CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformfv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLfloat* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetUniformfv(" << program << ", "
<< location << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(params)
<< ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetUniformfv");
typedef cmds::GetUniformfv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetUniformfv(program, location, GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
result->CopyResult(params);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
CheckGLError();
}
|
void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformfv(GLuint program,
GLint location,
GLfloat* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetUniformfv(" << program << ", "
<< location << ", " << static_cast<const void*>(params)
<< ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetUniformfv");
typedef cmds::GetUniformfv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetUniformfv(program, location, GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
result->CopyResult(params);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
CheckGLError();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17467
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17467/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
7da6c3419fd172405bcece1ae4ec6ec8316cd345
|
Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnUpdateDragCursor(WebDragOperation current_op) {
if (delegate_->OnUpdateDragCursor())
return;
RenderViewHostDelegateView* view = delegate_->GetDelegateView();
if (view)
view->UpdateDragCursor(current_op);
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnUpdateDragCursor(WebDragOperation current_op) {
if (delegate_->OnUpdateDragCursor())
return;
RenderViewHostDelegateView* view = delegate_->GetDelegateView();
if (view)
view->UpdateDragCursor(current_op);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserView::ProcessFullscreen(bool fullscreen,
FullscreenType type,
const GURL& url,
FullscreenExitBubbleType bubble_type) {
ignore_layout_ = true;
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
OmniboxViewWin* omnibox_win =
GetOmniboxViewWin(location_bar->GetLocationEntry());
#endif
if (type == FOR_METRO || !fullscreen) {
fullscreen_bubble_.reset();
}
if (fullscreen) {
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = GetFocusManager();
DCHECK(focus_manager);
if (location_bar->Contains(focus_manager->GetFocusedView()))
focus_manager->ClearFocus();
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (omnibox_win) {
omnibox_win->set_force_hidden(true);
ShowWindow(omnibox_win->m_hWnd, SW_HIDE);
}
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
views::ScopedFullscreenVisibility visibility(frame_->GetNativeView());
#endif
if (type == FOR_METRO) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
static_cast<views::NativeWidgetWin*>(
frame_->native_widget())->SetMetroSnapFullscreen(fullscreen);
#endif
} else {
frame_->SetFullscreen(fullscreen);
}
browser_->WindowFullscreenStateChanged();
if (fullscreen) {
bool is_kiosk =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kKioskMode);
if (!is_kiosk && type != FOR_METRO) {
fullscreen_bubble_.reset(new FullscreenExitBubbleViews(
GetWidget(), browser_.get(), url, bubble_type));
}
} else {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (omnibox_win) {
omnibox_win->set_force_hidden(false);
ShowWindow(omnibox_win->m_hWnd, SW_SHOW);
}
#endif
}
ignore_layout_ = false;
Layout();
}
|
void BrowserView::ProcessFullscreen(bool fullscreen,
FullscreenType type,
const GURL& url,
FullscreenExitBubbleType bubble_type) {
ignore_layout_ = true;
LocationBarView* location_bar = GetLocationBarView();
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
OmniboxViewWin* omnibox_win =
GetOmniboxViewWin(location_bar->GetLocationEntry());
#endif
if (type == FOR_METRO || !fullscreen) {
fullscreen_bubble_.reset();
}
if (fullscreen) {
views::FocusManager* focus_manager = GetFocusManager();
DCHECK(focus_manager);
if (location_bar->Contains(focus_manager->GetFocusedView()))
focus_manager->ClearFocus();
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (omnibox_win) {
omnibox_win->set_force_hidden(true);
ShowWindow(omnibox_win->m_hWnd, SW_HIDE);
}
#endif
}
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
views::ScopedFullscreenVisibility visibility(frame_->GetNativeView());
#endif
if (type == FOR_METRO) {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
static_cast<views::NativeWidgetWin*>(
frame_->native_widget())->SetMetroSnapFullscreen(fullscreen);
#endif
} else {
frame_->SetFullscreen(fullscreen);
}
browser_->WindowFullscreenStateChanged();
if (fullscreen) {
bool is_kiosk =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kKioskMode);
if (!is_kiosk && type != FOR_METRO) {
fullscreen_bubble_.reset(new FullscreenExitBubbleViews(
GetWidget(), browser_.get(), url, bubble_type));
}
} else {
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
if (omnibox_win) {
omnibox_win->set_force_hidden(false);
ShowWindow(omnibox_win->m_hWnd, SW_SHOW);
}
#endif
}
ignore_layout_ = false;
Layout();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6763/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected].
|
static ssize_t map_size_show(struct uio_mem *mem, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "0x%lx\n", mem->size);
}
|
static ssize_t map_size_show(struct uio_mem *mem, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "0x%lx\n", mem->size);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5847
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5847/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/GStreamer/gst-plugins-ugly/commit/d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
d21017b52a585f145e8d62781bcc1c5fefc7ee37
|
asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
|
gst_asf_demux_process_ext_stream_props (GstASFDemux * demux, guint8 * data,
guint64 size)
{
AsfStreamExtProps esp;
AsfStream *stream = NULL;
AsfObject stream_obj;
guint16 stream_name_count;
guint16 num_payload_ext;
guint64 len;
guint8 *stream_obj_data = NULL;
guint8 *data_start;
guint obj_size;
guint i, stream_num;
data_start = data;
obj_size = (guint) size;
esp.payload_extensions = NULL;
if (size < 64)
goto not_enough_data;
esp.valid = TRUE;
esp.start_time = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size) * GST_MSECOND;
esp.end_time = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size) * GST_MSECOND;
esp.data_bitrate = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.buffer_size = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.intial_buf_fullness = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.data_bitrate2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.buffer_size2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.intial_buf_fullness2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.max_obj_size = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.flags = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
stream_num = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
esp.lang_idx = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
esp.avg_time_per_frame = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size);
stream_name_count = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
num_payload_ext = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
GST_INFO ("start_time = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.start_time));
GST_INFO ("end_time = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.end_time));
GST_INFO ("flags = %08x", esp.flags);
GST_INFO ("average time per frame = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.avg_time_per_frame * 100));
GST_INFO ("stream number = %u", stream_num);
GST_INFO ("stream language ID idx = %u (%s)", esp.lang_idx,
(esp.lang_idx < demux->num_languages) ?
GST_STR_NULL (demux->languages[esp.lang_idx]) : "??");
GST_INFO ("stream name count = %u", stream_name_count);
/* read stream names */
for (i = 0; i < stream_name_count; ++i) {
guint16 stream_lang_idx G_GNUC_UNUSED;
gchar *stream_name = NULL;
if (size < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
stream_lang_idx = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_string (&stream_name, NULL, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
GST_INFO ("stream name %d: %s", i, GST_STR_NULL (stream_name));
g_free (stream_name); /* TODO: store names in struct */
}
/* read payload extension systems stuff */
GST_LOG ("payload extension systems count = %u", num_payload_ext);
if (num_payload_ext > 0)
esp.payload_extensions = g_new0 (AsfPayloadExtension, num_payload_ext + 1);
for (i = 0; i < num_payload_ext; ++i) {
AsfPayloadExtension ext;
ASFGuid ext_guid;
guint32 sys_info_len;
if (size < 16 + 2 + 4)
goto not_enough_data;
gst_asf_demux_get_guid (&ext_guid, &data, &size);
ext.id = gst_asf_demux_identify_guid (asf_payload_ext_guids, &ext_guid);
ext.len = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
sys_info_len = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
GST_LOG ("payload systems info len = %u", sys_info_len);
if (!gst_asf_demux_skip_bytes (sys_info_len, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
esp.payload_extensions[i] = ext;
}
GST_LOG ("bytes read: %u/%u", (guint) (data - data_start), obj_size);
/* there might be an optional STREAM_INFO object here now; if not, we
* should have parsed the corresponding stream info object already (since
* we are parsing the extended stream properties objects delayed) */
if (size == 0) {
stream = gst_asf_demux_get_stream (demux, stream_num);
goto done;
}
if (size < ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE)
goto not_enough_data;
/* get size of the stream object */
if (!asf_demux_peek_object (demux, data, size, &stream_obj, TRUE))
goto corrupted_stream;
if (stream_obj.id != ASF_OBJ_STREAM)
goto expected_stream_object;
if (stream_obj.size < ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE ||
stream_obj.size > (10 * 1024 * 1024))
goto not_enough_data;
gst_asf_demux_skip_bytes (ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE, &data, &size);
/* process this stream object later after all the other 'normal' ones
* have been processed (since the others are more important/non-hidden) */
len = stream_obj.size - ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE;
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_bytes (&stream_obj_data, len, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
/* parse stream object */
stream = gst_asf_demux_parse_stream_object (demux, stream_obj_data, len);
g_free (stream_obj_data);
done:
if (stream) {
stream->ext_props = esp;
/* try to set the framerate */
if (stream->is_video && stream->caps) {
GValue framerate = { 0 };
GstStructure *s;
gint num, denom;
g_value_init (&framerate, GST_TYPE_FRACTION);
num = GST_SECOND / 100;
denom = esp.avg_time_per_frame;
if (denom == 0) {
/* avoid division by 0, assume 25/1 framerate */
denom = GST_SECOND / 2500;
}
gst_value_set_fraction (&framerate, num, denom);
stream->caps = gst_caps_make_writable (stream->caps);
s = gst_caps_get_structure (stream->caps, 0);
gst_structure_set_value (s, "framerate", &framerate);
g_value_unset (&framerate);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "setting framerate of %d/%d = %f",
num, denom, ((gdouble) num) / denom);
}
/* add language info now if we have it */
if (stream->ext_props.lang_idx < demux->num_languages) {
if (stream->pending_tags == NULL)
stream->pending_tags = gst_tag_list_new_empty ();
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "stream %u has language '%s'", stream->id,
demux->languages[stream->ext_props.lang_idx]);
gst_tag_list_add (stream->pending_tags, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_TAG_LANGUAGE_CODE, demux->languages[stream->ext_props.lang_idx],
NULL);
}
} else if (gst_asf_demux_is_unknown_stream (demux, stream_num)) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "Ext. stream properties for unknown stream");
}
if (!stream)
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK;
/* Errors */
not_enough_data:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "short read parsing ext stream props object!");
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK; /* not absolutely fatal */
}
expected_stream_object:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "error parsing extended stream properties "
"object: expected embedded stream object, but got %s object instead!",
gst_asf_get_guid_nick (asf_object_guids, stream_obj.id));
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK; /* not absolutely fatal */
}
corrupted_stream:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "Corrupted stream");
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_ERROR;
}
}
|
gst_asf_demux_process_ext_stream_props (GstASFDemux * demux, guint8 * data,
guint64 size)
{
AsfStreamExtProps esp;
AsfStream *stream = NULL;
AsfObject stream_obj;
guint16 stream_name_count;
guint16 num_payload_ext;
guint64 len;
guint8 *stream_obj_data = NULL;
guint8 *data_start;
guint obj_size;
guint i, stream_num;
data_start = data;
obj_size = (guint) size;
esp.payload_extensions = NULL;
if (size < 64)
goto not_enough_data;
esp.valid = TRUE;
esp.start_time = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size) * GST_MSECOND;
esp.end_time = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size) * GST_MSECOND;
esp.data_bitrate = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.buffer_size = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.intial_buf_fullness = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.data_bitrate2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.buffer_size2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.intial_buf_fullness2 = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.max_obj_size = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
esp.flags = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
stream_num = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
esp.lang_idx = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
esp.avg_time_per_frame = gst_asf_demux_get_uint64 (&data, &size);
stream_name_count = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
num_payload_ext = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
GST_INFO ("start_time = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.start_time));
GST_INFO ("end_time = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.end_time));
GST_INFO ("flags = %08x", esp.flags);
GST_INFO ("average time per frame = %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
GST_TIME_ARGS (esp.avg_time_per_frame * 100));
GST_INFO ("stream number = %u", stream_num);
GST_INFO ("stream language ID idx = %u (%s)", esp.lang_idx,
(esp.lang_idx < demux->num_languages) ?
GST_STR_NULL (demux->languages[esp.lang_idx]) : "??");
GST_INFO ("stream name count = %u", stream_name_count);
/* read stream names */
for (i = 0; i < stream_name_count; ++i) {
guint16 stream_lang_idx G_GNUC_UNUSED;
gchar *stream_name = NULL;
if (size < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
stream_lang_idx = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_string (&stream_name, NULL, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
GST_INFO ("stream name %d: %s", i, GST_STR_NULL (stream_name));
g_free (stream_name); /* TODO: store names in struct */
}
/* read payload extension systems stuff */
GST_LOG ("payload extension systems count = %u", num_payload_ext);
if (num_payload_ext > 0)
esp.payload_extensions = g_new0 (AsfPayloadExtension, num_payload_ext + 1);
for (i = 0; i < num_payload_ext; ++i) {
AsfPayloadExtension ext;
ASFGuid ext_guid;
guint32 sys_info_len;
if (size < 16 + 2 + 4)
goto not_enough_data;
gst_asf_demux_get_guid (&ext_guid, &data, &size);
ext.id = gst_asf_demux_identify_guid (asf_payload_ext_guids, &ext_guid);
ext.len = gst_asf_demux_get_uint16 (&data, &size);
sys_info_len = gst_asf_demux_get_uint32 (&data, &size);
GST_LOG ("payload systems info len = %u", sys_info_len);
if (!gst_asf_demux_skip_bytes (sys_info_len, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
esp.payload_extensions[i] = ext;
}
GST_LOG ("bytes read: %u/%u", (guint) (data - data_start), obj_size);
/* there might be an optional STREAM_INFO object here now; if not, we
* should have parsed the corresponding stream info object already (since
* we are parsing the extended stream properties objects delayed) */
if (size == 0) {
stream = gst_asf_demux_get_stream (demux, stream_num);
goto done;
}
if (size < ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE)
goto not_enough_data;
/* get size of the stream object */
if (!asf_demux_peek_object (demux, data, size, &stream_obj, TRUE))
goto corrupted_stream;
if (stream_obj.id != ASF_OBJ_STREAM)
goto expected_stream_object;
if (stream_obj.size < ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE ||
stream_obj.size > (10 * 1024 * 1024))
goto not_enough_data;
gst_asf_demux_skip_bytes (ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE, &data, &size);
/* process this stream object later after all the other 'normal' ones
* have been processed (since the others are more important/non-hidden) */
len = stream_obj.size - ASF_OBJECT_HEADER_SIZE;
if (!gst_asf_demux_get_bytes (&stream_obj_data, len, &data, &size))
goto not_enough_data;
/* parse stream object */
stream = gst_asf_demux_parse_stream_object (demux, stream_obj_data, len);
g_free (stream_obj_data);
done:
if (stream) {
stream->ext_props = esp;
/* try to set the framerate */
if (stream->is_video && stream->caps) {
GValue framerate = { 0 };
GstStructure *s;
gint num, denom;
g_value_init (&framerate, GST_TYPE_FRACTION);
num = GST_SECOND / 100;
denom = esp.avg_time_per_frame;
if (denom == 0) {
/* avoid division by 0, assume 25/1 framerate */
denom = GST_SECOND / 2500;
}
gst_value_set_fraction (&framerate, num, denom);
stream->caps = gst_caps_make_writable (stream->caps);
s = gst_caps_get_structure (stream->caps, 0);
gst_structure_set_value (s, "framerate", &framerate);
g_value_unset (&framerate);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "setting framerate of %d/%d = %f",
num, denom, ((gdouble) num) / denom);
}
/* add language info now if we have it */
if (stream->ext_props.lang_idx < demux->num_languages) {
if (stream->pending_tags == NULL)
stream->pending_tags = gst_tag_list_new_empty ();
GST_LOG_OBJECT (demux, "stream %u has language '%s'", stream->id,
demux->languages[stream->ext_props.lang_idx]);
gst_tag_list_add (stream->pending_tags, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_TAG_LANGUAGE_CODE, demux->languages[stream->ext_props.lang_idx],
NULL);
}
} else if (gst_asf_demux_is_unknown_stream (demux, stream_num)) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "Ext. stream properties for unknown stream");
}
if (!stream)
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK;
/* Errors */
not_enough_data:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "short read parsing ext stream props object!");
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK; /* not absolutely fatal */
}
expected_stream_object:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "error parsing extended stream properties "
"object: expected embedded stream object, but got %s object instead!",
gst_asf_get_guid_nick (asf_object_guids, stream_obj.id));
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_OK; /* not absolutely fatal */
}
corrupted_stream:
{
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (demux, "Corrupted stream");
g_free (esp.payload_extensions);
return GST_FLOW_ERROR;
}
}
|
C
|
gst-plugins-ugly
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3688
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3688/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4
|
26b87c7881006311828bb0ab271a551a62dcceb4
|
net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
__u16 sport;
__u16 dport;
__u32 vtag;
/* Get the source and destination port from the inbound packet. */
sport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest);
dport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* The V-tag is going to be the same as the inbound packet if no
* association exists, otherwise, use the peer's vtag.
*/
if (asoc) {
/* Special case the INIT-ACK as there is no peer's vtag
* yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
{
sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
break;
}
} else {
/* Special case the INIT and stale COOKIE_ECHO as there is no
* vtag yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
{
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(init->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
break;
}
}
/* Make a transport for the bucket, Eliza... */
transport = sctp_transport_new(net, sctp_source(chunk), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!transport)
goto nomem;
/* Cache a route for the transport with the chunk's destination as
* the source address.
*/
sctp_transport_route(transport, (union sctp_addr *)&chunk->dest,
sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock));
packet = sctp_packet_init(&transport->packet, transport, sport, dport);
packet = sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag, 0);
return packet;
nomem:
return NULL;
}
|
static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
__u16 sport;
__u16 dport;
__u32 vtag;
/* Get the source and destination port from the inbound packet. */
sport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest);
dport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* The V-tag is going to be the same as the inbound packet if no
* association exists, otherwise, use the peer's vtag.
*/
if (asoc) {
/* Special case the INIT-ACK as there is no peer's vtag
* yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
{
sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
break;
}
} else {
/* Special case the INIT and stale COOKIE_ECHO as there is no
* vtag yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
{
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(init->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
break;
}
}
/* Make a transport for the bucket, Eliza... */
transport = sctp_transport_new(net, sctp_source(chunk), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!transport)
goto nomem;
/* Cache a route for the transport with the chunk's destination as
* the source address.
*/
sctp_transport_route(transport, (union sctp_addr *)&chunk->dest,
sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock));
packet = sctp_packet_init(&transport->packet, transport, sport, dport);
packet = sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag, 0);
return packet;
nomem:
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16080/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
bool BrowserView::IsBookmarkBarVisible() const {
if (!browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_BOOKMARKBAR))
return false;
if (!bookmark_bar_view_.get())
return false;
if (!bookmark_bar_view_->parent())
return false;
if (bookmark_bar_view_->GetPreferredSize().height() == 0)
return false;
if (immersive_mode_controller_->ShouldHideTopViews() &&
!bookmark_bar_view_->IsDetached())
return false;
return true;
}
|
bool BrowserView::IsBookmarkBarVisible() const {
if (!browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_BOOKMARKBAR))
return false;
if (!bookmark_bar_view_.get())
return false;
if (!bookmark_bar_view_->parent())
return false;
if (bookmark_bar_view_->GetPreferredSize().height() == 0)
return false;
if (immersive_mode_controller_->ShouldHideTopViews() &&
!bookmark_bar_view_->IsDetached())
return false;
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/26917dc40fb9dc7ef74fa9e0e8fd221e9b857993
|
26917dc40fb9dc7ef74fa9e0e8fd221e9b857993
|
2011-02-09 Abhishek Arya <[email protected]>
Reviewed by James Robinson.
[Chromium] Issue 72387: Integer bounds crash in LayerTilerChromium::resizeLayer
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=54132
* platform/graphics/chromium/LayerTilerChromium.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerTilerChromium::resizeLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@78143 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void LayerTilerChromium::invalidateTiles(const IntRect& oldLayerRect, const IntRect& newLayerRect)
{
if (!m_tiles.size())
return;
IntRect oldContentRect = layerRectToContentRect(oldLayerRect);
int oldLeft, oldTop, oldRight, oldBottom;
contentRectToTileIndices(oldContentRect, oldLeft, oldTop, oldRight, oldBottom);
IntRect newContentRect = layerRectToContentRect(newLayerRect);
int newLeft, newTop, newRight, newBottom;
contentRectToTileIndices(newContentRect, newLeft, newTop, newRight, newBottom);
for (int j = oldTop; j <= oldBottom; ++j) {
for (int i = oldLeft; i <= oldRight; ++i) {
if (i >= newLeft && i <= newRight && j >= newTop && j <= newBottom)
continue;
const int index = tileIndex(i, j);
if (m_tiles[index])
m_unusedTiles.append(m_tiles[index].release());
}
}
}
|
void LayerTilerChromium::invalidateTiles(const IntRect& oldLayerRect, const IntRect& newLayerRect)
{
if (!m_tiles.size())
return;
IntRect oldContentRect = layerRectToContentRect(oldLayerRect);
int oldLeft, oldTop, oldRight, oldBottom;
contentRectToTileIndices(oldContentRect, oldLeft, oldTop, oldRight, oldBottom);
IntRect newContentRect = layerRectToContentRect(newLayerRect);
int newLeft, newTop, newRight, newBottom;
contentRectToTileIndices(newContentRect, newLeft, newTop, newRight, newBottom);
for (int j = oldTop; j <= oldBottom; ++j) {
for (int i = oldLeft; i <= oldRight; ++i) {
if (i >= newLeft && i <= newRight && j >= newTop && j <= newBottom)
continue;
const int index = tileIndex(i, j);
if (m_tiles[index])
m_unusedTiles.append(m_tiles[index].release());
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type),
program_completion_queries_(
base::MRUCache<WebGLProgram*, GLuint>::NO_AUTO_EVICT) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
|
WebGLRenderingContextBase::WebGLRenderingContextBase(
CanvasRenderingContextHost* host,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
bool using_gpu_compositing,
const CanvasContextCreationAttributesCore& requested_attributes,
Platform::ContextType context_type)
: CanvasRenderingContext(host, requested_attributes),
context_group_(MakeGarbageCollected<WebGLContextGroup>()),
dispatch_context_lost_event_timer_(
task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::DispatchContextLostEvent),
restore_timer_(task_runner,
this,
&WebGLRenderingContextBase::MaybeRestoreContext),
task_runner_(task_runner),
num_gl_errors_to_console_allowed_(kMaxGLErrorsAllowedToConsole),
context_type_(context_type) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
xr_compatible_ = requested_attributes.xr_compatible;
context_group_->AddContext(this);
max_viewport_dims_[0] = max_viewport_dims_[1] = 0;
context_provider->ContextGL()->GetIntegerv(GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS,
max_viewport_dims_);
InitializeWebGLContextLimits(context_provider.get());
scoped_refptr<DrawingBuffer> buffer;
buffer =
CreateDrawingBuffer(std::move(context_provider), using_gpu_compositing);
if (!buffer) {
context_lost_mode_ = kSyntheticLostContext;
return;
}
drawing_buffer_ = std::move(buffer);
GetDrawingBuffer()->Bind(GL_FRAMEBUFFER);
SetupFlags();
String disabled_webgl_extensions(GetDrawingBuffer()
->ContextProvider()
->GetGpuFeatureInfo()
.disabled_webgl_extensions.c_str());
Vector<String> disabled_extension_list;
disabled_webgl_extensions.Split(' ', disabled_extension_list);
for (const auto& entry : disabled_extension_list) {
disabled_extensions_.insert(entry);
}
#define ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(set, values) \
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(values); ++i) { \
set.insert(values[i]); \
}
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_internal_formats_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_internal_formats_copy_tex_image_,
kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_formats_, kSupportedFormatsES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
ADD_VALUES_TO_SET(supported_tex_image_source_types_, kSupportedTypesES2);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err adaf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeDRMAUFormatBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeDRMAUFormatBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeDRMAUFormatBox ", trace);
fprintf(trace, "SelectiveEncryption=\"%d\" IV_length=\"%d\">\n", ptr->selective_enc ? 1 : 0, ptr->IV_length);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeDRMAUFormatBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err adaf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeDRMAUFormatBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeDRMAUFormatBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeDRMAUFormatBox ", trace);
fprintf(trace, "SelectiveEncryption=\"%d\" IV_length=\"%d\">\n", ptr->selective_enc ? 1 : 0, ptr->IV_length);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeDRMAUFormatBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2270
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2270/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/447558595a3650db2886cd2f416ad0beba965801
|
447558595a3650db2886cd2f416ad0beba965801
|
PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
|
check_fmt(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
regex_t rx;
int rc, rv = -1;
if (strchr(m->desc, '%') == NULL)
return 0;
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
rc = regcomp(&rx, "%[-0-9\\.]*s", REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB);
if (rc) {
char errmsg[512];
(void)regerror(rc, &rx, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg));
file_magerror(ms, "regex error %d, (%s)", rc, errmsg);
} else {
rc = regexec(&rx, m->desc, 0, 0, 0);
regfree(&rx);
rv = !rc;
}
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
return rv;
}
|
check_fmt(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
regex_t rx;
int rc, rv = -1;
if (strchr(m->desc, '%') == NULL)
return 0;
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
rc = regcomp(&rx, "%[-0-9\\.]*s", REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB);
if (rc) {
char errmsg[512];
(void)regerror(rc, &rx, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg));
file_magerror(ms, "regex error %d, (%s)", rc, errmsg);
} else {
rc = regexec(&rx, m->desc, 0, 0, 0);
regfree(&rx);
rv = !rc;
}
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
return rv;
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12178
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12178/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821
|
859b08d523307eebde7724fd1a0789c44813e821
| null |
disable_clientpointer(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < currentMaxClients; i++) {
ClientPtr client = clients[i];
if (client && client->clientPtr == dev)
client->clientPtr = NULL;
}
}
|
disable_clientpointer(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < currentMaxClients; i++) {
ClientPtr client = clients[i];
if (client && client->clientPtr == dev)
client->clientPtr = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6091
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6091/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/59ad2dcbe6dd5c5d846944258e6cd26a700ade83
|
59ad2dcbe6dd5c5d846944258e6cd26a700ade83
|
service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
|
void ImageLoader::ImageNotifyFinished(ImageResourceContent* resource) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1)
<< "ImageLoader::imageNotifyFinished " << this
<< "; has pending load event=" << pending_load_event_.IsActive();
DCHECK(failed_load_url_.IsEmpty());
DCHECK_EQ(resource, image_content_.Get());
if (loading_image_document_)
CHECK(image_complete_);
else
CHECK(!image_complete_);
image_complete_ = true;
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ = nullptr;
if (image_content_)
image_content_->UpdateImageAnimationPolicy();
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (image_content_ && image_content_->HasImage()) {
Image& image = *image_content_->GetImage();
if (IsHTMLImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kImg);
} else if (IsSVGImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kSvg);
}
if (image.IsSVGImage()) {
SVGImage& svg_image = ToSVGImage(image);
svg_image.CheckLoaded();
svg_image.UpdateUseCounters(GetElement()->GetDocument());
}
}
DispatchDecodeRequestsIfComplete();
if (loading_image_document_) {
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
return;
}
if (resource->ErrorOccurred()) {
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
Optional<ResourceError> error = resource->GetResourceError();
if (error && error->IsAccessCheck())
CrossSiteOrCSPViolationOccurred(AtomicString(error->FailingURL()));
if (!suppress_error_events_)
DispatchErrorEvent();
return;
}
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
pending_load_event_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetElement()->GetDocument().GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation),
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&ImageLoader::DispatchPendingLoadEvent, WrapPersistent(this),
WTF::Passed(IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(
GetElement()->GetDocument()))));
}
|
void ImageLoader::ImageNotifyFinished(ImageResourceContent* resource) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1)
<< "ImageLoader::imageNotifyFinished " << this
<< "; has pending load event=" << pending_load_event_.IsActive();
DCHECK(failed_load_url_.IsEmpty());
DCHECK_EQ(resource, image_content_.Get());
if (loading_image_document_)
CHECK(image_complete_);
else
CHECK(!image_complete_);
image_complete_ = true;
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ = nullptr;
if (image_content_)
image_content_->UpdateImageAnimationPolicy();
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (image_content_ && image_content_->HasImage()) {
Image& image = *image_content_->GetImage();
if (IsHTMLImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kImg);
} else if (IsSVGImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kSvg);
}
if (image.IsSVGImage()) {
SVGImage& svg_image = ToSVGImage(image);
svg_image.CheckLoaded();
svg_image.UpdateUseCounters(GetElement()->GetDocument());
}
}
DispatchDecodeRequestsIfComplete();
if (loading_image_document_) {
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
return;
}
if (resource->ErrorOccurred()) {
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
Optional<ResourceError> error = resource->GetResourceError();
if (error && error->IsAccessCheck())
CrossSiteOrCSPViolationOccurred(AtomicString(error->FailingURL()));
if (!suppress_error_events_)
DispatchErrorEvent();
return;
}
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
pending_load_event_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetElement()->GetDocument().GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation),
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&ImageLoader::DispatchPendingLoadEvent, WrapPersistent(this),
WTF::Passed(IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(
GetElement()->GetDocument()))));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2548
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2548/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6
|
crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static void ahash_op_unaligned_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct ahash_request *areq = req->data;
struct ahash_request_priv *priv = areq->priv;
crypto_completion_t complete = priv->complete;
void *data = priv->data;
ahash_op_unaligned_finish(areq, err);
complete(data, err);
}
|
static void ahash_op_unaligned_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct ahash_request *areq = req->data;
struct ahash_request_priv *priv = areq->priv;
crypto_completion_t complete = priv->complete;
void *data = priv->data;
ahash_op_unaligned_finish(areq, err);
complete(data, err);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18218/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
27463ad99f738ed93c7c8b3e2e5bc8c4853a2ff2
|
net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jun He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int hns_nic_init_phy(struct net_device *ndev, struct hnae_handle *h)
{
struct phy_device *phy_dev = h->phy_dev;
int ret;
if (!h->phy_dev)
return 0;
if (h->phy_if != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII) {
phy_dev->dev_flags = 0;
ret = phy_connect_direct(ndev, phy_dev, hns_nic_adjust_link,
h->phy_if);
} else {
ret = phy_attach_direct(ndev, phy_dev, 0, h->phy_if);
}
if (unlikely(ret))
return -ENODEV;
phy_dev->supported &= h->if_support;
phy_dev->advertising = phy_dev->supported;
if (h->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII)
phy_dev->autoneg = false;
return 0;
}
|
int hns_nic_init_phy(struct net_device *ndev, struct hnae_handle *h)
{
struct phy_device *phy_dev = h->phy_dev;
int ret;
if (!h->phy_dev)
return 0;
if (h->phy_if != PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII) {
phy_dev->dev_flags = 0;
ret = phy_connect_direct(ndev, phy_dev, hns_nic_adjust_link,
h->phy_if);
} else {
ret = phy_attach_direct(ndev, phy_dev, 0, h->phy_if);
}
if (unlikely(ret))
return -ENODEV;
phy_dev->supported &= h->if_support;
phy_dev->advertising = phy_dev->supported;
if (h->phy_if == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_XGMII)
phy_dev->autoneg = false;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static void CloneFormatEtc(FORMATETC* source, FORMATETC* clone) {
*clone = *source;
if (source->ptd) {
source->ptd =
static_cast<DVTARGETDEVICE*>(CoTaskMemAlloc(sizeof(DVTARGETDEVICE)));
*(clone->ptd) = *(source->ptd);
}
}
|
static void CloneFormatEtc(FORMATETC* source, FORMATETC* clone) {
*clone = *source;
if (source->ptd) {
source->ptd =
static_cast<DVTARGETDEVICE*>(CoTaskMemAlloc(sizeof(DVTARGETDEVICE)));
*(clone->ptd) = *(source->ptd);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
IsPointerDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return (dev->type == MASTER_POINTER) ||
(dev->valuator && dev->button) || (dev->valuator && !dev->key);
}
|
IsPointerDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return (dev->type == MASTER_POINTER) ||
(dev->valuator && dev->button) || (dev->valuator && !dev->key);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> mutablePointFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.mutablePointFunction");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
return toV8(WTF::getPtr(SVGPropertyTearOff<FloatPoint>::create(imp->mutablePointFunction())), args.GetIsolate());
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> mutablePointFunctionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.mutablePointFunction");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
return toV8(WTF::getPtr(SVGPropertyTearOff<FloatPoint>::create(imp->mutablePointFunction())), args.GetIsolate());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access,
unsigned long trans_exc_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long address;
unsigned int flags;
int fault;
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
* user context.
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
if (unlikely(!user_space_fault(trans_exc_code) || in_atomic() || !mm))
goto out;
address = trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (access == VM_WRITE || (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto out_up;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
address &= HPAGE_MASK;
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check will
* be repeated. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_PER_TRAP);
fault = 0;
out_up:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out:
return fault;
}
|
static inline int do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int access,
unsigned long trans_exc_code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long address;
unsigned int flags;
int fault;
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return 0;
tsk = current;
mm = tsk->mm;
/*
* Verify that the fault happened in user space, that
* we are not in an interrupt and that there is a
* user context.
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADCONTEXT;
if (unlikely(!user_space_fault(trans_exc_code) || in_atomic() || !mm))
goto out;
address = trans_exc_code & __FAIL_ADDR_MASK;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
if (access == VM_WRITE || (trans_exc_code & store_indication) == 0x400)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
retry:
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto out_up;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > address)) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto out_up;
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto out_up;
}
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & access)))
goto out_up;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
address &= HPAGE_MASK;
/*
* If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault,
* make sure we exit gracefully rather than endlessly redo
* the fault.
*/
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))
goto out_up;
/*
* Major/minor page fault accounting is only done on the
* initial attempt. If we go through a retry, it is extremely
* likely that the page will be found in page cache at that point.
*/
if (flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
tsk->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
tsk->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY) {
/* Clear FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY to avoid any risk
* of starvation. */
flags &= ~FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY;
goto retry;
}
}
/*
* The instruction that caused the program check will
* be repeated. Don't signal single step via SIGTRAP.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_PER_TRAP);
fault = 0;
out_up:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
out:
return fault;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
_exsltDateParseTime (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
unsigned int hour = 0; /* use temp var in case str is not xs:time */
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(hour, cur, VALID_HOUR, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
/* the ':' insures this string is xs:time */
dt->hour = hour;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->min, cur, VALID_MIN, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
PARSE_FLOAT(dt->sec, cur, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (!VALID_TIME(dt))
return 2;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed time %02i:%02i:%02.f\n",
dt->hour, dt->min, dt->sec);
#endif
return 0;
}
|
_exsltDateParseTime (exsltDateValDatePtr dt, const xmlChar **str)
{
const xmlChar *cur = *str;
unsigned int hour = 0; /* use temp var in case str is not xs:time */
int ret = 0;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(hour, cur, VALID_HOUR, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
/* the ':' insures this string is xs:time */
dt->hour = hour;
PARSE_2_DIGITS(dt->min, cur, VALID_MIN, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (*cur != ':')
return 1;
cur++;
PARSE_FLOAT(dt->sec, cur, ret);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (!VALID_TIME(dt))
return 2;
*str = cur;
#ifdef DEBUG_EXSLT_DATE
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Parsed time %02i:%02i:%02.f\n",
dt->hour, dt->min, dt->sec);
#endif
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11072/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/lighttpd/lighttpd1.4/commit/32120d5b8b3203fc21ccb9eafb0eaf824bb59354
|
32120d5b8b3203fc21ccb9eafb0eaf824bb59354
|
[core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
|
static int burl_normalize_basic_unreserved_fix (buffer *b, buffer *t, int i, int qs)
{
int j = i;
const int used = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const unsigned char * const s = (unsigned char *)b->ptr;
unsigned char * const p =
(unsigned char *)buffer_string_prepare_copy(t,i+(used-i)*3+1);
unsigned int n1, n2;
memcpy(p, s, (size_t)i);
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
if (!encoded_chars_http_uri_reqd[s[i]]) {
if (s[i] == '?' && -1 == qs) qs = j;
p[j] = s[i];
}
else if (s[i]=='%' && li_cton(s[i+1], n1) && li_cton(s[i+2], n2)) {
const unsigned int x = (n1 << 4) | n2;
if (burl_is_unreserved(x)) {
p[j] = x;
}
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n1]; /*(s[i+1] & 0xdf)*/
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n2]; /*(s[i+2] & 0xdf)*/
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(x)) qs = -2;
}
i+=2;
}
else if (s[i] == '#') break; /* ignore fragment */
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[s[i] & 0xF];
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(s[i])) qs = -2;
}
}
buffer_commit(t, (size_t)j);
buffer_copy_buffer(b, t);
return qs;
}
|
static int burl_normalize_basic_unreserved_fix (buffer *b, buffer *t, int i, int qs)
{
int j = i;
const int used = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const unsigned char * const s = (unsigned char *)b->ptr;
unsigned char * const p =
(unsigned char *)buffer_string_prepare_copy(t,i+(used-i)*3+1);
unsigned int n1, n2;
memcpy(p, s, (size_t)i);
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
if (!encoded_chars_http_uri_reqd[s[i]]) {
if (s[i] == '?' && -1 == qs) qs = j;
p[j] = s[i];
}
else if (s[i]=='%' && li_cton(s[i+1], n1) && li_cton(s[i+2], n2)) {
const unsigned int x = (n1 << 4) | n2;
if (burl_is_unreserved(x)) {
p[j] = x;
}
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n1]; /*(s[i+1] & 0xdf)*/
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n2]; /*(s[i+2] & 0xdf)*/
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(x)) qs = -2;
}
i+=2;
}
else if (s[i] == '#') break; /* ignore fragment */
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[s[i] & 0xF];
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(s[i])) qs = -2;
}
}
buffer_commit(t, (size_t)j);
buffer_copy_buffer(b, t);
return qs;
}
|
C
|
lighttpd1.4
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutoFillHelper::SendForms(WebFrame* frame) {
WebKit::WebVector<WebFormElement> web_forms;
frame->forms(web_forms);
std::vector<webkit_glue::FormData> forms;
for (size_t i = 0; i < web_forms.size(); ++i) {
const WebFormElement& web_form = web_forms[i];
webkit_glue::FormData form;
if (FormManager::WebFormElementToFormData(
web_form, FormManager::REQUIRE_NONE, false, &form)) {
forms.push_back(form);
}
}
if (!forms.empty()) {
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_FormsSeen(render_view_->routing_id(),
forms));
}
}
|
void AutoFillHelper::SendForms(WebFrame* frame) {
WebKit::WebVector<WebFormElement> web_forms;
frame->forms(web_forms);
std::vector<webkit_glue::FormData> forms;
for (size_t i = 0; i < web_forms.size(); ++i) {
const WebFormElement& web_form = web_forms[i];
webkit_glue::FormData form;
if (FormManager::WebFormElementToFormData(
web_form, FormManager::REQUIRE_NONE, false, &form)) {
forms.push_back(form);
}
}
if (!forms.empty()) {
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_FormsSeen(render_view_->routing_id(),
forms));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9191/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939
|
93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939
|
sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
|
void unregister_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header * header)
{
int nr_subheaders;
might_sleep();
if (header == NULL)
return;
nr_subheaders = count_subheaders(header->ctl_table_arg);
if (unlikely(nr_subheaders > 1)) {
struct ctl_table_header **subheaders;
int i;
subheaders = (struct ctl_table_header **)(header + 1);
for (i = nr_subheaders -1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct ctl_table_header *subh = subheaders[i];
struct ctl_table *table = subh->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_sysctl_table(subh);
kfree(table);
}
kfree(header);
return;
}
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
drop_sysctl_table(header);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
}
|
void unregister_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header * header)
{
int nr_subheaders;
might_sleep();
if (header == NULL)
return;
nr_subheaders = count_subheaders(header->ctl_table_arg);
if (unlikely(nr_subheaders > 1)) {
struct ctl_table_header **subheaders;
int i;
subheaders = (struct ctl_table_header **)(header + 1);
for (i = nr_subheaders -1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct ctl_table_header *subh = subheaders[i];
struct ctl_table *table = subh->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_sysctl_table(subh);
kfree(table);
}
kfree(header);
return;
}
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
drop_sysctl_table(header);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17476/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
3d41e77125f3de8d722b6d8303599abaf2a91667
|
If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
|
bool Browser::CanDragEnter(content::WebContents* source,
const content::DropData& data,
blink::WebDragOperationsMask operations_allowed) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((operations_allowed & blink::kWebDragOperationLink) &&
chrome::SettingsWindowManager::GetInstance()->IsSettingsBrowser(this)) {
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
}
|
bool Browser::CanDragEnter(content::WebContents* source,
const content::DropData& data,
blink::WebDragOperationsMask operations_allowed) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((operations_allowed & blink::kWebDragOperationLink) &&
chrome::SettingsWindowManager::GetInstance()->IsSettingsBrowser(this)) {
return false;
}
#endif
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6927/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a
|
fbe0e839d1e22d88810f3ee3e2f1479be4c0aa4a
|
futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
struct task_struct *p;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
rcu_read_lock();
ret = -ESRCH;
if (!pid)
p = current;
else {
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6496
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6496/
|
CWE-17
|
https://git.netfilter.org/conntrack-tools/commit/?id=c392c159605956c7bd4a264ab4490e2b2704c0cd
|
c392c159605956c7bd4a264ab4490e2b2704c0cd
| null |
void ct2msg(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
uint8_t l4proto = nfct_get_attr_u8(ct, ATTR_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV4)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV4, n, NTA_IPV4,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv4));
} else if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV6)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV6, n, NTA_IPV6,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv6));
}
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_STATUS, n, NTA_STATUS);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_L4PROTO, n, NTA_L4PROTO);
if (l4proto_fcn[l4proto].build)
l4proto_fcn[l4proto].build(ct, n);
if (!CONFIG(commit_timeout) && nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_TIMEOUT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_TIMEOUT, n, NTA_TIMEOUT);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_MARK))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_MARK, n, NTA_MARK);
/* setup the master conntrack */
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV4)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV4, n, NTA_MASTER_IPV4,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv4));
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_MASTER_L4PROTO, n, NTA_MASTER_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT,
n, NTA_MASTER_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
} else if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV6)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV6, n, NTA_MASTER_IPV6,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv6));
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_MASTER_L4PROTO, n, NTA_MASTER_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT,
n, NTA_MASTER_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
}
/* NAT */
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_SNAT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_REPL_IPV4_DST, n, NTA_SNAT_IPV4);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_DNAT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_REPL_IPV4_SRC, n, NTA_DNAT_IPV4);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_SPAT))
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_REPL_PORT_DST, n, NTA_SPAT_PORT);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_DPAT))
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_REPL_PORT_SRC, n, NTA_DPAT_PORT);
/* NAT sequence adjustment */
if (nfct_attr_is_set_array(ct, nat_type, 6))
ct_build_natseqadj(ct, n);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_HELPER_NAME))
ct_build_str(ct, ATTR_HELPER_NAME, n, NTA_HELPER_NAME);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_CONNLABELS))
ct_build_clabel(ct, n);
}
|
void ct2msg(const struct nf_conntrack *ct, struct nethdr *n)
{
uint8_t l4proto = nfct_get_attr_u8(ct, ATTR_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV4)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV4, n, NTA_IPV4,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv4));
} else if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV6)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_ORIG_IPV6, n, NTA_IPV6,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv6));
}
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_STATUS, n, NTA_STATUS);
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_L4PROTO, n, NTA_L4PROTO);
if (l4proto_fcn[l4proto].build)
l4proto_fcn[l4proto].build(ct, n);
if (!CONFIG(commit_timeout) && nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_TIMEOUT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_TIMEOUT, n, NTA_TIMEOUT);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_MARK))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_MARK, n, NTA_MARK);
/* setup the master conntrack */
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV4)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV4, n, NTA_MASTER_IPV4,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv4));
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_MASTER_L4PROTO, n, NTA_MASTER_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT,
n, NTA_MASTER_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
} else if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV6)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_IPV6, n, NTA_MASTER_IPV6,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_ipv6));
ct_build_u8(ct, ATTR_MASTER_L4PROTO, n, NTA_MASTER_L4PROTO);
if (nfct_attr_grp_is_set(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT)) {
ct_build_group(ct, ATTR_GRP_MASTER_PORT,
n, NTA_MASTER_PORT,
sizeof(struct nfct_attr_grp_port));
}
}
/* NAT */
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_SNAT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_REPL_IPV4_DST, n, NTA_SNAT_IPV4);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_DNAT))
ct_build_u32(ct, ATTR_REPL_IPV4_SRC, n, NTA_DNAT_IPV4);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_SPAT))
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_REPL_PORT_DST, n, NTA_SPAT_PORT);
if (nfct_getobjopt(ct, NFCT_GOPT_IS_DPAT))
ct_build_u16(ct, ATTR_REPL_PORT_SRC, n, NTA_DPAT_PORT);
/* NAT sequence adjustment */
if (nfct_attr_is_set_array(ct, nat_type, 6))
ct_build_natseqadj(ct, n);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_HELPER_NAME))
ct_build_str(ct, ATTR_HELPER_NAME, n, NTA_HELPER_NAME);
if (nfct_attr_is_set(ct, ATTR_CONNLABELS))
ct_build_clabel(ct, n);
}
|
C
|
netfilter
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2200/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?h=dbus-1.4&id=c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7
|
c3223ba6c401ba81df1305851312a47c485e6cd7
| null |
_dbus_header_load (DBusHeader *header,
DBusValidationMode mode,
DBusValidity *validity,
int byte_order,
int fields_array_len,
int header_len,
int body_len,
const DBusString *str,
int start,
int len)
{
int leftover;
DBusValidity v;
DBusTypeReader reader;
DBusTypeReader array_reader;
unsigned char v_byte;
dbus_uint32_t v_uint32;
dbus_uint32_t serial;
int padding_start;
int padding_len;
int i;
_dbus_assert (start == (int) _DBUS_ALIGN_VALUE (start, 8));
_dbus_assert (header_len <= len);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_string_get_length (&header->data) == 0);
if (!_dbus_string_copy_len (str, start, header_len, &header->data, 0))
{
_dbus_verbose ("Failed to copy buffer into new header\n");
*validity = DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR;
return FALSE;
}
if (mode == DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
leftover = len - header_len - body_len - start;
}
else
{
v = _dbus_validate_body_with_reason (&_dbus_header_signature_str, 0,
byte_order,
&leftover,
str, start, len);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
}
_dbus_assert (leftover < len);
padding_len = header_len - (FIRST_FIELD_OFFSET + fields_array_len);
padding_start = start + FIRST_FIELD_OFFSET + fields_array_len;
_dbus_assert (start + header_len == (int) _DBUS_ALIGN_VALUE (padding_start, 8));
_dbus_assert (start + header_len == padding_start + padding_len);
if (mode != DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
if (!_dbus_string_validate_nul (str, padding_start, padding_len))
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
goto invalid;
}
}
header->padding = padding_len;
if (mode == DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
*validity = DBUS_VALID;
return TRUE;
}
/* We now know the data is well-formed, but we have to check that
* it's valid.
*/
_dbus_type_reader_init (&reader,
byte_order,
&_dbus_header_signature_str, 0,
str, start);
/* BYTE ORDER */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == BYTE_ORDER_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
_dbus_assert (v_byte == byte_order);
header->byte_order = byte_order;
/* MESSAGE TYPE */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == TYPE_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
/* unknown message types are supposed to be ignored, so only validation here is
* that it isn't invalid
*/
if (v_byte == DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_INVALID)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE;
goto invalid;
}
/* FLAGS */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == FLAGS_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
/* unknown flags should be ignored */
/* PROTOCOL VERSION */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == VERSION_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
if (v_byte != DBUS_MAJOR_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto invalid;
}
/* BODY LENGTH */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_UINT32);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == BODY_LENGTH_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_uint32);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
_dbus_assert (body_len == (signed) v_uint32);
/* SERIAL */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_UINT32);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == SERIAL_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &serial);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
if (serial == 0)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_SERIAL;
goto invalid;
}
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == FIELDS_ARRAY_LENGTH_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&reader, &array_reader);
while (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&array_reader) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
{
DBusTypeReader struct_reader;
DBusTypeReader variant_reader;
unsigned char field_code;
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&array_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&array_reader, &struct_reader);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&struct_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&struct_reader, &field_code);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&struct_reader);
if (field_code == DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_INVALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("invalid header field code\n");
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_HEADER_FIELD_CODE;
goto invalid;
}
if (field_code > DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST)
{
_dbus_verbose ("unknown header field code %d, skipping\n",
field_code);
goto next_field;
}
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&struct_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&struct_reader, &variant_reader);
v = load_and_validate_field (header, field_code, &variant_reader);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("Field %d was invalid\n", field_code);
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
next_field:
_dbus_type_reader_next (&array_reader);
}
/* Anything we didn't fill in is now known not to exist */
i = 0;
while (i <= DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST)
{
if (header->fields[i].value_pos == _DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_VALUE_UNKNOWN)
header->fields[i].value_pos = _DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_VALUE_NONEXISTENT;
++i;
}
v = check_mandatory_fields (header);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("Mandatory fields were missing, code %d\n", v);
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
*validity = DBUS_VALID;
return TRUE;
invalid:
_dbus_string_set_length (&header->data, 0);
return FALSE;
}
|
_dbus_header_load (DBusHeader *header,
DBusValidationMode mode,
DBusValidity *validity,
int byte_order,
int fields_array_len,
int header_len,
int body_len,
const DBusString *str,
int start,
int len)
{
int leftover;
DBusValidity v;
DBusTypeReader reader;
DBusTypeReader array_reader;
unsigned char v_byte;
dbus_uint32_t v_uint32;
dbus_uint32_t serial;
int padding_start;
int padding_len;
int i;
_dbus_assert (start == (int) _DBUS_ALIGN_VALUE (start, 8));
_dbus_assert (header_len <= len);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_string_get_length (&header->data) == 0);
if (!_dbus_string_copy_len (str, start, header_len, &header->data, 0))
{
_dbus_verbose ("Failed to copy buffer into new header\n");
*validity = DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR;
return FALSE;
}
if (mode == DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
leftover = len - header_len - body_len - start;
}
else
{
v = _dbus_validate_body_with_reason (&_dbus_header_signature_str, 0,
byte_order,
&leftover,
str, start, len);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
}
_dbus_assert (leftover < len);
padding_len = header_len - (FIRST_FIELD_OFFSET + fields_array_len);
padding_start = start + FIRST_FIELD_OFFSET + fields_array_len;
_dbus_assert (start + header_len == (int) _DBUS_ALIGN_VALUE (padding_start, 8));
_dbus_assert (start + header_len == padding_start + padding_len);
if (mode != DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
if (!_dbus_string_validate_nul (str, padding_start, padding_len))
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
goto invalid;
}
}
header->padding = padding_len;
if (mode == DBUS_VALIDATION_MODE_WE_TRUST_THIS_DATA_ABSOLUTELY)
{
*validity = DBUS_VALID;
return TRUE;
}
/* We now know the data is well-formed, but we have to check that
* it's valid.
*/
_dbus_type_reader_init (&reader,
byte_order,
&_dbus_header_signature_str, 0,
str, start);
/* BYTE ORDER */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == BYTE_ORDER_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
_dbus_assert (v_byte == byte_order);
header->byte_order = byte_order;
/* MESSAGE TYPE */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == TYPE_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
/* unknown message types are supposed to be ignored, so only validation here is
* that it isn't invalid
*/
if (v_byte == DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_INVALID)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE;
goto invalid;
}
/* FLAGS */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == FLAGS_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
/* unknown flags should be ignored */
/* PROTOCOL VERSION */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == VERSION_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_byte);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
if (v_byte != DBUS_MAJOR_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto invalid;
}
/* BODY LENGTH */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_UINT32);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == BODY_LENGTH_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &v_uint32);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
_dbus_assert (body_len == (signed) v_uint32);
/* SERIAL */
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_UINT32);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == SERIAL_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&reader, &serial);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&reader);
if (serial == 0)
{
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_BAD_SERIAL;
goto invalid;
}
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&reader) == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_value_pos (&reader) == FIELDS_ARRAY_LENGTH_OFFSET);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&reader, &array_reader);
while (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&array_reader) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
{
DBusTypeReader struct_reader;
DBusTypeReader variant_reader;
unsigned char field_code;
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&array_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&array_reader, &struct_reader);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&struct_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_BYTE);
_dbus_type_reader_read_basic (&struct_reader, &field_code);
_dbus_type_reader_next (&struct_reader);
if (field_code == DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_INVALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("invalid header field code\n");
*validity = DBUS_INVALID_HEADER_FIELD_CODE;
goto invalid;
}
if (field_code > DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST)
{
_dbus_verbose ("unknown header field code %d, skipping\n",
field_code);
goto next_field;
}
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&struct_reader) == DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT);
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (&struct_reader, &variant_reader);
v = load_and_validate_field (header, field_code, &variant_reader);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("Field %d was invalid\n", field_code);
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
next_field:
_dbus_type_reader_next (&array_reader);
}
/* Anything we didn't fill in is now known not to exist */
i = 0;
while (i <= DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_LAST)
{
if (header->fields[i].value_pos == _DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_VALUE_UNKNOWN)
header->fields[i].value_pos = _DBUS_HEADER_FIELD_VALUE_NONEXISTENT;
++i;
}
v = check_mandatory_fields (header);
if (v != DBUS_VALID)
{
_dbus_verbose ("Mandatory fields were missing, code %d\n", v);
*validity = v;
goto invalid;
}
*validity = DBUS_VALID;
return TRUE;
invalid:
_dbus_string_set_length (&header->data, 0);
return FALSE;
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4130/
|
CWE-399
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
|
53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d
| null |
int red_channel_all_blocked(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
if (!channel || channel->clients_num == 0) {
return FALSE;
}
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
if (!rcc->send_data.blocked) {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
|
int red_channel_all_blocked(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
if (!channel || channel->clients_num == 0) {
return FALSE;
}
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
if (!rcc->send_data.blocked) {
return FALSE;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5755
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5755/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
971548cdca2d4c0a6fedd3db0c94372c2a27eac3
|
Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
|
base::Optional<CameraCalibration> VideoCaptureManager::GetCameraCalibration(
const std::string& device_id) {
media::VideoCaptureDeviceInfo* info = GetDeviceInfoById(device_id);
if (!info)
return base::Optional<CameraCalibration>();
return info->descriptor.camera_calibration;
}
|
base::Optional<CameraCalibration> VideoCaptureManager::GetCameraCalibration(
const std::string& device_id) {
media::VideoCaptureDeviceInfo* info = GetDeviceInfoById(device_id);
if (!info)
return base::Optional<CameraCalibration>();
return info->descriptor.camera_calibration;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1000020
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1000020/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1120/commits/8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423
|
8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423
|
iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is missing
A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop
forever.
read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension
to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while
loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails
before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without
advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry
indefinitely.
Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an
extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this
seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate
it to a fatal error immediately anyway.
Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym.
|
parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent,
const unsigned char *isodirrec, size_t reclen)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct file_info *file, *filep;
size_t name_len;
const unsigned char *rr_start, *rr_end;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t dr_len;
uint64_t fsize, offset;
int32_t location;
int flags;
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
if (reclen != 0)
dr_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_length_offset];
/*
* Sanity check that reclen is not zero and dr_len is greater than
* reclen but at least 34
*/
if (reclen == 0 || reclen < dr_len || dr_len < 34) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of directory record");
return (NULL);
}
name_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_name_len_offset];
location = archive_le32dec(isodirrec + DR_extent_offset);
fsize = toi(isodirrec + DR_size_offset, DR_size_size);
/* Sanity check that name_len doesn't exceed dr_len. */
if (dr_len - 33 < name_len || name_len == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of file identifier");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't exceed volume block.
* Don't check lower limit of location; it's possibility
* the location has negative value when file type is symbolic
* link or file size is zero. As far as I know latest mkisofs
* do that.
*/
if (location > 0 &&
(location + ((fsize + iso9660->logical_block_size -1)
/ iso9660->logical_block_size))
> (uint32_t)iso9660->volume_block) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't have a negative value
* when the file is not empty. it's too large. */
if (fsize != 0 && location < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that this entry does not create a cycle. */
offset = iso9660->logical_block_size * (uint64_t)location;
for (filep = parent; filep != NULL; filep = filep->parent) {
if (filep->offset == offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Directory structure contains loop");
return (NULL);
}
}
/* Create a new file entry and copy data from the ISO dir record. */
file = (struct file_info *)calloc(1, sizeof(*file));
if (file == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file entry");
return (NULL);
}
file->parent = parent;
file->offset = offset;
file->size = fsize;
file->mtime = isodate7(isodirrec + DR_date_offset);
file->ctime = file->atime = file->mtime;
file->rede_files.first = NULL;
file->rede_files.last = &(file->rede_files.first);
p = isodirrec + DR_name_offset;
/* Rockridge extensions (if any) follow name. Compute this
* before fidgeting the name_len below. */
rr_start = p + name_len + (name_len & 1 ? 0 : 1);
rr_end = isodirrec + dr_len;
if (iso9660->seenJoliet) {
/* Joliet names are max 64 chars (128 bytes) according to spec,
* but genisoimage/mkisofs allows recording longer Joliet
* names which are 103 UCS2 characters(206 bytes) by their
* option '-joliet-long'.
*/
if (name_len > 206)
name_len = 206;
name_len &= ~1;
/* trim trailing first version and dot from filename.
*
* Remember we were in UTF-16BE land!
* SEPARATOR 1 (.) and SEPARATOR 2 (;) are both
* 16 bits big endian characters on Joliet.
*
* TODO: sanitize filename?
* Joliet allows any UCS-2 char except:
* *, /, :, ;, ? and \.
*/
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 4 && p[name_len-4] == 0 && p[name_len-3] == ';'
&& p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '1')
name_len -= 4;
#if 0 /* XXX: this somehow manages to strip of single-character file extensions, like '.c'. */
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '.')
name_len -= 2;
#endif
if ((file->utf16be_name = malloc(name_len)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file name");
goto fail;
}
memcpy(file->utf16be_name, p, name_len);
file->utf16be_bytes = name_len;
} else {
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len - 2] == ';' &&
p[name_len - 1] == '1')
name_len -= 2;
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 1 && p[name_len - 1] == '.')
--name_len;
archive_strncpy(&file->name, (const char *)p, name_len);
}
flags = isodirrec[DR_flags_offset];
if (flags & 0x02)
file->mode = AE_IFDIR | 0700;
else
file->mode = AE_IFREG | 0400;
if (flags & 0x80)
file->multi_extent = 1;
else
file->multi_extent = 0;
/*
* Use a location for the file number, which is treated as an inode
* number to find out hardlink target. If Rockridge extensions is
* being used, the file number will be overwritten by FILE SERIAL
* NUMBER of RRIP "PX" extension.
* Note: Old mkisofs did not record that FILE SERIAL NUMBER
* in ISO images.
* Note2: xorriso set 0 to the location of a symlink file.
*/
if (file->size == 0 && location >= 0) {
/* If file->size is zero, its location points wrong place,
* and so we should not use it for the file number.
* When the location has negative value, it can be used
* for the file number.
*/
file->number = -1;
/* Do not appear before any directory entries. */
file->offset = -1;
} else
file->number = (int64_t)(uint32_t)location;
/* Rockridge extensions overwrite information from above. */
if (iso9660->opt_support_rockridge) {
if (parent == NULL && rr_end - rr_start >= 7) {
p = rr_start;
if (memcmp(p, "SP\x07\x01\xbe\xef", 6) == 0) {
/*
* SP extension stores the suspOffset
* (Number of bytes to skip between
* filename and SUSP records.)
* It is mandatory by the SUSP standard
* (IEEE 1281).
*
* It allows SUSP to coexist with
* non-SUSP uses of the System
* Use Area by placing non-SUSP data
* before SUSP data.
*
* SP extension must be in the root
* directory entry, disable all SUSP
* processing if not found.
*/
iso9660->suspOffset = p[6];
iso9660->seenSUSP = 1;
rr_start += 7;
}
}
if (iso9660->seenSUSP) {
int r;
file->name_continues = 0;
file->symlink_continues = 0;
rr_start += iso9660->suspOffset;
r = parse_rockridge(a, file, rr_start, rr_end);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto fail;
/*
* A file size of symbolic link files in ISO images
* made by makefs is not zero and its location is
* the same as those of next regular file. That is
* the same as hard like file and it causes unexpected
* error.
*/
if (file->size > 0 &&
(file->mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK) {
file->size = 0;
file->number = -1;
file->offset = -1;
}
} else
/* If there isn't SUSP, disable parsing
* rock ridge extensions. */
iso9660->opt_support_rockridge = 0;
}
file->nlinks = 1;/* Reset nlink. we'll calculate it later. */
/* Tell file's parent how many children that parent has. */
if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02))
parent->subdirs++;
if (iso9660->seenRockridge) {
if (parent != NULL && parent->parent == NULL &&
(flags & 0x02) && iso9660->rr_moved == NULL &&
file->name.s &&
(strcmp(file->name.s, "rr_moved") == 0 ||
strcmp(file->name.s, ".rr_moved") == 0)) {
iso9660->rr_moved = file;
file->rr_moved = 1;
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 1;
file->re = 0;
parent->subdirs--;
} else if (file->re) {
/*
* Sanity check: file's parent is rr_moved.
*/
if (parent == NULL || parent->rr_moved == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: file does not have "CL" extension.
*/
if (file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE and CL");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a directory.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
goto fail;
}
} else if (parent != NULL && parent->rr_moved)
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 0;
else if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02) &&
(parent->re || parent->re_descendant))
file->re_descendant = 1;
if (file->cl_offset) {
struct file_info *r;
if (parent == NULL || parent->parent == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a regular file.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
parent->subdirs++;
/* Overwrite an offset and a number of this "CL" entry
* to appear before other dirs. "+1" to those is to
* make sure to appear after "RE" entry which this
* "CL" entry should be connected with. */
file->offset = file->number = file->cl_offset + 1;
/*
* Sanity check: cl_offset does not point at its
* the parents or itself.
*/
for (r = parent; r; r = r->parent) {
if (r->offset == file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
}
if (file->cl_offset == file->offset ||
parent->rr_moved) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
}
}
#if DEBUG
/* DEBUGGING: Warn about attributes I don't yet fully support. */
if ((flags & ~0x02) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized flag: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (toi(isodirrec + DR_volume_sequence_number_offset, 2) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized sequence number: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_file_unit_size_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected file unit size: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_interleave_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected interleave: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_ext_attr_length_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected extended attribute length: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
register_file(iso9660, file);
return (file);
fail:
archive_string_free(&file->name);
free(file);
return (NULL);
}
|
parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent,
const unsigned char *isodirrec, size_t reclen)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct file_info *file, *filep;
size_t name_len;
const unsigned char *rr_start, *rr_end;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t dr_len;
uint64_t fsize, offset;
int32_t location;
int flags;
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
if (reclen != 0)
dr_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_length_offset];
/*
* Sanity check that reclen is not zero and dr_len is greater than
* reclen but at least 34
*/
if (reclen == 0 || reclen < dr_len || dr_len < 34) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of directory record");
return (NULL);
}
name_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_name_len_offset];
location = archive_le32dec(isodirrec + DR_extent_offset);
fsize = toi(isodirrec + DR_size_offset, DR_size_size);
/* Sanity check that name_len doesn't exceed dr_len. */
if (dr_len - 33 < name_len || name_len == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of file identifier");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't exceed volume block.
* Don't check lower limit of location; it's possibility
* the location has negative value when file type is symbolic
* link or file size is zero. As far as I know latest mkisofs
* do that.
*/
if (location > 0 &&
(location + ((fsize + iso9660->logical_block_size -1)
/ iso9660->logical_block_size))
> (uint32_t)iso9660->volume_block) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't have a negative value
* when the file is not empty. it's too large. */
if (fsize != 0 && location < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that this entry does not create a cycle. */
offset = iso9660->logical_block_size * (uint64_t)location;
for (filep = parent; filep != NULL; filep = filep->parent) {
if (filep->offset == offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Directory structure contains loop");
return (NULL);
}
}
/* Create a new file entry and copy data from the ISO dir record. */
file = (struct file_info *)calloc(1, sizeof(*file));
if (file == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file entry");
return (NULL);
}
file->parent = parent;
file->offset = offset;
file->size = fsize;
file->mtime = isodate7(isodirrec + DR_date_offset);
file->ctime = file->atime = file->mtime;
file->rede_files.first = NULL;
file->rede_files.last = &(file->rede_files.first);
p = isodirrec + DR_name_offset;
/* Rockridge extensions (if any) follow name. Compute this
* before fidgeting the name_len below. */
rr_start = p + name_len + (name_len & 1 ? 0 : 1);
rr_end = isodirrec + dr_len;
if (iso9660->seenJoliet) {
/* Joliet names are max 64 chars (128 bytes) according to spec,
* but genisoimage/mkisofs allows recording longer Joliet
* names which are 103 UCS2 characters(206 bytes) by their
* option '-joliet-long'.
*/
if (name_len > 206)
name_len = 206;
name_len &= ~1;
/* trim trailing first version and dot from filename.
*
* Remember we were in UTF-16BE land!
* SEPARATOR 1 (.) and SEPARATOR 2 (;) are both
* 16 bits big endian characters on Joliet.
*
* TODO: sanitize filename?
* Joliet allows any UCS-2 char except:
* *, /, :, ;, ? and \.
*/
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 4 && p[name_len-4] == 0 && p[name_len-3] == ';'
&& p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '1')
name_len -= 4;
#if 0 /* XXX: this somehow manages to strip of single-character file extensions, like '.c'. */
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '.')
name_len -= 2;
#endif
if ((file->utf16be_name = malloc(name_len)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file name");
goto fail;
}
memcpy(file->utf16be_name, p, name_len);
file->utf16be_bytes = name_len;
} else {
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len - 2] == ';' &&
p[name_len - 1] == '1')
name_len -= 2;
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 1 && p[name_len - 1] == '.')
--name_len;
archive_strncpy(&file->name, (const char *)p, name_len);
}
flags = isodirrec[DR_flags_offset];
if (flags & 0x02)
file->mode = AE_IFDIR | 0700;
else
file->mode = AE_IFREG | 0400;
if (flags & 0x80)
file->multi_extent = 1;
else
file->multi_extent = 0;
/*
* Use a location for the file number, which is treated as an inode
* number to find out hardlink target. If Rockridge extensions is
* being used, the file number will be overwritten by FILE SERIAL
* NUMBER of RRIP "PX" extension.
* Note: Old mkisofs did not record that FILE SERIAL NUMBER
* in ISO images.
* Note2: xorriso set 0 to the location of a symlink file.
*/
if (file->size == 0 && location >= 0) {
/* If file->size is zero, its location points wrong place,
* and so we should not use it for the file number.
* When the location has negative value, it can be used
* for the file number.
*/
file->number = -1;
/* Do not appear before any directory entries. */
file->offset = -1;
} else
file->number = (int64_t)(uint32_t)location;
/* Rockridge extensions overwrite information from above. */
if (iso9660->opt_support_rockridge) {
if (parent == NULL && rr_end - rr_start >= 7) {
p = rr_start;
if (memcmp(p, "SP\x07\x01\xbe\xef", 6) == 0) {
/*
* SP extension stores the suspOffset
* (Number of bytes to skip between
* filename and SUSP records.)
* It is mandatory by the SUSP standard
* (IEEE 1281).
*
* It allows SUSP to coexist with
* non-SUSP uses of the System
* Use Area by placing non-SUSP data
* before SUSP data.
*
* SP extension must be in the root
* directory entry, disable all SUSP
* processing if not found.
*/
iso9660->suspOffset = p[6];
iso9660->seenSUSP = 1;
rr_start += 7;
}
}
if (iso9660->seenSUSP) {
int r;
file->name_continues = 0;
file->symlink_continues = 0;
rr_start += iso9660->suspOffset;
r = parse_rockridge(a, file, rr_start, rr_end);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto fail;
/*
* A file size of symbolic link files in ISO images
* made by makefs is not zero and its location is
* the same as those of next regular file. That is
* the same as hard like file and it causes unexpected
* error.
*/
if (file->size > 0 &&
(file->mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK) {
file->size = 0;
file->number = -1;
file->offset = -1;
}
} else
/* If there isn't SUSP, disable parsing
* rock ridge extensions. */
iso9660->opt_support_rockridge = 0;
}
file->nlinks = 1;/* Reset nlink. we'll calculate it later. */
/* Tell file's parent how many children that parent has. */
if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02))
parent->subdirs++;
if (iso9660->seenRockridge) {
if (parent != NULL && parent->parent == NULL &&
(flags & 0x02) && iso9660->rr_moved == NULL &&
file->name.s &&
(strcmp(file->name.s, "rr_moved") == 0 ||
strcmp(file->name.s, ".rr_moved") == 0)) {
iso9660->rr_moved = file;
file->rr_moved = 1;
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 1;
file->re = 0;
parent->subdirs--;
} else if (file->re) {
/*
* Sanity check: file's parent is rr_moved.
*/
if (parent == NULL || parent->rr_moved == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: file does not have "CL" extension.
*/
if (file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE and CL");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a directory.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
goto fail;
}
} else if (parent != NULL && parent->rr_moved)
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 0;
else if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02) &&
(parent->re || parent->re_descendant))
file->re_descendant = 1;
if (file->cl_offset) {
struct file_info *r;
if (parent == NULL || parent->parent == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a regular file.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
parent->subdirs++;
/* Overwrite an offset and a number of this "CL" entry
* to appear before other dirs. "+1" to those is to
* make sure to appear after "RE" entry which this
* "CL" entry should be connected with. */
file->offset = file->number = file->cl_offset + 1;
/*
* Sanity check: cl_offset does not point at its
* the parents or itself.
*/
for (r = parent; r; r = r->parent) {
if (r->offset == file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
}
if (file->cl_offset == file->offset ||
parent->rr_moved) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
goto fail;
}
}
}
#if DEBUG
/* DEBUGGING: Warn about attributes I don't yet fully support. */
if ((flags & ~0x02) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized flag: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (toi(isodirrec + DR_volume_sequence_number_offset, 2) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized sequence number: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_file_unit_size_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected file unit size: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_interleave_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected interleave: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_ext_attr_length_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected extended attribute length: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
register_file(iso9660, file);
return (file);
fail:
archive_string_free(&file->name);
free(file);
return (NULL);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5149/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac
|
503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac
|
Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(
media::AudioInputController* controller,
int error_code) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(error_code="
<< error_code << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
}
|
void AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(
media::AudioInputController* controller,
int error_code) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError(error_code="
<< error_code << ")";
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
DeleteEntryOnError(entry);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
static void fbFetchSourcePict(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
SourcePictPtr pGradient = pict->pSourcePict;
GradientWalker walker;
CARD32 *end = buffer + width;
_gradient_walker_init (&walker, pGradient, pict->repeat);
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeSolidFill) {
register CARD32 color = pGradient->solidFill.color;
while (buffer < end) {
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
} else if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeLinear) {
PictVector v, unit;
xFixed_32_32 l;
xFixed_48_16 dx, dy, a, b, off;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (pict->transform) {
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
unit.vector[0] = pict->transform->matrix[0][0];
unit.vector[1] = pict->transform->matrix[1][0];
unit.vector[2] = pict->transform->matrix[2][0];
} else {
unit.vector[0] = xFixed1;
unit.vector[1] = 0;
unit.vector[2] = 0;
}
dx = pGradient->linear.p2.x - pGradient->linear.p1.x;
dy = pGradient->linear.p2.y - pGradient->linear.p1.y;
l = dx*dx + dy*dy;
if (l != 0) {
a = (dx << 32) / l;
b = (dy << 32) / l;
off = (-a*pGradient->linear.p1.x - b*pGradient->linear.p1.y)>>16;
}
if (l == 0 || (unit.vector[2] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1)) {
xFixed_48_16 inc, t;
/* affine transformation only */
if (l == 0) {
t = 0;
inc = 0;
} else {
t = ((a*v.vector[0] + b*v.vector[1]) >> 16) + off;
inc = (a * unit.vector[0] + b * unit.vector[1]) >> 16;
}
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
if (!mask) {
while (buffer < end)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
if (*mask++ & maskBits)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
}
}
}
else /* projective transformation */
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
if (v.vector[2] == 0)
{
t = 0;
}
else
{
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a * x + b * y) >> 16) + off;
}
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
while (buffer < end)
{
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
if (v.vector[2] == 0) {
t = 0;
} else {
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a*x + b*y) >> 16) + off;
}
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
v.vector[0] += unit.vector[0];
v.vector[1] += unit.vector[1];
v.vector[2] += unit.vector[2];
}
}
}
} else {
/*
* In the radial gradient problem we are given two circles (c₁,r₁) and
* (c₂,r₂) that define the gradient itself. Then, for any point p, we
* must compute the value(s) of t within [0.0, 1.0] representing the
* circle(s) that would color the point.
*
* There are potentially two values of t since the point p can be
* colored by both sides of the circle, (which happens whenever one
* circle is not entirely contained within the other).
*
* If we solve for a value of t that is outside of [0.0, 1.0] then we
* use the extend mode (NONE, REPEAT, REFLECT, or PAD) to map to a
* value within [0.0, 1.0].
*
* Here is an illustration of the problem:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ╲r₂
* p₁ · ╲
* • θ╲
* ╲ ╌╌•
* ╲r₁ · c₂
* θ╲ ·
* ╌╌•
* c₁
*
* Given (c₁,r₁), (c₂,r₂) and p, we must find an angle θ such that two
* points p₁ and p₂ on the two circles are collinear with p. Then, the
* desired value of t is the ratio of the length of p₁p to the length
* of p₁p₂.
*
* So, we have six unknown values: (p₁x, p₁y), (p₂x, p₂y), θ and t.
* We can also write six equations that constrain the problem:
*
* Point p₁ is a distance r₁ from c₁ at an angle of θ:
*
* 1. p₁x = c₁x + r₁·cos θ
* 2. p₁y = c₁y + r₁·sin θ
*
* Point p₂ is a distance r₂ from c₂ at an angle of θ:
*
* 3. p₂x = c₂x + r2·cos θ
* 4. p₂y = c₂y + r2·sin θ
*
* Point p lies at a fraction t along the line segment p₁p₂:
*
* 5. px = t·p₂x + (1-t)·p₁x
* 6. py = t·p₂y + (1-t)·p₁y
*
* To solve, first subtitute 1-4 into 5 and 6:
*
* px = t·(c₂x + r₂·cos θ) + (1-t)·(c₁x + r₁·cos θ)
* py = t·(c₂y + r₂·sin θ) + (1-t)·(c₁y + r₁·sin θ)
*
* Then solve each for cos θ and sin θ expressed as a function of t:
*
* cos θ = (-(c₂x - c₁x)·t + (px - c₁x)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-(c₂y - c₁y)·t + (py - c₁y)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
*
* To simplify this a bit, we define new variables for several of the
* common terms as shown below:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ┆ ╲r₂
* p₁ · ┆ ╲
* • pdy┆ ╲
* ╲ ┆ •c₂
* ╲r₁ ┆ · ┆
* ╲ ·┆ ┆cdy
* •╌╌╌╌┴╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┘
* c₁ pdx cdx
*
* cdx = (c₂x - c₁x)
* cdy = (c₂y - c₁y)
* dr = r₂-r₁
* pdx = px - c₁x
* pdy = py - c₁y
*
* Note that cdx, cdy, and dr do not depend on point p at all, so can
* be pre-computed for the entire gradient. The simplifed equations
* are now:
*
* cos θ = (-cdx·t + pdx) / (dr·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-cdy·t + pdy) / (dr·t + r₁)
*
* Finally, to get a single function of t and eliminate the last
* unknown θ, we use the identity sin²θ + cos²θ = 1. First, square
* each equation, (we knew a quadratic was coming since it must be
* possible to obtain two solutions in some cases):
*
* cos²θ = (cdx²t² - 2·cdx·pdx·t + pdx²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
* sin²θ = (cdy²t² - 2·cdy·pdy·t + pdy²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
*
* Then add both together, set the result equal to 1, and express as a
* standard quadratic equation in t of the form At² + Bt + C = 0
*
* (cdx² + cdy² - dr²)·t² - 2·(cdx·pdx + cdy·pdy + r₁·dr)·t + (pdx² + pdy² - r₁²) = 0
*
* In other words:
*
* A = cdx² + cdy² - dr²
* B = -2·(pdx·cdx + pdy·cdy + r₁·dr)
* C = pdx² + pdy² - r₁²
*
* And again, notice that A does not depend on p, so can be
* precomputed. From here we just use the quadratic formula to solve
* for t:
*
* t = (-2·B ± ⎷(B² - 4·A·C)) / 2·A
*/
/* radial or conical */
Bool affine = TRUE;
double cx = 1.;
double cy = 0.;
double cz = 0.;
double rx = x + 0.5;
double ry = y + 0.5;
double rz = 1.;
if (pict->transform) {
PictVector v;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
cx = pict->transform->matrix[0][0]/65536.;
cy = pict->transform->matrix[1][0]/65536.;
cz = pict->transform->matrix[2][0]/65536.;
rx = v.vector[0]/65536.;
ry = v.vector[1]/65536.;
rz = v.vector[2]/65536.;
affine = pict->transform->matrix[2][0] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1;
}
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeRadial) {
PictRadialGradient *radial;
radial = &pGradient->radial;
if (affine) {
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
pdx = rx - c1x;
pdy = ry - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
/* projective */
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
double x, y;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
pdx = x - c1x;
pdy = y - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
} else /* SourcePictTypeConical */ {
double a = pGradient->conical.angle/(180.*65536);
if (affine) {
rx -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
ry -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
while (buffer < end) {
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
angle = atan2(ry, rx) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
double x, y;
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
x -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
y -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
angle = atan2(y, x) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
}
}
}
|
static void fbFetchSourcePict(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
SourcePictPtr pGradient = pict->pSourcePict;
GradientWalker walker;
CARD32 *end = buffer + width;
_gradient_walker_init (&walker, pGradient, pict->repeat);
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeSolidFill) {
register CARD32 color = pGradient->solidFill.color;
while (buffer < end) {
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
} else if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeLinear) {
PictVector v, unit;
xFixed_32_32 l;
xFixed_48_16 dx, dy, a, b, off;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (pict->transform) {
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
unit.vector[0] = pict->transform->matrix[0][0];
unit.vector[1] = pict->transform->matrix[1][0];
unit.vector[2] = pict->transform->matrix[2][0];
} else {
unit.vector[0] = xFixed1;
unit.vector[1] = 0;
unit.vector[2] = 0;
}
dx = pGradient->linear.p2.x - pGradient->linear.p1.x;
dy = pGradient->linear.p2.y - pGradient->linear.p1.y;
l = dx*dx + dy*dy;
if (l != 0) {
a = (dx << 32) / l;
b = (dy << 32) / l;
off = (-a*pGradient->linear.p1.x - b*pGradient->linear.p1.y)>>16;
}
if (l == 0 || (unit.vector[2] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1)) {
xFixed_48_16 inc, t;
/* affine transformation only */
if (l == 0) {
t = 0;
inc = 0;
} else {
t = ((a*v.vector[0] + b*v.vector[1]) >> 16) + off;
inc = (a * unit.vector[0] + b * unit.vector[1]) >> 16;
}
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
if (!mask) {
while (buffer < end)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
if (*mask++ & maskBits)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
}
}
}
else /* projective transformation */
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
if (v.vector[2] == 0)
{
t = 0;
}
else
{
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a * x + b * y) >> 16) + off;
}
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
while (buffer < end)
{
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
if (v.vector[2] == 0) {
t = 0;
} else {
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a*x + b*y) >> 16) + off;
}
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
v.vector[0] += unit.vector[0];
v.vector[1] += unit.vector[1];
v.vector[2] += unit.vector[2];
}
}
}
} else {
/*
* In the radial gradient problem we are given two circles (c₁,r₁) and
* (c₂,r₂) that define the gradient itself. Then, for any point p, we
* must compute the value(s) of t within [0.0, 1.0] representing the
* circle(s) that would color the point.
*
* There are potentially two values of t since the point p can be
* colored by both sides of the circle, (which happens whenever one
* circle is not entirely contained within the other).
*
* If we solve for a value of t that is outside of [0.0, 1.0] then we
* use the extend mode (NONE, REPEAT, REFLECT, or PAD) to map to a
* value within [0.0, 1.0].
*
* Here is an illustration of the problem:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ╲r₂
* p₁ · ╲
* • θ╲
* ╲ ╌╌•
* ╲r₁ · c₂
* θ╲ ·
* ╌╌•
* c₁
*
* Given (c₁,r₁), (c₂,r₂) and p, we must find an angle θ such that two
* points p₁ and p₂ on the two circles are collinear with p. Then, the
* desired value of t is the ratio of the length of p₁p to the length
* of p₁p₂.
*
* So, we have six unknown values: (p₁x, p₁y), (p₂x, p₂y), θ and t.
* We can also write six equations that constrain the problem:
*
* Point p₁ is a distance r₁ from c₁ at an angle of θ:
*
* 1. p₁x = c₁x + r₁·cos θ
* 2. p₁y = c₁y + r₁·sin θ
*
* Point p₂ is a distance r₂ from c₂ at an angle of θ:
*
* 3. p₂x = c₂x + r2·cos θ
* 4. p₂y = c₂y + r2·sin θ
*
* Point p lies at a fraction t along the line segment p₁p₂:
*
* 5. px = t·p₂x + (1-t)·p₁x
* 6. py = t·p₂y + (1-t)·p₁y
*
* To solve, first subtitute 1-4 into 5 and 6:
*
* px = t·(c₂x + r₂·cos θ) + (1-t)·(c₁x + r₁·cos θ)
* py = t·(c₂y + r₂·sin θ) + (1-t)·(c₁y + r₁·sin θ)
*
* Then solve each for cos θ and sin θ expressed as a function of t:
*
* cos θ = (-(c₂x - c₁x)·t + (px - c₁x)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-(c₂y - c₁y)·t + (py - c₁y)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
*
* To simplify this a bit, we define new variables for several of the
* common terms as shown below:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ┆ ╲r₂
* p₁ · ┆ ╲
* • pdy┆ ╲
* ╲ ┆ •c₂
* ╲r₁ ┆ · ┆
* ╲ ·┆ ┆cdy
* •╌╌╌╌┴╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┘
* c₁ pdx cdx
*
* cdx = (c₂x - c₁x)
* cdy = (c₂y - c₁y)
* dr = r₂-r₁
* pdx = px - c₁x
* pdy = py - c₁y
*
* Note that cdx, cdy, and dr do not depend on point p at all, so can
* be pre-computed for the entire gradient. The simplifed equations
* are now:
*
* cos θ = (-cdx·t + pdx) / (dr·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-cdy·t + pdy) / (dr·t + r₁)
*
* Finally, to get a single function of t and eliminate the last
* unknown θ, we use the identity sin²θ + cos²θ = 1. First, square
* each equation, (we knew a quadratic was coming since it must be
* possible to obtain two solutions in some cases):
*
* cos²θ = (cdx²t² - 2·cdx·pdx·t + pdx²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
* sin²θ = (cdy²t² - 2·cdy·pdy·t + pdy²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
*
* Then add both together, set the result equal to 1, and express as a
* standard quadratic equation in t of the form At² + Bt + C = 0
*
* (cdx² + cdy² - dr²)·t² - 2·(cdx·pdx + cdy·pdy + r₁·dr)·t + (pdx² + pdy² - r₁²) = 0
*
* In other words:
*
* A = cdx² + cdy² - dr²
* B = -2·(pdx·cdx + pdy·cdy + r₁·dr)
* C = pdx² + pdy² - r₁²
*
* And again, notice that A does not depend on p, so can be
* precomputed. From here we just use the quadratic formula to solve
* for t:
*
* t = (-2·B ± ⎷(B² - 4·A·C)) / 2·A
*/
/* radial or conical */
Bool affine = TRUE;
double cx = 1.;
double cy = 0.;
double cz = 0.;
double rx = x + 0.5;
double ry = y + 0.5;
double rz = 1.;
if (pict->transform) {
PictVector v;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
cx = pict->transform->matrix[0][0]/65536.;
cy = pict->transform->matrix[1][0]/65536.;
cz = pict->transform->matrix[2][0]/65536.;
rx = v.vector[0]/65536.;
ry = v.vector[1]/65536.;
rz = v.vector[2]/65536.;
affine = pict->transform->matrix[2][0] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1;
}
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeRadial) {
PictRadialGradient *radial;
radial = &pGradient->radial;
if (affine) {
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
pdx = rx - c1x;
pdy = ry - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
/* projective */
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
double x, y;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
pdx = x - c1x;
pdy = y - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
} else /* SourcePictTypeConical */ {
double a = pGradient->conical.angle/(180.*65536);
if (affine) {
rx -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
ry -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
while (buffer < end) {
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
angle = atan2(ry, rx) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
double x, y;
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
x -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
y -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
angle = atan2(y, x) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0285/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b
|
e1b568dd2462f7cacf98f3d117936c34e2849a6b
| null |
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param, *p;
int al, j, ok;
long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
/*
* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
* ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
*/
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/*
* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
* identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
* problems later.
*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
} else {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len = 0;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/*
* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
* is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
* so create a NULL-terminated string.
*/
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (1 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0) ;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/*
* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
* byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len = 4;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p += 3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p += 1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n -= param_len;
p += encoded_pt_len;
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv;
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0) {
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
} else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
n -= 2;
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/*
* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
*/
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int num;
unsigned int size;
j = 0;
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
q += size;
j += size;
}
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (-1);
}
|
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param, *p;
int al, j, ok;
long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
/*
* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
* ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
*/
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/*
* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
* identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
* problems later.
*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
}
#endif
} else {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len = 0;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/*
* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
* is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
* so create a NULL-terminated string.
*/
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (1 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
/* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
rsa = NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0) ;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
if (2 > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p, i);
if (i > n - param_len) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p += i;
n -= param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# else
if (0) ;
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
} else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/*
* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
* byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len = 4;
if (param_len > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p += 3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p += 1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n -= param_len;
p += encoded_pt_len;
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
# endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv;
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0) {
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
} else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
n -= 2;
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/*
* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
*/
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int num;
unsigned int size;
j = 0;
q = md_buf;
for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
q += size;
j += size;
}
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (-1);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2839/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CrosMock::SetTouchpadLibraryExpectations() {
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_touchpad_library_, SetSensitivity(_))
.Times(AnyNumber());
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_touchpad_library_, SetTapToClick(_))
.Times(AnyNumber());
}
|
void CrosMock::SetTouchpadLibraryExpectations() {
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_touchpad_library_, SetSensitivity(_))
.Times(AnyNumber());
EXPECT_CALL(*mock_touchpad_library_, SetTapToClick(_))
.Times(AnyNumber());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5353
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5353/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/7d7190695ce2ff269fdffb04e87139995cde21f4
|
7d7190695ce2ff269fdffb04e87139995cde21f4
|
UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
dissect_dch_timing_advance(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
guint8 cfn;
guint16 timing_advance;
proto_item *timing_advance_ti;
/* CFN control */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Timing Advance */
timing_advance = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x3f) * 4;
timing_advance_ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_timing_advance, tvb, offset, 1, timing_advance);
offset++;
if ((p_fp_info->release == 7) &&
(tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 0)) {
/* New IE flags */
guint8 flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
guint8 extended_bits = flags & 0x01;
offset++;
if (extended_bits) {
guint8 extra_bit = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_item_append_text(timing_advance_ti, " (extended to %u)",
(timing_advance << 1) | extra_bit);
}
offset++;
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN = %u, TA = %u",
cfn, timing_advance);
return offset;
}
|
dissect_dch_timing_advance(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo,
tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info)
{
guint8 cfn;
guint16 timing_advance;
proto_item *timing_advance_ti;
/* CFN control */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Timing Advance */
timing_advance = (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x3f) * 4;
timing_advance_ti = proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_timing_advance, tvb, offset, 1, timing_advance);
offset++;
if ((p_fp_info->release == 7) &&
(tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 0)) {
/* New IE flags */
guint8 flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
guint8 extended_bits = flags & 0x01;
offset++;
if (extended_bits) {
guint8 extra_bit = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_item_append_text(timing_advance_ti, " (extended to %u)",
(timing_advance << 1) | extra_bit);
}
offset++;
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, " CFN = %u, TA = %u",
cfn, timing_advance);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6154/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::framebufferTextureLayer(GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
WebGLTexture* texture,
GLint level,
GLint layer) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateFramebufferFuncParameters(
"framebufferTextureLayer", target, attachment))
return;
if (texture && !texture->Validate(ContextGroup(), this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"texture does not belong to this context");
return;
}
GLenum textarget = texture ? texture->GetTarget() : 0;
if (texture) {
if (textarget != GL_TEXTURE_3D && textarget != GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"invalid texture type");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFuncLayer("framebufferTextureLayer", textarget, layer))
return;
if (!ValidateTexFuncLevel("framebufferTextureLayer", textarget, level))
return;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
if (!framebuffer_binding || !framebuffer_binding->Object()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"no framebuffer bound");
return;
}
if (framebuffer_binding && framebuffer_binding->Opaque()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"opaque framebuffer bound");
return;
}
framebuffer_binding->SetAttachmentForBoundFramebuffer(
target, attachment, textarget, texture, level, layer);
ApplyStencilTest();
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::framebufferTextureLayer(GLenum target,
GLenum attachment,
WebGLTexture* texture,
GLint level,
GLint layer) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateFramebufferFuncParameters(
"framebufferTextureLayer", target, attachment))
return;
if (texture && !texture->Validate(ContextGroup(), this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"no texture or texture not from this context");
return;
}
GLenum textarget = texture ? texture->GetTarget() : 0;
if (texture) {
if (textarget != GL_TEXTURE_3D && textarget != GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"invalid texture type");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFuncLayer("framebufferTextureLayer", textarget, layer))
return;
if (!ValidateTexFuncLevel("framebufferTextureLayer", textarget, level))
return;
}
WebGLFramebuffer* framebuffer_binding = GetFramebufferBinding(target);
if (!framebuffer_binding || !framebuffer_binding->Object()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"no framebuffer bound");
return;
}
if (framebuffer_binding && framebuffer_binding->Opaque()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "framebufferTextureLayer",
"opaque framebuffer bound");
return;
}
framebuffer_binding->SetAttachmentForBoundFramebuffer(
target, attachment, textarget, texture, level, layer);
ApplyStencilTest();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
|
29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac
| null |
void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
void BrowserContextDestroyer::Shutdown() {
auto destroy_all_unused_contexts = []() {
auto it = g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().begin();
while (it != g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get().end()) {
BrowserContextDestroyer* destroyer = *it;
++it;
if (!destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_) {
continue;
}
destroyer->FinishDestroyContext();
// |destroyer| is invalid now
}
};
// We make 2 passes over the list because the first pass can destroy an
// incognito BrowserContext that subsequently schedules its owner context for
// deletion
destroy_all_unused_contexts();
destroy_all_unused_contexts();
}
//// static
void BrowserContextDestroyer::RenderProcessHostAssignedToSiteInstance(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
BrowserContextDestroyer* destroyer = GetForContext(host->GetBrowserContext());
if (!destroyer) {
return;
}
CHECK(!destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_);
if (destroyer->pending_host_ids_.find(host->GetID()) !=
destroyer->pending_host_ids_.end()) {
return;
}
destroyer->ObserveHost(host);
}
|
void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(BrowserContext* context) {
CHECK(context->IsOffTheRecord() || !context->HasOffTheRecordContext());
content::BrowserContext::NotifyWillBeDestroyed(context);
std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*> hosts;
for (content::RenderProcessHost::iterator it =
content::RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator();
!it.IsAtEnd(); it.Advance()) {
content::RenderProcessHost* host = it.GetCurrentValue();
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != context) {
continue;
}
hosts.insert(host);
//// static
}
if (hosts.empty()) {
delete context;
} else {
new BrowserContextDestroyer(context, hosts);
}
}
|
CPP
|
launchpad
| 1 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
b173ac05993f634a42be3d3535e1b158de0c3372
|
Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
|
qboolean Com_SafeMode( void ) {
int i;
for ( i = 0 ; i < com_numConsoleLines ; i++ ) {
Cmd_TokenizeString( com_consoleLines[i] );
if ( !Q_stricmp( Cmd_Argv(0), "safe" )
|| !Q_stricmp( Cmd_Argv(0), "cvar_restart" ) ) {
com_consoleLines[i][0] = 0;
return qtrue;
}
}
return qfalse;
}
|
qboolean Com_SafeMode( void ) {
int i;
for ( i = 0 ; i < com_numConsoleLines ; i++ ) {
Cmd_TokenizeString( com_consoleLines[i] );
if ( !Q_stricmp( Cmd_Argv(0), "safe" )
|| !Q_stricmp( Cmd_Argv(0), "cvar_restart" ) ) {
com_consoleLines[i][0] = 0;
return qtrue;
}
}
return qfalse;
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2696/
|
CWE-18
|
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a
|
e04f0283516e80d2f93366e0d479d13c9b5c8c2a
|
Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
#if 0
size_t i;
#endif
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
#if 0
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
}
}
#endif
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
|
krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
#if 0
size_t i;
#endif
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
#if 0
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_set_sec_context_option_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
}
}
#endif
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5307/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_single(int vpid)
{
if (vpid == 0)
return;
if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single())
__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT, vpid, 0);
}
|
static inline void vpid_sync_vcpu_single(int vpid)
{
if (vpid == 0)
return;
if (cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single())
__invvpid(VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT, vpid, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
explicit TestObserver(WallpaperManager* wallpaper_manager)
: update_wallpaper_count_(0), wallpaper_manager_(wallpaper_manager) {
DCHECK(wallpaper_manager_);
wallpaper_manager_->AddObserver(this);
}
|
explicit TestObserver(WallpaperManager* wallpaper_manager)
: update_wallpaper_count_(0), wallpaper_manager_(wallpaper_manager) {
DCHECK(wallpaper_manager_);
wallpaper_manager_->AddObserver(this);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-3731
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-3731/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/00d965474b22b54e4275232bc71ee0c699c5cd21
|
00d965474b22b54e4275232bc71ee0c699c5cd21
|
crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!cctx->key_set)
return -1;
if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
if (!cctx->iv_set)
return -1;
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
return -1;
if (!out) {
if (!in) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
return len;
}
/* If have AAD need message length */
if (!cctx->len_set && len)
return -1;
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
return len;
}
/* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
if (!in)
return 0;
/* If not set length yet do it */
if (!cctx->len_set) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
return -1;
cctx->tag_set = 1;
return len;
} else {
int rv = -1;
if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
unsigned char tag[16];
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
cctx->M))
rv = len;
}
}
if (rv == -1)
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
cctx->iv_set = 0;
cctx->tag_set = 0;
cctx->len_set = 0;
return rv;
}
}
|
static int aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_CCM_CTX *cctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_CCM_CTX,ctx);
CCM128_CONTEXT *ccm = &cctx->ccm;
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!cctx->key_set)
return -1;
if (cctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_ccm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
if (!cctx->iv_set)
return -1;
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
return -1;
if (!out) {
if (!in) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
return len;
}
/* If have AAD need message length */
if (!cctx->len_set && len)
return -1;
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
return len;
}
/* EVP_*Final() doesn't return any data */
if (!in)
return 0;
/* If not set length yet do it */
if (!cctx->len_set) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
15 - cctx->L, len))
return -1;
cctx->len_set = 1;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
if (cctx->str ? CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
CRYPTO_ccm128_encrypt(ccm, in, out, len))
return -1;
cctx->tag_set = 1;
return len;
} else {
int rv = -1;
if (cctx->str ? !CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt_ccm64(ccm, in, out, len,
cctx->str) :
!CRYPTO_ccm128_decrypt(ccm, in, out, len)) {
unsigned char tag[16];
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_tag(ccm, tag, cctx->M)) {
if (!CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
cctx->M))
rv = len;
}
}
if (rv == -1)
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
cctx->iv_set = 0;
cctx->tag_set = 0;
cctx->len_set = 0;
return rv;
}
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
5041f984669fe3a989a84c348eb838c8f7233f6b
|
AutoFill: Release the cached frame when we receive the frameDestroyed() message
from WebKit.
BUG=48857
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3173005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55789 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderView::OnUndo() {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Undo"));
UserMetricsRecordAction("Undo");
}
|
void RenderView::OnUndo() {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Undo"));
UserMetricsRecordAction("Undo");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6348
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6348/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4c03b862b12f980456f9de92db6d508a4999b788
|
4c03b862b12f980456f9de92db6d508a4999b788
|
irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int hashbin_delete( hashbin_t* hashbin, FREE_FUNC free_func)
{
irda_queue_t* queue;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int i;
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin != NULL, return -1;);
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return -1;);
/* Synchronize */
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
/*
* Free the entries in the hashbin, TODO: use hashbin_clear when
* it has been shown to work
*/
for (i = 0; i < HASHBIN_SIZE; i ++ ) {
while (1) {
queue = dequeue_first((irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
if (!queue)
break;
if (free_func) {
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
free_func(queue);
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
}
}
}
/* Cleanup local data */
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
hashbin->magic = ~HB_MAGIC;
/* Release lock */
if (hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
/*
* Free the hashbin structure
*/
kfree(hashbin);
return 0;
}
|
int hashbin_delete( hashbin_t* hashbin, FREE_FUNC free_func)
{
irda_queue_t* queue;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int i;
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin != NULL, return -1;);
IRDA_ASSERT(hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return -1;);
/* Synchronize */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_lock_irqsave_nested(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags,
hashbin_lock_depth++);
}
/*
* Free the entries in the hashbin, TODO: use hashbin_clear when
* it has been shown to work
*/
for (i = 0; i < HASHBIN_SIZE; i ++ ) {
queue = dequeue_first((irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
while (queue ) {
if (free_func)
(*free_func)(queue);
queue = dequeue_first(
(irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[i]);
}
}
/* Cleanup local data */
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
hashbin->magic = ~HB_MAGIC;
/* Release lock */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
hashbin_lock_depth--;
#endif
}
/*
* Free the hashbin structure
*/
kfree(hashbin);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
put_set_field(struct ofpbuf *openflow, enum ofp_version ofp_version,
enum mf_field_id field, uint64_t value_)
{
struct ofp12_action_set_field *oasf OVS_UNUSED;
int n_bytes = mf_from_id(field)->n_bytes;
size_t start_ofs = openflow->size;
union mf_value value;
value.be64 = htonll(value_ << (8 * (8 - n_bytes)));
oasf = put_OFPAT12_SET_FIELD(openflow);
openflow->size = openflow->size - sizeof oasf->pad;
nx_put_entry(openflow, mf_from_id(field), ofp_version, &value, NULL);
pad_ofpat(openflow, start_ofs);
}
|
put_set_field(struct ofpbuf *openflow, enum ofp_version ofp_version,
enum mf_field_id field, uint64_t value_)
{
struct ofp12_action_set_field *oasf OVS_UNUSED;
int n_bytes = mf_from_id(field)->n_bytes;
size_t start_ofs = openflow->size;
union mf_value value;
value.be64 = htonll(value_ << (8 * (8 - n_bytes)));
oasf = put_OFPAT12_SET_FIELD(openflow);
openflow->size = openflow->size - sizeof oasf->pad;
nx_put_entry(openflow, mf_from_id(field), ofp_version, &value, NULL);
pad_ofpat(openflow, start_ofs);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static struct object_entry *insert_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned int h = sha1[0] << 8 | sha1[1];
struct object_entry *e = object_table[h];
while (e) {
if (!hashcmp(sha1, e->idx.sha1))
return e;
e = e->next;
}
e = new_object(sha1);
e->next = object_table[h];
e->idx.offset = 0;
object_table[h] = e;
return e;
}
|
static struct object_entry *insert_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned int h = sha1[0] << 8 | sha1[1];
struct object_entry *e = object_table[h];
while (e) {
if (!hashcmp(sha1, e->idx.sha1))
return e;
e = e->next;
}
e = new_object(sha1);
e->next = object_table[h];
e->idx.offset = 0;
object_table[h] = e;
return e;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6210
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6210/
|
CWE-476
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/virglrenderer/commit/?id=0a5dff15912207b83018485f83e067474e818bab
|
0a5dff15912207b83018485f83e067474e818bab
| null |
static int vrend_decode_create_sampler_view(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t res_handle, format, val0, val1, swizzle_packed;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
res_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_RES_HANDLE);
format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_FORMAT);
val0 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_BUFFER_FIRST_ELEMENT);
val1 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_BUFFER_LAST_ELEMENT);
swizzle_packed = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_SWIZZLE);
return vrend_create_sampler_view(ctx->grctx, handle, res_handle, format, val0, val1,swizzle_packed);
}
|
static int vrend_decode_create_sampler_view(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t res_handle, format, val0, val1, swizzle_packed;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
res_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_RES_HANDLE);
format = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_FORMAT);
val0 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_BUFFER_FIRST_ELEMENT);
val1 = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_BUFFER_LAST_ELEMENT);
swizzle_packed = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_SAMPLER_VIEW_SWIZZLE);
return vrend_create_sampler_view(ctx->grctx, handle, res_handle, format, val0, val1,swizzle_packed);
}
|
C
|
virglrenderer
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3849
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3849/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/4cff1f49ff95d990d6c2614da5d5a23d02145885
|
4cff1f49ff95d990d6c2614da5d5a23d02145885
|
Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
|
static jboolean Region_setRect(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong dstHandle, jint left, jint top, jint right, jint bottom) {
SkRegion* dst = reinterpret_cast<SkRegion*>(dstHandle);
bool result = dst->setRect(left, top, right, bottom);
return boolTojboolean(result);
}
|
static jboolean Region_setRect(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong dstHandle, jint left, jint top, jint right, jint bottom) {
SkRegion* dst = reinterpret_cast<SkRegion*>(dstHandle);
bool result = dst->setRect(left, top, right, bottom);
return boolTojboolean(result);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::ViewSource(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& content_state) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ViewSource"));
DCHECK(contents);
TabContentsWrapper* view_source_contents = contents->Clone();
view_source_contents->controller().PruneAllButActive();
NavigationEntry* active_entry =
view_source_contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!active_entry)
return;
GURL view_source_url = GURL(chrome::kViewSourceScheme + std::string(":") +
url.spec());
active_entry->set_virtual_url(view_source_url);
active_entry->set_content_state(
webkit_glue::RemoveScrollOffsetFromHistoryState(content_state));
active_entry->set_title(string16());
if (CanSupportWindowFeature(FEATURE_TABSTRIP)) {
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->
GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
int add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE |
TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_GROUP;
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(index + 1,
view_source_contents,
add_types);
} else {
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForType(TYPE_TABBED, profile_);
BrowserWindow* new_window = browser->window();
new_window->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(new_window->GetRestoredBounds().origin(),
window()->GetRestoredBounds().size()));
browser->window()->Show();
browser->AddTab(view_source_contents, PageTransition::LINK);
}
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(view_source_contents, false);
}
|
void Browser::ViewSource(TabContentsWrapper* contents,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& content_state) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ViewSource"));
DCHECK(contents);
TabContentsWrapper* view_source_contents = contents->Clone();
view_source_contents->controller().PruneAllButActive();
NavigationEntry* active_entry =
view_source_contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!active_entry)
return;
GURL view_source_url = GURL(chrome::kViewSourceScheme + std::string(":") +
url.spec());
active_entry->set_virtual_url(view_source_url);
active_entry->set_content_state(
webkit_glue::RemoveScrollOffsetFromHistoryState(content_state));
active_entry->set_title(string16());
if (CanSupportWindowFeature(FEATURE_TABSTRIP)) {
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->
GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
int add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE |
TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_GROUP;
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(index + 1,
view_source_contents,
add_types);
} else {
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForType(TYPE_TABBED, profile_);
BrowserWindow* new_window = browser->window();
new_window->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(new_window->GetRestoredBounds().origin(),
window()->GetRestoredBounds().size()));
browser->window()->Show();
browser->AddTab(view_source_contents, PageTransition::LINK);
}
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(view_source_contents, false);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
MemoryTracker* memory_tracker() {
return group_->memory_tracker();
}
|
MemoryTracker* memory_tracker() {
return group_->memory_tracker();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4648
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4648/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a54917c3fc295cb61f3fb52373c173fd3b69f48
|
0a54917c3fc295cb61f3fb52373c173fd3b69f48
|
orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <[email protected]>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
static int orinoco_set_key(struct orinoco_private *priv, int index,
enum orinoco_alg alg, const u8 *key, int key_len,
const u8 *seq, int seq_len)
{
kzfree(priv->keys[index].key);
kzfree(priv->keys[index].seq);
if (key_len) {
priv->keys[index].key = kzalloc(key_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!priv->keys[index].key)
goto nomem;
} else
priv->keys[index].key = NULL;
if (seq_len) {
priv->keys[index].seq = kzalloc(seq_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!priv->keys[index].seq)
goto free_key;
} else
priv->keys[index].seq = NULL;
priv->keys[index].key_len = key_len;
priv->keys[index].seq_len = seq_len;
if (key_len)
memcpy(priv->keys[index].key, key, key_len);
if (seq_len)
memcpy(priv->keys[index].seq, seq, seq_len);
switch (alg) {
case ORINOCO_ALG_TKIP:
priv->keys[index].cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
break;
case ORINOCO_ALG_WEP:
priv->keys[index].cipher = (key_len > SMALL_KEY_SIZE) ?
WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 : WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
break;
case ORINOCO_ALG_NONE:
default:
priv->keys[index].cipher = 0;
break;
}
return 0;
free_key:
kfree(priv->keys[index].key);
priv->keys[index].key = NULL;
nomem:
priv->keys[index].key_len = 0;
priv->keys[index].seq_len = 0;
priv->keys[index].cipher = 0;
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
static int orinoco_set_key(struct orinoco_private *priv, int index,
enum orinoco_alg alg, const u8 *key, int key_len,
const u8 *seq, int seq_len)
{
kzfree(priv->keys[index].key);
kzfree(priv->keys[index].seq);
if (key_len) {
priv->keys[index].key = kzalloc(key_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!priv->keys[index].key)
goto nomem;
} else
priv->keys[index].key = NULL;
if (seq_len) {
priv->keys[index].seq = kzalloc(seq_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!priv->keys[index].seq)
goto free_key;
} else
priv->keys[index].seq = NULL;
priv->keys[index].key_len = key_len;
priv->keys[index].seq_len = seq_len;
if (key_len)
memcpy(priv->keys[index].key, key, key_len);
if (seq_len)
memcpy(priv->keys[index].seq, seq, seq_len);
switch (alg) {
case ORINOCO_ALG_TKIP:
priv->keys[index].cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
break;
case ORINOCO_ALG_WEP:
priv->keys[index].cipher = (key_len > SMALL_KEY_SIZE) ?
WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 : WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
break;
case ORINOCO_ALG_NONE:
default:
priv->keys[index].cipher = 0;
break;
}
return 0;
free_key:
kfree(priv->keys[index].key);
priv->keys[index].key = NULL;
nomem:
priv->keys[index].key_len = 0;
priv->keys[index].seq_len = 0;
priv->keys[index].cipher = 0;
return -ENOMEM;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010251
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010251/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3590/commits/11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe
|
11f3659f64a4e42e90cb3c09fcef66894205aefe
|
teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
|
const char *PktSrcToString(enum PktSrcEnum pkt_src)
{
const char *pkt_src_str = "<unknown>";
switch (pkt_src) {
case PKT_SRC_WIRE:
pkt_src_str = "wire/pcap";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_GRE:
pkt_src_str = "gre tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV4:
pkt_src_str = "ipv4 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV6:
pkt_src_str = "ipv6 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO:
pkt_src_str = "teredo tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DEFRAG:
pkt_src_str = "defrag";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_STREAM_END_PSEUDO:
pkt_src_str = "stream";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_DETECTLOG_FLUSH:
pkt_src_str = "stream (detect/log)";
break;
case PKT_SRC_FFR:
pkt_src_str = "stream (flow timeout)";
break;
}
return pkt_src_str;
}
|
const char *PktSrcToString(enum PktSrcEnum pkt_src)
{
const char *pkt_src_str = "<unknown>";
switch (pkt_src) {
case PKT_SRC_WIRE:
pkt_src_str = "wire/pcap";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_GRE:
pkt_src_str = "gre tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV4:
pkt_src_str = "ipv4 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_IPV6:
pkt_src_str = "ipv6 tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO:
pkt_src_str = "teredo tunnel";
break;
case PKT_SRC_DEFRAG:
pkt_src_str = "defrag";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_STREAM_END_PSEUDO:
pkt_src_str = "stream";
break;
case PKT_SRC_STREAM_TCP_DETECTLOG_FLUSH:
pkt_src_str = "stream (detect/log)";
break;
case PKT_SRC_FFR:
pkt_src_str = "stream (flow timeout)";
break;
}
return pkt_src_str;
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::JavaScriptDialogClosed(IPC::Message* reply_msg,
bool success,
const string16& user_input) {
GetProcess()->SetIgnoreInputEvents(false);
bool is_waiting =
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ || is_waiting_for_unload_ack_;
if (is_waiting) {
StartHangMonitorTimeout(TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
success ? kUnloadTimeoutMS : hung_renderer_delay_ms_));
}
ViewHostMsg_RunJavaScriptMessage::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg,
success, user_input);
Send(reply_msg);
if (is_waiting && are_javascript_messages_suppressed_)
delegate_->RendererUnresponsive(this, is_waiting);
}
|
void RenderViewHostImpl::JavaScriptDialogClosed(IPC::Message* reply_msg,
bool success,
const string16& user_input) {
GetProcess()->SetIgnoreInputEvents(false);
bool is_waiting =
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ || is_waiting_for_unload_ack_;
if (is_waiting) {
StartHangMonitorTimeout(TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(
success ? kUnloadTimeoutMS : hung_renderer_delay_ms_));
}
ViewHostMsg_RunJavaScriptMessage::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg,
success, user_input);
Send(reply_msg);
if (is_waiting && are_javascript_messages_suppressed_)
delegate_->RendererUnresponsive(this, is_waiting);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tun_net_mclist(struct net_device *dev)
{
/*
* This callback is supposed to deal with mc filter in
* _rx_ path and has nothing to do with the _tx_ path.
* In rx path we always accept everything userspace gives us.
*/
}
|
static void tun_net_mclist(struct net_device *dev)
{
/*
* This callback is supposed to deal with mc filter in
* _rx_ path and has nothing to do with the _tx_ path.
* In rx path we always accept everything userspace gives us.
*/
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5189
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5189/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd
|
2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd
|
[GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
|
HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetStringValue(DWORD field_id, wchar_t** value) {
return GetStringValueImpl(field_id, value);
}
|
HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetStringValue(DWORD field_id, wchar_t** value) {
return GetStringValueImpl(field_id, value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnFirstVisuallyNonEmptyPaint(RenderViewHostImpl* source) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidFirstVisuallyNonEmptyPaint();
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_ = true;
if (theme_color_ != last_sent_theme_color_) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidChangeThemeColor(theme_color_);
last_sent_theme_color_ = theme_color_;
}
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnFirstVisuallyNonEmptyPaint(RenderViewHostImpl* source) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidFirstVisuallyNonEmptyPaint();
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_ = true;
if (theme_color_ != last_sent_theme_color_) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidChangeThemeColor(theme_color_);
last_sent_theme_color_ = theme_color_;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
put_chunk(const unsigned char *chunk, uInt length)
{
uLong crc;
put_uLong(length-4); /* Exclude the tag */
fwrite(chunk, length, 1, stdout);
crc = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
put_uLong(crc32(crc, chunk, length));
}
|
put_chunk(const unsigned char *chunk, uInt length)
{
uLong crc;
put_uLong(length-4); /* Exclude the tag */
fwrite(chunk, length, 1, stdout);
crc = crc32(0, Z_NULL, 0);
put_uLong(crc32(crc, chunk, length));
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d
|
Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Browser* Browser::AsBrowser() {
return this;
}
|
Browser* Browser::AsBrowser() {
return this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6621/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderFrameImpl::runModalAlertDialog(const blink::WebString& message) {
RunJavaScriptMessage(JAVASCRIPT_MESSAGE_TYPE_ALERT,
message,
base::string16(),
frame_->document().url(),
NULL);
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::runModalAlertDialog(const blink::WebString& message) {
RunJavaScriptMessage(JAVASCRIPT_MESSAGE_TYPE_ALERT,
message,
base::string16(),
frame_->document().url(),
NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5156
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5156/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
b15c87071f906301bccc824ce013966ca93998c7
|
Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string GenerateIpcChannelName(void* client) {
return base::StringPrintf("%d.%p.%d",
base::GetCurrentProcId(), client,
base::RandInt(0, std::numeric_limits<int>::max()));
}
|
std::string GenerateIpcChannelName(void* client) {
return base::StringPrintf("%d.%p.%d",
base::GetCurrentProcId(), client,
base::RandInt(0, std::numeric_limits<int>::max()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-2331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2331/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=ef8fc4b53d92fbfcd8ef1abbd6f2f5fe2c4a11e5
|
ef8fc4b53d92fbfcd8ef1abbd6f2f5fe2c4a11e5
| null |
_zip_write4(unsigned int i, FILE *fp)
{
putc(i&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>8)&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>16)&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>24)&0xff, fp);
return;
}
|
_zip_write4(unsigned int i, FILE *fp)
{
putc(i&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>8)&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>16)&0xff, fp);
putc((i>>24)&0xff, fp);
return;
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2010-3855
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-3855/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=59eb9f8cfe7d1df379a2318316d1f04f80fba54a
|
59eb9f8cfe7d1df379a2318316d1f04f80fba54a
| null |
TT_Set_MM_Blend( TT_Face face,
FT_UInt num_coords,
FT_Fixed* coords )
{
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
GX_Blend blend;
FT_MM_Var* mmvar;
FT_UInt i;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
enum
{
mcvt_retain,
mcvt_modify,
mcvt_load
} manageCvt;
face->doblend = FALSE;
if ( face->blend == NULL )
{
if ( (error = TT_Get_MM_Var( face, NULL)) != 0 )
goto Exit;
}
blend = face->blend;
mmvar = blend->mmvar;
if ( num_coords != mmvar->num_axis )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
if ( coords[i] < -0x00010000L || coords[i] > 0x00010000L )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( blend->glyphoffsets == NULL )
if ( (error = ft_var_load_gvar( face )) != 0 )
goto Exit;
if ( blend->normalizedcoords == NULL )
{
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( blend->normalizedcoords, num_coords ) )
goto Exit;
manageCvt = mcvt_modify;
/* If we have not set the blend coordinates before this, then the */
/* cvt table will still be what we read from the `cvt ' table and */
/* we don't need to reload it. We may need to change it though... */
}
else
{
manageCvt = mcvt_retain;
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
{
if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] != coords[i] )
{
manageCvt = mcvt_load;
break;
}
}
/* If we don't change the blend coords then we don't need to do */
/* anything to the cvt table. It will be correct. Otherwise we */
/* no longer have the original cvt (it was modified when we set */
/* the blend last time), so we must reload and then modify it. */
}
blend->num_axis = num_coords;
FT_MEM_COPY( blend->normalizedcoords,
coords,
num_coords * sizeof ( FT_Fixed ) );
face->doblend = TRUE;
if ( face->cvt != NULL )
{
switch ( manageCvt )
{
case mcvt_load:
/* The cvt table has been loaded already; every time we change the */
/* blend we may need to reload and remodify the cvt table. */
FT_FREE( face->cvt );
face->cvt = NULL;
tt_face_load_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_modify:
/* The original cvt table is in memory. All we need to do is */
/* apply the `cvar' table (if any). */
tt_face_vary_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_retain:
/* The cvt table is correct for this set of coordinates. */
break;
}
}
Exit:
return error;
}
|
TT_Set_MM_Blend( TT_Face face,
FT_UInt num_coords,
FT_Fixed* coords )
{
FT_Error error = TT_Err_Ok;
GX_Blend blend;
FT_MM_Var* mmvar;
FT_UInt i;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
enum
{
mcvt_retain,
mcvt_modify,
mcvt_load
} manageCvt;
face->doblend = FALSE;
if ( face->blend == NULL )
{
if ( (error = TT_Get_MM_Var( face, NULL)) != 0 )
goto Exit;
}
blend = face->blend;
mmvar = blend->mmvar;
if ( num_coords != mmvar->num_axis )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
if ( coords[i] < -0x00010000L || coords[i] > 0x00010000L )
{
error = TT_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
if ( blend->glyphoffsets == NULL )
if ( (error = ft_var_load_gvar( face )) != 0 )
goto Exit;
if ( blend->normalizedcoords == NULL )
{
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( blend->normalizedcoords, num_coords ) )
goto Exit;
manageCvt = mcvt_modify;
/* If we have not set the blend coordinates before this, then the */
/* cvt table will still be what we read from the `cvt ' table and */
/* we don't need to reload it. We may need to change it though... */
}
else
{
manageCvt = mcvt_retain;
for ( i = 0; i < num_coords; ++i )
{
if ( blend->normalizedcoords[i] != coords[i] )
{
manageCvt = mcvt_load;
break;
}
}
/* If we don't change the blend coords then we don't need to do */
/* anything to the cvt table. It will be correct. Otherwise we */
/* no longer have the original cvt (it was modified when we set */
/* the blend last time), so we must reload and then modify it. */
}
blend->num_axis = num_coords;
FT_MEM_COPY( blend->normalizedcoords,
coords,
num_coords * sizeof ( FT_Fixed ) );
face->doblend = TRUE;
if ( face->cvt != NULL )
{
switch ( manageCvt )
{
case mcvt_load:
/* The cvt table has been loaded already; every time we change the */
/* blend we may need to reload and remodify the cvt table. */
FT_FREE( face->cvt );
face->cvt = NULL;
tt_face_load_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_modify:
/* The original cvt table is in memory. All we need to do is */
/* apply the `cvar' table (if any). */
tt_face_vary_cvt( face, face->root.stream );
break;
case mcvt_retain:
/* The cvt table is correct for this set of coordinates. */
break;
}
}
Exit:
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1674/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
14ff9d0cded8ae8032ef027d1f33c6666a695019
|
[Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> CreateV8String(v8::Isolate* isolate,
const std::string& str) {
return v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, str.c_str(),
v8::String::kNormalString, str.length());
}
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> CreateV8String(v8::Isolate* isolate,
const std::string& str) {
return v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, str.c_str(),
v8::String::kNormalString, str.length());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute_Getter");
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
V8PerContextData* context_data = script_state->PerContextData();
if (context_data && context_data->ActivityLogger()) {
context_data->ActivityLogger()->LogGetter("TestObject.activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute");
}
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute_Getter");
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
V8PerContextData* context_data = script_state->PerContextData();
if (context_data && context_data->ActivityLogger()) {
context_data->ActivityLogger()->LogGetter("TestObject.activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute");
}
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0816/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/f490fc335772a9b14e78997486f4a572b0594c04
|
f490fc335772a9b14e78997486f4a572b0594c04
|
Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking to Downmix and Reverb
Bug: 63662938
Bug: 63526567
Test: Added CTS tests
Change-Id: I8ed398cd62a9f461b0590e37f593daa3d8e4dbc4
(cherry picked from commit 804632afcdda6e80945bf27c384757bda50560cb)
|
void Reverb_free(ReverbContext *pContext){
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVREV_MemoryTable_st MemTab;
/* Free the algorithm memory */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetMemoryTable(pContext->hInstance,
&MemTab,
LVM_NULL);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetMemoryTable", "Reverb_free")
for (int i=0; i<LVM_NR_MEMORY_REGIONS; i++){
if (MemTab.Region[i].Size != 0){
if (MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress != NULL){
ALOGV("\tfree() - START freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
free(MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
ALOGV("\tfree() - END freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}else{
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : free() - trying to free with NULL pointer %" PRIu32 " bytes "
"for region %u at %p ERROR\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}
}
}
} /* end Reverb_free */
|
void Reverb_free(ReverbContext *pContext){
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVREV_MemoryTable_st MemTab;
/* Free the algorithm memory */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetMemoryTable(pContext->hInstance,
&MemTab,
LVM_NULL);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetMemoryTable", "Reverb_free")
for (int i=0; i<LVM_NR_MEMORY_REGIONS; i++){
if (MemTab.Region[i].Size != 0){
if (MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress != NULL){
ALOGV("\tfree() - START freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
free(MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
ALOGV("\tfree() - END freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}else{
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : free() - trying to free with NULL pointer %" PRIu32 " bytes "
"for region %u at %p ERROR\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}
}
}
} /* end Reverb_free */
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9761
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9761/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/00e8f205475332d7842d0f0d1481eeab4e83017c
|
00e8f205475332d7842d0f0d1481eeab4e83017c
|
Fix #7727 - undefined pointers and out of band string access fixes
|
static char *parse_tmp_evals(RCore *core, const char *str) {
char *res = NULL;
RStrBuf *buf;
char *s = strdup (str);
buf = r_strbuf_new ("");
int i, argc = r_str_split (s, ',');
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
char *eq, *kv = (char *)r_str_word_get0 (s, i);
if (!kv) {
break;
}
eq = strchr (kv, '=');
if (eq) {
*eq = 0;
const char *ov = r_config_get (core->config, kv);
r_strbuf_appendf (buf, "e %s=%s;", kv, ov);
r_config_set (core->config, kv, eq + 1);
*eq = '=';
} else {
eprintf ("Missing '=' in e: expression (%s)\n", kv);
}
}
res = r_strbuf_drain (buf);
free (s);
return res;
}
|
static char *parse_tmp_evals(RCore *core, const char *str) {
char *res = NULL;
RStrBuf *buf;
char *s = strdup (str);
buf = r_strbuf_new ("");
int i, argc = r_str_split (s, ',');
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
char *eq, *kv = (char *)r_str_word_get0 (s, i);
if (!kv) {
break;
}
eq = strchr (kv, '=');
if (eq) {
*eq = 0;
const char *ov = r_config_get (core->config, kv);
r_strbuf_appendf (buf, "e %s=%s;", kv, ov);
r_config_set (core->config, kv, eq + 1);
*eq = '=';
} else {
eprintf ("Missing '=' in e: expression (%s)\n", kv);
}
}
res = r_strbuf_drain (buf);
free (s);
return res;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15572
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15572/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346
|
fdf82a7856b32d905c39afc85e34364491e46346
|
x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
{
return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
}
|
static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
{
return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16863
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16863/
|
CWE-78
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=79cccf641486
|
79cccf641486a6595c43f1de1cd7ade696020a31
| null |
gx_device_set_resolution(gx_device * dev, double x_dpi, double y_dpi)
{
dev->HWResolution[0] = x_dpi;
dev->HWResolution[1] = y_dpi;
gx_device_set_hwsize_from_media(dev);
}
|
gx_device_set_resolution(gx_device * dev, double x_dpi, double y_dpi)
{
dev->HWResolution[0] = x_dpi;
dev->HWResolution[1] = y_dpi;
gx_device_set_hwsize_from_media(dev);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestObjLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<long>(exec, value));
}
|
void setJSTestObjLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<long>(exec, value));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5011/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
eea3300239f0b53e172a320eb8de59d0bea65f27
|
DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
|
void DevToolsUIBindings::FileSystemRemoved(
const std::string& file_system_path) {
base::StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.fileSystemRemoved",
&file_system_path_value, NULL, NULL);
}
|
void DevToolsUIBindings::FileSystemRemoved(
const std::string& file_system_path) {
base::StringValue file_system_path_value(file_system_path);
CallClientFunction("DevToolsAPI.fileSystemRemoved",
&file_system_path_value, NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/183f4bcddd821b4af3f6234ad2e8c371694a9ffb
|
183f4bcddd821b4af3f6234ad2e8c371694a9ffb
|
Add a histogram (Net.PacResultForStrippedUrl) that estimates how often PAC scripts depend on the URL path.
BUG=593759
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1797313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#382644}
|
void ProxyResolverV8TracingFactoryImpl::CreateProxyResolverV8Tracing(
const scoped_refptr<ProxyResolverScriptData>& pac_script,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverV8Tracing::Bindings> bindings,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverV8Tracing>* resolver,
const CompletionCallback& callback,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverFactory::Request>* request) {
scoped_ptr<CreateJob> job(
new CreateJob(this, std::move(bindings), pac_script, resolver, callback));
jobs_.insert(job.get());
*request = std::move(job);
}
|
void ProxyResolverV8TracingFactoryImpl::CreateProxyResolverV8Tracing(
const scoped_refptr<ProxyResolverScriptData>& pac_script,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverV8Tracing::Bindings> bindings,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverV8Tracing>* resolver,
const CompletionCallback& callback,
scoped_ptr<ProxyResolverFactory::Request>* request) {
scoped_ptr<CreateJob> job(
new CreateJob(this, std::move(bindings), pac_script, resolver, callback));
jobs_.insert(job.get());
*request = std::move(job);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void activityLoggedAttrSetter1AttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedAttrSetter1", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedAttrSetter1(cppValue);
}
|
static void activityLoggedAttrSetter1AttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedAttrSetter1", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedAttrSetter1(cppValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0145
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0145/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=f0dce23475b5af5da6b17b97c1765271307734b6
|
f0dce23475b5af5da6b17b97c1765271307734b6
| null |
static int read_uint64(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t offset, uint64_t *result)
{
uint64_t buffer;
int ret;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, offset, &buffer, 8);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
*result = be64_to_cpu(buffer);
return 0;
}
|
static int read_uint64(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t offset, uint64_t *result)
{
uint64_t buffer;
int ret;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, offset, &buffer, 8);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
*result = be64_to_cpu(buffer);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0811
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0811/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libhevc/+/25c0ffbe6a181b4a373c3c9b421ea449d457e6ed
|
25c0ffbe6a181b4a373c3c9b421ea449d457e6ed
|
Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
|
static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_sub_layer_hrd_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
sub_lyr_hrd_params_t *ps_sub_layer_hrd_params,
WORD32 cpb_cnt,
WORD32 sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i <= cpb_cnt; i++)
{
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
if(sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("cbr_flag[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au1_cbr_flag[i], ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
return ret;
}
|
static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_sub_layer_hrd_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
sub_lyr_hrd_params_t *ps_sub_layer_hrd_params,
WORD32 cpb_cnt,
WORD32 sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i <= cpb_cnt; i++)
{
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
if(sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("cbr_flag[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au1_cbr_flag[i], ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct rtnl_link_stats64 *tg3_get_stats64(struct net_device *dev,
struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
if (!tp->hw_stats) {
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
return &tp->net_stats_prev;
}
tg3_get_nstats(tp, stats);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
return stats;
}
|
static struct rtnl_link_stats64 *tg3_get_stats64(struct net_device *dev,
struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
if (!tp->hw_stats) {
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
return &tp->net_stats_prev;
}
tg3_get_nstats(tp, stats);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
return stats;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3927
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3927/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
58ffd25567098d8ce9443b7c977382929d163b3d
|
[skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void GraphicsContext::strokePath(const Path& pathToStroke)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
SkPath path = *pathToStroke.platformPath();
if (!isPathSkiaSafe(getCTM(), path))
return;
SkPaint paint;
platformContext()->setupPaintForStroking(&paint, 0, 0);
platformContext()->canvas()->drawPath(path, paint);
}
|
void GraphicsContext::strokePath(const Path& pathToStroke)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
SkPath path = *pathToStroke.platformPath();
if (!isPathSkiaSafe(getCTM(), path))
return;
SkPaint paint;
platformContext()->setupPaintForStroking(&paint, 0, 0);
platformContext()->canvas()->drawPath(path, paint);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual ~WindowObserver() {}
|
virtual ~WindowObserver() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4265/
| null |
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/c94f9e854228e0ea00e1de8769d8d3f7cab84a55
|
c94f9e854228e0ea00e1de8769d8d3f7cab84a55
|
avutil/mem: Fix flipped condition
Fixes return code and later null pointer dereference
Found-by: Laurent Butti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && nmemb && size)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
|
int av_reallocp_array(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void **ptrptr = ptr;
*ptrptr = av_realloc_f(*ptrptr, nmemb, size);
if (!*ptrptr && !(nmemb && size))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244
|
1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244
|
Change VideoDecoder::ReadCB to take const scoped_refptr<VideoFrame>&.
BUG=none
TEST=media_unittests, media layout tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10559074
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143192 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void VideoRendererBase::DoStopOrError_Locked() {
DCHECK(!pending_paint_);
DCHECK(!pending_paint_with_last_available_);
lock_.AssertAcquired();
current_frame_ = NULL;
last_available_frame_ = NULL;
ready_frames_.clear();
}
|
void VideoRendererBase::DoStopOrError_Locked() {
DCHECK(!pending_paint_);
DCHECK(!pending_paint_with_last_available_);
lock_.AssertAcquired();
current_frame_ = NULL;
last_available_frame_ = NULL;
ready_frames_.clear();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
return __inet_hash_connect(death_row, sk, inet6_sk_port_offset(sk),
__inet6_check_established, __inet6_hash);
}
|
int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
return __inet_hash_connect(death_row, sk, inet6_sk_port_offset(sk),
__inet6_check_established, __inet6_hash);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-5313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-5313/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105
|
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
|
static int emulator_read_emulated(unsigned long addr,
void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
gpa_t gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_read_completed) {
memcpy(val, vcpu->mmio_data, bytes);
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes,
vcpu->mmio_phys_addr, *(u64 *)val);
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 0;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, addr, exception);
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
/* For APIC access vmexit */
if ((gpa & PAGE_MASK) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE)
goto mmio;
if (kvm_read_guest_virt(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, exception)
== X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
mmio:
/*
* Is this MMIO handled locally?
*/
if (!vcpu_mmio_read(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val)) {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes, gpa, *(u64 *)val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, 0);
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = vcpu->mmio_phys_addr = gpa;
vcpu->run->mmio.len = vcpu->mmio_size = bytes;
vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write = 0;
return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
}
|
static int emulator_read_emulated(unsigned long addr,
void *val,
unsigned int bytes,
struct x86_exception *exception,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
gpa_t gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_read_completed) {
memcpy(val, vcpu->mmio_data, bytes);
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes,
vcpu->mmio_phys_addr, *(u64 *)val);
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 0;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
gpa = kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(vcpu, addr, exception);
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
/* For APIC access vmexit */
if ((gpa & PAGE_MASK) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE)
goto mmio;
if (kvm_read_guest_virt(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, exception)
== X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
mmio:
/*
* Is this MMIO handled locally?
*/
if (!vcpu_mmio_read(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val)) {
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, bytes, gpa, *(u64 *)val);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ_UNSATISFIED, bytes, gpa, 0);
vcpu->mmio_needed = 1;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
vcpu->run->mmio.phys_addr = vcpu->mmio_phys_addr = gpa;
vcpu->run->mmio.len = vcpu->mmio_size = bytes;
vcpu->run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write = 0;
return X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
void Document::DidMoveTreeToNewDocument(const Node& root) {
DCHECK_NE(root.GetDocument(), this);
if (!ranges_.IsEmpty()) {
AttachedRangeSet ranges = ranges_;
for (Range* range : ranges)
range->UpdateOwnerDocumentIfNeeded();
}
NotifyMoveTreeToNewDocument(root);
}
|
void Document::DidMoveTreeToNewDocument(const Node& root) {
DCHECK_NE(root.GetDocument(), this);
if (!ranges_.IsEmpty()) {
AttachedRangeSet ranges = ranges_;
for (Range* range : ranges)
range->UpdateOwnerDocumentIfNeeded();
}
NotifyMoveTreeToNewDocument(root);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1643
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1643/
|
CWE-361
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2386a6a49ea992a1e859eb0296c1cc53e5772cdb
|
2386a6a49ea992a1e859eb0296c1cc53e5772cdb
|
ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
|
bool ImageInputType::shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes()
{
return true;
}
|
bool ImageInputType::shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes()
{
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-3731
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-3731/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/00d965474b22b54e4275232bc71ee0c699c5cd21
|
00d965474b22b54e4275232bc71ee0c699c5cd21
|
crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
size_t i;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
if (len < bl)
return 1;
for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
(*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
return 1;
}
|
static int aes_ecb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
size_t bl = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
size_t i;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
if (len < bl)
return 1;
for (i = 0, len -= bl; i <= len; i += bl)
(*dat->block) (in + i, out + i, &dat->ks);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1774/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int get_descriptor_addr(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int desc_type, struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc)
{
int start_address;
int status;
/* Search for requested descriptor in I2C */
start_address = 2;
do {
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
(__u8 *)rom_desc);
if (status)
return 0;
if (rom_desc->Type == desc_type)
return start_address;
start_address = start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc)
+ rom_desc->Size;
} while ((start_address < TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE) && rom_desc->Type);
return 0;
}
|
static int get_descriptor_addr(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int desc_type, struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc)
{
int start_address;
int status;
/* Search for requested descriptor in I2C */
start_address = 2;
do {
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
(__u8 *)rom_desc);
if (status)
return 0;
if (rom_desc->Type == desc_type)
return start_address;
start_address = start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc)
+ rom_desc->Size;
} while ((start_address < TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE) && rom_desc->Type);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15423
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2
|
Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
|
viz::SharedBitmapManager* RenderThreadImpl::GetSharedBitmapManager() {
return shared_bitmap_manager();
}
|
viz::SharedBitmapManager* RenderThreadImpl::GetSharedBitmapManager() {
return shared_bitmap_manager();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0217/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7d5145d8eb2b9791533ffe4dc003b129b9696c48
|
7d5145d8eb2b9791533ffe4dc003b129b9696c48
|
xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int netbk_check_gop(struct xenvif *vif, int nr_meta_slots,
struct netrx_pending_operations *npo)
{
struct gnttab_copy *copy_op;
int status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_meta_slots; i++) {
copy_op = npo->copy + npo->copy_cons++;
if (copy_op->status != GNTST_okay) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Bad status %d from copy to DOM%d.\n",
copy_op->status, vif->domid);
status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR;
}
}
return status;
}
|
static int netbk_check_gop(struct xenvif *vif, int nr_meta_slots,
struct netrx_pending_operations *npo)
{
struct gnttab_copy *copy_op;
int status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_meta_slots; i++) {
copy_op = npo->copy + npo->copy_cons++;
if (copy_op->status != GNTST_okay) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Bad status %d from copy to DOM%d.\n",
copy_op->status, vif->domid);
status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR;
}
}
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0828
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0828/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4d17163f4b66be517dc49019a029e5ddbd45078c
|
4d17163f4b66be517dc49019a029e5ddbd45078c
|
Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static unsigned computeMatchedPropertiesHash(const MatchedProperties* properties, unsigned size)
{
return StringHasher::hashMemory(properties, sizeof(MatchedProperties) * size);
}
|
static unsigned computeMatchedPropertiesHash(const MatchedProperties* properties, unsigned size)
{
return StringHasher::hashMemory(properties, sizeof(MatchedProperties) * size);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_set_name (Daemon *daemon,
const gchar *group_uuid,
const gchar *uuid,
const gchar *new_name,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-lvm2",
"LinuxLvm2LVSetName",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_set_name_authorized_cb,
context,
3,
g_strdup (group_uuid),
g_free,
g_strdup (uuid),
g_free,
g_strdup (new_name),
g_free);
return TRUE;
}
|
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_set_name (Daemon *daemon,
const gchar *group_uuid,
const gchar *uuid,
const gchar *new_name,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-lvm2",
"LinuxLvm2LVSetName",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_set_name_authorized_cb,
context,
3,
g_strdup (group_uuid),
g_free,
g_strdup (uuid),
g_free,
g_strdup (new_name),
g_free);
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9934
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9934/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/6045de69c7dedcba3eadf7c4bba424b19c81d00d
|
6045de69c7dedcba3eadf7c4bba424b19c81d00d
|
Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
|
static PHP_METHOD(PDOStatement, fetchColumn)
{
long col_n = 0;
PHP_STMT_GET_OBJ;
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &col_n)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PDO_STMT_CLEAR_ERR();
if (!do_fetch_common(stmt, PDO_FETCH_ORI_NEXT, 0, TRUE TSRMLS_CC)) {
PDO_HANDLE_STMT_ERR();
RETURN_FALSE;
}
fetch_value(stmt, return_value, col_n, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
static PHP_METHOD(PDOStatement, fetchColumn)
{
long col_n = 0;
PHP_STMT_GET_OBJ;
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|l", &col_n)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PDO_STMT_CLEAR_ERR();
if (!do_fetch_common(stmt, PDO_FETCH_ORI_NEXT, 0, TRUE TSRMLS_CC)) {
PDO_HANDLE_STMT_ERR();
RETURN_FALSE;
}
fetch_value(stmt, return_value, col_n, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18337
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18337/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f8e481c12c9e8de107b73508b6c283569d4df5b
|
2f8e481c12c9e8de107b73508b6c283569d4df5b
|
Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
[email protected]
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
|
bool HTMLLinkElement::HasActivationBehavior() const {
return false;
}
|
bool HTMLLinkElement::HasActivationBehavior() const {
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18017/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901
|
2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901
|
netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doff
Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use
after free in xt_TCPMSS
I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or
in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible
impact.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
tcpmss_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
{
struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
__be16 newlen;
int ret;
ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par,
PF_INET,
iph->ihl * 4,
sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
if (ret < 0)
return NF_DROP;
if (ret > 0) {
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
newlen = htons(ntohs(iph->tot_len) + ret);
csum_replace2(&iph->check, iph->tot_len, newlen);
iph->tot_len = newlen;
}
return XT_CONTINUE;
}
|
tcpmss_tg4(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
{
struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
__be16 newlen;
int ret;
ret = tcpmss_mangle_packet(skb, par,
PF_INET,
iph->ihl * 4,
sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(struct tcphdr));
if (ret < 0)
return NF_DROP;
if (ret > 0) {
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
newlen = htons(ntohs(iph->tot_len) + ret);
csum_replace2(&iph->check, iph->tot_len, newlen);
iph->tot_len = newlen;
}
return XT_CONTINUE;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = root;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
/* Also sync guest cr3 here in case we live migrate */
svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
|
static void set_tdp_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = root;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
/* Also sync guest cr3 here in case we live migrate */
svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
svm_flush_tlb(vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18344
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18344/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c71d8045ce0592cf3f4290744ab57b23c1d1b4c6
|
c71d8045ce0592cf3f4290744ab57b23c1d1b4c6
|
[DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
|
bool DevToolsAgentHostClient::MayAttachToRenderer(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_webui) {
return true;
}
|
bool DevToolsAgentHostClient::MayAttachToRenderer(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
bool is_webui) {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblks[2];
if (dst != src) {
dst[0] = src[0];
dst[1] = src[1];
}
le128_to_be128(&ctrblks[0], iv);
le128_inc(iv);
le128_to_be128(&ctrblks[1], iv);
le128_inc(iv);
camellia_enc_blk_xor_2way(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)ctrblks);
}
|
void camellia_crypt_ctr_2way(void *ctx, u128 *dst, const u128 *src, le128 *iv)
{
be128 ctrblks[2];
if (dst != src) {
dst[0] = src[0];
dst[1] = src[1];
}
le128_to_be128(&ctrblks[0], iv);
le128_inc(iv);
le128_to_be128(&ctrblks[1], iv);
le128_inc(iv);
camellia_enc_blk_xor_2way(ctx, (u8 *)dst, (u8 *)ctrblks);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13136/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterTIFFImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIFF64");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIFF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PTIF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
if (tiff_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
if (instantiate_key != MagickFalse)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFMERGEFIELDINFO) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFSETTAGEXTENDER)
if (tag_extender == (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
(void) TIFFSetTagExtender(tag_extender);
#endif
if (DeleteMagickThreadKey(tiff_exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) TIFFSetWarningHandler(warning_handler);
(void) TIFFSetErrorHandler(error_handler);
instantiate_key=MagickFalse;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
RelinquishSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
#endif
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterTIFFImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIFF64");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIFF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("TIF");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PTIF");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_TIFF_DELEGATE)
if (tiff_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
if (instantiate_key != MagickFalse)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFMERGEFIELDINFO) && defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFSETTAGEXTENDER)
if (tag_extender == (TIFFExtendProc) NULL)
(void) TIFFSetTagExtender(tag_extender);
#endif
if (DeleteMagickThreadKey(tiff_exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) TIFFSetWarningHandler(warning_handler);
(void) TIFFSetErrorHandler(error_handler);
instantiate_key=MagickFalse;
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(tiff_semaphore);
RelinquishSemaphoreInfo(&tiff_semaphore);
#endif
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12843
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12843/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/53c4137bd924b954432c6c59da7572c4c5ffa901
|
53c4137bd924b954432c6c59da7572c4c5ffa901
|
imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
|
static void cmd_list(char *tag, struct listargs *listargs)
{
clock_t start = clock();
char mytime[100];
if (listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_REMOTE) {
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_PROXYD_DISABLE_MAILBOX_REFERRALS)) {
supports_referrals = !disable_referrals;
}
}
list_callback_calls = 0;
if (listargs->pat.count && !*(listargs->pat.data[0]) && (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LIST)) {
/* special case: query top-level hierarchy separator */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* LIST (\\Noselect) \"%c\" \"\"\r\n",
imapd_namespace.hier_sep);
} else if (listargs->pat.count && !*(listargs->pat.data[0]) && (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_XLIST)) {
/* special case: query top-level hierarchy separator */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* XLIST (\\Noselect) \"%c\" \"\"\r\n",
imapd_namespace.hier_sep);
} else if ((listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LSUB) &&
(backend_inbox || (backend_inbox = proxy_findinboxserver(imapd_userid)))) {
/* remote inbox */
if (list_data_remote(backend_inbox, tag, listargs, NULL))
return;
} else {
list_data(listargs);
}
strarray_fini(&listargs->pat);
strarray_fini(&listargs->metaitems);
imapd_check((listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED) ? NULL : backend_inbox, 0);
snprintf(mytime, sizeof(mytime), "%2.3f",
(clock() - start) / (double) CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
if ((listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_METADATA) && listargs->metaopts.maxsize &&
listargs->metaopts.biggest > listargs->metaopts.maxsize) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK [METADATA LONGENTRIES %u] %s\r\n", tag,
(unsigned)listargs->metaopts.biggest, error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s (%s secs", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED), mytime);
if (list_callback_calls)
prot_printf(imapd_out, " %u calls", list_callback_calls);
prot_printf(imapd_out, ")\r\n");
}
if (global_conversations) {
conversations_abort(&global_conversations);
global_conversations = NULL;
}
}
|
static void cmd_list(char *tag, struct listargs *listargs)
{
clock_t start = clock();
char mytime[100];
if (listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_REMOTE) {
if (!config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_PROXYD_DISABLE_MAILBOX_REFERRALS)) {
supports_referrals = !disable_referrals;
}
}
list_callback_calls = 0;
if (listargs->pat.count && !*(listargs->pat.data[0]) && (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LIST)) {
/* special case: query top-level hierarchy separator */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* LIST (\\Noselect) \"%c\" \"\"\r\n",
imapd_namespace.hier_sep);
} else if (listargs->pat.count && !*(listargs->pat.data[0]) && (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_XLIST)) {
/* special case: query top-level hierarchy separator */
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* XLIST (\\Noselect) \"%c\" \"\"\r\n",
imapd_namespace.hier_sep);
} else if ((listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LSUB) &&
(backend_inbox || (backend_inbox = proxy_findinboxserver(imapd_userid)))) {
/* remote inbox */
if (list_data_remote(backend_inbox, tag, listargs, NULL))
return;
} else {
list_data(listargs);
}
strarray_fini(&listargs->pat);
strarray_fini(&listargs->metaitems);
imapd_check((listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED) ? NULL : backend_inbox, 0);
snprintf(mytime, sizeof(mytime), "%2.3f",
(clock() - start) / (double) CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
if ((listargs->sel & LIST_SEL_METADATA) && listargs->metaopts.maxsize &&
listargs->metaopts.biggest > listargs->metaopts.maxsize) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK [METADATA LONGENTRIES %u] %s\r\n", tag,
(unsigned)listargs->metaopts.biggest, error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s (%s secs", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED), mytime);
if (list_callback_calls)
prot_printf(imapd_out, " %u calls", list_callback_calls);
prot_printf(imapd_out, ")\r\n");
}
if (global_conversations) {
conversations_abort(&global_conversations);
global_conversations = NULL;
}
}
|
C
|
cyrus-imapd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9793/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290
|
b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290
|
net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int sock_no_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t len)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
|
int sock_no_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t len)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2915
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2915/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
b12eb22a27110f49a2ad54b9e4ffd0ccb6cf9ce9
|
Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TakeScreenshotFor(content::NavigationEntryImpl* entry) {
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.setConfig(SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config, 1, 1);
bitmap.allocPixels();
bitmap.eraseRGB(0, 0, 0);
encoding_screenshot_in_progress_ = true;
OnScreenshotTaken(entry->GetUniqueID(), true, bitmap);
WaitUntilScreenshotIsReady();
}
|
void TakeScreenshotFor(content::NavigationEntryImpl* entry) {
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.setConfig(SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config, 1, 1);
bitmap.allocPixels();
bitmap.eraseRGB(0, 0, 0);
encoding_screenshot_in_progress_ = true;
OnScreenshotTaken(entry->GetUniqueID(), true, bitmap);
WaitUntilScreenshotIsReady();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10746/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/libvirt/libvirt/commit/506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
506e9d6c2d4baaf580d489fff0690c0ff2ff588f
|
virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]>
|
virDomainMigrateUnmanagedProto2(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *dconnuri,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
unsigned int flags)
{
/* uri parameter is added for direct case */
const char *compatParams[] = { VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_BANDWIDTH,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI };
const char *uri = NULL;
const char *miguri = NULL;
const char *dname = NULL;
unsigned long long bandwidth = 0;
if (!virTypedParamsCheck(params, nparams, compatParams,
ARRAY_CARDINALITY(compatParams))) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_ARGUMENT_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Some parameters are not supported by migration "
"protocol 2"));
return -1;
}
if (virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI, &miguri) < 0 ||
virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME, &dname) < 0 ||
virTypedParamsGetULLong(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_BANDWIDTH, &bandwidth) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (flags & VIR_MIGRATE_PEER2PEER) {
if (miguri) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Unable to override peer2peer migration URI"));
return -1;
}
uri = dconnuri;
} else {
uri = miguri;
}
return domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform
(domain, NULL, 0, uri, flags, dname, bandwidth);
}
|
virDomainMigrateUnmanagedProto2(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *dconnuri,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
unsigned int flags)
{
/* uri parameter is added for direct case */
const char *compatParams[] = { VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_BANDWIDTH,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI };
const char *uri = NULL;
const char *miguri = NULL;
const char *dname = NULL;
unsigned long long bandwidth = 0;
if (!virTypedParamsCheck(params, nparams, compatParams,
ARRAY_CARDINALITY(compatParams))) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_ARGUMENT_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
_("Some parameters are not supported by migration "
"protocol 2"));
return -1;
}
if (virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_URI, &miguri) < 0 ||
virTypedParamsGetString(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_DEST_NAME, &dname) < 0 ||
virTypedParamsGetULLong(params, nparams,
VIR_MIGRATE_PARAM_BANDWIDTH, &bandwidth) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (flags & VIR_MIGRATE_PEER2PEER) {
if (miguri) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("Unable to override peer2peer migration URI"));
return -1;
}
uri = dconnuri;
} else {
uri = miguri;
}
return domain->conn->driver->domainMigratePerform
(domain, NULL, 0, uri, flags, dname, bandwidth);
}
|
C
|
libvirt
| 0 |
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