CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int sha512_sparc64_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha512_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
sctx->state[0] = SHA512_H0;
sctx->state[1] = SHA512_H1;
sctx->state[2] = SHA512_H2;
sctx->state[3] = SHA512_H3;
sctx->state[4] = SHA512_H4;
sctx->state[5] = SHA512_H5;
sctx->state[6] = SHA512_H6;
sctx->state[7] = SHA512_H7;
sctx->count[0] = sctx->count[1] = 0;
return 0;
}
|
static int sha512_sparc64_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha512_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
sctx->state[0] = SHA512_H0;
sctx->state[1] = SHA512_H1;
sctx->state[2] = SHA512_H2;
sctx->state[3] = SHA512_H3;
sctx->state[4] = SHA512_H4;
sctx->state[5] = SHA512_H5;
sctx->state[6] = SHA512_H6;
sctx->state[7] = SHA512_H7;
sctx->count[0] = sctx->count[1] = 0;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1790/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?h=poppler-0.22&id=b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
|
b1026b5978c385328f2a15a2185c599a563edf91
| null |
GBool RunLengthStream::fillBuf() {
int c;
int n, i;
if (eof)
return gFalse;
c = str->getChar();
if (c == 0x80 || c == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
if (c < 0x80) {
n = c + 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
buf[i] = (char)str->getChar();
} else {
n = 0x101 - c;
c = str->getChar();
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
buf[i] = (char)c;
}
bufPtr = buf;
bufEnd = buf + n;
return gTrue;
}
|
GBool RunLengthStream::fillBuf() {
int c;
int n, i;
if (eof)
return gFalse;
c = str->getChar();
if (c == 0x80 || c == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
if (c < 0x80) {
n = c + 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
buf[i] = (char)str->getChar();
} else {
n = 0x101 - c;
c = str->getChar();
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
buf[i] = (char)c;
}
bufPtr = buf;
bufEnd = buf + n;
return gTrue;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoSendRequest() {
next_state_ = STATE_SEND_REQUEST_COMPLETE;
HttpRequestHeaders authorization_headers;
if (auth_->HaveAuth()) {
auth_->AddAuthorizationHeader(&authorization_headers);
}
std::string request_line;
HttpRequestHeaders request_headers;
BuildTunnelRequest(request_, authorization_headers, endpoint_, &request_line,
&request_headers);
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_TUNNEL_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpRequestHeaders::NetLogCallback,
base::Unretained(&request_headers),
&request_line));
request_.extra_headers.MergeFrom(request_headers);
scoped_ptr<SpdyHeaderBlock> headers(new SpdyHeaderBlock());
CreateSpdyHeadersFromHttpRequest(request_, request_headers,
spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion(), true,
headers.get());
if (spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion() > 2) {
(*headers)[":path"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase(":scheme");
} else {
(*headers)["url"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase("scheme");
}
return spdy_stream_->SendRequestHeaders(headers.Pass(), MORE_DATA_TO_SEND);
}
|
int SpdyProxyClientSocket::DoSendRequest() {
next_state_ = STATE_SEND_REQUEST_COMPLETE;
HttpRequestHeaders authorization_headers;
if (auth_->HaveAuth()) {
auth_->AddAuthorizationHeader(&authorization_headers);
}
std::string request_line;
HttpRequestHeaders request_headers;
BuildTunnelRequest(request_, authorization_headers, endpoint_, &request_line,
&request_headers);
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_TUNNEL_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpRequestHeaders::NetLogCallback,
base::Unretained(&request_headers),
&request_line));
request_.extra_headers.MergeFrom(request_headers);
scoped_ptr<SpdyHeaderBlock> headers(new SpdyHeaderBlock());
CreateSpdyHeadersFromHttpRequest(request_, request_headers,
spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion(), true,
headers.get());
if (spdy_stream_->GetProtocolVersion() > 2) {
(*headers)[":path"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase(":scheme");
} else {
(*headers)["url"] = endpoint_.ToString();
headers->erase("scheme");
}
return spdy_stream_->SendRequestHeaders(headers.Pass(), MORE_DATA_TO_SEND);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16085
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16085/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fa76a9f7ef6a028f83f97c181b150ecfd2b13be1
|
fa76a9f7ef6a028f83f97c181b150ecfd2b13be1
|
Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
|
void CoordinatorImpl::BindHeapProfilerHelperRequest(
mojom::HeapProfilerHelperRequest request,
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo& source_info) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
bindings_heap_profiler_helper_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request),
source_info.identity);
}
|
void CoordinatorImpl::BindHeapProfilerHelperRequest(
mojom::HeapProfilerHelperRequest request,
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo& source_info) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
bindings_heap_profiler_helper_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request),
source_info.identity);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
int usb_reset_configuration(struct usb_device *dev)
{
int i, retval;
struct usb_host_config *config;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(dev->bus);
if (dev->state == USB_STATE_SUSPENDED)
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* caller must have locked the device and must own
* the usb bus readlock (so driver bindings are stable);
* calls during probe() are fine
*/
for (i = 1; i < 16; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i, true);
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i + USB_DIR_IN, true);
}
config = dev->actconfig;
retval = 0;
mutex_lock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* Disable LPM, and re-enable it once the configuration is reset, so
* that the xHCI driver can recalculate the U1/U2 timeouts.
*/
if (usb_disable_lpm(dev)) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "%s Failed to disable LPM\n.", __func__);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Make sure we have enough bandwidth for each alternate setting 0 */
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting)
retval = usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL,
intf->cur_altsetting, alt);
if (retval < 0)
break;
}
/* If not, reinstate the old alternate settings */
if (retval < 0) {
reset_old_alts:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting)
usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL,
alt, intf->cur_altsetting);
}
usb_enable_lpm(dev);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
return retval;
}
retval = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION, 0,
config->desc.bConfigurationValue, 0,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (retval < 0)
goto reset_old_alts;
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* re-init hc/hcd interface/endpoint state */
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
/* No altsetting 0? We'll assume the first altsetting.
* We could use a GetInterface call, but if a device is
* so non-compliant that it doesn't have altsetting 0
* then I wouldn't trust its reply anyway.
*/
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting) {
remove_intf_ep_devs(intf);
usb_remove_sysfs_intf_files(intf);
}
intf->cur_altsetting = alt;
usb_enable_interface(dev, intf, true);
if (device_is_registered(&intf->dev)) {
usb_create_sysfs_intf_files(intf);
create_intf_ep_devs(intf);
}
}
/* Now that the interfaces are installed, re-enable LPM. */
usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(dev);
return 0;
}
|
int usb_reset_configuration(struct usb_device *dev)
{
int i, retval;
struct usb_host_config *config;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(dev->bus);
if (dev->state == USB_STATE_SUSPENDED)
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* caller must have locked the device and must own
* the usb bus readlock (so driver bindings are stable);
* calls during probe() are fine
*/
for (i = 1; i < 16; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i, true);
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i + USB_DIR_IN, true);
}
config = dev->actconfig;
retval = 0;
mutex_lock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* Disable LPM, and re-enable it once the configuration is reset, so
* that the xHCI driver can recalculate the U1/U2 timeouts.
*/
if (usb_disable_lpm(dev)) {
dev_err(&dev->dev, "%s Failed to disable LPM\n.", __func__);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Make sure we have enough bandwidth for each alternate setting 0 */
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting)
retval = usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL,
intf->cur_altsetting, alt);
if (retval < 0)
break;
}
/* If not, reinstate the old alternate settings */
if (retval < 0) {
reset_old_alts:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting)
usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL,
alt, intf->cur_altsetting);
}
usb_enable_lpm(dev);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
return retval;
}
retval = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION, 0,
config->desc.bConfigurationValue, 0,
NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (retval < 0)
goto reset_old_alts;
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* re-init hc/hcd interface/endpoint state */
for (i = 0; i < config->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_interface *intf = config->interface[i];
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
alt = usb_altnum_to_altsetting(intf, 0);
/* No altsetting 0? We'll assume the first altsetting.
* We could use a GetInterface call, but if a device is
* so non-compliant that it doesn't have altsetting 0
* then I wouldn't trust its reply anyway.
*/
if (!alt)
alt = &intf->altsetting[0];
if (alt != intf->cur_altsetting) {
remove_intf_ep_devs(intf);
usb_remove_sysfs_intf_files(intf);
}
intf->cur_altsetting = alt;
usb_enable_interface(dev, intf, true);
if (device_is_registered(&intf->dev)) {
usb_create_sysfs_intf_files(intf);
create_intf_ep_devs(intf);
}
}
/* Now that the interfaces are installed, re-enable LPM. */
usb_unlocked_enable_lpm(dev);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0
|
sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline int cfs_rq_throttled(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
return cfs_bandwidth_used() && cfs_rq->throttled;
}
|
static inline int cfs_rq_throttled(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
return cfs_bandwidth_used() && cfs_rq->throttled;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5013
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5013/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
8f3a9a68b2dcdd2c54cf49a41ad34729ab576702
|
Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
|
Browser::CreateParams Browser::CreateParams::CreateForApp(
const std::string& app_name,
bool trusted_source,
const gfx::Rect& window_bounds,
Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(!app_name.empty());
CreateParams params(TYPE_POPUP, profile);
params.app_name = app_name;
params.trusted_source = trusted_source;
params.initial_bounds = window_bounds;
return params;
}
|
Browser::CreateParams Browser::CreateParams::CreateForApp(
const std::string& app_name,
bool trusted_source,
const gfx::Rect& window_bounds,
Profile* profile) {
DCHECK(!app_name.empty());
CreateParams params(TYPE_POPUP, profile);
params.app_name = app_name;
params.trusted_source = trusted_source;
params.initial_bounds = window_bounds;
return params;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1503
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1503/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/dhcpcd/+/1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09
|
1390ace71179f04a09c300ee8d0300aa69d9db09
|
Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
|
write_lease(const struct interface *iface, const struct dhcp_message *dhcp)
{
int fd;
ssize_t bytes = sizeof(*dhcp);
const uint8_t *p = dhcp->options;
const uint8_t *e = p + sizeof(dhcp->options);
uint8_t l;
uint8_t o = 0;
/* We don't write BOOTP leases */
if (is_bootp(dhcp)) {
unlink(iface->leasefile);
return 0;
}
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: writing lease `%s'",
iface->name, iface->leasefile);
fd = open(iface->leasefile, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0444);
#ifdef ANDROID
if (fd == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
/* the lease file might have been created when dhcpcd was running as root */
unlink(iface->leasefile);
fd = open(iface->leasefile, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0444);
}
#endif
if (fd == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: open: %m", iface->name);
return -1;
}
/* Only write as much as we need */
while (p < e) {
o = *p;
if (o == DHO_END) {
bytes = p - (const uint8_t *)dhcp;
break;
}
p++;
if (o != DHO_PAD) {
l = *p++;
p += l;
}
}
bytes = write(fd, dhcp, bytes);
close(fd);
return bytes;
}
|
write_lease(const struct interface *iface, const struct dhcp_message *dhcp)
{
int fd;
ssize_t bytes = sizeof(*dhcp);
const uint8_t *p = dhcp->options;
const uint8_t *e = p + sizeof(dhcp->options);
uint8_t l;
uint8_t o = 0;
/* We don't write BOOTP leases */
if (is_bootp(dhcp)) {
unlink(iface->leasefile);
return 0;
}
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: writing lease `%s'",
iface->name, iface->leasefile);
fd = open(iface->leasefile, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0444);
#ifdef ANDROID
if (fd == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
/* the lease file might have been created when dhcpcd was running as root */
unlink(iface->leasefile);
fd = open(iface->leasefile, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0444);
}
#endif
if (fd == -1) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s: open: %m", iface->name);
return -1;
}
/* Only write as much as we need */
while (p < e) {
o = *p;
if (o == DHO_END) {
bytes = p - (const uint8_t *)dhcp;
break;
}
p++;
if (o != DHO_PAD) {
l = *p++;
p += l;
}
}
bytes = write(fd, dhcp, bytes);
close(fd);
return bytes;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
server_disconnect (session * sess, int sendquit, int err)
{
server *serv = sess->server;
GSList *list;
char tbuf[64];
gboolean shutup = FALSE;
/* send our QUIT reason */
if (sendquit && serv->connected)
{
server_sendquit (sess);
}
fe_server_event (serv, FE_SE_DISCONNECT, 0);
/* close all sockets & io tags */
switch (server_cleanup (serv))
{
case 0: /* it wasn't even connected! */
notc_msg (sess);
return;
case 1: /* it was in the process of connecting */
sprintf (tbuf, "%d", sess->server->childpid);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_STOPCONNECT, sess, tbuf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
return;
case 3:
shutup = TRUE; /* won't print "disconnected" in channels */
}
server_flush_queue (serv);
list = sess_list;
while (list)
{
sess = (struct session *) list->data;
if (sess->server == serv)
{
if (!shutup || sess->type == SESS_SERVER)
/* print "Disconnected" to each window using this server */
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_DISCON, sess, errorstring (err), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (!sess->channel[0] || sess->type == SESS_CHANNEL)
clear_channel (sess);
}
list = list->next;
}
serv->pos = 0;
serv->motd_skipped = FALSE;
serv->no_login = FALSE;
serv->servername[0] = 0;
serv->lag_sent = 0;
notify_cleanup ();
}
|
server_disconnect (session * sess, int sendquit, int err)
{
server *serv = sess->server;
GSList *list;
char tbuf[64];
gboolean shutup = FALSE;
/* send our QUIT reason */
if (sendquit && serv->connected)
{
server_sendquit (sess);
}
fe_server_event (serv, FE_SE_DISCONNECT, 0);
/* close all sockets & io tags */
switch (server_cleanup (serv))
{
case 0: /* it wasn't even connected! */
notc_msg (sess);
return;
case 1: /* it was in the process of connecting */
sprintf (tbuf, "%d", sess->server->childpid);
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_STOPCONNECT, sess, tbuf, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
return;
case 3:
shutup = TRUE; /* won't print "disconnected" in channels */
}
server_flush_queue (serv);
list = sess_list;
while (list)
{
sess = (struct session *) list->data;
if (sess->server == serv)
{
if (!shutup || sess->type == SESS_SERVER)
/* print "Disconnected" to each window using this server */
EMIT_SIGNAL (XP_TE_DISCON, sess, errorstring (err), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (!sess->channel[0] || sess->type == SESS_CHANNEL)
clear_channel (sess);
}
list = list->next;
}
serv->pos = 0;
serv->motd_skipped = FALSE;
serv->no_login = FALSE;
serv->servername[0] = 0;
serv->lag_sent = 0;
notify_cleanup ();
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5170
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5170/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
c3957448cfc6e299165196a33cd954b790875fdb
|
Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
|
void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (!AllowedToUseDynamicMarkUpInsertion("open", exception_state))
return;
if (entered_document && !GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPort(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->IsParsing() && parser->IsExecutingScript())
return;
}
if (ignore_opens_during_unload_count_)
return;
if (entered_document && this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
SetCookieURL(entered_document->CookieURL());
}
open();
}
|
void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (!AllowedToUseDynamicMarkUpInsertion("open", exception_state))
return;
if (entered_document && !GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPort(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
if (parser->IsParsing() && parser->IsExecutingScript())
return;
}
if (ignore_opens_during_unload_count_)
return;
if (entered_document && this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
SetCookieURL(entered_document->CookieURL());
}
open();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(struct ofpbuf *openflow,
unsigned int actions_len,
enum ofp_version version,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
return ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__(openflow, actions_len, version,
1u << OVSINST_OFPIT11_APPLY_ACTIONS,
ofpacts, 0, vl_mff_map,
ofpacts_tlv_bitmap);
}
|
ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions(struct ofpbuf *openflow,
unsigned int actions_len,
enum ofp_version version,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *ofpacts_tlv_bitmap,
struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
return ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__(openflow, actions_len, version,
1u << OVSINST_OFPIT11_APPLY_ACTIONS,
ofpacts, 0, vl_mff_map,
ofpacts_tlv_bitmap);
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424
|
tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matt Carlson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int tg3_get_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *eeprom, u8 *data)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int ret;
u8 *pd;
u32 i, offset, len, b_offset, b_count;
__be32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, NO_NVRAM))
return -EINVAL;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER)
return -EAGAIN;
offset = eeprom->offset;
len = eeprom->len;
eeprom->len = 0;
eeprom->magic = TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC;
if (offset & 3) {
/* adjustments to start on required 4 byte boundary */
b_offset = offset & 3;
b_count = 4 - b_offset;
if (b_count > len) {
/* i.e. offset=1 len=2 */
b_count = len;
}
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset-b_offset, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(data, ((char *)&val) + b_offset, b_count);
len -= b_count;
offset += b_count;
eeprom->len += b_count;
}
/* read bytes up to the last 4 byte boundary */
pd = &data[eeprom->len];
for (i = 0; i < (len - (len & 3)); i += 4) {
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset + i, &val);
if (ret) {
eeprom->len += i;
return ret;
}
memcpy(pd + i, &val, 4);
}
eeprom->len += i;
if (len & 3) {
/* read last bytes not ending on 4 byte boundary */
pd = &data[eeprom->len];
b_count = len & 3;
b_offset = offset + len - b_count;
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, b_offset, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(pd, &val, b_count);
eeprom->len += b_count;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int tg3_get_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *eeprom, u8 *data)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int ret;
u8 *pd;
u32 i, offset, len, b_offset, b_count;
__be32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, NO_NVRAM))
return -EINVAL;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_LOW_POWER)
return -EAGAIN;
offset = eeprom->offset;
len = eeprom->len;
eeprom->len = 0;
eeprom->magic = TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC;
if (offset & 3) {
/* adjustments to start on required 4 byte boundary */
b_offset = offset & 3;
b_count = 4 - b_offset;
if (b_count > len) {
/* i.e. offset=1 len=2 */
b_count = len;
}
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset-b_offset, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(data, ((char *)&val) + b_offset, b_count);
len -= b_count;
offset += b_count;
eeprom->len += b_count;
}
/* read bytes up to the last 4 byte boundary */
pd = &data[eeprom->len];
for (i = 0; i < (len - (len & 3)); i += 4) {
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, offset + i, &val);
if (ret) {
eeprom->len += i;
return ret;
}
memcpy(pd + i, &val, 4);
}
eeprom->len += i;
if (len & 3) {
/* read last bytes not ending on 4 byte boundary */
pd = &data[eeprom->len];
b_count = len & 3;
b_offset = offset + len - b_count;
ret = tg3_nvram_read_be32(tp, b_offset, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(pd, &val, b_count);
eeprom->len += b_count;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void print_tracking(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
{
if (!(s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER))
return;
print_track("Allocated", get_track(s, object, TRACK_ALLOC));
print_track("Freed", get_track(s, object, TRACK_FREE));
}
|
static void print_tracking(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
{
if (!(s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER))
return;
print_track("Allocated", get_track(s, object, TRACK_ALLOC));
print_track("Freed", get_track(s, object, TRACK_FREE));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
// Cancel any visible dialogs so that they don't interfere with the
// interstitial.
if (dialog_manager_)
dialog_manager_->CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs(this);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
render_manager_.set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DidAttachInterstitialPage());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-1116
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1116/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/polkit/commit/?id=bc7ffad5364
|
bc7ffad53643a9c80231fc41f5582d6a8931c32c
| null |
polkit_backend_interactive_authority_get_version (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority)
{
return PACKAGE_VERSION;
}
|
polkit_backend_interactive_authority_get_version (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority)
{
return PACKAGE_VERSION;
}
|
C
|
polkit
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5842/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
static char *TraceSVGClippath(const unsigned char *blob,size_t length,
const size_t columns,const size_t rows)
{
char
*path,
*message;
MagickBooleanType
in_subpath;
PointInfo
first[3],
last[3],
point[3];
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
knot_count,
selector,
x,
y;
path=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
if (path == (char *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
message=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
("<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"iso-8859-1\"?>\n"
"<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\""
" width=\"%.20g\" height=\"%.20g\">\n"
"<g>\n"
"<path fill-rule=\"evenodd\" style=\"fill:#00000000;stroke:#00000000;"
"stroke-width:0;stroke-antialiasing:false\" d=\"\n"),
(double) columns,(double) rows);
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(point,0,sizeof(point));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(first,0,sizeof(first));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(last,0,sizeof(last));
knot_count=0;
in_subpath=MagickFalse;
while (length != 0)
{
selector=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&blob,&length);
switch (selector)
{
case 0:
case 3:
{
if (knot_count != 0)
{
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
/*
Expected subpath length record.
*/
knot_count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&blob,&length);
blob+=22;
length-=MagickMin(22,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 5:
{
if (knot_count == 0)
{
/*
Unexpected subpath knot.
*/
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
/*
Add sub-path knot
*/
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
unsigned int
xx,
yy;
yy=(unsigned int) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&blob,&length);
xx=(unsigned int) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&blob,&length);
x=(ssize_t) xx;
if (xx > 2147483647)
x=(ssize_t) xx-4294967295U-1;
y=(ssize_t) yy;
if (yy > 2147483647)
y=(ssize_t) yy-4294967295U-1;
point[i].x=(double) x*columns/4096/4096;
point[i].y=(double) y*rows/4096/4096;
}
if (in_subpath == MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"M %g %g\n",
point[1].x,point[1].y);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
first[i]=point[i];
last[i]=point[i];
}
}
else
{
/*
Handle special cases when Bezier curves are used to describe
corners and straight lines.
*/
if ((last[1].x == last[2].x) && (last[1].y == last[2].y) &&
(point[0].x == point[1].x) && (point[0].y == point[1].y))
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"L %g %g\n",point[1].x,point[1].y);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"C %g %g %g %g %g %g\n",last[2].x,
last[2].y,point[0].x,point[0].y,point[1].x,point[1].y);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
last[i]=point[i];
}
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
in_subpath=MagickTrue;
knot_count--;
/*
Close the subpath if there are no more knots.
*/
if (knot_count == 0)
{
/*
Same special handling as above except we compare to the
first point in the path and close the path.
*/
if ((last[1].x == last[2].x) && (last[1].y == last[2].y) &&
(first[0].x == first[1].x) && (first[0].y == first[1].y))
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"L %g %g Z\n",first[1].x,first[1].y);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"C %g %g %g %g %g %g Z\n",last[2].x,
last[2].y,first[0].x,first[0].y,first[1].x,first[1].y);
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
in_subpath=MagickFalse;
}
break;
}
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
default:
{
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
}
}
/*
Return an empty SVG image if the path does not have knots.
*/
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,"\"/>\n</g>\n</svg>\n");
message=DestroyString(message);
return(path);
}
|
static char *TraceSVGClippath(const unsigned char *blob,size_t length,
const size_t columns,const size_t rows)
{
char
*path,
*message;
MagickBooleanType
in_subpath;
PointInfo
first[3],
last[3],
point[3];
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
knot_count,
selector,
x,
y;
path=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
if (path == (char *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
message=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
("<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"iso-8859-1\"?>\n"
"<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\""
" width=\"%.20g\" height=\"%.20g\">\n"
"<g>\n"
"<path fill-rule=\"evenodd\" style=\"fill:#00000000;stroke:#00000000;"
"stroke-width:0;stroke-antialiasing:false\" d=\"\n"),
(double) columns,(double) rows);
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(point,0,sizeof(point));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(first,0,sizeof(first));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(last,0,sizeof(last));
knot_count=0;
in_subpath=MagickFalse;
while (length != 0)
{
selector=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&blob,&length);
switch (selector)
{
case 0:
case 3:
{
if (knot_count != 0)
{
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
/*
Expected subpath length record.
*/
knot_count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&blob,&length);
blob+=22;
length-=MagickMin(22,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
case 5:
{
if (knot_count == 0)
{
/*
Unexpected subpath knot.
*/
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
/*
Add sub-path knot
*/
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
unsigned int
xx,
yy;
yy=(unsigned int) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&blob,&length);
xx=(unsigned int) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&blob,&length);
x=(ssize_t) xx;
if (xx > 2147483647)
x=(ssize_t) xx-4294967295U-1;
y=(ssize_t) yy;
if (yy > 2147483647)
y=(ssize_t) yy-4294967295U-1;
point[i].x=(double) x*columns/4096/4096;
point[i].y=(double) y*rows/4096/4096;
}
if (in_subpath == MagickFalse)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"M %g %g\n",
point[1].x,point[1].y);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
{
first[i]=point[i];
last[i]=point[i];
}
}
else
{
/*
Handle special cases when Bezier curves are used to describe
corners and straight lines.
*/
if ((last[1].x == last[2].x) && (last[1].y == last[2].y) &&
(point[0].x == point[1].x) && (point[0].y == point[1].y))
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"L %g %g\n",point[1].x,point[1].y);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"C %g %g %g %g %g %g\n",last[2].x,
last[2].y,point[0].x,point[0].y,point[1].x,point[1].y);
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
last[i]=point[i];
}
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
in_subpath=MagickTrue;
knot_count--;
/*
Close the subpath if there are no more knots.
*/
if (knot_count == 0)
{
/*
Same special handling as above except we compare to the
first point in the path and close the path.
*/
if ((last[1].x == last[2].x) && (last[1].y == last[2].y) &&
(first[0].x == first[1].x) && (first[0].y == first[1].y))
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"L %g %g Z\n",first[1].x,first[1].y);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,
"C %g %g %g %g %g %g Z\n",last[2].x,
last[2].y,first[0].x,first[0].y,first[1].x,first[1].y);
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,message);
in_subpath=MagickFalse;
}
break;
}
case 6:
case 7:
case 8:
default:
{
blob+=24;
length-=MagickMin(24,(ssize_t) length);
break;
}
}
}
/*
Return an empty SVG image if the path does not have knots.
*/
(void) ConcatenateString(&path,"\"/>\n</g>\n</svg>\n");
message=DestroyString(message);
return(path);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7151
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7151/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/aquynh/capstone/commit/87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
87a25bb543c8e4c09b48d4b4a6c7db31ce58df06
|
x86: fast path checking for X86_insn_reg_intel()
|
static void add_cx(MCInst *MI)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
x86_reg cx;
if (MI->csh->mode & CS_MODE_16)
cx = X86_REG_CX;
else if (MI->csh->mode & CS_MODE_32)
cx = X86_REG_ECX;
else // 64-bit
cx = X86_REG_RCX;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read[MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read_count] = cx;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read_count++;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write[MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write_count] = cx;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write_count++;
}
}
|
static void add_cx(MCInst *MI)
{
if (MI->csh->detail) {
x86_reg cx;
if (MI->csh->mode & CS_MODE_16)
cx = X86_REG_CX;
else if (MI->csh->mode & CS_MODE_32)
cx = X86_REG_ECX;
else // 64-bit
cx = X86_REG_RCX;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read[MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read_count] = cx;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_read_count++;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write[MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write_count] = cx;
MI->flat_insn->detail->regs_write_count++;
}
}
|
C
|
capstone
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5307/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int vmx_create_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct page *pml_pg;
pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!pml_pg)
return -ENOMEM;
vmx->pml_pg = pml_pg;
vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
return 0;
}
|
static int vmx_create_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
struct page *pml_pg;
pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!pml_pg)
return -ENOMEM;
vmx->pml_pg = pml_pg;
vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10146/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aeff00de228bc5a158c2a975ab47845d8a1db456
|
aeff00de228bc5a158c2a975ab47845d8a1db456
|
Fix a small memory leak
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterLABELImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("LABEL");
}
|
ModuleExport void UnregisterLABELImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("LABEL");
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
|
ofputil_decode_packet_in_private(const struct ofp_header *oh, bool loose,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
struct ofputil_packet_in_private *pin,
size_t *total_len, uint32_t *buffer_id)
{
memset(pin, 0, sizeof *pin);
struct ofpbuf continuation;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_decode_packet_in(oh, loose, tun_table, vl_mff_map,
&pin->public, total_len, buffer_id,
&continuation);
if (error) {
return error;
}
struct ofpbuf actions, action_set;
ofpbuf_init(&actions, 0);
ofpbuf_init(&action_set, 0);
uint8_t table_id = 0;
ovs_be64 cookie = 0;
struct ofpbuf stack;
ofpbuf_init(&stack, 0);
while (continuation.size > 0) {
struct ofpbuf payload;
uint64_t type;
error = ofpprop_pull(&continuation, &payload, &type);
if (error) {
break;
}
switch (type) {
case NXCPT_BRIDGE:
error = ofpprop_parse_uuid(&payload, &pin->bridge);
break;
case NXCPT_STACK:
error = parse_stack_prop(&payload, &stack);
break;
case NXCPT_MIRRORS:
error = ofpprop_parse_u32(&payload, &pin->mirrors);
break;
case NXCPT_CONNTRACKED:
pin->conntracked = true;
break;
case NXCPT_TABLE_ID:
error = ofpprop_parse_u8(&payload, &table_id);
break;
case NXCPT_COOKIE:
error = ofpprop_parse_be64(&payload, &cookie);
break;
case NXCPT_ACTIONS: {
struct ofpact_unroll_xlate *unroll
= ofpact_put_UNROLL_XLATE(&actions);
unroll->rule_table_id = table_id;
unroll->rule_cookie = cookie;
error = parse_actions_property(&payload, oh->version, &actions);
break;
}
case NXCPT_ACTION_SET:
error = parse_actions_property(&payload, oh->version, &action_set);
break;
default:
error = OFPPROP_UNKNOWN(loose, "continuation", type);
break;
}
if (error) {
break;
}
}
pin->actions_len = actions.size;
pin->actions = ofpbuf_steal_data(&actions);
pin->action_set_len = action_set.size;
pin->action_set = ofpbuf_steal_data(&action_set);
pin->stack_size = stack.size;
pin->stack = ofpbuf_steal_data(&stack);
if (error) {
ofputil_packet_in_private_destroy(pin);
}
return error;
}
|
ofputil_decode_packet_in_private(const struct ofp_header *oh, bool loose,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
struct ofputil_packet_in_private *pin,
size_t *total_len, uint32_t *buffer_id)
{
memset(pin, 0, sizeof *pin);
struct ofpbuf continuation;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_decode_packet_in(oh, loose, tun_table, vl_mff_map,
&pin->public, total_len, buffer_id,
&continuation);
if (error) {
return error;
}
struct ofpbuf actions, action_set;
ofpbuf_init(&actions, 0);
ofpbuf_init(&action_set, 0);
uint8_t table_id = 0;
ovs_be64 cookie = 0;
struct ofpbuf stack;
ofpbuf_init(&stack, 0);
while (continuation.size > 0) {
struct ofpbuf payload;
uint64_t type;
error = ofpprop_pull(&continuation, &payload, &type);
if (error) {
break;
}
switch (type) {
case NXCPT_BRIDGE:
error = ofpprop_parse_uuid(&payload, &pin->bridge);
break;
case NXCPT_STACK:
error = parse_stack_prop(&payload, &stack);
break;
case NXCPT_MIRRORS:
error = ofpprop_parse_u32(&payload, &pin->mirrors);
break;
case NXCPT_CONNTRACKED:
pin->conntracked = true;
break;
case NXCPT_TABLE_ID:
error = ofpprop_parse_u8(&payload, &table_id);
break;
case NXCPT_COOKIE:
error = ofpprop_parse_be64(&payload, &cookie);
break;
case NXCPT_ACTIONS: {
struct ofpact_unroll_xlate *unroll
= ofpact_put_UNROLL_XLATE(&actions);
unroll->rule_table_id = table_id;
unroll->rule_cookie = cookie;
error = parse_actions_property(&payload, oh->version, &actions);
break;
}
case NXCPT_ACTION_SET:
error = parse_actions_property(&payload, oh->version, &action_set);
break;
default:
error = OFPPROP_UNKNOWN(loose, "continuation", type);
break;
}
if (error) {
break;
}
}
pin->actions_len = actions.size;
pin->actions = ofpbuf_steal_data(&actions);
pin->action_set_len = action_set.size;
pin->action_set = ofpbuf_steal_data(&action_set);
pin->stack_size = stack.size;
pin->stack = ofpbuf_steal_data(&stack);
if (error) {
ofputil_packet_in_private_destroy(pin);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6627
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6627/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d6805d0d1d21976cf16d0237d9091f7eebea4ea5
|
d6805d0d1d21976cf16d0237d9091f7eebea4ea5
|
Content Shell: Move shell_layout_tests_android into layout_tests/.
BUG=420994
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/661743002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299892}
|
void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
|
void EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests() {
CHECK(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDumpRenderTree));
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
content::NestedMessagePumpAndroid::RegisterJni(env);
content::RegisterNativesImpl(env);
bool success = base::MessageLoop::InitMessagePumpForUIFactory(
&CreateMessagePumpForUI);
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the message pump for Android.";
base::FilePath files_dir(GetTestFilesDirectory(env));
base::FilePath stdout_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("test.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdout_fifo);
base::FilePath stderr_fifo(
files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stderr.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stderr_fifo);
base::FilePath stdin_fifo(files_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("stdin.fifo")));
EnsureCreateFIFO(stdin_fifo);
success = base::android::RedirectStream(stdout, stdout_fifo, "w") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stdin, stdin_fifo, "r") &&
base::android::RedirectStream(stderr, stderr_fifo, "w");
CHECK(success) << "Unable to initialize the Android FIFOs.";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6169
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6169/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/303d78445257d1eec726c4ebadb3517cb16c8c09
|
303d78445257d1eec726c4ebadb3517cb16c8c09
|
[Extensions UI] Initially disabled OK button for extension install prompts and enable them after a 500 ms time period.
BUG=394518
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2716353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461933}
|
views::DialogDelegateView* CreateAndShowPrompt(
ExtensionInstallPromptTestHelper* helper) {
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallDialogView> dialog(
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(profile(), web_contents(),
helper->GetCallback(), CreatePrompt()));
views::DialogDelegateView* delegate_view = dialog.get();
views::Widget* modal_dialog = views::DialogDelegate::CreateDialogWidget(
dialog.release(), nullptr,
platform_util::GetViewForWindow(
browser()->window()->GetNativeWindow()));
modal_dialog->Show();
return delegate_view;
}
|
views::DialogDelegateView* CreateAndShowPrompt(
ExtensionInstallPromptTestHelper* helper) {
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionInstallDialogView> dialog(
new ExtensionInstallDialogView(profile(), web_contents(),
helper->GetCallback(), CreatePrompt()));
views::DialogDelegateView* delegate_view = dialog.get();
views::Widget* modal_dialog = views::DialogDelegate::CreateDialogWidget(
dialog.release(), nullptr,
platform_util::GetViewForWindow(
browser()->window()->GetNativeWindow()));
modal_dialog->Show();
return delegate_view;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2906
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2906/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
b5b515445f4f5a905c5dd27e6e682868ccd6c09d
|
[SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <[email protected]>
|
static void __exit pmcraid_exit(void)
{
pmcraid_netlink_release();
unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(pmcraid_major, 0),
PMCRAID_MAX_ADAPTERS);
pci_unregister_driver(&pmcraid_driver);
class_destroy(pmcraid_class);
}
|
static void __exit pmcraid_exit(void)
{
pmcraid_netlink_release();
unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(pmcraid_major, 0),
PMCRAID_MAX_ADAPTERS);
pci_unregister_driver(&pmcraid_driver);
class_destroy(pmcraid_class);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6560
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6560/
|
CWE-436
|
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6
|
52346bf187b5a7f1c0fe9075b328b7ad6abe78f6
|
Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
|
read_uint32 (Header *header, guint8 *ptr)
{
if (header->big_endian)
return GUINT32_FROM_BE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
else
return GUINT32_FROM_LE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
}
|
read_uint32 (Header *header, guint8 *ptr)
{
if (header->big_endian)
return GUINT32_FROM_BE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
else
return GUINT32_FROM_LE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
}
|
C
|
flatpak
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
TransportDIB* BrowserRenderProcessHost::MapTransportDIB(
TransportDIB::Id dib_id) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE section = win_util::GetSectionFromProcess(
dib_id.handle, GetRendererProcessHandle(), false /* read write */);
return TransportDIB::Map(section);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return widget_helper_->MapTransportDIB(dib_id);
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
return TransportDIB::Map(dib_id);
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX)
}
|
TransportDIB* BrowserRenderProcessHost::MapTransportDIB(
TransportDIB::Id dib_id) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
HANDLE section = win_util::GetSectionFromProcess(
dib_id.handle, GetRendererProcessHandle(), false /* read write */);
return TransportDIB::Map(section);
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
return widget_helper_->MapTransportDIB(dib_id);
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
return TransportDIB::Map(dib_id);
#endif // defined(OS_LINUX)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16529
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16529/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfc81a8bc18e3c4ba0cbaa7666ff76be2f998991
|
bfc81a8bc18e3c4ba0cbaa7666ff76be2f998991
|
ALSA: usb-audio: Check out-of-bounds access by corrupted buffer descriptor
When a USB-audio device receives a maliciously adjusted or corrupted
buffer descriptor, the USB-audio driver may access an out-of-bounce
value at its parser. This was detected by syzkaller, something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006b83a9e8 by task kworker/0:1/24
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #224
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
snd_usb_create_streams sound/usb/card.c:248
usb_audio_probe+0x27b2/0x2ab0 sound/usb/card.c:605
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
This patch adds the checks of out-of-bounce accesses at appropriate
places and bails out when it goes out of the given buffer.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int usb_audio_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
return __usb_audio_resume(intf, true);
}
|
static int usb_audio_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
return __usb_audio_resume(intf, true);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb);
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header;
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len;
int gre_offset, outer_hlen;
bool need_csum, ufo;
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
~(SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |
SKB_GSO_TCPV6 |
SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN |
SKB_GSO_GRE |
SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM |
SKB_GSO_IPIP |
SKB_GSO_SIT)))
goto out;
if (!skb->encapsulation)
goto out;
if (unlikely(tnl_hlen < sizeof(struct gre_base_hdr)))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, tnl_hlen)))
goto out;
/* setup inner skb. */
skb->encapsulation = 0;
__skb_pull(skb, tnl_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_inner_network_offset(skb));
skb->mac_len = skb_inner_network_offset(skb);
skb->protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
need_csum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM);
skb->encap_hdr_csum = need_csum;
ufo = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP);
features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features;
/* The only checksum offload we care about from here on out is the
* outer one so strip the existing checksum feature flags based
* on the fact that we will be computing our checksum in software.
*/
if (ufo) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK;
if (!need_csum)
features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
}
/* segment inner packet. */
segs = skb_mac_gso_segment(skb, features);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
skb_gso_error_unwind(skb, protocol, tnl_hlen, mac_offset,
mac_len);
goto out;
}
outer_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
gre_offset = outer_hlen - tnl_hlen;
skb = segs;
do {
struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
__be32 *pcsum;
/* Set up inner headers if we are offloading inner checksum */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
skb->encapsulation = 1;
}
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
skb->protocol = protocol;
__skb_push(skb, outer_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
skb_set_transport_header(skb, gre_offset);
if (!need_csum)
continue;
greh = (struct gre_base_hdr *)skb_transport_header(skb);
pcsum = (__be32 *)(greh + 1);
*pcsum = 0;
*(__sum16 *)pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0);
} while ((skb = skb->next));
out:
return segs;
}
|
static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
netdev_features_t features)
{
int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb);
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header;
__be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len;
int gre_offset, outer_hlen;
bool need_csum, ufo;
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type &
~(SKB_GSO_TCPV4 |
SKB_GSO_TCPV6 |
SKB_GSO_UDP |
SKB_GSO_DODGY |
SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN |
SKB_GSO_GRE |
SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM |
SKB_GSO_IPIP |
SKB_GSO_SIT)))
goto out;
if (!skb->encapsulation)
goto out;
if (unlikely(tnl_hlen < sizeof(struct gre_base_hdr)))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, tnl_hlen)))
goto out;
/* setup inner skb. */
skb->encapsulation = 0;
__skb_pull(skb, tnl_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_inner_network_offset(skb));
skb->mac_len = skb_inner_network_offset(skb);
skb->protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
need_csum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM);
skb->encap_hdr_csum = need_csum;
ufo = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP);
features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features;
/* The only checksum offload we care about from here on out is the
* outer one so strip the existing checksum feature flags based
* on the fact that we will be computing our checksum in software.
*/
if (ufo) {
features &= ~NETIF_F_CSUM_MASK;
if (!need_csum)
features |= NETIF_F_HW_CSUM;
}
/* segment inner packet. */
segs = skb_mac_gso_segment(skb, features);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
skb_gso_error_unwind(skb, protocol, tnl_hlen, mac_offset,
mac_len);
goto out;
}
outer_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb);
gre_offset = outer_hlen - tnl_hlen;
skb = segs;
do {
struct gre_base_hdr *greh;
__be32 *pcsum;
/* Set up inner headers if we are offloading inner checksum */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
skb_reset_inner_headers(skb);
skb->encapsulation = 1;
}
skb->mac_len = mac_len;
skb->protocol = protocol;
__skb_push(skb, outer_hlen);
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
skb_set_transport_header(skb, gre_offset);
if (!need_csum)
continue;
greh = (struct gre_base_hdr *)skb_transport_header(skb);
pcsum = (__be32 *)(greh + 1);
*pcsum = 0;
*(__sum16 *)pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0);
} while ((skb = skb->next));
out:
return segs;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2875/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::remoteDescription()
postTask(new FailureCallbackTask(this, request));
}
|
WebRTCSessionDescriptionDescriptor MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::remoteDescription()
{
return m_remoteDescription;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
static int migrate_swap_stop(void *data)
{
struct migration_swap_arg *arg = data;
struct rq *src_rq, *dst_rq;
int ret = -EAGAIN;
src_rq = cpu_rq(arg->src_cpu);
dst_rq = cpu_rq(arg->dst_cpu);
double_raw_lock(&arg->src_task->pi_lock,
&arg->dst_task->pi_lock);
double_rq_lock(src_rq, dst_rq);
if (task_cpu(arg->dst_task) != arg->dst_cpu)
goto unlock;
if (task_cpu(arg->src_task) != arg->src_cpu)
goto unlock;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg->dst_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg->src_task)))
goto unlock;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg->src_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg->dst_task)))
goto unlock;
__migrate_swap_task(arg->src_task, arg->dst_cpu);
__migrate_swap_task(arg->dst_task, arg->src_cpu);
ret = 0;
unlock:
double_rq_unlock(src_rq, dst_rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&arg->dst_task->pi_lock);
raw_spin_unlock(&arg->src_task->pi_lock);
return ret;
}
|
static int migrate_swap_stop(void *data)
{
struct migration_swap_arg *arg = data;
struct rq *src_rq, *dst_rq;
int ret = -EAGAIN;
src_rq = cpu_rq(arg->src_cpu);
dst_rq = cpu_rq(arg->dst_cpu);
double_raw_lock(&arg->src_task->pi_lock,
&arg->dst_task->pi_lock);
double_rq_lock(src_rq, dst_rq);
if (task_cpu(arg->dst_task) != arg->dst_cpu)
goto unlock;
if (task_cpu(arg->src_task) != arg->src_cpu)
goto unlock;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg->dst_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg->src_task)))
goto unlock;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(arg->src_cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(arg->dst_task)))
goto unlock;
__migrate_swap_task(arg->src_task, arg->dst_cpu);
__migrate_swap_task(arg->dst_task, arg->src_cpu);
ret = 0;
unlock:
double_rq_unlock(src_rq, dst_rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&arg->dst_task->pi_lock);
raw_spin_unlock(&arg->src_task->pi_lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5754
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5754/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
fd2335678e96c34d14f4b20f0d9613dfbd1ccdb4
|
Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
|
bool ShouldMarkQuicBrokenWhenNetworkBlackholes(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params,
"mark_quic_broken_when_network_blackholes"),
"true");
}
|
bool ShouldMarkQuicBrokenWhenNetworkBlackholes(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
return base::LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params,
"mark_quic_broken_when_network_blackholes"),
"true");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7865
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7865/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
2080bc33717955a0e4268e738acf8c1eeddbf8cb
|
avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
unsigned int av_xiphlacing(unsigned char *s, unsigned int v)
{
unsigned int n = 0;
while (v >= 0xff) {
*s++ = 0xff;
v -= 0xff;
n++;
}
*s = v;
n++;
return n;
}
|
unsigned int av_xiphlacing(unsigned char *s, unsigned int v)
{
unsigned int n = 0;
while (v >= 0xff) {
*s++ = 0xff;
v -= 0xff;
n++;
}
*s = v;
n++;
return n;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1867/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/84ac07c
|
84ac07c
|
Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
|
__add_xml_object(xmlNode * parent, xmlNode * target, xmlNode * patch)
{
xmlNode *patch_child = NULL;
xmlNode *target_child = NULL;
xmlAttrPtr xIter = NULL;
const char *id = NULL;
const char *name = NULL;
const char *value = NULL;
if (patch == NULL) {
return;
} else if (parent == NULL && target == NULL) {
return;
}
/* check for XML_DIFF_MARKER in a child */
value = crm_element_value(patch, XML_DIFF_MARKER);
if (target == NULL
&& value != NULL
&& strcmp(value, "added:top") == 0) {
id = ID(patch);
name = crm_element_name(patch);
crm_trace("We are the root of the addition: %s.id=%s", name, id);
add_node_copy(parent, patch);
return;
} else if(target == NULL) {
id = ID(patch);
name = crm_element_name(patch);
crm_err("Could not locate: %s.id=%s", name, id);
return;
}
if (target->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
add_xml_comment(parent, target, patch);
}
name = crm_element_name(target);
CRM_CHECK(name != NULL, return);
CRM_CHECK(safe_str_eq(crm_element_name(target), crm_element_name(patch)), return);
CRM_CHECK(safe_str_eq(ID(target), ID(patch)), return);
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(patch); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *p_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
const char *p_value = crm_element_value(patch, p_name);
xml_remove_prop(target, p_name); /* Preserve the patch order */
crm_xml_add(target, p_name, p_value);
}
/* changes to child objects */
for (patch_child = __xml_first_child(patch); patch_child != NULL;
patch_child = __xml_next(patch_child)) {
if (patch_child->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
target_child = find_xml_comment(target, patch_child);
} else {
target_child = find_entity(target, crm_element_name(patch_child), ID(patch_child));
}
__add_xml_object(target, target_child, patch_child);
}
}
|
__add_xml_object(xmlNode * parent, xmlNode * target, xmlNode * patch)
{
xmlNode *patch_child = NULL;
xmlNode *target_child = NULL;
xmlAttrPtr xIter = NULL;
const char *id = NULL;
const char *name = NULL;
const char *value = NULL;
if (patch == NULL) {
return;
} else if (parent == NULL && target == NULL) {
return;
}
/* check for XML_DIFF_MARKER in a child */
value = crm_element_value(patch, XML_DIFF_MARKER);
if (target == NULL
&& value != NULL
&& strcmp(value, "added:top") == 0) {
id = ID(patch);
name = crm_element_name(patch);
crm_trace("We are the root of the addition: %s.id=%s", name, id);
add_node_copy(parent, patch);
return;
} else if(target == NULL) {
id = ID(patch);
name = crm_element_name(patch);
crm_err("Could not locate: %s.id=%s", name, id);
return;
}
if (target->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
add_xml_comment(parent, target, patch);
}
name = crm_element_name(target);
CRM_CHECK(name != NULL, return);
CRM_CHECK(safe_str_eq(crm_element_name(target), crm_element_name(patch)), return);
CRM_CHECK(safe_str_eq(ID(target), ID(patch)), return);
for (xIter = crm_first_attr(patch); xIter != NULL; xIter = xIter->next) {
const char *p_name = (const char *)xIter->name;
const char *p_value = crm_element_value(patch, p_name);
xml_remove_prop(target, p_name); /* Preserve the patch order */
crm_xml_add(target, p_name, p_value);
}
/* changes to child objects */
for (patch_child = __xml_first_child(patch); patch_child != NULL;
patch_child = __xml_next(patch_child)) {
if (patch_child->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE) {
target_child = find_xml_comment(target, patch_child);
} else {
target_child = find_entity(target, crm_element_name(patch_child), ID(patch_child));
}
__add_xml_object(target, target_child, patch_child);
}
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void longAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::longAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void longAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::longAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void usb_disable_interface(struct usb_device *dev, struct usb_interface *intf,
bool reset_hardware)
{
struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev,
alt->endpoint[i].desc.bEndpointAddress,
reset_hardware);
}
}
|
void usb_disable_interface(struct usb_device *dev, struct usb_interface *intf,
bool reset_hardware)
{
struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev,
alt->endpoint[i].desc.bEndpointAddress,
reset_hardware);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLInputElement::reset()
{
if (m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute())
setValue(String());
setAutofilled(false);
setChecked(hasAttribute(checkedAttr));
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = true;
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::reset()
{
if (m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute())
setValue(String());
setAutofilled(false);
setChecked(hasAttribute(checkedAttr));
m_reflectsCheckedAttribute = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9
|
sync: ensure sync init path doesn't block on CheckTime
The call to RequestEarlyExit (which calls Abort) only happens if the SyncBackendHost has received the initialization callback from the SyncManager. But during init, the SyncManager could make a call to CheckTime, meaning that call would never be aborted. This patch makes sure to cover that case.
BUG=93829
TEST=None at the moment :(
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7862011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100543 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
sync_api::HttpPostProviderFactory* SyncBackendHost::MakeHttpBridgeFactory(
const scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter>& getter) {
return new HttpBridgeFactory(getter);
}
|
sync_api::HttpPostProviderFactory* SyncBackendHost::MakeHttpBridgeFactory(
const scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter>& getter) {
return new HttpBridgeFactory(getter);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0829
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0829/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d123966ec156cd2f92fdada36be39694641b479e
|
d123966ec156cd2f92fdada36be39694641b479e
|
File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnReadDirectory(
int request_id, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
FileSystemURL url(path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kReadFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->ReadDirectory(
url, base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidReadDirectory,
this, request_id));
}
|
void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnReadDirectory(
int request_id, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
base::PlatformFileError error;
FileSystemURL url(path);
if (!HasPermissionsForFile(url, kReadFilePermissions, &error)) {
Send(new FileSystemMsg_DidFail(request_id, error));
return;
}
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->ReadDirectory(
url, base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidReadDirectory,
this, request_id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/be655fd4fb9ab3291a855a939496111674037a2f
|
be655fd4fb9ab3291a855a939496111674037a2f
|
Always use FrameNavigationDisabler during DocumentLoader detach.
BUG=617495
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2079473002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400558}
|
void FrameLoader::didAccessInitialDocumentTimerFired(Timer<FrameLoader>*)
{
if (client())
client()->didAccessInitialDocument();
}
|
void FrameLoader::didAccessInitialDocumentTimerFired(Timer<FrameLoader>*)
{
if (client())
client()->didAccessInitialDocument();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
11a83410153756ae350a82ed41b08d128ff7f998
|
All: Merge some file writing extension checks
|
void Com_TouchMemory( void ) {
int start, end;
int i, j;
int sum;
memblock_t *block;
Z_CheckHeap();
start = Sys_Milliseconds();
sum = 0;
j = hunk_low.permanent >> 2;
for ( i = 0 ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)s_hunkData )[i];
}
i = ( s_hunkTotal - hunk_high.permanent ) >> 2;
j = hunk_high.permanent >> 2;
for ( ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)s_hunkData )[i];
}
for ( block = mainzone->blocklist.next ; ; block = block->next ) {
if ( block->tag ) {
j = block->size >> 2;
for ( i = 0 ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)block )[i];
}
}
if ( block->next == &mainzone->blocklist ) {
break; // all blocks have been hit
}
}
end = Sys_Milliseconds();
Com_Printf( "Com_TouchMemory: %i msec\n", end - start );
}
|
void Com_TouchMemory( void ) {
int start, end;
int i, j;
int sum;
memblock_t *block;
Z_CheckHeap();
start = Sys_Milliseconds();
sum = 0;
j = hunk_low.permanent >> 2;
for ( i = 0 ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)s_hunkData )[i];
}
i = ( s_hunkTotal - hunk_high.permanent ) >> 2;
j = hunk_high.permanent >> 2;
for ( ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)s_hunkData )[i];
}
for ( block = mainzone->blocklist.next ; ; block = block->next ) {
if ( block->tag ) {
j = block->size >> 2;
for ( i = 0 ; i < j ; i += 64 ) { // only need to touch each page
sum += ( (int *)block )[i];
}
}
if ( block->next == &mainzone->blocklist ) {
break; // all blocks have been hit
}
}
end = Sys_Milliseconds();
Com_Printf( "Com_TouchMemory: %i msec\n", end - start );
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool TabCloseableStateWatcher::CanCloseTab(const Browser* browser) const {
return true;
}
|
bool TabCloseableStateWatcher::CanCloseTab(const Browser* browser) const {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual ~WebRTCMockRenderProcess() {}
|
virtual ~WebRTCMockRenderProcess() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1271/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
String MediaControlTextTrackListElement::getTextTrackLabel(TextTrack* track) {
if (!track) {
return mediaElement().locale().queryString(
WebLocalizedString::TextTracksOff);
}
String trackLabel = track->label();
if (trackLabel.isEmpty())
trackLabel = track->language();
if (trackLabel.isEmpty()) {
trackLabel = String(mediaElement().locale().queryString(
WebLocalizedString::TextTracksNoLabel,
String::number(track->trackIndex() + 1)));
}
return trackLabel;
}
|
String MediaControlTextTrackListElement::getTextTrackLabel(TextTrack* track) {
if (!track) {
return mediaElement().locale().queryString(
WebLocalizedString::TextTracksOff);
}
String trackLabel = track->label();
if (trackLabel.isEmpty())
trackLabel = track->language();
if (trackLabel.isEmpty()) {
trackLabel = String(mediaElement().locale().queryString(
WebLocalizedString::TextTracksNoLabel,
String::number(track->trackIndex() + 1)));
}
return trackLabel;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void QuotaManager::GetLRUOrigin(
StorageType type,
GetLRUOriginCallback* callback) {
LazyInitialize();
DCHECK(!lru_origin_callback_.get());
lru_origin_callback_.reset(callback);
if (db_disabled_) {
lru_origin_callback_->Run(GURL());
lru_origin_callback_.reset();
return;
}
scoped_refptr<GetLRUOriginTask> task(new GetLRUOriginTask(
this, type, origins_in_use_,
origins_in_error_, callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&QuotaManager::DidGetDatabaseLRUOrigin)));
task->Start();
}
|
void QuotaManager::GetLRUOrigin(
StorageType type,
GetLRUOriginCallback* callback) {
LazyInitialize();
DCHECK(!lru_origin_callback_.get());
lru_origin_callback_.reset(callback);
if (db_disabled_) {
lru_origin_callback_->Run(GURL());
lru_origin_callback_.reset();
return;
}
scoped_refptr<GetLRUOriginTask> task(new GetLRUOriginTask(
this, type, origins_in_use_,
origins_in_error_, callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&QuotaManager::DidGetDatabaseLRUOrigin)));
task->Start();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
fbCombineConjointOutPart (CARD8 a, CARD8 b)
{
/* max (1-b/a,0) */
/* = 1-min(b/a,1) */
/* min (1, (1-b) / a) */
if (b >= a) /* b >= a -> b/a >= 1 */
return 0x00; /* 0 */
return ~FbIntDiv(b,a); /* 1 - b/a */
}
|
fbCombineConjointOutPart (CARD8 a, CARD8 b)
{
/* max (1-b/a,0) */
/* = 1-min(b/a,1) */
/* min (1, (1-b) / a) */
if (b >= a) /* b >= a -> b/a >= 1 */
return 0x00; /* 0 */
return ~FbIntDiv(b,a); /* 1 - b/a */
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9745
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9745/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=df14e6c0b9592cbb24d5381dfc6106b14f915e75
|
df14e6c0b9592cbb24d5381dfc6106b14f915e75
| null |
parse_buildchar( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
face->len_buildchar = T1_ToFixedArray( &loader->parser, 0, NULL, 0 );
return;
}
|
parse_buildchar( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
face->len_buildchar = T1_ToFixedArray( &loader->parser, 0, NULL, 0 );
return;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5194
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782}
|
base::FilePath GetMyDrivePath() { return mount_path().Append("root"); }
|
base::FilePath GetMyDrivePath() { return mount_path().Append("root"); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1715
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1715/
|
CWE-22
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
ce70785c73a2b7cf2b34de0d8439ca31929b4743
|
Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::addLowestFloatFromChildren(LayoutBlockFlow* block)
{
if (!block || !block->containsFloats() || block->createsNewFormattingContext())
return;
FloatingObject* floatingObject = block->m_floatingObjects->lowestFloatingObject();
if (!floatingObject || containsFloat(floatingObject->layoutObject()))
return;
LayoutSize offset(-block->logicalLeft(), -block->logicalTop());
if (!isHorizontalWritingMode())
offset = offset.transposedSize();
if (!m_floatingObjects)
createFloatingObjects();
FloatingObject* newFloatingObject = m_floatingObjects->add(floatingObject->copyToNewContainer(offset, FloatingObject::IndirectlyContained));
newFloatingObject->setIsLowestNonOverhangingFloatInChild(true);
}
|
void LayoutBlockFlow::addLowestFloatFromChildren(LayoutBlockFlow* block)
{
if (!block || !block->containsFloats() || block->createsNewFormattingContext())
return;
FloatingObject* floatingObject = block->m_floatingObjects->lowestFloatingObject();
if (!floatingObject || containsFloat(floatingObject->layoutObject()))
return;
LayoutSize offset(-block->logicalLeft(), -block->logicalTop());
if (!isHorizontalWritingMode())
offset = offset.transposedSize();
if (!m_floatingObjects)
createFloatingObjects();
FloatingObject* newFloatingObject = m_floatingObjects->add(floatingObject->copyToNewContainer(offset, FloatingObject::IndirectlyContained));
newFloatingObject->setIsLowestNonOverhangingFloatInChild(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/YanVugenfirer/kvm-guest-drivers-windows/commit/fbfa4d1083ea84c5429992ca3e996d7d4fbc8238
|
fbfa4d1083ea84c5429992ca3e996d7d4fbc8238
|
NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
|
static NDIS_STATUS SetupDPCTarget(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
ULONG i;
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
NDIS_STATUS status;
PROCESSOR_NUMBER procNumber;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
status = KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex(i, &procNumber);
if (status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] - KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex failed for index %lu - %d\n", __FUNCTION__, i, status));
return status;
}
ParaNdis_ProcessorNumberToGroupAffinity(&pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity, &procNumber);
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor = 1i64 << i;
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not supported
#endif
}
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
pContext->CXPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->CXPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not yet defined
#endif
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
static NDIS_STATUS SetupDPCTarget(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
ULONG i;
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
NDIS_STATUS status;
PROCESSOR_NUMBER procNumber;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
status = KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex(i, &procNumber);
if (status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] - KeGetProcessorNumberFromIndex failed for index %lu - %d\n", __FUNCTION__, i, status));
return status;
}
ParaNdis_ProcessorNumberToGroupAffinity(&pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity, &procNumber);
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor = 1i64 << i;
pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[i].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not supported
#endif
}
#if NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS620
pContext->CXPath.DPCAffinity = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCAffinity;
#elif NDIS_SUPPORT_NDIS6
pContext->CXPath.DPCTargetProcessor = pContext->pPathBundles[0].rxPath.DPCTargetProcessor;
#else
#error not yet defined
#endif
return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
kvm-guest-drivers-windows
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
static u32 md_csum_fold(u32 csum)
{
csum = (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
return (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
}
|
static u32 md_csum_fold(u32 csum)
{
csum = (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
return (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-6638
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6638/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa
|
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr &&
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq -
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq >= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss))
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, tcp_time_stamp - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr, 0);
}
|
static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr &&
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq -
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq >= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss))
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, tcp_time_stamp - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataFileSystem::CheckLocalModificationAndRunAfterGetCacheFile(
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto,
const GetEntryInfoCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& local_cache_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK, entry_proto.Pass());
return;
}
base::PlatformFileInfo* file_info = new base::PlatformFileInfo;
bool* get_file_info_result = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetFileInfoOnBlockingPool,
local_cache_path,
base::Unretained(file_info),
base::Unretained(get_file_info_result)),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::CheckLocalModificationAndRunAfterGetFileInfo,
ui_weak_ptr_,
base::Passed(&entry_proto),
callback,
base::Owned(file_info),
base::Owned(get_file_info_result)));
}
|
void GDataFileSystem::CheckLocalModificationAndRunAfterGetCacheFile(
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto,
const GetEntryInfoCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& local_cache_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK, entry_proto.Pass());
return;
}
base::PlatformFileInfo* file_info = new base::PlatformFileInfo;
bool* get_file_info_result = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetFileInfoOnBlockingPool,
local_cache_path,
base::Unretained(file_info),
base::Unretained(get_file_info_result)),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::CheckLocalModificationAndRunAfterGetFileInfo,
ui_weak_ptr_,
base::Passed(&entry_proto),
callback,
base::Owned(file_info),
base::Owned(get_file_info_result)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1691
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1691/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::DefaultPolicy_GroupPolicyNotSupported() {
UpdateComponent(MakeCrxComponent(false));
}
|
void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::DefaultPolicy_GroupPolicyNotSupported() {
UpdateComponent(MakeCrxComponent(false));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2839/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
c63f2b7fe4fe2977f858a8e36d5f48db17eff2e7
|
Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static std::string SizeToString(const gfx::Size& max_size) {
return base::IntToString(max_size.width()) + "x" +
base::IntToString(max_size.height());
}
|
static std::string SizeToString(const gfx::Size& max_size) {
return base::IntToString(max_size.width()) + "x" +
base::IntToString(max_size.height());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1274
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1
|
Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
bool AXNodeObject::canvasHasFallbackContent() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!isHTMLCanvasElement(node))
return false;
return ElementTraversal::firstChild(*node);
}
|
bool AXNodeObject::canvasHasFallbackContent() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!isHTMLCanvasElement(node))
return false;
return ElementTraversal::firstChild(*node);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2270
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2270/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/file/file/commit/447558595a3650db2886cd2f416ad0beba965801
|
447558595a3650db2886cd2f416ad0beba965801
|
PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
|
mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + file_pstring_length_size(m);
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s))
len = sizeof(p->s) - 1;
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
|
mconvert(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m, int flip)
{
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (cvt_flip(m->type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
cvt_8(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_SHORT:
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16: {
/* Null terminate and eat *trailing* return */
p->s[sizeof(p->s) - 1] = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_PSTRING: {
char *ptr1 = p->s, *ptr2 = ptr1 + file_pstring_length_size(m);
size_t len = file_pstring_get_length(m, ptr1);
if (len >= sizeof(p->s))
len = sizeof(p->s) - 1;
while (len--)
*ptr1++ = *ptr2++;
*ptr1 = '\0';
return 1;
}
case FILE_BESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|(p->hs[1]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[0]<<24)|(p->hl[1]<<16)|(p->hl[2]<<8)|(p->hl[3]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[7]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LESHORT:
p->h = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|(p->hs[0]));
cvt_16(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[3]<<24)|(p->hl[2]<<16)|(p->hl[1]<<8)|(p->hl[0]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
p->q = (uint64_t)
(((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8)|((uint64_t)p->hq[0]));
cvt_64(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
p->l = (int32_t)
((p->hl[1]<<24)|(p->hl[0]<<16)|(p->hl[3]<<8)|(p->hl[2]));
cvt_32(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_FLOAT:
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[0]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[3]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
p->l = ((uint32_t)p->hl[3]<<24)|((uint32_t)p->hl[2]<<16)|
((uint32_t)p->hl[1]<<8) |((uint32_t)p->hl[0]);
cvt_float(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[0]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[7]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
p->q = ((uint64_t)p->hq[7]<<56)|((uint64_t)p->hq[6]<<48)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[5]<<40)|((uint64_t)p->hq[4]<<32)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[3]<<24)|((uint64_t)p->hq[2]<<16)|
((uint64_t)p->hq[1]<<8) |((uint64_t)p->hq[0]);
cvt_double(p, m);
return 1;
case FILE_REGEX:
case FILE_SEARCH:
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
return 1;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid type %d in mconvert()", m->type);
return 0;
}
}
|
C
|
file
| 0 |
CVE-2019-9003
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-9003/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8
|
77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8
|
ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
|
static int intf_next_seq(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
struct ipmi_recv_msg *recv_msg,
unsigned long timeout,
int retries,
int broadcast,
unsigned char *seq,
long *seqid)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (timeout == 0)
timeout = default_retry_ms;
if (retries < 0)
retries = default_max_retries;
for (i = intf->curr_seq; (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ != intf->curr_seq;
i = (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ) {
if (!intf->seq_table[i].inuse)
break;
}
if (!intf->seq_table[i].inuse) {
intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg = recv_msg;
/*
* Start with the maximum timeout, when the send response
* comes in we will start the real timer.
*/
intf->seq_table[i].timeout = MAX_MSG_TIMEOUT;
intf->seq_table[i].orig_timeout = timeout;
intf->seq_table[i].retries_left = retries;
intf->seq_table[i].broadcast = broadcast;
intf->seq_table[i].inuse = 1;
intf->seq_table[i].seqid = NEXT_SEQID(intf->seq_table[i].seqid);
*seq = i;
*seqid = intf->seq_table[i].seqid;
intf->curr_seq = (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ;
need_waiter(intf);
} else {
rv = -EAGAIN;
}
return rv;
}
|
static int intf_next_seq(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
struct ipmi_recv_msg *recv_msg,
unsigned long timeout,
int retries,
int broadcast,
unsigned char *seq,
long *seqid)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned int i;
if (timeout == 0)
timeout = default_retry_ms;
if (retries < 0)
retries = default_max_retries;
for (i = intf->curr_seq; (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ != intf->curr_seq;
i = (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ) {
if (!intf->seq_table[i].inuse)
break;
}
if (!intf->seq_table[i].inuse) {
intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg = recv_msg;
/*
* Start with the maximum timeout, when the send response
* comes in we will start the real timer.
*/
intf->seq_table[i].timeout = MAX_MSG_TIMEOUT;
intf->seq_table[i].orig_timeout = timeout;
intf->seq_table[i].retries_left = retries;
intf->seq_table[i].broadcast = broadcast;
intf->seq_table[i].inuse = 1;
intf->seq_table[i].seqid = NEXT_SEQID(intf->seq_table[i].seqid);
*seq = i;
*seqid = intf->seq_table[i].seqid;
intf->curr_seq = (i+1)%IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ;
need_waiter(intf);
} else {
rv = -EAGAIN;
}
return rv;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3231
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3231/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181
|
c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181
|
llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
struct llc_sap *sap;
int rc = -EINVAL;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
rc = -ENODEV;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
llc->dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (llc->dev && addr->sllc_arphrd != llc->dev->type) {
dev_put(llc->dev);
llc->dev = NULL;
}
} else
llc->dev = dev_getfirstbyhwtype(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd);
if (!llc->dev)
goto out;
rc = -EUSERS;
llc->laddr.lsap = llc_ui_autoport();
if (!llc->laddr.lsap)
goto out;
rc = -EBUSY; /* some other network layer is using the sap */
sap = llc_sap_open(llc->laddr.lsap, NULL);
if (!sap)
goto out;
memcpy(llc->laddr.mac, llc->dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN);
memcpy(&llc->addr, addr, sizeof(llc->addr));
/* assign new connection to its SAP */
llc_sap_add_socket(sap, sk);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
|
static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_llc *addr)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
struct llc_sap *sap;
int rc = -EINVAL;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
goto out;
rc = -ENODEV;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
llc->dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (llc->dev && addr->sllc_arphrd != llc->dev->type) {
dev_put(llc->dev);
llc->dev = NULL;
}
} else
llc->dev = dev_getfirstbyhwtype(&init_net, addr->sllc_arphrd);
if (!llc->dev)
goto out;
rc = -EUSERS;
llc->laddr.lsap = llc_ui_autoport();
if (!llc->laddr.lsap)
goto out;
rc = -EBUSY; /* some other network layer is using the sap */
sap = llc_sap_open(llc->laddr.lsap, NULL);
if (!sap)
goto out;
memcpy(llc->laddr.mac, llc->dev->dev_addr, IFHWADDRLEN);
memcpy(&llc->addr, addr, sizeof(llc->addr));
/* assign new connection to its SAP */
llc_sap_add_socket(sap, sk);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9739/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
|
c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
| null |
static void Ins_JMPR( INS_ARG )
{
if ( BOUNDS(CUR.IP + args[0], CUR.codeSize ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.IP += (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
* allow for simple cases here by just checking the preceding byte.
* Fonts with this problem are not uncommon.
*/
CUR.IP -= 1;
}
|
static void Ins_JMPR( INS_ARG )
{
CUR.IP += (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
* allow for simple cases here by just checking the preceding byte.
* Fonts with this problem are not uncommon.
*/
CUR.IP -= 1;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2902
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2902/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c
|
Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void LayerTreeHost::StartPageScaleAnimation(const gfx::Vector2d& target_offset,
bool use_anchor,
float scale,
base::TimeDelta duration) {
pending_page_scale_animation_.reset(new PendingPageScaleAnimation);
pending_page_scale_animation_->target_offset = target_offset;
pending_page_scale_animation_->use_anchor = use_anchor;
pending_page_scale_animation_->scale = scale;
pending_page_scale_animation_->duration = duration;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
|
void LayerTreeHost::StartPageScaleAnimation(const gfx::Vector2d& target_offset,
bool use_anchor,
float scale,
base::TimeDelta duration) {
pending_page_scale_animation_.reset(new PendingPageScaleAnimation);
pending_page_scale_animation_->target_offset = target_offset;
pending_page_scale_animation_->use_anchor = use_anchor;
pending_page_scale_animation_->scale = scale;
pending_page_scale_animation_->duration = duration;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b
|
ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
gfx::Rect LauncherView::GetIdealBoundsOfItemIcon(LauncherID id) {
int index = model_->ItemIndexByID(id);
if (index == -1 || index > last_visible_index_)
return gfx::Rect();
const gfx::Rect& ideal_bounds(view_model_->ideal_bounds(index));
DCHECK_NE(TYPE_APP_LIST, model_->items()[index].type);
LauncherButton* button =
static_cast<LauncherButton*>(view_model_->view_at(index));
gfx::Rect icon_bounds = button->GetIconBounds();
return gfx::Rect(ideal_bounds.x() + icon_bounds.x(),
ideal_bounds.y() + icon_bounds.y(),
icon_bounds.width(), icon_bounds.height());
}
|
gfx::Rect LauncherView::GetIdealBoundsOfItemIcon(LauncherID id) {
int index = model_->ItemIndexByID(id);
if (index == -1 || index > last_visible_index_)
return gfx::Rect();
const gfx::Rect& ideal_bounds(view_model_->ideal_bounds(index));
DCHECK_NE(TYPE_APP_LIST, model_->items()[index].type);
LauncherButton* button =
static_cast<LauncherButton*>(view_model_->view_at(index));
gfx::Rect icon_bounds = button->GetIconBounds();
return gfx::Rect(ideal_bounds.x() + icon_bounds.x(),
ideal_bounds.y() + icon_bounds.y(),
icon_bounds.width(), icon_bounds.height());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
String DOMWindow::CrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(
const LocalDOMWindow* calling_window) const {
if (!calling_window || !calling_window->document() || !GetFrame())
return String();
const KURL& calling_window_url = calling_window->document()->Url();
if (calling_window_url.IsNull())
return String();
const SecurityOrigin* active_origin =
calling_window->document()->GetSecurityOrigin();
const SecurityOrigin* target_origin =
GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
DCHECK(GetFrame()->IsRemoteFrame() ||
!active_origin->CanAccess(target_origin));
String message = "Blocked a frame with origin \"" +
active_origin->ToString() +
"\" from accessing a frame with origin \"" +
target_origin->ToString() + "\". ";
KURL active_url = calling_window->document()->Url();
KURL target_url = IsLocalDOMWindow()
? blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(this)->document()->Url()
: KURL(NullURL(), target_origin->ToString());
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin) ||
calling_window->document()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
message = "Blocked a frame at \"" +
SecurityOrigin::Create(active_url)->ToString() +
"\" from accessing a frame at \"" +
SecurityOrigin::Create(target_url)->ToString() + "\". ";
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin) &&
calling_window->document()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin))
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" Both frames are sandboxed and lack the \"allow-same-origin\" "
"flag.";
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin))
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" The frame being accessed is sandboxed and lacks the "
"\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" The frame requesting access is sandboxed and lacks the "
"\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
}
if (target_origin->Protocol() != active_origin->Protocol())
return message + " The frame requesting access has a protocol of \"" +
active_url.Protocol() +
"\", the frame being accessed has a protocol of \"" +
target_url.Protocol() + "\". Protocols must match.\n";
if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM() && active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message +
"The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
active_origin->Domain() +
"\", the frame being accessed set it to \"" +
target_origin->Domain() +
"\". Both must set \"document.domain\" to the same value to allow "
"access.";
if (active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message +
"The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
active_origin->Domain() +
"\", but the frame being accessed did not. Both must set "
"\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message + "The frame being accessed set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
target_origin->Domain() +
"\", but the frame requesting access did not. Both must set "
"\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
return message + "Protocols, domains, and ports must match.";
}
|
String DOMWindow::CrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(
const LocalDOMWindow* calling_window) const {
if (!calling_window || !calling_window->document() || !GetFrame())
return String();
const KURL& calling_window_url = calling_window->document()->Url();
if (calling_window_url.IsNull())
return String();
const SecurityOrigin* active_origin =
calling_window->document()->GetSecurityOrigin();
const SecurityOrigin* target_origin =
GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
DCHECK(GetFrame()->IsRemoteFrame() ||
!active_origin->CanAccess(target_origin));
String message = "Blocked a frame with origin \"" +
active_origin->ToString() +
"\" from accessing a frame with origin \"" +
target_origin->ToString() + "\". ";
KURL active_url = calling_window->document()->Url();
KURL target_url = IsLocalDOMWindow()
? blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(this)->document()->Url()
: KURL(NullURL(), target_origin->ToString());
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin) ||
calling_window->document()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin)) {
message = "Blocked a frame at \"" +
SecurityOrigin::Create(active_url)->ToString() +
"\" from accessing a frame at \"" +
SecurityOrigin::Create(target_url)->ToString() + "\". ";
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin) &&
calling_window->document()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin))
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" Both frames are sandboxed and lack the \"allow-same-origin\" "
"flag.";
if (GetFrame()->GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin))
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" The frame being accessed is sandboxed and lacks the "
"\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
return "Sandbox access violation: " + message +
" The frame requesting access is sandboxed and lacks the "
"\"allow-same-origin\" flag.";
}
if (target_origin->Protocol() != active_origin->Protocol())
return message + " The frame requesting access has a protocol of \"" +
active_url.Protocol() +
"\", the frame being accessed has a protocol of \"" +
target_url.Protocol() + "\". Protocols must match.\n";
if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM() && active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message +
"The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
active_origin->Domain() +
"\", the frame being accessed set it to \"" +
target_origin->Domain() +
"\". Both must set \"document.domain\" to the same value to allow "
"access.";
if (active_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message +
"The frame requesting access set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
active_origin->Domain() +
"\", but the frame being accessed did not. Both must set "
"\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
if (target_origin->DomainWasSetInDOM())
return message + "The frame being accessed set \"document.domain\" to \"" +
target_origin->Domain() +
"\", but the frame requesting access did not. Both must set "
"\"document.domain\" to the same value to allow access.";
return message + "Protocols, domains, and ports must match.";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
29afdd2550b3d30a8defece2b95ae81edcf66ac9
|
core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
|
static const char *set_override_list(cmd_parms *cmd, void *d_, int argc, char *const argv[])
{
core_dir_config *d = d_;
int i;
const char *err;
/* Throw a warning if we're in <Location> or <Files> */
if (ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_LOCATION | NOT_IN_FILES)) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server, APLOGNO(00115)
"Useless use of AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
cmd->directive->filename, cmd->directive->line_num);
}
if ((err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_HTACCESS)) != NULL)
return err;
d->override_list = apr_table_make(cmd->pool, argc);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(argv[i], "None")) {
if (argc != 1) {
return "'None' not allowed with other directives in "
"AllowOverrideList";
}
return NULL;
}
else {
const command_rec *result = NULL;
module *mod = ap_top_module;
result = ap_find_command_in_modules(argv[i], &mod);
if (result == NULL) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server,
APLOGNO(00116) "Discarding unrecognized "
"directive `%s' in AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
argv[i], cmd->directive->filename,
cmd->directive->line_num);
continue;
}
else if ((result->req_override & (OR_ALL|ACCESS_CONF)) == 0) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server,
APLOGNO(02304) "Discarding directive `%s' not "
"allowed in AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
argv[i], cmd->directive->filename,
cmd->directive->line_num);
continue;
}
else {
apr_table_setn(d->override_list, argv[i], "1");
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
static const char *set_override_list(cmd_parms *cmd, void *d_, int argc, char *const argv[])
{
core_dir_config *d = d_;
int i;
const char *err;
/* Throw a warning if we're in <Location> or <Files> */
if (ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_LOCATION | NOT_IN_FILES)) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server, APLOGNO(00115)
"Useless use of AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
cmd->directive->filename, cmd->directive->line_num);
}
if ((err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_HTACCESS)) != NULL)
return err;
d->override_list = apr_table_make(cmd->pool, argc);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (!ap_cstr_casecmp(argv[i], "None")) {
if (argc != 1) {
return "'None' not allowed with other directives in "
"AllowOverrideList";
}
return NULL;
}
else {
const command_rec *result = NULL;
module *mod = ap_top_module;
result = ap_find_command_in_modules(argv[i], &mod);
if (result == NULL) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server,
APLOGNO(00116) "Discarding unrecognized "
"directive `%s' in AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
argv[i], cmd->directive->filename,
cmd->directive->line_num);
continue;
}
else if ((result->req_override & (OR_ALL|ACCESS_CONF)) == 0) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, cmd->server,
APLOGNO(02304) "Discarding directive `%s' not "
"allowed in AllowOverrideList at %s:%d",
argv[i], cmd->directive->filename,
cmd->directive->line_num);
continue;
}
else {
apr_table_setn(d->override_list, argv[i], "1");
}
}
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
httpd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7134
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7134/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/72dbb7f416160f490c4e9987040989a10ad431c7?w=1
|
72dbb7f416160f490c4e9987040989a10ad431c7?w=1
|
Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
|
PHP_FUNCTION(curl_getinfo)
{
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
zend_long option = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r|l", &zid, &option) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() < 2) {
char *s_code;
/* libcurl expects long datatype. So far no cases are known where
it would be an issue. Using zend_long would truncate a 64-bit
var on Win64, so the exact long datatype fits everywhere, as
long as there's no 32-bit int overflow. */
long l_code;
double d_code;
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM > 0x071301
struct curl_certinfo *ci = NULL;
zval listcode;
#endif
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("url", s_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_TYPE, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
if (s_code != NULL) {
CAAS("content_type", s_code);
} else {
zval retnull;
ZVAL_NULL(&retnull);
CAAZ("content_type", &retnull);
}
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("http_code", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("header_size", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REQUEST_SIZE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("request_size", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_FILETIME, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("filetime", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SSL_VERIFYRESULT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("ssl_verify_result", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_COUNT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("redirect_count", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_TOTAL_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("total_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_NAMELOOKUP_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("namelookup_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONNECT_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("connect_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("pretransfer_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SIZE_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("size_upload", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SIZE_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("size_download", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SPEED_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("speed_download", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SPEED_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("speed_upload", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_LENGTH_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("download_content_length", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_LENGTH_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("upload_content_length", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_STARTTRANSFER_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("starttransfer_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("redirect_time", d_code);
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071202 /* Available since 7.18.2 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_URL, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("redirect_url", s_code);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071300 /* Available since 7.19.0 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRIMARY_IP, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("primary_ip", s_code);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 /* Available since 7.19.1 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CERTINFO, &ci) == CURLE_OK) {
array_init(&listcode);
create_certinfo(ci, &listcode);
CAAZ("certinfo", &listcode);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071500 /* Available since 7.21.0 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRIMARY_PORT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("primary_port", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_LOCAL_IP, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("local_ip", s_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_LOCAL_PORT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("local_port", l_code);
}
#endif
if (ch->header.str) {
CAASTR("request_header", ch->header.str);
}
} else {
switch (option) {
case CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT:
if (ch->header.str) {
RETURN_STR_COPY(ch->header.str);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 /* Available since 7.19.1 */
case CURLINFO_CERTINFO: {
struct curl_certinfo *ci = NULL;
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CERTINFO, &ci) == CURLE_OK) {
create_certinfo(ci, return_value);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#endif
default: {
int type = CURLINFO_TYPEMASK & option;
switch (type) {
case CURLINFO_STRING:
{
char *s_code = NULL;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &s_code) == CURLE_OK && s_code) {
RETURN_STRING(s_code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
case CURLINFO_LONG:
{
zend_long code = 0;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &code) == CURLE_OK) {
RETURN_LONG(code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
case CURLINFO_DOUBLE:
{
double code = 0.0;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &code) == CURLE_OK) {
RETURN_DOUBLE(code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070c03 /* Available since 7.12.3 */
case CURLINFO_SLIST:
{
struct curl_slist *slist;
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &slist) == CURLE_OK) {
while (slist) {
add_next_index_string(return_value, slist->data);
slist = slist->next;
}
curl_slist_free_all(slist);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#endif
default:
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}
|
PHP_FUNCTION(curl_getinfo)
{
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
zend_long option = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r|l", &zid, &option) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() < 2) {
char *s_code;
/* libcurl expects long datatype. So far no cases are known where
it would be an issue. Using zend_long would truncate a 64-bit
var on Win64, so the exact long datatype fits everywhere, as
long as there's no 32-bit int overflow. */
long l_code;
double d_code;
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM > 0x071301
struct curl_certinfo *ci = NULL;
zval listcode;
#endif
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_EFFECTIVE_URL, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("url", s_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_TYPE, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
if (s_code != NULL) {
CAAS("content_type", s_code);
} else {
zval retnull;
ZVAL_NULL(&retnull);
CAAZ("content_type", &retnull);
}
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("http_code", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("header_size", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REQUEST_SIZE, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("request_size", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_FILETIME, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("filetime", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SSL_VERIFYRESULT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("ssl_verify_result", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_COUNT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("redirect_count", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_TOTAL_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("total_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_NAMELOOKUP_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("namelookup_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONNECT_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("connect_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRETRANSFER_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("pretransfer_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SIZE_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("size_upload", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SIZE_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("size_download", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SPEED_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("speed_download", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_SPEED_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("speed_upload", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_LENGTH_DOWNLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("download_content_length", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CONTENT_LENGTH_UPLOAD, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("upload_content_length", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_STARTTRANSFER_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("starttransfer_time", d_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_TIME, &d_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAD("redirect_time", d_code);
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071202 /* Available since 7.18.2 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_REDIRECT_URL, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("redirect_url", s_code);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071300 /* Available since 7.19.0 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRIMARY_IP, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("primary_ip", s_code);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 /* Available since 7.19.1 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CERTINFO, &ci) == CURLE_OK) {
array_init(&listcode);
create_certinfo(ci, &listcode);
CAAZ("certinfo", &listcode);
}
#endif
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071500 /* Available since 7.21.0 */
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_PRIMARY_PORT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("primary_port", l_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_LOCAL_IP, &s_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAS("local_ip", s_code);
}
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_LOCAL_PORT, &l_code) == CURLE_OK) {
CAAL("local_port", l_code);
}
#endif
if (ch->header.str) {
CAASTR("request_header", ch->header.str);
}
} else {
switch (option) {
case CURLINFO_HEADER_OUT:
if (ch->header.str) {
RETURN_STR_COPY(ch->header.str);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x071301 /* Available since 7.19.1 */
case CURLINFO_CERTINFO: {
struct curl_certinfo *ci = NULL;
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, CURLINFO_CERTINFO, &ci) == CURLE_OK) {
create_certinfo(ci, return_value);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#endif
default: {
int type = CURLINFO_TYPEMASK & option;
switch (type) {
case CURLINFO_STRING:
{
char *s_code = NULL;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &s_code) == CURLE_OK && s_code) {
RETURN_STRING(s_code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
case CURLINFO_LONG:
{
zend_long code = 0;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &code) == CURLE_OK) {
RETURN_LONG(code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
case CURLINFO_DOUBLE:
{
double code = 0.0;
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &code) == CURLE_OK) {
RETURN_DOUBLE(code);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070c03 /* Available since 7.12.3 */
case CURLINFO_SLIST:
{
struct curl_slist *slist;
array_init(return_value);
if (curl_easy_getinfo(ch->cp, option, &slist) == CURLE_OK) {
while (slist) {
add_next_index_string(return_value, slist->data);
slist = slist->next;
}
curl_slist_free_all(slist);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
#endif
default:
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
static __be32 nfsd4_do_lookupp(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fh)
{
struct svc_fh tmp_fh;
__be32 ret;
fh_init(&tmp_fh, NFS4_FHSIZE);
ret = exp_pseudoroot(rqstp, &tmp_fh);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (tmp_fh.fh_dentry == fh->fh_dentry) {
fh_put(&tmp_fh);
return nfserr_noent;
}
fh_put(&tmp_fh);
return nfsd_lookup(rqstp, fh, "..", 2, fh);
}
|
static __be32 nfsd4_do_lookupp(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fh)
{
struct svc_fh tmp_fh;
__be32 ret;
fh_init(&tmp_fh, NFS4_FHSIZE);
ret = exp_pseudoroot(rqstp, &tmp_fh);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (tmp_fh.fh_dentry == fh->fh_dentry) {
fh_put(&tmp_fh);
return nfserr_noent;
}
fh_put(&tmp_fh);
return nfsd_lookup(rqstp, fh, "..", 2, fh);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0716
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0716/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
6b0d6a9b4296fa16a28d10d416db7a770fc03287
|
bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void br_multicast_group_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge *br = mp->br;
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || timer_pending(&mp->timer))
goto out;
if (!hlist_unhashed(&mp->mglist))
hlist_del_init(&mp->mglist);
if (mp->ports)
goto out;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
hlist_del_rcu(&mp->hlist[mdb->ver]);
mdb->size--;
del_timer(&mp->query_timer);
call_rcu_bh(&mp->rcu, br_multicast_free_group);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
|
static void br_multicast_group_expired(unsigned long data)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp = (void *)data;
struct net_bridge *br = mp->br;
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
spin_lock(&br->multicast_lock);
if (!netif_running(br->dev) || timer_pending(&mp->timer))
goto out;
if (!hlist_unhashed(&mp->mglist))
hlist_del_init(&mp->mglist);
if (mp->ports)
goto out;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
hlist_del_rcu(&mp->hlist[mdb->ver]);
mdb->size--;
del_timer(&mp->query_timer);
call_rcu_bh(&mp->rcu, br_multicast_free_group);
out:
spin_unlock(&br->multicast_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9421/
| null |
https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/a197e92349a4aa2141b5dff12e9dd44c2a2166e3
|
a197e92349a4aa2141b5dff12e9dd44c2a2166e3
|
Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
|
xdr_dpol_arg(XDR *xdrs, dpol_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->name)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
|
xdr_dpol_arg(XDR *xdrs, dpol_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->name)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
|
C
|
krb5
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9330/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
|
26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
| null |
static void usb_ohci_realize_pci(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
Error *err = NULL;
OHCIPCIState *ohci = PCI_OHCI(dev);
dev->config[PCI_CLASS_PROG] = 0x10; /* OHCI */
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01; /* interrupt pin A */
usb_ohci_init(&ohci->state, DEVICE(dev), ohci->num_ports, 0,
ohci->masterbus, ohci->firstport,
pci_get_address_space(dev), &err);
if (err) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
ohci->state.irq = pci_allocate_irq(dev);
pci_register_bar(dev, 0, 0, &ohci->state.mem);
}
|
static void usb_ohci_realize_pci(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
Error *err = NULL;
OHCIPCIState *ohci = PCI_OHCI(dev);
dev->config[PCI_CLASS_PROG] = 0x10; /* OHCI */
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN] = 0x01; /* interrupt pin A */
usb_ohci_init(&ohci->state, DEVICE(dev), ohci->num_ports, 0,
ohci->masterbus, ohci->firstport,
pci_get_address_space(dev), &err);
if (err) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
ohci->state.irq = pci_allocate_irq(dev);
pci_register_bar(dev, 0, 0, &ohci->state.mem);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebSettingsImpl::setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(bool enabled)
{
m_settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(enabled);
}
|
void WebSettingsImpl::setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(bool enabled)
{
m_settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(enabled);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3905
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3905/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/kohler/t1utils/commit/6b9d1aafcb61a3663c883663eb19ccdbfcde8d33
|
6b9d1aafcb61a3663c883663eb19ccdbfcde8d33
|
Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
|
fatal_error(const char *message, ...)
{
va_list val;
va_start(val, message);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", program_name);
vfprintf(stderr, message, val);
putc('\n', stderr);
va_end(val);
exit(1);
}
|
fatal_error(const char *message, ...)
{
va_list val;
va_start(val, message);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", program_name);
vfprintf(stderr, message, val);
putc('\n', stderr);
va_end(val);
exit(1);
}
|
C
|
t1utils
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4098
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4098/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/64dd153c83743af81f20924c6343652d731eeecb
|
64dd153c83743af81f20924c6343652d731eeecb
|
GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
|
static void do_unflock(struct file *file, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct gfs2_file *fp = file->private_data;
struct gfs2_holder *fl_gh = &fp->f_fl_gh;
mutex_lock(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
flock_lock_file_wait(file, fl);
if (fl_gh->gh_gl) {
gfs2_glock_dq_wait(fl_gh);
gfs2_holder_uninit(fl_gh);
}
mutex_unlock(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
}
|
static void do_unflock(struct file *file, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct gfs2_file *fp = file->private_data;
struct gfs2_holder *fl_gh = &fp->f_fl_gh;
mutex_lock(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
flock_lock_file_wait(file, fl);
if (fl_gh->gh_gl) {
gfs2_glock_dq_wait(fl_gh);
gfs2_holder_uninit(fl_gh);
}
mutex_unlock(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5194
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782}
|
TestEntryInfo(EntryType type,
const std::string& source_file_name,
const std::string& target_path)
: type(type),
shared_option(NONE),
source_file_name(source_file_name),
target_path(target_path),
last_modified_time(base::Time::Now()) {}
|
TestEntryInfo(EntryType type,
const std::string& source_file_name,
const std::string& target_path)
: type(type),
shared_option(NONE),
source_file_name(source_file_name),
target_path(target_path),
last_modified_time(base::Time::Now()) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1444
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1444/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194
|
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
fst_closeport(struct fst_port_info *port)
{
if (port->card->state == FST_RUNNING) {
if (port->run) {
port->run = 0;
fst_op_lower(port, OPSTS_RTS | OPSTS_DTR);
fst_issue_cmd(port, STOPPORT);
} else {
dbg(DBG_OPEN, "close: port not running\n");
}
}
}
|
fst_closeport(struct fst_port_info *port)
{
if (port->card->state == FST_RUNNING) {
if (port->run) {
port->run = 0;
fst_op_lower(port, OPSTS_RTS | OPSTS_DTR);
fst_issue_cmd(port, STOPPORT);
} else {
dbg(DBG_OPEN, "close: port not running\n");
}
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5141
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5141/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/21fdcdd977e8ab479dd99c6d0d2f562dda98261d
|
21fdcdd977e8ab479dd99c6d0d2f562dda98261d
|
Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ChromotingInstance::RegisterLoggingInstance() {
base::AutoLock lock(g_logging_lock.Get());
g_logging_instance.Get() = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
g_logging_task_runner.Get() = plugin_task_runner_;
g_has_logging_instance = true;
}
|
void ChromotingInstance::RegisterLoggingInstance() {
base::AutoLock lock(g_logging_lock.Get());
g_logging_instance.Get() = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
g_logging_task_runner.Get() = plugin_task_runner_;
g_has_logging_instance = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15115
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15115/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74
|
df80cd9b28b9ebaa284a41df611dbf3a2d05ca74
|
sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_peeloff_common(struct sock *sk, sctp_peeloff_arg_t *peeloff,
struct file **newfile, unsigned flags)
{
struct socket *newsock;
int retval;
retval = sctp_do_peeloff(sk, peeloff->associd, &newsock);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
/* Map the socket to an unused fd that can be returned to the user. */
retval = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & SOCK_CLOEXEC);
if (retval < 0) {
sock_release(newsock);
goto out;
}
*newfile = sock_alloc_file(newsock, 0, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(*newfile)) {
put_unused_fd(retval);
sock_release(newsock);
retval = PTR_ERR(*newfile);
*newfile = NULL;
return retval;
}
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, newsk:%p, sd:%d\n", __func__, sk, newsock->sk,
retval);
peeloff->sd = retval;
if (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK)
(*newfile)->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
out:
return retval;
}
|
static int sctp_getsockopt_peeloff_common(struct sock *sk, sctp_peeloff_arg_t *peeloff,
struct file **newfile, unsigned flags)
{
struct socket *newsock;
int retval;
retval = sctp_do_peeloff(sk, peeloff->associd, &newsock);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
/* Map the socket to an unused fd that can be returned to the user. */
retval = get_unused_fd_flags(flags & SOCK_CLOEXEC);
if (retval < 0) {
sock_release(newsock);
goto out;
}
*newfile = sock_alloc_file(newsock, 0, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(*newfile)) {
put_unused_fd(retval);
sock_release(newsock);
retval = PTR_ERR(*newfile);
*newfile = NULL;
return retval;
}
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, newsk:%p, sd:%d\n", __func__, sk, newsock->sk,
retval);
peeloff->sd = retval;
if (flags & SOCK_NONBLOCK)
(*newfile)->f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
out:
return retval;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3897
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3897/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
c7a90019bf7054145b11d2577b851cf2779d3d79
|
Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void CreatePrintSettingsDictionary(DictionaryValue* dict) {
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, false);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, printing::GRAY);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, printing::SIMPLEX);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, 1);
dict->SetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, "dummy");
dict->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, "0xb33fbeef");
dict->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, 12345);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, true);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingDefaultMarginsSelected, true);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
|
void CreatePrintSettingsDictionary(DictionaryValue* dict) {
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, false);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, printing::GRAY);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, true);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, printing::SIMPLEX);
dict->SetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, 1);
dict->SetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, "dummy");
dict->SetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, "0xb33fbeef");
dict->SetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, 12345);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, true);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingDefaultMarginsSelected, true);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled, false);
dict->SetBoolean(printing::kSettingGenerateDraftData, true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2491/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
0b760113a3a155269a3fba93a409c640031dd68f
|
NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void nlmclnt_setlockargs(struct nlm_rqst *req, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct nlm_args *argp = &req->a_args;
struct nlm_lock *lock = &argp->lock;
nlmclnt_next_cookie(&argp->cookie);
memcpy(&lock->fh, NFS_FH(fl->fl_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode), sizeof(struct nfs_fh));
lock->caller = utsname()->nodename;
lock->oh.data = req->a_owner;
lock->oh.len = snprintf(req->a_owner, sizeof(req->a_owner), "%u@%s",
(unsigned int)fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->pid,
utsname()->nodename);
lock->svid = fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->pid;
lock->fl.fl_start = fl->fl_start;
lock->fl.fl_end = fl->fl_end;
lock->fl.fl_type = fl->fl_type;
}
|
static void nlmclnt_setlockargs(struct nlm_rqst *req, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct nlm_args *argp = &req->a_args;
struct nlm_lock *lock = &argp->lock;
nlmclnt_next_cookie(&argp->cookie);
memcpy(&lock->fh, NFS_FH(fl->fl_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode), sizeof(struct nfs_fh));
lock->caller = utsname()->nodename;
lock->oh.data = req->a_owner;
lock->oh.len = snprintf(req->a_owner, sizeof(req->a_owner), "%u@%s",
(unsigned int)fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->pid,
utsname()->nodename);
lock->svid = fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.owner->pid;
lock->fl.fl_start = fl->fl_start;
lock->fl.fl_end = fl->fl_end;
lock->fl.fl_type = fl->fl_type;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-4036
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4036/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c
|
59c816c1f24df0204e01851431d3bab3eb76719c
|
vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
|
static int vhost_scsi_shutdown_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
return 0;
}
|
static int vhost_scsi_shutdown_session(struct se_session *se_sess)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eb7971fdb0c3b76bacfb77c1ecc76459ef481f17
|
eb7971fdb0c3b76bacfb77c1ecc76459ef481f17
|
Implement delegation to Metro file pickers.
[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=None
TEST=None
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10310103
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@136624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SelectFileDialogImpl::~SelectFileDialogImpl() {
}
|
SelectFileDialogImpl::~SelectFileDialogImpl() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7550
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7550/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
|
b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d
|
KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
error:
return ret;
}
|
long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
{
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
error:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6663
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6663/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cace1e6998293b9b025d4bbdaf5cb5b6a1c2efb4
|
cace1e6998293b9b025d4bbdaf5cb5b6a1c2efb4
|
Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
String SVGImage::filenameExtension() const
{
return "svg";
}
|
String SVGImage::filenameExtension() const
{
return "svg";
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a
|
[BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPage::setColorInput(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& value)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading()) {
d->m_deferredTasks.append(adoptPtr(new DeferredTaskSetColorInput(d, value)));
return;
}
DeferredTaskSetColorInput::finishOrCancel(d);
d->m_inputHandler->setInputValue(value);
}
|
void WebPage::setColorInput(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& value)
{
if (d->m_page->defersLoading()) {
d->m_deferredTasks.append(adoptPtr(new DeferredTaskSetColorInput(d, value)));
return;
}
DeferredTaskSetColorInput::finishOrCancel(d);
d->m_inputHandler->setInputValue(value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-15911
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15911/
|
CWE-119
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=8e9ce5016db968b40e4ec255a3005f2786cce45f
|
8e9ce5016db968b40e4ec255a3005f2786cce45f
| null |
s_aes_init(stream_state *ss)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
/* clear the flags so we know we're at the start of a stream */
state->initialized = 0;
state->ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
|
s_aes_init(stream_state *ss)
{
stream_aes_state *const state = (stream_aes_state *) ss;
/* clear the flags so we know we're at the start of a stream */
state->initialized = 0;
state->ctx = NULL;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7191/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
0ad646c81b2182f7fa67ec0c8c825e0ee165696d
|
tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void flush_all_backlogs(void)
{
unsigned int cpu;
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
queue_work_on(cpu, system_highpri_wq,
per_cpu_ptr(&flush_works, cpu));
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
flush_work(per_cpu_ptr(&flush_works, cpu));
put_online_cpus();
}
|
static void flush_all_backlogs(void)
{
unsigned int cpu;
get_online_cpus();
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
queue_work_on(cpu, system_highpri_wq,
per_cpu_ptr(&flush_works, cpu));
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
flush_work(per_cpu_ptr(&flush_works, cpu));
put_online_cpus();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12154/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
51aa68e7d57e3217192d88ce90fd5b8ef29ec94f
|
kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long exit_qualification,
u32 vmx_instruction_info, bool wr, gva_t *ret)
{
gva_t off;
bool exn;
struct kvm_segment s;
/*
* According to Vol. 3B, "Information for VM Exits Due to Instruction
* Execution", on an exit, vmx_instruction_info holds most of the
* addressing components of the operand. Only the displacement part
* is put in exit_qualification (see 3B, "Basic VM-Exit Information").
* For how an actual address is calculated from all these components,
* refer to Vol. 1, "Operand Addressing".
*/
int scaling = vmx_instruction_info & 3;
int addr_size = (vmx_instruction_info >> 7) & 7;
bool is_reg = vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 10);
int seg_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 15) & 7;
int index_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 18) & 0xf;
bool index_is_valid = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 22));
int base_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 23) & 0xf;
bool base_is_valid = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 27));
if (is_reg) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
/* Addr = segment_base + offset */
/* offset = base + [index * scale] + displacement */
off = exit_qualification; /* holds the displacement */
if (base_is_valid)
off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, base_reg);
if (index_is_valid)
off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, index_reg)<<scaling;
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg_reg);
*ret = s.base + off;
if (addr_size == 1) /* 32 bit */
*ret &= 0xffffffff;
/* Checks for #GP/#SS exceptions. */
exn = false;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
/* Long mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory address is in a
* non-canonical form. This is the only check on the memory
* destination for long mode!
*/
exn = is_noncanonical_address(*ret, vcpu);
} else if (is_protmode(vcpu)) {
/* Protected mode: apply checks for segment validity in the
* following order:
* - segment type check (#GP(0) may be thrown)
* - usability check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
* - limit check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
*/
if (wr)
/* #GP(0) if the destination operand is located in a
* read-only data segment or any code segment.
*/
exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 0 || (s.type & 8));
else
/* #GP(0) if the source operand is located in an
* execute-only code segment
*/
exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 8);
if (exn) {
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
return 1;
}
/* Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the segment is unusable.
*/
exn = (s.unusable != 0);
/* Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory
* operand is outside the segment limit.
*/
exn = exn || (off + sizeof(u64) > s.limit);
}
if (exn) {
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu,
seg_reg == VCPU_SREG_SS ?
SS_VECTOR : GP_VECTOR,
0);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int get_vmx_mem_address(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long exit_qualification,
u32 vmx_instruction_info, bool wr, gva_t *ret)
{
gva_t off;
bool exn;
struct kvm_segment s;
/*
* According to Vol. 3B, "Information for VM Exits Due to Instruction
* Execution", on an exit, vmx_instruction_info holds most of the
* addressing components of the operand. Only the displacement part
* is put in exit_qualification (see 3B, "Basic VM-Exit Information").
* For how an actual address is calculated from all these components,
* refer to Vol. 1, "Operand Addressing".
*/
int scaling = vmx_instruction_info & 3;
int addr_size = (vmx_instruction_info >> 7) & 7;
bool is_reg = vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 10);
int seg_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 15) & 7;
int index_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 18) & 0xf;
bool index_is_valid = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 22));
int base_reg = (vmx_instruction_info >> 23) & 0xf;
bool base_is_valid = !(vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 27));
if (is_reg) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
/* Addr = segment_base + offset */
/* offset = base + [index * scale] + displacement */
off = exit_qualification; /* holds the displacement */
if (base_is_valid)
off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, base_reg);
if (index_is_valid)
off += kvm_register_read(vcpu, index_reg)<<scaling;
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg_reg);
*ret = s.base + off;
if (addr_size == 1) /* 32 bit */
*ret &= 0xffffffff;
/* Checks for #GP/#SS exceptions. */
exn = false;
if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
/* Long mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory address is in a
* non-canonical form. This is the only check on the memory
* destination for long mode!
*/
exn = is_noncanonical_address(*ret, vcpu);
} else if (is_protmode(vcpu)) {
/* Protected mode: apply checks for segment validity in the
* following order:
* - segment type check (#GP(0) may be thrown)
* - usability check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
* - limit check (#GP(0)/#SS(0))
*/
if (wr)
/* #GP(0) if the destination operand is located in a
* read-only data segment or any code segment.
*/
exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 0 || (s.type & 8));
else
/* #GP(0) if the source operand is located in an
* execute-only code segment
*/
exn = ((s.type & 0xa) == 8);
if (exn) {
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, 0);
return 1;
}
/* Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the segment is unusable.
*/
exn = (s.unusable != 0);
/* Protected mode: #GP(0)/#SS(0) if the memory
* operand is outside the segment limit.
*/
exn = exn || (off + sizeof(u64) > s.limit);
}
if (exn) {
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu,
seg_reg == VCPU_SREG_SS ?
SS_VECTOR : GP_VECTOR,
0);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5826
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4
|
eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4
|
[IndexedDB] Fixed force close during pending connection open
During a force close of the database, the connections to that database
are iterated and force closed. The iteration method was not safe to
modification, and if there was a pending connection waiting to open,
that request would execute once all the other connections were
destroyed and create a new connection.
This change changes the iteration method to account for new connections
that are added during the iteration.
[email protected]
Bug: 941746
Change-Id: If1b3137237dc2920ad369d6ac99c963ed9c57d0c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1522330
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Chase Phillips <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640604}
|
static std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> GenerateKey(
IndexedDBBackingStore* backing_store,
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t database_id,
int64_t object_store_id) {
const int64_t max_generator_value = 9007199254740992LL;
int64_t current_number;
Status s = backing_store->GetKeyGeneratorCurrentNumber(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), database_id, object_store_id,
¤t_number);
if (!s.ok()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to GetKeyGeneratorCurrentNumber";
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>();
}
if (current_number < 0 || current_number > max_generator_value)
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>();
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>(current_number,
blink::mojom::IDBKeyType::Number);
}
|
static std::unique_ptr<IndexedDBKey> GenerateKey(
IndexedDBBackingStore* backing_store,
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t database_id,
int64_t object_store_id) {
const int64_t max_generator_value = 9007199254740992LL;
int64_t current_number;
Status s = backing_store->GetKeyGeneratorCurrentNumber(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), database_id, object_store_id,
¤t_number);
if (!s.ok()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to GetKeyGeneratorCurrentNumber";
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>();
}
if (current_number < 0 || current_number > max_generator_value)
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>();
return std::make_unique<IndexedDBKey>(current_number,
blink::mojom::IDBKeyType::Number);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
set_permissions_file (SetPermissionsJob *job,
GFile *file,
GFileInfo *info)
{
CommonJob *common;
GFileInfo *child_info;
gboolean free_info;
guint32 current;
guint32 value;
guint32 mask;
GFileEnumerator *enumerator;
GFile *child;
common = (CommonJob *) job;
nautilus_progress_info_pulse_progress (common->progress);
free_info = FALSE;
if (info == NULL)
{
free_info = TRUE;
info = g_file_query_info (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
/* Ignore errors */
if (info == NULL)
{
return;
}
}
if (g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
value = job->dir_permissions;
mask = job->dir_mask;
}
else
{
value = job->file_permissions;
mask = job->file_mask;
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_has_attribute (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE))
{
current = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint32 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE);
if (common->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_info_rec_permissions_add_file (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_INFO_REC_PERMISSIONS (common->undo_info),
file, current);
}
current = (current & ~mask) | value;
g_file_set_attribute_uint32 (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
current, G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable, NULL);
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
if (enumerator)
{
while (!job_aborted (common) &&
(child_info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL)) != NULL)
{
child = g_file_get_child (file,
g_file_info_get_name (child_info));
set_permissions_file (job, child, child_info);
g_object_unref (child);
g_object_unref (child_info);
}
g_file_enumerator_close (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL);
g_object_unref (enumerator);
}
}
if (free_info)
{
g_object_unref (info);
}
}
|
set_permissions_file (SetPermissionsJob *job,
GFile *file,
GFileInfo *info)
{
CommonJob *common;
GFileInfo *child_info;
gboolean free_info;
guint32 current;
guint32 value;
guint32 mask;
GFileEnumerator *enumerator;
GFile *child;
common = (CommonJob *) job;
nautilus_progress_info_pulse_progress (common->progress);
free_info = FALSE;
if (info == NULL)
{
free_info = TRUE;
info = g_file_query_info (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
/* Ignore errors */
if (info == NULL)
{
return;
}
}
if (g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
value = job->dir_permissions;
mask = job->dir_mask;
}
else
{
value = job->file_permissions;
mask = job->file_mask;
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_has_attribute (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE))
{
current = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint32 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE);
if (common->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_info_rec_permissions_add_file (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_INFO_REC_PERMISSIONS (common->undo_info),
file, current);
}
current = (current & ~mask) | value;
g_file_set_attribute_uint32 (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
current, G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable, NULL);
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
if (enumerator)
{
while (!job_aborted (common) &&
(child_info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL)) != NULL)
{
child = g_file_get_child (file,
g_file_info_get_name (child_info));
set_permissions_file (job, child, child_info);
g_object_unref (child);
g_object_unref (child_info);
}
g_file_enumerator_close (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL);
g_object_unref (enumerator);
}
}
if (free_info)
{
g_object_unref (info);
}
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4588/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
04bcef2a83f40c6db24222b27a52892cba39dffb
|
ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
|
static int ip_vs_flush(void)
{
int idx;
struct ip_vs_service *svc, *nxt;
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by <protocol,addr,port>
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt, &ip_vs_svc_table[idx], s_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by fwmark
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt,
&ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[idx], f_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static int ip_vs_flush(void)
{
int idx;
struct ip_vs_service *svc, *nxt;
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by <protocol,addr,port>
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt, &ip_vs_svc_table[idx], s_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
/*
* Flush the service table hashed by fwmark
*/
for(idx = 0; idx < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; idx++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(svc, nxt,
&ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[idx], f_list) {
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
ip_vs_svc_unhash(svc);
/*
* Wait until all the svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 0);
__ip_vs_del_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6624
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6624/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
36773850210becda3d76f27285ecd899fafdfc72
|
Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLDocument::clear()
{
}
|
void HTMLDocument::clear()
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3645
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3645/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
bfd0a56b90005f8c8a004baf407ad90045c2b11e
|
nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
int dr, reg;
/* Do not handle if the CPL > 0, will trigger GP on re-entry */
if (!kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
return 1;
dr = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
if (dr & DR7_GD) {
/*
* As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
* need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
* guest debugging itself.
*/
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc =
vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) +
vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
return 0;
} else {
vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_BD;
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vcpu->arch.dr7);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
}
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
unsigned long val;
if (!kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val))
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
} else
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, vcpu->arch.regs[reg]);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
int dr, reg;
/* Do not handle if the CPL > 0, will trigger GP on re-entry */
if (!kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
return 1;
dr = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
if (dr & DR7_GD) {
/*
* As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
* need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
* guest debugging itself.
*/
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr;
vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc =
vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) +
vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
return 0;
} else {
vcpu->arch.dr7 &= ~DR7_GD;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_BD;
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vcpu->arch.dr7);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
}
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
unsigned long val;
if (!kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val))
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
} else
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, vcpu->arch.regs[reg]);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18349/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5f8671e7667b8b133bd3664100012a3906e92d65
|
5f8671e7667b8b133bd3664100012a3906e92d65
|
Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
|
void RemoteFrame::DetachChildren() {
using FrameVector = HeapVector<Member<Frame>>;
FrameVector children_to_detach;
children_to_detach.ReserveCapacity(Tree().ChildCount());
for (Frame* child = Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling())
children_to_detach.push_back(child);
for (const auto& child : children_to_detach)
child->Detach(FrameDetachType::kRemove);
}
|
void RemoteFrame::DetachChildren() {
using FrameVector = HeapVector<Member<Frame>>;
FrameVector children_to_detach;
children_to_detach.ReserveCapacity(Tree().ChildCount());
for (Frame* child = Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling())
children_to_detach.push_back(child);
for (const auto& child : children_to_detach)
child->Detach(FrameDetachType::kRemove);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1767/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f00110f7273f9ff04ac69a5f85bb535a4fd0987
|
5f00110f7273f9ff04ac69a5f85bb535a4fd0987
|
tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
pgoff_t start, end;
loff_t new_offset;
if (whence != SEEK_DATA && whence != SEEK_HOLE)
return generic_file_llseek_size(file, offset, whence,
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, i_size_read(inode));
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* We're holding i_mutex so we can access i_size directly */
if (offset < 0)
offset = -EINVAL;
else if (offset >= inode->i_size)
offset = -ENXIO;
else {
start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
end = (inode->i_size + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
new_offset = shmem_seek_hole_data(mapping, start, end, whence);
new_offset <<= PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (new_offset > offset) {
if (new_offset < inode->i_size)
offset = new_offset;
else if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
offset = -ENXIO;
else
offset = inode->i_size;
}
}
if (offset >= 0 && offset != file->f_pos) {
file->f_pos = offset;
file->f_version = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return offset;
}
|
static loff_t shmem_file_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
pgoff_t start, end;
loff_t new_offset;
if (whence != SEEK_DATA && whence != SEEK_HOLE)
return generic_file_llseek_size(file, offset, whence,
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, i_size_read(inode));
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/* We're holding i_mutex so we can access i_size directly */
if (offset < 0)
offset = -EINVAL;
else if (offset >= inode->i_size)
offset = -ENXIO;
else {
start = offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
end = (inode->i_size + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
new_offset = shmem_seek_hole_data(mapping, start, end, whence);
new_offset <<= PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (new_offset > offset) {
if (new_offset < inode->i_size)
offset = new_offset;
else if (whence == SEEK_DATA)
offset = -ENXIO;
else
offset = inode->i_size;
}
}
if (offset >= 0 && offset != file->f_pos) {
file->f_pos = offset;
file->f_version = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5094/
|
CWE-704
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
41f5b55ab27da6890af96f2f8f0f6dd5bc6cc93c
|
SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::RecreateRootRecorder() {
DCHECK(characterization_.isValid());
root_recorder_.emplace(characterization_);
ignore_result(root_recorder_->getCanvas());
}
|
void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::RecreateRootRecorder() {
DCHECK(characterization_.isValid());
root_recorder_.emplace(characterization_);
ignore_result(root_recorder_->getCanvas());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static void jv_dm_cback(tBTA_JV_EVT event, tBTA_JV *p_data, void *user_data) {
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
switch(event) {
case BTA_JV_GET_SCN_EVT:
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t* rs = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
int new_scn = p_data->scn;
if(rs && (new_scn != 0))
{
rs->scn = new_scn;
/* BTA_JvCreateRecordByUser will only create a record if a UUID is specified,
* else it just allocate a RFC channel and start the RFCOMM thread - needed
* for the java
* layer to get a RFCOMM channel.
* If uuid is null the create_sdp_record() will be called from Java when it
* has received the RFCOMM and L2CAP channel numbers through the sockets.*/
if(!send_app_scn(rs)){
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("send_app_scn() failed, close rs->id:%d", rs->id);
cleanup_rfc_slot(rs);
} else {
if(rs->is_service_uuid_valid == true) {
BTA_JvCreateRecordByUser((void *)rs->id);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("is_service_uuid_valid==false - don't set SDP-record, "
"just start the RFCOMM server", rs->id);
BTA_JvRfcommStartServer(rs->security, rs->role, rs->scn, MAX_RFC_SESSION,
rfcomm_cback, (void*)rs->id);
}
}
} else if(rs) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("jv_dm_cback: Error: allocate channel %d, slot found:%p", rs->scn, rs);
cleanup_rfc_slot(rs);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_GET_PSM_EVT:
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("Received PSM: 0x%04x", p_data->psm);
on_l2cap_psm_assigned(id, p_data->psm);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_CREATE_RECORD_EVT: {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (slot && create_server_sdp_record(slot)) {
BTA_JvRfcommStartServer(slot->security, slot->role, slot->scn, MAX_RFC_SESSION, rfcomm_cback, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id);
} else if(slot) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("jv_dm_cback: cannot start server, slot found:%p", slot);
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT: {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (p_data->disc_comp.status == BTA_JV_SUCCESS && p_data->disc_comp.scn) {
if (slot && slot->f.doing_sdp_request) {
if (BTA_JvRfcommConnect(slot->security, slot->role, p_data->disc_comp.scn, slot->addr.address, rfcomm_cback, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id) == BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
slot->scn = p_data->disc_comp.scn;
slot->f.doing_sdp_request = false;
if (!send_app_scn(slot))
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
} else {
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
} else if (slot) {
LOG_ERROR("%s SDP response returned but RFCOMM slot %d did not request SDP record.", __func__, id);
}
} else if (slot) {
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
slot = find_rfc_slot_by_pending_sdp();
if (slot) {
tSDP_UUID sdp_uuid;
sdp_uuid.len = 16;
memcpy(sdp_uuid.uu.uuid128, slot->service_uuid, sizeof(sdp_uuid.uu.uuid128));
BTA_JvStartDiscovery((uint8_t *)slot->addr.address, 1, &sdp_uuid, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id);
slot->f.pending_sdp_request = false;
slot->f.doing_sdp_request = true;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unhandled event:%d, slot id:%d", event, id);
break;
}
}
|
static void jv_dm_cback(tBTA_JV_EVT event, tBTA_JV *p_data, void *user_data) {
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
switch(event) {
case BTA_JV_GET_SCN_EVT:
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t* rs = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
int new_scn = p_data->scn;
if(rs && (new_scn != 0))
{
rs->scn = new_scn;
/* BTA_JvCreateRecordByUser will only create a record if a UUID is specified,
* else it just allocate a RFC channel and start the RFCOMM thread - needed
* for the java
* layer to get a RFCOMM channel.
* If uuid is null the create_sdp_record() will be called from Java when it
* has received the RFCOMM and L2CAP channel numbers through the sockets.*/
if(!send_app_scn(rs)){
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("send_app_scn() failed, close rs->id:%d", rs->id);
cleanup_rfc_slot(rs);
} else {
if(rs->is_service_uuid_valid == true) {
BTA_JvCreateRecordByUser((void *)rs->id);
} else {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("is_service_uuid_valid==false - don't set SDP-record, "
"just start the RFCOMM server", rs->id);
BTA_JvRfcommStartServer(rs->security, rs->role, rs->scn, MAX_RFC_SESSION,
rfcomm_cback, (void*)rs->id);
}
}
} else if(rs) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("jv_dm_cback: Error: allocate channel %d, slot found:%p", rs->scn, rs);
cleanup_rfc_slot(rs);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_GET_PSM_EVT:
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("Received PSM: 0x%04x", p_data->psm);
on_l2cap_psm_assigned(id, p_data->psm);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_CREATE_RECORD_EVT: {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (slot && create_server_sdp_record(slot)) {
BTA_JvRfcommStartServer(slot->security, slot->role, slot->scn, MAX_RFC_SESSION, rfcomm_cback, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id);
} else if(slot) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("jv_dm_cback: cannot start server, slot found:%p", slot);
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
case BTA_JV_DISCOVERY_COMP_EVT: {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (p_data->disc_comp.status == BTA_JV_SUCCESS && p_data->disc_comp.scn) {
if (slot && slot->f.doing_sdp_request) {
if (BTA_JvRfcommConnect(slot->security, slot->role, p_data->disc_comp.scn, slot->addr.address, rfcomm_cback, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id) == BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
slot->scn = p_data->disc_comp.scn;
slot->f.doing_sdp_request = false;
if (!send_app_scn(slot))
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
} else {
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
} else if (slot) {
LOG_ERROR("%s SDP response returned but RFCOMM slot %d did not request SDP record.", __func__, id);
}
} else if (slot) {
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
slot = find_rfc_slot_by_pending_sdp();
if (slot) {
tSDP_UUID sdp_uuid;
sdp_uuid.len = 16;
memcpy(sdp_uuid.uu.uuid128, slot->service_uuid, sizeof(sdp_uuid.uu.uuid128));
BTA_JvStartDiscovery((uint8_t *)slot->addr.address, 1, &sdp_uuid, (void *)(uintptr_t)slot->id);
slot->f.pending_sdp_request = false;
slot->f.doing_sdp_request = true;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
break;
}
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unhandled event:%d, slot id:%d", event, id);
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1774
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1774/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
1ee0a224bc9aad1de496c795f96bc6ba2c394811
|
USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int valid_csum(struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc, __u8 *buffer)
{
__u16 i;
__u8 cs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rom_desc->Size; i++)
cs = (__u8)(cs + buffer[i]);
if (cs != rom_desc->CheckSum) {
pr_debug("%s - Mismatch %x - %x", __func__, rom_desc->CheckSum, cs);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int valid_csum(struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc, __u8 *buffer)
{
__u16 i;
__u8 cs = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rom_desc->Size; i++)
cs = (__u8)(cs + buffer[i]);
if (cs != rom_desc->CheckSum) {
pr_debug("%s - Mismatch %x - %x", __func__, rom_desc->CheckSum, cs);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15785
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15785/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/fontforge/fontforge/commit/626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
|
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
|
void FVChangeChar(FontView *fv,int i) {
if ( i!=-1 ) {
FVDeselectAll(fv);
fv->b.selected[i] = true;
fv->sel_index = 1;
fv->end_pos = fv->pressed_pos = i;
FVToggleCharSelected(fv,i);
FVScrollToChar(fv,i);
FVShowInfo(fv);
}
}
|
void FVChangeChar(FontView *fv,int i) {
if ( i!=-1 ) {
FVDeselectAll(fv);
fv->b.selected[i] = true;
fv->sel_index = 1;
fv->end_pos = fv->pressed_pos = i;
FVToggleCharSelected(fv,i);
FVScrollToChar(fv,i);
FVShowInfo(fv);
}
}
|
C
|
fontforge
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
9ad7483d8e7c20e9f1a5a08d00150fb51899f14c
|
Shutdown Timebomb - In canary, get a callstack if it takes longer than
10 minutes. In Dev, get callstack if it takes longer than 20 minutes.
In Beta (50 minutes) and Stable (100 minutes) it is same as before.
BUG=519321
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1409333005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355586}
|
JankTimeBomb::JankTimeBomb(base::TimeDelta duration)
: weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (IsEnabled()) {
WatchDogThread::PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&JankTimeBomb::Alarm,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::PlatformThread::CurrentId()),
duration);
}
}
|
JankTimeBomb::JankTimeBomb(base::TimeDelta duration)
: weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
if (IsEnabled()) {
WatchDogThread::PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&JankTimeBomb::Alarm,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::PlatformThread::CurrentId()),
duration);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9535
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9535/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/6a984bf7905c6621281588431f384e79d11a2e33
|
6a984bf7905c6621281588431f384e79d11a2e33
|
* libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
|
fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp;
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
|
fpDiff(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if((cc%(bps*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpDiff",
"%s", "(cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[byte * wc + count] = tmp[bps * count + byte];
#else
cp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count] =
tmp[bps * count + byte];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
cp += cc - stride - 1;
for (count = cc; count > stride; count -= stride)
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] = (unsigned char)((cp[stride] - cp[0])&0xff); cp--)
return 1;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6135/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
2ccbb407dccc976ae4bdbaa5ff2f777f4eb0723b
|
Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
|
void WebContentsImpl::WasHidden() {
const Visibility previous_visibility = GetVisibility();
if (!IsBeingCaptured()) {
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView())
view->Hide();
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(false);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasHidden(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
}
should_normally_be_visible_ = false;
NotifyVisibilityChanged(previous_visibility);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::WasHidden() {
const Visibility previous_visibility = GetVisibility();
if (!IsBeingCaptured()) {
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView())
view->Hide();
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(false);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasHidden(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
}
should_normally_be_visible_ = false;
NotifyVisibilityChanged(previous_visibility);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err twrp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TextWrapBox*p = (GF_TextWrapBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TextWrapBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "wrap_flag=\"%s\">\n", p->wrap_flag ? ( (p->wrap_flag>1) ? "Reserved" : "Automatic" ) : "No Wrap");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TextWrapBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err twrp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TextWrapBox*p = (GF_TextWrapBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TextWrapBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "wrap_flag=\"%s\">\n", p->wrap_flag ? ( (p->wrap_flag>1) ? "Reserved" : "Automatic" ) : "No Wrap");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TextWrapBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
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Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.