintf(stream, " <current_dc present=\"true\" version=\"%s\" name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" with_quorum=\"%s\" />\n",
dc_version ? crm_element_value(dc_version, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE) : "",
uname,
id,
quorum ? (crm_is_true(quorum) ? "true" : "false") : "false");
}
quorum_node = get_xpath_object("//nvpair[@name='" XML_ATTR_EXPECTED_VOTES "']",
data_set->input,
LOG_DEBUG);
if (quorum_node) {
quorum_votes = crm_element_value(quorum_node, XML_NVPAIR_ATTR_VALUE);
}
fprintf(stream, " <nodes_configured number=\"%d\" expected_votes=\"%s\" />\n",
g_list_length(data_set->nodes),
quorum_votes);
fprintf(stream, " <resources_configured number=\"%d\" />\n", count_resources(data_set, NULL));
fprintf(stream, " </summary>\n");
/*** NODES ***/
fprintf(stream, " <nodes>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->nodes; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
node_t *node = (node_t *) gIter->data;
const char *node_type = "unknown";
switch (node->details->type) {
case node_member:
node_type = "member";
break;
case node_ping:
node_type = "ping";
break;
}
fprintf(stream, " <node name=\"%s\" ", node->details->uname);
fprintf(stream, "id=\"%s\" ", node->details->id);
fprintf(stream, "online=\"%s\" ", node->details->online ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "standby=\"%s\" ", node->details->standby ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "standby_onfail=\"%s\" ", node->details->standby_onfail ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "pending=\"%s\" ", node->details->pending ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "unclean=\"%s\" ", node->details->unclean ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "shutdown=\"%s\" ", node->details->shutdown ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "expected_up=\"%s\" ", node->details->expected_up ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "is_dc=\"%s\" ", node->details->is_dc ? "true" : "false");
fprintf(stream, "resources_running=\"%d\" ", g_list_length(node->details->running_rsc));
fprintf(stream, "type=\"%s\" ", node_type);
if (group_by_node) {
GListPtr lpc2 = NULL;
fprintf(stream, ">\n");
for (lpc2 = node->details->running_rsc; lpc2 != NULL; lpc2 = lpc2->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) lpc2->data;
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml | pe_print_rsconly, stream);
}
fprintf(stream, " </node>\n");
} else {
fprintf(stream, "/>\n");
}
}
fprintf(stream, " </nodes>\n");
/*** RESOURCES ***/
if (group_by_node == FALSE || inactive_resources) {
fprintf(stream, " <resources>\n");
for (gIter = data_set->resources; gIter != NULL; gIter = gIter->next) {
resource_t *rsc = (resource_t *) gIter->data;
gboolean is_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, TRUE);
gboolean partially_active = rsc->fns->active(rsc, FALSE);
if (is_set(rsc->flags, pe_rsc_orphan) && is_active == FALSE) {
continue;
} else if (group_by_node == FALSE) {
if (partially_active || inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml, stream);
}
} else if (is_active == FALSE && inactive_resources) {
rsc->fns->print(rsc, " ", pe_print_xml, stream);
}
}
fprintf(stream, " </resources>\n");
}
fprintf(stream, "</crm_mon>\n");
fflush(stream);
fclose(stream);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
return false;
}
|
bool ContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
cmp_anchor_hseq(const void *a, const void *b)
{
return (*((const Anchor **) a))->hseq - (*((const Anchor **) b))->hseq;
}
|
cmp_anchor_hseq(const void *a, const void *b)
{
return (*((const Anchor **) a))->hseq - (*((const Anchor **) b))->hseq;
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0812/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
|
static char* in_get_parameters(const struct audio_stream *stream,
const char *keys)
{
(void)stream;
(void)keys;
return strdup("");
}
|
static char* in_get_parameters(const struct audio_stream *stream,
const char *keys)
{
(void)stream;
(void)keys;
return strdup("");
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXObject::hasAttribute(const QualifiedName& attribute) const {
Node* elementNode = getNode();
if (!elementNode)
return false;
if (!elementNode->isElementNode())
return false;
Element* element = toElement(elementNode);
return element->fastHasAttribute(attribute);
}
|
bool AXObject::hasAttribute(const QualifiedName& attribute) const {
Node* elementNode = getNode();
if (!elementNode)
return false;
if (!elementNode->isElementNode())
return false;
Element* element = toElement(elementNode);
return element->fastHasAttribute(attribute);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1743
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9
|
sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
|
void BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility(bool window_visible) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"window_visible",
window_visible);
window_visible_ = window_visible;
UpdateCompositorIsActive();
}
|
void BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility(bool window_visible) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::SetWindowVisibility",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"window_visible",
window_visible);
window_visible_ = window_visible;
UpdateCompositorIsActive();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
error::Error WillAccessBoundFramebufferForRead() {
if (ShouldDeferReads())
return error::kDeferCommandUntilLater;
if (!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get() &&
!framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() &&
!surface_->SetBackbufferAllocation(true))
return error::kLostContext;
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error WillAccessBoundFramebufferForRead() {
if (ShouldDeferReads())
return error::kDeferCommandUntilLater;
if (!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get() &&
!framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() &&
!surface_->SetBackbufferAllocation(true))
return error::kLostContext;
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned long blocks_for_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_lblk_t needed;
needed = inode->i_blocks >> (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
/* Give ourselves just enough room to cope with inodes in which
* i_blocks is corrupt: we've seen disk corruptions in the past
* which resulted in random data in an inode which looked enough
* like a regular file for ext4 to try to delete it. Things
* will go a bit crazy if that happens, but at least we should
* try not to panic the whole kernel. */
if (needed < 2)
needed = 2;
/* But we need to bound the transaction so we don't overflow the
* journal. */
if (needed > EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA)
needed = EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA;
return EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb) + needed;
}
|
static unsigned long blocks_for_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
ext4_lblk_t needed;
needed = inode->i_blocks >> (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
/* Give ourselves just enough room to cope with inodes in which
* i_blocks is corrupt: we've seen disk corruptions in the past
* which resulted in random data in an inode which looked enough
* like a regular file for ext4 to try to delete it. Things
* will go a bit crazy if that happens, but at least we should
* try not to panic the whole kernel. */
if (needed < 2)
needed = 2;
/* But we need to bound the transaction so we don't overflow the
* journal. */
if (needed > EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA)
needed = EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA;
return EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb) + needed;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15594/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd
|
5800dc5c19f34e6e03b5adab1282535cb102fafd
|
x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
unsigned paravirt_patch_default(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf,
unsigned long addr, unsigned len)
{
void *opfunc = get_call_destination(type);
unsigned ret;
if (opfunc == NULL)
/* If there's no function, patch it with a ud2a (BUG) */
ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, ud2a, ud2a+sizeof(ud2a));
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_nop)
ret = 0;
/* identity functions just return their single argument */
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_32)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_32(insnbuf, len);
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_64)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_64(insnbuf, len);
else if (type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.iret) ||
type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.usergs_sysret64))
/* If operation requires a jmp, then jmp */
ret = paravirt_patch_jmp(insnbuf, opfunc, addr, len);
else
/* Otherwise call the function; assume target could
clobber any caller-save reg */
ret = paravirt_patch_call(insnbuf, opfunc, CLBR_ANY,
addr, clobbers, len);
return ret;
}
|
unsigned paravirt_patch_default(u8 type, u16 clobbers, void *insnbuf,
unsigned long addr, unsigned len)
{
void *opfunc = get_call_destination(type);
unsigned ret;
if (opfunc == NULL)
/* If there's no function, patch it with a ud2a (BUG) */
ret = paravirt_patch_insns(insnbuf, len, ud2a, ud2a+sizeof(ud2a));
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_nop)
ret = 0;
/* identity functions just return their single argument */
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_32)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_32(insnbuf, len);
else if (opfunc == _paravirt_ident_64)
ret = paravirt_patch_ident_64(insnbuf, len);
else if (type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.iret) ||
type == PARAVIRT_PATCH(pv_cpu_ops.usergs_sysret64))
/* If operation requires a jmp, then jmp */
ret = paravirt_patch_jmp(insnbuf, opfunc, addr, len);
else
/* Otherwise call the function; assume target could
clobber any caller-save reg */
ret = paravirt_patch_call(insnbuf, opfunc, CLBR_ANY,
addr, clobbers, len);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9322
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9322/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441
|
6f442be2fb22be02cafa606f1769fa1e6f894441
|
x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state;
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
/*
* ftrace must be first, everything else may cause a recursive crash.
* See note by declaration of modifying_ftrace_code in ftrace.c
*/
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&modifying_ftrace_code)) &&
ftrace_int3_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
if (poke_int3_handler(regs))
return;
prev_state = exception_enter();
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP
if (kgdb_ll_trap(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
#endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP */
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
if (kprobe_int3_handler(regs))
goto exit;
#endif
if (notify_die(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
/*
* Let others (NMI) know that the debug stack is in use
* as we may switch to the interrupt stack.
*/
debug_stack_usage_inc();
preempt_conditional_sti(regs);
do_trap(X86_TRAP_BP, SIGTRAP, "int3", regs, error_code, NULL);
preempt_conditional_cli(regs);
debug_stack_usage_dec();
exit:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
|
dotraplinkage void notrace do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state;
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
/*
* ftrace must be first, everything else may cause a recursive crash.
* See note by declaration of modifying_ftrace_code in ftrace.c
*/
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&modifying_ftrace_code)) &&
ftrace_int3_handler(regs))
return;
#endif
if (poke_int3_handler(regs))
return;
prev_state = exception_enter();
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP
if (kgdb_ll_trap(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
#endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP */
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
if (kprobe_int3_handler(regs))
goto exit;
#endif
if (notify_die(DIE_INT3, "int3", regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_BP,
SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto exit;
/*
* Let others (NMI) know that the debug stack is in use
* as we may switch to the interrupt stack.
*/
debug_stack_usage_inc();
preempt_conditional_sti(regs);
do_trap(X86_TRAP_BP, SIGTRAP, "int3", regs, error_code, NULL);
preempt_conditional_cli(regs);
debug_stack_usage_dec();
exit:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3103
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3103/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2dfe7c175fb21263f06eb586f1ed235482a3281
|
b2dfe7c175fb21263f06eb586f1ed235482a3281
|
[EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Eina_Bool ewk_frame_mixed_content_run_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
return smartData->hasRunMixedContent;
}
|
Eina_Bool ewk_frame_mixed_content_run_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
return smartData->hasRunMixedContent;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3288
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3288/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d
|
6b7339f4c31ad69c8e9c0b2859276e22cf72176d
|
mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int fault_around_bytes_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
if (val / PAGE_SIZE > PTRS_PER_PTE)
return -EINVAL;
if (val > PAGE_SIZE)
fault_around_bytes = rounddown_pow_of_two(val);
else
fault_around_bytes = PAGE_SIZE; /* rounddown_pow_of_two(0) is undefined */
return 0;
}
|
static int fault_around_bytes_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
if (val / PAGE_SIZE > PTRS_PER_PTE)
return -EINVAL;
if (val > PAGE_SIZE)
fault_around_bytes = rounddown_pow_of_two(val);
else
fault_around_bytes = PAGE_SIZE; /* rounddown_pow_of_two(0) is undefined */
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
const KURL& DocumentLoader::requestURL() const
{
return request().url();
}
|
const KURL& DocumentLoader::requestURL() const
{
return request().url();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
{
efer_reserved_bits &= ~mask;
}
|
void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
{
efer_reserved_bits &= ~mask;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11383
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11383/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
|
static void __generic_sub_update_flags(RAnalOp *op, char t_d, ut64 v_d, char t_rk, ut64 v_rk, int carry) {
RStrBuf *d_strbuf, *rk_strbuf;
char *d, *rk;
d_strbuf = r_strbuf_new (NULL);
rk_strbuf = r_strbuf_new (NULL);
r_strbuf_setf (d_strbuf, t_d == 'r' ? "r%d" : "%" PFMT64d, v_d);
r_strbuf_setf (rk_strbuf, t_rk == 'r' ? "r%d" : "%" PFMT64d, v_rk);
d = r_strbuf_get(d_strbuf);
rk = r_strbuf_get(rk_strbuf);
ESIL_A ("%s,0x08,&,!," "%s,0x08,&,!,!," "&," // H
"%s,0x08,&,!,!," "0,RPICK,0x08,&,!,!," "&,"
"%s,0x08,&,!," "0,RPICK,0x08,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,|,hf,=,",
d, rk, rk, d);
ESIL_A ("%s,0x80,&,!,!," "%s,0x80,&,!," "&," // V
"" "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!," "&,"
"%s,0x80,&,!," "%s,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"" "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,vf,=,",
d, rk, d, rk);
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!,nf,=,"); // N
if (carry)
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,&,zf,=,"); // Z
else
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,=,"); // Z
ESIL_A ("%s,0x80,&,!," "%s,0x80,&,!,!," "&," // C
"%s,0x80,&,!,!," "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"%s,0x80,&,!," "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,|,cf,=,",
d, rk, rk, d);
ESIL_A ("vf,nf,^,sf,=,"); // S
r_strbuf_free (d_strbuf);
r_strbuf_free (rk_strbuf);
}
|
static void __generic_sub_update_flags(RAnalOp *op, char t_d, ut64 v_d, char t_rk, ut64 v_rk, int carry) {
RStrBuf *d_strbuf, *rk_strbuf;
char *d, *rk;
d_strbuf = r_strbuf_new (NULL);
rk_strbuf = r_strbuf_new (NULL);
r_strbuf_setf (d_strbuf, t_d == 'r' ? "r%d" : "%" PFMT64d, v_d);
r_strbuf_setf (rk_strbuf, t_rk == 'r' ? "r%d" : "%" PFMT64d, v_rk);
d = r_strbuf_get(d_strbuf);
rk = r_strbuf_get(rk_strbuf);
ESIL_A ("%s,0x08,&,!," "%s,0x08,&,!,!," "&," // H
"%s,0x08,&,!,!," "0,RPICK,0x08,&,!,!," "&,"
"%s,0x08,&,!," "0,RPICK,0x08,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,|,hf,=,",
d, rk, rk, d);
ESIL_A ("%s,0x80,&,!,!," "%s,0x80,&,!," "&," // V
"" "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!," "&,"
"%s,0x80,&,!," "%s,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"" "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,vf,=,",
d, rk, d, rk);
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!,nf,=,"); // N
if (carry)
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,&,zf,=,"); // Z
else
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,=,"); // Z
ESIL_A ("%s,0x80,&,!," "%s,0x80,&,!,!," "&," // C
"%s,0x80,&,!,!," "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"%s,0x80,&,!," "0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!," "&,"
"|,|,cf,=,",
d, rk, rk, d);
ESIL_A ("vf,nf,^,sf,=,"); // S
r_strbuf_free (d_strbuf);
r_strbuf_free (rk_strbuf);
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8374/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7
|
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
|
static struct inode *btrfs_iget_locked(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *location,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct btrfs_iget_args args;
unsigned long hashval = btrfs_inode_hash(location->objectid, root);
args.location = location;
args.root = root;
inode = iget5_locked(s, hashval, btrfs_find_actor,
btrfs_init_locked_inode,
(void *)&args);
return inode;
}
|
static struct inode *btrfs_iget_locked(struct super_block *s,
struct btrfs_key *location,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct btrfs_iget_args args;
unsigned long hashval = btrfs_inode_hash(location->objectid, root);
args.location = location;
args.root = root;
inode = iget5_locked(s, hashval, btrfs_find_actor,
btrfs_init_locked_inode,
(void *)&args);
return inode;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7166/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0
|
6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0
|
Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
|
_archive_read_free(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct archive_read_passphrase *p;
int i, n;
int slots;
int r = ARCHIVE_OK;
if (_a == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY | ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL, "archive_read_free");
if (a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_CLOSED
&& a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL)
r = archive_read_close(&a->archive);
/* Call cleanup functions registered by optional components. */
if (a->cleanup_archive_extract != NULL)
r = (a->cleanup_archive_extract)(a);
/* Cleanup format-specific data. */
slots = sizeof(a->formats) / sizeof(a->formats[0]);
for (i = 0; i < slots; i++) {
a->format = &(a->formats[i]);
if (a->formats[i].cleanup)
(a->formats[i].cleanup)(a);
}
/* Free the filters */
__archive_read_free_filters(a);
/* Release the bidder objects. */
n = sizeof(a->bidders)/sizeof(a->bidders[0]);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (a->bidders[i].free != NULL) {
int r1 = (a->bidders[i].free)(&a->bidders[i]);
if (r1 < r)
r = r1;
}
}
/* Release passphrase list. */
p = a->passphrases.first;
while (p != NULL) {
struct archive_read_passphrase *np = p->next;
/* A passphrase should be cleaned. */
memset(p->passphrase, 0, strlen(p->passphrase));
free(p->passphrase);
free(p);
p = np;
}
archive_string_free(&a->archive.error_string);
if (a->entry)
archive_entry_free(a->entry);
a->archive.magic = 0;
__archive_clean(&a->archive);
free(a->client.dataset);
free(a);
return (r);
}
|
_archive_read_free(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct archive_read_passphrase *p;
int i, n;
int slots;
int r = ARCHIVE_OK;
if (_a == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY | ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL, "archive_read_free");
if (a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_CLOSED
&& a->archive.state != ARCHIVE_STATE_FATAL)
r = archive_read_close(&a->archive);
/* Call cleanup functions registered by optional components. */
if (a->cleanup_archive_extract != NULL)
r = (a->cleanup_archive_extract)(a);
/* Cleanup format-specific data. */
slots = sizeof(a->formats) / sizeof(a->formats[0]);
for (i = 0; i < slots; i++) {
a->format = &(a->formats[i]);
if (a->formats[i].cleanup)
(a->formats[i].cleanup)(a);
}
/* Free the filters */
__archive_read_free_filters(a);
/* Release the bidder objects. */
n = sizeof(a->bidders)/sizeof(a->bidders[0]);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (a->bidders[i].free != NULL) {
int r1 = (a->bidders[i].free)(&a->bidders[i]);
if (r1 < r)
r = r1;
}
}
/* Release passphrase list. */
p = a->passphrases.first;
while (p != NULL) {
struct archive_read_passphrase *np = p->next;
/* A passphrase should be cleaned. */
memset(p->passphrase, 0, strlen(p->passphrase));
free(p->passphrase);
free(p);
p = np;
}
archive_string_free(&a->archive.error_string);
if (a->entry)
archive_entry_free(a->entry);
a->archive.magic = 0;
__archive_clean(&a->archive);
free(a->client.dataset);
free(a);
return (r);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t ap_depth_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ap_dev->queue_depth);
}
|
static ssize_t ap_depth_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct ap_device *ap_dev = to_ap_dev(dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ap_dev->queue_depth);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ClientStateNotification::~ClientStateNotification() {}
|
ClientStateNotification::~ClientStateNotification() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-0011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-0011/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl/commit/1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
|
sharg_append(GArray *a, const gchar *str) {
const gchar *s = (str ? str : "");
g_array_append_val(a, s);
}
|
sharg_append(GArray *a, const gchar *str) {
const gchar *s = (str ? str : "");
g_array_append_val(a, s);
}
|
C
|
uzbl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3745
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3745/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/audio/+/073a80800f341325932c66818ce4302b312909a4
|
073a80800f341325932c66818ce4302b312909a4
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
|
static int effect_release(struct effect_s *effect)
{
return effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_INIT);
}
|
static int effect_release(struct effect_s *effect)
{
return effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_INIT);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_decache_cr4_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
|
static void svm_decache_cr4_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver::Observe(
int type, const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
switch (type) {
case content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP:
if (!extension_ || !DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
break;
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOADED: {
const extensions::Extension* loaded_extension =
content::Details<const extensions::Extension>(details).ptr();
extensions::Extension::Location location = loaded_extension->location();
if (location != extensions::Extension::INTERNAL &&
location != extensions::Extension::LOAD)
return;
extension_ = loaded_extension;
if (!DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
if (!service_->IsBackgroundPageReady(extension_))
return;
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALL_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOAD_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
AutomationJSONReply reply(automation_, reply_message_.release());
if (extension_) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("id", extension_->id());
reply.SendSuccess(&dict);
} else {
reply.SendError("Extension could not be installed");
}
delete this;
}
|
void ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver::Observe(
int type, const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
switch (type) {
case content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP:
if (!extension_ || !DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
break;
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOADED: {
const extensions::Extension* loaded_extension =
content::Details<const extensions::Extension>(details).ptr();
extensions::Extension::Location location = loaded_extension->location();
if (location != extensions::Extension::INTERNAL &&
location != extensions::Extension::LOAD)
return;
extension_ = loaded_extension;
if (!DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
if (!service_->IsBackgroundPageReady(extension_))
return;
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALL_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOAD_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
AutomationJSONReply reply(automation_, reply_message_.release());
if (extension_) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("id", extension_->id());
reply.SendSuccess(&dict);
} else {
reply.SendError("Extension could not be installed");
}
delete this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4700/
|
CWE-17
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be
|
3f7352bf21f8fd7ba3e2fcef9488756f188e12be
|
x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying
to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction.
While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing
multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes.
Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs
may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the
pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration
the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns.
Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program.
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool is_ereg(u32 reg)
{
return (1 << reg) & (BIT(BPF_REG_5) |
BIT(AUX_REG) |
BIT(BPF_REG_7) |
BIT(BPF_REG_8) |
BIT(BPF_REG_9));
}
|
static bool is_ereg(u32 reg)
{
return (1 << reg) & (BIT(BPF_REG_5) |
BIT(AUX_REG) |
BIT(BPF_REG_7) |
BIT(BPF_REG_8) |
BIT(BPF_REG_9));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
static int jas_icctxtdesc_getsize(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval)
{
jas_icctxtdesc_t *txtdesc = &attrval->data.txtdesc;
return JAS_CAST(int, strlen(txtdesc->ascdata) + 1 + txtdesc->uclen * 2 +
15 + 67);
}
|
static int jas_icctxtdesc_getsize(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval)
{
jas_icctxtdesc_t *txtdesc = &attrval->data.txtdesc;
return JAS_CAST(int, strlen(txtdesc->ascdata) + 1 + txtdesc->uclen * 2 +
15 + 67);
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool Init(const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
|
bool Init(const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle,
PP_Module pp_module,
PP_GetInterface_Func local_get_interface,
const ppapi::Preferences& preferences,
SyncMessageStatusReceiver* status_receiver) {
dispatcher_delegate_.reset(new ProxyChannelDelegate);
dispatcher_.reset(new ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher(
pp_module, local_get_interface, status_receiver));
if (!dispatcher_->InitHostWithChannel(dispatcher_delegate_.get(),
channel_handle,
true, // Client.
preferences)) {
dispatcher_.reset();
dispatcher_delegate_.reset();
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::ConnectionFilterController::DisableFilter() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (filter_)
filter_->Disable();
}
|
void RenderProcessHostImpl::ConnectionFilterController::DisableFilter() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (filter_)
filter_->Disable();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static int try_delta(struct unpacked *trg, struct unpacked *src,
unsigned max_depth, unsigned long *mem_usage)
{
struct object_entry *trg_entry = trg->entry;
struct object_entry *src_entry = src->entry;
unsigned long trg_size, src_size, delta_size, sizediff, max_size, sz;
unsigned ref_depth;
enum object_type type;
void *delta_buf;
/* Don't bother doing diffs between different types */
if (trg_entry->type != src_entry->type)
return -1;
/*
* We do not bother to try a delta that we discarded on an
* earlier try, but only when reusing delta data. Note that
* src_entry that is marked as the preferred_base should always
* be considered, as even if we produce a suboptimal delta against
* it, we will still save the transfer cost, as we already know
* the other side has it and we won't send src_entry at all.
*/
if (reuse_delta && trg_entry->in_pack &&
trg_entry->in_pack == src_entry->in_pack &&
!src_entry->preferred_base &&
trg_entry->in_pack_type != OBJ_REF_DELTA &&
trg_entry->in_pack_type != OBJ_OFS_DELTA)
return 0;
/* Let's not bust the allowed depth. */
if (src->depth >= max_depth)
return 0;
/* Now some size filtering heuristics. */
trg_size = trg_entry->size;
if (!trg_entry->delta) {
max_size = trg_size/2 - 20;
ref_depth = 1;
} else {
max_size = trg_entry->delta_size;
ref_depth = trg->depth;
}
max_size = (uint64_t)max_size * (max_depth - src->depth) /
(max_depth - ref_depth + 1);
if (max_size == 0)
return 0;
src_size = src_entry->size;
sizediff = src_size < trg_size ? trg_size - src_size : 0;
if (sizediff >= max_size)
return 0;
if (trg_size < src_size / 32)
return 0;
/* Load data if not already done */
if (!trg->data) {
read_lock();
trg->data = read_sha1_file(trg_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
read_unlock();
if (!trg->data)
die("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(trg_entry->idx.sha1));
if (sz != trg_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(trg_entry->idx.sha1), sz, trg_size);
*mem_usage += sz;
}
if (!src->data) {
read_lock();
src->data = read_sha1_file(src_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
read_unlock();
if (!src->data) {
if (src_entry->preferred_base) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned++)
warning("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
/*
* Those objects are not included in the
* resulting pack. Be resilient and ignore
* them if they can't be read, in case the
* pack could be created nevertheless.
*/
return 0;
}
die("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
}
if (sz != src_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1), sz, src_size);
*mem_usage += sz;
}
if (!src->index) {
src->index = create_delta_index(src->data, src_size);
if (!src->index) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned++)
warning("suboptimal pack - out of memory");
return 0;
}
*mem_usage += sizeof_delta_index(src->index);
}
delta_buf = create_delta(src->index, trg->data, trg_size, &delta_size, max_size);
if (!delta_buf)
return 0;
if (trg_entry->delta) {
/* Prefer only shallower same-sized deltas. */
if (delta_size == trg_entry->delta_size &&
src->depth + 1 >= trg->depth) {
free(delta_buf);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Handle memory allocation outside of the cache
* accounting lock. Compiler will optimize the strangeness
* away when NO_PTHREADS is defined.
*/
free(trg_entry->delta_data);
cache_lock();
if (trg_entry->delta_data) {
delta_cache_size -= trg_entry->delta_size;
trg_entry->delta_data = NULL;
}
if (delta_cacheable(src_size, trg_size, delta_size)) {
delta_cache_size += delta_size;
cache_unlock();
trg_entry->delta_data = xrealloc(delta_buf, delta_size);
} else {
cache_unlock();
free(delta_buf);
}
trg_entry->delta = src_entry;
trg_entry->delta_size = delta_size;
trg->depth = src->depth + 1;
return 1;
}
|
static int try_delta(struct unpacked *trg, struct unpacked *src,
unsigned max_depth, unsigned long *mem_usage)
{
struct object_entry *trg_entry = trg->entry;
struct object_entry *src_entry = src->entry;
unsigned long trg_size, src_size, delta_size, sizediff, max_size, sz;
unsigned ref_depth;
enum object_type type;
void *delta_buf;
/* Don't bother doing diffs between different types */
if (trg_entry->type != src_entry->type)
return -1;
/*
* We do not bother to try a delta that we discarded on an
* earlier try, but only when reusing delta data. Note that
* src_entry that is marked as the preferred_base should always
* be considered, as even if we produce a suboptimal delta against
* it, we will still save the transfer cost, as we already know
* the other side has it and we won't send src_entry at all.
*/
if (reuse_delta && trg_entry->in_pack &&
trg_entry->in_pack == src_entry->in_pack &&
!src_entry->preferred_base &&
trg_entry->in_pack_type != OBJ_REF_DELTA &&
trg_entry->in_pack_type != OBJ_OFS_DELTA)
return 0;
/* Let's not bust the allowed depth. */
if (src->depth >= max_depth)
return 0;
/* Now some size filtering heuristics. */
trg_size = trg_entry->size;
if (!trg_entry->delta) {
max_size = trg_size/2 - 20;
ref_depth = 1;
} else {
max_size = trg_entry->delta_size;
ref_depth = trg->depth;
}
max_size = (uint64_t)max_size * (max_depth - src->depth) /
(max_depth - ref_depth + 1);
if (max_size == 0)
return 0;
src_size = src_entry->size;
sizediff = src_size < trg_size ? trg_size - src_size : 0;
if (sizediff >= max_size)
return 0;
if (trg_size < src_size / 32)
return 0;
/* Load data if not already done */
if (!trg->data) {
read_lock();
trg->data = read_sha1_file(trg_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
read_unlock();
if (!trg->data)
die("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(trg_entry->idx.sha1));
if (sz != trg_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(trg_entry->idx.sha1), sz, trg_size);
*mem_usage += sz;
}
if (!src->data) {
read_lock();
src->data = read_sha1_file(src_entry->idx.sha1, &type, &sz);
read_unlock();
if (!src->data) {
if (src_entry->preferred_base) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned++)
warning("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
/*
* Those objects are not included in the
* resulting pack. Be resilient and ignore
* them if they can't be read, in case the
* pack could be created nevertheless.
*/
return 0;
}
die("object %s cannot be read",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1));
}
if (sz != src_size)
die("object %s inconsistent object length (%lu vs %lu)",
sha1_to_hex(src_entry->idx.sha1), sz, src_size);
*mem_usage += sz;
}
if (!src->index) {
src->index = create_delta_index(src->data, src_size);
if (!src->index) {
static int warned = 0;
if (!warned++)
warning("suboptimal pack - out of memory");
return 0;
}
*mem_usage += sizeof_delta_index(src->index);
}
delta_buf = create_delta(src->index, trg->data, trg_size, &delta_size, max_size);
if (!delta_buf)
return 0;
if (trg_entry->delta) {
/* Prefer only shallower same-sized deltas. */
if (delta_size == trg_entry->delta_size &&
src->depth + 1 >= trg->depth) {
free(delta_buf);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Handle memory allocation outside of the cache
* accounting lock. Compiler will optimize the strangeness
* away when NO_PTHREADS is defined.
*/
free(trg_entry->delta_data);
cache_lock();
if (trg_entry->delta_data) {
delta_cache_size -= trg_entry->delta_size;
trg_entry->delta_data = NULL;
}
if (delta_cacheable(src_size, trg_size, delta_size)) {
delta_cache_size += delta_size;
cache_unlock();
trg_entry->delta_data = xrealloc(delta_buf, delta_size);
} else {
cache_unlock();
free(delta_buf);
}
trg_entry->delta = src_entry;
trg_entry->delta_size = delta_size;
trg->depth = src->depth + 1;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0812/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
|
static int get_snd_codec_id(audio_format_t format)
{
int id = 0;
switch (format & AUDIO_FORMAT_MAIN_MASK) {
default:
ALOGE("%s: Unsupported audio format", __func__);
}
return id;
}
|
static int get_snd_codec_id(audio_format_t format)
{
int id = 0;
switch (format & AUDIO_FORMAT_MAIN_MASK) {
default:
ALOGE("%s: Unsupported audio format", __func__);
}
return id;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
|
static void svm_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1697/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1948aefa8901dca0ccb993753fca00b15d2a6e25
|
1948aefa8901dca0ccb993753fca00b15d2a6e25
|
Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
|
bool HTMLAnchorElement::supportsFocus() const
{
if (hasEditableStyle())
return HTMLElement::supportsFocus();
return isLink() || HTMLElement::supportsFocus();
}
|
bool HTMLAnchorElement::supportsFocus() const
{
if (hasEditableStyle())
return HTMLElement::supportsFocus();
return isLink() || HTMLElement::supportsFocus();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void WebKitTestController::DiscardMainWindow() {
WebContentsObserver::Observe(NULL);
if (test_phase_ != BETWEEN_TESTS) {
Shell::CloseAllWindows();
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
test_phase_ = CLEAN_UP;
} else if (main_window_) {
main_window_->Close();
}
main_window_ = NULL;
current_pid_ = base::kNullProcessId;
}
|
void WebKitTestController::DiscardMainWindow() {
WebContentsObserver::Observe(NULL);
if (test_phase_ != BETWEEN_TESTS) {
Shell::CloseAllWindows();
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
test_phase_ = CLEAN_UP;
} else if (main_window_) {
main_window_->Close();
}
main_window_ = NULL;
current_pid_ = base::kNullProcessId;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int __init ghash_mod_init(void)
{
if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KIMD_GHASH,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
}
|
static int __init ghash_mod_init(void)
{
if (!crypt_s390_func_available(KIMD_GHASH,
CRYPT_S390_MSA | CRYPT_S390_MSA4))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return crypto_register_shash(&ghash_alg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
void UIPC_Close(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : ch_id %d", ch_id);
/* special case handling uipc shutdown */
if (ch_id != UIPC_CH_ID_ALL)
{
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : waiting for shutdown to complete");
uipc_stop_main_server_thread();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : shutdown complete");
}
}
|
void UIPC_Close(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : ch_id %d", ch_id);
/* special case handling uipc shutdown */
if (ch_id != UIPC_CH_ID_ALL)
{
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : waiting for shutdown to complete");
uipc_stop_main_server_thread();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("UIPC_Close : shutdown complete");
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static void ColorTwistMultiply(FPXColorTwistMatrix first,
FPXColorTwistMatrix second,FPXColorTwistMatrix *color_twist)
{
/*
Matrix multiply.
*/
assert(color_twist != (FPXColorTwistMatrix *) NULL);
color_twist->byy=(first.byy*second.byy)+(first.byc1*second.bc1y)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->byc1=(first.byy*second.byc1)+(first.byc1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->byc2=(first.byy*second.byc2)+(first.byc1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy1_zero=(first.byy*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.byc1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.byc2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->bc1y=(first.bc1y*second.byy)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1y)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->bc1c1=(first.bc1y*second.byc1)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->bc1c2=(first.bc1y*second.byc2)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy2_zero=(first.bc1y*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.bc1c1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.bc1c2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->bc2y=(first.bc2y*second.byy)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1y)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->bc2c1=(first.bc2y*second.byc1)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->bc2c2=(first.bc2y*second.byc2)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy3_zero=(first.bc2y*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.bc2c1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.bc2c2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->dummy4_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byy)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1y)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2y)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->dummy5_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byc1)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1c1)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2c1)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->dummy6_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byc2)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1c2)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2c2)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy7_one=(first.dummy4_zero*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.dummy2_zero)+
(first.dummy6_zero*second.dummy3_zero)+(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy7_one);
}
|
static void ColorTwistMultiply(FPXColorTwistMatrix first,
FPXColorTwistMatrix second,FPXColorTwistMatrix *color_twist)
{
/*
Matrix multiply.
*/
assert(color_twist != (FPXColorTwistMatrix *) NULL);
color_twist->byy=(first.byy*second.byy)+(first.byc1*second.bc1y)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->byc1=(first.byy*second.byc1)+(first.byc1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->byc2=(first.byy*second.byc2)+(first.byc1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.byc2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy1_zero=(first.byy*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.byc1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.byc2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy1_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->bc1y=(first.bc1y*second.byy)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1y)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->bc1c1=(first.bc1y*second.byc1)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->bc1c2=(first.bc1y*second.byc2)+(first.bc1c1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.bc1c2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy2_zero=(first.bc1y*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.bc1c1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.bc1c2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy2_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->bc2y=(first.bc2y*second.byy)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1y)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2y)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->bc2c1=(first.bc2y*second.byc1)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1c1)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2c1)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->bc2c2=(first.bc2y*second.byc2)+(first.bc2c1*second.bc1c2)+
(first.bc2c2*second.bc2c2)+(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy3_zero=(first.bc2y*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.bc2c1*second.dummy2_zero)+(first.bc2c2*second.dummy3_zero)+
(first.dummy3_zero*second.dummy7_one);
color_twist->dummy4_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byy)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1y)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2y)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy4_zero);
color_twist->dummy5_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byc1)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1c1)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2c1)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy5_zero);
color_twist->dummy6_zero=(first.dummy4_zero*second.byc2)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.bc1c2)+(first.dummy6_zero*second.bc2c2)+
(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy6_zero);
color_twist->dummy7_one=(first.dummy4_zero*second.dummy1_zero)+
(first.dummy5_zero*second.dummy2_zero)+
(first.dummy6_zero*second.dummy3_zero)+(first.dummy7_one*second.dummy7_one);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1867/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/84ac07c
|
84ac07c
|
Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
|
pcmkDeregisterNode(xmlNodePtr node)
{
__xml_private_free(node->_private);
}
|
pcmkDeregisterNode(xmlNodePtr node)
{
__xml_private_free(node->_private);
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
295c883fe3105b19bcd0f9e07d54c6b589fc5bff
|
DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::ActiveTabChanged(TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index,
bool user_gesture) {
bool did_reload = false;
if (user_gesture && ShouldReloadCrashedTab(new_contents->web_contents())) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Reloading killed tab at " << index;
static int reload_count = 0;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"Tabs.SadTab.ReloadCount", ++reload_count, 1, 1000, 50);
chrome::Reload(this, CURRENT_TAB);
did_reload = true;
}
if (!did_reload && tab_strip_model_->IsTabDiscarded(index)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Reloading discarded tab at " << index;
static int reload_count = 0;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"Tabs.Discard.ReloadCount", ++reload_count, 1, 1000, 50);
chrome::Reload(this, CURRENT_TAB);
}
if (chrome_updater_factory_.HasWeakPtrs() && old_contents)
ProcessPendingUIUpdates();
UpdateToolbar(true);
UpdateSearchState(new_contents);
command_controller_->LoadingStateChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->IsLoading(), true);
command_controller_->TabStateChanged();
StatusBubble* status_bubble = GetStatusBubble();
if (status_bubble) {
status_bubble->Hide();
status_bubble->SetStatus(
CoreTabHelper::FromWebContents(chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this))->
GetStatusText());
}
if (HasFindBarController()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(new_contents->web_contents());
find_bar_controller_->find_bar()->MoveWindowIfNecessary(gfx::Rect(), true);
}
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service && !tab_strip_model_->closing_all()) {
session_service->SetSelectedTabInWindow(session_id(), active_index());
}
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
}
|
void Browser::ActiveTabChanged(TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index,
bool user_gesture) {
bool did_reload = false;
if (user_gesture && ShouldReloadCrashedTab(new_contents->web_contents())) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Reloading killed tab at " << index;
static int reload_count = 0;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"Tabs.SadTab.ReloadCount", ++reload_count, 1, 1000, 50);
chrome::Reload(this, CURRENT_TAB);
did_reload = true;
}
if (!did_reload && tab_strip_model_->IsTabDiscarded(index)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Reloading discarded tab at " << index;
static int reload_count = 0;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS(
"Tabs.Discard.ReloadCount", ++reload_count, 1, 1000, 50);
chrome::Reload(this, CURRENT_TAB);
}
if (chrome_updater_factory_.HasWeakPtrs() && old_contents)
ProcessPendingUIUpdates();
UpdateToolbar(true);
UpdateSearchState(new_contents);
command_controller_->LoadingStateChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->IsLoading(), true);
command_controller_->TabStateChanged();
StatusBubble* status_bubble = GetStatusBubble();
if (status_bubble) {
status_bubble->Hide();
status_bubble->SetStatus(
CoreTabHelper::FromWebContents(chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this))->
GetStatusText());
}
if (HasFindBarController()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(new_contents->web_contents());
find_bar_controller_->find_bar()->MoveWindowIfNecessary(gfx::Rect(), true);
}
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service && !tab_strip_model_->closing_all()) {
session_service->SetSelectedTabInWindow(session_id(), active_index());
}
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2463
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2463/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2b6f22dc64d456471a1dc6df09d515771d1427c8
|
2b6f22dc64d456471a1dc6df09d515771d1427c8
|
h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
i32 instCount, instRunning;
i32 i;
u32 maxNumPics;
u32 strmLen;
H264SwDecRet ret;
u32 numErrors = 0;
u32 cropDisplay = 0;
u32 disableOutputReordering = 0;
FILE *finput;
Decoder **decoder;
char outFileName[256] = "out.yuv";
if ( argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "-T") == 0 )
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", tagName);
return 0;
}
if (argc < 2)
{
DEBUG((
"Usage: %s [-Nn] [-Ooutfile] [-P] [-U] [-C] [-R] [-T] file1.264 [file2.264] .. [fileN.264]\n",
argv[0]));
DEBUG(("\t-Nn forces decoding to stop after n pictures\n"));
#if defined(_NO_OUT)
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile output writing disabled at compile time\n"));
#else
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile write output to \"outfile\" (default out.yuv)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-Onone does not write output\n"));
#endif
DEBUG(("\t-C display cropped image (default decoded image)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-R disable DPB output reordering\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-T to print tag name and exit\n"));
exit(100);
}
instCount = argc - 1;
/* read command line arguments */
maxNumPics = 0;
for (i = 1; i < (argc-1); i++)
{
if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-N", 2) == 0 )
{
maxNumPics = (u32)atoi(argv[i]+2);
instCount--;
}
else if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-O", 2) == 0 )
{
strcpy(outFileName, argv[i]+2);
instCount--;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-C") == 0 )
{
cropDisplay = 1;
instCount--;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-R") == 0 )
{
disableOutputReordering = 1;
instCount--;
}
}
if (instCount < 1)
{
DEBUG(("No input files\n"));
exit(100);
}
/* allocate memory for multiple decoder instances
* one instance for every stream file */
decoder = (Decoder **)malloc(sizeof(Decoder*)*(u32)instCount);
if (decoder == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to allocate memory\n"));
exit(100);
}
/* prepare each decoder instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
decoder[i] = (Decoder *)calloc(1, sizeof(Decoder));
/* open input file */
finput = fopen(argv[argc-instCount+i],"rb");
if (finput == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to open input file <%s>\n", argv[argc-instCount+i]));
exit(100);
}
DEBUG(("Reading input file[%d] %s\n", i, argv[argc-instCount+i]));
/* read input stream to buffer */
fseek(finput,0L,SEEK_END);
strmLen = (u32)ftell(finput);
rewind(finput);
decoder[i]->byteStrmStart = (u8 *)malloc(sizeof(u8)*strmLen);
if (decoder[i]->byteStrmStart == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to allocate memory\n"));
exit(100);
}
fread(decoder[i]->byteStrmStart, sizeof(u8), strmLen, finput);
fclose(finput);
/* open output file */
if (strcmp(outFileName, "none") != 0)
{
#if defined(_NO_OUT)
decoder[i]->foutput = NULL;
#else
sprintf(decoder[i]->outFileName, "%s%i", outFileName, i);
decoder[i]->foutput = fopen(decoder[i]->outFileName, "wb");
if (decoder[i]->foutput == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to open output file\n"));
exit(100);
}
#endif
}
ret = H264SwDecInit(&(decoder[i]->decInst), disableOutputReordering);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
{
DEBUG(("Init failed %d\n", ret));
exit(100);
}
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream = decoder[i]->byteStrmStart;
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = strmLen;
decoder[i]->decInput.intraConcealmentMethod = 0;
}
/* main decoding loop */
do
{
/* decode once using each instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
ret = H264SwDecDecode(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInput),
&(decoder[i]->decOutput));
switch(ret)
{
case H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInfo));
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
exit(1);
if (cropDisplay && decoder[i]->decInfo.croppingFlag)
{
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] Cropping params: (%d, %d) %dx%d\n",
i,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropLeftOffset,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropTopOffset,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropOutWidth,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropOutHeight));
}
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] Width %d Height %d\n", i,
decoder[i]->decInfo.picWidth,
decoder[i]->decInfo.picHeight));
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] videoRange %d, matricCoefficients %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->decInfo.videoRange,
decoder[i]->decInfo.matrixCoefficients));
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos -
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream);
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream =
decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
break;
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos -
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream);
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream =
decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
/* fall through */
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY:
if (ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInfo));
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
exit(1);
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decPicture), 0) == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
{
decoder[i]->picNumber++;
numErrors += decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs;
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->picNumber,
decoder[i]->decPicture.isIdrPicture
? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
fflush(stdout);
CropWriteOutput(decoder[i]->foutput,
(u8*)decoder[i]->decPicture.pOutputPicture,
cropDisplay, &(decoder[i]->decInfo));
}
if (maxNumPics && decoder[i]->picNumber == maxNumPics)
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
break;
case H264SWDEC_STRM_PROCESSED:
case H264SWDEC_STRM_ERR:
case H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR:
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
break;
default:
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] FATAL ERROR\n", i));
exit(10);
break;
}
}
/* check if any of the instances is still running (=has more data) */
instRunning = instCount;
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
if (decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen == 0)
instRunning--;
}
} while (instRunning);
/* get last frames and close each instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decPicture), 1) == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
{
decoder[i]->picNumber++;
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->picNumber,
decoder[i]->decPicture.isIdrPicture
? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
fflush(stdout);
CropWriteOutput(decoder[i]->foutput,
(u8*)decoder[i]->decPicture.pOutputPicture,
cropDisplay, &(decoder[i]->decInfo));
}
H264SwDecRelease(decoder[i]->decInst);
if (decoder[i]->foutput)
fclose(decoder[i]->foutput);
free(decoder[i]->byteStrmStart);
free(decoder[i]);
}
free(decoder);
if (numErrors)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
|
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
i32 instCount, instRunning;
i32 i;
u32 maxNumPics;
u32 strmLen;
H264SwDecRet ret;
u32 numErrors = 0;
u32 cropDisplay = 0;
u32 disableOutputReordering = 0;
FILE *finput;
Decoder **decoder;
char outFileName[256] = "out.yuv";
if ( argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "-T") == 0 )
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", tagName);
return 0;
}
if (argc < 2)
{
DEBUG((
"Usage: %s [-Nn] [-Ooutfile] [-P] [-U] [-C] [-R] [-T] file1.264 [file2.264] .. [fileN.264]\n",
argv[0]));
DEBUG(("\t-Nn forces decoding to stop after n pictures\n"));
#if defined(_NO_OUT)
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile output writing disabled at compile time\n"));
#else
DEBUG(("\t-Ooutfile write output to \"outfile\" (default out.yuv)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-Onone does not write output\n"));
#endif
DEBUG(("\t-C display cropped image (default decoded image)\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-R disable DPB output reordering\n"));
DEBUG(("\t-T to print tag name and exit\n"));
exit(100);
}
instCount = argc - 1;
/* read command line arguments */
maxNumPics = 0;
for (i = 1; i < (argc-1); i++)
{
if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-N", 2) == 0 )
{
maxNumPics = (u32)atoi(argv[i]+2);
instCount--;
}
else if ( strncmp(argv[i], "-O", 2) == 0 )
{
strcpy(outFileName, argv[i]+2);
instCount--;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-C") == 0 )
{
cropDisplay = 1;
instCount--;
}
else if ( strcmp(argv[i], "-R") == 0 )
{
disableOutputReordering = 1;
instCount--;
}
}
if (instCount < 1)
{
DEBUG(("No input files\n"));
exit(100);
}
/* allocate memory for multiple decoder instances
* one instance for every stream file */
decoder = (Decoder **)malloc(sizeof(Decoder*)*(u32)instCount);
if (decoder == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to allocate memory\n"));
exit(100);
}
/* prepare each decoder instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
decoder[i] = (Decoder *)calloc(1, sizeof(Decoder));
/* open input file */
finput = fopen(argv[argc-instCount+i],"rb");
if (finput == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to open input file <%s>\n", argv[argc-instCount+i]));
exit(100);
}
DEBUG(("Reading input file[%d] %s\n", i, argv[argc-instCount+i]));
/* read input stream to buffer */
fseek(finput,0L,SEEK_END);
strmLen = (u32)ftell(finput);
rewind(finput);
decoder[i]->byteStrmStart = (u8 *)malloc(sizeof(u8)*strmLen);
if (decoder[i]->byteStrmStart == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to allocate memory\n"));
exit(100);
}
fread(decoder[i]->byteStrmStart, sizeof(u8), strmLen, finput);
fclose(finput);
/* open output file */
if (strcmp(outFileName, "none") != 0)
{
#if defined(_NO_OUT)
decoder[i]->foutput = NULL;
#else
sprintf(decoder[i]->outFileName, "%s%i", outFileName, i);
decoder[i]->foutput = fopen(decoder[i]->outFileName, "wb");
if (decoder[i]->foutput == NULL)
{
DEBUG(("Unable to open output file\n"));
exit(100);
}
#endif
}
ret = H264SwDecInit(&(decoder[i]->decInst), disableOutputReordering);
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
{
DEBUG(("Init failed %d\n", ret));
exit(100);
}
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream = decoder[i]->byteStrmStart;
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = strmLen;
decoder[i]->decInput.intraConcealmentMethod = 0;
}
/* main decoding loop */
do
{
/* decode once using each instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
ret = H264SwDecDecode(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInput),
&(decoder[i]->decOutput));
switch(ret)
{
case H264SWDEC_HDRS_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInfo));
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
exit(1);
if (cropDisplay && decoder[i]->decInfo.croppingFlag)
{
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] Cropping params: (%d, %d) %dx%d\n",
i,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropLeftOffset,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropTopOffset,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropOutWidth,
decoder[i]->decInfo.cropParams.cropOutHeight));
}
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] Width %d Height %d\n", i,
decoder[i]->decInfo.picWidth,
decoder[i]->decInfo.picHeight));
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] videoRange %d, matricCoefficients %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->decInfo.videoRange,
decoder[i]->decInfo.matrixCoefficients));
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos -
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream);
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream =
decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
break;
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY_BUFF_NOT_EMPTY:
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen -=
(u32)(decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos -
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream);
decoder[i]->decInput.pStream =
decoder[i]->decOutput.pStrmCurrPos;
/* fall through */
case H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY:
if (ret == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
ret = H264SwDecGetInfo(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decInfo));
if (ret != H264SWDEC_OK)
exit(1);
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decPicture), 0) == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
{
decoder[i]->picNumber++;
numErrors += decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs;
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->picNumber,
decoder[i]->decPicture.isIdrPicture
? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
fflush(stdout);
CropWriteOutput(decoder[i]->foutput,
(u8*)decoder[i]->decPicture.pOutputPicture,
cropDisplay, &(decoder[i]->decInfo));
}
if (maxNumPics && decoder[i]->picNumber == maxNumPics)
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
break;
case H264SWDEC_STRM_PROCESSED:
case H264SWDEC_STRM_ERR:
case H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR:
decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen = 0;
break;
default:
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] FATAL ERROR\n", i));
exit(10);
break;
}
}
/* check if any of the instances is still running (=has more data) */
instRunning = instCount;
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
if (decoder[i]->decInput.dataLen == 0)
instRunning--;
}
} while (instRunning);
/* get last frames and close each instance */
for (i = 0; i < instCount; i++)
{
while (H264SwDecNextPicture(decoder[i]->decInst,
&(decoder[i]->decPicture), 1) == H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY)
{
decoder[i]->picNumber++;
DEBUG(("Decoder[%d] PIC %d, type %s, concealed %d\n",
i, decoder[i]->picNumber,
decoder[i]->decPicture.isIdrPicture
? "IDR" : "NON-IDR",
decoder[i]->decPicture.nbrOfErrMBs));
fflush(stdout);
CropWriteOutput(decoder[i]->foutput,
(u8*)decoder[i]->decPicture.pOutputPicture,
cropDisplay, &(decoder[i]->decInfo));
}
H264SwDecRelease(decoder[i]->decInst);
if (decoder[i]->foutput)
fclose(decoder[i]->foutput);
free(decoder[i]->byteStrmStart);
free(decoder[i]);
}
free(decoder);
if (numErrors)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
a46bcef82b29d30836a0f26226e3d4aca4fa9612
|
Access ChromotingHost::clients_ only on network thread.
Previously ChromotingHost was doing some work on the main thread and
some on the network thread. |clients_| and some other members were
accessed without lock on both of these threads. Moved most of the
ChromotingHost activity to the network thread to avoid possible
race conditions.
BUG=96325
TEST=Chromoting works
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void HostNPScriptObject::SetException(const std::string& exception_string) {
CHECK_EQ(base::PlatformThread::CurrentId(), np_thread_id_);
g_npnetscape_funcs->setexception(parent_, exception_string.c_str());
LOG(INFO) << exception_string;
}
|
void HostNPScriptObject::SetException(const std::string& exception_string) {
CHECK_EQ(base::PlatformThread::CurrentId(), np_thread_id_);
g_npnetscape_funcs->setexception(parent_, exception_string.c_str());
LOG(INFO) << exception_string;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1213
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707
|
[Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::readyStateChanged() {
setReadyState(static_cast<ReadyState>(webMediaPlayer()->getReadyState()));
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::readyStateChanged() {
setReadyState(static_cast<ReadyState>(webMediaPlayer()->getReadyState()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2829
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2829/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a
|
a4b20ed4917f1f6fc83b6375a48e2c3895d43a8a
|
Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLvoid StubGLTexSubImage2D(GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, const void* pixels) {
glTexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type,
pixels);
}
|
GLvoid StubGLTexSubImage2D(GLenum target, GLint level, GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, const void* pixels) {
glTexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type,
pixels);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8106/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=bf25983345ca44aec3dd92c57142be45452bd38a
|
bf25983345ca44aec3dd92c57142be45452bd38a
| null |
static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
if (s->cirrus_blt_width > CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE) {
return true;
}
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
assert(s->cirrus_blt_height > 0);
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2012-0957
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0957/
|
CWE-16
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e
|
2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e
|
kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
{
if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
else
rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
else
rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
}
|
static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
{
if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
else
rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
else
rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9620
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9620/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/ce90e05774dd77d86cfc8dfa6da57b32816841c4
|
ce90e05774dd77d86cfc8dfa6da57b32816841c4
|
- Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
|
usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr, USAGE, progname, progname, progname);
exit(1);
}
|
usage(void)
{
(void)fprintf(stderr, USAGE, progname, progname, progname);
exit(1);
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::attributesOfColumnHeaders()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::attributesOfColumnHeaders()
{
return JSStringCreateWithCharacters(0, 0);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static long arch_ptrace_old(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
void __user *datavp = (void __user *) data;
switch (request) {
case PPC_PTRACE_GETREGS: /* Get GPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(long),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_SETREGS: /* Set GPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(long),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_GETFPREGS: /* Get FPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_SETFPREGS: /* Set FPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
}
return -EPERM;
}
|
static long arch_ptrace_old(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
{
void __user *datavp = (void __user *) data;
switch (request) {
case PPC_PTRACE_GETREGS: /* Get GPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(long),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_SETREGS: /* Set GPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_GPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(long),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_GETFPREGS: /* Get FPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_to_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
case PPC_PTRACE_SETFPREGS: /* Set FPRs 0 - 31. */
return copy_regset_from_user(child, &user_ppc_native_view,
REGSET_FPR, 0, 32 * sizeof(double),
datavp);
}
return -EPERM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5185
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5185/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
f2d26633cbd50735ac2af30436888b71ac0abad3
|
[Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
|
bool IsAutofillUpstreamBlankCardholderNameFieldExperimentEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAutofillUpstreamBlankCardholderNameField);
}
|
bool IsAutofillUpstreamBlankCardholderNameFieldExperimentEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kAutofillUpstreamBlankCardholderNameField);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::load() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "load(" << (void*)this << ")";
autoplay_policy_->TryUnlockingUserGesture();
ignore_preload_none_ = true;
InvokeLoadAlgorithm();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::load() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "load(" << (void*)this << ")";
autoplay_policy_->TryUnlockingUserGesture();
ignore_preload_none_ = true;
InvokeLoadAlgorithm();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd
|
Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896}
|
void Document::didLoadAllImports()
{
if (!haveScriptBlockingStylesheetsLoaded())
return;
if (!importLoader())
styleResolverMayHaveChanged();
didLoadAllScriptBlockingResources();
}
|
void Document::didLoadAllImports()
{
if (!haveScriptBlockingStylesheetsLoaded())
return;
if (!importLoader())
styleResolverMayHaveChanged();
didLoadAllScriptBlockingResources();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
Shutdown Timebomb - In canary, get a callstack if it takes longer than
10 minutes. In Dev, get callstack if it takes longer than 20 minutes.
In Beta (50 minutes) and Stable (100 minutes) it is same as before.
BUG=519321
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1409333005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355586}
|
void ThreadWatcherList::GetStatusOfThreads(uint32* responding_thread_count,
uint32* unresponding_thread_count) {
DCHECK(WatchDogThread::CurrentlyOnWatchDogThread());
*responding_thread_count = 0;
*unresponding_thread_count = 0;
if (!g_thread_watcher_list_)
return;
for (RegistrationList::iterator it =
g_thread_watcher_list_->registered_.begin();
g_thread_watcher_list_->registered_.end() != it;
++it) {
if (it->second->IsVeryUnresponsive())
++(*unresponding_thread_count);
else
++(*responding_thread_count);
}
}
|
void ThreadWatcherList::GetStatusOfThreads(uint32* responding_thread_count,
uint32* unresponding_thread_count) {
DCHECK(WatchDogThread::CurrentlyOnWatchDogThread());
*responding_thread_count = 0;
*unresponding_thread_count = 0;
if (!g_thread_watcher_list_)
return;
for (RegistrationList::iterator it =
g_thread_watcher_list_->registered_.begin();
g_thread_watcher_list_->registered_.end() != it;
++it) {
if (it->second->IsVeryUnresponsive())
++(*unresponding_thread_count);
else
++(*responding_thread_count);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static char *getgname(void)
{
struct group *result;
result = getgrgid(getegid());
if (!result)
return NULL;
return strdup(result->gr_name);
}
|
static char *getgname(void)
{
struct group *result;
result = getgrgid(getegid());
if (!result)
return NULL;
return strdup(result->gr_name);
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
LayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedrawRect()
: num_draws_(0), bounds_(50, 50), invalid_rect_(10, 10, 20, 20) {}
|
LayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedrawRect()
: num_draws_(0), bounds_(50, 50), invalid_rect_(10, 10, 20, 20) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-10664
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10664/
|
CWE-89
|
https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00
|
Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
|
void CWebServer::Cmd_SetUnused(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string sidx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (sidx.empty())
return;
int idx = atoi(sidx.c_str());
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "SetUnused";
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceStatus SET Used=0 WHERE (ID == %d)", idx);
if (m_sql.m_bEnableEventSystem)
m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.RemoveSingleState(idx, m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.REASON_DEVICE);
#ifdef ENABLE_PYTHON
m_mainworker.m_pluginsystem.DeviceModified(idx);
#endif
}
|
void CWebServer::Cmd_SetUnused(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string sidx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (sidx.empty())
return;
int idx = atoi(sidx.c_str());
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "SetUnused";
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceStatus SET Used=0 WHERE (ID == %d)", idx);
if (m_sql.m_bEnableEventSystem)
m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.RemoveSingleState(idx, m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.REASON_DEVICE);
#ifdef ENABLE_PYTHON
m_mainworker.m_pluginsystem.DeviceModified(idx);
#endif
}
|
C
|
domoticz
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct sk_buff *sk_stream_alloc_skb(struct sock *sk, int size, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* The TCP header must be at least 32-bit aligned. */
size = ALIGN(size, 4);
skb = alloc_skb_fclone(size + sk->sk_prot->max_header, gfp);
if (skb) {
if (sk_wmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize)) {
/*
* Make sure that we have exactly size bytes
* available to the caller, no more, no less.
*/
skb_reserve(skb, skb_tailroom(skb) - size);
return skb;
}
__kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure(sk);
sk_stream_moderate_sndbuf(sk);
}
return NULL;
}
|
struct sk_buff *sk_stream_alloc_skb(struct sock *sk, int size, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
/* The TCP header must be at least 32-bit aligned. */
size = ALIGN(size, 4);
skb = alloc_skb_fclone(size + sk->sk_prot->max_header, gfp);
if (skb) {
if (sk_wmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize)) {
/*
* Make sure that we have exactly size bytes
* available to the caller, no more, no less.
*/
skb_reserve(skb, skb_tailroom(skb) - size);
return skb;
}
__kfree_skb(skb);
} else {
sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure(sk);
sk_stream_moderate_sndbuf(sk);
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1799/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
5fd35e5359c6345b8709695cd71fba307318e6aa
|
Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <[email protected]> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::mapLocalToContainer(RenderBoxModelObject* repaintContainer, bool fixed, bool useTransforms, TransformState& transformState) const
{
if (repaintContainer == this)
return;
if (RenderView* v = view()) {
if (v->layoutStateEnabled() && !repaintContainer) {
LayoutState* layoutState = v->layoutState();
LayoutSize offset = layoutState->m_paintOffset;
offset.expand(x(), y());
if (style()->position() == RelativePosition && layer())
offset += layer()->relativePositionOffset();
transformState.move(offset);
return;
}
}
bool containerSkipped;
RenderObject* o = container(repaintContainer, &containerSkipped);
if (!o)
return;
bool isFixedPos = style()->position() == FixedPosition;
bool hasTransform = hasLayer() && layer()->transform();
if (hasTransform) {
fixed &= isFixedPos;
} else
fixed |= isFixedPos;
LayoutSize containerOffset = offsetFromContainer(o, roundedLayoutPoint(transformState.mappedPoint()));
bool preserve3D = useTransforms && (o->style()->preserves3D() || style()->preserves3D());
if (useTransforms && shouldUseTransformFromContainer(o)) {
TransformationMatrix t;
getTransformFromContainer(o, containerOffset, t);
transformState.applyTransform(t, preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
} else
transformState.move(containerOffset.width(), containerOffset.height(), preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
if (containerSkipped) {
LayoutSize containerOffset = repaintContainer->offsetFromAncestorContainer(o);
transformState.move(-containerOffset.width(), -containerOffset.height(), preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
return;
}
o->mapLocalToContainer(repaintContainer, fixed, useTransforms, transformState);
}
|
void RenderBox::mapLocalToContainer(RenderBoxModelObject* repaintContainer, bool fixed, bool useTransforms, TransformState& transformState) const
{
if (repaintContainer == this)
return;
if (RenderView* v = view()) {
if (v->layoutStateEnabled() && !repaintContainer) {
LayoutState* layoutState = v->layoutState();
LayoutSize offset = layoutState->m_paintOffset;
offset.expand(x(), y());
if (style()->position() == RelativePosition && layer())
offset += layer()->relativePositionOffset();
transformState.move(offset);
return;
}
}
bool containerSkipped;
RenderObject* o = container(repaintContainer, &containerSkipped);
if (!o)
return;
bool isFixedPos = style()->position() == FixedPosition;
bool hasTransform = hasLayer() && layer()->transform();
if (hasTransform) {
fixed &= isFixedPos;
} else
fixed |= isFixedPos;
LayoutSize containerOffset = offsetFromContainer(o, roundedLayoutPoint(transformState.mappedPoint()));
bool preserve3D = useTransforms && (o->style()->preserves3D() || style()->preserves3D());
if (useTransforms && shouldUseTransformFromContainer(o)) {
TransformationMatrix t;
getTransformFromContainer(o, containerOffset, t);
transformState.applyTransform(t, preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
} else
transformState.move(containerOffset.width(), containerOffset.height(), preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
if (containerSkipped) {
LayoutSize containerOffset = repaintContainer->offsetFromAncestorContainer(o);
transformState.move(-containerOffset.width(), -containerOffset.height(), preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
return;
}
o->mapLocalToContainer(repaintContainer, fixed, useTransforms, transformState);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2929/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
int ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
if (write) {
ret = expand_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
if (ret < 0)
return NULL;
}
#endif
ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
if (ret <= 0)
return NULL;
if (write) {
unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
struct rlimit *rlim;
acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX)
* of argument strings even with small stacks
*/
if (size <= ARG_MAX)
return page;
/*
* Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
* This ensures that:
* - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
* - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
* to work from.
*/
rlim = current->signal->rlim;
if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
put_page(page);
return NULL;
}
}
return page;
}
|
static struct page *get_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
int write)
{
struct page *page;
int ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
if (write) {
ret = expand_downwards(bprm->vma, pos);
if (ret < 0)
return NULL;
}
#endif
ret = get_user_pages(current, bprm->mm, pos,
1, write, 1, &page, NULL);
if (ret <= 0)
return NULL;
if (write) {
unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
struct rlimit *rlim;
acct_arg_size(bprm, size / PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* We've historically supported up to 32 pages (ARG_MAX)
* of argument strings even with small stacks
*/
if (size <= ARG_MAX)
return page;
/*
* Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
* This ensures that:
* - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
* - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
* to work from.
*/
rlim = current->signal->rlim;
if (size > ACCESS_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4) {
put_page(page);
return NULL;
}
}
return page;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ExtensionPrefs::MigratePermissions(const ExtensionIdSet& extension_ids) {
ExtensionPermissionsInfo* info = ExtensionPermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator ext_id = extension_ids.begin();
ext_id != extension_ids.end(); ++ext_id) {
bool full_access;
const DictionaryValue* ext = GetExtensionPref(*ext_id);
if (!ext || !ext->GetBoolean(kPrefOldGrantedFullAccess, &full_access))
continue;
UpdateExtensionPref(
*ext_id, kPrefOldGrantedFullAccess, new ListValue());
if (full_access) {
ListValue* apis = NULL;
ListValue* new_apis = NULL;
std::string granted_apis =
JoinPrefs(kPrefGrantedPermissions, kPrefAPIs);
if (ext->GetList(kPrefOldGrantedAPIs, &apis))
new_apis = apis->DeepCopy();
else
new_apis = new ListValue();
std::string plugin_name = info->GetByID(
ExtensionAPIPermission::kPlugin)->name();
new_apis->Append(Value::CreateStringValue(plugin_name));
UpdateExtensionPref(*ext_id, granted_apis, new_apis);
}
ListValue* hosts;
std::string explicit_hosts =
JoinPrefs(kPrefGrantedPermissions, kPrefExplicitHosts);
if (ext->GetList(kPrefOldGrantedHosts, &hosts)) {
UpdateExtensionPref(
*ext_id, explicit_hosts, hosts->DeepCopy());
UpdateExtensionPref(*ext_id, kPrefOldGrantedHosts, new ListValue());
}
}
}
|
void ExtensionPrefs::MigratePermissions(const ExtensionIdSet& extension_ids) {
ExtensionPermissionsInfo* info = ExtensionPermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator ext_id = extension_ids.begin();
ext_id != extension_ids.end(); ++ext_id) {
bool full_access;
const DictionaryValue* ext = GetExtensionPref(*ext_id);
if (!ext || !ext->GetBoolean(kPrefOldGrantedFullAccess, &full_access))
continue;
UpdateExtensionPref(
*ext_id, kPrefOldGrantedFullAccess, new ListValue());
if (full_access) {
ListValue* apis = NULL;
ListValue* new_apis = NULL;
std::string granted_apis =
JoinPrefs(kPrefGrantedPermissions, kPrefAPIs);
if (ext->GetList(kPrefOldGrantedAPIs, &apis))
new_apis = apis->DeepCopy();
else
new_apis = new ListValue();
std::string plugin_name = info->GetByID(
ExtensionAPIPermission::kPlugin)->name();
new_apis->Append(Value::CreateStringValue(plugin_name));
UpdateExtensionPref(*ext_id, granted_apis, new_apis);
}
ListValue* hosts;
std::string explicit_hosts =
JoinPrefs(kPrefGrantedPermissions, kPrefExplicitHosts);
if (ext->GetList(kPrefOldGrantedHosts, &hosts)) {
UpdateExtensionPref(
*ext_id, explicit_hosts, hosts->DeepCopy());
UpdateExtensionPref(*ext_id, kPrefOldGrantedHosts, new ListValue());
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WindowDragResponseTask(AutomationProvider* provider,
IPC::Message* reply_message)
: provider_(provider),
reply_message_(reply_message) {
DCHECK(provider_);
DCHECK(reply_message_);
}
|
WindowDragResponseTask(AutomationProvider* provider,
IPC::Message* reply_message)
: provider_(provider),
reply_message_(reply_message) {
DCHECK(provider_);
DCHECK(reply_message_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::SetSendBufferSize(int32 size) {
return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::SetSendBufferSize(int32 size) {
return ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7998/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/commit/20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
|
vips_foreign_load_init( VipsForeignLoad *load )
{
load->disc = TRUE;
load->access = VIPS_ACCESS_RANDOM;
}
|
vips_foreign_load_init( VipsForeignLoad *load )
{
load->disc = TRUE;
load->access = VIPS_ACCESS_RANDOM;
}
|
C
|
libvips
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
99844692ee805d18d5ee7fd9c62f14d2dffa2e06
|
Removing unnecessary DCHECK from SafeBrowsing interstitial.
BUG=30079
TEST=None.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1131003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42049 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void InterstitialPage::InterstitialPageRVHViewDelegate::OnFindReply(
int request_id, int number_of_matches, const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal, bool final_update) {
}
|
void InterstitialPage::InterstitialPageRVHViewDelegate::OnFindReply(
int request_id, int number_of_matches, const gfx::Rect& selection_rect,
int active_match_ordinal, bool final_update) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static int remove_ftrace_list_ops(struct ftrace_ops **list,
struct ftrace_ops *main_ops,
struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
int ret = remove_ftrace_ops(list, ops);
if (!ret && *list == &ftrace_list_end)
ret = remove_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, main_ops);
return ret;
}
|
static int remove_ftrace_list_ops(struct ftrace_ops **list,
struct ftrace_ops *main_ops,
struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
int ret = remove_ftrace_ops(list, ops);
if (!ret && *list == &ftrace_list_end)
ret = remove_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, main_ops);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline void parity_protection_init(void)
{
switch (current_cpu_type()) {
case CPU_24K:
case CPU_34K:
case CPU_74K:
case CPU_1004K:
{
#define ERRCTL_PE 0x80000000
#define ERRCTL_L2P 0x00800000
unsigned long errctl;
unsigned int l1parity_present, l2parity_present;
errctl = read_c0_ecc();
errctl &= ~(ERRCTL_PE|ERRCTL_L2P);
/* probe L1 parity support */
write_c0_ecc(errctl | ERRCTL_PE);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
l1parity_present = (read_c0_ecc() & ERRCTL_PE);
/* probe L2 parity support */
write_c0_ecc(errctl|ERRCTL_L2P);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
l2parity_present = (read_c0_ecc() & ERRCTL_L2P);
if (l1parity_present && l2parity_present) {
if (l1parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_PE;
if (l1parity ^ l2parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_L2P;
} else if (l1parity_present) {
if (l1parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_PE;
} else if (l2parity_present) {
if (l2parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_L2P;
} else {
/* No parity available */
}
printk(KERN_INFO "Writing ErrCtl register=%08lx\n", errctl);
write_c0_ecc(errctl);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
errctl = read_c0_ecc();
printk(KERN_INFO "Readback ErrCtl register=%08lx\n", errctl);
if (l1parity_present)
printk(KERN_INFO "Cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(errctl & ERRCTL_PE) ? "en" : "dis");
if (l2parity_present) {
if (l1parity_present && l1parity)
errctl ^= ERRCTL_L2P;
printk(KERN_INFO "L2 cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(errctl & ERRCTL_L2P) ? "en" : "dis");
}
}
break;
case CPU_5KC:
write_c0_ecc(0x80000000);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
/* Set the PE bit (bit 31) in the c0_errctl register. */
printk(KERN_INFO "Cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(read_c0_ecc() & 0x80000000) ? "en" : "dis");
break;
case CPU_20KC:
case CPU_25KF:
/* Clear the DE bit (bit 16) in the c0_status register. */
printk(KERN_INFO "Enable cache parity protection for "
"MIPS 20KC/25KF CPUs.\n");
clear_c0_status(ST0_DE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
static inline void parity_protection_init(void)
{
switch (current_cpu_type()) {
case CPU_24K:
case CPU_34K:
case CPU_74K:
case CPU_1004K:
{
#define ERRCTL_PE 0x80000000
#define ERRCTL_L2P 0x00800000
unsigned long errctl;
unsigned int l1parity_present, l2parity_present;
errctl = read_c0_ecc();
errctl &= ~(ERRCTL_PE|ERRCTL_L2P);
/* probe L1 parity support */
write_c0_ecc(errctl | ERRCTL_PE);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
l1parity_present = (read_c0_ecc() & ERRCTL_PE);
/* probe L2 parity support */
write_c0_ecc(errctl|ERRCTL_L2P);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
l2parity_present = (read_c0_ecc() & ERRCTL_L2P);
if (l1parity_present && l2parity_present) {
if (l1parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_PE;
if (l1parity ^ l2parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_L2P;
} else if (l1parity_present) {
if (l1parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_PE;
} else if (l2parity_present) {
if (l2parity)
errctl |= ERRCTL_L2P;
} else {
/* No parity available */
}
printk(KERN_INFO "Writing ErrCtl register=%08lx\n", errctl);
write_c0_ecc(errctl);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
errctl = read_c0_ecc();
printk(KERN_INFO "Readback ErrCtl register=%08lx\n", errctl);
if (l1parity_present)
printk(KERN_INFO "Cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(errctl & ERRCTL_PE) ? "en" : "dis");
if (l2parity_present) {
if (l1parity_present && l1parity)
errctl ^= ERRCTL_L2P;
printk(KERN_INFO "L2 cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(errctl & ERRCTL_L2P) ? "en" : "dis");
}
}
break;
case CPU_5KC:
write_c0_ecc(0x80000000);
back_to_back_c0_hazard();
/* Set the PE bit (bit 31) in the c0_errctl register. */
printk(KERN_INFO "Cache parity protection %sabled\n",
(read_c0_ecc() & 0x80000000) ? "en" : "dis");
break;
case CPU_20KC:
case CPU_25KF:
/* Clear the DE bit (bit 16) in the c0_status register. */
printk(KERN_INFO "Enable cache parity protection for "
"MIPS 20KC/25KF CPUs.\n");
clear_c0_status(ST0_DE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7532
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7532/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/4f2c04ea6673863b87ac7f186cbb0d911f74085c
|
4f2c04ea6673863b87ac7f186cbb0d911f74085c
|
Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
LayerInfo* layer_info,const size_t channel,
const PSDCompressionType compression,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1)
{
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2 ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 3) || (layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
offset=TellBlob(channel_image);
status=MagickTrue;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,offsets,exception);
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
PixelInfo
color;
layer_info->mask.image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,
MagickTrue,exception);
layer_info->mask.image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
GetPixelInfo(layer_info->mask.image,&color);
color.red=layer_info->mask.background == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange;
SetImageColor(layer_info->mask.image,&color,exception);
(void) CompositeImage(layer_info->mask.image,mask,OverCompositeOp,
MagickTrue,layer_info->mask.page.x,layer_info->mask.page.y,
exception);
}
DestroyImage(mask);
}
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
LayerInfo* layer_info,const size_t channel,
const PSDCompressionType compression,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1)
{
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2 ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 3) || (layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
offset=TellBlob(channel_image);
status=MagickTrue;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*offsets;
offsets=ReadPSDRLEOffsets(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,offsets,exception);
offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(offsets);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
PixelInfo
color;
layer_info->mask.image=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,
MagickTrue,exception);
layer_info->mask.image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
GetPixelInfo(layer_info->mask.image,&color);
color.red=layer_info->mask.background == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange;
SetImageColor(layer_info->mask.image,&color,exception);
(void) CompositeImage(layer_info->mask.image,mask,OverCompositeOp,
MagickTrue,layer_info->mask.page.x,layer_info->mask.page.y,
exception);
}
DestroyImage(mask);
}
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6165/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4391ff2884fe15b8d609bd6d3af61aacf8ad52a1
|
4391ff2884fe15b8d609bd6d3af61aacf8ad52a1
|
Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DeleteNavigationEntries(
const DeletionPredicate& deletionPredicate) {
CHECK(CanPruneAllButLastCommitted());
std::vector<int> delete_indices;
for (size_t i = 0; i < entries_.size(); i++) {
if (i != static_cast<size_t>(last_committed_entry_index_) &&
deletionPredicate.Run(*entries_[i])) {
delete_indices.push_back(i);
}
}
if (delete_indices.empty())
return;
if (delete_indices.size() == GetEntryCount() - 1U) {
PruneAllButLastCommitted();
} else {
for (auto it = delete_indices.rbegin(); it != delete_indices.rend(); ++it) {
RemoveEntryAtIndex(*it);
}
delegate_->SetHistoryOffsetAndLength(last_committed_entry_index_,
GetEntryCount());
}
delegate()->NotifyNavigationEntriesDeleted();
}
|
void NavigationControllerImpl::DeleteNavigationEntries(
const DeletionPredicate& deletionPredicate) {
CHECK(CanPruneAllButLastCommitted());
std::vector<int> delete_indices;
for (size_t i = 0; i < entries_.size(); i++) {
if (i != static_cast<size_t>(last_committed_entry_index_) &&
deletionPredicate.Run(*entries_[i])) {
delete_indices.push_back(i);
}
}
if (delete_indices.empty())
return;
if (delete_indices.size() == GetEntryCount() - 1U) {
PruneAllButLastCommitted();
} else {
for (auto it = delete_indices.rbegin(); it != delete_indices.rend(); ++it) {
RemoveEntryAtIndex(*it);
}
delegate_->SetHistoryOffsetAndLength(last_committed_entry_index_,
GetEntryCount());
}
delegate()->NotifyNavigationEntriesDeleted();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16425/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/commit/360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
360e95d45ac4123255a4c796db96337f332160ad#diff-d643a0fa169471dbf2912f4866dc49c5
|
fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
|
int sc_format_oid(struct sc_object_id *oid, const char *in)
{
int ii, ret = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
const char *p;
char *q;
if (oid == NULL || in == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
sc_init_oid(oid);
p = in;
for (ii=0; ii < SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS; ii++) {
oid->value[ii] = strtol(p, &q, 10);
if (!*q)
break;
if (!(q[0] == '.' && isdigit(q[1])))
goto out;
p = q + 1;
}
if (!sc_valid_oid(oid))
goto out;
ret = SC_SUCCESS;
out:
if (ret)
sc_init_oid(oid);
return ret;
}
|
int sc_format_oid(struct sc_object_id *oid, const char *in)
{
int ii, ret = SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
const char *p;
char *q;
if (oid == NULL || in == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
sc_init_oid(oid);
p = in;
for (ii=0; ii < SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS; ii++) {
oid->value[ii] = strtol(p, &q, 10);
if (!*q)
break;
if (!(q[0] == '.' && isdigit(q[1])))
goto out;
p = q + 1;
}
if (!sc_valid_oid(oid))
goto out;
ret = SC_SUCCESS;
out:
if (ret)
sc_init_oid(oid);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderView::OnSetFocus(bool enable) {
RenderWidget::OnSetFocus(enable);
if (webview() && webview()->isActive()) {
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
if (enable)
(*plugin_it)->SetWindowFocus(true);
(*plugin_it)->SetContentAreaFocus(enable);
}
}
}
|
void RenderView::OnSetFocus(bool enable) {
RenderWidget::OnSetFocus(enable);
if (webview() && webview()->isActive()) {
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
if (enable)
(*plugin_it)->SetWindowFocus(true);
(*plugin_it)->SetContentAreaFocus(enable);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15397
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15397/
|
CWE-311
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
0579ed631fb37de5704b54ed2ee466bf29630ad0
|
Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
|
NetworkChangeNotifierMac::GetCurrentConnectionType() const {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowWait allow_wait;
base::AutoLock lock(connection_type_lock_);
while (!connection_type_initialized_) {
initial_connection_type_cv_.Wait();
}
return connection_type_;
}
|
NetworkChangeNotifierMac::GetCurrentConnectionType() const {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowWait allow_wait;
base::AutoLock lock(connection_type_lock_);
while (!connection_type_initialized_) {
initial_connection_type_cv_.Wait();
}
return connection_type_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2428
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2428/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/aac/+/5d4405f601fa11a8955fd7611532c982420e4206
|
5d4405f601fa11a8955fd7611532c982420e4206
|
Fix stack corruption happening in aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap()
In the aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap() function, self->numThreads
can be used after having exceeded its intended max value,
MAX_DRC_THREADS, causing memory to be cleared after the
threadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS] array.
The crash is prevented by never using self->numThreads with
a value equal to or greater than MAX_DRC_THREADS.
A proper fix will be required as there seems to be an issue as
to which entry in the threadBs array is meant to be initialized
and used.
Bug 26751339
Change-Id: I655cc40c35d4206ab72e83b2bdb751be2fe52b5a
|
void aacDecoder_drcGetInfo (
HANDLE_AAC_DRC self,
SCHAR *pPresMode,
SCHAR *pProgRefLevel )
{
if (self != NULL) {
if (pPresMode != NULL) {
*pPresMode = self->presMode;
}
if (pProgRefLevel != NULL) {
if (self->progRefLevelPresent) {
*pProgRefLevel = self->progRefLevel;
} else {
*pProgRefLevel = -1;
}
}
}
}
|
void aacDecoder_drcGetInfo (
HANDLE_AAC_DRC self,
SCHAR *pPresMode,
SCHAR *pProgRefLevel )
{
if (self != NULL) {
if (pPresMode != NULL) {
*pPresMode = self->presMode;
}
if (pProgRefLevel != NULL) {
if (self->progRefLevelPresent) {
*pProgRefLevel = self->progRefLevel;
} else {
*pProgRefLevel = -1;
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3916
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3916/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/media/+/8e7a2b4d13bff03973dbad2bfb88a04296140433
|
8e7a2b4d13bff03973dbad2bfb88a04296140433
|
Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
|
const char *get_camera_metadata_section_name(uint32_t tag) {
uint32_t tag_section = tag >> 16;
if (tag_section >= VENDOR_SECTION && vendor_tag_ops != NULL) {
return vendor_tag_ops->get_section_name(
vendor_tag_ops,
tag);
}
if (tag_section >= ANDROID_SECTION_COUNT) {
return NULL;
}
return camera_metadata_section_names[tag_section];
}
|
const char *get_camera_metadata_section_name(uint32_t tag) {
uint32_t tag_section = tag >> 16;
if (tag_section >= VENDOR_SECTION && vendor_tag_ops != NULL) {
return vendor_tag_ops->get_section_name(
vendor_tag_ops,
tag);
}
if (tag_section >= ANDROID_SECTION_COUNT) {
return NULL;
}
return camera_metadata_section_names[tag_section];
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
_alloc_gids(int n, gid_t *gids)
{
gids_t *new;
new = (gids_t *)xmalloc(sizeof(gids_t));
new->ngids = n;
new->gids = gids;
return new;
}
|
_alloc_gids(int n, gid_t *gids)
{
gids_t *new;
new = (gids_t *)xmalloc(sizeof(gids_t));
new->ngids = n;
new->gids = gids;
return new;
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10165
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10165/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
5ca71a7bc18b6897ab21d815d15e218e204581e2
|
Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
|
cmsTagTypeSignature DecideXYZtype(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
return cmsSigXYZType;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(ICCVersion);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Data);
}
|
cmsTagTypeSignature DecideXYZtype(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
return cmsSigXYZType;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(ICCVersion);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Data);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d8fccaec4e73a9120074293c1997f963f810c9dd
|
d8fccaec4e73a9120074293c1997f963f810c9dd
|
Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
float HarfBuzzShaper::adjustSpacing(HarfBuzzRun* currentRun, size_t glyphIndex, unsigned currentCharacterIndex, HarfBuzzRun* previousRun, float& offsetX, float& totalAdvance)
{
float spacing = 0;
UChar32 character = m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex];
if (m_letterSpacing && !Character::treatAsZeroWidthSpace(character))
spacing += m_letterSpacing;
bool treatAsSpace = Character::treatAsSpace(character);
if (treatAsSpace && currentCharacterIndex && (character != '\t' || !m_run.allowTabs()))
spacing += m_wordSpacingAdjustment;
if (!m_expansionOpportunityCount)
return spacing;
if (treatAsSpace) {
spacing += nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
m_isAfterExpansion = true;
return spacing;
}
if (m_run.textJustify() != TextJustify::TextJustifyAuto) {
m_isAfterExpansion = false;
return spacing;
}
if (U16_IS_LEAD(character) && currentCharacterIndex + 1 < m_normalizedBufferLength && U16_IS_TRAIL(m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex + 1]))
character = U16_GET_SUPPLEMENTARY(character, m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex + 1]);
if (!Character::isCJKIdeographOrSymbol(character)) {
m_isAfterExpansion = false;
return spacing;
}
if (!m_isAfterExpansion) {
float expandBefore = nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
if (expandBefore) {
if (glyphIndex > 0) {
currentRun->addAdvance(glyphIndex - 1, expandBefore);
totalAdvance += expandBefore;
} else if (previousRun) {
previousRun->addAdvance(previousRun->numGlyphs() - 1, expandBefore);
previousRun->setWidth(previousRun->width() + expandBefore);
m_totalWidth += expandBefore;
} else {
offsetX += expandBefore;
totalAdvance += expandBefore;
}
}
if (!m_expansionOpportunityCount)
return spacing;
}
spacing += nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
m_isAfterExpansion = true;
return spacing;
}
|
float HarfBuzzShaper::adjustSpacing(HarfBuzzRun* currentRun, size_t glyphIndex, unsigned currentCharacterIndex, HarfBuzzRun* previousRun, float& offsetX, float& totalAdvance)
{
float spacing = 0;
UChar32 character = m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex];
if (m_letterSpacing && !Character::treatAsZeroWidthSpace(character))
spacing += m_letterSpacing;
bool treatAsSpace = Character::treatAsSpace(character);
if (treatAsSpace && currentCharacterIndex && (character != '\t' || !m_run.allowTabs()))
spacing += m_wordSpacingAdjustment;
if (!m_expansionOpportunityCount)
return spacing;
if (treatAsSpace) {
spacing += nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
m_isAfterExpansion = true;
return spacing;
}
if (m_run.textJustify() != TextJustify::TextJustifyAuto) {
m_isAfterExpansion = false;
return spacing;
}
if (U16_IS_LEAD(character) && currentCharacterIndex + 1 < m_normalizedBufferLength && U16_IS_TRAIL(m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex + 1]))
character = U16_GET_SUPPLEMENTARY(character, m_normalizedBuffer[currentCharacterIndex + 1]);
if (!Character::isCJKIdeographOrSymbol(character)) {
m_isAfterExpansion = false;
return spacing;
}
if (!m_isAfterExpansion) {
float expandBefore = nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
if (expandBefore) {
if (glyphIndex > 0) {
currentRun->addAdvance(glyphIndex - 1, expandBefore);
totalAdvance += expandBefore;
} else if (previousRun) {
previousRun->addAdvance(previousRun->numGlyphs() - 1, expandBefore);
previousRun->setWidth(previousRun->width() + expandBefore);
m_totalWidth += expandBefore;
} else {
offsetX += expandBefore;
totalAdvance += expandBefore;
}
}
if (!m_expansionOpportunityCount)
return spacing;
}
spacing += nextExpansionPerOpportunity();
m_isAfterExpansion = true;
return spacing;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5511
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5511/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/c8c6a0f123d5e35c173125365c97e2c0fc7eca42
|
c8c6a0f123d5e35c173125365c97e2c0fc7eca42
|
Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
|
static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
|
static size_t WritePSDChannel(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const QuantumType quantum_type, unsigned char *compact_pixels,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
y;
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count,
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
#define CHUNK 16384
int
flush,
level;
unsigned char
*compressed_pixels;
z_stream
stream;
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
flush=Z_NO_FLUSH;
#endif
count=0;
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
size_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,1);
}
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
monochrome=IsImageMonochrome(image) && (image->depth == 1) ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return(0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(CHUNK,
sizeof(*compressed_pixels));
if (compressed_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
ResetMagickMemory(&stream,0,sizeof(stream));
stream.data_type=Z_BINARY;
level=Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION;
if ((image_info->quality > 0 && image_info->quality < 10))
level=(int) image_info->quality;
if (deflateInit(&stream,level) != Z_OK)
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(0);
}
}
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (monochrome != MagickFalse)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
pixels[i]=(~pixels[i]);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels,
exception);
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compact_pixels);
size_offset+=WritePSDOffset(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
stream.avail_in=(uInt) length;
stream.next_in=(Bytef *) pixels;
if (y == (ssize_t) next_image->rows-1)
flush=Z_FINISH;
do {
stream.avail_out=(uInt) CHUNK;
stream.next_out=(Bytef *) compressed_pixels;
if (deflate(&stream,flush) == Z_STREAM_ERROR)
break;
length=(size_t) CHUNK-stream.avail_out;
if (length > 0)
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,compressed_pixels);
} while (stream.avail_out == 0);
}
#endif
else
count+=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
if (next_image->compression == ZipCompression)
{
(void) deflateEnd(&stream);
compressed_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compressed_pixels);
}
#endif
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
return(count);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
void OnDeviceStoppedInternal(const std::string& label,
const MediaStreamDevice& device) {
if (IsVideoInputMediaType(device.type))
EXPECT_TRUE(device.IsSameDevice(video_devices_[0]));
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(device.type))
EXPECT_TRUE(device.IsSameDevice(audio_devices_[0]));
OnDeviceStopSuccess();
}
|
void OnDeviceStoppedInternal(const std::string& label,
const MediaStreamDevice& device) {
if (IsVideoInputMediaType(device.type))
EXPECT_TRUE(device.IsSameDevice(video_devices_[0]));
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(device.type))
EXPECT_TRUE(device.IsSameDevice(audio_devices_[0]));
OnDeviceStopSuccess();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15951
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15951/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76
|
363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76
|
KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
|
static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
char *datablob = NULL;
const char *format = NULL;
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
datablob[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
&decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen);
if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
goto out;
}
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
kzfree(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
kzfree(datablob);
return ret;
}
|
static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
char *datablob = NULL;
const char *format = NULL;
char *master_desc = NULL;
char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!datablob)
return -ENOMEM;
datablob[datalen] = 0;
memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
&decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen);
if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
goto out;
}
ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
if (ret < 0) {
kzfree(epayload);
goto out;
}
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
out:
kzfree(datablob);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_APList_open( struct inode *inode, struct file *file ) {
struct proc_data *data;
struct proc_dir_entry *dp = PDE(inode);
struct net_device *dev = dp->data;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
int i;
char *ptr;
APListRid APList_rid;
if ((file->private_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_data ), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
data = file->private_data;
if ((data->rbuffer = kmalloc( 104, GFP_KERNEL )) == NULL) {
kfree (file->private_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
data->writelen = 0;
data->maxwritelen = 4*6*3;
if ((data->wbuffer = kzalloc( data->maxwritelen, GFP_KERNEL )) == NULL) {
kfree (data->rbuffer);
kfree (file->private_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
data->on_close = proc_APList_on_close;
readAPListRid(ai, &APList_rid);
ptr = data->rbuffer;
for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) {
if ( !*(int*)APList_rid.ap[i] &&
!*(int*)&APList_rid.ap[i][2]) break;
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%pM\n", APList_rid.ap[i]);
}
if (i==0) ptr += sprintf(ptr, "Not using specific APs\n");
*ptr = '\0';
data->readlen = strlen( data->rbuffer );
return 0;
}
|
static int proc_APList_open( struct inode *inode, struct file *file ) {
struct proc_data *data;
struct proc_dir_entry *dp = PDE(inode);
struct net_device *dev = dp->data;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
int i;
char *ptr;
APListRid APList_rid;
if ((file->private_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_data ), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
data = file->private_data;
if ((data->rbuffer = kmalloc( 104, GFP_KERNEL )) == NULL) {
kfree (file->private_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
data->writelen = 0;
data->maxwritelen = 4*6*3;
if ((data->wbuffer = kzalloc( data->maxwritelen, GFP_KERNEL )) == NULL) {
kfree (data->rbuffer);
kfree (file->private_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
data->on_close = proc_APList_on_close;
readAPListRid(ai, &APList_rid);
ptr = data->rbuffer;
for( i = 0; i < 4; i++ ) {
if ( !*(int*)APList_rid.ap[i] &&
!*(int*)&APList_rid.ap[i][2]) break;
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%pM\n", APList_rid.ap[i]);
}
if (i==0) ptr += sprintf(ptr, "Not using specific APs\n");
*ptr = '\0';
data->readlen = strlen( data->rbuffer );
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateEncoding(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const std::string& encoding) {
SetEncoding(encoding);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateEncoding(RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const std::string& encoding) {
SetEncoding(encoding);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4fdb2b3ebb31e39852fb1bc20fcdf3b5e4de382e
|
4fdb2b3ebb31e39852fb1bc20fcdf3b5e4de382e
|
ur_ls -> urls in ResourceFetcher
Blink Reformat miss? fix
BUG=675877
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2809103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#463599}
|
void ResourceFetcher::ClearPreloads(ClearPreloadsPolicy policy) {
if (!preloads_)
return;
LogPreloadStats(policy);
for (const auto& resource : *preloads_) {
if (policy == kClearAllPreloads || !resource->IsLinkPreload()) {
resource->DecreasePreloadCount();
if (resource->GetPreloadResult() == Resource::kPreloadNotReferenced)
GetMemoryCache()->Remove(resource.Get());
preloads_->erase(resource);
}
}
if (!preloads_->size())
preloads_.Clear();
}
|
void ResourceFetcher::ClearPreloads(ClearPreloadsPolicy policy) {
if (!preloads_)
return;
LogPreloadStats(policy);
for (const auto& resource : *preloads_) {
if (policy == kClearAllPreloads || !resource->IsLinkPreload()) {
resource->DecreasePreloadCount();
if (resource->GetPreloadResult() == Resource::kPreloadNotReferenced)
GetMemoryCache()->Remove(resource.Get());
preloads_->erase(resource);
}
}
if (!preloads_->size())
preloads_.Clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
VerifyResult SyncerUtil::VerifyNewEntry(
const SyncEntity& update,
syncable::Entry* target,
const bool deleted) {
if (target->good()) {
return VERIFY_UNDECIDED;
}
if (deleted) {
return VERIFY_SKIP;
}
return VERIFY_SUCCESS;
}
|
VerifyResult SyncerUtil::VerifyNewEntry(
const SyncEntity& update,
syncable::Entry* target,
const bool deleted) {
if (target->good()) {
return VERIFY_UNDECIDED;
}
if (deleted) {
return VERIFY_SKIP;
}
return VERIFY_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3525
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3525/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/Jabberd2/jabberd2/commit/aabcffae560d5fd00cd1d2ffce5d760353cf0a4d
|
aabcffae560d5fd00cd1d2ffce5d760353cf0a4d
|
Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
|
static void _out_packet_queue(s2s_t s2s, pkt_t pkt) {
char *rkey = s2s_route_key(NULL, pkt->from->domain, pkt->to->domain);
jqueue_t q = (jqueue_t) xhash_get(s2s->outq, rkey);
if(q == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "creating new out packet queue for '%s'", rkey);
q = jqueue_new();
q->key = rkey;
xhash_put(s2s->outq, q->key, (void *) q);
} else {
free(rkey);
}
log_debug(ZONE, "queueing packet for '%s'", q->key);
jqueue_push(q, (void *) pkt, 0);
}
|
static void _out_packet_queue(s2s_t s2s, pkt_t pkt) {
char *rkey = s2s_route_key(NULL, pkt->from->domain, pkt->to->domain);
jqueue_t q = (jqueue_t) xhash_get(s2s->outq, rkey);
if(q == NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "creating new out packet queue for '%s'", rkey);
q = jqueue_new();
q->key = rkey;
xhash_put(s2s->outq, q->key, (void *) q);
} else {
free(rkey);
}
log_debug(ZONE, "queueing packet for '%s'", q->key);
jqueue_push(q, (void *) pkt, 0);
}
|
C
|
jabberd2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API int add_assoc_function(zval *arg, const char *key, void (*function_ptr)(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)) /* {{{ */
{
zend_error(E_WARNING, "add_assoc_function() is no longer supported");
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API int add_assoc_function(zval *arg, const char *key, void (*function_ptr)(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)) /* {{{ */
{
zend_error(E_WARNING, "add_assoc_function() is no longer supported");
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
690d0a9175790c4bd3abd066932bc08203c164ca
|
Avoid excessive nesting / recursion in browser URL handling.
BUG=31517
TEST=ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/525038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35585 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::IsPseudoScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
AutoLock lock(lock_);
return (pseudo_schemes_.find(scheme) != pseudo_schemes_.end());
}
|
bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::IsPseudoScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
AutoLock lock(lock_);
return (pseudo_schemes_.find(scheme) != pseudo_schemes_.end());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3194
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3194/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/05c619eb6e7dac046afc72c0d5381856f87fb421
|
05c619eb6e7dac046afc72c0d5381856f87fb421
|
exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
|
void ShellSurface::CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
DCHECK(enabled());
DCHECK(!widget_);
views::Widget::InitParams params;
params.type = views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW;
params.ownership = views::Widget::InitParams::NATIVE_WIDGET_OWNS_WIDGET;
params.delegate = this;
params.shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.show_state = show_state;
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container_);
params.bounds = initial_bounds_;
bool activatable = activatable_;
// ShellSurfaces in system modal container are only activatable if input
// region is non-empty. See OnCommitSurface() for more details.
if (container_ == ash::kShellWindowId_SystemModalContainer)
activatable &= !surface_->GetHitTestBounds().IsEmpty();
params.activatable = activatable ? views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_YES
: views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_NO;
widget_ = new ShellSurfaceWidget(this);
widget_->Init(params);
widget_->set_movement_disabled(!initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
aura::Window* window = widget_->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetName("ExoShellSurface");
window->AddChild(surface_->window());
window->SetEventTargeter(base::WrapUnique(new CustomWindowTargeter));
SetApplicationId(window, &application_id_);
SetMainSurface(window, surface_);
window->AddObserver(this);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->AddObserver(this);
if (parent_)
wm::AddTransientChild(parent_, window);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->set_window_position_managed(
ash::wm::ToWindowShowState(ash::wm::WINDOW_STATE_TYPE_AUTO_POSITIONED) ==
show_state &&
initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = widget_->GetFocusManager();
for (const auto& entry : kCloseWindowAccelerators) {
focus_manager->RegisterAccelerator(
ui::Accelerator(entry.keycode, entry.modifiers),
ui::AcceleratorManager::kNormalPriority, this);
}
pending_show_widget_ = true;
}
|
void ShellSurface::CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::WindowShowState show_state) {
DCHECK(enabled());
DCHECK(!widget_);
views::Widget::InitParams params;
params.type = views::Widget::InitParams::TYPE_WINDOW;
params.ownership = views::Widget::InitParams::NATIVE_WIDGET_OWNS_WIDGET;
params.delegate = this;
params.shadow_type = views::Widget::InitParams::SHADOW_TYPE_NONE;
params.opacity = views::Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW;
params.show_state = show_state;
params.parent =
ash::Shell::GetContainer(ash::Shell::GetPrimaryRootWindow(), container_);
params.bounds = initial_bounds_;
bool activatable = activatable_ && !surface_->GetHitTestBounds().IsEmpty();
params.activatable = activatable ? views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_YES
: views::Widget::InitParams::ACTIVATABLE_NO;
widget_ = new ShellSurfaceWidget(this);
widget_->Init(params);
widget_->set_movement_disabled(!initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
aura::Window* window = widget_->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetName("ExoShellSurface");
window->AddChild(surface_->window());
window->SetEventTargeter(base::WrapUnique(new CustomWindowTargeter));
SetApplicationId(window, &application_id_);
SetMainSurface(window, surface_);
window->AddObserver(this);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->AddObserver(this);
if (parent_)
wm::AddTransientChild(parent_, window);
ash::wm::GetWindowState(window)->set_window_position_managed(
ash::wm::ToWindowShowState(ash::wm::WINDOW_STATE_TYPE_AUTO_POSITIONED) ==
show_state &&
initial_bounds_.IsEmpty());
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = widget_->GetFocusManager();
for (const auto& entry : kCloseWindowAccelerators) {
focus_manager->RegisterAccelerator(
ui::Accelerator(entry.keycode, entry.modifiers),
ui::AcceleratorManager::kNormalPriority, this);
}
pending_show_widget_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2017-11144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11144/
|
CWE-754
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
|
73cabfedf519298e1a11192699f44d53c529315e
| null |
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_sign)
{
zval *key, *signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned int siglen;
zend_string *sigbuf;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sigbuf = zend_string_alloc(siglen, 0);
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx != NULL &&
EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, mdtype) &&
EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, data, data_len) &&
EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf), &siglen, pkey)) {
zval_dtor(signature);
ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf)[siglen] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(sigbuf) = siglen;
ZVAL_NEW_STR(signature, sigbuf);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
efree(sigbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_sign)
{
zval *key, *signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned int siglen;
zend_string *sigbuf;
zend_resource *keyresource = NULL;
char * data;
size_t data_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
zval *method = NULL;
zend_long signature_algo = OPENSSL_ALGO_SHA1;
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sz/z|z", &data, &data_len, &signature, &key, &method) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "supplied key param cannot be coerced into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_LONG) {
if (method != NULL) {
signature_algo = Z_LVAL_P(method);
}
mdtype = php_openssl_get_evp_md_from_algo(signature_algo);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(method) == IS_STRING) {
mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(Z_STRVAL_P(method));
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!mdtype) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
sigbuf = zend_string_alloc(siglen, 0);
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (md_ctx != NULL &&
EVP_SignInit(md_ctx, mdtype) &&
EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, data, data_len) &&
EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, (unsigned char*)ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf), &siglen, pkey)) {
zval_dtor(signature);
ZSTR_VAL(sigbuf)[siglen] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(sigbuf) = siglen;
ZVAL_NEW_STR(signature, sigbuf);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
efree(sigbuf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
if (keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.