CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
input_type_->StepUp(-1.0 * n, exception_state);
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
input_type_->StepUp(-1.0 * n, exception_state);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW_POP_MPLS(ovs_be16 ethertype,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_POP_MPLS(out)->ethertype = ethertype;
return 0;
}
|
decode_OFPAT_RAW_POP_MPLS(ovs_be16 ethertype,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_POP_MPLS(out)->ethertype = ethertype;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11384
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11384/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/77c47cf873dd55b396da60baa2ca83bbd39e4add
|
77c47cf873dd55b396da60baa2ca83bbd39e4add
|
Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
|
static int bsr(RAnal* anal, RAnalOp* op, ut16 code){
/* Subroutine call, relative to PC */
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CALL;
op->jump = disarm_12bit_offset (op, GET_BRA_OFFSET(code));
op->delay = 1;
return op->size;
}
|
static int bsr(RAnal* anal, RAnalOp* op, ut16 code){
/* Subroutine call, relative to PC */
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CALL;
op->jump = disarm_12bit_offset (op, GET_BRA_OFFSET(code));
op->delay = 1;
return op->size;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1667
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1667/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
350f7d4b2c76950c8e7271284de84a9756b796e1
|
P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
|
FakePacketTransport(quic::QuicAlarmFactory* alarm_factory,
quic::MockClock* clock)
: alarm_(alarm_factory->CreateAlarm(new AlarmDelegate(this))),
clock_(clock) {}
|
FakePacketTransport(quic::QuicAlarmFactory* alarm_factory,
quic::MockClock* clock)
: alarm_(alarm_factory->CreateAlarm(new AlarmDelegate(this))),
clock_(clock) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
void RenderProcessHostWatcher::RenderProcessExited(
RenderProcessHost* host,
const ChildProcessTerminationInfo& info) {
did_exit_normally_ =
info.status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
if (type_ == WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT)
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
|
void RenderProcessHostWatcher::RenderProcessExited(
RenderProcessHost* host,
const ChildProcessTerminationInfo& info) {
did_exit_normally_ =
info.status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
if (type_ == WATCH_FOR_PROCESS_EXIT)
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13225
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13225/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/kkos/oniguruma/commit/c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c
|
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
|
clear_opt_map(OptMap* map)
{
static const OptMap clean_info = {
{0, 0}, {0, 0}, 0,
{
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
}
};
xmemcpy(map, &clean_info, sizeof(OptMap));
}
|
clear_opt_map(OptMap* map)
{
static const OptMap clean_info = {
{0, 0}, {0, 0}, 0,
{
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
}
};
xmemcpy(map, &clean_info, sizeof(OptMap));
}
|
C
|
oniguruma
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0804
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0804/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/224858e719d045c8554856b12c4ab73d2375cf33
|
224858e719d045c8554856b12c4ab73d2375cf33
|
GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
|
void NuPlayer::GenericSource::onGetFormatMeta(sp<AMessage> msg) const {
int32_t audio;
CHECK(msg->findInt32("audio", &audio));
sp<AMessage> response = new AMessage;
sp<MetaData> format = doGetFormatMeta(audio);
response->setPointer("format", format.get());
uint32_t replyID;
CHECK(msg->senderAwaitsResponse(&replyID));
response->postReply(replyID);
}
|
void NuPlayer::GenericSource::onGetFormatMeta(sp<AMessage> msg) const {
int32_t audio;
CHECK(msg->findInt32("audio", &audio));
sp<AMessage> response = new AMessage;
sp<MetaData> format = doGetFormatMeta(audio);
response->setPointer("format", format.get());
uint32_t replyID;
CHECK(msg->senderAwaitsResponse(&replyID));
response->postReply(replyID);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4594
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4594/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
bc909d9ddbf7778371e36a651d6e4194b1cc7d4c
|
sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
CC: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
CC: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CC: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(send, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned, flags)
{
return sys_sendto(fd, buff, len, flags, NULL, 0);
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(send, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned, flags)
{
return sys_sendto(fd, buff, len, flags, NULL, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t sanity_checks_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_FREE));
}
|
static ssize_t sanity_checks_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_FREE));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16075
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16075/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
d913f72b4875cf0814fc3f03ad7c00642097c4a4
|
Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
|
ReferrerPolicy CSSStyleSheetResource::GetReferrerPolicy() const {
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy = kReferrerPolicyDefault;
String referrer_policy_header =
GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(http_names::kReferrerPolicy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
SecurityPolicy::ReferrerPolicyFromHeaderValue(
referrer_policy_header, kDoNotSupportReferrerPolicyLegacyKeywords,
&referrer_policy);
}
return referrer_policy;
}
|
ReferrerPolicy CSSStyleSheetResource::GetReferrerPolicy() const {
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy = kReferrerPolicyDefault;
String referrer_policy_header =
GetResponse().HttpHeaderField(http_names::kReferrerPolicy);
if (!referrer_policy_header.IsNull()) {
SecurityPolicy::ReferrerPolicyFromHeaderValue(
referrer_policy_header, kDoNotSupportReferrerPolicyLegacyKeywords,
&referrer_policy);
}
return referrer_policy;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0922/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/28aaa72a03df96fa1934876b0efbbc7e6b4b38af
|
28aaa72a03df96fa1934876b0efbbc7e6b4b38af
|
Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
net::Error CallbackAndReturn(
const DownloadResourceHandler::OnStartedCallback& started_cb,
net::Error net_error) {
if (started_cb.is_null())
return net_error;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(started_cb, static_cast<DownloadItem*>(NULL), net_error));
return net_error;
}
|
net::Error CallbackAndReturn(
const DownloadResourceHandler::OnStartedCallback& started_cb,
net::Error net_error) {
if (started_cb.is_null())
return net_error;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(started_cb, static_cast<DownloadItem*>(NULL), net_error));
return net_error;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
status_t ACodec::setSupportedOutputFormat(bool getLegacyFlexibleFormat) {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE format, legacyFormat;
InitOMXParams(&format);
format.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
InitOMXParams(&legacyFormat);
legacyFormat.eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
for (OMX_U32 index = 0; ; ++index) {
format.nIndex = index;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat,
&format, sizeof(format));
if (err != OK) {
if (legacyFormat.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
memcpy(&format, &legacyFormat, sizeof(format));
break;
}
return err;
}
if (format.eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!getLegacyFlexibleFormat) {
break;
}
if (format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_TI_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar) {
break;
}
OMX_U32 flexibleEquivalent;
if (legacyFormat.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused
&& isFlexibleColorFormat(
mOMX, mNode, format.eColorFormat, false /* usingNativeBuffers */,
&flexibleEquivalent)
&& flexibleEquivalent == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Flexible) {
memcpy(&legacyFormat, &format, sizeof(format));
}
}
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat,
&format, sizeof(format));
}
|
status_t ACodec::setSupportedOutputFormat(bool getLegacyFlexibleFormat) {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE format, legacyFormat;
InitOMXParams(&format);
format.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
InitOMXParams(&legacyFormat);
legacyFormat.eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
for (OMX_U32 index = 0; ; ++index) {
format.nIndex = index;
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat,
&format, sizeof(format));
if (err != OK) {
if (legacyFormat.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
memcpy(&format, &legacyFormat, sizeof(format));
break;
}
return err;
}
if (format.eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!getLegacyFlexibleFormat) {
break;
}
if (format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar
|| format.eColorFormat == OMX_TI_COLOR_FormatYUV420PackedSemiPlanar) {
break;
}
OMX_U32 flexibleEquivalent;
if (legacyFormat.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused
&& isFlexibleColorFormat(
mOMX, mNode, format.eColorFormat, false /* usingNativeBuffers */,
&flexibleEquivalent)
&& flexibleEquivalent == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Flexible) {
memcpy(&legacyFormat, &format, sizeof(format));
}
}
return mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat,
&format, sizeof(format));
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6640
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6640/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/kernel%2Fcommon/+/69bfe2d957d903521d32324190c2754cb073be15
|
69bfe2d957d903521d32324190c2754cb073be15
|
mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <[email protected]>
|
static int prctl_update_vma_anon_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
const char __user *name_addr)
{
struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
int error = 0;
pgoff_t pgoff;
if (name_addr == vma_get_anon_name(vma)) {
*prev = vma;
goto out;
}
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
*prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
name_addr);
if (*prev) {
vma = *prev;
goto success;
}
*prev = vma;
if (start != vma->vm_start) {
error = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (end != vma->vm_end) {
error = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (error)
goto out;
}
success:
if (!vma->vm_file)
vma->shared.anon_name = name_addr;
out:
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
return error;
}
|
static int prctl_update_vma_anon_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct vm_area_struct **prev,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
const char __user *name_addr)
{
struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
int error = 0;
pgoff_t pgoff;
if (name_addr == vma_get_anon_name(vma)) {
*prev = vma;
goto out;
}
pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff + ((start - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
*prev = vma_merge(mm, *prev, start, end, vma->vm_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma),
name_addr);
if (*prev) {
vma = *prev;
goto success;
}
*prev = vma;
if (start != vma->vm_start) {
error = split_vma(mm, vma, start, 1);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if (end != vma->vm_end) {
error = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
if (error)
goto out;
}
success:
if (!vma->vm_file)
vma->shared.anon_name = name_addr;
out:
if (error == -ENOMEM)
error = -EAGAIN;
return error;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836
|
xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct xfrm_userspi_info *p;
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
xfrm_address_t *daddr;
int family;
int err;
u32 mark;
struct xfrm_mark m;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
err = verify_userspi_info(p);
if (err)
goto out_noput;
family = p->info.family;
daddr = &p->info.id.daddr;
x = NULL;
mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (p->info.seq) {
x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, p->info.seq);
if (x && xfrm_addr_cmp(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family)) {
xfrm_state_put(x);
x = NULL;
}
}
if (!x)
x = xfrm_find_acq(net, &m, p->info.mode, p->info.reqid,
p->info.id.proto, daddr,
&p->info.saddr, 1,
family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
goto out_noput;
err = xfrm_alloc_spi(x, p->min, p->max);
if (err)
goto out;
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
goto out;
}
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
out_noput:
return err;
}
|
static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct xfrm_userspi_info *p;
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
xfrm_address_t *daddr;
int family;
int err;
u32 mark;
struct xfrm_mark m;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
err = verify_userspi_info(p);
if (err)
goto out_noput;
family = p->info.family;
daddr = &p->info.id.daddr;
x = NULL;
mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (p->info.seq) {
x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, p->info.seq);
if (x && xfrm_addr_cmp(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family)) {
xfrm_state_put(x);
x = NULL;
}
}
if (!x)
x = xfrm_find_acq(net, &m, p->info.mode, p->info.reqid,
p->info.id.proto, daddr,
&p->info.saddr, 1,
family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
goto out_noput;
err = xfrm_alloc_spi(x, p->min, p->max);
if (err)
goto out;
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
goto out;
}
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
out_noput:
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
exsltDateDayNameFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *dt = NULL;
const xmlChar *ret;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
dt = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateDayName(dt);
if (dt != NULL)
xmlFree(dt);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, xmlStrdup(ret));
}
|
exsltDateDayNameFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *dt = NULL;
const xmlChar *ret;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
dt = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateDayName(dt);
if (dt != NULL)
xmlFree(dt);
if (ret == NULL)
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
else
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, xmlStrdup(ret));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2463
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2463/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2b6f22dc64d456471a1dc6df09d515771d1427c8
|
2b6f22dc64d456471a1dc6df09d515771d1427c8
|
h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
|
void H264SwDecTrace(char *string)
{
FILE *fp;
fp = fopen("dec_api.trc", "at");
if (!fp)
return;
fwrite(string, 1, strlen(string), fp);
fwrite("\n", 1,1, fp);
fclose(fp);
}
|
void H264SwDecTrace(char *string)
{
FILE *fp;
fp = fopen("dec_api.trc", "at");
if (!fp)
return;
fwrite(string, 1, strlen(string), fp);
fwrite("\n", 1,1, fp);
fclose(fp);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataCache::CommitDirty(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry =
GetCacheEntry(resource_id, std::string());
if (!cache_entry.get() ||
cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Can't commit dirty a file that wasn't cached: res_id="
<< resource_id
<< ", md5=" << md5;
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
return;
}
if (!cache_entry->IsDirty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Can't commit a non-dirty file: res_id="
<< resource_id
<< ", md5=" << md5;
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
FilePath symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
FilePath target_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
*error = ModifyCacheState(target_path, // source
target_path, // destination
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
true /* create symlink */);
}
|
void GDataCache::CommitDirty(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry =
GetCacheEntry(resource_id, std::string());
if (!cache_entry.get() ||
cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Can't commit dirty a file that wasn't cached: res_id="
<< resource_id
<< ", md5=" << md5;
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
return;
}
if (!cache_entry->IsDirty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Can't commit a non-dirty file: res_id="
<< resource_id
<< ", md5=" << md5;
*error = base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION;
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
FilePath symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_OUTGOING,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
FilePath target_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
*error = ModifyCacheState(target_path, // source
target_path, // destination
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
true /* create symlink */);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void TearDown() {
mock_server_.reset();
delete syncer_;
syncer_ = NULL;
syncdb_.TearDown();
}
|
virtual void TearDown() {
mock_server_.reset();
delete syncer_;
syncer_ = NULL;
syncdb_.TearDown();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tcp_v6_gso_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
struct tcphdr *th;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th)))
return -EINVAL;
ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
th = tcp_hdr(skb);
th->check = 0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr);
return 0;
}
|
static int tcp_v6_gso_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
struct tcphdr *th;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th)))
return -EINVAL;
ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
th = tcp_hdr(skb);
th->check = 0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0028
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0028/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
8141c7f3e7aee618312fa1c15109e1219de784a7
|
Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Efros <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
struct io_context *ioc = current->io_context;
if (!ioc)
return 0;
/*
* Share io context with parent, if CLONE_IO is set
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_IO) {
tsk->io_context = ioc_task_link(ioc);
if (unlikely(!tsk->io_context))
return -ENOMEM;
} else if (ioprio_valid(ioc->ioprio)) {
tsk->io_context = alloc_io_context(GFP_KERNEL, -1);
if (unlikely(!tsk->io_context))
return -ENOMEM;
tsk->io_context->ioprio = ioc->ioprio;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
|
static int copy_io(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
struct io_context *ioc = current->io_context;
if (!ioc)
return 0;
/*
* Share io context with parent, if CLONE_IO is set
*/
if (clone_flags & CLONE_IO) {
tsk->io_context = ioc_task_link(ioc);
if (unlikely(!tsk->io_context))
return -ENOMEM;
} else if (ioprio_valid(ioc->ioprio)) {
tsk->io_context = alloc_io_context(GFP_KERNEL, -1);
if (unlikely(!tsk->io_context))
return -ENOMEM;
tsk->io_context->ioprio = ioc->ioprio;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5
|
284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5
| null |
GBool SplashOutputDev::beginType3Char(GfxState *state, double x, double y,
double dx, double dy,
CharCode code, Unicode *u, int uLen) {
GfxFont *gfxFont;
Ref *fontID;
double *ctm, *bbox;
T3FontCache *t3Font;
T3GlyphStack *t3gs;
GBool validBBox;
double x1, y1, xMin, yMin, xMax, yMax, xt, yt;
int i, j;
if (!(gfxFont = state->getFont())) {
return gFalse;
}
fontID = gfxFont->getID();
ctm = state->getCTM();
state->transform(0, 0, &xt, &yt);
if (!(nT3Fonts > 0 &&
t3FontCache[0]->matches(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3]))) {
for (i = 1; i < nT3Fonts; ++i) {
if (t3FontCache[i]->matches(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3])) {
t3Font = t3FontCache[i];
for (j = i; j > 0; --j) {
t3FontCache[j] = t3FontCache[j - 1];
}
t3FontCache[0] = t3Font;
break;
}
}
if (i >= nT3Fonts) {
if (nT3Fonts == splashOutT3FontCacheSize) {
delete t3FontCache[nT3Fonts - 1];
--nT3Fonts;
}
for (j = nT3Fonts; j > 0; --j) {
t3FontCache[j] = t3FontCache[j - 1];
}
++nT3Fonts;
bbox = gfxFont->getFontBBox();
if (bbox[0] == 0 && bbox[1] == 0 && bbox[2] == 0 && bbox[3] == 0) {
xMin = xt - 5;
xMax = xMin + 30;
yMax = yt + 15;
yMin = yMax - 45;
validBBox = gFalse;
} else {
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[1], &x1, &y1);
xMin = xMax = x1;
yMin = yMax = y1;
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[3], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[1], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[3], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
validBBox = gTrue;
}
t3FontCache[0] = new T3FontCache(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3],
(int)floor(xMin - xt),
(int)floor(yMin - yt),
(int)ceil(xMax) - (int)floor(xMin) + 3,
(int)ceil(yMax) - (int)floor(yMin) + 3,
validBBox,
colorMode != splashModeMono1);
}
}
t3Font = t3FontCache[0];
i = (code & (t3Font->cacheSets - 1)) * t3Font->cacheAssoc;
for (j = 0; j < t3Font->cacheAssoc; ++j) {
if (t3Font->cacheTags != NULL) {
if ((t3Font->cacheTags[i+j].mru & 0x8000) &&
t3Font->cacheTags[i+j].code == code) {
drawType3Glyph(t3Font, &t3Font->cacheTags[i+j],
t3Font->cacheData + (i+j) * t3Font->glyphSize);
return gTrue;
}
}
}
t3gs = new T3GlyphStack();
t3gs->next = t3GlyphStack;
t3GlyphStack = t3gs;
t3GlyphStack->code = code;
t3GlyphStack->cache = t3Font;
t3GlyphStack->cacheTag = NULL;
t3GlyphStack->cacheData = NULL;
return gFalse;
}
|
GBool SplashOutputDev::beginType3Char(GfxState *state, double x, double y,
double dx, double dy,
CharCode code, Unicode *u, int uLen) {
GfxFont *gfxFont;
Ref *fontID;
double *ctm, *bbox;
T3FontCache *t3Font;
T3GlyphStack *t3gs;
GBool validBBox;
double x1, y1, xMin, yMin, xMax, yMax, xt, yt;
int i, j;
if (!(gfxFont = state->getFont())) {
return gFalse;
}
fontID = gfxFont->getID();
ctm = state->getCTM();
state->transform(0, 0, &xt, &yt);
if (!(nT3Fonts > 0 &&
t3FontCache[0]->matches(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3]))) {
for (i = 1; i < nT3Fonts; ++i) {
if (t3FontCache[i]->matches(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3])) {
t3Font = t3FontCache[i];
for (j = i; j > 0; --j) {
t3FontCache[j] = t3FontCache[j - 1];
}
t3FontCache[0] = t3Font;
break;
}
}
if (i >= nT3Fonts) {
if (nT3Fonts == splashOutT3FontCacheSize) {
delete t3FontCache[nT3Fonts - 1];
--nT3Fonts;
}
for (j = nT3Fonts; j > 0; --j) {
t3FontCache[j] = t3FontCache[j - 1];
}
++nT3Fonts;
bbox = gfxFont->getFontBBox();
if (bbox[0] == 0 && bbox[1] == 0 && bbox[2] == 0 && bbox[3] == 0) {
xMin = xt - 5;
xMax = xMin + 30;
yMax = yt + 15;
yMin = yMax - 45;
validBBox = gFalse;
} else {
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[1], &x1, &y1);
xMin = xMax = x1;
yMin = yMax = y1;
state->transform(bbox[0], bbox[3], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[1], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
state->transform(bbox[2], bbox[3], &x1, &y1);
if (x1 < xMin) {
xMin = x1;
} else if (x1 > xMax) {
xMax = x1;
}
if (y1 < yMin) {
yMin = y1;
} else if (y1 > yMax) {
yMax = y1;
}
validBBox = gTrue;
}
t3FontCache[0] = new T3FontCache(fontID, ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3],
(int)floor(xMin - xt),
(int)floor(yMin - yt),
(int)ceil(xMax) - (int)floor(xMin) + 3,
(int)ceil(yMax) - (int)floor(yMin) + 3,
validBBox,
colorMode != splashModeMono1);
}
}
t3Font = t3FontCache[0];
i = (code & (t3Font->cacheSets - 1)) * t3Font->cacheAssoc;
for (j = 0; j < t3Font->cacheAssoc; ++j) {
if (t3Font->cacheTags != NULL) {
if ((t3Font->cacheTags[i+j].mru & 0x8000) &&
t3Font->cacheTags[i+j].code == code) {
drawType3Glyph(t3Font, &t3Font->cacheTags[i+j],
t3Font->cacheData + (i+j) * t3Font->glyphSize);
return gTrue;
}
}
}
t3gs = new T3GlyphStack();
t3gs->next = t3GlyphStack;
t3GlyphStack = t3gs;
t3GlyphStack->code = code;
t3GlyphStack->cache = t3Font;
t3GlyphStack->cacheTag = NULL;
t3GlyphStack->cacheData = NULL;
return gFalse;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6791/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
bool mounted() const { return drivefs_has_mounted_ && !mount_path_.empty(); }
|
bool mounted() const { return drivefs_has_mounted_ && !mount_path_.empty(); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void br_multicast_port_group_query_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge_port *port = pg->port;
struct net_bridge *br = port->br;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || hlist_unhashed(&pg->mglist) ||
pg->queries_sent >= br->multicast_last_member_count)
goto out;
br_multicast_send_port_group_query(pg);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
|
static void br_multicast_port_group_query_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge_port *port = pg->port;
struct net_bridge *br = port->br;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || hlist_unhashed(&pg->mglist) ||
pg->queries_sent >= br->multicast_last_member_count)
goto out;
br_multicast_send_port_group_query(pg);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
bitgetbit(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *arg1 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
int32 n = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
int bitlen;
bits8 *p;
int byteNo,
bitNo;
bitlen = VARBITLEN(arg1);
if (n < 0 || n >= bitlen)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("bit index %d out of valid range (0..%d)",
n, bitlen - 1)));
p = VARBITS(arg1);
byteNo = n / BITS_PER_BYTE;
bitNo = BITS_PER_BYTE - 1 - (n % BITS_PER_BYTE);
if (p[byteNo] & (1 << bitNo))
PG_RETURN_INT32(1);
else
PG_RETURN_INT32(0);
}
|
bitgetbit(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
VarBit *arg1 = PG_GETARG_VARBIT_P(0);
int32 n = PG_GETARG_INT32(1);
int bitlen;
bits8 *p;
int byteNo,
bitNo;
bitlen = VARBITLEN(arg1);
if (n < 0 || n >= bitlen)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("bit index %d out of valid range (0..%d)",
n, bitlen - 1)));
p = VARBITS(arg1);
byteNo = n / BITS_PER_BYTE;
bitNo = BITS_PER_BYTE - 1 - (n % BITS_PER_BYTE);
if (p[byteNo] & (1 << bitNo))
PG_RETURN_INT32(1);
else
PG_RETURN_INT32(0);
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15420
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15420/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
56a84aa67bb071a33a48ac1481b555c48e0a9a59
|
Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
|
bool NavigationControllerImpl::IsURLSameDocumentNavigation(
const GURL& url,
const url::Origin& origin,
bool renderer_says_same_document,
RenderFrameHost* rfh) const {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(rfh);
GURL last_committed_url;
if (rfh->GetParent()) {
last_committed_url = rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_url();
} else {
NavigationEntry* last_committed = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!last_committed)
return false;
last_committed_url = last_committed->GetURL();
}
WebPreferences prefs = rfh->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWebkitPreferences();
const url::Origin& committed_origin =
rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_origin();
bool is_same_origin = last_committed_url.is_empty() ||
last_committed_url == url::kAboutBlankURL ||
last_committed_url.GetOrigin() == url.GetOrigin() ||
committed_origin == origin ||
!prefs.web_security_enabled ||
(prefs.allow_universal_access_from_file_urls &&
committed_origin.scheme() == url::kFileScheme);
if (!is_same_origin && renderer_says_same_document) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(rfh->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NC_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
}
return is_same_origin && renderer_says_same_document;
}
|
bool NavigationControllerImpl::IsURLSameDocumentNavigation(
const GURL& url,
const url::Origin& origin,
bool renderer_says_same_document,
RenderFrameHost* rfh) const {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfhi = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(rfh);
GURL last_committed_url;
if (rfh->GetParent()) {
last_committed_url = rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_url();
} else {
NavigationEntry* last_committed = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!last_committed)
return false;
last_committed_url = last_committed->GetURL();
}
WebPreferences prefs = rfh->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWebkitPreferences();
const url::Origin& committed_origin =
rfhi->frame_tree_node()->current_origin();
bool is_same_origin = last_committed_url.is_empty() ||
last_committed_url == url::kAboutBlankURL ||
last_committed_url.GetOrigin() == url.GetOrigin() ||
committed_origin == origin ||
!prefs.web_security_enabled ||
(prefs.allow_universal_access_from_file_urls &&
committed_origin.scheme() == url::kFileScheme);
if (!is_same_origin && renderer_says_same_document) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(rfh->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NC_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
}
return is_same_origin && renderer_says_same_document;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int forced_push(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return after(tp->write_seq, tp->pushed_seq + (tp->max_window >> 1));
}
|
static inline int forced_push(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
return after(tp->write_seq, tp->pushed_seq + (tp->max_window >> 1));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
void http_end_txn_clean_session(struct session *s)
{
int prev_status = s->txn.status;
/* FIXME: We need a more portable way of releasing a backend's and a
* server's connections. We need a safer way to reinitialize buffer
* flags. We also need a more accurate method for computing per-request
* data.
*/
/* unless we're doing keep-alive, we want to quickly close the connection
* to the server.
*/
if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) {
s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER | SI_FL_NOHALF;
si_shutr(s->req->cons);
si_shutw(s->req->cons);
}
if (s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) {
s->be->beconn--;
if (unlikely(s->srv_conn))
sess_change_server(s, NULL);
}
s->logs.t_close = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
session_process_counters(s);
if (s->txn.status) {
int n;
n = s->txn.status / 100;
if (n < 1 || n > 5)
n = 0;
if (s->fe->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) {
s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++;
if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY))
s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++;
}
if ((s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) &&
(s->be->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)) {
s->be->be_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++;
s->be->be_counters.p.http.cum_req++;
if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY))
s->be->be_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++;
}
}
/* don't count other requests' data */
s->logs.bytes_in -= s->req->buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out -= s->rep->buf->i;
/* let's do a final log if we need it */
if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&s->fe->logformat) && s->logs.logwait &&
!(s->flags & SN_MONITOR) &&
(!(s->fe->options & PR_O_NULLNOLOG) || s->req->total)) {
s->do_log(s);
}
/* stop tracking content-based counters */
session_stop_content_counters(s);
session_update_time_stats(s);
s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */
s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */
tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request);
s->logs.t_queue = -1;
s->logs.t_connect = -1;
s->logs.t_data = -1;
s->logs.t_close = 0;
s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */
s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */
s->logs.bytes_in = s->req->total = s->req->buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out = s->rep->total = s->rep->buf->i;
if (s->pend_pos)
pendconn_free(s->pend_pos);
if (objt_server(s->target)) {
if (s->flags & SN_CURR_SESS) {
s->flags &= ~SN_CURR_SESS;
objt_server(s->target)->cur_sess--;
}
if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be))
process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target));
}
s->target = NULL;
/* only release our endpoint if we don't intend to reuse the
* connection.
*/
if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) {
si_release_endpoint(s->req->cons);
}
s->req->cons->state = s->req->cons->prev_state = SI_ST_INI;
s->req->cons->err_type = SI_ET_NONE;
s->req->cons->conn_retries = 0; /* used for logging too */
s->req->cons->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->req->cons->flags &= SI_FL_DONT_WAKE; /* we're in the context of process_session */
s->req->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_AUTO_CONNECT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WAKE_CONNECT|CF_WROTE_DATA);
s->rep->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW|CF_READ_ATTACHED|CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_NOEXP|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_WRITE_PARTIAL|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WROTE_DATA);
s->flags &= ~(SN_DIRECT|SN_ASSIGNED|SN_ADDR_SET|SN_BE_ASSIGNED|SN_FORCE_PRST|SN_IGNORE_PRST);
s->flags &= ~(SN_CURR_SESS|SN_REDIRECTABLE|SN_SRV_REUSED);
s->txn.meth = 0;
http_reset_txn(s);
s->txn.flags |= TX_NOT_FIRST | TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
if (prev_status == 401 || prev_status == 407) {
/* In HTTP keep-alive mode, if we receive a 401, we still have
* a chance of being able to send the visitor again to the same
* server over the same connection. This is required by some
* broken protocols such as NTLM, and anyway whenever there is
* an opportunity for sending the challenge to the proper place,
* it's better to do it (at least it helps with debugging).
*/
s->txn.flags |= TX_PREFER_LAST;
}
if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_INDEPSTR)
s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_INDEP_STR;
if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_NODELAY) {
s->req->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
s->rep->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
}
/* if the request buffer is not empty, it means we're
* about to process another request, so send pending
* data with MSG_MORE to merge TCP packets when possible.
* Just don't do this if the buffer is close to be full,
* because the request will wait for it to flush a little
* bit before proceeding.
*/
if (s->req->buf->i) {
if (s->rep->buf->o &&
!buffer_full(s->rep->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite) &&
bi_end(s->rep->buf) <= s->rep->buf->data + s->rep->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)
s->rep->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
}
/* we're removing the analysers, we MUST re-enable events detection */
channel_auto_read(s->req);
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
/* we're in keep-alive with an idle connection, monitor it */
si_idle_conn(s->req->cons);
s->req->analysers = s->listener->analysers;
s->rep->analysers = 0;
}
|
void http_end_txn_clean_session(struct session *s)
{
int prev_status = s->txn.status;
/* FIXME: We need a more portable way of releasing a backend's and a
* server's connections. We need a safer way to reinitialize buffer
* flags. We also need a more accurate method for computing per-request
* data.
*/
/* unless we're doing keep-alive, we want to quickly close the connection
* to the server.
*/
if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) {
s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER | SI_FL_NOHALF;
si_shutr(s->req->cons);
si_shutw(s->req->cons);
}
if (s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) {
s->be->beconn--;
if (unlikely(s->srv_conn))
sess_change_server(s, NULL);
}
s->logs.t_close = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
session_process_counters(s);
if (s->txn.status) {
int n;
n = s->txn.status / 100;
if (n < 1 || n > 5)
n = 0;
if (s->fe->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) {
s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++;
if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY))
s->fe->fe_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++;
}
if ((s->flags & SN_BE_ASSIGNED) &&
(s->be->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)) {
s->be->be_counters.p.http.rsp[n]++;
s->be->be_counters.p.http.cum_req++;
if (s->comp_algo && (s->flags & SN_COMP_READY))
s->be->be_counters.p.http.comp_rsp++;
}
}
/* don't count other requests' data */
s->logs.bytes_in -= s->req->buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out -= s->rep->buf->i;
/* let's do a final log if we need it */
if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&s->fe->logformat) && s->logs.logwait &&
!(s->flags & SN_MONITOR) &&
(!(s->fe->options & PR_O_NULLNOLOG) || s->req->total)) {
s->do_log(s);
}
/* stop tracking content-based counters */
session_stop_content_counters(s);
session_update_time_stats(s);
s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */
s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */
tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request);
s->logs.t_queue = -1;
s->logs.t_connect = -1;
s->logs.t_data = -1;
s->logs.t_close = 0;
s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */
s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */
s->logs.bytes_in = s->req->total = s->req->buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out = s->rep->total = s->rep->buf->i;
if (s->pend_pos)
pendconn_free(s->pend_pos);
if (objt_server(s->target)) {
if (s->flags & SN_CURR_SESS) {
s->flags &= ~SN_CURR_SESS;
objt_server(s->target)->cur_sess--;
}
if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be))
process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target));
}
s->target = NULL;
/* only release our endpoint if we don't intend to reuse the
* connection.
*/
if (((s->txn.flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(s->req->cons)) {
si_release_endpoint(s->req->cons);
}
s->req->cons->state = s->req->cons->prev_state = SI_ST_INI;
s->req->cons->err_type = SI_ET_NONE;
s->req->cons->conn_retries = 0; /* used for logging too */
s->req->cons->exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->req->cons->flags &= SI_FL_DONT_WAKE; /* we're in the context of process_session */
s->req->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_AUTO_CONNECT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WAKE_CONNECT);
s->rep->flags &= ~(CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW|CF_READ_ATTACHED|CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_NOEXP|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_WRITE_PARTIAL|CF_NEVER_WAIT);
s->flags &= ~(SN_DIRECT|SN_ASSIGNED|SN_ADDR_SET|SN_BE_ASSIGNED|SN_FORCE_PRST|SN_IGNORE_PRST);
s->flags &= ~(SN_CURR_SESS|SN_REDIRECTABLE|SN_SRV_REUSED);
s->txn.meth = 0;
http_reset_txn(s);
s->txn.flags |= TX_NOT_FIRST | TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
if (prev_status == 401 || prev_status == 407) {
/* In HTTP keep-alive mode, if we receive a 401, we still have
* a chance of being able to send the visitor again to the same
* server over the same connection. This is required by some
* broken protocols such as NTLM, and anyway whenever there is
* an opportunity for sending the challenge to the proper place,
* it's better to do it (at least it helps with debugging).
*/
s->txn.flags |= TX_PREFER_LAST;
}
if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_INDEPSTR)
s->req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_INDEP_STR;
if (s->fe->options2 & PR_O2_NODELAY) {
s->req->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
s->rep->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
}
/* if the request buffer is not empty, it means we're
* about to process another request, so send pending
* data with MSG_MORE to merge TCP packets when possible.
* Just don't do this if the buffer is close to be full,
* because the request will wait for it to flush a little
* bit before proceeding.
*/
if (s->req->buf->i) {
if (s->rep->buf->o &&
!buffer_full(s->rep->buf, global.tune.maxrewrite) &&
bi_end(s->rep->buf) <= s->rep->buf->data + s->rep->buf->size - global.tune.maxrewrite)
s->rep->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
}
/* we're removing the analysers, we MUST re-enable events detection */
channel_auto_read(s->req);
channel_auto_close(s->req);
channel_auto_read(s->rep);
channel_auto_close(s->rep);
/* we're in keep-alive with an idle connection, monitor it */
si_idle_conn(s->req->cons);
s->req->analysers = s->listener->analysers;
s->rep->analysers = 0;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::SetReportLoadProgressEnabled(bool enabled) {
if (!enabled) {
load_progress_tracker_.reset(NULL);
return;
}
if (load_progress_tracker_ == NULL)
load_progress_tracker_.reset(new LoadProgressTracker(this));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::SetReportLoadProgressEnabled(bool enabled) {
if (!enabled) {
load_progress_tracker_.reset(NULL);
return;
}
if (load_progress_tracker_ == NULL)
load_progress_tracker_.reset(new LoadProgressTracker(this));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-7395
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-7395/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
|
static const StringInfo *GetAdditionalInformation(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define PSDKeySize 5
#define PSDAllowedLength 36
char
key[PSDKeySize];
/* Whitelist of keys from: https://www.adobe.com/devnet-apps/photoshop/fileformatashtml/ */
const char
allowed[PSDAllowedLength][PSDKeySize] = {
"blnc", "blwh", "brit", "brst", "clbl", "clrL", "curv", "expA", "FMsk",
"GdFl", "grdm", "hue ", "hue2", "infx", "knko", "lclr", "levl", "lnsr",
"lfx2", "luni", "lrFX", "lspf", "lyid", "lyvr", "mixr", "nvrt", "phfl",
"post", "PtFl", "selc", "shpa", "sn2P", "SoCo", "thrs", "tsly", "vibA"
},
*option;
const StringInfo
*info;
MagickBooleanType
found;
register size_t
i;
size_t
remaining_length,
length;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
size;
info=GetImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
if (info == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
return((const StringInfo *) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:additional-info");
if (LocaleCompare(option,"all") == 0)
return(info);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"selective") != 0)
{
profile=RemoveImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
return(DestroyStringInfo(profile));
}
length=GetStringInfoLength(info);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(info);
remaining_length=length;
length=0;
while (remaining_length >= 12)
{
/* skip over signature */
p+=4;
key[0]=(char) (*p++);
key[1]=(char) (*p++);
key[2]=(char) (*p++);
key[3]=(char) (*p++);
key[4]='\0';
size=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 24;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 16;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 8;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++);
size=size & 0xffffffff;
remaining_length-=12;
if ((size_t) size > remaining_length)
return((const StringInfo *) NULL);
found=MagickFalse;
for (i=0; i < PSDAllowedLength; i++)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(key,allowed[i],PSDKeySize) != 0)
continue;
found=MagickTrue;
break;
}
remaining_length-=(size_t) size;
if (found == MagickFalse)
{
if (remaining_length > 0)
p=(unsigned char *) memmove(p-12,p+size,remaining_length);
continue;
}
length+=(size_t) size+12;
p+=size;
}
profile=RemoveImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
if (length == 0)
return(DestroyStringInfo(profile));
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(const size_t) length);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info",info,exception);
return(profile);
}
|
static const StringInfo *GetAdditionalInformation(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define PSDKeySize 5
#define PSDAllowedLength 36
char
key[PSDKeySize];
/* Whitelist of keys from: https://www.adobe.com/devnet-apps/photoshop/fileformatashtml/ */
const char
allowed[PSDAllowedLength][PSDKeySize] = {
"blnc", "blwh", "brit", "brst", "clbl", "clrL", "curv", "expA", "FMsk",
"GdFl", "grdm", "hue ", "hue2", "infx", "knko", "lclr", "levl", "lnsr",
"lfx2", "luni", "lrFX", "lspf", "lyid", "lyvr", "mixr", "nvrt", "phfl",
"post", "PtFl", "selc", "shpa", "sn2P", "SoCo", "thrs", "tsly", "vibA"
},
*option;
const StringInfo
*info;
MagickBooleanType
found;
register size_t
i;
size_t
remaining_length,
length;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
size;
info=GetImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
if (info == (const StringInfo *) NULL)
return((const StringInfo *) NULL);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:additional-info");
if (LocaleCompare(option,"all") == 0)
return(info);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"selective") != 0)
{
profile=RemoveImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
return(DestroyStringInfo(profile));
}
length=GetStringInfoLength(info);
p=GetStringInfoDatum(info);
remaining_length=length;
length=0;
while (remaining_length >= 12)
{
/* skip over signature */
p+=4;
key[0]=(char) (*p++);
key[1]=(char) (*p++);
key[2]=(char) (*p++);
key[3]=(char) (*p++);
key[4]='\0';
size=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 24;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 16;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++) << 8;
size|=(unsigned int) (*p++);
size=size & 0xffffffff;
remaining_length-=12;
if ((size_t) size > remaining_length)
return((const StringInfo *) NULL);
found=MagickFalse;
for (i=0; i < PSDAllowedLength; i++)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(key,allowed[i],PSDKeySize) != 0)
continue;
found=MagickTrue;
break;
}
remaining_length-=(size_t) size;
if (found == MagickFalse)
{
if (remaining_length > 0)
p=(unsigned char *) memmove(p-12,p+size,remaining_length);
continue;
}
length+=(size_t) size+12;
p+=size;
}
profile=RemoveImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info");
if (length == 0)
return(DestroyStringInfo(profile));
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(const size_t) length);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"psd:additional-info",info,exception);
return(profile);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15416
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15416/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11bd4bc92f3fe704631e3e6ad1dd1a4351641f7c
|
11bd4bc92f3fe704631e3e6ad1dd1a4351641f7c
|
[BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
|
void BlobStorageContext::NotifyTransportCompleteInternal(BlobEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
for (ShareableBlobDataItem* shareable_item :
entry->building_state_->transport_items) {
DCHECK(shareable_item->state() == ShareableBlobDataItem::QUOTA_GRANTED);
shareable_item->set_state(ShareableBlobDataItem::POPULATED_WITH_QUOTA);
}
entry->set_status(BlobStatus::PENDING_INTERNALS);
if (entry->CanFinishBuilding())
FinishBuilding(entry);
}
|
void BlobStorageContext::NotifyTransportCompleteInternal(BlobEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
for (ShareableBlobDataItem* shareable_item :
entry->building_state_->transport_items) {
DCHECK(shareable_item->state() == ShareableBlobDataItem::QUOTA_GRANTED);
shareable_item->set_state(ShareableBlobDataItem::POPULATED_WITH_QUOTA);
}
entry->set_status(BlobStatus::PENDING_INTERNALS);
if (entry->CanFinishBuilding())
FinishBuilding(entry);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10067/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/0474237508f39c4f783208123431815f1ededb76
|
0474237508f39c4f783208123431815f1ededb76
|
Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
|
static MagickBooleanType IsVIFF(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\253\001",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType IsVIFF(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\253\001",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2906/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
c4a4dfb26615b5ef5e9dcc730ef43f70ce9202e2
|
Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetCreated() {
widget_count_++;
}
|
void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetCreated() {
widget_count_++;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5354
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5354/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/04038bf3633c4b909b5ded3072dc88c8c419bf16
|
04038bf3633c4b909b5ded3072dc88c8c419bf16
|
Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354]
Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or
"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with
no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return
NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in
krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod().
Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key
principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and
slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more
appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when
n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both
entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library,
the correct behavior for a keyless principal.
However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP
library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get
a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only
add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a
Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional
on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean.
CVE-2014-5354:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL
dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which
contains no long-term keys.
In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry
from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the
LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a
NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the
LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array
did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present,
returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was
unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP
operations to perform.
Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for
principal entries to have no long-term key material, and
therefore are not vulnerable.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8041 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.13.1
subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries
|
krb5_decode_krbsecretkey(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entries,
struct berval **bvalues,
krb5_tl_data *userinfo_tl_data, krb5_kvno *mkvno)
{
char *user=NULL;
int i=0, j=0, noofkeys=0;
krb5_key_data *key_data=NULL, *tmp;
krb5_error_code st=0;
if ((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entries->princ, &user)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
for (i=0; bvalues[i] != NULL; ++i) {
krb5_int16 n_kd;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_data in;
if (bvalues[i]->bv_len == 0)
continue;
in.length = bvalues[i]->bv_len;
in.data = bvalues[i]->bv_val;
st = asn1_decode_sequence_of_keys (&in,
&kd,
&n_kd,
mkvno);
if (st != 0) {
const char *msg = error_message(st);
st = -1; /* Something more appropriate ? */
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("unable to decode stored principal key data (%s)"),
msg);
goto cleanup;
}
noofkeys += n_kd;
tmp = key_data;
/* Allocate an extra key data to avoid allocating zero bytes. */
key_data = realloc(key_data, (noofkeys + 1) * sizeof (krb5_key_data));
if (key_data == NULL) {
key_data = tmp;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0; j < n_kd; j++)
key_data[noofkeys - n_kd + j] = kd[j];
free (kd);
}
entries->n_key_data = noofkeys;
entries->key_data = key_data;
cleanup:
free (user);
return st;
}
|
krb5_decode_krbsecretkey(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *entries,
struct berval **bvalues,
krb5_tl_data *userinfo_tl_data, krb5_kvno *mkvno)
{
char *user=NULL;
int i=0, j=0, noofkeys=0;
krb5_key_data *key_data=NULL, *tmp;
krb5_error_code st=0;
if ((st=krb5_unparse_name(context, entries->princ, &user)) != 0)
goto cleanup;
for (i=0; bvalues[i] != NULL; ++i) {
krb5_int16 n_kd;
krb5_key_data *kd;
krb5_data in;
if (bvalues[i]->bv_len == 0)
continue;
in.length = bvalues[i]->bv_len;
in.data = bvalues[i]->bv_val;
st = asn1_decode_sequence_of_keys (&in,
&kd,
&n_kd,
mkvno);
if (st != 0) {
const char *msg = error_message(st);
st = -1; /* Something more appropriate ? */
k5_setmsg(context, st,
_("unable to decode stored principal key data (%s)"),
msg);
goto cleanup;
}
noofkeys += n_kd;
tmp = key_data;
/* Allocate an extra key data to avoid allocating zero bytes. */
key_data = realloc(key_data, (noofkeys + 1) * sizeof (krb5_key_data));
if (key_data == NULL) {
key_data = tmp;
st = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
for (j = 0; j < n_kd; j++)
key_data[noofkeys - n_kd + j] = kd[j];
free (kd);
}
entries->n_key_data = noofkeys;
entries->key_data = key_data;
cleanup:
free (user);
return st;
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5794
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5794/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
56b512399a5c2221ba4812f5170f3f8dc352cd74
|
Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailedInternal(
const network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus& status,
bool skip_throttles,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content,
bool collapse_frame) {
DCHECK(state_ == STARTED || state_ == RESPONSE_STARTED);
DCHECK(!(status.error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED &&
error_page_content.has_value()));
common_params_.previews_state = content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
if (status.ssl_info.has_value())
ssl_info_ = status.ssl_info;
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationRequestFailed(*this, status);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1("navigation", "NavigationRequest", this,
"OnRequestFailed", "error", status.error_code);
state_ = FAILED;
if (navigation_handle_.get()) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(
static_cast<net::Error>(status.error_code));
}
int expected_pending_entry_id =
navigation_handle_.get() ? navigation_handle_->pending_nav_entry_id()
: nav_entry_id_;
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(
expected_pending_entry_id);
if (status.error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED) {
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (collapse_frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame());
DCHECK_EQ(net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT, status.error_code);
frame_tree_node_->SetCollapsed(true);
}
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host = nullptr;
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())) {
navigation_handle_->SetExpectedProcess(nullptr);
render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
} else {
if (ShouldKeepErrorPageInCurrentProcess(status.error_code)) {
render_frame_host = frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
} else {
render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
}
}
CHECK(!render_frame_host_ || render_frame_host_ == render_frame_host);
render_frame_host_ = render_frame_host;
DCHECK(render_frame_host_);
NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(render_frame_host_,
common_params_.url);
has_stale_copy_in_cache_ = status.exists_in_cache;
net_error_ = status.error_code;
if (skip_throttles) {
CommitErrorPage(error_page_content);
} else {
navigation_handle_->WillFailRequest(base::BindOnce(
&NavigationRequest::OnFailureChecksComplete, base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
|
void NavigationRequest::OnRequestFailedInternal(
const network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus& status,
bool skip_throttles,
const base::Optional<std::string>& error_page_content,
bool collapse_frame) {
DCHECK(state_ == STARTED || state_ == RESPONSE_STARTED);
DCHECK(!(status.error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED &&
error_page_content.has_value()));
common_params_.previews_state = content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
if (status.ssl_info.has_value())
ssl_info_ = status.ssl_info;
devtools_instrumentation::OnNavigationRequestFailed(*this, status);
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_STEP_INTO1("navigation", "NavigationRequest", this,
"OnRequestFailed", "error", status.error_code);
state_ = FAILED;
if (navigation_handle_.get()) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(
static_cast<net::Error>(status.error_code));
}
int expected_pending_entry_id =
navigation_handle_.get() ? navigation_handle_->pending_nav_entry_id()
: nav_entry_id_;
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(
expected_pending_entry_id);
if (status.error_code == net::ERR_ABORTED) {
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (collapse_frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame());
DCHECK_EQ(net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT, status.error_code);
frame_tree_node_->SetCollapsed(true);
}
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host = nullptr;
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame())) {
navigation_handle_->SetExpectedProcess(nullptr);
render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
} else {
if (ShouldKeepErrorPageInCurrentProcess(status.error_code)) {
render_frame_host = frame_tree_node_->current_frame_host();
} else {
render_frame_host =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetFrameHostForNavigation(*this);
}
}
CHECK(!render_frame_host_ || render_frame_host_ == render_frame_host);
render_frame_host_ = render_frame_host;
DCHECK(render_frame_host_);
NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(render_frame_host_,
common_params_.url);
has_stale_copy_in_cache_ = status.exists_in_cache;
net_error_ = status.error_code;
if (skip_throttles) {
CommitErrorPage(error_page_content);
} else {
navigation_handle_->WillFailRequest(base::BindOnce(
&NavigationRequest::OnFailureChecksComplete, base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4080/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfdc0b497faa82a0ba2f9dddcf109231dd519fcc
|
bfdc0b497faa82a0ba2f9dddcf109231dd519fcc
|
sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Eugene Teo <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
void sysctl_head_finish(struct ctl_table_header *head)
{
if (!head)
return;
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
}
|
void sysctl_head_finish(struct ctl_table_header *head)
{
if (!head)
return;
spin_lock(&sysctl_lock);
unuse_table(head);
spin_unlock(&sysctl_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2849
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2849/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5dc90e57abcc7f0489e7ae09a3e687e9c6f4fad5
|
5dc90e57abcc7f0489e7ae09a3e687e9c6f4fad5
|
Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebSocketJob::OnAuthRequired(
SocketStream* socket, AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnAuthRequired(socket, auth_info);
}
|
void WebSocketJob::OnAuthRequired(
SocketStream* socket, AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnAuthRequired(socket, auth_info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13142
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13142/
|
CWE-754
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aa84944b405acebbeefe871d0f64969b9e9f31ac
|
aa84944b405acebbeefe871d0f64969b9e9f31ac
|
...
|
static MagickBooleanType IsPNG(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 8)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType IsPNG(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 8)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
get_total_entries(struct trace_buffer *buf,
unsigned long *total, unsigned long *entries)
{
unsigned long count;
int cpu;
*total = 0;
*entries = 0;
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
count = ring_buffer_entries_cpu(buf->buffer, cpu);
/*
* If this buffer has skipped entries, then we hold all
* entries for the trace and we need to ignore the
* ones before the time stamp.
*/
if (per_cpu_ptr(buf->data, cpu)->skipped_entries) {
count -= per_cpu_ptr(buf->data, cpu)->skipped_entries;
/* total is the same as the entries */
*total += count;
} else
*total += count +
ring_buffer_overrun_cpu(buf->buffer, cpu);
*entries += count;
}
}
|
get_total_entries(struct trace_buffer *buf,
unsigned long *total, unsigned long *entries)
{
unsigned long count;
int cpu;
*total = 0;
*entries = 0;
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
count = ring_buffer_entries_cpu(buf->buffer, cpu);
/*
* If this buffer has skipped entries, then we hold all
* entries for the trace and we need to ignore the
* ones before the time stamp.
*/
if (per_cpu_ptr(buf->data, cpu)->skipped_entries) {
count -= per_cpu_ptr(buf->data, cpu)->skipped_entries;
/* total is the same as the entries */
*total += count;
} else
*total += count +
ring_buffer_overrun_cpu(buf->buffer, cpu);
*entries += count;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
encode_SET_MPLS_LABEL(const struct ofpact_mpls_label *label,
enum ofp_version ofp_version,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version < OFP12_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT_SET_MPLS_LABEL(out, ofp_version, label->label);
} else {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, MFF_MPLS_LABEL, ntohl(label->label));
}
}
|
encode_SET_MPLS_LABEL(const struct ofpact_mpls_label *label,
enum ofp_version ofp_version,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version < OFP12_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT_SET_MPLS_LABEL(out, ofp_version, label->label);
} else {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, MFF_MPLS_LABEL, ntohl(label->label));
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int __init camellia_aesni_init(void)
{
u64 xcr0;
if (!cpu_has_avx || !cpu_has_aes || !cpu_has_osxsave) {
pr_info("AVX or AES-NI instructions are not detected.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
if ((xcr0 & (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) != (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) {
pr_info("AVX detected but unusable.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return crypto_register_algs(cmll_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(cmll_algs));
}
|
static int __init camellia_aesni_init(void)
{
u64 xcr0;
if (!cpu_has_avx || !cpu_has_aes || !cpu_has_osxsave) {
pr_info("AVX or AES-NI instructions are not detected.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
if ((xcr0 & (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) != (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) {
pr_info("AVX detected but unusable.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return crypto_register_algs(cmll_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(cmll_algs));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void vmx_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer)
kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
pi_post_block(vcpu);
}
|
static void vmx_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer)
kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
pi_post_block(vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
DoubleOrString result;
impl->doubleOrStringAttribute(result);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
|
static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
DoubleOrString result;
impl->doubleOrStringAttribute(result);
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8924/
|
CWE-191
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e
|
654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e
|
USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
|
static int write_boot_mem(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int start_address, int length, __u8 *buffer)
{
int status = 0;
int i;
u8 *temp;
/* Must do a read before write */
if (!serial->TiReadI2C) {
temp = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp)
return -ENOMEM;
status = read_boot_mem(serial, 0, 1, temp);
kfree(temp);
if (status)
return status;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
status = ti_vsend_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_WRITE,
buffer[i], (u16)(i + start_address), NULL,
0, TI_VSEND_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT);
if (status)
return status;
}
dev_dbg(&serial->serial->dev->dev, "%s - start_sddr = %x, length = %d\n", __func__, start_address, length);
usb_serial_debug_data(&serial->serial->dev->dev, __func__, length, buffer);
return status;
}
|
static int write_boot_mem(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int start_address, int length, __u8 *buffer)
{
int status = 0;
int i;
u8 *temp;
/* Must do a read before write */
if (!serial->TiReadI2C) {
temp = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp)
return -ENOMEM;
status = read_boot_mem(serial, 0, 1, temp);
kfree(temp);
if (status)
return status;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
status = ti_vsend_sync(serial->serial->dev, UMPC_MEMORY_WRITE,
buffer[i], (u16)(i + start_address), NULL,
0, TI_VSEND_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT);
if (status)
return status;
}
dev_dbg(&serial->serial->dev->dev, "%s - start_sddr = %x, length = %d\n", __func__, start_address, length);
usb_serial_debug_data(&serial->serial->dev->dev, __func__, length, buffer);
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11413
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11413/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/ccxvii/mujs/commit/00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2
|
00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2
|
Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
|
static int hex(struct cstate *g, int c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 0xA;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 0xA;
die(g, "invalid escape sequence");
return 0;
}
|
static int hex(struct cstate *g, int c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') return c - 'a' + 0xA;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') return c - 'A' + 0xA;
die(g, "invalid escape sequence");
return 0;
}
|
C
|
mujs
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14357/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
e52393740334443ae0206cab2d7caef381646725
|
quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
static void cmd_parse_capability(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
mutt_debug(3, "Handling CAPABILITY\n");
s = imap_next_word(s);
char *bracket = strchr(s, ']');
if (bracket)
*bracket = '\0';
FREE(&idata->capstr);
idata->capstr = mutt_str_strdup(s);
memset(idata->capabilities, 0, sizeof(idata->capabilities));
while (*s)
{
for (int i = 0; i < CAPMAX; i++)
{
if (mutt_str_word_casecmp(Capabilities[i], s) == 0)
{
mutt_bit_set(idata->capabilities, i);
mutt_debug(4, " Found capability \"%s\": %d\n", Capabilities[i], i);
break;
}
}
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
}
|
static void cmd_parse_capability(struct ImapData *idata, char *s)
{
mutt_debug(3, "Handling CAPABILITY\n");
s = imap_next_word(s);
char *bracket = strchr(s, ']');
if (bracket)
*bracket = '\0';
FREE(&idata->capstr);
idata->capstr = mutt_str_strdup(s);
memset(idata->capabilities, 0, sizeof(idata->capabilities));
while (*s)
{
for (int i = 0; i < CAPMAX; i++)
{
if (mutt_str_word_casecmp(Capabilities[i], s) == 0)
{
mutt_bit_set(idata->capabilities, i);
mutt_debug(4, " Found capability \"%s\": %d\n", Capabilities[i], i);
break;
}
}
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3735
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3735/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/fb58e69a84f4fde603a630d2c9df2fa3be16d846
|
fb58e69a84f4fde603a630d2c9df2fa3be16d846
|
fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
|
static size_t encoding_filter_script_to_intermediate(unsigned char **to, size_t *to_length, const unsigned char *from, size_t from_length TSRMLS_DC)
{
return zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(to, to_length, from, from_length, zend_multibyte_encoding_utf8, LANG_SCNG(script_encoding) TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
static size_t encoding_filter_script_to_intermediate(unsigned char **to, size_t *to_length, const unsigned char *from, size_t from_length TSRMLS_DC)
{
return zend_multibyte_encoding_converter(to, to_length, from, from_length, zend_multibyte_encoding_utf8, LANG_SCNG(script_encoding) TSRMLS_CC);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1686
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1686/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3e16497d0d5639fb3257305ea369ba4ab8ba210
|
e3e16497d0d5639fb3257305ea369ba4ab8ba210
|
Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
|
void InputConnectionImpl::SendControlKeyEvent(const base::string16& text) {
DCHECK(IsControlChar(text));
const std::string str = base::UTF16ToUTF8(text);
DCHECK_EQ(1u, str.length());
for (const auto& t : kControlCharToKeyEvent) {
if (std::get<0>(t) == str[0]) {
chromeos::InputMethodEngine::KeyboardEvent press;
press.type = "keydown";
press.key_code = std::get<1>(t);
press.key = press.code = std::get<2>(t);
chromeos::InputMethodEngine::KeyboardEvent release(press);
release.type = "keyup";
ime_engine_->SendKeyEvents(input_context_id_, {press, release});
break;
}
}
return;
}
|
void InputConnectionImpl::SendControlKeyEvent(const base::string16& text) {
DCHECK(IsControlChar(text));
const std::string str = base::UTF16ToUTF8(text);
DCHECK_EQ(1u, str.length());
for (const auto& t : kControlCharToKeyEvent) {
if (std::get<0>(t) == str[0]) {
chromeos::InputMethodEngine::KeyboardEvent press;
press.type = "keydown";
press.key_code = std::get<1>(t);
press.key = press.code = std::get<2>(t);
chromeos::InputMethodEngine::KeyboardEvent release(press);
release.type = "keyup";
ime_engine_->SendKeyEvents(input_context_id_, {press, release});
break;
}
}
return;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::UsvStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_usvStringAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::UsvStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::UsvStringAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_usvStringAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::UsvStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::AskUserForSettings(
gfx::NativeView parent_view,
int max_pages,
bool has_selection) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return FAILED;
}
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::AskUserForSettings(
gfx::NativeWindow window,
int max_pages,
bool has_selection) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return FAILED;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3167
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3167/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44f1431b20c16d8f8da0ce8ff7bbf2adddcdd785
|
44f1431b20c16d8f8da0ce8ff7bbf2adddcdd785
|
Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
|
LayoutSVGResourceMarker::~LayoutSVGResourceMarker()
{
}
|
LayoutSVGResourceMarker::~LayoutSVGResourceMarker()
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14363
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14363/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/neomutt/neomutt/commit/9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
9bfab35522301794483f8f9ed60820bdec9be59e
|
sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
|
void nntp_newsrc_close(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
if (!nserv->newsrc_fp)
return;
mutt_debug(1, "Unlocking %s\n", nserv->newsrc_file);
mutt_file_unlock(fileno(nserv->newsrc_fp));
mutt_file_fclose(&nserv->newsrc_fp);
}
|
void nntp_newsrc_close(struct NntpServer *nserv)
{
if (!nserv->newsrc_fp)
return;
mutt_debug(1, "Unlocking %s\n", nserv->newsrc_file);
mutt_file_unlock(fileno(nserv->newsrc_fp));
mutt_file_fclose(&nserv->newsrc_fp);
}
|
C
|
neomutt
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2724
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2724/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.samba.org/?p=cifs-utils.git;a=commit;h=1e7a32924b22d1f786b6f490ce8590656f578f91
|
1e7a32924b22d1f786b6f490ce8590656f578f91
| null |
static int check_mtab(const char *progname, const char *devname,
const char *dir)
{
if (check_newline(progname, devname) || check_newline(progname, dir))
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
|
static int check_mtab(const char *progname, const char *devname,
const char *dir)
{
if (check_newline(progname, devname) == -1 ||
check_newline(progname, dir) == -1)
return EX_USAGE;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
samba
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void InspectorAccessibilityAgent::addAncestors(
AXObject& firstAncestor,
AXObject* inspectedAXObject,
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<AXNode>>& nodes,
AXObjectCacheImpl& cache) const {
AXObject* ancestor = &firstAncestor;
while (ancestor) {
nodes->addItem(buildProtocolAXObject(*ancestor, inspectedAXObject, true,
nodes, cache));
ancestor = ancestor->parentObjectUnignored();
}
}
|
void InspectorAccessibilityAgent::addAncestors(
AXObject& firstAncestor,
AXObject* inspectedAXObject,
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<AXNode>>& nodes,
AXObjectCacheImpl& cache) const {
AXObject* ancestor = &firstAncestor;
while (ancestor) {
nodes->addItem(buildProtocolAXObject(*ancestor, inspectedAXObject, true,
nodes, cache));
ancestor = ancestor->parentObjectUnignored();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5118
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832
|
Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
|
void Document::AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage* console_message) {
if (!IsContextThread()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnthrottled, this)
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&RunAddConsoleMessageTask, console_message->Source(),
console_message->Level(), console_message->Message(),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
return;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
if (console_message->Location()->IsUnknown()) {
unsigned line_number = 0;
if (!IsInDocumentWrite() && GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser();
if (parser->IsParsingAtLineNumber())
line_number = parser->LineNumber().OneBasedInt();
}
console_message = ConsoleMessage::Create(
console_message->Source(), console_message->Level(),
console_message->Message(),
SourceLocation::Create(Url().GetString(), line_number, 0, nullptr));
}
frame_->Console().AddMessage(console_message);
}
|
void Document::AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage* console_message) {
if (!IsContextThread()) {
TaskRunnerHelper::Get(TaskType::kUnthrottled, this)
->PostTask(BLINK_FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(
&RunAddConsoleMessageTask, console_message->Source(),
console_message->Level(), console_message->Message(),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
return;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
if (console_message->Location()->IsUnknown()) {
unsigned line_number = 0;
if (!IsInDocumentWrite() && GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser();
if (parser->IsParsingAtLineNumber())
line_number = parser->LineNumber().OneBasedInt();
}
console_message = ConsoleMessage::Create(
console_message->Source(), console_message->Level(),
console_message->Message(),
SourceLocation::Create(Url().GetString(), line_number, 0, nullptr));
}
frame_->Console().AddMessage(console_message);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20815
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20815/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=da885fe1ee8b4589047484bd7fa05a4905b52b17
|
da885fe1ee8b4589047484bd7fa05a4905b52b17
| null |
void *load_device_tree(const char *filename_path, int *sizep)
{
int dt_size;
int dt_file_load_size;
int ret;
void *fdt = NULL;
*sizep = 0;
dt_size = get_image_size(filename_path);
if (dt_size < 0) {
error_report("Unable to get size of device tree file '%s'",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
/* Expand to 2x size to give enough room for manipulation. */
dt_size += 10000;
dt_size *= 2;
/* First allocate space in qemu for device tree */
fdt = g_malloc0(dt_size);
dt_file_load_size = load_image_size(filename_path, fdt, dt_size);
if (dt_file_load_size < 0) {
error_report("Unable to open device tree file '%s'",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
ret = fdt_open_into(fdt, fdt, dt_size);
if (ret) {
error_report("Unable to copy device tree in memory");
goto fail;
}
/* Check sanity of device tree */
if (fdt_check_header(fdt)) {
error_report("Device tree file loaded into memory is invalid: %s",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
*sizep = dt_size;
return fdt;
fail:
g_free(fdt);
return NULL;
}
|
void *load_device_tree(const char *filename_path, int *sizep)
{
int dt_size;
int dt_file_load_size;
int ret;
void *fdt = NULL;
*sizep = 0;
dt_size = get_image_size(filename_path);
if (dt_size < 0) {
error_report("Unable to get size of device tree file '%s'",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
/* Expand to 2x size to give enough room for manipulation. */
dt_size += 10000;
dt_size *= 2;
/* First allocate space in qemu for device tree */
fdt = g_malloc0(dt_size);
dt_file_load_size = load_image(filename_path, fdt);
if (dt_file_load_size < 0) {
error_report("Unable to open device tree file '%s'",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
ret = fdt_open_into(fdt, fdt, dt_size);
if (ret) {
error_report("Unable to copy device tree in memory");
goto fail;
}
/* Check sanity of device tree */
if (fdt_check_header(fdt)) {
error_report("Device tree file loaded into memory is invalid: %s",
filename_path);
goto fail;
}
*sizep = dt_size;
return fdt;
fail:
g_free(fdt);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
const SVGDocumentExtensions* Document::svgExtensions()
{
return m_svgExtensions.get();
}
|
const SVGDocumentExtensions* Document::svgExtensions()
{
return m_svgExtensions.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Framebuffer::SetDrawBuffers(GLsizei n, const GLenum* bufs) {
DCHECK(n <= static_cast<GLsizei>(manager_->max_draw_buffers_));
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < n; ++i)
draw_buffers_[i] = bufs[i];
}
|
void Framebuffer::SetDrawBuffers(GLsizei n, const GLenum* bufs) {
DCHECK(n <= static_cast<GLsizei>(manager_->max_draw_buffers_));
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < n; ++i)
draw_buffers_[i] = bufs[i];
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15162/
|
CWE-345
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/commit/484d60cbf7ca4ec758c3cbb8a82d68b244a78d58
|
484d60cbf7ca4ec758c3cbb8a82d68b244a78d58
|
On UN*X, don't tell the client why authentication failed.
"no such user" tells the client that the user ID isn't valid and,
therefore, that it needn't bother trying to do password cracking for
that user ID; just saying that the authentication failed dosn't give
them that hint.
This resolves the third problem in Include Security issue F11: [libpcap]
Remote Packet Capture Daemon Multiple Authentication Improvements.
The Windows LogonUser() API returns ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE for both cases,
so the Windows code doesn't have this issue. Just return the same
"Authentication failed" message on Windows to the user.
For various authentication failures *other* than "no such user" and
"password not valid", log a message, as there's a problem that may need
debugging. We don't need to tell the end user what the problem is, as
they may not bother reporting it and, even if they do, they may not give
the full error message.
|
daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
DWORD error;
HANDLE Token;
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to log
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
error = GetLastError();
if (error != ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE)
{
// Some error other than an authentication error;
// log it.
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf,
PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, error, "LogonUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
}
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "%s", errmsgbuf);
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
int error;
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
//
// The Single UNIX Specification says that if crypt() fails it
// sets errno, but some implementatons that haven't been run
// through the SUS test suite might not do so.
//
errno = 0;
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
error = errno;
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
if (error == 0)
{
// It didn't set errno.
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed");
}
else
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "crypt() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
}
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
error, "setuid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setuid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
error = errno;
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "setgid() failed: %s",
strerror(error));
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
|
daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
HANDLE Token;
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "LogonUser() failed");
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setuid");
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
|
C
|
libpcap
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::Size RenderViewImpl::GetSize() const {
return size();
}
|
gfx::Size RenderViewImpl::GetSize() const {
return size();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
void InputMethodController::DeleteSurroundingText(int before, int after) {
if (!GetEditor().CanEdit())
return;
const PlainTextRange selection_offsets(GetSelectionOffsets());
if (selection_offsets.IsNull())
return;
Element* const root_editable_element =
GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return;
int selection_start = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.Start());
int selection_end = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.End());
if (before > 0 && selection_start > 0) {
const int start = std::max(selection_start - before, 0);
const EphemeralRange& range =
PlainTextRange(0, start).CreateRange(*root_editable_element);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const Position& position = range.EndPosition();
const size_t diff = ComputeDistanceToLeftGraphemeBoundary(position);
const int adjusted_start = start - static_cast<int>(diff);
if (!SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(adjusted_start, selection_start)))
return;
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument());
selection_end = selection_end - (selection_start - adjusted_start);
selection_start = adjusted_start;
}
if (after > 0) {
const PlainTextRange range(0, selection_end + after);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const EphemeralRange& valid_range =
range.CreateRange(*root_editable_element);
if (valid_range.IsNull())
return;
const int end =
PlainTextRange::Create(*root_editable_element, valid_range).End();
const Position& position = valid_range.EndPosition();
const size_t diff = ComputeDistanceToRightGraphemeBoundary(position);
const int adjusted_end = end + static_cast<int>(diff);
if (!SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(selection_end, adjusted_end)))
return;
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument());
}
SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(selection_start, selection_end));
}
|
void InputMethodController::DeleteSurroundingText(int before, int after) {
if (!GetEditor().CanEdit())
return;
const PlainTextRange selection_offsets(GetSelectionOffsets());
if (selection_offsets.IsNull())
return;
Element* const root_editable_element =
GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.RootEditableElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return;
int selection_start = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.Start());
int selection_end = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.End());
if (before > 0 && selection_start > 0) {
const int start = std::max(selection_start - before, 0);
const EphemeralRange& range =
PlainTextRange(0, start).CreateRange(*root_editable_element);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const Position& position = range.EndPosition();
const size_t diff = ComputeDistanceToLeftGraphemeBoundary(position);
const int adjusted_start = start - static_cast<int>(diff);
if (!SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(adjusted_start, selection_start)))
return;
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument());
selection_end = selection_end - (selection_start - adjusted_start);
selection_start = adjusted_start;
}
if (after > 0) {
const PlainTextRange range(0, selection_end + after);
if (range.IsNull())
return;
const EphemeralRange& valid_range =
range.CreateRange(*root_editable_element);
if (valid_range.IsNull())
return;
const int end =
PlainTextRange::Create(*root_editable_element, valid_range).End();
const Position& position = valid_range.EndPosition();
const size_t diff = ComputeDistanceToRightGraphemeBoundary(position);
const int adjusted_end = end + static_cast<int>(diff);
if (!SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(selection_end, adjusted_end)))
return;
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument());
}
SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(selection_start, selection_end));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
freeBindings(XML_Parser parser, BINDING *bindings) {
while (bindings) {
BINDING *b = bindings;
/* m_startNamespaceDeclHandler will have been called for this
* binding in addBindings(), so call the end handler now.
*/
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, b->prefix->name);
bindings = bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
}
|
freeBindings(XML_Parser parser, BINDING *bindings) {
while (bindings) {
BINDING *b = bindings;
/* m_startNamespaceDeclHandler will have been called for this
* binding in addBindings(), so call the end handler now.
*/
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, b->prefix->name);
bindings = bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5842/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
size_t
length;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
size_t
length;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-1000198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000198/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/open-iscsi/tcmu-runner/commit/61bd03e600d2abf309173e9186f4d465bb1b7157
|
61bd03e600d2abf309173e9186f4d465bb1b7157
|
glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <[email protected]>
|
static int tcmu_glfs_open(struct tcmu_device *dev)
{
struct glfs_state *gfsp;
int ret = 0;
char *config;
struct stat st;
gfsp = calloc(1, sizeof(*gfsp));
if (!gfsp)
return -ENOMEM;
tcmu_set_dev_private(dev, gfsp);
config = tcmu_get_path(dev);
if (!config) {
goto fail;
}
gfsp->fs = tcmu_create_glfs_object(config, &gfsp->hosts);
if (!gfsp->fs) {
tcmu_err("tcmu_create_glfs_object failed\n");
goto fail;
}
gfsp->gfd = glfs_open(gfsp->fs, gfsp->hosts->path, ALLOWED_BSOFLAGS);
if (!gfsp->gfd) {
tcmu_err("glfs_open failed: %m\n");
goto unref;
}
ret = glfs_lstat(gfsp->fs, gfsp->hosts->path, &st);
if (ret) {
tcmu_err("glfs_lstat failed: %m\n");
goto unref;
}
if (st.st_size != tcmu_get_device_size(dev)) {
tcmu_err("device size and backing size disagree: "
"device %lld backing %lld\n",
tcmu_get_device_size(dev),
(long long) st.st_size);
goto unref;
}
return 0;
unref:
gluster_cache_refresh(gfsp->fs, tcmu_get_path(dev));
fail:
if (gfsp->gfd)
glfs_close(gfsp->gfd);
gluster_free_server(&gfsp->hosts);
free(gfsp);
return -EIO;
}
|
static int tcmu_glfs_open(struct tcmu_device *dev)
{
struct glfs_state *gfsp;
int ret = 0;
char *config;
struct stat st;
gfsp = calloc(1, sizeof(*gfsp));
if (!gfsp)
return -ENOMEM;
tcmu_set_dev_private(dev, gfsp);
config = tcmu_get_path(dev);
if (!config) {
goto fail;
}
gfsp->fs = tcmu_create_glfs_object(config, &gfsp->hosts);
if (!gfsp->fs) {
tcmu_err("tcmu_create_glfs_object failed\n");
goto fail;
}
gfsp->gfd = glfs_open(gfsp->fs, gfsp->hosts->path, ALLOWED_BSOFLAGS);
if (!gfsp->gfd) {
tcmu_err("glfs_open failed: %m\n");
goto unref;
}
ret = glfs_lstat(gfsp->fs, gfsp->hosts->path, &st);
if (ret) {
tcmu_err("glfs_lstat failed: %m\n");
goto unref;
}
if (st.st_size != tcmu_get_device_size(dev)) {
tcmu_err("device size and backing size disagree: "
"device %lld backing %lld\n",
tcmu_get_device_size(dev),
(long long) st.st_size);
goto unref;
}
return 0;
unref:
gluster_cache_refresh(gfsp->fs, tcmu_get_path(dev));
fail:
if (gfsp->gfd)
glfs_close(gfsp->gfd);
gluster_free_server(&gfsp->hosts);
free(gfsp);
return -EIO;
}
|
C
|
tcmu-runner
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19409
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19409/
| null |
https://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=661e8d8fb8248c38d67958beda32f3a5876d0c3f
|
661e8d8fb8248c38d67958beda32f3a5876d0c3f
| null |
zcurrentdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
gs_ref_memory_t *mem = (gs_ref_memory_t *) dev->memory;
push(1);
make_tav(op, t_device,
(mem == 0 ? avm_foreign : imemory_space(mem)) | a_all,
pdevice, dev);
return 0;
}
|
zcurrentdevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
gs_ref_memory_t *mem = (gs_ref_memory_t *) dev->memory;
push(1);
make_tav(op, t_device,
(mem == 0 ? avm_foreign : imemory_space(mem)) | a_all,
pdevice, dev);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16612
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16612/
|
CWE-190
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/wayland/wayland/commit/?id=5d201df72f3d4f4cb8b8f75f980169b03507da38
|
5d201df72f3d4f4cb8b8f75f980169b03507da38
| null |
_XcursorThemeInherits (const char *full)
{
char line[8192];
char *result = NULL;
FILE *f;
if (!full)
return NULL;
f = fopen (full, "r");
if (f)
{
while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), f))
{
if (!strncmp (line, "Inherits", 8))
{
char *l = line + 8;
char *r;
while (*l == ' ') l++;
if (*l != '=') continue;
l++;
while (*l == ' ') l++;
result = malloc (strlen (l) + 1);
if (result)
{
r = result;
while (*l)
{
while (XcursorSep(*l) || XcursorWhite (*l)) l++;
if (!*l)
break;
if (r != result)
*r++ = ':';
while (*l && !XcursorWhite(*l) &&
!XcursorSep(*l))
*r++ = *l++;
}
*r++ = '\0';
}
break;
}
}
fclose (f);
}
return result;
}
|
_XcursorThemeInherits (const char *full)
{
char line[8192];
char *result = NULL;
FILE *f;
if (!full)
return NULL;
f = fopen (full, "r");
if (f)
{
while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), f))
{
if (!strncmp (line, "Inherits", 8))
{
char *l = line + 8;
char *r;
while (*l == ' ') l++;
if (*l != '=') continue;
l++;
while (*l == ' ') l++;
result = malloc (strlen (l) + 1);
if (result)
{
r = result;
while (*l)
{
while (XcursorSep(*l) || XcursorWhite (*l)) l++;
if (!*l)
break;
if (r != result)
*r++ = ':';
while (*l && !XcursorWhite(*l) &&
!XcursorSep(*l))
*r++ = *l++;
}
*r++ = '\0';
}
break;
}
}
fclose (f);
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
wayland
| 0 |
CVE-2018-8754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-8754/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/libyal/libevt/commit/444ca3ce7853538c577e0ec3f6146d2d65780734
|
444ca3ce7853538c577e0ec3f6146d2d65780734
|
Applied updates and addition boundary checks for corrupted data
|
int libevt_record_values_clone(
libevt_record_values_t **destination_record_values,
libevt_record_values_t *source_record_values,
libcerror_error_t **error )
{
static char *function = "libevt_record_values_clone";
if( destination_record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid destination record values.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( *destination_record_values != NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_RUNTIME,
LIBCERROR_RUNTIME_ERROR_VALUE_ALREADY_SET,
"%s: invalid destination record values value already set.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( source_record_values == NULL )
{
*destination_record_values = NULL;
return( 1 );
}
*destination_record_values = memory_allocate_structure(
libevt_record_values_t );
if( *destination_record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_MEMORY,
LIBCERROR_MEMORY_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT,
"%s: unable to create destination record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
if( memory_copy(
*destination_record_values,
source_record_values,
sizeof( libevt_record_values_t ) ) == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_MEMORY,
LIBCERROR_MEMORY_ERROR_COPY_FAILED,
"%s: unable to copy source to destination record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
return( 1 );
on_error:
if( *destination_record_values != NULL )
{
memory_free(
*destination_record_values );
*destination_record_values = NULL;
}
return( -1 );
}
|
int libevt_record_values_clone(
libevt_record_values_t **destination_record_values,
libevt_record_values_t *source_record_values,
libcerror_error_t **error )
{
static char *function = "libevt_record_values_clone";
if( destination_record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_ARGUMENTS,
LIBCERROR_ARGUMENT_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE,
"%s: invalid destination record values.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( *destination_record_values != NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_RUNTIME,
LIBCERROR_RUNTIME_ERROR_VALUE_ALREADY_SET,
"%s: invalid destination record values value already set.",
function );
return( -1 );
}
if( source_record_values == NULL )
{
*destination_record_values = NULL;
return( 1 );
}
*destination_record_values = memory_allocate_structure(
libevt_record_values_t );
if( *destination_record_values == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_MEMORY,
LIBCERROR_MEMORY_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT,
"%s: unable to create destination record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
if( memory_copy(
*destination_record_values,
source_record_values,
sizeof( libevt_record_values_t ) ) == NULL )
{
libcerror_error_set(
error,
LIBCERROR_ERROR_DOMAIN_MEMORY,
LIBCERROR_MEMORY_ERROR_COPY_FAILED,
"%s: unable to copy source to destination record values.",
function );
goto on_error;
}
return( 1 );
on_error:
if( *destination_record_values != NULL )
{
memory_free(
*destination_record_values );
*destination_record_values = NULL;
}
return( -1 );
}
|
C
|
libevt
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3750
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3750/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8
|
54cb02ad733fb71b1bdf78590428817fb780aff8
|
Correctly handle dup() failure in Parcel::readNativeHandle
bail out if dup() fails, instead of creating an invalid native_handle_t
Bug: 28395952
Change-Id: Ia1a6198c0f45165b9c6a55a803e5f64d8afa0572
|
status_t Parcel::write(const FlattenableHelperInterface& val)
{
status_t err;
const size_t len = val.getFlattenedSize();
const size_t fd_count = val.getFdCount();
if ((len > INT32_MAX) || (fd_count > INT32_MAX)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = this->writeInt32(len);
if (err) return err;
err = this->writeInt32(fd_count);
if (err) return err;
void* const buf = this->writeInplace(pad_size(len));
if (buf == NULL)
return BAD_VALUE;
int* fds = NULL;
if (fd_count) {
fds = new int[fd_count];
}
err = val.flatten(buf, len, fds, fd_count);
for (size_t i=0 ; i<fd_count && err==NO_ERROR ; i++) {
err = this->writeDupFileDescriptor( fds[i] );
}
if (fd_count) {
delete [] fds;
}
return err;
}
|
status_t Parcel::write(const FlattenableHelperInterface& val)
{
status_t err;
const size_t len = val.getFlattenedSize();
const size_t fd_count = val.getFdCount();
if ((len > INT32_MAX) || (fd_count > INT32_MAX)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = this->writeInt32(len);
if (err) return err;
err = this->writeInt32(fd_count);
if (err) return err;
void* const buf = this->writeInplace(pad_size(len));
if (buf == NULL)
return BAD_VALUE;
int* fds = NULL;
if (fd_count) {
fds = new int[fd_count];
}
err = val.flatten(buf, len, fds, fd_count);
for (size_t i=0 ; i<fd_count && err==NO_ERROR ; i++) {
err = this->writeDupFileDescriptor( fds[i] );
}
if (fd_count) {
delete [] fds;
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/aquynh/capstone/commit/87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
|
void X86_reg_access(const cs_insn *insn,
cs_regs regs_read, uint8_t *regs_read_count,
cs_regs regs_write, uint8_t *regs_write_count)
{
uint8_t i;
uint8_t read_count, write_count;
cs_x86 *x86 = &(insn->detail->x86);
read_count = insn->detail->regs_read_count;
write_count = insn->detail->regs_write_count;
memcpy(regs_read, insn->detail->regs_read, read_count * sizeof(insn->detail->regs_read[0]));
memcpy(regs_write, insn->detail->regs_write, write_count * sizeof(insn->detail->regs_write[0]));
for (i = 0; i < x86->op_count; i++) {
cs_x86_op *op = &(x86->operands[i]);
switch((int)op->type) {
case X86_OP_REG:
if ((op->access & CS_AC_READ) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->reg)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->reg;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->access & CS_AC_WRITE) && !arr_exist(regs_write, write_count, op->reg)) {
regs_write[write_count] = op->reg;
write_count++;
}
break;
case X86_OP_MEM:
if ((op->mem.segment != X86_REG_INVALID)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.segment;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->mem.base != X86_REG_INVALID) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->mem.base)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.base;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->mem.index != X86_REG_INVALID) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->mem.index)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.index;
read_count++;
}
default:
break;
}
}
*regs_read_count = read_count;
*regs_write_count = write_count;
}
|
void X86_reg_access(const cs_insn *insn,
cs_regs regs_read, uint8_t *regs_read_count,
cs_regs regs_write, uint8_t *regs_write_count)
{
uint8_t i;
uint8_t read_count, write_count;
cs_x86 *x86 = &(insn->detail->x86);
read_count = insn->detail->regs_read_count;
write_count = insn->detail->regs_write_count;
memcpy(regs_read, insn->detail->regs_read, read_count * sizeof(insn->detail->regs_read[0]));
memcpy(regs_write, insn->detail->regs_write, write_count * sizeof(insn->detail->regs_write[0]));
for (i = 0; i < x86->op_count; i++) {
cs_x86_op *op = &(x86->operands[i]);
switch((int)op->type) {
case X86_OP_REG:
if ((op->access & CS_AC_READ) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->reg)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->reg;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->access & CS_AC_WRITE) && !arr_exist(regs_write, write_count, op->reg)) {
regs_write[write_count] = op->reg;
write_count++;
}
break;
case X86_OP_MEM:
if ((op->mem.segment != X86_REG_INVALID)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.segment;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->mem.base != X86_REG_INVALID) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->mem.base)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.base;
read_count++;
}
if ((op->mem.index != X86_REG_INVALID) && !arr_exist(regs_read, read_count, op->mem.index)) {
regs_read[read_count] = op->mem.index;
read_count++;
}
default:
break;
}
}
*regs_read_count = read_count;
*regs_write_count = write_count;
}
|
C
|
capstone
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13303
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13303/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/00e8181bd97c834fe60751b0c511d4bb97875f78
|
00e8181bd97c834fe60751b0c511d4bb97875f78
|
avcodec/ac3_parser: Check init_get_bits8() for failure
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_6.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
int av_ac3_parse_header(const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
uint8_t *bitstream_id, uint16_t *frame_size)
{
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
|
int av_ac3_parse_header(const uint8_t *buf, size_t size,
uint8_t *bitstream_id, uint16_t *frame_size)
{
return AVERROR(ENOSYS);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12714
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12714/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
81f9c4e4177d31ced6f52a89bb70e93bfb77ca03
|
Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
|
void tracing_snapshot(void)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Snapshot feature not enabled, but internal snapshot used");
}
|
void tracing_snapshot(void)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Snapshot feature not enabled, but internal snapshot used");
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9659
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9659/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=2cdc4562f873237f1c77d43540537c7a721d3fd8
|
2cdc4562f873237f1c77d43540537c7a721d3fd8
| null |
cf2_hint_isPairTop( const CF2_Hint hint )
{
return (FT_Bool)( ( hint->flags & CF2_PairTop ) != 0 );
}
|
cf2_hint_isPairTop( const CF2_Hint hint )
{
return (FT_Bool)( ( hint->flags & CF2_PairTop ) != 0 );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Document::didAddTouchEventHandler(Node* handler)
{
if (!m_touchEventTargets.get())
m_touchEventTargets = adoptPtr(new TouchEventTargetSet);
m_touchEventTargets->add(handler);
if (Document* parent = parentDocument()) {
parent->didAddTouchEventHandler(this);
return;
}
if (Page* page = this->page()) {
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = page->scrollingCoordinator())
scrollingCoordinator->touchEventTargetRectsDidChange(this);
if (m_touchEventTargets->size() == 1)
page->chrome().client().needTouchEvents(true);
}
}
|
void Document::didAddTouchEventHandler(Node* handler)
{
if (!m_touchEventTargets.get())
m_touchEventTargets = adoptPtr(new TouchEventTargetSet);
m_touchEventTargets->add(handler);
if (Document* parent = parentDocument()) {
parent->didAddTouchEventHandler(this);
return;
}
if (Page* page = this->page()) {
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = page->scrollingCoordinator())
scrollingCoordinator->touchEventTargetRectsDidChange(this);
if (m_touchEventTargets->size() == 1)
page->chrome().client().needTouchEvents(true);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d30a8bd191f17b61938fc87890bffc80049b0774
|
d30a8bd191f17b61938fc87890bffc80049b0774
|
[Extensions] Rework inline installation observation
Instead of observing through the WebstoreAPI, observe directly in the TabHelper.
This is a great deal less code, more direct, and also fixes a lifetime issue
with the TabHelper being deleted before the inline installation completes.
BUG=613949
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2103663002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#403188}
|
SkBitmap* TabHelper::GetExtensionAppIcon() {
if (extension_app_icon_.empty())
return NULL;
return &extension_app_icon_;
}
|
SkBitmap* TabHelper::GetExtensionAppIcon() {
if (extension_app_icon_.empty())
return NULL;
return &extension_app_icon_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-0011
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-0011/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/Dieterbe/uzbl/commit/1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
1958b52d41cba96956dc1995660de49525ed1047
|
disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
|
save_cookies (SoupMessage *msg, gpointer user_data){
(void) user_data;
GSList *ck;
char *cookie;
for (ck = soup_cookies_from_response(msg); ck; ck = ck->next){
cookie = soup_cookie_to_set_cookie_header(ck->data);
SoupURI * soup_uri = soup_message_get_uri(msg);
GString *s = g_string_new ("");
g_string_printf(s, "PUT '%s' '%s' '%s' '%s'", soup_uri->scheme, soup_uri->host, soup_uri->path, cookie);
run_handler(uzbl.behave.cookie_handler, s->str);
g_free (cookie);
g_string_free(s, TRUE);
}
g_slist_free(ck);
}
|
save_cookies (SoupMessage *msg, gpointer user_data){
(void) user_data;
GSList *ck;
char *cookie;
for (ck = soup_cookies_from_response(msg); ck; ck = ck->next){
cookie = soup_cookie_to_set_cookie_header(ck->data);
SoupURI * soup_uri = soup_message_get_uri(msg);
GString *s = g_string_new ("");
g_string_printf(s, "PUT '%s' '%s' '%s' '%s'", soup_uri->scheme, soup_uri->host, soup_uri->path, cookie);
run_handler(uzbl.behave.cookie_handler, s->str);
g_free (cookie);
g_string_free(s, TRUE);
}
g_slist_free(ck);
}
|
C
|
uzbl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
list_add_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT);
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
/*
* If we're a stand alone event or group leader, we go to the context
* list, group events are kept attached to the group so that
* perf_group_detach can, at all times, locate all siblings.
*/
if (event->group_leader == event) {
struct list_head *list;
event->group_caps = event->event_caps;
list = ctx_group_list(event, ctx);
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, list);
}
list_update_cgroup_event(event, ctx, true);
list_add_rcu(&event->event_entry, &ctx->event_list);
ctx->nr_events++;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat++;
ctx->generation++;
}
|
list_add_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT);
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
/*
* If we're a stand alone event or group leader, we go to the context
* list, group events are kept attached to the group so that
* perf_group_detach can, at all times, locate all siblings.
*/
if (event->group_leader == event) {
struct list_head *list;
event->group_caps = event->event_caps;
list = ctx_group_list(event, ctx);
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, list);
}
list_update_cgroup_event(event, ctx, true);
list_add_rcu(&event->event_entry, &ctx->event_list);
ctx->nr_events++;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat++;
ctx->generation++;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9137
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9137/
|
CWE-416
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
|
0e6fe3a4c96be2d3e88389a5776f878021b4c59f
| null |
ZEND_API int zend_startup_modules(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_sort(&module_registry, zend_sort_modules, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_apply(&module_registry, (apply_func_t)zend_startup_module_int TSRMLS_CC);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
ZEND_API int zend_startup_modules(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_sort(&module_registry, zend_sort_modules, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_apply(&module_registry, (apply_func_t)zend_startup_module_int TSRMLS_CC);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
void AXTableCell::rowIndexRange(std::pair<unsigned, unsigned>& rowRange) {
if (!m_layoutObject || !m_layoutObject->isTableCell())
return;
LayoutTableCell* layoutCell = toLayoutTableCell(m_layoutObject);
rowRange.first = layoutCell->rowIndex();
rowRange.second = layoutCell->rowSpan();
LayoutTableSection* section = layoutCell->section();
LayoutTable* table = layoutCell->table();
if (!table || !section)
return;
LayoutTableSection* tableSection = table->topSection();
unsigned rowOffset = 0;
while (tableSection) {
if (tableSection == section)
break;
rowOffset += tableSection->numRows();
tableSection = table->sectionBelow(tableSection, SkipEmptySections);
}
rowRange.first += rowOffset;
}
|
void AXTableCell::rowIndexRange(std::pair<unsigned, unsigned>& rowRange) {
if (!m_layoutObject || !m_layoutObject->isTableCell())
return;
LayoutTableCell* layoutCell = toLayoutTableCell(m_layoutObject);
rowRange.first = layoutCell->rowIndex();
rowRange.second = layoutCell->rowSpan();
LayoutTableSection* section = layoutCell->section();
LayoutTable* table = layoutCell->table();
if (!table || !section)
return;
LayoutTableSection* tableSection = table->topSection();
unsigned rowOffset = 0;
while (tableSection) {
if (tableSection == section)
break;
rowOffset += tableSection->numRows();
tableSection = table->sectionBelow(tableSection, SkipEmptySections);
}
rowRange.first += rowOffset;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool Document::regionBasedColumnsEnabled() const
{
return settings() && settings()->regionBasedColumnsEnabled();
}
|
bool Document::regionBasedColumnsEnabled() const
{
return settings() && settings()->regionBasedColumnsEnabled();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2345/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf04ad0dae9f4f479f90fd2b38f634ffbaf434b4
|
bf04ad0dae9f4f479f90fd2b38f634ffbaf434b4
|
Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PPVarFromNPObject::~PPVarFromNPObject() {
Var::PluginReleasePPVar(var_);
}
|
PPVarFromNPObject::~PPVarFromNPObject() {
Var::PluginReleasePPVar(var_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11171/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/GNOME/gnome-session/commit/b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
b0dc999e0b45355314616321dbb6cb71e729fc9d
|
[gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
xsmp_save_yourself_phase2 (GsmClient *client)
{
GsmXSMPClient *xsmp = (GsmXSMPClient *) client;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: xsmp_save_yourself_phase2 ('%s')", xsmp->priv->description);
SmsSaveYourselfPhase2 (xsmp->priv->conn);
}
|
xsmp_save_yourself_phase2 (GsmClient *client)
{
GsmXSMPClient *xsmp = (GsmXSMPClient *) client;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: xsmp_save_yourself_phase2 ('%s')", xsmp->priv->description);
SmsSaveYourselfPhase2 (xsmp->priv->conn);
}
|
C
|
gnome-session
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14341
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14341/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/4eae304e773bad8a876c3c26fdffac24d4253ae4
|
4eae304e773bad8a876c3c26fdffac24d4253ae4
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/654
|
static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent-1);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
|
static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent-1);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
u32 svc_max_payload(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
u32 max = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_class->xcl_max_payload;
if (rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload < max)
max = rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload;
return max;
}
|
u32 svc_max_payload(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
u32 max = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_class->xcl_max_payload;
if (rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload < max)
max = rqstp->rq_server->sv_max_payload;
return max;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2849
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2849/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5dc90e57abcc7f0489e7ae09a3e687e9c6f4fad5
|
5dc90e57abcc7f0489e7ae09a3e687e9c6f4fad5
|
Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
net::SocketStreamJob* WebSocketJobFactory(
const GURL& url, net::SocketStream::Delegate* delegate) {
net::WebSocketJob* job = new net::WebSocketJob(delegate);
job->InitSocketStream(new net::SocketStream(url, job));
return job;
}
|
net::SocketStreamJob* WebSocketJobFactory(
const GURL& url, net::SocketStream::Delegate* delegate) {
net::WebSocketJob* job = new net::WebSocketJob(delegate);
job->InitSocketStream(new net::SocketStream(url, job));
return job;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static bool tg3_test_and_report_link_chg(struct tg3 *tp, int curr_link_up)
{
if (curr_link_up != tp->link_up) {
if (curr_link_up) {
netif_carrier_on(tp->dev);
} else {
netif_carrier_off(tp->dev);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_PARALLEL_DETECT;
}
tg3_link_report(tp);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
static bool tg3_test_and_report_link_chg(struct tg3 *tp, int curr_link_up)
{
if (curr_link_up != tp->link_up) {
if (curr_link_up) {
netif_carrier_on(tp->dev);
} else {
netif_carrier_off(tp->dev);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_PARALLEL_DETECT;
}
tg3_link_report(tp);
return true;
}
return false;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThreadImpl::ScheduleIdleHandler(int64 initial_delay_ms) {
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = initial_delay_ms;
idle_timer_.Stop();
idle_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(initial_delay_ms),
this, &RenderThreadImpl::IdleHandler);
}
|
void RenderThreadImpl::ScheduleIdleHandler(int64 initial_delay_ms) {
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = initial_delay_ms;
idle_timer_.Stop();
idle_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(initial_delay_ms),
this, &RenderThreadImpl::IdleHandler);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7906/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31
|
3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31
|
Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
|
void PepperPlatformVideoCapture::DetachEventHandler() {
handler_ = NULL;
StopCapture();
if (!release_device_cb_.is_null()) {
release_device_cb_.Run();
release_device_cb_.Reset();
}
if (!label_.empty()) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* const device_manager = GetMediaDeviceManager();
if (device_manager)
device_manager->CloseDevice(label_);
label_.clear();
}
if (pending_open_device_) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* const device_manager = GetMediaDeviceManager();
if (device_manager)
device_manager->CancelOpenDevice(pending_open_device_id_);
pending_open_device_ = false;
pending_open_device_id_ = -1;
}
}
|
void PepperPlatformVideoCapture::DetachEventHandler() {
handler_ = NULL;
StopCapture();
if (!release_device_cb_.is_null()) {
release_device_cb_.Run();
release_device_cb_.Reset();
}
if (!label_.empty()) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* const device_manager = GetMediaDeviceManager();
if (device_manager)
device_manager->CloseDevice(label_);
label_.clear();
}
if (pending_open_device_) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* const device_manager = GetMediaDeviceManager();
if (device_manager)
device_manager->CancelOpenDevice(pending_open_device_id_);
pending_open_device_ = false;
pending_open_device_id_ = -1;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10048
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb
|
Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreeChild(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,const char *tag)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*child;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
child=xml_info->child;
if (tag != (const char *) NULL)
while ((child != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) && (strcmp(child->tag,tag) != 0))
child=child->sibling;
return(child);
}
|
MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreeChild(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,const char *tag)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*child;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
child=xml_info->child;
if (tag != (const char *) NULL)
while ((child != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) && (strcmp(child->tag,tag) != 0))
child=child->sibling;
return(child);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1772
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1772/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ce0030c00f95cf9110d9cdcd41e901e1fb814417
|
ce0030c00f95cf9110d9cdcd41e901e1fb814417
|
printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
{
/*
* If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
* already done the capabilities checks at open time.
*/
if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
return 0;
if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
return 0;
/* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
"Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
"but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file)
{
/*
* If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've
* already done the capabilities checks at open time.
*/
if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN)
return 0;
if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) {
if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG))
return 0;
/* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
"Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN "
"but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
{
mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
}
|
static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in, int bytes)
{
mix_pool_bytes_extract(r, in, bytes, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15924/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
01ca667133d019edc9f0a1f70a272447c84ec41f
|
fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>
|
static int fm10k_alloc_q_vector(struct fm10k_intfc *interface,
unsigned int v_count, unsigned int v_idx,
unsigned int txr_count, unsigned int txr_idx,
unsigned int rxr_count, unsigned int rxr_idx)
{
struct fm10k_q_vector *q_vector;
struct fm10k_ring *ring;
int ring_count;
ring_count = txr_count + rxr_count;
/* allocate q_vector and rings */
q_vector = kzalloc(struct_size(q_vector, ring, ring_count), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!q_vector)
return -ENOMEM;
/* initialize NAPI */
netif_napi_add(interface->netdev, &q_vector->napi,
fm10k_poll, NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT);
/* tie q_vector and interface together */
interface->q_vector[v_idx] = q_vector;
q_vector->interface = interface;
q_vector->v_idx = v_idx;
/* initialize pointer to rings */
ring = q_vector->ring;
/* save Tx ring container info */
q_vector->tx.ring = ring;
q_vector->tx.work_limit = FM10K_DEFAULT_TX_WORK;
q_vector->tx.itr = interface->tx_itr;
q_vector->tx.itr_scale = interface->hw.mac.itr_scale;
q_vector->tx.count = txr_count;
while (txr_count) {
/* assign generic ring traits */
ring->dev = &interface->pdev->dev;
ring->netdev = interface->netdev;
/* configure backlink on ring */
ring->q_vector = q_vector;
/* apply Tx specific ring traits */
ring->count = interface->tx_ring_count;
ring->queue_index = txr_idx;
/* assign ring to interface */
interface->tx_ring[txr_idx] = ring;
/* update count and index */
txr_count--;
txr_idx += v_count;
/* push pointer to next ring */
ring++;
}
/* save Rx ring container info */
q_vector->rx.ring = ring;
q_vector->rx.itr = interface->rx_itr;
q_vector->rx.itr_scale = interface->hw.mac.itr_scale;
q_vector->rx.count = rxr_count;
while (rxr_count) {
/* assign generic ring traits */
ring->dev = &interface->pdev->dev;
ring->netdev = interface->netdev;
rcu_assign_pointer(ring->l2_accel, interface->l2_accel);
/* configure backlink on ring */
ring->q_vector = q_vector;
/* apply Rx specific ring traits */
ring->count = interface->rx_ring_count;
ring->queue_index = rxr_idx;
/* assign ring to interface */
interface->rx_ring[rxr_idx] = ring;
/* update count and index */
rxr_count--;
rxr_idx += v_count;
/* push pointer to next ring */
ring++;
}
fm10k_dbg_q_vector_init(q_vector);
return 0;
}
|
static int fm10k_alloc_q_vector(struct fm10k_intfc *interface,
unsigned int v_count, unsigned int v_idx,
unsigned int txr_count, unsigned int txr_idx,
unsigned int rxr_count, unsigned int rxr_idx)
{
struct fm10k_q_vector *q_vector;
struct fm10k_ring *ring;
int ring_count;
ring_count = txr_count + rxr_count;
/* allocate q_vector and rings */
q_vector = kzalloc(struct_size(q_vector, ring, ring_count), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!q_vector)
return -ENOMEM;
/* initialize NAPI */
netif_napi_add(interface->netdev, &q_vector->napi,
fm10k_poll, NAPI_POLL_WEIGHT);
/* tie q_vector and interface together */
interface->q_vector[v_idx] = q_vector;
q_vector->interface = interface;
q_vector->v_idx = v_idx;
/* initialize pointer to rings */
ring = q_vector->ring;
/* save Tx ring container info */
q_vector->tx.ring = ring;
q_vector->tx.work_limit = FM10K_DEFAULT_TX_WORK;
q_vector->tx.itr = interface->tx_itr;
q_vector->tx.itr_scale = interface->hw.mac.itr_scale;
q_vector->tx.count = txr_count;
while (txr_count) {
/* assign generic ring traits */
ring->dev = &interface->pdev->dev;
ring->netdev = interface->netdev;
/* configure backlink on ring */
ring->q_vector = q_vector;
/* apply Tx specific ring traits */
ring->count = interface->tx_ring_count;
ring->queue_index = txr_idx;
/* assign ring to interface */
interface->tx_ring[txr_idx] = ring;
/* update count and index */
txr_count--;
txr_idx += v_count;
/* push pointer to next ring */
ring++;
}
/* save Rx ring container info */
q_vector->rx.ring = ring;
q_vector->rx.itr = interface->rx_itr;
q_vector->rx.itr_scale = interface->hw.mac.itr_scale;
q_vector->rx.count = rxr_count;
while (rxr_count) {
/* assign generic ring traits */
ring->dev = &interface->pdev->dev;
ring->netdev = interface->netdev;
rcu_assign_pointer(ring->l2_accel, interface->l2_accel);
/* configure backlink on ring */
ring->q_vector = q_vector;
/* apply Rx specific ring traits */
ring->count = interface->rx_ring_count;
ring->queue_index = rxr_idx;
/* assign ring to interface */
interface->rx_ring[rxr_idx] = ring;
/* update count and index */
rxr_count--;
rxr_idx += v_count;
/* push pointer to next ring */
ring++;
}
fm10k_dbg_q_vector_init(q_vector);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f
|
Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
[email protected]
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124}
|
void HandleTakeScreenshot(ScreenshotDelegate* screenshot_delegate) {
base::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Take_Screenshot"));
DCHECK(screenshot_delegate);
if (screenshot_delegate->CanTakeScreenshot())
screenshot_delegate->HandleTakeScreenshotForAllRootWindows();
}
|
void HandleTakeScreenshot(ScreenshotDelegate* screenshot_delegate) {
base::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Take_Screenshot"));
DCHECK(screenshot_delegate);
if (screenshot_delegate->CanTakeScreenshot())
screenshot_delegate->HandleTakeScreenshotForAllRootWindows();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6712
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6712/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d
|
fdb1b40e7bb147c07bda988c9501ad223795d12d
|
DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
|
void vp9_remove_common(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
vp9_free_context_buffers(cm);
vpx_free(cm->fc);
cm->fc = NULL;
vpx_free(cm->frame_contexts);
cm->frame_contexts = NULL;
}
|
void vp9_remove_common(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
vp9_free_context_buffers(cm);
vpx_free(cm->fc);
cm->fc = NULL;
vpx_free(cm->frame_contexts);
cm->frame_contexts = NULL;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7550
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7550/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
|
b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
|
KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
const char __user *, _description,
const char __user *, _callout_info,
key_serial_t, destringid)
{
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t dest_ref;
size_t callout_len;
char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
long ret;
/* pull the type into kernel space */
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
/* pull the description into kernel space */
description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
goto error;
}
/* pull the callout info into kernel space */
callout_info = NULL;
callout_len = 0;
if (_callout_info) {
callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
goto error2;
}
callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
}
/* get the destination keyring if specified */
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
}
}
/* find the key type */
ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
goto error4;
}
/* do the search */
key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key);
goto error5;
}
/* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto error6;
ret = key->serial;
error6:
key_put(key);
error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
error4:
key_ref_put(dest_ref);
error3:
kfree(callout_info);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
return ret;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
const char __user *, _description,
const char __user *, _callout_info,
key_serial_t, destringid)
{
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t dest_ref;
size_t callout_len;
char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
long ret;
/* pull the type into kernel space */
ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
/* pull the description into kernel space */
description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(description)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(description);
goto error;
}
/* pull the callout info into kernel space */
callout_info = NULL;
callout_len = 0;
if (_callout_info) {
callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
goto error2;
}
callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
}
/* get the destination keyring if specified */
dest_ref = NULL;
if (destringid) {
dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
KEY_NEED_WRITE);
if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
goto error3;
}
}
/* find the key type */
ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
if (IS_ERR(ktype)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
goto error4;
}
/* do the search */
key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key);
goto error5;
}
/* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto error6;
ret = key->serial;
error6:
key_put(key);
error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
error4:
key_ref_put(dest_ref);
error3:
kfree(callout_info);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
virtual void TearDown() {
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
|
virtual void TearDown() {
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6035
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6035/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
2649de11c562aa96d336c06136a1a20c01711be0
|
Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
|
MessagingDelegate* ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::GetMessagingDelegate() {
if (!messaging_delegate_)
messaging_delegate_ = base::MakeUnique<ChromeMessagingDelegate>();
return messaging_delegate_.get();
}
|
MessagingDelegate* ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::GetMessagingDelegate() {
if (!messaging_delegate_)
messaging_delegate_ = base::MakeUnique<ChromeMessagingDelegate>();
return messaging_delegate_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-2647
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2647/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81
|
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
|
void user_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data;
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
}
}
|
void user_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data;
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (upayload) {
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
kfree_rcu(upayload, rcu);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4
|
Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetParentBrowserOfTab(int tab_handle,
int* browser_handle,
bool* success) {
*success = false;
if (tab_tracker_->ContainsHandle(tab_handle)) {
NavigationController* controller = tab_tracker_->GetResource(tab_handle);
int index;
Browser* browser = Browser::GetBrowserForController(controller, &index);
if (browser) {
*browser_handle = browser_tracker_->Add(browser);
*success = true;
}
}
}
|
void TestingAutomationProvider::GetParentBrowserOfTab(int tab_handle,
int* browser_handle,
bool* success) {
*success = false;
if (tab_tracker_->ContainsHandle(tab_handle)) {
NavigationController* controller = tab_tracker_->GetResource(tab_handle);
int index;
Browser* browser = Browser::GetBrowserForController(controller, &index);
if (browser) {
*browser_handle = browser_tracker_->Add(browser);
*success = true;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7472
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7472/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b
|
c9f838d104fed6f2f61d68164712e3204bf5271b
|
KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret, old_setting;
old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
return old_setting;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
set:
new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
commit_creds(new);
return old_setting;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
|
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret, old_setting;
old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
return old_setting;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
switch (reqkey_defl) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -EEXIST)
goto error;
ret = 0;
}
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
set:
new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
commit_creds(new);
return old_setting;
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2011-2801
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2801/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f837b6744eb9ca9d8e4f2e93d9118bf787ca5e24
|
f837b6744eb9ca9d8e4f2e93d9118bf787ca5e24
|
Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int64 TypedUrlModelAssociator::GetSyncIdFromChromeId(
const std::string& typed_url) {
TypedUrlToSyncIdMap::const_iterator iter = id_map_.find(typed_url);
return iter == id_map_.end() ? sync_api::kInvalidId : iter->second;
}
|
int64 TypedUrlModelAssociator::GetSyncIdFromChromeId(
const std::string& typed_url) {
TypedUrlToSyncIdMap::const_iterator iter = id_map_.find(typed_url);
return iter == id_map_.end() ? sync_api::kInvalidId : iter->second;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8645/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3
|
tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tcp6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct tcp_iter_state *st;
struct sock *sk = v;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
" sl "
"local_address "
"remote_address "
"st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt"
" uid timeout inode\n");
goto out;
}
st = seq->private;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
get_timewait6_sock(seq, v, st->num);
else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV)
get_openreq6(seq, v, st->num);
else
get_tcp6_sock(seq, v, st->num);
out:
return 0;
}
|
static int tcp6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct tcp_iter_state *st;
struct sock *sk = v;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(seq,
" sl "
"local_address "
"remote_address "
"st tx_queue rx_queue tr tm->when retrnsmt"
" uid timeout inode\n");
goto out;
}
st = seq->private;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
get_timewait6_sock(seq, v, st->num);
else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV)
get_openreq6(seq, v, st->num);
else
get_tcp6_sock(seq, v, st->num);
out:
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
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