CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
void TabStrip::MaybeStartDrag(
Tab* tab,
const ui::LocatedEvent& event,
const ui::ListSelectionModel& original_selection) {
if (IsAnimating() || tab->closing() ||
controller_->HasAvailableDragActions() == 0) {
return;
}
int model_index = GetModelIndexOfTab(tab);
if (!IsValidModelIndex(model_index)) {
CHECK(false);
return;
}
drag_context_->MaybeStartDrag(tab, model_index, event, original_selection);
}
|
void TabStrip::MaybeStartDrag(
Tab* tab,
const ui::LocatedEvent& event,
const ui::ListSelectionModel& original_selection) {
if (IsAnimating() || tab->closing() ||
controller_->HasAvailableDragActions() == 0) {
return;
}
int model_index = GetModelIndexOfTab(tab);
if (!IsValidModelIndex(model_index)) {
CHECK(false);
return;
}
drag_context_->MaybeStartDrag(tab, model_index, event, original_selection);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3610
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23
|
KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_NMI_MASK;
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
}
|
static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;
vcpu->arch.hflags |= HF_NMI_MASK;
set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2128
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2128/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae
|
net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void tcp_done(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT || sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV)
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
tcp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
else
inet_csk_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
void tcp_done(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT || sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV)
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
tcp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
else
inet_csk_destroy_sock(sk);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5336
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5336/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/monkey/monkey/commit/b2d0e6f92310bb14a15aa2f8e96e1fb5379776dd
|
b2d0e6f92310bb14a15aa2f8e96e1fb5379776dd
|
Request: new request session flag to mark those files opened by FDT
This patch aims to fix a potential DDoS problem that can be caused
in the server quering repetitive non-existent resources.
When serving a static file, the core use Vhost FDT mechanism, but if
it sends a static error page it does a direct open(2). When closing
the resources for the same request it was just calling mk_vhost_close()
which did not clear properly the file descriptor.
This patch adds a new field on the struct session_request called 'fd_is_fdt',
which contains MK_TRUE or MK_FALSE depending of how fd_file was opened.
Thanks to Matthew Daley <[email protected]> for report and troubleshoot this
problem.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <[email protected]>
|
void mk_request_free_list(struct client_session *cs)
{
struct session_request *sr_node;
struct mk_list *sr_head, *temp;
/* sr = last node */
MK_TRACE("[FD %i] Free struct client_session", cs->socket);
mk_list_foreach_safe(sr_head, temp, &cs->request_list) {
sr_node = mk_list_entry(sr_head, struct session_request, _head);
mk_list_del(sr_head);
mk_request_free(sr_node);
if (sr_node != &cs->sr_fixed) {
mk_mem_free(sr_node);
}
}
}
|
void mk_request_free_list(struct client_session *cs)
{
struct session_request *sr_node;
struct mk_list *sr_head, *temp;
/* sr = last node */
MK_TRACE("[FD %i] Free struct client_session", cs->socket);
mk_list_foreach_safe(sr_head, temp, &cs->request_list) {
sr_node = mk_list_entry(sr_head, struct session_request, _head);
mk_list_del(sr_head);
mk_request_free(sr_node);
if (sr_node != &cs->sr_fixed) {
mk_mem_free(sr_node);
}
}
}
|
C
|
monkey
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2017/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void dev_seq_printf_stats(struct seq_file *seq, struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct net_device_stats *stats = dev_get_stats(dev);
seq_printf(seq, "%6s: %7lu %7lu %4lu %4lu %4lu %5lu %10lu %9lu "
"%8lu %7lu %4lu %4lu %4lu %5lu %7lu %10lu\n",
dev->name, stats->rx_bytes, stats->rx_packets,
stats->rx_errors,
stats->rx_dropped + stats->rx_missed_errors,
stats->rx_fifo_errors,
stats->rx_length_errors + stats->rx_over_errors +
stats->rx_crc_errors + stats->rx_frame_errors,
stats->rx_compressed, stats->multicast,
stats->tx_bytes, stats->tx_packets,
stats->tx_errors, stats->tx_dropped,
stats->tx_fifo_errors, stats->collisions,
stats->tx_carrier_errors +
stats->tx_aborted_errors +
stats->tx_window_errors +
stats->tx_heartbeat_errors,
stats->tx_compressed);
}
|
static void dev_seq_printf_stats(struct seq_file *seq, struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct net_device_stats *stats = dev_get_stats(dev);
seq_printf(seq, "%6s: %7lu %7lu %4lu %4lu %4lu %5lu %10lu %9lu "
"%8lu %7lu %4lu %4lu %4lu %5lu %7lu %10lu\n",
dev->name, stats->rx_bytes, stats->rx_packets,
stats->rx_errors,
stats->rx_dropped + stats->rx_missed_errors,
stats->rx_fifo_errors,
stats->rx_length_errors + stats->rx_over_errors +
stats->rx_crc_errors + stats->rx_frame_errors,
stats->rx_compressed, stats->multicast,
stats->tx_bytes, stats->tx_packets,
stats->tx_errors, stats->tx_dropped,
stats->tx_fifo_errors, stats->collisions,
stats->tx_carrier_errors +
stats->tx_aborted_errors +
stats->tx_window_errors +
stats->tx_heartbeat_errors,
stats->tx_compressed);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15923
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15923/
| null |
https://cgit.kde.org/konversation.git/commit/?h=1.7&id=6a7f59ee1b9dbc6e5cf9e5f3b306504d02b73ef0
|
6a7f59ee1b9dbc6e5cf9e5f3b306504d02b73ef0
| null |
QString IRCView::openTags(TextHtmlData* data, int from)
{
QString ret, tag;
int i = from > -1 ? from : 0;
for ( ; i < data->openHtmlTags.count(); ++i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::TextViewBackground).name());
}
else
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(data->lastFgColor);
}
}
else if (tag == QLatin1String("span"))
{
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->defaultColor);
}
else
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->lastBgColor);
}
}
else
{
ret += QLatin1Char('<') + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
}
}
|
QString IRCView::openTags(TextHtmlData* data, int from)
{
QString ret, tag;
int i = from;
for ( ; i < data->openHtmlTags.count(); ++i)
{
tag = data->openHtmlTags.at(i);
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::TextViewBackground).name());
}
else
{
ret += fontColorOpenTag(data->lastFgColor);
}
}
else if (tag == QLatin1String("span"))
{
if (data->reverse)
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->defaultColor);
}
else
{
ret += spanColorOpenTag(data->lastBgColor);
}
}
else
{
ret += QLatin1Char('<') + tag + QLatin1Char('>');
}
}
|
CPP
|
kde
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2882/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dbbcd55a666ab8389d5d223994a95a59ad20dd13
|
dbbcd55a666ab8389d5d223994a95a59ad20dd13
|
Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void SetProfile(const AutofillProfile& profile) {
std::vector<AutofillProfile> profiles;
profiles.push_back(profile);
SetProfiles(&profiles);
}
|
void SetProfile(const AutofillProfile& profile) {
std::vector<AutofillProfile> profiles;
profiles.push_back(profile);
SetProfiles(&profiles);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
String InputMethodController::ComposingText() const {
DocumentLifecycle::DisallowTransitionScope disallow_transition(
GetDocument().Lifecycle());
return PlainText(
CompositionEphemeralRange(),
TextIteratorBehavior::Builder().SetEmitsOriginalText(true).Build());
}
|
String InputMethodController::ComposingText() const {
DocumentLifecycle::DisallowTransitionScope disallow_transition(
GetDocument().Lifecycle());
return PlainText(
CompositionEphemeralRange(),
TextIteratorBehavior::Builder().SetEmitsOriginalText(true).Build());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6663
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6663/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fb5dce12f0462056fc9f66967b0f7b2b7bcd88f5
|
fb5dce12f0462056fc9f66967b0f7b2b7bcd88f5
|
One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
|
content::WebUIDataSource* CreateOobeUIDataSource(
const base::DictionaryValue& localized_strings,
const std::string& display_type) {
content::WebUIDataSource* source =
content::WebUIDataSource::Create(chrome::kChromeUIOobeHost);
source->AddLocalizedStrings(localized_strings);
source->SetJsonPath(kStringsJSPath);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kOobeJSPath, IDR_OOBE_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath, IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_JS);
} else {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kLoginJSPath, IDR_LOGIN_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_JS);
}
source->AddResourcePath(kKeyboardUtilsJSPath, IDR_KEYBOARD_UTILS_JS);
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyFrameSrc(
base::StringPrintf(
"frame-src chrome://terms/ %s/;",
extensions::kGaiaAuthExtensionOrigin));
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyObjectSrc("object-src *;");
bool is_webview_signin_enabled = StartupUtils::IsWebviewSigninEnabled();
source->AddResourcePath("gaia_auth_host.js", is_webview_signin_enabled ?
IDR_GAIA_AUTH_AUTHENTICATOR_JS : IDR_GAIA_AUTH_HOST_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentHTMLPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_HTML
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentCSSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_CSS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_CSS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentJSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_JS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_JS);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Thin.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_THIN);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Light.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_LIGHT);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Regular.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_REGULAR);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Medium.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_MEDIUM);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Bold.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_BOLD);
}
return source;
}
|
content::WebUIDataSource* CreateOobeUIDataSource(
const base::DictionaryValue& localized_strings,
const std::string& display_type) {
content::WebUIDataSource* source =
content::WebUIDataSource::Create(chrome::kChromeUIOobeHost);
source->AddLocalizedStrings(localized_strings);
source->SetJsonPath(kStringsJSPath);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kOobeJSPath, IDR_OOBE_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath, IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_OOBE_JS);
} else {
source->SetDefaultResource(IDR_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kLoginJSPath, IDR_LOGIN_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsHTMLPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kCustomElementsJSPath,
IDR_CUSTOM_ELEMENTS_LOGIN_JS);
}
source->AddResourcePath(kPolymerConfigJSPath, IDR_POLYMER_CONFIG_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kKeyboardUtilsJSPath, IDR_KEYBOARD_UTILS_JS);
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyFrameSrc(
base::StringPrintf(
"frame-src chrome://terms/ %s/;",
extensions::kGaiaAuthExtensionOrigin));
source->OverrideContentSecurityPolicyObjectSrc("object-src *;");
bool is_webview_signin_enabled = StartupUtils::IsWebviewSigninEnabled();
source->AddResourcePath("gaia_auth_host.js", is_webview_signin_enabled ?
IDR_GAIA_AUTH_AUTHENTICATOR_JS : IDR_GAIA_AUTH_HOST_JS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentHTMLPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_HTML
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_HTML);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentCSSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_CSS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_CSS);
source->AddResourcePath(kEnrollmentJSPath,
is_webview_signin_enabled
? IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_WEBVIEW_JS
: IDR_OOBE_ENROLLMENT_JS);
if (display_type == OobeUI::kOobeDisplay) {
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Thin.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_THIN);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Light.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_LIGHT);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Regular.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_REGULAR);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Medium.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_MEDIUM);
source->AddResourcePath("Roboto-Bold.ttf", IDR_FONT_ROBOTO_BOLD);
}
return source;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3826
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3826/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6
|
9cd8c3289c91254b3955bd7347cf605d6fa032c6
|
Check effect command reply size in AudioFlinger
Bug: 29251553
Change-Id: I1bcc1281f1f0542bb645f6358ce31631f2a8ffbf
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::configure()
{
status_t status;
sp<ThreadBase> thread;
uint32_t size;
audio_channel_mask_t channelMask;
if (mEffectInterface == NULL) {
status = NO_INIT;
goto exit;
}
thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
status = DEAD_OBJECT;
goto exit;
}
channelMask = thread->channelMask();
mConfig.outputCfg.channels = channelMask;
if ((mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY) {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_MONO;
} else {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = channelMask;
if (channelMask == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_MONO) {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
mConfig.outputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
ALOGV("Overriding effect input and output as STEREO");
}
}
mConfig.inputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
mConfig.outputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate = thread->sampleRate();
mConfig.outputCfg.samplingRate = mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_READ;
if (mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.raw != mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.raw) {
mConfig.outputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE;
} else {
mConfig.outputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_WRITE;
}
mConfig.inputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
mConfig.outputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount = thread->frameCount();
mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.frameCount = mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount;
ALOGV("configure() %p thread %p buffer %p framecount %d",
this, thread.get(), mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.raw, mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount);
status_t cmdStatus;
size = sizeof(int);
status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG,
sizeof(effect_config_t),
&mConfig,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
if (status == 0) {
status = cmdStatus;
}
if (status == 0 &&
(memcmp(&mDescriptor.type, SL_IID_VISUALIZATION, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0)) {
uint32_t buf32[sizeof(effect_param_t) / sizeof(uint32_t) + 2];
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)buf32;
p->psize = sizeof(uint32_t);
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
size = sizeof(int);
*(int32_t *)p->data = VISUALIZER_PARAM_LATENCY;
uint32_t latency = 0;
PlaybackThread *pbt = thread->mAudioFlinger->checkPlaybackThread_l(thread->mId);
if (pbt != NULL) {
latency = pbt->latency_l();
}
*((int32_t *)p->data + 1)= latency;
(*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM,
sizeof(effect_param_t) + 8,
&buf32,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
}
mMaxDisableWaitCnt = (MAX_DISABLE_TIME_MS * mConfig.outputCfg.samplingRate) /
(1000 * mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.frameCount);
exit:
mStatus = status;
return status;
}
|
status_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::configure()
{
status_t status;
sp<ThreadBase> thread;
uint32_t size;
audio_channel_mask_t channelMask;
if (mEffectInterface == NULL) {
status = NO_INIT;
goto exit;
}
thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
status = DEAD_OBJECT;
goto exit;
}
channelMask = thread->channelMask();
mConfig.outputCfg.channels = channelMask;
if ((mDescriptor.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY) {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_MONO;
} else {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = channelMask;
if (channelMask == AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_MONO) {
mConfig.inputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
mConfig.outputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
ALOGV("Overriding effect input and output as STEREO");
}
}
mConfig.inputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
mConfig.outputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate = thread->sampleRate();
mConfig.outputCfg.samplingRate = mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.outputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
mConfig.inputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_READ;
if (mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.raw != mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.raw) {
mConfig.outputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE;
} else {
mConfig.outputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_WRITE;
}
mConfig.inputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
mConfig.outputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount = thread->frameCount();
mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.frameCount = mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount;
ALOGV("configure() %p thread %p buffer %p framecount %d",
this, thread.get(), mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.raw, mConfig.inputCfg.buffer.frameCount);
status_t cmdStatus;
size = sizeof(int);
status = (*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG,
sizeof(effect_config_t),
&mConfig,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
if (status == 0) {
status = cmdStatus;
}
if (status == 0 &&
(memcmp(&mDescriptor.type, SL_IID_VISUALIZATION, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0)) {
uint32_t buf32[sizeof(effect_param_t) / sizeof(uint32_t) + 2];
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)buf32;
p->psize = sizeof(uint32_t);
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
size = sizeof(int);
*(int32_t *)p->data = VISUALIZER_PARAM_LATENCY;
uint32_t latency = 0;
PlaybackThread *pbt = thread->mAudioFlinger->checkPlaybackThread_l(thread->mId);
if (pbt != NULL) {
latency = pbt->latency_l();
}
*((int32_t *)p->data + 1)= latency;
(*mEffectInterface)->command(mEffectInterface,
EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM,
sizeof(effect_param_t) + 8,
&buf32,
&size,
&cmdStatus);
}
mMaxDisableWaitCnt = (MAX_DISABLE_TIME_MS * mConfig.outputCfg.samplingRate) /
(1000 * mConfig.outputCfg.buffer.frameCount);
exit:
mStatus = status;
return status;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11922
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0
|
fixed T36302429
|
size_t ZSTD_compress_advanced_internal(
ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
const void* dict,size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_compress_advanced_internal (srcSize:%u)", (U32)srcSize);
CHECK_F( ZSTD_compressBegin_internal(cctx,
dict, dictSize, ZSTD_dct_auto, ZSTD_dtlm_fast, NULL,
params, srcSize, ZSTDb_not_buffered) );
return ZSTD_compressEnd(cctx, dst, dstCapacity, src, srcSize);
}
|
size_t ZSTD_compress_advanced_internal(
ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
const void* dict,size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_compress_advanced_internal (srcSize:%u)", (U32)srcSize);
CHECK_F( ZSTD_compressBegin_internal(cctx,
dict, dictSize, ZSTD_dct_auto, ZSTD_dtlm_fast, NULL,
params, srcSize, ZSTDb_not_buffered) );
return ZSTD_compressEnd(cctx, dst, dstCapacity, src, srcSize);
}
|
C
|
zstd
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
_dupv8 (const char *s)
{
const char *end_valid;
if (!g_utf8_validate (s, -1, &end_valid))
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: The string '%s' is not valid UTF-8. Invalid characters begins at '%s'\n", s, end_valid);
return g_strndup (s, end_valid - s);
}
else
{
return g_strdup (s);
}
}
|
_dupv8 (const char *s)
{
const char *end_valid;
if (!g_utf8_validate (s, -1, &end_valid))
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: The string '%s' is not valid UTF-8. Invalid characters begins at '%s'\n", s, end_valid);
return g_strndup (s, end_valid - s);
}
else
{
return g_strdup (s);
}
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3236
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3236/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba
|
680d04e0ba7e926233e3b9cee59125ce181f66ba
|
VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Cc: George Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int vmci_transport_notify_poll_in(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
size_t target,
bool *data_ready_now)
{
return vmci_trans(vsk)->notify_ops->poll_in(
&vsk->sk, target, data_ready_now);
}
|
static int vmci_transport_notify_poll_in(
struct vsock_sock *vsk,
size_t target,
bool *data_ready_now)
{
return vmci_trans(vsk)->notify_ops->poll_in(
&vsk->sk, target, data_ready_now);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2793
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2793/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
a6e146b4a369b31afa4c4323cc813dcbe0ef0c2b
|
Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool LiveSyncTest::SetUpLocalTestServer() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType server_cmdline_string = cl->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kSyncServerCommandLine);
CommandLine::StringVector server_cmdline_vector;
CommandLine::StringType delimiters(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(" "));
Tokenize(server_cmdline_string, delimiters, &server_cmdline_vector);
CommandLine server_cmdline(server_cmdline_vector);
if (!base::LaunchApp(server_cmdline, false, true, &test_server_handle_))
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not launch local test server.";
const int kMaxWaitTime = TestTimeouts::live_operation_timeout_ms();
const int kNumIntervals = 15;
if (WaitForTestServerToStart(kMaxWaitTime, kNumIntervals)) {
VLOG(1) << "Started local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return true;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not start local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return false;
}
}
|
bool LiveSyncTest::SetUpLocalTestServer() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType server_cmdline_string = cl->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kSyncServerCommandLine);
CommandLine::StringVector server_cmdline_vector;
CommandLine::StringType delimiters(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(" "));
Tokenize(server_cmdline_string, delimiters, &server_cmdline_vector);
CommandLine server_cmdline(server_cmdline_vector);
if (!base::LaunchApp(server_cmdline, false, true, &test_server_handle_))
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not launch local test server.";
const int kMaxWaitTime = TestTimeouts::live_operation_timeout_ms();
const int kNumIntervals = 15;
if (WaitForTestServerToStart(kMaxWaitTime, kNumIntervals)) {
VLOG(1) << "Started local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return true;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not start local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython::conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethod();
}
|
static void conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython::conditionalConditionStaticVoidMethod();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2100
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2100/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void ext4_orphan_cleanup(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_super_block *es)
{
unsigned int s_flags = sb->s_flags;
int nr_orphans = 0, nr_truncates = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int i;
#endif
if (!es->s_last_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "no orphan inodes to clean up\n");
return;
}
if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "write access "
"unavailable, skipping orphan cleanup");
return;
}
/* Check if feature set would not allow a r/w mount */
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Skipping orphan cleanup due to "
"unknown ROCOMPAT features");
return;
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS) {
if (es->s_last_orphan)
jbd_debug(1, "Errors on filesystem, "
"clearing orphan list.\n");
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
jbd_debug(1, "Skipping orphan recovery on fs with errors.\n");
return;
}
if (s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "orphan cleanup on readonly fs");
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Needed for iput() to work correctly and not trash data */
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
/* Turn on quotas so that they are updated correctly */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_qf_names[i]) {
int ret = ext4_quota_on_mount(sb, i);
if (ret < 0)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot turn on journaled "
"quota: error %d", ret);
}
}
#endif
while (es->s_last_orphan) {
struct inode *inode;
inode = ext4_orphan_get(sb, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_orphan));
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
break;
}
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
dquot_initialize(inode);
if (inode->i_nlink) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_DEBUG,
"%s: truncating inode %lu to %lld bytes",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
jbd_debug(2, "truncating inode %lu to %lld bytes\n",
inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
ext4_truncate(inode);
nr_truncates++;
} else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_DEBUG,
"%s: deleting unreferenced inode %lu",
__func__, inode->i_ino);
jbd_debug(2, "deleting unreferenced inode %lu\n",
inode->i_ino);
nr_orphans++;
}
iput(inode); /* The delete magic happens here! */
}
#define PLURAL(x) (x), ((x) == 1) ? "" : "s"
if (nr_orphans)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d orphan inode%s deleted",
PLURAL(nr_orphans));
if (nr_truncates)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d truncate%s cleaned up",
PLURAL(nr_truncates));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Turn quotas off */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (sb_dqopt(sb)->files[i])
dquot_quota_off(sb, i);
}
#endif
sb->s_flags = s_flags; /* Restore MS_RDONLY status */
}
|
static void ext4_orphan_cleanup(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_super_block *es)
{
unsigned int s_flags = sb->s_flags;
int nr_orphans = 0, nr_truncates = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int i;
#endif
if (!es->s_last_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "no orphan inodes to clean up\n");
return;
}
if (bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "write access "
"unavailable, skipping orphan cleanup");
return;
}
/* Check if feature set would not allow a r/w mount */
if (!ext4_feature_set_ok(sb, 0)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "Skipping orphan cleanup due to "
"unknown ROCOMPAT features");
return;
}
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS) {
if (es->s_last_orphan)
jbd_debug(1, "Errors on filesystem, "
"clearing orphan list.\n");
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
jbd_debug(1, "Skipping orphan recovery on fs with errors.\n");
return;
}
if (s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "orphan cleanup on readonly fs");
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Needed for iput() to work correctly and not trash data */
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
/* Turn on quotas so that they are updated correctly */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_qf_names[i]) {
int ret = ext4_quota_on_mount(sb, i);
if (ret < 0)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Cannot turn on journaled "
"quota: error %d", ret);
}
}
#endif
while (es->s_last_orphan) {
struct inode *inode;
inode = ext4_orphan_get(sb, le32_to_cpu(es->s_last_orphan));
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
es->s_last_orphan = 0;
break;
}
list_add(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_orphan, &EXT4_SB(sb)->s_orphan);
dquot_initialize(inode);
if (inode->i_nlink) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_DEBUG,
"%s: truncating inode %lu to %lld bytes",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
jbd_debug(2, "truncating inode %lu to %lld bytes\n",
inode->i_ino, inode->i_size);
ext4_truncate(inode);
nr_truncates++;
} else {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_DEBUG,
"%s: deleting unreferenced inode %lu",
__func__, inode->i_ino);
jbd_debug(2, "deleting unreferenced inode %lu\n",
inode->i_ino);
nr_orphans++;
}
iput(inode); /* The delete magic happens here! */
}
#define PLURAL(x) (x), ((x) == 1) ? "" : "s"
if (nr_orphans)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d orphan inode%s deleted",
PLURAL(nr_orphans));
if (nr_truncates)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "%d truncate%s cleaned up",
PLURAL(nr_truncates));
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Turn quotas off */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (sb_dqopt(sb)->files[i])
dquot_quota_off(sb, i);
}
#endif
sb->s_flags = s_flags; /* Restore MS_RDONLY status */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0823
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0823/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/ril/+/cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42
|
cd5f15f588a5d27e99ba12f057245bfe507f8c42
|
DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
|
dispatchImsSms(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
int32_t t;
status_t status = p.readInt32(&t);
RIL_RadioTechnologyFamily format;
uint8_t retry;
int32_t messageRef;
RLOGD("dispatchImsSms");
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
format = (RIL_RadioTechnologyFamily) t;
status = p.read(&retry,sizeof(retry));
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
status = p.read(&messageRef,sizeof(messageRef));
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
if (RADIO_TECH_3GPP == format) {
dispatchImsGsmSms(p, pRI, retry, messageRef);
} else if (RADIO_TECH_3GPP2 == format) {
dispatchImsCdmaSms(p, pRI, retry, messageRef);
} else {
ALOGE("requestImsSendSMS invalid format value =%d", format);
}
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
|
dispatchImsSms(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
int32_t t;
status_t status = p.readInt32(&t);
RIL_RadioTechnologyFamily format;
uint8_t retry;
int32_t messageRef;
RLOGD("dispatchImsSms");
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
format = (RIL_RadioTechnologyFamily) t;
status = p.read(&retry,sizeof(retry));
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
status = p.read(&messageRef,sizeof(messageRef));
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
goto invalid;
}
if (RADIO_TECH_3GPP == format) {
dispatchImsGsmSms(p, pRI, retry, messageRef);
} else if (RADIO_TECH_3GPP2 == format) {
dispatchImsCdmaSms(p, pRI, retry, messageRef);
} else {
ALOGE("requestImsSendSMS invalid format value =%d", format);
}
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return __udp4_lib_rcv(skb, &udp_table, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
|
int udp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return __udp4_lib_rcv(skb, &udp_table, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16080/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
c552cd7b8a0862f6b3c8c6a07f98bda3721101eb
|
Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
|
void BrowserView::InitViews() {
GetWidget()->AddObserver(this);
GetWidget()->SetNativeWindowProperty(kBrowserViewKey, this);
GetWidget()->SetNativeWindowProperty(Profile::kProfileKey,
browser_->profile());
#if defined(OS_WIN) || (defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS))
GetWidget()->GetNativeView()->AddPreTargetHandler(
ConfirmQuitBubbleController::GetInstance());
#endif
#if defined(USE_AURA)
SetThemeProfileForWindow(GetNativeWindow(), browser_->profile());
#endif
LoadAccelerators();
contents_web_view_ = new ContentsWebView(browser_->profile());
contents_web_view_->set_id(VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER);
contents_web_view_->SetEmbedFullscreenWidgetMode(true);
web_contents_close_handler_.reset(
new WebContentsCloseHandler(contents_web_view_));
devtools_web_view_ = new views::WebView(browser_->profile());
devtools_web_view_->set_id(VIEW_ID_DEV_TOOLS_DOCKED);
devtools_web_view_->SetVisible(false);
contents_container_ = new views::View();
contents_container_->SetBackground(views::CreateSolidBackground(
GetThemeProvider()->GetColor(ThemeProperties::COLOR_CONTROL_BACKGROUND)));
contents_container_->AddChildView(devtools_web_view_);
contents_container_->AddChildView(contents_web_view_);
contents_container_->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<ContentsLayoutManager>(
devtools_web_view_, contents_web_view_));
AddChildView(contents_container_);
set_contents_view(contents_container_);
top_container_ = new TopContainerView(this);
AddChildView(top_container_);
BrowserTabStripController* tabstrip_controller =
new BrowserTabStripController(browser_->tab_strip_model(), this);
tabstrip_ =
new TabStrip(std::unique_ptr<TabStripController>(tabstrip_controller));
top_container_->AddChildView(tabstrip_); // Takes ownership.
tabstrip_controller->InitFromModel(tabstrip_);
toolbar_ = new ToolbarView(browser_.get(), this);
top_container_->AddChildView(toolbar_);
toolbar_->Init();
if (!toolbar_button_provider_)
SetToolbarButtonProvider(toolbar_);
infobar_container_ = new InfoBarContainerView(this);
AddChildView(infobar_container_);
InitStatusBubble();
find_bar_host_view_ = new View();
AddChildView(find_bar_host_view_);
immersive_mode_controller_->Init(this);
auto browser_view_layout = std::make_unique<BrowserViewLayout>();
browser_view_layout->Init(new BrowserViewLayoutDelegateImpl(this),
browser(),
this,
top_container_,
tabstrip_,
toolbar_,
infobar_container_,
contents_container_,
GetContentsLayoutManager(),
immersive_mode_controller_.get());
SetLayoutManager(std::move(browser_view_layout));
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (JumpList::Enabled()) {
load_complete_listener_.reset(new LoadCompleteListener(this));
}
#endif
frame_->OnBrowserViewInitViewsComplete();
frame_->GetFrameView()->UpdateMinimumSize();
}
|
void BrowserView::InitViews() {
GetWidget()->AddObserver(this);
GetWidget()->SetNativeWindowProperty(kBrowserViewKey, this);
GetWidget()->SetNativeWindowProperty(Profile::kProfileKey,
browser_->profile());
#if defined(OS_WIN) || (defined(OS_LINUX) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS))
GetWidget()->GetNativeView()->AddPreTargetHandler(
ConfirmQuitBubbleController::GetInstance());
#endif
#if defined(USE_AURA)
SetThemeProfileForWindow(GetNativeWindow(), browser_->profile());
#endif
LoadAccelerators();
contents_web_view_ = new ContentsWebView(browser_->profile());
contents_web_view_->set_id(VIEW_ID_TAB_CONTAINER);
contents_web_view_->SetEmbedFullscreenWidgetMode(true);
web_contents_close_handler_.reset(
new WebContentsCloseHandler(contents_web_view_));
devtools_web_view_ = new views::WebView(browser_->profile());
devtools_web_view_->set_id(VIEW_ID_DEV_TOOLS_DOCKED);
devtools_web_view_->SetVisible(false);
contents_container_ = new views::View();
contents_container_->SetBackground(views::CreateSolidBackground(
GetThemeProvider()->GetColor(ThemeProperties::COLOR_CONTROL_BACKGROUND)));
contents_container_->AddChildView(devtools_web_view_);
contents_container_->AddChildView(contents_web_view_);
contents_container_->SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<ContentsLayoutManager>(
devtools_web_view_, contents_web_view_));
AddChildView(contents_container_);
set_contents_view(contents_container_);
top_container_ = new TopContainerView(this);
AddChildView(top_container_);
BrowserTabStripController* tabstrip_controller =
new BrowserTabStripController(browser_->tab_strip_model(), this);
tabstrip_ =
new TabStrip(std::unique_ptr<TabStripController>(tabstrip_controller));
top_container_->AddChildView(tabstrip_); // Takes ownership.
tabstrip_controller->InitFromModel(tabstrip_);
toolbar_ = new ToolbarView(browser_.get(), this);
top_container_->AddChildView(toolbar_);
toolbar_->Init();
if (!toolbar_button_provider_)
SetToolbarButtonProvider(toolbar_);
infobar_container_ = new InfoBarContainerView(this);
AddChildView(infobar_container_);
InitStatusBubble();
find_bar_host_view_ = new View();
AddChildView(find_bar_host_view_);
immersive_mode_controller_->Init(this);
auto browser_view_layout = std::make_unique<BrowserViewLayout>();
browser_view_layout->Init(new BrowserViewLayoutDelegateImpl(this),
browser(),
this,
top_container_,
tabstrip_,
toolbar_,
infobar_container_,
contents_container_,
GetContentsLayoutManager(),
immersive_mode_controller_.get());
SetLayoutManager(std::move(browser_view_layout));
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (JumpList::Enabled()) {
load_complete_listener_.reset(new LoadCompleteListener(this));
}
#endif
frame_->OnBrowserViewInitViewsComplete();
frame_->GetFrameView()->UpdateMinimumSize();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::ScheduleNotifyPlaying() {
ScheduleEvent(event_type_names::kPlaying);
ScheduleResolvePlayPromises();
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::ScheduleNotifyPlaying() {
ScheduleEvent(event_type_names::kPlaying);
ScheduleResolvePlayPromises();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6177
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6177/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4504a474c069d07104237d0c03bfce7b29a42de6
|
4504a474c069d07104237d0c03bfce7b29a42de6
|
defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
|
WebLayer* HTMLMediaElement::PlatformLayer() const {
return web_layer_;
}
|
WebLayer* HTMLMediaElement::PlatformLayer() const {
return web_layer_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3104/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
6b5f83842b5edb5d4bd6684b196b3630c6769731
|
[i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RefCountedMemory* NTPResourceCache::GetNewTabCSS(bool is_incognito) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (is_incognito) {
if (!new_tab_incognito_css_.get())
CreateNewTabIncognitoCSS();
} else {
if (!new_tab_css_.get())
CreateNewTabCSS();
}
return is_incognito ? new_tab_incognito_css_.get()
: new_tab_css_.get();
}
|
RefCountedMemory* NTPResourceCache::GetNewTabCSS(bool is_incognito) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (is_incognito) {
if (!new_tab_incognito_css_.get())
CreateNewTabIncognitoCSS();
} else {
if (!new_tab_css_.get())
CreateNewTabCSS();
}
return is_incognito ? new_tab_incognito_css_.get()
: new_tab_css_.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-10184
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10184/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git;a=commit;h=3f0e1ec70173593f4c2b3681b26c04a4ed5fc588
|
3f0e1ec70173593f4c2b3681b26c04a4ed5fc588
| null |
static inline __maybe_unused uint64_t h2_get_n64(const struct buffer *b, int o)
{
return readv_n64(b_ptr(b, o), b_end(b) - b_ptr(b, o), b->data);
}
|
static inline __maybe_unused uint64_t h2_get_n64(const struct buffer *b, int o)
{
return readv_n64(b_ptr(b, o), b_end(b) - b_ptr(b, o), b->data);
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3097
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3097/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d
|
Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SessionService::FindClosestNavigationWithIndex(
std::vector<TabNavigation>* navigations,
int index) {
DCHECK(navigations);
for (std::vector<TabNavigation>::iterator i = navigations->begin();
i != navigations->end(); ++i) {
if (i->index() >= index)
return i;
}
return navigations->end();
}
|
SessionService::FindClosestNavigationWithIndex(
std::vector<TabNavigation>* navigations,
int index) {
DCHECK(navigations);
for (std::vector<TabNavigation>::iterator i = navigations->begin();
i != navigations->end(); ++i) {
if (i->index() >= index)
return i;
}
return navigations->end();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool CreateTabFunction::RunImpl() {
DictionaryValue* args;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(0, &args));
Browser *browser;
int window_id = -1;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kWindowIdKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(
keys::kWindowIdKey, &window_id));
browser = GetBrowserInProfileWithId(profile(), window_id,
include_incognito(), &error_);
} else {
browser = GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser)
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
}
if (!browser)
return false;
std::string url_string;
GURL url;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kUrlKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetString(keys::kUrlKey,
&url_string));
url = ResolvePossiblyRelativeURL(url_string, GetExtension());
if (!url.is_valid()) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(keys::kInvalidUrlError,
url_string);
return false;
}
}
bool selected = true;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kSelectedKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey,
&selected));
int index = -1;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kIndexKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(keys::kIndexKey,
&index));
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
browser = Browser::GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(
browser->profile()->GetOriginalProfile());
DCHECK(browser);
}
TabStripModel* tab_strip = browser->tabstrip_model();
if (index < 0) {
index = -1;
}
if (index > tab_strip->count()) {
index = tab_strip->count();
}
int add_types = selected ? Browser::ADD_SELECTED : Browser::ADD_NONE;
add_types |= Browser::ADD_FORCE_INDEX;
TabContents* contents = browser->AddTabWithURL(url, GURL(),
PageTransition::LINK, index, add_types, NULL, std::string());
index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
browser->window()->Show();
if (selected)
contents->Focus();
if (has_callback())
result_.reset(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, index));
return true;
}
|
bool CreateTabFunction::RunImpl() {
DictionaryValue* args;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(0, &args));
Browser *browser;
int window_id = -1;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kWindowIdKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(
keys::kWindowIdKey, &window_id));
browser = GetBrowserInProfileWithId(profile(), window_id,
include_incognito(), &error_);
} else {
browser = GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser)
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
}
if (!browser)
return false;
std::string url_string;
GURL url;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kUrlKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetString(keys::kUrlKey,
&url_string));
url = ResolvePossiblyRelativeURL(url_string, GetExtension());
if (!url.is_valid()) {
error_ = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(keys::kInvalidUrlError,
url_string);
return false;
}
}
bool selected = true;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kSelectedKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey,
&selected));
int index = -1;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kIndexKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(keys::kIndexKey,
&index));
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme) &&
browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
browser = Browser::GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(
browser->profile()->GetOriginalProfile());
DCHECK(browser);
}
TabStripModel* tab_strip = browser->tabstrip_model();
if (index < 0) {
index = -1;
}
if (index > tab_strip->count()) {
index = tab_strip->count();
}
int add_types = selected ? Browser::ADD_SELECTED : Browser::ADD_NONE;
add_types |= Browser::ADD_FORCE_INDEX;
TabContents* contents = browser->AddTabWithURL(url, GURL(),
PageTransition::LINK, index, add_types, NULL, std::string());
index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
browser->window()->Show();
if (selected)
contents->Focus();
if (has_callback())
result_.reset(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, index));
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct pagemapread pm;
int ret = -ESRCH;
struct mm_walk pagemap_walk = {};
unsigned long src;
unsigned long svpfn;
unsigned long start_vaddr;
unsigned long end_vaddr;
int copied = 0;
if (!task)
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* file position must be aligned */
if ((*ppos % PM_ENTRY_BYTES) || (count % PM_ENTRY_BYTES))
goto out_task;
ret = 0;
if (!count)
goto out_task;
pm.len = PM_ENTRY_BYTES * (PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
pm.buffer = kmalloc(pm.len, GFP_TEMPORARY);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!pm.buffer)
goto out_task;
mm = mm_for_maps(task);
ret = PTR_ERR(mm);
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
goto out_free;
pagemap_walk.pmd_entry = pagemap_pte_range;
pagemap_walk.pte_hole = pagemap_pte_hole;
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
pagemap_walk.hugetlb_entry = pagemap_hugetlb_range;
#endif
pagemap_walk.mm = mm;
pagemap_walk.private = ±
src = *ppos;
svpfn = src / PM_ENTRY_BYTES;
start_vaddr = svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
end_vaddr = TASK_SIZE_OF(task);
/* watch out for wraparound */
if (svpfn > TASK_SIZE_OF(task) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
/*
* The odds are that this will stop walking way
* before end_vaddr, because the length of the
* user buffer is tracked in "pm", and the walk
* will stop when we hit the end of the buffer.
*/
ret = 0;
while (count && (start_vaddr < end_vaddr)) {
int len;
unsigned long end;
pm.pos = 0;
end = (start_vaddr + PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE) & PAGEMAP_WALK_MASK;
/* overflow ? */
if (end < start_vaddr || end > end_vaddr)
end = end_vaddr;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
ret = walk_page_range(start_vaddr, end, &pagemap_walk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
start_vaddr = end;
len = min(count, PM_ENTRY_BYTES * pm.pos);
if (copy_to_user(buf, pm.buffer, len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_mm;
}
copied += len;
buf += len;
count -= len;
}
*ppos += copied;
if (!ret || ret == PM_END_OF_BUFFER)
ret = copied;
out_mm:
mmput(mm);
out_free:
kfree(pm.buffer);
out_task:
put_task_struct(task);
out:
return ret;
}
|
static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
struct mm_struct *mm;
struct pagemapread pm;
int ret = -ESRCH;
struct mm_walk pagemap_walk = {};
unsigned long src;
unsigned long svpfn;
unsigned long start_vaddr;
unsigned long end_vaddr;
int copied = 0;
if (!task)
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* file position must be aligned */
if ((*ppos % PM_ENTRY_BYTES) || (count % PM_ENTRY_BYTES))
goto out_task;
ret = 0;
if (!count)
goto out_task;
pm.len = PM_ENTRY_BYTES * (PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
pm.buffer = kmalloc(pm.len, GFP_TEMPORARY);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!pm.buffer)
goto out_task;
mm = mm_for_maps(task);
ret = PTR_ERR(mm);
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
goto out_free;
pagemap_walk.pmd_entry = pagemap_pte_range;
pagemap_walk.pte_hole = pagemap_pte_hole;
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
pagemap_walk.hugetlb_entry = pagemap_hugetlb_range;
#endif
pagemap_walk.mm = mm;
pagemap_walk.private = ±
src = *ppos;
svpfn = src / PM_ENTRY_BYTES;
start_vaddr = svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
end_vaddr = TASK_SIZE_OF(task);
/* watch out for wraparound */
if (svpfn > TASK_SIZE_OF(task) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
/*
* The odds are that this will stop walking way
* before end_vaddr, because the length of the
* user buffer is tracked in "pm", and the walk
* will stop when we hit the end of the buffer.
*/
ret = 0;
while (count && (start_vaddr < end_vaddr)) {
int len;
unsigned long end;
pm.pos = 0;
end = (start_vaddr + PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE) & PAGEMAP_WALK_MASK;
/* overflow ? */
if (end < start_vaddr || end > end_vaddr)
end = end_vaddr;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
ret = walk_page_range(start_vaddr, end, &pagemap_walk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
start_vaddr = end;
len = min(count, PM_ENTRY_BYTES * pm.pos);
if (copy_to_user(buf, pm.buffer, len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_mm;
}
copied += len;
buf += len;
count -= len;
}
*ppos += copied;
if (!ret || ret == PM_END_OF_BUFFER)
ret = copied;
out_mm:
mmput(mm);
out_free:
kfree(pm.buffer);
out_task:
put_task_struct(task);
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3713/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9842df62004f366b9fed2423e24df10542ee0dc5
|
9842df62004f366b9fed2423e24df10542ee0dc5
|
KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: David Matlack <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void mtrr_lookup_init(struct mtrr_iter *iter,
struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state, u64 start, u64 end)
{
iter->mtrr_state = mtrr_state;
iter->start = start;
iter->end = end;
iter->mtrr_disabled = false;
iter->partial_map = false;
iter->fixed = false;
iter->range = NULL;
mtrr_lookup_start(iter);
}
|
static void mtrr_lookup_init(struct mtrr_iter *iter,
struct kvm_mtrr *mtrr_state, u64 start, u64 end)
{
iter->mtrr_state = mtrr_state;
iter->start = start;
iter->end = end;
iter->mtrr_disabled = false;
iter->partial_map = false;
iter->fixed = false;
iter->range = NULL;
mtrr_lookup_start(iter);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13106/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commits/master
|
master
|
Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
void qrio_enable_app_buffer(void)
{
u8 ctrll;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
/* enable application buffer */
ctrll = in_8(qrio_base + CTRLL_OFF);
ctrll |= (CTRLL_WRB_BUFENA);
out_8(qrio_base + CTRLL_OFF, ctrll);
}
|
void qrio_enable_app_buffer(void)
{
u8 ctrll;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
/* enable application buffer */
ctrll = in_8(qrio_base + CTRLL_OFF);
ctrll |= (CTRLL_WRB_BUFENA);
out_8(qrio_base + CTRLL_OFF, ctrll);
}
|
C
|
u-boot
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2909/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool alwaysRequiresLineBox(RenderObject* flow)
{
return isEmptyInline(flow) && toRenderInline(flow)->hasInlineDirectionBordersPaddingOrMargin();
}
|
static bool alwaysRequiresLineBox(RenderObject* flow)
{
return isEmptyInline(flow) && toRenderInline(flow)->hasInlineDirectionBordersPaddingOrMargin();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct cast6_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
return glue_xts_crypt_128bit(&cast6_enc_xts, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__cast6_encrypt),
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx);
}
|
static int xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct cast6_xts_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
return glue_xts_crypt_128bit(&cast6_enc_xts, desc, dst, src, nbytes,
XTS_TWEAK_CAST(__cast6_encrypt),
&ctx->tweak_ctx, &ctx->crypt_ctx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *net_cat,
u32 net_cat_len,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int ret_val;
int net_spot = -1;
u32 host_spot = CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT;
u32 net_clen_bits = net_cat_len * 8;
u32 net_cat_size = 0;
u32 *net_cat_array = NULL;
if (doi_def->type == CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS) {
net_cat_size = doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size;
net_cat_array = doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso;
}
for (;;) {
net_spot = cipso_v4_bitmap_walk(net_cat,
net_clen_bits,
net_spot + 1,
1);
if (net_spot < 0) {
if (net_spot == -2)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
switch (doi_def->type) {
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
host_spot = net_spot;
break;
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
if (net_spot >= net_cat_size)
return -EPERM;
host_spot = net_cat_array[net_spot];
if (host_spot >= CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT)
return -EPERM;
break;
}
ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
host_spot,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int cipso_v4_map_cat_rbm_ntoh(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,
const unsigned char *net_cat,
u32 net_cat_len,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
int ret_val;
int net_spot = -1;
u32 host_spot = CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT;
u32 net_clen_bits = net_cat_len * 8;
u32 net_cat_size = 0;
u32 *net_cat_array = NULL;
if (doi_def->type == CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS) {
net_cat_size = doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso_size;
net_cat_array = doi_def->map.std->cat.cipso;
}
for (;;) {
net_spot = cipso_v4_bitmap_walk(net_cat,
net_clen_bits,
net_spot + 1,
1);
if (net_spot < 0) {
if (net_spot == -2)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
switch (doi_def->type) {
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS:
host_spot = net_spot;
break;
case CIPSO_V4_MAP_TRANS:
if (net_spot >= net_cat_size)
return -EPERM;
host_spot = net_cat_array[net_spot];
if (host_spot >= CIPSO_V4_INV_CAT)
return -EPERM;
break;
}
ret_val = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(secattr->attr.mls.cat,
host_spot,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret_val != 0)
return ret_val;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3885
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3885/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/rawstudio/rawstudio/commit/983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
983bda1f0fa5fa86884381208274198a620f006e
|
Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
|
void CLASS panasonic_load_raw()
{
int row, col, i, j, sh=0, pred[2], nonz[2];
pana_bits(0);
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < raw_width; col++) {
if ((i = col % 14) == 0)
pred[0] = pred[1] = nonz[0] = nonz[1] = 0;
if (i % 3 == 2) sh = 4 >> (3 - pana_bits(2));
if (nonz[i & 1]) {
if ((j = pana_bits(8))) {
if ((pred[i & 1] -= 0x80 << sh) < 0 || sh == 4)
pred[i & 1] &= ~(-1 << sh);
pred[i & 1] += j << sh;
}
} else if ((nonz[i & 1] = pana_bits(8)) || i > 11)
pred[i & 1] = nonz[i & 1] << 4 | pana_bits(4);
if (col < width)
if ((BAYER(row,col) = pred[col & 1]) > 4098) derror();
}
}
|
void CLASS panasonic_load_raw()
{
int row, col, i, j, sh=0, pred[2], nonz[2];
pana_bits(0);
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < raw_width; col++) {
if ((i = col % 14) == 0)
pred[0] = pred[1] = nonz[0] = nonz[1] = 0;
if (i % 3 == 2) sh = 4 >> (3 - pana_bits(2));
if (nonz[i & 1]) {
if ((j = pana_bits(8))) {
if ((pred[i & 1] -= 0x80 << sh) < 0 || sh == 4)
pred[i & 1] &= ~(-1 << sh);
pred[i & 1] += j << sh;
}
} else if ((nonz[i & 1] = pana_bits(8)) || i > 11)
pred[i & 1] = nonz[i & 1] << 4 | pana_bits(4);
if (col < width)
if ((BAYER(row,col) = pred[col & 1]) > 4098) derror();
}
}
|
C
|
rawstudio
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18208
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18208/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ea8d958a2c95a1d514015d4e29ba21a8c0a1a91
|
6ea8d958a2c95a1d514015d4e29ba21a8c0a1a91
|
mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[[email protected]: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
Cc: Miao Xie <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Shaohua Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Carsten Otte <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int madvise_free_single_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start_addr, unsigned long end_addr)
{
unsigned long start, end;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mmu_gather tlb;
/* MADV_FREE works for only anon vma at the moment */
if (!vma_is_anonymous(vma))
return -EINVAL;
start = max(vma->vm_start, start_addr);
if (start >= vma->vm_end)
return -EINVAL;
end = min(vma->vm_end, end_addr);
if (end <= vma->vm_start)
return -EINVAL;
lru_add_drain();
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end);
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, start, end);
madvise_free_page_range(&tlb, vma, start, end);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, start, end);
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end);
return 0;
}
|
static int madvise_free_single_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start_addr, unsigned long end_addr)
{
unsigned long start, end;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mmu_gather tlb;
/* MADV_FREE works for only anon vma at the moment */
if (!vma_is_anonymous(vma))
return -EINVAL;
start = max(vma->vm_start, start_addr);
if (start >= vma->vm_end)
return -EINVAL;
end = min(vma->vm_end, end_addr);
if (end <= vma->vm_start)
return -EINVAL;
lru_add_drain();
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end);
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm, start, end);
madvise_free_page_range(&tlb, vma, start, end);
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm, start, end);
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10267
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10267/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
* libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
|
OJPEGWriteStreamSoi(TIFF* tif, void** mem, uint32* len)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
assert(OJPEG_BUFFER>=2);
sp->out_buffer[0]=255;
sp->out_buffer[1]=JPEG_MARKER_SOI;
*len=2;
*mem=(void*)sp->out_buffer;
sp->out_state++;
}
|
OJPEGWriteStreamSoi(TIFF* tif, void** mem, uint32* len)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
assert(OJPEG_BUFFER>=2);
sp->out_buffer[0]=255;
sp->out_buffer[1]=JPEG_MARKER_SOI;
*len=2;
*mem=(void*)sp->out_buffer;
sp->out_state++;
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10218/
|
CWE-476
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
|
d621292fb2c8157d9899dcd83fd04dd250e30fe4
| null |
pdf14_buf_new(gs_int_rect *rect, bool has_tags, bool has_alpha_g,
bool has_shape, bool idle, int n_chan, int num_spots,
gs_memory_t *memory)
{
/* Note that alpha_g is the alpha for the GROUP */
/* This is distinct from the alpha that may also exist */
/* for the objects within the group. Hence it can introduce */
/* yet another plane */
pdf14_buf *result;
pdf14_parent_color_t *new_parent_color;
int rowstride = (rect->q.x - rect->p.x + 3) & -4;
int height = (rect->q.y - rect->p.y);
int n_planes = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0) +
(has_tags ? 1 : 0);
int planestride;
double dsize = (((double) rowstride) * height) * n_planes;
if (dsize > (double)max_uint)
return NULL;
result = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_buf, &st_pdf14_buf,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result == NULL)
return result;
result->backdrop = NULL;
result->saved = NULL;
result->isolated = false;
result->knockout = false;
result->has_alpha_g = has_alpha_g;
result->has_shape = has_shape;
result->has_tags = has_tags;
result->rect = *rect;
result->n_chan = n_chan;
result->n_planes = n_planes;
result->rowstride = rowstride;
result->transfer_fn = NULL;
result->matte_num_comps = 0;
result->matte = NULL;
result->mask_stack = NULL;
result->idle = idle;
result->mask_id = 0;
result->num_spots = num_spots;
new_parent_color = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_parent_color_t, &st_pdf14_clr,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (new_parent_color == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
result->parent_color_info_procs = new_parent_color;
result->parent_color_info_procs->get_cmap_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_mapping_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_comp_index = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->icc_profile = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->previous = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->encode = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->decode = NULL;
if (height <= 0) {
/* Empty clipping - will skip all drawings. */
result->planestride = 0;
result->data = 0;
} else {
planestride = rowstride * height;
result->planestride = planestride;
result->data = gs_alloc_bytes(memory, planestride * n_planes,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result->data == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
if (has_alpha_g) {
int alpha_g_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + alpha_g_plane * planestride, 0, planestride);
}
if (has_tags) {
int tags_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + tags_plane * planestride,
GS_UNTOUCHED_TAG, planestride);
}
}
/* Initialize dirty box with an invalid rectangle (the reversed rectangle).
* Any future drawing will make it valid again, so we won't blend back
* more than we need. */
result->dirty.p.x = rect->q.x;
result->dirty.p.y = rect->q.y;
result->dirty.q.x = rect->p.x;
result->dirty.q.y = rect->p.y;
return result;
}
|
pdf14_buf_new(gs_int_rect *rect, bool has_tags, bool has_alpha_g,
bool has_shape, bool idle, int n_chan, int num_spots,
gs_memory_t *memory)
{
/* Note that alpha_g is the alpha for the GROUP */
/* This is distinct from the alpha that may also exist */
/* for the objects within the group. Hence it can introduce */
/* yet another plane */
pdf14_buf *result;
pdf14_parent_color_t *new_parent_color;
int rowstride = (rect->q.x - rect->p.x + 3) & -4;
int height = (rect->q.y - rect->p.y);
int n_planes = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0) +
(has_tags ? 1 : 0);
int planestride;
double dsize = (((double) rowstride) * height) * n_planes;
if (dsize > (double)max_uint)
return NULL;
result = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_buf, &st_pdf14_buf,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result == NULL)
return result;
result->backdrop = NULL;
result->saved = NULL;
result->isolated = false;
result->knockout = false;
result->has_alpha_g = has_alpha_g;
result->has_shape = has_shape;
result->has_tags = has_tags;
result->rect = *rect;
result->n_chan = n_chan;
result->n_planes = n_planes;
result->rowstride = rowstride;
result->transfer_fn = NULL;
result->matte_num_comps = 0;
result->matte = NULL;
result->mask_stack = NULL;
result->idle = idle;
result->mask_id = 0;
result->num_spots = num_spots;
new_parent_color = gs_alloc_struct(memory, pdf14_parent_color_t, &st_pdf14_clr,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (new_parent_color == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
result->parent_color_info_procs = new_parent_color;
result->parent_color_info_procs->get_cmap_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_mapping_procs = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->parent_color_comp_index = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->icc_profile = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->previous = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->encode = NULL;
result->parent_color_info_procs->decode = NULL;
if (height <= 0) {
/* Empty clipping - will skip all drawings. */
result->planestride = 0;
result->data = 0;
} else {
planestride = rowstride * height;
result->planestride = planestride;
result->data = gs_alloc_bytes(memory, planestride * n_planes,
"pdf14_buf_new");
if (result->data == NULL) {
gs_free_object(memory, result, "pdf14_buf_new");
return NULL;
}
if (has_alpha_g) {
int alpha_g_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + alpha_g_plane * planestride, 0, planestride);
}
if (has_tags) {
int tags_plane = n_chan + (has_shape ? 1 : 0) + (has_alpha_g ? 1 : 0);
memset (result->data + tags_plane * planestride,
GS_UNTOUCHED_TAG, planestride);
}
}
/* Initialize dirty box with an invalid rectangle (the reversed rectangle).
* Any future drawing will make it valid again, so we won't blend back
* more than we need. */
result->dirty.p.x = rect->q.x;
result->dirty.p.y = rect->q.y;
result->dirty.q.x = rect->p.x;
result->dirty.q.y = rect->p.y;
return result;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3301
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3301/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
6a76f8c0ab19f215af2a3442870eeb5f0e81998d
|
tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static void *g_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&graph_lock);
/* Nothing, tell g_show to print all functions are enabled */
if (!ftrace_graph_filter_enabled && !*pos)
return (void *)1;
return __g_next(m, pos);
}
|
static void *g_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&graph_lock);
/* Nothing, tell g_show to print all functions are enabled */
if (!ftrace_graph_filter_enabled && !*pos)
return (void *)1;
return __g_next(m, pos);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-17113
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17113/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
927688ddab43c2b203569de79407a899e734fabe
|
[Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_InstrumentName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
char buf[32];
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_instrument_name(file->mod,qual-1);
memset(buf,0,32);
if(str){
strncpy(buf,str,31);
openmpt_free_string(str);
}
if(buff){
strncpy(buff,buf,32);
}
return (unsigned int)strlen(buf);
}
|
LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API unsigned int ModPlug_InstrumentName(ModPlugFile* file, unsigned int qual, char* buff)
{
const char* str;
unsigned int retval;
size_t tmpretval;
if(!file) return 0;
str = openmpt_module_get_instrument_name(file->mod,qual-1);
if(!str){
if(buff){
*buff = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
tmpretval = strlen(str);
if(tmpretval>=INT_MAX){
tmpretval = INT_MAX-1;
}
retval = (int)tmpretval;
if(buff){
memcpy(buff,str,retval+1);
buff[retval] = '\0';
}
openmpt_free_string(str);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
openmpt
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0375
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0375/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/torproject/tor/commit/79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
79b59a2dfcb68897ee89d98587d09e55f07e68d7
|
TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
|
connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
const node_t *exit_node)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
tor_assert(exit_node);
/* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
* make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
*/
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
const node_t *chosen_exit =
node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* doesn't match */
return 0;
}
}
if (conn->use_begindir) {
/* Internal directory fetches do not count as exiting. */
return 1;
}
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
tor_addr_t addr, *addrp = NULL;
addr_policy_result_t r;
if (0 == tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address)) {
addrp = &addr;
} else if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET6);
addrp = &addr;
} else if (conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
addrp = &addr;
}
r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,
exit_node);
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
return 0; /* We don't know the addr, but the exit policy rejects most
* addresses with this port. Since the user didn't ask for
* this node, err on the side of caution. */
} else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
/* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node))
return 0;
}
if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) {
/* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
const node_t *exit_node)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
tor_assert(exit_node);
/* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
* make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
*/
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
const node_t *chosen_exit =
node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* doesn't match */
return 0;
}
}
if (conn->use_begindir) {
/* Internal directory fetches do not count as exiting. */
return 1;
}
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
tor_addr_t addr, *addrp = NULL;
addr_policy_result_t r;
if (0 == tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address)) {
addrp = &addr;
} else if (!conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET6);
addrp = &addr;
} else if (conn->entry_cfg.ipv4_traffic && !conn->entry_cfg.ipv6_traffic) {
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
addrp = &addr;
}
r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,
exit_node);
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
return 0; /* We don't know the addr, but the exit policy rejects most
* addresses with this port. Since the user didn't ask for
* this node, err on the side of caution. */
} else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
/* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node))
return 0;
}
if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) {
/* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
tor
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserView::ZoomChangedForActiveTab(bool can_show_bubble) {
GetLocationBarView()->ZoomChangedForActiveTab(
can_show_bubble && !toolbar_->IsWrenchMenuShowing());
}
|
void BrowserView::ZoomChangedForActiveTab(bool can_show_bubble) {
GetLocationBarView()->ZoomChangedForActiveTab(
can_show_bubble && !toolbar_->IsWrenchMenuShowing());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
int conn_si_send_proxy(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag)
{
/* we might have been called just after an asynchronous shutw */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH)
goto out_error;
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
goto out_error;
if (!fd_send_ready(conn->t.sock.fd))
goto out_wait;
/* If we have a PROXY line to send, we'll use this to validate the
* connection, in which case the connection is validated only once
* we've sent the whole proxy line. Otherwise we use connect().
*/
while (conn->send_proxy_ofs) {
int ret;
/* The target server expects a PROXY line to be sent first.
* If the send_proxy_ofs is negative, it corresponds to the
* offset to start sending from then end of the proxy string
* (which is recomputed every time since it's constant). If
* it is positive, it means we have to send from the start.
* We can only send a "normal" PROXY line when the connection
* is attached to a stream interface. Otherwise we can only
* send a LOCAL line (eg: for use with health checks).
*/
if (conn->data == &si_conn_cb) {
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct connection *remote = objt_conn(si->ob->prod->end);
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), remote);
}
else {
/* The target server expects a LOCAL line to be sent first. Retrieving
* local or remote addresses may fail until the connection is established.
*/
conn_get_from_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_FROM_SET))
goto out_wait;
conn_get_to_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET))
goto out_wait;
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), conn);
}
if (!ret)
goto out_error;
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs > 0)
conn->send_proxy_ofs = -ret; /* first call */
/* we have to send trash from (ret+sp for -sp bytes). If the
* data layer has a pending write, we'll also set MSG_MORE.
*/
ret = send(conn->t.sock.fd, trash.str + ret + conn->send_proxy_ofs, -conn->send_proxy_ofs,
(conn->flags & CO_FL_DATA_WR_ENA) ? MSG_MORE : 0);
if (ret == 0)
goto out_wait;
if (ret < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == ENOTCONN)
goto out_wait;
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH;
goto out_error;
}
conn->send_proxy_ofs += ret; /* becomes zero once complete */
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs != 0)
goto out_wait;
/* OK we've sent the whole line, we're connected */
break;
}
/* The connection is ready now, simply return and let the connection
* handler notify upper layers if needed.
*/
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
conn->flags &= ~flag;
return 1;
out_error:
/* Write error on the file descriptor */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
return 0;
out_wait:
__conn_sock_stop_recv(conn);
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
|
int conn_si_send_proxy(struct connection *conn, unsigned int flag)
{
/* we might have been called just after an asynchronous shutw */
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH)
goto out_error;
if (!conn_ctrl_ready(conn))
goto out_error;
if (!fd_send_ready(conn->t.sock.fd))
goto out_wait;
/* If we have a PROXY line to send, we'll use this to validate the
* connection, in which case the connection is validated only once
* we've sent the whole proxy line. Otherwise we use connect().
*/
while (conn->send_proxy_ofs) {
int ret;
/* The target server expects a PROXY line to be sent first.
* If the send_proxy_ofs is negative, it corresponds to the
* offset to start sending from then end of the proxy string
* (which is recomputed every time since it's constant). If
* it is positive, it means we have to send from the start.
* We can only send a "normal" PROXY line when the connection
* is attached to a stream interface. Otherwise we can only
* send a LOCAL line (eg: for use with health checks).
*/
if (conn->data == &si_conn_cb) {
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct connection *remote = objt_conn(si->ob->prod->end);
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), remote);
}
else {
/* The target server expects a LOCAL line to be sent first. Retrieving
* local or remote addresses may fail until the connection is established.
*/
conn_get_from_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_FROM_SET))
goto out_wait;
conn_get_to_addr(conn);
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_ADDR_TO_SET))
goto out_wait;
ret = make_proxy_line(trash.str, trash.size, objt_server(conn->target), conn);
}
if (!ret)
goto out_error;
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs > 0)
conn->send_proxy_ofs = -ret; /* first call */
/* we have to send trash from (ret+sp for -sp bytes). If the
* data layer has a pending write, we'll also set MSG_MORE.
*/
ret = send(conn->t.sock.fd, trash.str + ret + conn->send_proxy_ofs, -conn->send_proxy_ofs,
(conn->flags & CO_FL_DATA_WR_ENA) ? MSG_MORE : 0);
if (ret == 0)
goto out_wait;
if (ret < 0) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == ENOTCONN)
goto out_wait;
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
conn->flags |= CO_FL_SOCK_RD_SH | CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH;
goto out_error;
}
conn->send_proxy_ofs += ret; /* becomes zero once complete */
if (conn->send_proxy_ofs != 0)
goto out_wait;
/* OK we've sent the whole line, we're connected */
break;
}
/* The connection is ready now, simply return and let the connection
* handler notify upper layers if needed.
*/
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN)
conn->flags &= ~CO_FL_WAIT_L4_CONN;
conn->flags &= ~flag;
return 1;
out_error:
/* Write error on the file descriptor */
conn->flags |= CO_FL_ERROR;
return 0;
out_wait:
__conn_sock_stop_recv(conn);
fd_cant_send(conn->t.sock.fd);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
d358f57009b85fb7440208afa5ba87636b491889
|
Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnConnectError(
bool after_pairing,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to connect device: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorFailed) {
error_code = ERROR_FAILED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorInProgress) {
error_code = ERROR_INPROGRESS;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorNotSupported) {
error_code = ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DEVICE;
}
if (after_pairing)
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
|
void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnConnectError(
bool after_pairing,
const ConnectErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
if (--num_connecting_calls_ == 0)
adapter_->NotifyDeviceChanged(this);
DCHECK(num_connecting_calls_ >= 0);
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to connect device: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": " << num_connecting_calls_
<< " still in progress";
ConnectErrorCode error_code = ERROR_UNKNOWN;
if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorFailed) {
error_code = ERROR_FAILED;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorInProgress) {
error_code = ERROR_INPROGRESS;
} else if (error_name == bluetooth_device::kErrorNotSupported) {
error_code = ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DEVICE;
}
if (after_pairing)
RecordPairingResult(error_code);
error_callback.Run(error_code);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8955
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8955/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071
|
8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071
|
arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
|
static int map_cpu_event(struct perf_event *event,
const unsigned (*event_map)[PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX],
const unsigned (*cache_map)
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX],
u32 raw_event_mask)
{
u64 config = event->attr.config;
switch (event->attr.type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
return armpmu_map_event(event_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
return armpmu_map_cache_event(cache_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
return armpmu_map_raw_event(raw_event_mask, config);
}
return -ENOENT;
}
|
static int map_cpu_event(struct perf_event *event,
const unsigned (*event_map)[PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX],
const unsigned (*cache_map)
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX]
[PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX],
u32 raw_event_mask)
{
u64 config = event->attr.config;
switch (event->attr.type) {
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
return armpmu_map_event(event_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
return armpmu_map_cache_event(cache_map, config);
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
return armpmu_map_raw_event(raw_event_mask, config);
}
return -ENOENT;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void reflectedClassAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectedClassAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void reflectedClassAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::reflectedClassAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75
|
ca989269a2876bae79393bd54c3e72d49975fc75
| null |
int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
{
return(SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
}
|
int ssl3_num_ciphers(void)
{
return(SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6763/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
7314e613d5ff9f0934f7a0f74ed7973b903315d1
|
Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected].
|
static int fbinfo2index (struct fb_info *fb_info)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < device_count; ++i) {
if (fb_info == _au1200fb_infos[i])
return i;
}
printk("au1200fb: ERROR: fbinfo2index failed!\n");
return -1;
}
|
static int fbinfo2index (struct fb_info *fb_info)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < device_count; ++i) {
if (fb_info == _au1200fb_infos[i])
return i;
}
printk("au1200fb: ERROR: fbinfo2index failed!\n");
return -1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
dealloc_ofp_port(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
if (ofp_to_u16(ofp_port) < ofproto->max_ports) {
ofport_set_usage(ofproto, ofp_port, time_msec());
}
}
|
dealloc_ofp_port(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
if (ofp_to_u16(ofp_port) < ofproto->max_ports) {
ofport_set_usage(ofproto, ofp_port, time_msec());
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10741
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10741/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04197b341f23b908193308b8d63d17ff23232598
|
04197b341f23b908193308b8d63d17ff23232598
|
xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
|
xfs_end_io_direct_write(
struct kiocb *iocb,
loff_t offset,
ssize_t size,
void *private)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
uintptr_t flags = (uintptr_t)private;
int error = 0;
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write(ip, offset, size);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
return -EIO;
if (size <= 0)
return size;
/*
* The flags tell us whether we are doing unwritten extent conversions
* or an append transaction that updates the on-disk file size. These
* cases are the only cases where we should *potentially* be needing
* to update the VFS inode size.
*/
if (flags == 0) {
ASSERT(offset + size <= i_size_read(inode));
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to update the in-core inode size here so that we don't end up
* with the on-disk inode size being outside the in-core inode size. We
* have no other method of updating EOF for AIO, so always do it here
* if necessary.
*
* We need to lock the test/set EOF update as we can be racing with
* other IO completions here to update the EOF. Failing to serialise
* here can result in EOF moving backwards and Bad Things Happen when
* that occurs.
*/
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (offset + size > i_size_read(inode))
i_size_write(inode, offset + size);
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_COW)
error = xfs_reflink_end_cow(ip, offset, size);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_UNWRITTEN) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_iomap_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
}
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_APPEND) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_append(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_setfilesize(ip, offset, size);
}
return error;
}
|
xfs_end_io_direct_write(
struct kiocb *iocb,
loff_t offset,
ssize_t size,
void *private)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
uintptr_t flags = (uintptr_t)private;
int error = 0;
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write(ip, offset, size);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
return -EIO;
if (size <= 0)
return size;
/*
* The flags tell us whether we are doing unwritten extent conversions
* or an append transaction that updates the on-disk file size. These
* cases are the only cases where we should *potentially* be needing
* to update the VFS inode size.
*/
if (flags == 0) {
ASSERT(offset + size <= i_size_read(inode));
return 0;
}
/*
* We need to update the in-core inode size here so that we don't end up
* with the on-disk inode size being outside the in-core inode size. We
* have no other method of updating EOF for AIO, so always do it here
* if necessary.
*
* We need to lock the test/set EOF update as we can be racing with
* other IO completions here to update the EOF. Failing to serialise
* here can result in EOF moving backwards and Bad Things Happen when
* that occurs.
*/
spin_lock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (offset + size > i_size_read(inode))
i_size_write(inode, offset + size);
spin_unlock(&ip->i_flags_lock);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_COW)
error = xfs_reflink_end_cow(ip, offset, size);
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_UNWRITTEN) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_iomap_write_unwritten(ip, offset, size);
}
if (flags & XFS_DIO_FLAG_APPEND) {
trace_xfs_end_io_direct_write_append(ip, offset, size);
error = xfs_setfilesize(ip, offset, size);
}
return error;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6575
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6575/
|
CWE-189
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/cf1581c66c2ad8c5b1aaca2e43e350cf5974f46d
|
cf1581c66c2ad8c5b1aaca2e43e350cf5974f46d
|
Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
|
status_t SampleTable::getSampleSize_l(
uint32_t sampleIndex, size_t *sampleSize) {
return mSampleIterator->getSampleSizeDirect(
sampleIndex, sampleSize);
}
|
status_t SampleTable::getSampleSize_l(
uint32_t sampleIndex, size_t *sampleSize) {
return mSampleIterator->getSampleSizeDirect(
sampleIndex, sampleSize);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6079
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd
|
Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
|
void ContextState::InitStateManual(const ContextState*) const {
UpdatePackParameters();
UpdateUnpackParameters();
UpdateWindowRectangles();
}
|
void ContextState::InitStateManual(const ContextState*) const {
UpdatePackParameters();
UpdateUnpackParameters();
UpdateWindowRectangles();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1010251
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1010251/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/OISF/suricata/pull/3590/commits/8357ef3f8ffc7d99ef6571350724160de356158b
|
8357ef3f8ffc7d99ef6571350724160de356158b
|
proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
|
int AppLayerProtoDetectPPParseConfPorts(const char *ipproto_name,
uint8_t ipproto,
const char *alproto_name,
AppProto alproto,
uint16_t min_depth, uint16_t max_depth,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParserTs,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParserTc)
{
SCEnter();
char param[100];
int r;
ConfNode *node;
ConfNode *port_node = NULL;
int config = 0;
r = snprintf(param, sizeof(param), "%s%s%s", "app-layer.protocols.",
alproto_name, ".detection-ports");
if (r < 0) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "snprintf failure.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (r > (int)sizeof(param)) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "buffer not big enough to write param.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
node = ConfGetNode(param);
if (node == NULL) {
SCLogDebug("Entry for %s not found.", param);
r = snprintf(param, sizeof(param), "%s%s%s%s%s", "app-layer.protocols.",
alproto_name, ".", ipproto_name, ".detection-ports");
if (r < 0) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "snprintf failure.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (r > (int)sizeof(param)) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "buffer not big enough to write param.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
node = ConfGetNode(param);
if (node == NULL)
goto end;
}
/* detect by destination port of the flow (e.g. port 53 for DNS) */
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "dp");
if (port_node == NULL)
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "toserver");
if (port_node != NULL && port_node->val != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(ipproto,
port_node->val,
alproto,
min_depth, max_depth,
STREAM_TOSERVER, /* to indicate dp */
ProbingParserTs, ProbingParserTc);
}
/* detect by source port of flow */
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "sp");
if (port_node == NULL)
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "toclient");
if (port_node != NULL && port_node->val != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(ipproto,
port_node->val,
alproto,
min_depth, max_depth,
STREAM_TOCLIENT, /* to indicate sp */
ProbingParserTc, ProbingParserTs);
}
config = 1;
end:
SCReturnInt(config);
}
|
int AppLayerProtoDetectPPParseConfPorts(const char *ipproto_name,
uint8_t ipproto,
const char *alproto_name,
AppProto alproto,
uint16_t min_depth, uint16_t max_depth,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParserTs,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParserTc)
{
SCEnter();
char param[100];
int r;
ConfNode *node;
ConfNode *port_node = NULL;
int config = 0;
r = snprintf(param, sizeof(param), "%s%s%s", "app-layer.protocols.",
alproto_name, ".detection-ports");
if (r < 0) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "snprintf failure.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (r > (int)sizeof(param)) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "buffer not big enough to write param.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
node = ConfGetNode(param);
if (node == NULL) {
SCLogDebug("Entry for %s not found.", param);
r = snprintf(param, sizeof(param), "%s%s%s%s%s", "app-layer.protocols.",
alproto_name, ".", ipproto_name, ".detection-ports");
if (r < 0) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "snprintf failure.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (r > (int)sizeof(param)) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "buffer not big enough to write param.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
node = ConfGetNode(param);
if (node == NULL)
goto end;
}
/* detect by destination port of the flow (e.g. port 53 for DNS) */
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "dp");
if (port_node == NULL)
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "toserver");
if (port_node != NULL && port_node->val != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(ipproto,
port_node->val,
alproto,
min_depth, max_depth,
STREAM_TOSERVER, /* to indicate dp */
ProbingParserTs, ProbingParserTc);
}
/* detect by source port of flow */
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "sp");
if (port_node == NULL)
port_node = ConfNodeLookupChild(node, "toclient");
if (port_node != NULL && port_node->val != NULL) {
AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(ipproto,
port_node->val,
alproto,
min_depth, max_depth,
STREAM_TOCLIENT, /* to indicate sp */
ProbingParserTc, ProbingParserTs);
}
config = 1;
end:
SCReturnInt(config);
}
|
C
|
suricata
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1563
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1563/
|
CWE-311
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=08229ad838c50f644d7e928e2eef147b4308ad64
|
08229ad838c50f644d7e928e2eef147b4308ad64
| null |
CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
unsigned char *id, size_t idlen,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date,
ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId,
ASN1_TYPE *otherType)
{
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
if (!env)
goto err;
if (nid == NID_undef) {
switch (keylen) {
case 16:
nid = NID_id_aes128_wrap;
break;
case 24:
nid = NID_id_aes192_wrap;
break;
case 32:
nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap;
break;
default:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
} else {
size_t exp_keylen = aes_wrap_keylen(nid);
if (!exp_keylen) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY,
CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (keylen != exp_keylen) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
}
/* Initialize recipient info */
ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
if (!ri)
goto merr;
ri->d.kekri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo);
if (!ri->d.kekri)
goto merr;
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK;
kekri = ri->d.kekri;
if (otherTypeId) {
kekri->kekid->other = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute);
if (kekri->kekid->other == NULL)
goto merr;
}
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
goto merr;
/* After this point no calls can fail */
kekri->version = 4;
kekri->key = key;
kekri->keylen = keylen;
ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier, id, idlen);
kekri->kekid->date = date;
if (kekri->kekid->other) {
kekri->kekid->other->keyAttrId = otherTypeId;
kekri->kekid->other->keyAttr = otherType;
}
X509_ALGOR_set0(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm,
OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
return ri;
merr:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
return NULL;
}
|
CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
unsigned char *id, size_t idlen,
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date,
ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId,
ASN1_TYPE *otherType)
{
CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
if (!env)
goto err;
if (nid == NID_undef) {
switch (keylen) {
case 16:
nid = NID_id_aes128_wrap;
break;
case 24:
nid = NID_id_aes192_wrap;
break;
case 32:
nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap;
break;
default:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
} else {
size_t exp_keylen = aes_wrap_keylen(nid);
if (!exp_keylen) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY,
CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if (keylen != exp_keylen) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
}
/* Initialize recipient info */
ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
if (!ri)
goto merr;
ri->d.kekri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo);
if (!ri->d.kekri)
goto merr;
ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK;
kekri = ri->d.kekri;
if (otherTypeId) {
kekri->kekid->other = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute);
if (kekri->kekid->other == NULL)
goto merr;
}
if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
goto merr;
/* After this point no calls can fail */
kekri->version = 4;
kekri->key = key;
kekri->keylen = keylen;
ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier, id, idlen);
kekri->kekid->date = date;
if (kekri->kekid->other) {
kekri->kekid->other->keyAttrId = otherTypeId;
kekri->kekid->other->keyAttr = otherType;
}
X509_ALGOR_set0(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm,
OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
return ri;
merr:
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15393
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15393/
|
CWE-668
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8ef19900d003ff7078fe4fcec8f63496b18f0dc
|
a8ef19900d003ff7078fe4fcec8f63496b18f0dc
|
[DevTools] Use no-referrer for DevTools links
Bug: 732751
Change-Id: I77753120e2424203dedcc7bc0847fb67f87fe2b2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/615021
Reviewed-by: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#494413}
|
void DevToolsWindow::OpenNodeFrontendWindow(Profile* profile) {
for (DevToolsWindow* window : g_instances.Get()) {
if (window->frontend_type_ == kFrontendNode) {
window->ActivateWindow();
return;
}
}
DevToolsWindow* window =
Create(profile, nullptr, kFrontendNode, std::string(), false,
std::string(), std::string());
if (!window)
return;
window->bindings_->AttachTo(DevToolsAgentHost::CreateForDiscovery());
window->ScheduleShow(DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
}
|
void DevToolsWindow::OpenNodeFrontendWindow(Profile* profile) {
for (DevToolsWindow* window : g_instances.Get()) {
if (window->frontend_type_ == kFrontendNode) {
window->ActivateWindow();
return;
}
}
DevToolsWindow* window =
Create(profile, nullptr, kFrontendNode, std::string(), false,
std::string(), std::string());
if (!window)
return;
window->bindings_->AttachTo(DevToolsAgentHost::CreateForDiscovery());
window->ScheduleShow(DevToolsToggleAction::Show());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3515/
| null |
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
|
88223c5245e9b470e1e6362bfd96829562ffe6ab
| null |
SPL_METHOD(Array, unserialize)
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *pmembers, *pflags = NULL;
long flags;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Empty serialized string cannot be empty");
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pflags);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pflags, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pflags) != IS_LONG) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
goto outexcept;
}
--p; /* for ';' */
flags = Z_LVAL_P(pflags);
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
/* flags needs to be verified and we also need to verify whether the next
* thing we get is ';'. After that we require an 'm' or somethign else
* where 'm' stands for members and anything else should be an array. If
* neither 'a' or 'm' follows we have an error. */
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if (*p!='m') {
if (*p!='a' && *p!='O' && *p!='C' && *p!='r') {
goto outexcept;
}
intern->ar_flags &= ~SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
intern->ar_flags |= flags & SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->array);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->array);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&intern->array, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto outexcept;
}
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pmembers);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pmembers) != IS_ARRAY) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
goto outexcept;
}
/* copy members */
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
zend_hash_copy(intern->std.properties, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) NULL, sizeof(zval *));
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
/* done reading $serialized */
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return;
outexcept:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Error at offset %ld of %d bytes", (long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ arginfo and function tbale */
|
SPL_METHOD(Array, unserialize)
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *pmembers, *pflags = NULL;
long flags;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Empty serialized string cannot be empty");
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pflags);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pflags, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pflags) != IS_LONG) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
goto outexcept;
}
--p; /* for ';' */
flags = Z_LVAL_P(pflags);
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
/* flags needs to be verified and we also need to verify whether the next
* thing we get is ';'. After that we require an 'm' or somethign else
* where 'm' stands for members and anything else should be an array. If
* neither 'a' or 'm' follows we have an error. */
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if (*p!='m') {
if (*p!='a' && *p!='O' && *p!='C' && *p!='r') {
goto outexcept;
}
intern->ar_flags &= ~SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
intern->ar_flags |= flags & SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->array);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->array);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&intern->array, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto outexcept;
}
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pmembers);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
goto outexcept;
}
/* copy members */
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
zend_hash_copy(intern->std.properties, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) NULL, sizeof(zval *));
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
/* done reading $serialized */
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return;
outexcept:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Error at offset %ld of %d bytes", (long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ arginfo and function tbale */
|
C
|
php
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244
|
1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244
|
Change VideoDecoder::ReadCB to take const scoped_refptr<VideoFrame>&.
BUG=none
TEST=media_unittests, media layout tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10559074
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143192 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
NullVideoFrame() {}
|
NullVideoFrame() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d193f6bb5aa5bdc05e07f314abacf7d7bc466d3d
|
d193f6bb5aa5bdc05e07f314abacf7d7bc466d3d
|
cc: Make the PictureLayerImpl raster source null until commit.
No need to make a raster source that is never used.
R=enne, vmpstr
BUG=387116
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/809433003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#308466}
|
void AssertAllTilesRequired(PictureLayerTiling* tiling) {
std::vector<Tile*> tiles = tiling->AllTilesForTesting();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tiles.size(); ++i)
EXPECT_TRUE(tiles[i]->required_for_activation()) << "i: " << i;
EXPECT_GT(tiles.size(), 0u);
}
|
void AssertAllTilesRequired(PictureLayerTiling* tiling) {
std::vector<Tile*> tiles = tiling->AllTilesForTesting();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tiles.size(); ++i)
EXPECT_TRUE(tiles[i]->required_for_activation()) << "i: " << i;
EXPECT_GT(tiles.size(), 0u);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-3235
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3235/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/60085c3d009b0df252547adb336d1ccca5ce52ec
|
60085c3d009b0df252547adb336d1ccca5ce52ec
|
tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Cc: Allan Stephens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tipc_set_portimportance(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
res = tipc_set_portunreliable(tport->ref, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
res = tipc_set_portunreturnable(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tipc_set_portimportance(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
res = tipc_set_portunreliable(tport->ref, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
res = tipc_set_portunreturnable(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4131
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4131/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
bf118a342f10dafe44b14451a1392c3254629a1f
|
NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
_copy_to_pages(struct page **pages, size_t pgbase, const char *p, size_t len)
{
struct page **pgto;
char *vto;
size_t copy;
pgto = pages + (pgbase >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
pgbase &= ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
for (;;) {
copy = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - pgbase;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vto = kmap_atomic(*pgto, KM_USER0);
memcpy(vto + pgbase, p, copy);
kunmap_atomic(vto, KM_USER0);
len -= copy;
if (len == 0)
break;
pgbase += copy;
if (pgbase == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
flush_dcache_page(*pgto);
pgbase = 0;
pgto++;
}
p += copy;
}
flush_dcache_page(*pgto);
}
|
_copy_to_pages(struct page **pages, size_t pgbase, const char *p, size_t len)
{
struct page **pgto;
char *vto;
size_t copy;
pgto = pages + (pgbase >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
pgbase &= ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
for (;;) {
copy = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - pgbase;
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vto = kmap_atomic(*pgto, KM_USER0);
memcpy(vto + pgbase, p, copy);
kunmap_atomic(vto, KM_USER0);
len -= copy;
if (len == 0)
break;
pgbase += copy;
if (pgbase == PAGE_CACHE_SIZE) {
flush_dcache_page(*pgto);
pgbase = 0;
pgto++;
}
p += copy;
}
flush_dcache_page(*pgto);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline u32 inet_synq_hash(const __be32 raddr, const __be16 rport,
const u32 rnd, const u32 synq_hsize)
{
return jhash_2words((__force u32)raddr, (__force u32)rport, rnd) & (synq_hsize - 1);
}
|
static inline u32 inet_synq_hash(const __be32 raddr, const __be16 rport,
const u32 rnd, const u32 synq_hsize)
{
return jhash_2words((__force u32)raddr, (__force u32)rport, rnd) & (synq_hsize - 1);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9588
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9588/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388
|
kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_basic(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
/*
* The "non-true" VMX capability MSRs are generated from the
* "true" MSRs, so we do not support restoring them directly.
*
* If userspace wants to emulate VMX_BASIC[55]=0, userspace
* should restore the "true" MSRs with the must-be-1 bits
* set according to the SDM Vol 3. A.2 "RESERVED CONTROLS AND
* DEFAULT SETTINGS".
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
return vmx_restore_control_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_misc(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
return vmx_restore_fixed0_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
/*
* These MSRs are generated based on the vCPU's CPUID, so we
* do not support restoring them directly.
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
return vmx_restore_vmx_ept_vpid_cap(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmcs_enum = data;
return 0;
default:
/*
* The rest of the VMX capability MSRs do not support restore.
*/
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
static int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_basic(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
/*
* The "non-true" VMX capability MSRs are generated from the
* "true" MSRs, so we do not support restoring them directly.
*
* If userspace wants to emulate VMX_BASIC[55]=0, userspace
* should restore the "true" MSRs with the must-be-1 bits
* set according to the SDM Vol 3. A.2 "RESERVED CONTROLS AND
* DEFAULT SETTINGS".
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
return vmx_restore_control_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_misc(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
return vmx_restore_fixed0_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
/*
* These MSRs are generated based on the vCPU's CPUID, so we
* do not support restoring them directly.
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
return vmx_restore_vmx_ept_vpid_cap(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmcs_enum = data;
return 0;
default:
/*
* The rest of the VMX capability MSRs do not support restore.
*/
return -EINVAL;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1618
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1618/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d
|
0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d
|
Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
|
~ProxyPlatform()
{
blink::Platform::initialize(m_platform);
}
|
~ProxyPlatform()
{
blink::Platform::initialize(m_platform);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
SpoolssEnumForms_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
BUFFER buffer;
guint32 level = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(dcv->se_data), i, count;
int buffer_offset;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, &buffer);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_needed, NULL);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_enumforms_num, &count);
/* Unfortunately this array isn't in NDR format so we can't
use prs_array(). The other weird thing is the
struct_start being inside the loop rather than outside.
Very strange. */
buffer_offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int struct_start = buffer_offset;
buffer_offset = dissect_FORM_REL(
buffer.tvb, buffer_offset, pinfo, buffer.tree, di, drep,
struct_start);
}
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
SpoolssEnumForms_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
BUFFER buffer;
guint32 level = GPOINTER_TO_UINT(dcv->se_data), i, count;
int buffer_offset;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, &buffer);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_needed, NULL);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d", level);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_enumforms_num, &count);
/* Unfortunately this array isn't in NDR format so we can't
use prs_array(). The other weird thing is the
struct_start being inside the loop rather than outside.
Very strange. */
buffer_offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int struct_start = buffer_offset;
buffer_offset = dissect_FORM_REL(
buffer.tvb, buffer_offset, pinfo, buffer.tree, di, drep,
struct_start);
}
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17407
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17407/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/TeX-Live/texlive-source/commit/6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
6ed0077520e2b0da1fd060c7f88db7b2e6068e4c
|
writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
|
static float t1_scan_num(char *p, char **r)
{
float f;
skip(p, ' ');
if (sscanf(p, "%g", &f) != 1) {
remove_eol(p, t1_line_array);
pdftex_fail("a number expected: `%s'", t1_line_array);
}
if (r != NULL) {
for (; isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p == '.' ||
*p == 'e' || *p == 'E' || *p == '+' || *p == '-'; p++);
*r = p;
}
return f;
}
|
static float t1_scan_num(char *p, char **r)
{
float f;
skip(p, ' ');
if (sscanf(p, "%g", &f) != 1) {
remove_eol(p, t1_line_array);
pdftex_fail("a number expected: `%s'", t1_line_array);
}
if (r != NULL) {
for (; isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p == '.' ||
*p == 'e' || *p == 'E' || *p == '+' || *p == '-'; p++);
*r = p;
}
return f;
}
|
C
|
texlive-source
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9374/
|
CWE-772
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
|
d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
| null |
static inline bool ehci_async_enabled(EHCIState *s)
{
return ehci_enabled(s) && (s->usbcmd & USBCMD_ASE);
}
|
static inline bool ehci_async_enabled(EHCIState *s)
{
return ehci_enabled(s) && (s->usbcmd & USBCMD_ASE);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13302
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13302/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d5089971bd792311aaab5cb73460326d7ef7f32d
|
d5089971bd792311aaab5cb73460326d7ef7f32d
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1597
|
static MagickBooleanType InverseFourier(FourierInfo *fourier_info,
const Image *magnitude_image,const Image *phase_image,
fftw_complex *fourier_pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*magnitude_view,
*phase_view;
double
*inverse_pixels,
*magnitude_pixels,
*phase_pixels;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*inverse_info,
*magnitude_info,
*phase_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Inverse fourier - read image and break down into a double array.
*/
magnitude_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*magnitude_pixels));
phase_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*phase_pixels));
inverse_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
(fourier_info->height/2+1)*sizeof(*inverse_pixels));
if ((magnitude_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL) ||
(phase_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL) ||
(inverse_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (magnitude_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
magnitude_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(magnitude_info);
if (phase_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
phase_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(phase_info);
if (inverse_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
inverse_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(inverse_info);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
magnitude_image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
magnitude_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(magnitude_info);
phase_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(phase_info);
inverse_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(inverse_info);
i=0L;
magnitude_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(magnitude_image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(magnitude_view,0L,y,fourier_info->width,1UL,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedPixelChannel:
default:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case GreenPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case BluePixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case BlackPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlack(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case AlphaPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelAlpha(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
}
i++;
p+=GetPixelChannels(magnitude_image);
}
}
magnitude_view=DestroyCacheView(magnitude_view);
status=InverseQuadrantSwap(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
magnitude_pixels,inverse_pixels);
(void) memcpy(magnitude_pixels,inverse_pixels,fourier_info->height*
fourier_info->center*sizeof(*magnitude_pixels));
i=0L;
phase_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(phase_image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(phase_view,0,y,fourier_info->width,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedPixelChannel:
default:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case GreenPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case BluePixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case BlackPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlack(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case AlphaPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelAlpha(phase_image,p);
break;
}
}
i++;
p+=GetPixelChannels(phase_image);
}
}
if (fourier_info->modulus != MagickFalse)
{
i=0L;
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
phase_pixels[i]-=0.5;
phase_pixels[i]*=(2.0*MagickPI);
i++;
}
}
phase_view=DestroyCacheView(phase_view);
CorrectPhaseLHS(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,phase_pixels);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=InverseQuadrantSwap(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
phase_pixels,inverse_pixels);
(void) memcpy(phase_pixels,inverse_pixels,fourier_info->height*
fourier_info->center*sizeof(*phase_pixels));
inverse_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(inverse_info);
/*
Merge two sets.
*/
i=0L;
if (fourier_info->modulus != MagickFalse)
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]=magnitude_pixels[i]*cos(phase_pixels[i])+I*
magnitude_pixels[i]*sin(phase_pixels[i]);
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]=magnitude_pixels[i]*cos(phase_pixels[i]);
fourier_pixels[i][1]=magnitude_pixels[i]*sin(phase_pixels[i]);
#endif
i++;
}
else
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]=magnitude_pixels[i]+I*phase_pixels[i];
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]=magnitude_pixels[i];
fourier_pixels[i][1]=phase_pixels[i];
#endif
i++;
}
magnitude_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(magnitude_info);
phase_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(phase_info);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType InverseFourier(FourierInfo *fourier_info,
const Image *magnitude_image,const Image *phase_image,
fftw_complex *fourier_pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*magnitude_view,
*phase_view;
double
*inverse_pixels,
*magnitude_pixels,
*phase_pixels;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*inverse_info,
*magnitude_info,
*phase_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Inverse fourier - read image and break down into a double array.
*/
magnitude_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*magnitude_pixels));
phase_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*phase_pixels));
inverse_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
(fourier_info->height/2+1)*sizeof(*inverse_pixels));
if ((magnitude_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL) ||
(phase_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL) ||
(inverse_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL))
{
if (magnitude_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
magnitude_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(magnitude_info);
if (phase_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
phase_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(phase_info);
if (inverse_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
inverse_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(inverse_info);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
magnitude_image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
magnitude_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(magnitude_info);
phase_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(phase_info);
inverse_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(inverse_info);
i=0L;
magnitude_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(magnitude_image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(magnitude_view,0L,y,fourier_info->width,1UL,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedPixelChannel:
default:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case GreenPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case BluePixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case BlackPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlack(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
case AlphaPixelChannel:
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelAlpha(magnitude_image,p);
break;
}
}
i++;
p+=GetPixelChannels(magnitude_image);
}
}
magnitude_view=DestroyCacheView(magnitude_view);
status=InverseQuadrantSwap(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
magnitude_pixels,inverse_pixels);
(void) memcpy(magnitude_pixels,inverse_pixels,fourier_info->height*
fourier_info->center*sizeof(*magnitude_pixels));
i=0L;
phase_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(phase_image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(phase_view,0,y,fourier_info->width,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedPixelChannel:
default:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case GreenPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case BluePixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case BlackPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlack(phase_image,p);
break;
}
case AlphaPixelChannel:
{
phase_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelAlpha(phase_image,p);
break;
}
}
i++;
p+=GetPixelChannels(phase_image);
}
}
if (fourier_info->modulus != MagickFalse)
{
i=0L;
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
phase_pixels[i]-=0.5;
phase_pixels[i]*=(2.0*MagickPI);
i++;
}
}
phase_view=DestroyCacheView(phase_view);
CorrectPhaseLHS(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,phase_pixels);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=InverseQuadrantSwap(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
phase_pixels,inverse_pixels);
(void) memcpy(phase_pixels,inverse_pixels,fourier_info->height*
fourier_info->center*sizeof(*phase_pixels));
inverse_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(inverse_info);
/*
Merge two sets.
*/
i=0L;
if (fourier_info->modulus != MagickFalse)
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]=magnitude_pixels[i]*cos(phase_pixels[i])+I*
magnitude_pixels[i]*sin(phase_pixels[i]);
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]=magnitude_pixels[i]*cos(phase_pixels[i]);
fourier_pixels[i][1]=magnitude_pixels[i]*sin(phase_pixels[i]);
#endif
i++;
}
else
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]=magnitude_pixels[i]+I*phase_pixels[i];
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]=magnitude_pixels[i];
fourier_pixels[i][1]=phase_pixels[i];
#endif
i++;
}
magnitude_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(magnitude_info);
phase_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(phase_info);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8666/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971
|
tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int dev_get_phys_port_name(struct net_device *dev,
char *name, size_t len)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (!ops->ndo_get_phys_port_name)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return ops->ndo_get_phys_port_name(dev, name, len);
}
|
int dev_get_phys_port_name(struct net_device *dev,
char *name, size_t len)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (!ops->ndo_get_phys_port_name)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return ops->ndo_get_phys_port_name(dev, name, len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2884/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
4ac8bc08e3306f38a5ab3e551aef6ad43753579c
|
Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
ShareableElementData::ShareableElementData(const UniqueElementData& other)
: ElementData(other, false)
{
ASSERT(!other.m_presentationAttributeStyle);
if (other.m_inlineStyle) {
ASSERT(!other.m_inlineStyle->hasCSSOMWrapper());
m_inlineStyle = other.m_inlineStyle->immutableCopyIfNeeded();
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_arraySize; ++i)
new (&m_attributeArray[i]) Attribute(other.m_attributeVector.at(i));
}
|
ShareableElementData::ShareableElementData(const UniqueElementData& other)
: ElementData(other, false)
{
ASSERT(!other.m_presentationAttributeStyle);
if (other.m_inlineStyle) {
ASSERT(!other.m_inlineStyle->hasCSSOMWrapper());
m_inlineStyle = other.m_inlineStyle->immutableCopyIfNeeded();
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_arraySize; ++i)
new (&m_attributeArray[i]) Attribute(other.m_attributeVector.at(i));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6520/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/76401e172ea3a55182be2b8e2aca4d07270f6da6
|
76401e172ea3a55182be2b8e2aca4d07270f6da6
|
Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)
|
static inline double gamma_pow(const double value,const double gamma)
{
return(value < 0.0 ? value : pow(value,gamma));
}
|
static inline double gamma_pow(const double value,const double gamma)
{
return(value < 0.0 ? value : pow(value,gamma));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16435
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16435/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/768f70ca405cd3159d990e962d54456773bb8cf8
|
768f70ca405cd3159d990e962d54456773bb8cf8
|
Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
|
const char* CMSEXPORT cmsIT8GetDataRowCol(cmsHANDLE hIT8, int row, int col)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
_cmsAssert(hIT8 != NULL);
return GetData(it8, row, col);
}
|
const char* CMSEXPORT cmsIT8GetDataRowCol(cmsHANDLE hIT8, int row, int col)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
_cmsAssert(hIT8 != NULL);
return GetData(it8, row, col);
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9666
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9666/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=257c270bd25e15890190a28a1456e7623bba4439
|
257c270bd25e15890190a28a1456e7623bba4439
| null |
tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
FT_Byte* p,
FT_Byte* limit,
FT_Int x_pos,
FT_Int y_pos )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Byte* line;
FT_Int bit_height, bit_width, pitch, width, height, line_bits, h;
FT_Bitmap* bitmap;
/* check that we can write the glyph into the bitmap */
bitmap = decoder->bitmap;
bit_width = bitmap->width;
bit_height = bitmap->rows;
pitch = bitmap->pitch;
line = bitmap->buffer;
width = decoder->metrics->width;
height = decoder->metrics->height;
line_bits = width * decoder->bit_depth;
if ( x_pos < 0 || x_pos + width > bit_width ||
y_pos < 0 || y_pos + height > bit_height )
{
FT_TRACE1(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned:"
" invalid bitmap dimensions\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
if ( p + ( ( line_bits + 7 ) >> 3 ) * height > limit )
{
FT_TRACE1(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned: broken bitmap\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now do the blit */
line += y_pos * pitch + ( x_pos >> 3 );
x_pos &= 7;
if ( x_pos == 0 ) /* the easy one */
{
for ( h = height; h > 0; h--, line += pitch )
{
FT_Byte* pwrite = line;
FT_Int w;
for ( w = line_bits; w >= 8; w -= 8 )
{
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | *p++ );
pwrite += 1;
}
if ( w > 0 )
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( *p++ & ( 0xFF00U >> w ) ) );
}
}
else /* x_pos > 0 */
{
for ( h = height; h > 0; h--, line += pitch )
{
FT_Byte* pwrite = line;
FT_Int w;
FT_UInt wval = 0;
for ( w = line_bits; w >= 8; w -= 8 )
{
wval = (FT_UInt)( wval | *p++ );
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
pwrite += 1;
wval <<= 8;
}
if ( w > 0 )
wval = (FT_UInt)( wval | ( *p++ & ( 0xFF00U >> w ) ) );
/* all bits read and there are `x_pos + w' bits to be written */
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
if ( x_pos + w > 8 )
{
pwrite++;
wval <<= 8;
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
}
}
}
Exit:
if ( !error )
FT_TRACE3(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned: loaded\n" ));
return error;
}
|
tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned( TT_SBitDecoder decoder,
FT_Byte* p,
FT_Byte* limit,
FT_Int x_pos,
FT_Int y_pos )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Byte* line;
FT_Int bit_height, bit_width, pitch, width, height, line_bits, h;
FT_Bitmap* bitmap;
/* check that we can write the glyph into the bitmap */
bitmap = decoder->bitmap;
bit_width = bitmap->width;
bit_height = bitmap->rows;
pitch = bitmap->pitch;
line = bitmap->buffer;
width = decoder->metrics->width;
height = decoder->metrics->height;
line_bits = width * decoder->bit_depth;
if ( x_pos < 0 || x_pos + width > bit_width ||
y_pos < 0 || y_pos + height > bit_height )
{
FT_TRACE1(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned:"
" invalid bitmap dimensions\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
if ( p + ( ( line_bits + 7 ) >> 3 ) * height > limit )
{
FT_TRACE1(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned: broken bitmap\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now do the blit */
line += y_pos * pitch + ( x_pos >> 3 );
x_pos &= 7;
if ( x_pos == 0 ) /* the easy one */
{
for ( h = height; h > 0; h--, line += pitch )
{
FT_Byte* pwrite = line;
FT_Int w;
for ( w = line_bits; w >= 8; w -= 8 )
{
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | *p++ );
pwrite += 1;
}
if ( w > 0 )
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( *p++ & ( 0xFF00U >> w ) ) );
}
}
else /* x_pos > 0 */
{
for ( h = height; h > 0; h--, line += pitch )
{
FT_Byte* pwrite = line;
FT_Int w;
FT_UInt wval = 0;
for ( w = line_bits; w >= 8; w -= 8 )
{
wval = (FT_UInt)( wval | *p++ );
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
pwrite += 1;
wval <<= 8;
}
if ( w > 0 )
wval = (FT_UInt)( wval | ( *p++ & ( 0xFF00U >> w ) ) );
/* all bits read and there are `x_pos + w' bits to be written */
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
if ( x_pos + w > 8 )
{
pwrite++;
wval <<= 8;
pwrite[0] = (FT_Byte)( pwrite[0] | ( wval >> x_pos ) );
}
}
}
Exit:
if ( !error )
FT_TRACE3(( "tt_sbit_decoder_load_byte_aligned: loaded\n" ));
return error;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6791/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
bool WakeOnWifiEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(kDisableWakeOnWifi);
}
|
bool WakeOnWifiEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(kDisableWakeOnWifi);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
bool SafeSock :: init_MD(CONDOR_MD_MODE /* mode */, KeyInfo * key, const char * keyId)
{
bool inited = true;
if (mdChecker_) {
delete mdChecker_;
mdChecker_ = 0;
}
if (key) {
mdChecker_ = new Condor_MD_MAC(key);
}
if (_longMsg) {
inited = _longMsg->verifyMD(mdChecker_);
}
else {
inited = _shortMsg.verifyMD(mdChecker_);
}
if( !_outMsg.init_MD(keyId) ) {
inited = false;
}
return inited;
}
|
bool SafeSock :: init_MD(CONDOR_MD_MODE /* mode */, KeyInfo * key, const char * keyId)
{
bool inited = true;
if (mdChecker_) {
delete mdChecker_;
mdChecker_ = 0;
}
if (key) {
mdChecker_ = new Condor_MD_MAC(key);
}
if (_longMsg) {
inited = _longMsg->verifyMD(mdChecker_);
}
else {
inited = _shortMsg.verifyMD(mdChecker_);
}
if( !_outMsg.init_MD(keyId) ) {
inited = false;
}
return inited;
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5688
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5688/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
aecd0ada163a4d6c769cec178955d5f3e9316f2f
|
Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
|
static const Quantum *GetVirtualPixelsCache(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(GetVirtualPixelsNexus(image->cache,cache_info->nexus_info[id]));
}
|
static const Quantum *GetVirtualPixelsCache(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(GetVirtualPixelsNexus(image->cache,cache_info->nexus_info[id]));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3188
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3188/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
6e5714eaf77d79ae1c8b47e3e040ff5411b717ec
|
net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static inline int compare_netns(struct rtable *rt1, struct rtable *rt2)
{
return net_eq(dev_net(rt1->dst.dev), dev_net(rt2->dst.dev));
}
|
static inline int compare_netns(struct rtable *rt1, struct rtable *rt2)
{
return net_eq(dev_net(rt1->dst.dev), dev_net(rt2->dst.dev));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
V8Proxy::V8Proxy(Frame* frame)
: m_frame(frame)
, m_windowShell(V8DOMWindowShell::create(frame))
{
}
|
V8Proxy::V8Proxy(Frame* frame)
: m_frame(frame)
, m_windowShell(V8DOMWindowShell::create(frame))
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7539/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=ff82911cd3f69f028f2537825c9720ff78bc3f19
|
ff82911cd3f69f028f2537825c9720ff78bc3f19
| null |
ssize_t nbd_wr_syncv(QIOChannel *ioc,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t niov,
size_t length,
bool do_read)
{
ssize_t done = 0;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct iovec *local_iov = g_new(struct iovec, niov);
struct iovec *local_iov_head = local_iov;
unsigned int nlocal_iov = niov;
nlocal_iov = iov_copy(local_iov, nlocal_iov, iov, niov, 0, length);
while (nlocal_iov > 0) {
ssize_t len;
if (do_read) {
len = qio_channel_readv(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
} else {
len = qio_channel_writev(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
}
if (len == QIO_CHANNEL_ERR_BLOCK) {
if (qemu_in_coroutine()) {
qio_channel_yield(ioc, do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
continue;
}
if (len < 0) {
TRACE("I/O error: %s", error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
/* XXX handle Error objects */
done = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (do_read && len == 0) {
break;
}
iov_discard_front(&local_iov, &nlocal_iov, len);
done += len;
}
|
ssize_t nbd_wr_syncv(QIOChannel *ioc,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t niov,
size_t length,
bool do_read)
{
ssize_t done = 0;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct iovec *local_iov = g_new(struct iovec, niov);
struct iovec *local_iov_head = local_iov;
unsigned int nlocal_iov = niov;
nlocal_iov = iov_copy(local_iov, nlocal_iov, iov, niov, 0, length);
while (nlocal_iov > 0) {
ssize_t len;
if (do_read) {
len = qio_channel_readv(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
} else {
len = qio_channel_writev(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
}
if (len == QIO_CHANNEL_ERR_BLOCK) {
if (qemu_in_coroutine()) {
/* XXX figure out if we can create a variant on
* qio_channel_yield() that works with AIO contexts
* and consider using that in this branch */
qemu_coroutine_yield();
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
continue;
}
if (len < 0) {
TRACE("I/O error: %s", error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
/* XXX handle Error objects */
done = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (do_read && len == 0) {
break;
}
iov_discard_front(&local_iov, &nlocal_iov, len);
done += len;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0592/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/acc192347665943ca674acf117e4f74a88436922
|
acc192347665943ca674acf117e4f74a88436922
|
FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
|
status_t FLACSource::read(
MediaBuffer **outBuffer, const ReadOptions *options)
{
MediaBuffer *buffer;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if ((NULL != options) && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
FLAC__uint64 sample;
if (seekTimeUs <= 0LL) {
sample = 0LL;
} else {
sample = (seekTimeUs * mParser->getSampleRate()) / 1000000LL;
if (sample >= mParser->getTotalSamples()) {
sample = mParser->getTotalSamples();
}
}
buffer = mParser->readBuffer(sample);
} else {
buffer = mParser->readBuffer();
}
*outBuffer = buffer;
return buffer != NULL ? (status_t) OK : (status_t) ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
|
status_t FLACSource::read(
MediaBuffer **outBuffer, const ReadOptions *options)
{
MediaBuffer *buffer;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if ((NULL != options) && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
FLAC__uint64 sample;
if (seekTimeUs <= 0LL) {
sample = 0LL;
} else {
sample = (seekTimeUs * mParser->getSampleRate()) / 1000000LL;
if (sample >= mParser->getTotalSamples()) {
sample = mParser->getTotalSamples();
}
}
buffer = mParser->readBuffer(sample);
} else {
buffer = mParser->readBuffer();
}
*outBuffer = buffer;
return buffer != NULL ? (status_t) OK : (status_t) ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4623/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
|
void ssl_set_renegotiation( ssl_context *ssl, int renegotiation )
{
ssl->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation;
}
|
void ssl_set_renegotiation( ssl_context *ssl, int renegotiation )
{
ssl->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation;
}
|
C
|
polarssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18241
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982
|
f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
|
static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode,
struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct inmem_pages *cur, *tmp;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cur, tmp, head, list) {
struct page *page = cur->page;
if (drop)
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_DROP);
lock_page(page);
if (recover) {
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct node_info ni;
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_REVOKE);
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (get_dnode_of_data(&dn, page->index, LOOKUP_NODE)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto next;
}
get_node_info(sbi, dn.nid, &ni);
f2fs_replace_block(sbi, &dn, dn.data_blkaddr,
cur->old_addr, ni.version, true, true);
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
}
next:
/* we don't need to invalidate this in the sccessful status */
if (drop || recover)
ClearPageUptodate(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
ClearPagePrivate(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
list_del(&cur->list);
kmem_cache_free(inmem_entry_slab, cur);
dec_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
}
return err;
}
|
static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode,
struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct inmem_pages *cur, *tmp;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cur, tmp, head, list) {
struct page *page = cur->page;
if (drop)
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_DROP);
lock_page(page);
if (recover) {
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct node_info ni;
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_REVOKE);
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (get_dnode_of_data(&dn, page->index, LOOKUP_NODE)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto next;
}
get_node_info(sbi, dn.nid, &ni);
f2fs_replace_block(sbi, &dn, dn.data_blkaddr,
cur->old_addr, ni.version, true, true);
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
}
next:
/* we don't need to invalidate this in the sccessful status */
if (drop || recover)
ClearPageUptodate(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
ClearPagePrivate(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
list_del(&cur->list);
kmem_cache_free(inmem_entry_slab, cur);
dec_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
}
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/irssi/irssi/commit/77b2631c78461965bc9a7414aae206b5c514e1b3
|
77b2631c78461965bc9a7414aae206b5c514e1b3
|
Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
|
void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
signal_add("server disconnected", (SIGNAL_FUNC) sig_server_disconnected);
}
|
void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
}
|
C
|
irssi
| 1 |
CVE-2016-4482
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4482/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee
|
USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void destroy_async_on_interface(struct usb_dev_state *ps,
unsigned int ifnum)
{
struct list_head *p, *q, hitlist;
unsigned long flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hitlist);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
list_for_each_safe(p, q, &ps->async_pending)
if (ifnum == list_entry(p, struct async, asynclist)->ifnum)
list_move_tail(p, &hitlist);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
destroy_async(ps, &hitlist);
}
|
static void destroy_async_on_interface(struct usb_dev_state *ps,
unsigned int ifnum)
{
struct list_head *p, *q, hitlist;
unsigned long flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hitlist);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ps->lock, flags);
list_for_each_safe(p, q, &ps->async_pending)
if (ifnum == list_entry(p, struct async, asynclist)->ifnum)
list_move_tail(p, &hitlist);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ps->lock, flags);
destroy_async(ps, &hitlist);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6663
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6663/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fb5dce12f0462056fc9f66967b0f7b2b7bcd88f5
|
fb5dce12f0462056fc9f66967b0f7b2b7bcd88f5
|
One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
|
UserBoardView* OobeUI::GetUserBoardScreenActor() {
return user_board_screen_handler_;
}
|
UserBoardView* OobeUI::GetUserBoardScreenActor() {
return user_board_screen_handler_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0723
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0723/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439
|
tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
struct device *tty_register_device(struct tty_driver *driver, unsigned index,
struct device *device)
{
return tty_register_device_attr(driver, index, device, NULL, NULL);
}
|
struct device *tty_register_device(struct tty_driver *driver, unsigned index,
struct device *device)
{
return tty_register_device_attr(driver, index, device, NULL, NULL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GpuCommandBufferMemoryTracker(GpuChannel* channel) {
gpu_memory_manager_tracking_group_ = new GpuMemoryTrackingGroup(
channel->renderer_pid(),
this,
channel->gpu_channel_manager()->gpu_memory_manager());
}
|
GpuCommandBufferMemoryTracker(GpuChannel* channel) {
gpu_memory_manager_tracking_group_ = new GpuMemoryTrackingGroup(
channel->renderer_pid(),
this,
channel->gpu_channel_manager()->gpu_memory_manager());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6991
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6991/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
3bfe67c9c4b45eb713326aae7a67c8f7390dae08
|
sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
|
static int addToSavepointBitvecs(Pager *pPager, Pgno pgno){
int ii; /* Loop counter */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Result code */
for(ii=0; ii<pPager->nSavepoint; ii++){
PagerSavepoint *p = &pPager->aSavepoint[ii];
if( pgno<=p->nOrig ){
rc |= sqlite3BitvecSet(p->pInSavepoint, pgno);
testcase( rc==SQLITE_NOMEM );
assert( rc==SQLITE_OK || rc==SQLITE_NOMEM );
}
}
return rc;
}
|
static int addToSavepointBitvecs(Pager *pPager, Pgno pgno){
int ii; /* Loop counter */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Result code */
for(ii=0; ii<pPager->nSavepoint; ii++){
PagerSavepoint *p = &pPager->aSavepoint[ii];
if( pgno<=p->nOrig ){
rc |= sqlite3BitvecSet(p->pInSavepoint, pgno);
testcase( rc==SQLITE_NOMEM );
assert( rc==SQLITE_OK || rc==SQLITE_NOMEM );
}
}
return rc;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2390
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2390/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
c50ac050811d6485616a193eb0f37bfbd191cc89
|
hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t nr_hugepages_mempolicy_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
return nr_hugepages_store_common(true, kobj, attr, buf, len);
}
|
static ssize_t nr_hugepages_mempolicy_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
{
return nr_hugepages_store_common(true, kobj, attr, buf, len);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9888/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libgsf/commit/95a8351a75758cf10b3bf6abae0b6b461f90d9e5
|
95a8351a75758cf10b3bf6abae0b6b461f90d9e5
|
tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
|
gsf_infile_tar_finalize (GObject *obj)
{
GsfInfileTar *tar = GSF_INFILE_TAR (obj);
g_array_free (tar->children, TRUE);
parent_class->finalize (obj);
}
|
gsf_infile_tar_finalize (GObject *obj)
{
GsfInfileTar *tar = GSF_INFILE_TAR (obj);
g_array_free (tar->children, TRUE);
parent_class->finalize (obj);
}
|
C
|
libgsf
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0884
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0884/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
4c39b8e5670c4a0f2bb06008502ebb0c4fe322e0
|
[4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::dispatchMouseEvent(const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
m_generatingEvent = true;
WebMouseEvent webEvent = WebMouseEventBuilder(m_webViewImpl->mainFrameImpl()->frameView(), event);
m_webViewImpl->handleInputEvent(webEvent);
m_generatingEvent = false;
}
|
void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::dispatchMouseEvent(const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
m_generatingEvent = true;
WebMouseEvent webEvent = WebMouseEventBuilder(m_webViewImpl->mainFrameImpl()->frameView(), event);
m_webViewImpl->handleInputEvent(webEvent);
m_generatingEvent = false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6001
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6001/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290
|
perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Min Chong <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_event *child_event, *next;
WARN_ON_ONCE(child != current);
child_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(child, ctxn);
if (!child_ctx)
return;
/*
* In order to reduce the amount of tricky in ctx tear-down, we hold
* ctx::mutex over the entire thing. This serializes against almost
* everything that wants to access the ctx.
*
* The exception is sys_perf_event_open() /
* perf_event_create_kernel_count() which does find_get_context()
* without ctx::mutex (it cannot because of the move_group double mutex
* lock thing). See the comments in perf_install_in_context().
*/
mutex_lock(&child_ctx->mutex);
/*
* In a single ctx::lock section, de-schedule the events and detach the
* context from the task such that we cannot ever get it scheduled back
* in.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
task_ctx_sched_out(__get_cpu_context(child_ctx), child_ctx);
/*
* Now that the context is inactive, destroy the task <-> ctx relation
* and mark the context dead.
*/
RCU_INIT_POINTER(child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], NULL);
put_ctx(child_ctx); /* cannot be last */
WRITE_ONCE(child_ctx->task, TASK_TOMBSTONE);
put_task_struct(current); /* cannot be last */
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(child_ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
/*
* Report the task dead after unscheduling the events so that we
* won't get any samples after PERF_RECORD_EXIT. We can however still
* get a few PERF_RECORD_READ events.
*/
perf_event_task(child, child_ctx, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list, event_entry)
perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx, child);
mutex_unlock(&child_ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(child_ctx);
}
|
static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_event *child_event, *next;
WARN_ON_ONCE(child != current);
child_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(child, ctxn);
if (!child_ctx)
return;
/*
* In order to reduce the amount of tricky in ctx tear-down, we hold
* ctx::mutex over the entire thing. This serializes against almost
* everything that wants to access the ctx.
*
* The exception is sys_perf_event_open() /
* perf_event_create_kernel_count() which does find_get_context()
* without ctx::mutex (it cannot because of the move_group double mutex
* lock thing). See the comments in perf_install_in_context().
*/
mutex_lock(&child_ctx->mutex);
/*
* In a single ctx::lock section, de-schedule the events and detach the
* context from the task such that we cannot ever get it scheduled back
* in.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
task_ctx_sched_out(__get_cpu_context(child_ctx), child_ctx);
/*
* Now that the context is inactive, destroy the task <-> ctx relation
* and mark the context dead.
*/
RCU_INIT_POINTER(child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], NULL);
put_ctx(child_ctx); /* cannot be last */
WRITE_ONCE(child_ctx->task, TASK_TOMBSTONE);
put_task_struct(current); /* cannot be last */
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(child_ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
/*
* Report the task dead after unscheduling the events so that we
* won't get any samples after PERF_RECORD_EXIT. We can however still
* get a few PERF_RECORD_READ events.
*/
perf_event_task(child, child_ctx, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list, event_entry)
perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx, child);
mutex_unlock(&child_ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(child_ctx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void mipspmu_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
if (!mipspmu)
return;
if (flags & PERF_EF_RELOAD)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE));
hwc->state = 0;
/* Set the period for the event. */
mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, hwc->idx);
/* Enable the event. */
mipspmu->enable_event(hwc, hwc->idx);
}
|
static void mipspmu_start(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
if (!mipspmu)
return;
if (flags & PERF_EF_RELOAD)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(hwc->state & PERF_HES_UPTODATE));
hwc->state = 0;
/* Set the period for the event. */
mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, hwc->idx);
/* Enable the event. */
mipspmu->enable_event(hwc, hwc->idx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15391
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15391/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
f1afce25b3f94d8bddec69b08ffbc29b989ad844
|
[Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
|
const extensions::Extension* GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
const ExtensionSet& extensions, const GURL& url) {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (extension && extension->from_bookmark())
extension = NULL;
return extension;
}
|
const extensions::Extension* GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
const ExtensionSet& extensions, const GURL& url) {
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions.GetExtensionOrAppByURL(url);
if (extension && extension->from_bookmark())
extension = NULL;
return extension;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetTreeLayerOpacityMutated(ElementId element_id,
LayerTreeImpl* tree,
float opacity) {
if (!tree)
return;
PropertyTrees* property_trees = tree->property_trees();
DCHECK_EQ(1u,
property_trees->element_id_to_effect_node_index.count(element_id));
const int effect_node_index =
property_trees->element_id_to_effect_node_index[element_id];
property_trees->effect_tree.OnOpacityAnimated(opacity, effect_node_index,
tree);
}
|
void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetTreeLayerOpacityMutated(ElementId element_id,
LayerTreeImpl* tree,
float opacity) {
if (!tree)
return;
PropertyTrees* property_trees = tree->property_trees();
DCHECK_EQ(1u,
property_trees->element_id_to_effect_node_index.count(element_id));
const int effect_node_index =
property_trees->element_id_to_effect_node_index[element_id];
property_trees->effect_tree.OnOpacityAnimated(opacity, effect_node_index,
tree);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static void btif_hl_proc_reg_request(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 app_id,
tBTA_HL_REG_PARAM *p_reg_param,
tBTA_HL_CBACK *p_cback){
UNUSED(p_cback);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_idx=%d app_id=%d", __FUNCTION__, app_idx, app_id);
if(reg_counter >1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_proc_reg_request: calling uPDATE");
BTA_HlUpdate(app_id, p_reg_param,TRUE, btif_hl_cback);
}
else
BTA_HlRegister(app_id, p_reg_param, btif_hl_cback);
}
|
static void btif_hl_proc_reg_request(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 app_id,
tBTA_HL_REG_PARAM *p_reg_param,
tBTA_HL_CBACK *p_cback){
UNUSED(p_cback);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_idx=%d app_id=%d", __FUNCTION__, app_idx, app_id);
if(reg_counter >1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_proc_reg_request: calling uPDATE");
BTA_HlUpdate(app_id, p_reg_param,TRUE, btif_hl_cback);
}
else
BTA_HlRegister(app_id, p_reg_param, btif_hl_cback);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
WebWidget* RenderViewImpl::CreatePopup(blink::WebLocalFrame* creator,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderWidget* widget = RenderWidget::CreateForPopup(
this, compositor_deps_, popup_type, screen_info_,
creator->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnthrottled));
if (!widget)
return nullptr;
if (screen_metrics_emulator_) {
widget->SetPopupOriginAdjustmentsForEmulation(
screen_metrics_emulator_.get());
}
return widget->GetWebWidget();
}
|
WebWidget* RenderViewImpl::CreatePopup(blink::WebLocalFrame* creator,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderWidget* widget = RenderWidget::CreateForPopup(
this, compositor_deps_, popup_type, screen_info_,
creator->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnthrottled));
if (!widget)
return nullptr;
if (screen_metrics_emulator_) {
widget->SetPopupOriginAdjustmentsForEmulation(
screen_metrics_emulator_.get());
}
return widget->GetWebWidget();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7421
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b
|
crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int xts_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, long func,
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
unsigned int offset = (xts_ctx->key_len >> 1) & 0x10;
int ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
unsigned int n;
u8 *in, *out;
struct pcc_param pcc_param;
struct {
u8 key[32];
u8 init[16];
} xts_param;
if (!nbytes)
goto out;
memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block));
memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit));
memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts));
memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
memcpy(pcc_param.key, xts_ctx->pcc_key, 32);
ret = crypt_s390_pcc(func, &pcc_param.key[offset]);
if (ret < 0)
return -EIO;
memcpy(xts_param.key, xts_ctx->key, 32);
memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
do {
/* only use complete blocks */
n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
out = walk->dst.virt.addr;
in = walk->src.virt.addr;
ret = crypt_s390_km(func, &xts_param.key[offset], out, in, n);
if (ret < 0 || ret != n)
return -EIO;
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes);
} while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes));
out:
return ret;
}
|
static int xts_aes_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, long func,
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
unsigned int offset = (xts_ctx->key_len >> 1) & 0x10;
int ret = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
unsigned int n;
u8 *in, *out;
struct pcc_param pcc_param;
struct {
u8 key[32];
u8 init[16];
} xts_param;
if (!nbytes)
goto out;
memset(pcc_param.block, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.block));
memset(pcc_param.bit, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.bit));
memset(pcc_param.xts, 0, sizeof(pcc_param.xts));
memcpy(pcc_param.tweak, walk->iv, sizeof(pcc_param.tweak));
memcpy(pcc_param.key, xts_ctx->pcc_key, 32);
ret = crypt_s390_pcc(func, &pcc_param.key[offset]);
if (ret < 0)
return -EIO;
memcpy(xts_param.key, xts_ctx->key, 32);
memcpy(xts_param.init, pcc_param.xts, 16);
do {
/* only use complete blocks */
n = nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
out = walk->dst.virt.addr;
in = walk->src.virt.addr;
ret = crypt_s390_km(func, &xts_param.key[offset], out, in, n);
if (ret < 0 || ret != n)
return -EIO;
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
ret = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes);
} while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes));
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual bool wifi_connecting() const { return false; }
|
virtual bool wifi_connecting() const { return false; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9114
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9114/
|
CWE-77
|
https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc
|
89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc
|
libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
|
static void safe_print(const char *cp, int len, const char *esc)
{
unsigned char ch;
if (len < 0)
len = strlen(cp);
while (len--) {
ch = *cp++;
if (!raw_chars) {
if (ch >= 128) {
fputs("M-", stdout);
ch -= 128;
}
if ((ch < 32) || (ch == 0x7f)) {
fputc('^', stdout);
ch ^= 0x40; /* ^@, ^A, ^B; ^? for DEL */
} else if (esc && strchr(esc, ch))
fputc('\\', stdout);
}
fputc(ch, stdout);
}
}
|
static void safe_print(const char *cp, int len, const char *esc)
{
unsigned char ch;
if (len < 0)
len = strlen(cp);
while (len--) {
ch = *cp++;
if (!raw_chars) {
if (ch >= 128) {
fputs("M-", stdout);
ch -= 128;
}
if ((ch < 32) || (ch == 0x7f)) {
fputc('^', stdout);
ch ^= 0x40; /* ^@, ^A, ^B; ^? for DEL */
} else if (esc && strchr(esc, ch))
fputc('\\', stdout);
}
fputc(ch, stdout);
}
}
|
C
|
util-linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_write_find_filter(png_structp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info)
{
png_bytep best_row;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_bytep prev_row, row_buf;
png_uint_32 mins, bpp;
png_byte filter_to_do = png_ptr->do_filter;
png_uint_32 row_bytes = row_info->rowbytes;
png_debug(1, "in png_write_find_filter");
/* Find out how many bytes offset each pixel is */
bpp = (row_info->pixel_depth + 7) >> 3;
prev_row = png_ptr->prev_row;
#endif
best_row = png_ptr->row_buf;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
row_buf = best_row;
mins = PNG_MAXSUM;
/* The prediction method we use is to find which method provides the
* smallest value when summing the absolute values of the distances
* from zero, using anything >= 128 as negative numbers. This is known
* as the "minimum sum of absolute differences" heuristic. Other
* heuristics are the "weighted minimum sum of absolute differences"
* (experimental and can in theory improve compression), and the "zlib
* predictive" method (not implemented yet), which does test compressions
* of lines using different filter methods, and then chooses the
* (series of) filter(s) that give minimum compressed data size (VERY
* computationally expensive).
*
* GRR 980525: consider also
* (1) minimum sum of absolute differences from running average (i.e.,
* keep running sum of non-absolute differences & count of bytes)
* [track dispersion, too? restart average if dispersion too large?]
* (1b) minimum sum of absolute differences from sliding average, probably
* with window size <= deflate window (usually 32K)
* (2) minimum sum of squared differences from zero or running average
* (i.e., ~ root-mean-square approach)
*/
/* We don't need to test the 'no filter' case if this is the only filter
* that has been chosen, as it doesn't actually do anything to the data.
*/
if ((filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_NONE) &&
filter_to_do != PNG_FILTER_NONE)
{
png_bytep rp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++, rp++)
{
v = *rp;
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
mins = sum;
}
/* Sub filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_SUB)
/* It's the only filter so no testing is needed */
{
png_bytep rp, lp, dp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->sub_row + 1; i < bpp;
i++, rp++, dp++)
{
*dp = *rp;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, lp++, dp++)
{
*dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*lp) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->sub_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->sub_row + 1; i < bpp;
i++, rp++, dp++)
{
v = *dp = *rp;
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, lp++, dp++)
{
v = *dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*lp) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->sub_row;
}
}
/* Up filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->up_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, pp++, dp++)
{
*dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*pp) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->up_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->up_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->up_row;
}
}
/* Avg filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, lp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->avg_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - ((int)*pp++ / 2)) & 0xff);
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (((int)*pp++ + (int)*lp++) / 2))
& 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->avg_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->avg_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - ((int)*pp++ / 2)) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
v = *dp++ =
(png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (((int)*pp++ + (int)*lp++) / 2)) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->avg_row;
}
}
/* Paeth filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, cp, lp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->paeth_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1, cp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
int a, b, c, pa, pb, pc, p;
b = *pp++;
c = *cp++;
a = *lp++;
p = b - c;
pc = a - c;
#ifdef PNG_USE_ABS
pa = abs(p);
pb = abs(pc);
pc = abs(p + pc);
#else
pa = p < 0 ? -p : p;
pb = pc < 0 ? -pc : pc;
pc = (p + pc) < 0 ? -(p + pc) : p + pc;
#endif
p = (pa <= pb && pa <=pc) ? a : (pb <= pc) ? b : c;
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - p) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->paeth_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, cp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->paeth_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1, cp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
int a, b, c, pa, pb, pc, p;
b = *pp++;
c = *cp++;
a = *lp++;
#ifndef PNG_SLOW_PAETH
p = b - c;
pc = a - c;
#ifdef PNG_USE_ABS
pa = abs(p);
pb = abs(pc);
pc = abs(p + pc);
#else
pa = p < 0 ? -p : p;
pb = pc < 0 ? -pc : pc;
pc = (p + pc) < 0 ? -(p + pc) : p + pc;
#endif
p = (pa <= pb && pa <=pc) ? a : (pb <= pc) ? b : c;
#else /* PNG_SLOW_PAETH */
p = a + b - c;
pa = abs(p - a);
pb = abs(p - b);
pc = abs(p - c);
if (pa <= pb && pa <= pc)
p = a;
else if (pb <= pc)
p = b;
else
p = c;
#endif /* PNG_SLOW_PAETH */
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - p) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
if (sum < mins)
{
best_row = png_ptr->paeth_row;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
/* Do the actual writing of the filtered row data from the chosen filter. */
png_write_filtered_row(png_ptr, best_row);
}
|
png_write_find_filter(png_structp png_ptr, png_row_infop row_info)
{
png_bytep best_row;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_bytep prev_row, row_buf;
png_uint_32 mins, bpp;
png_byte filter_to_do = png_ptr->do_filter;
png_uint_32 row_bytes = row_info->rowbytes;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
int num_p_filters = (int)png_ptr->num_prev_filters;
#endif
png_debug(1, "in png_write_find_filter");
#ifndef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->row_number == 0 && filter_to_do == PNG_ALL_FILTERS)
{
/* These will never be selected so we need not test them. */
filter_to_do &= ~(PNG_FILTER_UP | PNG_FILTER_PAETH);
}
#endif
/* Find out how many bytes offset each pixel is */
bpp = (row_info->pixel_depth + 7) >> 3;
prev_row = png_ptr->prev_row;
#endif
best_row = png_ptr->row_buf;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
row_buf = best_row;
mins = PNG_MAXSUM;
/* The prediction method we use is to find which method provides the
* smallest value when summing the absolute values of the distances
* from zero, using anything >= 128 as negative numbers. This is known
* as the "minimum sum of absolute differences" heuristic. Other
* heuristics are the "weighted minimum sum of absolute differences"
* (experimental and can in theory improve compression), and the "zlib
* predictive" method (not implemented yet), which does test compressions
* of lines using different filter methods, and then chooses the
* (series of) filter(s) that give minimum compressed data size (VERY
* computationally expensive).
*
* GRR 980525: consider also
* (1) minimum sum of absolute differences from running average (i.e.,
* keep running sum of non-absolute differences & count of bytes)
* [track dispersion, too? restart average if dispersion too large?]
* (1b) minimum sum of absolute differences from sliding average, probably
* with window size <= deflate window (usually 32K)
* (2) minimum sum of squared differences from zero or running average
* (i.e., ~ root-mean-square approach)
*/
/* We don't need to test the 'no filter' case if this is the only filter
* that has been chosen, as it doesn't actually do anything to the data.
*/
if ((filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_NONE) &&
filter_to_do != PNG_FILTER_NONE)
{
png_bytep rp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++, rp++)
{
v = *rp;
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
png_uint_32 sumhi, sumlo;
int j;
sumlo = sum & PNG_LOMASK;
sumhi = (sum >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK; /* Gives us some footroom */
/* Reduce the sum if we match any of the previous rows */
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE)
{
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
/* Factor in the cost of this filter (this is here for completeness,
* but it makes no sense to have a "cost" for the NONE filter, as
* it has the minimum possible computational cost - none).
*/
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (sumhi > PNG_HIMASK)
sum = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
sum = (sumhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + sumlo;
}
#endif
mins = sum;
}
/* Sub filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_SUB)
/* It's the only filter so no testing is needed */
{
png_bytep rp, lp, dp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->sub_row + 1; i < bpp;
i++, rp++, dp++)
{
*dp = *rp;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, lp++, dp++)
{
*dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*lp) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->sub_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_SUB)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* We temporarily increase the "minimum sum" by the factor we
* would reduce the sum of this filter, so that we can do the
* early exit comparison without scaling the sum each time.
*/
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 lmhi, lmlo;
lmlo = lmins & PNG_LOMASK;
lmhi = (lmins >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB)
{
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (lmhi > PNG_HIMASK)
lmins = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
lmins = (lmhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + lmlo;
}
#endif
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->sub_row + 1; i < bpp;
i++, rp++, dp++)
{
v = *dp = *rp;
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, lp++, dp++)
{
v = *dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*lp) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 sumhi, sumlo;
sumlo = sum & PNG_LOMASK;
sumhi = (sum >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB)
{
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (sumhi > PNG_HIMASK)
sum = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
sum = (sumhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + sumlo;
}
#endif
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->sub_row;
}
}
/* Up filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->up_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes;
i++, rp++, pp++, dp++)
{
*dp = (png_byte)(((int)*rp - (int)*pp) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->up_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_UP)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 lmhi, lmlo;
lmlo = lmins & PNG_LOMASK;
lmhi = (lmins >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP)
{
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (lmhi > PNG_HIMASK)
lmins = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
lmins = (lmhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + lmlo;
}
#endif
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->up_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 sumhi, sumlo;
sumlo = sum & PNG_LOMASK;
sumhi = (sum >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP)
{
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (sumhi > PNG_HIMASK)
sum = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
sum = (sumhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + sumlo;
}
#endif
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->up_row;
}
}
/* Avg filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, lp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->avg_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - ((int)*pp++ / 2)) & 0xff);
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (((int)*pp++ + (int)*lp++) / 2))
& 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->avg_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_AVG)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 lmhi, lmlo;
lmlo = lmins & PNG_LOMASK;
lmhi = (lmins >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG)
{
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (lmhi > PNG_HIMASK)
lmins = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
lmins = (lmhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + lmlo;
}
#endif
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->avg_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - ((int)*pp++ / 2)) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
v = *dp++ =
(png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (((int)*pp++ + (int)*lp++) / 2)) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 sumhi, sumlo;
sumlo = sum & PNG_LOMASK;
sumhi = (sum >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_NONE)
{
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (sumhi > PNG_HIMASK)
sum = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
sum = (sumhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + sumlo;
}
#endif
if (sum < mins)
{
mins = sum;
best_row = png_ptr->avg_row;
}
}
/* Paeth filter */
if (filter_to_do == PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, cp, lp;
png_uint_32 i;
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->paeth_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1, cp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
int a, b, c, pa, pb, pc, p;
b = *pp++;
c = *cp++;
a = *lp++;
p = b - c;
pc = a - c;
#ifdef PNG_USE_ABS
pa = abs(p);
pb = abs(pc);
pc = abs(p + pc);
#else
pa = p < 0 ? -p : p;
pb = pc < 0 ? -pc : pc;
pc = (p + pc) < 0 ? -(p + pc) : p + pc;
#endif
p = (pa <= pb && pa <=pc) ? a : (pb <= pc) ? b : c;
*dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - p) & 0xff);
}
best_row = png_ptr->paeth_row;
}
else if (filter_to_do & PNG_FILTER_PAETH)
{
png_bytep rp, dp, pp, cp, lp;
png_uint_32 sum = 0, lmins = mins;
png_uint_32 i;
int v;
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 lmhi, lmlo;
lmlo = lmins & PNG_LOMASK;
lmhi = (lmins >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH)
{
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
lmlo = (lmlo * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
lmhi = (lmhi * png_ptr->inv_filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (lmhi > PNG_HIMASK)
lmins = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
lmins = (lmhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + lmlo;
}
#endif
for (i = 0, rp = row_buf + 1, dp = png_ptr->paeth_row + 1,
pp = prev_row + 1; i < bpp; i++)
{
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - (int)*pp++) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
}
for (lp = row_buf + 1, cp = prev_row + 1; i < row_bytes; i++)
{
int a, b, c, pa, pb, pc, p;
b = *pp++;
c = *cp++;
a = *lp++;
#ifndef PNG_SLOW_PAETH
p = b - c;
pc = a - c;
#ifdef PNG_USE_ABS
pa = abs(p);
pb = abs(pc);
pc = abs(p + pc);
#else
pa = p < 0 ? -p : p;
pb = pc < 0 ? -pc : pc;
pc = (p + pc) < 0 ? -(p + pc) : p + pc;
#endif
p = (pa <= pb && pa <=pc) ? a : (pb <= pc) ? b : c;
#else /* PNG_SLOW_PAETH */
p = a + b - c;
pa = abs(p - a);
pb = abs(p - b);
pc = abs(p - c);
if (pa <= pb && pa <= pc)
p = a;
else if (pb <= pc)
p = b;
else
p = c;
#endif /* PNG_SLOW_PAETH */
v = *dp++ = (png_byte)(((int)*rp++ - p) & 0xff);
sum += (v < 128) ? v : 256 - v;
if (sum > lmins) /* We are already worse, don't continue. */
break;
}
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->heuristic_method == PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_WEIGHTED)
{
int j;
png_uint_32 sumhi, sumlo;
sumlo = sum & PNG_LOMASK;
sumhi = (sum >> PNG_HISHIFT) & PNG_HIMASK;
for (j = 0; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
if (png_ptr->prev_filters[j] == PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH)
{
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_weights[j]) >>
PNG_WEIGHT_SHIFT;
}
}
sumlo = (sumlo * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
sumhi = (sumhi * png_ptr->filter_costs[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH]) >>
PNG_COST_SHIFT;
if (sumhi > PNG_HIMASK)
sum = PNG_MAXSUM;
else
sum = (sumhi << PNG_HISHIFT) + sumlo;
}
#endif
if (sum < mins)
{
best_row = png_ptr->paeth_row;
}
}
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
/* Do the actual writing of the filtered row data from the chosen filter. */
png_write_filtered_row(png_ptr, best_row);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
/* Save the type of filter we picked this time for future calculations */
if (png_ptr->num_prev_filters > 0)
{
int j;
for (j = 1; j < num_p_filters; j++)
{
png_ptr->prev_filters[j] = png_ptr->prev_filters[j - 1];
}
png_ptr->prev_filters[j] = best_row[0];
}
#endif
#endif /* PNG_WRITE_FILTER_SUPPORTED */
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = NULL;
static struct proto prot = {.name = "PF_CAIF",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.obj_size = sizeof(struct caifsock),
};
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
* The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
* The CAIF socket is a packet stream in the sense
* that it is packet based. CAIF trusts the reliability
* of the link, no resending is implemented.
*/
if (sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)
sock->ops = &caif_seqpacket_ops;
else if (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM)
sock->ops = &caif_stream_ops;
else
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= CAIFPROTO_MAX)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
/*
* Set the socket state to unconnected. The socket state
* is really not used at all in the net/core or socket.c but the
* initialization makes sure that sock->state is not uninitialized.
*/
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_CAIF, GFP_KERNEL, &prot);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
/* Store the protocol */
sk->sk_protocol = (unsigned char) protocol;
/* Initialize default priority for well-known cases */
switch (protocol) {
case CAIFPROTO_AT:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_CONTROL;
break;
case CAIFPROTO_RFM:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE_BULK;
break;
default:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT;
}
/*
* Lock in order to try to stop someone from opening the socket
* too early.
*/
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
/* Initialize the nozero default sock structure data. */
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = caif_sock_destructor;
mutex_init(&cf_sk->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
cf_sk->layer.ctrlcmd = caif_ctrl_cb;
cf_sk->sk.sk_socket->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
cf_sk->sk.sk_state = CAIF_DISCONNECTED;
set_tx_flow_off(cf_sk);
set_rx_flow_on(cf_sk);
/* Set default options on configuration */
cf_sk->conn_req.link_selector = CAIF_LINK_LOW_LATENCY;
cf_sk->conn_req.protocol = protocol;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
}
|
static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk = NULL;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = NULL;
static struct proto prot = {.name = "PF_CAIF",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.obj_size = sizeof(struct caifsock),
};
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
* The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
* The CAIF socket is a packet stream in the sense
* that it is packet based. CAIF trusts the reliability
* of the link, no resending is implemented.
*/
if (sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)
sock->ops = &caif_seqpacket_ops;
else if (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM)
sock->ops = &caif_stream_ops;
else
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= CAIFPROTO_MAX)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
/*
* Set the socket state to unconnected. The socket state
* is really not used at all in the net/core or socket.c but the
* initialization makes sure that sock->state is not uninitialized.
*/
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_CAIF, GFP_KERNEL, &prot);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
/* Store the protocol */
sk->sk_protocol = (unsigned char) protocol;
/* Initialize default priority for well-known cases */
switch (protocol) {
case CAIFPROTO_AT:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_CONTROL;
break;
case CAIFPROTO_RFM:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_INTERACTIVE_BULK;
break;
default:
sk->sk_priority = TC_PRIO_BESTEFFORT;
}
/*
* Lock in order to try to stop someone from opening the socket
* too early.
*/
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
/* Initialize the nozero default sock structure data. */
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = caif_sock_destructor;
mutex_init(&cf_sk->readlock); /* single task reading lock */
cf_sk->layer.ctrlcmd = caif_ctrl_cb;
cf_sk->sk.sk_socket->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
cf_sk->sk.sk_state = CAIF_DISCONNECTED;
set_tx_flow_off(cf_sk);
set_rx_flow_on(cf_sk);
/* Set default options on configuration */
cf_sk->conn_req.link_selector = CAIF_LINK_LOW_LATENCY;
cf_sk->conn_req.protocol = protocol;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4914
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4914/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e0bccd315db0c2f919e7fcf9cb60db21d9986f52
|
e0bccd315db0c2f919e7fcf9cb60db21d9986f52
|
rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void rose_kill_by_neigh(struct rose_neigh *neigh)
{
struct sock *s;
struct hlist_node *node;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, node, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->neighbour == neigh) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->neighbour = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
|
void rose_kill_by_neigh(struct rose_neigh *neigh)
{
struct sock *s;
struct hlist_node *node;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
sk_for_each(s, node, &rose_list) {
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(s);
if (rose->neighbour == neigh) {
rose_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH, ROSE_OUT_OF_ORDER, 0);
rose->neighbour->use--;
rose->neighbour = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_list_lock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6784/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
|
void PageSerializer::registerRewriteURL(const String& from, const String& to)
{
m_rewriteURLs.set(from, to);
}
|
void PageSerializer::registerRewriteURL(const String& from, const String& to)
{
m_rewriteURLs.set(from, to);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
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