CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2016-6308
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6308/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=df6b5e29ffea2d5a3e08de92fb765fdb21c7a21e
|
df6b5e29ffea2d5a3e08de92fb765fdb21c7a21e
| null |
int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
unsigned int curr_mtu;
int retry = 1;
unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
/* should have something reasonable now */
return -1;
if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (s->write_hash) {
if (s->enc_write_ctx
&& (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0)
mac_size = 0;
else
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
} else
mac_size = 0;
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx);
else
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
while (s->init_num > 0) {
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
/* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
if (frag_off > 0) {
/* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
* contained the message header plus one other byte.
* Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
* |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
* wrong.
*/
return -1;
}
/*
* Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
* message header for this fragment.
*/
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
/*
* We must have been called again after a retry so use the
* fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
* to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
* that should already have been done before the retry.
*/
frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
}
}
used_len = BIO_wpending(s->wbio) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
else
curr_mtu = 0;
if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
*/
ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (ret <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
}
used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
} else {
/* Shouldn't happen */
return -1;
}
}
/*
* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
*/
if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
/*
* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
* so fail
*/
return -1;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s,
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
data[s->init_off]);
}
ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len);
if (ret < 0) {
/*
* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
* previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
* retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
* wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
*/
if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
/* Have one more go */
retry = 0;
} else
return -1;
} else {
return (-1);
}
} else {
/*
* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
* got sent. but why would this happen?
*/
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
/*
* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway
*/
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
* single fragment
*/
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret;
} else {
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen))
return -1;
}
if (ret == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
return (1);
}
s->init_off += ret;
s->init_num -= ret;
ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
frag_off += ret;
/*
* We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
* available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
* next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
* updated again later.
*/
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
}
}
return (0);
}
|
int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
unsigned int curr_mtu;
int retry = 1;
unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
/* should have something reasonable now */
return -1;
if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
(int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
if (s->write_hash) {
if (s->enc_write_ctx
&& (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0)
mac_size = 0;
else
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
} else
mac_size = 0;
if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx);
else
blocksize = 0;
frag_off = 0;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
/* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
while (s->init_num > 0) {
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
/* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
if (frag_off > 0) {
/* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
* contained the message header plus one other byte.
* Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
* |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
* wrong.
*/
return -1;
}
/*
* Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
* message header for this fragment.
*/
s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
/*
* We must have been called again after a retry so use the
* fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
* to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
* that should already have been done before the retry.
*/
frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
}
}
used_len = BIO_wpending(s->wbio) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
else
curr_mtu = 0;
if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
*/
ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (ret <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
return ret;
}
used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
} else {
/* Shouldn't happen */
return -1;
}
}
/*
* We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
*/
if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
len = curr_mtu;
else
len = s->init_num;
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
/*
* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
*/
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/*
* len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
* so fail
*/
return -1;
}
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
dtls1_write_message_header(s,
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
data[s->init_off]);
}
ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len);
if (ret < 0) {
/*
* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
* previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
* retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
* wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
*/
if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
return -1;
/* Have one more go */
retry = 0;
} else
return -1;
} else {
return (-1);
}
} else {
/*
* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
* got sent. but why would this happen?
*/
OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
/*
* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway
*/
unsigned char *p =
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
int xlen;
if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
/*
* reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
* single fragment
*/
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(0, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret;
} else {
p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
}
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen))
return -1;
}
if (ret == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
return (1);
}
s->init_off += ret;
s->init_num -= ret;
ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
frag_off += ret;
/*
* We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
* available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
* next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
* updated again later.
*/
dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
}
}
return (0);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306
|
When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
|
vrrp_garp_delay_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
unsigned delay;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &delay, 0, UINT_MAX / TIMER_HZ, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): garp_master_delay '%s' invalid - ignoring", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
vrrp->garp_delay = delay * TIMER_HZ;
}
|
vrrp_garp_delay_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
unsigned delay;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &delay, 0, UINT_MAX / TIMER_HZ, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): garp_master_delay '%s' invalid - ignoring", vrrp->iname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
vrrp->garp_delay = delay * TIMER_HZ;
}
|
C
|
keepalived
| 0 |
CVE-2017-17807
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-17807/
|
CWE-862
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b
|
4dca6ea1d9432052afb06baf2e3ae78188a4410b
|
KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However,
there is actually no permission check.
This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.
Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().
Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.
We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.
We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)
Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
|
static int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
{
struct subprocess_info *info;
info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,
umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
session_keyring);
if (!info)
return -ENOMEM;
key_get(session_keyring);
return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
}
|
static int call_usermodehelper_keys(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
{
struct subprocess_info *info;
info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, GFP_KERNEL,
umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
session_keyring);
if (!info)
return -ENOMEM;
key_get(session_keyring);
return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5697
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5697/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
|
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
void md_rdev_clear(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
if (rdev->sb_page) {
put_page(rdev->sb_page);
rdev->sb_loaded = 0;
rdev->sb_page = NULL;
rdev->sb_start = 0;
rdev->sectors = 0;
}
if (rdev->bb_page) {
put_page(rdev->bb_page);
rdev->bb_page = NULL;
}
kfree(rdev->badblocks.page);
rdev->badblocks.page = NULL;
}
|
void md_rdev_clear(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
if (rdev->sb_page) {
put_page(rdev->sb_page);
rdev->sb_loaded = 0;
rdev->sb_page = NULL;
rdev->sb_start = 0;
rdev->sectors = 0;
}
if (rdev->bb_page) {
put_page(rdev->bb_page);
rdev->bb_page = NULL;
}
kfree(rdev->badblocks.page);
rdev->badblocks.page = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778
|
[GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool AccessibilityUIElement::hasPopup() const
{
return false;
}
|
bool AccessibilityUIElement::hasPopup() const
{
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateStencilOrDepthFunc(
const char* function_name,
GLenum func) {
switch (func) {
case GL_NEVER:
case GL_LESS:
case GL_LEQUAL:
case GL_GREATER:
case GL_GEQUAL:
case GL_EQUAL:
case GL_NOTEQUAL:
case GL_ALWAYS:
return true;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid function");
return false;
}
}
|
bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateStencilOrDepthFunc(
const char* function_name,
GLenum func) {
switch (func) {
case GL_NEVER:
case GL_LESS:
case GL_LEQUAL:
case GL_GREATER:
case GL_GEQUAL:
case GL_EQUAL:
case GL_NOTEQUAL:
case GL_ALWAYS:
return true;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid function");
return false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5873
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5873/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/m6w6/ext-http/commit/3724cd76a28be1d6049b5537232e97ac
|
3724cd76a28be1d6049b5537232e97ac
|
fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
|
char *php_http_url_authority_to_string(const php_http_url_t *url, char **url_str, size_t *url_len)
{
php_http_buffer_t buf;
php_http_buffer_init(&buf);
if (url->user && *url->user) {
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->user);
if (url->pass && *url->pass) {
php_http_buffer_appends(&buf, ":");
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->pass);
}
php_http_buffer_appends(&buf, "@");
}
if (url->host && *url->host) {
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->host);
if (url->port) {
php_http_buffer_appendf(&buf, ":%hu", url->port);
}
}
php_http_buffer_shrink(&buf);
php_http_buffer_fix(&buf);
if (url_len) {
*url_len = buf.used;
}
if (url_str) {
*url_str = buf.data;
}
return buf.data;
}
|
char *php_http_url_authority_to_string(const php_http_url_t *url, char **url_str, size_t *url_len)
{
php_http_buffer_t buf;
php_http_buffer_init(&buf);
if (url->user && *url->user) {
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->user);
if (url->pass && *url->pass) {
php_http_buffer_appends(&buf, ":");
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->pass);
}
php_http_buffer_appends(&buf, "@");
}
if (url->host && *url->host) {
php_http_buffer_appendl(&buf, url->host);
if (url->port) {
php_http_buffer_appendf(&buf, ":%hu", url->port);
}
}
php_http_buffer_shrink(&buf);
php_http_buffer_fix(&buf);
if (url_len) {
*url_len = buf.used;
}
if (url_str) {
*url_str = buf.data;
}
return buf.data;
}
|
C
|
ext-http
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4650
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4650/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
7572777eef78ebdee1ecb7c258c0ef94d35bad16
|
fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
CC: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> [2.6.31+]
|
static void fuse_write_fill(struct fuse_req *req, struct fuse_file *ff,
loff_t pos, size_t count)
{
struct fuse_write_in *inarg = &req->misc.write.in;
struct fuse_write_out *outarg = &req->misc.write.out;
inarg->fh = ff->fh;
inarg->offset = pos;
inarg->size = count;
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_WRITE;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 2;
if (ff->fc->minor < 9)
req->in.args[0].size = FUSE_COMPAT_WRITE_IN_SIZE;
else
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(struct fuse_write_in);
req->in.args[0].value = inarg;
req->in.args[1].size = count;
req->out.numargs = 1;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(struct fuse_write_out);
req->out.args[0].value = outarg;
}
|
static void fuse_write_fill(struct fuse_req *req, struct fuse_file *ff,
loff_t pos, size_t count)
{
struct fuse_write_in *inarg = &req->misc.write.in;
struct fuse_write_out *outarg = &req->misc.write.out;
inarg->fh = ff->fh;
inarg->offset = pos;
inarg->size = count;
req->in.h.opcode = FUSE_WRITE;
req->in.h.nodeid = ff->nodeid;
req->in.numargs = 2;
if (ff->fc->minor < 9)
req->in.args[0].size = FUSE_COMPAT_WRITE_IN_SIZE;
else
req->in.args[0].size = sizeof(struct fuse_write_in);
req->in.args[0].value = inarg;
req->in.args[1].size = count;
req->out.numargs = 1;
req->out.args[0].size = sizeof(struct fuse_write_out);
req->out.args[0].value = outarg;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
94d9e646454f6246bf823b6897bd6aea5f08eda3
|
Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
|
static status_t GetMimeTypeForVideoCoding(
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType, AString *mime) {
for (size_t i = 0;
i < sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry) / sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry[0]);
++i) {
if (codingType == kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mVideoCodingType) {
*mime = kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mMime;
return OK;
}
}
mime->clear();
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
|
static status_t GetMimeTypeForVideoCoding(
OMX_VIDEO_CODINGTYPE codingType, AString *mime) {
for (size_t i = 0;
i < sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry) / sizeof(kVideoCodingMapEntry[0]);
++i) {
if (codingType == kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mVideoCodingType) {
*mime = kVideoCodingMapEntry[i].mMime;
return OK;
}
}
mime->clear();
return ERROR_UNSUPPORTED;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6368
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd
|
KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
void kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
int kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
{
if (vapic_addr) {
if (kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(vcpu->kvm,
&vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_cache,
vapic_addr, sizeof(u32)))
return -EINVAL;
__set_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
} else {
__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
}
vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr = vapic_addr;
return 0;
}
|
void kvm_lapic_set_vapic_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vapic_addr)
{
vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr = vapic_addr;
if (vapic_addr)
__set_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
else
__clear_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2014-3167
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3167/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/44f1431b20c16d8f8da0ce8ff7bbf2adddcdd785
|
44f1431b20c16d8f8da0ce8ff7bbf2adddcdd785
|
Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
|
void LayoutSVGViewportContainer::determineIfLayoutSizeChanged()
{
ASSERT(element());
if (!isSVGSVGElement(*element()))
return;
m_isLayoutSizeChanged = toSVGSVGElement(element())->hasRelativeLengths() && selfNeedsLayout();
}
|
void LayoutSVGViewportContainer::determineIfLayoutSizeChanged()
{
ASSERT(element());
if (!isSVGSVGElement(*element()))
return;
m_isLayoutSizeChanged = toSVGSVGElement(element())->hasRelativeLengths() && selfNeedsLayout();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
JSObject* JSTestNamedConstructor::createPrototype(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return JSTestNamedConstructorPrototype::create(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSTestNamedConstructorPrototype::createStructure(globalObject->globalData(), globalObject, globalObject->objectPrototype()));
}
|
JSObject* JSTestNamedConstructor::createPrototype(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return JSTestNamedConstructorPrototype::create(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSTestNamedConstructorPrototype::createStructure(globalObject->globalData(), globalObject, globalObject->objectPrototype()));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13307/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/91e58d967a92250439ede038ccfb0913a81e59fe
|
91e58d967a92250439ede038ccfb0913a81e59fe
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
|
static void GetStandardDeviationPixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,
MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
MagickRealType
sum,
sum_squared;
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[ListChannels];
/*
Find the standard-deviation value for each of the color.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
color=65536L;
count=0;
sum=0.0;
sum_squared=0.0;
do
{
register ssize_t
i;
color=list->nodes[color].next[0];
sum+=(MagickRealType) list->nodes[color].count*color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) list->nodes[color].count; i++)
sum_squared+=((MagickRealType) color)*((MagickRealType) color);
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
sum/=pixel_list->length;
sum_squared/=pixel_list->length;
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) sqrt(sum_squared-(sum*sum));
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
|
static void GetStandardDeviationPixelList(PixelList *pixel_list,
MagickPixelPacket *pixel)
{
MagickRealType
sum,
sum_squared;
register SkipList
*list;
register ssize_t
channel;
size_t
color;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned short
channels[ListChannels];
/*
Find the standard-deviation value for each of the color.
*/
for (channel=0; channel < 5; channel++)
{
list=pixel_list->lists+channel;
color=65536L;
count=0;
sum=0.0;
sum_squared=0.0;
do
{
register ssize_t
i;
color=list->nodes[color].next[0];
sum+=(MagickRealType) list->nodes[color].count*color;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) list->nodes[color].count; i++)
sum_squared+=((MagickRealType) color)*((MagickRealType) color);
count+=list->nodes[color].count;
} while (count < (ssize_t) pixel_list->length);
sum/=pixel_list->length;
sum_squared/=pixel_list->length;
channels[channel]=(unsigned short) sqrt(sum_squared-(sum*sum));
}
pixel->red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[0]);
pixel->green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[1]);
pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[2]);
pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[3]);
pixel->index=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(channels[4]);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20169
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20169/
|
CWE-400
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf
|
704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf
|
USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void hwahc_op_endpoint_disable(struct usb_hcd *usb_hcd,
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep)
{
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = usb_hcd_to_wusbhc(usb_hcd);
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
rpipe_ep_disable(&hwahc->wa, ep);
}
|
static void hwahc_op_endpoint_disable(struct usb_hcd *usb_hcd,
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep)
{
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = usb_hcd_to_wusbhc(usb_hcd);
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
rpipe_ep_disable(&hwahc->wa, ep);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1
|
Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
command_buffer_->DestroyTransferBuffer(id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
|
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnDestroyTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
command_buffer_->DestroyTransferBuffer(id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5057/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cbc5d5153b18ea387f4769caa01d1339261f6ed6
|
cbc5d5153b18ea387f4769caa01d1339261f6ed6
|
gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
[email protected]
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
|
FeatureInfo::FeatureInfo() {
InitializeBasicState(base::CommandLine::InitializedForCurrentProcess()
? base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
: nullptr);
}
|
FeatureInfo::FeatureInfo() {
InitializeBasicState(base::CommandLine::InitializedForCurrentProcess()
? base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()
: nullptr);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20721
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20721/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/uriparser/uriparser/commit/cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4
|
cef25028de5ff872c2e1f0a6c562eb3ea9ecbce4
|
Fix uriParse*Ex* out-of-bounds read
|
bool testToStringCharsRequiredHelper(const wchar_t * text) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, text);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
int charsRequired;
if (uriToStringCharsRequiredW(&uri, &charsRequired) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(charsRequired, wcslen(text));
wchar_t * buffer = new wchar_t[charsRequired + 1];
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired + 1, NULL) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired, NULL) == 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return true;
}
|
bool testToStringCharsRequiredHelper(const wchar_t * text) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, text);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
int charsRequired;
if (uriToStringCharsRequiredW(&uri, &charsRequired) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
EXPECT_EQ(charsRequired, wcslen(text));
wchar_t * buffer = new wchar_t[charsRequired + 1];
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired + 1, NULL) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired, NULL) == 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return true;
}
|
C
|
uriparser
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int nfc_llcp_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
u32 opt;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%p optname %d\n", sk, optname);
if (level != SOL_NFC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case NFC_LLCP_RW:
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_BOUND ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > LLCP_MAX_RW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
llcp_sock->rw = (u8) opt;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_MIUX:
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_BOUND ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > LLCP_MAX_MIUX) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
llcp_sock->miux = cpu_to_be16((u16) opt);
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
pr_debug("%p rw %d miux %d\n", llcp_sock,
llcp_sock->rw, llcp_sock->miux);
return err;
}
|
static int nfc_llcp_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
u32 opt;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%p optname %d\n", sk, optname);
if (level != SOL_NFC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case NFC_LLCP_RW:
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_BOUND ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > LLCP_MAX_RW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
llcp_sock->rw = (u8) opt;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_MIUX:
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_BOUND ||
sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt > LLCP_MAX_MIUX) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
llcp_sock->miux = cpu_to_be16((u16) opt);
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
pr_debug("%p rw %d miux %d\n", llcp_sock,
llcp_sock->rw, llcp_sock->miux);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
93dd81929416a0170935e6eeac03d10aed60df18
|
Implement NPN_RemoveProperty
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43315
Reviewed by Sam Weinig.
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Plugins/NPJSObject.cpp:
(WebKit::NPJSObject::removeProperty):
Try to remove the property.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::npClass):
Add NP_RemoveProperty.
(WebKit::NPJSObject::NP_RemoveProperty):
Call NPJSObject::removeProperty.
* WebProcess/Plugins/Netscape/NetscapeBrowserFuncs.cpp:
(WebKit::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Call the NPClass::removeProperty function.
WebKitTools:
* DumpRenderTree/DumpRenderTree.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.cpp:
(PluginTest::NPN_GetStringIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_GetIntIdentifier):
(PluginTest::NPN_RemoveProperty):
Add NPN_ helpers.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/PluginTest.h:
Support more NPClass functions.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/Tests/NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp: Added.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPRuntimeRemoveProperty):
Test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::hasMethod):
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::TestObject::invoke):
Add a testRemoveProperty method.
(NPRuntimeRemoveProperty::NPP_GetValue):
Return the test object.
* DumpRenderTree/TestNetscapePlugIn/win/TestNetscapePlugin.vcproj:
* DumpRenderTree/qt/TestNetscapePlugin/TestNetscapePlugin.pro:
* GNUmakefile.am:
Add NPRuntimeRemoveProperty.cpp
LayoutTests:
Add a test for NPN_RemoveProperty.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property-expected.txt: Added.
* plugins/npruntime/remove-property.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool NPJSObject::invoke(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject, JSValue function, const NPVariant* arguments, uint32_t argumentCount, NPVariant* result)
{
CallData callData;
CallType callType = getCallData(function, callData);
if (callType == CallTypeNone)
return false;
MarkedArgumentBuffer argumentList;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argumentCount; ++i)
argumentList.append(m_objectMap->convertNPVariantToJSValue(exec, globalObject, arguments[i]));
exec->globalData().timeoutChecker.start();
JSValue value = JSC::call(exec, function, callType, callData, m_jsObject, argumentList);
exec->globalData().timeoutChecker.stop();
m_objectMap->convertJSValueToNPVariant(exec, value, *result);
exec->clearException();
return true;
}
|
bool NPJSObject::invoke(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject, JSValue function, const NPVariant* arguments, uint32_t argumentCount, NPVariant* result)
{
CallData callData;
CallType callType = getCallData(function, callData);
if (callType == CallTypeNone)
return false;
MarkedArgumentBuffer argumentList;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < argumentCount; ++i)
argumentList.append(m_objectMap->convertNPVariantToJSValue(exec, globalObject, arguments[i]));
exec->globalData().timeoutChecker.start();
JSValue value = JSC::call(exec, function, callType, callData, m_jsObject, argumentList);
exec->globalData().timeoutChecker.stop();
m_objectMap->convertJSValueToNPVariant(exec, value, *result);
exec->clearException();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6111
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f
|
DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams EmulationHandler::GetDeviceEmulationParams() {
return device_emulation_params_;
}
|
blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams EmulationHandler::GetDeviceEmulationParams() {
return device_emulation_params_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_prune(struct sock *parent,
const unsigned long interval,
const unsigned long timeout,
const unsigned long max_rto)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(parent);
struct request_sock_queue *queue = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue;
struct listen_sock *lopt = queue->listen_opt;
int max_retries = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? : sysctl_tcp_synack_retries;
int thresh = max_retries;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
struct request_sock **reqp, *req;
int i, budget;
if (lopt == NULL || lopt->qlen == 0)
return;
/* Normally all the openreqs are young and become mature
* (i.e. converted to established socket) for first timeout.
* If synack was not acknowledged for 3 seconds, it means
* one of the following things: synack was lost, ack was lost,
* rtt is high or nobody planned to ack (i.e. synflood).
* When server is a bit loaded, queue is populated with old
* open requests, reducing effective size of queue.
* When server is well loaded, queue size reduces to zero
* after several minutes of work. It is not synflood,
* it is normal operation. The solution is pruning
* too old entries overriding normal timeout, when
* situation becomes dangerous.
*
* Essentially, we reserve half of room for young
* embrions; and abort old ones without pity, if old
* ones are about to clog our table.
*/
if (lopt->qlen>>(lopt->max_qlen_log-1)) {
int young = (lopt->qlen_young<<1);
while (thresh > 2) {
if (lopt->qlen < young)
break;
thresh--;
young <<= 1;
}
}
if (queue->rskq_defer_accept)
max_retries = queue->rskq_defer_accept;
budget = 2 * (lopt->nr_table_entries / (timeout / interval));
i = lopt->clock_hand;
do {
reqp=&lopt->syn_table[i];
while ((req = *reqp) != NULL) {
if (time_after_eq(now, req->expires)) {
int expire = 0, resend = 0;
syn_ack_recalc(req, thresh, max_retries,
queue->rskq_defer_accept,
&expire, &resend);
if (req->rsk_ops->syn_ack_timeout)
req->rsk_ops->syn_ack_timeout(parent, req);
if (!expire &&
(!resend ||
!req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req, NULL) ||
inet_rsk(req)->acked)) {
unsigned long timeo;
if (req->retrans++ == 0)
lopt->qlen_young--;
timeo = min((timeout << req->retrans), max_rto);
req->expires = now + timeo;
reqp = &req->dl_next;
continue;
}
/* Drop this request */
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_unlink(parent, req, reqp);
reqsk_queue_removed(queue, req);
reqsk_free(req);
continue;
}
reqp = &req->dl_next;
}
i = (i + 1) & (lopt->nr_table_entries - 1);
} while (--budget > 0);
lopt->clock_hand = i;
if (lopt->qlen)
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(parent, interval);
}
|
void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_prune(struct sock *parent,
const unsigned long interval,
const unsigned long timeout,
const unsigned long max_rto)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(parent);
struct request_sock_queue *queue = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue;
struct listen_sock *lopt = queue->listen_opt;
int max_retries = icsk->icsk_syn_retries ? : sysctl_tcp_synack_retries;
int thresh = max_retries;
unsigned long now = jiffies;
struct request_sock **reqp, *req;
int i, budget;
if (lopt == NULL || lopt->qlen == 0)
return;
/* Normally all the openreqs are young and become mature
* (i.e. converted to established socket) for first timeout.
* If synack was not acknowledged for 3 seconds, it means
* one of the following things: synack was lost, ack was lost,
* rtt is high or nobody planned to ack (i.e. synflood).
* When server is a bit loaded, queue is populated with old
* open requests, reducing effective size of queue.
* When server is well loaded, queue size reduces to zero
* after several minutes of work. It is not synflood,
* it is normal operation. The solution is pruning
* too old entries overriding normal timeout, when
* situation becomes dangerous.
*
* Essentially, we reserve half of room for young
* embrions; and abort old ones without pity, if old
* ones are about to clog our table.
*/
if (lopt->qlen>>(lopt->max_qlen_log-1)) {
int young = (lopt->qlen_young<<1);
while (thresh > 2) {
if (lopt->qlen < young)
break;
thresh--;
young <<= 1;
}
}
if (queue->rskq_defer_accept)
max_retries = queue->rskq_defer_accept;
budget = 2 * (lopt->nr_table_entries / (timeout / interval));
i = lopt->clock_hand;
do {
reqp=&lopt->syn_table[i];
while ((req = *reqp) != NULL) {
if (time_after_eq(now, req->expires)) {
int expire = 0, resend = 0;
syn_ack_recalc(req, thresh, max_retries,
queue->rskq_defer_accept,
&expire, &resend);
if (req->rsk_ops->syn_ack_timeout)
req->rsk_ops->syn_ack_timeout(parent, req);
if (!expire &&
(!resend ||
!req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req, NULL) ||
inet_rsk(req)->acked)) {
unsigned long timeo;
if (req->retrans++ == 0)
lopt->qlen_young--;
timeo = min((timeout << req->retrans), max_rto);
req->expires = now + timeo;
reqp = &req->dl_next;
continue;
}
/* Drop this request */
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_unlink(parent, req, reqp);
reqsk_queue_removed(queue, req);
reqsk_free(req);
continue;
}
reqp = &req->dl_next;
}
i = (i + 1) & (lopt->nr_table_entries - 1);
} while (--budget > 0);
lopt->clock_hand = i;
if (lopt->qlen)
inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(parent, interval);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9806/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520
|
netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int __netlink_dump_start(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_dump_control *control)
{
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sock *sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
int ret;
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(ssk), ssk->sk_protocol, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
if (sk == NULL) {
ret = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto error_free;
}
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
/* A dump is in progress... */
if (nlk->cb_running) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto error_unlock;
}
/* add reference of module which cb->dump belongs to */
if (!try_module_get(control->module)) {
ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
goto error_unlock;
}
cb = &nlk->cb;
memset(cb, 0, sizeof(*cb));
cb->start = control->start;
cb->dump = control->dump;
cb->done = control->done;
cb->nlh = nlh;
cb->data = control->data;
cb->module = control->module;
cb->min_dump_alloc = control->min_dump_alloc;
cb->skb = skb;
nlk->cb_running = true;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (cb->start)
cb->start(cb);
ret = netlink_dump(sk);
sock_put(sk);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* We successfully started a dump, by returning -EINTR we
* signal not to send ACK even if it was requested.
*/
return -EINTR;
error_unlock:
sock_put(sk);
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
error_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
|
int __netlink_dump_start(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct netlink_dump_control *control)
{
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sock *sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
int ret;
atomic_inc(&skb->users);
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(ssk), ssk->sk_protocol, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
if (sk == NULL) {
ret = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto error_free;
}
nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
/* A dump is in progress... */
if (nlk->cb_running) {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto error_unlock;
}
/* add reference of module which cb->dump belongs to */
if (!try_module_get(control->module)) {
ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
goto error_unlock;
}
cb = &nlk->cb;
memset(cb, 0, sizeof(*cb));
cb->start = control->start;
cb->dump = control->dump;
cb->done = control->done;
cb->nlh = nlh;
cb->data = control->data;
cb->module = control->module;
cb->min_dump_alloc = control->min_dump_alloc;
cb->skb = skb;
nlk->cb_running = true;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (cb->start)
cb->start(cb);
ret = netlink_dump(sk);
sock_put(sk);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* We successfully started a dump, by returning -EINTR we
* signal not to send ACK even if it was requested.
*/
return -EINTR;
error_unlock:
sock_put(sk);
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
error_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool DefaultTabHandler::UseVerticalTabs() const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->UseVerticalTabs();
}
|
bool DefaultTabHandler::UseVerticalTabs() const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->UseVerticalTabs();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6850
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6850/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/e96fc4fdd525fa0ede28074a7e2b1caf94b58b0d
|
e96fc4fdd525fa0ede28074a7e2b1caf94b58b0d
|
Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
|
jas_stream_t *jas_stream_freopen(const char *path, const char *mode, FILE *fp)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
int openflags;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_freopen(\"%s\", \"%s\", %p)\n", path, mode,
fp));
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variable. */
path = 0;
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
/* Determine the correct flags to use for opening the file. */
if ((stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) &&
(stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE)) {
openflags = O_RDWR;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) {
openflags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE) {
openflags = O_WRONLY;
} else {
openflags = 0;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_APPEND) {
openflags |= O_APPEND;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
openflags |= O_BINARY;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_CREATE) {
openflags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
}
stream->obj_ = JAS_CAST(void *, fp);
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_sfileops;
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
return stream;
}
|
jas_stream_t *jas_stream_freopen(const char *path, const char *mode, FILE *fp)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
int openflags;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_freopen(\"%s\", \"%s\", %p)\n", path, mode,
fp));
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variable. */
path = 0;
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
/* Determine the correct flags to use for opening the file. */
if ((stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) &&
(stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE)) {
openflags = O_RDWR;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) {
openflags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE) {
openflags = O_WRONLY;
} else {
openflags = 0;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_APPEND) {
openflags |= O_APPEND;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
openflags |= O_BINARY;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_CREATE) {
openflags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
}
stream->obj_ = JAS_CAST(void *, fp);
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_sfileops;
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
return stream;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac
|
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void *if6_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa;
ifa = if6_get_next(seq, v);
++*pos;
return ifa;
}
|
static void *if6_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifa;
ifa = if6_get_next(seq, v);
++*pos;
return ifa;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void VoidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<kTreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString> default_string_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_string_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLByteStringOrNull>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_string_arg = nullptr;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg(default_string_arg);
}
|
static void VoidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8StringResource<kTreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString> default_string_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_string_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLByteStringOrNull>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_string_arg = nullptr;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultNullableByteStringArg(default_string_arg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
bool mem_cgroup_bad_page_check(struct page *page)
{
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return false;
return lookup_page_cgroup_used(page) != NULL;
}
|
bool mem_cgroup_bad_page_check(struct page *page)
{
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return false;
return lookup_page_cgroup_used(page) != NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4998/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91
|
netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
{
return (struct arpt_entry *)(base + offset);
}
|
get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
{
return (struct arpt_entry *)(base + offset);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9313
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9313/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7df3e59c3d1df4f87fe874c7956ef7a3d2f4d5fb
|
7df3e59c3d1df4f87fe874c7956ef7a3d2f4d5fb
|
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <[email protected]>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <[email protected]>
cc: Artem Savkov <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
}
kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
|
void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
}
kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5818/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35
|
929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35
|
Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by [email protected].
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
|
static MediaContainerName LookupContainerByFirst4(const uint8_t* buffer,
int buffer_size) {
if (buffer_size < kMinimumContainerSize)
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
uint32_t first4 = Read32(buffer);
switch (first4) {
case 0x1a45dfa3:
if (CheckWebm(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_WEBM;
break;
case 0x3026b275:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kAsfSignature,
sizeof(kAsfSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_ASF;
}
break;
case TAG('#','!','A','M'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAmrSignature))
return CONTAINER_AMR;
break;
case TAG('#','E','X','T'):
if (CheckHls(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_HLS;
break;
case TAG('.','R','M','F'):
if (buffer[4] == 0 && buffer[5] == 0)
return CONTAINER_RM;
break;
case TAG('.','r','a','\xfd'):
return CONTAINER_RM;
case TAG('B','I','K','b'):
case TAG('B','I','K','d'):
case TAG('B','I','K','f'):
case TAG('B','I','K','g'):
case TAG('B','I','K','h'):
case TAG('B','I','K','i'):
if (CheckBink(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_BINK;
break;
case TAG('c','a','f','f'):
if (CheckCaf(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_CAF;
break;
case TAG('D','E','X','A'):
if (buffer_size > 15 &&
Read16(buffer + 11) <= 2048 &&
Read16(buffer + 13) <= 2048) {
return CONTAINER_DXA;
}
break;
case TAG('D','T','S','H'):
if (Read32(buffer + 4) == TAG('D','H','D','R'))
return CONTAINER_DTSHD;
break;
case 0x64a30100:
case 0x64a30200:
case 0x64a30300:
case 0x64a30400:
case 0x0001a364:
case 0x0002a364:
case 0x0003a364:
if (Read32(buffer + 4) != 0 && Read32(buffer + 8) != 0)
return CONTAINER_IRCAM;
break;
case TAG('f','L','a','C'):
return CONTAINER_FLAC;
case TAG('F','L','V',0):
case TAG('F','L','V',1):
case TAG('F','L','V',2):
case TAG('F','L','V',3):
case TAG('F','L','V',4):
if (buffer[5] == 0 && Read32(buffer + 5) > 8)
return CONTAINER_FLV;
break;
case TAG('F','O','R','M'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','I','F','F'):
case TAG('A','I','F','C'):
return CONTAINER_AIFF;
}
break;
case TAG('M','A','C',' '):
return CONTAINER_APE;
case TAG('O','N','2',' '):
if (Read32(buffer + 8) == TAG('O','N','2','f'))
return CONTAINER_AVI;
break;
case TAG('O','g','g','S'):
if (buffer[5] <= 7)
return CONTAINER_OGG;
break;
case TAG('R','F','6','4'):
if (buffer_size > 16 && Read32(buffer + 12) == TAG('d','s','6','4'))
return CONTAINER_WAV;
break;
case TAG('R','I','F','F'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','V','I',' '):
case TAG('A','V','I','X'):
case TAG('A','V','I','\x19'):
case TAG('A','M','V',' '):
return CONTAINER_AVI;
case TAG('W','A','V','E'):
return CONTAINER_WAV;
}
break;
case TAG('[','S','c','r'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case TAG('\xef','\xbb','\xbf','['):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssBomSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case 0x7ffe8001:
case 0xfe7f0180:
case 0x1fffe800:
case 0xff1f00e8:
if (CheckDts(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_DTS;
break;
case 0xb7d80020:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kWtvSignature,
sizeof(kWtvSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_WTV;
}
break;
}
uint32_t first3 = first4 & 0xffffff00;
switch (first3) {
case TAG('C','W','S',0):
case TAG('F','W','S',0):
return CONTAINER_SWF;
case TAG('I','D','3',0):
return CONTAINER_MP3;
}
uint32_t first2 = Read16(buffer);
switch (first2) {
case kAc3SyncWord:
if (CheckAc3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AC3;
if (CheckEac3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_EAC3;
break;
case 0xfff0:
case 0xfff1:
case 0xfff8:
case 0xfff9:
if (CheckAac(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AAC;
break;
}
if (CheckMp3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_MP3;
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
}
|
static MediaContainerName LookupContainerByFirst4(const uint8_t* buffer,
int buffer_size) {
if (buffer_size < kMinimumContainerSize)
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
uint32_t first4 = Read32(buffer);
switch (first4) {
case 0x1a45dfa3:
if (CheckWebm(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_WEBM;
break;
case 0x3026b275:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kAsfSignature,
sizeof(kAsfSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_ASF;
}
break;
case TAG('#','!','A','M'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAmrSignature))
return CONTAINER_AMR;
break;
case TAG('#','E','X','T'):
if (CheckHls(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_HLS;
break;
case TAG('.','R','M','F'):
if (buffer[4] == 0 && buffer[5] == 0)
return CONTAINER_RM;
break;
case TAG('.','r','a','\xfd'):
return CONTAINER_RM;
case TAG('B','I','K','b'):
case TAG('B','I','K','d'):
case TAG('B','I','K','f'):
case TAG('B','I','K','g'):
case TAG('B','I','K','h'):
case TAG('B','I','K','i'):
if (CheckBink(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_BINK;
break;
case TAG('c','a','f','f'):
if (CheckCaf(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_CAF;
break;
case TAG('D','E','X','A'):
if (buffer_size > 15 &&
Read16(buffer + 11) <= 2048 &&
Read16(buffer + 13) <= 2048) {
return CONTAINER_DXA;
}
break;
case TAG('D','T','S','H'):
if (Read32(buffer + 4) == TAG('D','H','D','R'))
return CONTAINER_DTSHD;
break;
case 0x64a30100:
case 0x64a30200:
case 0x64a30300:
case 0x64a30400:
case 0x0001a364:
case 0x0002a364:
case 0x0003a364:
if (Read32(buffer + 4) != 0 && Read32(buffer + 8) != 0)
return CONTAINER_IRCAM;
break;
case TAG('f','L','a','C'):
return CONTAINER_FLAC;
case TAG('F','L','V',0):
case TAG('F','L','V',1):
case TAG('F','L','V',2):
case TAG('F','L','V',3):
case TAG('F','L','V',4):
if (buffer[5] == 0 && Read32(buffer + 5) > 8)
return CONTAINER_FLV;
break;
case TAG('F','O','R','M'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','I','F','F'):
case TAG('A','I','F','C'):
return CONTAINER_AIFF;
}
break;
case TAG('M','A','C',' '):
return CONTAINER_APE;
case TAG('O','N','2',' '):
if (Read32(buffer + 8) == TAG('O','N','2','f'))
return CONTAINER_AVI;
break;
case TAG('O','g','g','S'):
if (buffer[5] <= 7)
return CONTAINER_OGG;
break;
case TAG('R','F','6','4'):
if (buffer_size > 16 && Read32(buffer + 12) == TAG('d','s','6','4'))
return CONTAINER_WAV;
break;
case TAG('R','I','F','F'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','V','I',' '):
case TAG('A','V','I','X'):
case TAG('A','V','I','\x19'):
case TAG('A','M','V',' '):
return CONTAINER_AVI;
case TAG('W','A','V','E'):
return CONTAINER_WAV;
}
break;
case TAG('[','S','c','r'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case TAG('\xef','\xbb','\xbf','['):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssBomSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case 0x7ffe8001:
case 0xfe7f0180:
case 0x1fffe800:
case 0xff1f00e8:
if (CheckDts(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_DTS;
break;
case 0xb7d80020:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kWtvSignature,
sizeof(kWtvSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_WTV;
}
break;
}
uint32_t first3 = first4 & 0xffffff00;
switch (first3) {
case TAG('C','W','S',0):
case TAG('F','W','S',0):
return CONTAINER_SWF;
case TAG('I','D','3',0):
return CONTAINER_MP3;
}
uint32_t first2 = Read16(buffer);
switch (first2) {
case kAc3SyncWord:
if (CheckAc3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AC3;
if (CheckEac3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_EAC3;
break;
case 0xfff0:
case 0xfff1:
case 0xfff8:
case 0xfff9:
if (CheckAac(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AAC;
break;
}
if (CheckMp3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_MP3;
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int TabStrip::button_v_offset() {
return newtab_button_v_offset();
}
|
int TabStrip::button_v_offset() {
return newtab_button_v_offset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2146
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2146/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e
|
f1923820c447e986a9da0fc6bf60c1dccdf0408e
|
perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
intel_put_shared_regs_event_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event_extra *reg;
reg = &event->hw.extra_reg;
if (reg->idx != EXTRA_REG_NONE)
__intel_shared_reg_put_constraints(cpuc, reg);
reg = &event->hw.branch_reg;
if (reg->idx != EXTRA_REG_NONE)
__intel_shared_reg_put_constraints(cpuc, reg);
}
|
intel_put_shared_regs_event_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct hw_perf_event_extra *reg;
reg = &event->hw.extra_reg;
if (reg->idx != EXTRA_REG_NONE)
__intel_shared_reg_put_constraints(cpuc, reg);
reg = &event->hw.branch_reg;
if (reg->idx != EXTRA_REG_NONE)
__intel_shared_reg_put_constraints(cpuc, reg);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
assert(jas_image_numcmpts(image) <= 3);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
data[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (!(data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image)))) {
goto error;
}
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
goto error;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
data[i] = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
if (data[i]) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
}
return -1;
}
|
static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
assert(jas_image_numcmpts(image) <= 3);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
data[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (!(data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image)))) {
goto error;
}
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
goto error;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
data[i] = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
if (data[i]) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6327
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6327/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
51093254bf879bc9ce96590400a87897c7498463
|
IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
|
static int srpt_refresh_port(struct srpt_port *sport)
{
struct ib_mad_reg_req reg_req;
struct ib_port_modify port_modify;
struct ib_port_attr port_attr;
int ret;
memset(&port_modify, 0, sizeof port_modify);
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = 0;
ret = ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
if (ret)
goto err_mod_port;
ret = ib_query_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, &port_attr);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
sport->sm_lid = port_attr.sm_lid;
sport->lid = port_attr.lid;
ret = ib_query_gid(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &sport->gid,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
if (!sport->mad_agent) {
memset(®_req, 0, sizeof reg_req);
reg_req.mgmt_class = IB_MGMT_CLASS_DEVICE_MGMT;
reg_req.mgmt_class_version = IB_MGMT_BASE_VERSION;
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET, reg_req.method_mask);
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_SET, reg_req.method_mask);
sport->mad_agent = ib_register_mad_agent(sport->sdev->device,
sport->port,
IB_QPT_GSI,
®_req, 0,
srpt_mad_send_handler,
srpt_mad_recv_handler,
sport, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sport->mad_agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sport->mad_agent);
sport->mad_agent = NULL;
goto err_query_port;
}
}
return 0;
err_query_port:
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = 0;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
err_mod_port:
return ret;
}
|
static int srpt_refresh_port(struct srpt_port *sport)
{
struct ib_mad_reg_req reg_req;
struct ib_port_modify port_modify;
struct ib_port_attr port_attr;
int ret;
memset(&port_modify, 0, sizeof port_modify);
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = 0;
ret = ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
if (ret)
goto err_mod_port;
ret = ib_query_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, &port_attr);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
sport->sm_lid = port_attr.sm_lid;
sport->lid = port_attr.lid;
ret = ib_query_gid(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &sport->gid,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
if (!sport->mad_agent) {
memset(®_req, 0, sizeof reg_req);
reg_req.mgmt_class = IB_MGMT_CLASS_DEVICE_MGMT;
reg_req.mgmt_class_version = IB_MGMT_BASE_VERSION;
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET, reg_req.method_mask);
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_SET, reg_req.method_mask);
sport->mad_agent = ib_register_mad_agent(sport->sdev->device,
sport->port,
IB_QPT_GSI,
®_req, 0,
srpt_mad_send_handler,
srpt_mad_recv_handler,
sport, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sport->mad_agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sport->mad_agent);
sport->mad_agent = NULL;
goto err_query_port;
}
}
return 0;
err_query_port:
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = 0;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
err_mod_port:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9739/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
|
c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
| null |
static void Ins_INSTCTRL( INS_ARG )
{
Long K, L;
K = args[1];
L = args[0];
if ( K < 0 || K > 3 )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.GS.instruct_control = (Int)((CUR.GS.instruct_control & (~K)) | (L & K));
}
|
static void Ins_INSTCTRL( INS_ARG )
{
Long K, L;
K = args[1];
L = args[0];
if ( K < 0 || K > 3 )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
CUR.GS.instruct_control = (Int)((CUR.GS.instruct_control & (~K)) | (L & K));
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4623
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4623/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/polarssl/polarssl/commit/1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
1922a4e6aade7b1d685af19d4d9339ddb5c02859
|
ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
|
size_t ssl_get_bytes_avail( const ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen );
}
|
size_t ssl_get_bytes_avail( const ssl_context *ssl )
{
return( ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen );
}
|
C
|
polarssl
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5842
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5842/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
d8ab7f046587f2e9f734b687ba7e6e10147c294b
|
Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
|
static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
|
static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleRegisterSharedIds(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::RegisterSharedIds& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "RegisterSharedIds: n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoRegisterSharedIds(namespace_id, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleRegisterSharedIds(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::RegisterSharedIds& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "RegisterSharedIds: n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoRegisterSharedIds(namespace_id, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void mem_cgroup_lru_del(struct page *page)
{
mem_cgroup_lru_del_list(page, page_lru(page));
}
|
void mem_cgroup_lru_del(struct page *page)
{
mem_cgroup_lru_del_list(page, page_lru(page));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-0494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-0494/
|
CWE-20
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/wget.git/commit/?id=1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
|
1fc9c95ec144499e69dc8ec76dbe07799d7d82cd
| null |
open_output_stream (struct http_stat *hs, int count, FILE **fp)
{
/* 2005-06-17 SMS.
For VMS, define common fopen() optional arguments.
*/
#ifdef __VMS
# define FOPEN_OPT_ARGS "fop=sqo", "acc", acc_cb, &open_id
# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG 3
#else /* def __VMS */
# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG true
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
/* Open the local file. */
if (!output_stream)
{
mkalldirs (hs->local_file);
if (opt.backups)
rotate_backups (hs->local_file);
if (hs->restval)
{
#ifdef __VMS
int open_id;
open_id = 21;
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS);
#else /* def __VMS */
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab");
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
}
else if (ALLOW_CLOBBER || count > 0)
{
if (opt.unlink_requested && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL))
{
if (unlink (hs->local_file) < 0)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file,
strerror (errno));
return UNLINKERR;
}
}
#ifdef __VMS
int open_id;
open_id = 22;
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS);
#else /* def __VMS */
if (hs->temporary)
{
*fp = fdopen (open (hs->local_file, O_BINARY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR), "wb");
}
else
{
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb");
}
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
}
else
{
*fp = fopen_excl (hs->local_file, FOPEN_BIN_FLAG);
if (!*fp && errno == EEXIST)
{
/* We cannot just invent a new name and use it (which is
what functions like unique_create typically do)
because we told the user we'd use this name.
Instead, return and retry the download. */
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("%s has sprung into existence.\n"),
hs->local_file);
return FOPEN_EXCL_ERR;
}
}
if (!*fp)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file, strerror (errno));
return FOPENERR;
}
}
else
*fp = output_stream;
/* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Saving to: %s\n"),
HYPHENP (hs->local_file) ? quote ("STDOUT") : quote (hs->local_file));
return RETROK;
}
|
open_output_stream (struct http_stat *hs, int count, FILE **fp)
{
/* 2005-06-17 SMS.
For VMS, define common fopen() optional arguments.
*/
#ifdef __VMS
# define FOPEN_OPT_ARGS "fop=sqo", "acc", acc_cb, &open_id
# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG 3
#else /* def __VMS */
# define FOPEN_BIN_FLAG true
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
/* Open the local file. */
if (!output_stream)
{
mkalldirs (hs->local_file);
if (opt.backups)
rotate_backups (hs->local_file);
if (hs->restval)
{
#ifdef __VMS
int open_id;
open_id = 21;
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS);
#else /* def __VMS */
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "ab");
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
}
else if (ALLOW_CLOBBER || count > 0)
{
if (opt.unlink_requested && file_exists_p (hs->local_file, NULL))
{
if (unlink (hs->local_file) < 0)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file,
strerror (errno));
return UNLINKERR;
}
}
#ifdef __VMS
int open_id;
open_id = 22;
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb", FOPEN_OPT_ARGS);
#else /* def __VMS */
if (hs->temporary)
{
*fp = fdopen (open (hs->local_file, O_BINARY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR), "wb");
}
else
{
*fp = fopen (hs->local_file, "wb");
}
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
}
else
{
*fp = fopen_excl (hs->local_file, FOPEN_BIN_FLAG);
if (!*fp && errno == EEXIST)
{
/* We cannot just invent a new name and use it (which is
what functions like unique_create typically do)
because we told the user we'd use this name.
Instead, return and retry the download. */
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("%s has sprung into existence.\n"),
hs->local_file);
return FOPEN_EXCL_ERR;
}
}
if (!*fp)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", hs->local_file, strerror (errno));
return FOPENERR;
}
}
else
*fp = output_stream;
/* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Saving to: %s\n"),
HYPHENP (hs->local_file) ? quote ("STDOUT") : quote (hs->local_file));
return RETROK;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(E1000IntrDelayTimer *timer)
{
int64_t delay_ns = (int64_t) timer->core->mac[timer->delay_reg] *
timer->delay_resolution_ns;
trace_e1000e_irq_rearm_timer(timer->delay_reg << 2, delay_ns);
timer_mod(timer->timer, qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL) + delay_ns);
timer->running = true;
}
|
e1000e_intrmgr_rearm_timer(E1000IntrDelayTimer *timer)
{
int64_t delay_ns = (int64_t) timer->core->mac[timer->delay_reg] *
timer->delay_resolution_ns;
trace_e1000e_irq_rearm_timer(timer->delay_reg << 2, delay_ns);
timer_mod(timer->timer, qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL) + delay_ns);
timer->running = true;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.postgresql.org/gitweb/?p=postgresql.git;a=commit;h=08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
|
08fa47c4850cea32c3116665975bca219fbf2fe6
| null |
sn_array_start(void *state)
{
StripnullState *_state = (StripnullState *) state;
appendStringInfoCharMacro(_state->strval, '[');
}
|
sn_array_start(void *state)
{
StripnullState *_state = (StripnullState *) state;
appendStringInfoCharMacro(_state->strval, '[');
}
|
C
|
postgresql
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2220/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/LawnGnome/php-radius/commit/13c149b051f82b709e8d7cc32111e84b49d57234
|
13c149b051f82b709e8d7cc32111e84b49d57234
|
Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
|
PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(radius)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "radius support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "version", PHP_RADIUS_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_end();
}
|
PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(radius)
{
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_header(2, "radius support", "enabled");
php_info_print_table_row(2, "version", PHP_RADIUS_VERSION);
php_info_print_table_end();
}
|
C
|
php-radius
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
|
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18349/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5f8671e7667b8b133bd3664100012a3906e92d65
|
5f8671e7667b8b133bd3664100012a3906e92d65
|
Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
|
CommitMessageOrderReverser(
WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& deferred_url,
DidStartDeferringCommitCallback deferred_url_triggered_action)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
deferred_url_(deferred_url),
deferred_url_triggered_action_(
std::move(deferred_url_triggered_action)) {}
|
CommitMessageOrderReverser(
WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& deferred_url,
DidStartDeferringCommitCallback deferred_url_triggered_action)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
deferred_url_(deferred_url),
deferred_url_triggered_action_(
std::move(deferred_url_triggered_action)) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
String InputType::LocalizeValue(const String& proposed_value) const {
return proposed_value;
}
|
String InputType::LocalizeValue(const String& proposed_value) const {
return proposed_value;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSDataViewConstructor::constructJSDataView(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argument(0).isNull() || !exec->argument(0).isObject())
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
RefPtr<DataView> view = constructArrayBufferViewWithArrayBufferArgument<DataView, char>(exec);
if (!view.get()) {
setDOMException(exec, INDEX_SIZE_ERR);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
JSDataViewConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSDataViewConstructor*>(exec->callee());
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), view.get())));
}
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL JSDataViewConstructor::constructJSDataView(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argument(0).isNull() || !exec->argument(0).isObject())
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
RefPtr<DataView> view = constructArrayBufferViewWithArrayBufferArgument<DataView, char>(exec);
if (!view.get()) {
setDOMException(exec, INDEX_SIZE_ERR);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
JSDataViewConstructor* jsConstructor = jsCast<JSDataViewConstructor*>(exec->callee());
return JSValue::encode(asObject(toJS(exec, jsConstructor->globalObject(), view.get())));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-12249
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12249/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/mruby/mruby/commit/faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3
|
`mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
|
mrb_class_new(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *super)
{
struct RClass *c;
if (super) {
mrb_check_inheritable(mrb, super);
}
c = boot_defclass(mrb, super);
if (super) {
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(c, MRB_INSTANCE_TT(super));
}
make_metaclass(mrb, c);
return c;
}
|
mrb_class_new(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *super)
{
struct RClass *c;
if (super) {
mrb_check_inheritable(mrb, super);
}
c = boot_defclass(mrb, super);
if (super) {
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(c, MRB_INSTANCE_TT(super));
}
make_metaclass(mrb, c);
return c;
}
|
C
|
mruby
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6077/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6ed26f014f76f10e76e80636027a2db9dcbe1664
|
6ed26f014f76f10e76e80636027a2db9dcbe1664
|
[PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
|
bool BaseRenderingContext2D::IsPointInStrokeInternal(const Path& path,
const double x,
const double y) {
PaintCanvas* c = DrawingCanvas();
if (!c)
return false;
if (!GetState().IsTransformInvertible())
return false;
FloatPoint point(x, y);
if (!std::isfinite(point.X()) || !std::isfinite(point.Y()))
return false;
AffineTransform ctm = GetState().Transform();
FloatPoint transformed_point = ctm.Inverse().MapPoint(point);
StrokeData stroke_data;
stroke_data.SetThickness(GetState().LineWidth());
stroke_data.SetLineCap(GetState().GetLineCap());
stroke_data.SetLineJoin(GetState().GetLineJoin());
stroke_data.SetMiterLimit(GetState().MiterLimit());
Vector<float> line_dash(GetState().LineDash().size());
std::copy(GetState().LineDash().begin(), GetState().LineDash().end(),
line_dash.begin());
stroke_data.SetLineDash(line_dash, GetState().LineDashOffset());
return path.StrokeContains(transformed_point, stroke_data);
}
|
bool BaseRenderingContext2D::IsPointInStrokeInternal(const Path& path,
const double x,
const double y) {
PaintCanvas* c = DrawingCanvas();
if (!c)
return false;
if (!GetState().IsTransformInvertible())
return false;
FloatPoint point(x, y);
if (!std::isfinite(point.X()) || !std::isfinite(point.Y()))
return false;
AffineTransform ctm = GetState().Transform();
FloatPoint transformed_point = ctm.Inverse().MapPoint(point);
StrokeData stroke_data;
stroke_data.SetThickness(GetState().LineWidth());
stroke_data.SetLineCap(GetState().GetLineCap());
stroke_data.SetLineJoin(GetState().GetLineJoin());
stroke_data.SetMiterLimit(GetState().MiterLimit());
Vector<float> line_dash(GetState().LineDash().size());
std::copy(GetState().LineDash().begin(), GetState().LineDash().end(),
line_dash.begin());
stroke_data.SetLineDash(line_dash, GetState().LineDashOffset());
return path.StrokeContains(transformed_point, stroke_data);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2870
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2870/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e741149a6b7872a2bf1f2b6cc0a56e836592fb77
|
e741149a6b7872a2bf1f2b6cc0a56e836592fb77
|
Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xsltRegisterAllFunctions(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
{
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "current",
xsltCurrentFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "document",
xsltDocumentFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "key", xsltKeyFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "unparsed-entity-uri",
xsltUnparsedEntityURIFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "format-number",
xsltFormatNumberFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "generate-id",
xsltGenerateIdFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "system-property",
xsltSystemPropertyFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "element-available",
xsltElementAvailableFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "function-available",
xsltFunctionAvailableFunction);
}
|
xsltRegisterAllFunctions(xmlXPathContextPtr ctxt)
{
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "current",
xsltCurrentFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "document",
xsltDocumentFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "key", xsltKeyFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "unparsed-entity-uri",
xsltUnparsedEntityURIFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "format-number",
xsltFormatNumberFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "generate-id",
xsltGenerateIdFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "system-property",
xsltSystemPropertyFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "element-available",
xsltElementAvailableFunction);
xmlXPathRegisterFunc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *) "function-available",
xsltFunctionAvailableFunction);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
partition_create_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
guint64 offset,
guint64 size,
const char *fstype,
char **fsoptions)
{
CreatePartitionData *data;
data = g_new0 (CreatePartitionData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->device = g_object_ref (device);
data->offset = offset;
data->size = size;
data->fstype = g_strdup (fstype);
data->fsoptions = g_strdupv (fsoptions);
return data;
}
|
partition_create_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
guint64 offset,
guint64 size,
const char *fstype,
char **fsoptions)
{
CreatePartitionData *data;
data = g_new0 (CreatePartitionData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->device = g_object_ref (device);
data->offset = offset;
data->size = size;
data->fstype = g_strdup (fstype);
data->fsoptions = g_strdupv (fsoptions);
return data;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2816
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2816/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
cd0bd79d6ebdb72183e6f0833673464cc10b3600
|
Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool GpuChannel::Send(IPC::Message* message) {
DCHECK(!message->is_sync());
if (log_messages_) {
DVLOG(1) << "sending message @" << message << " on channel @" << this
<< " with type " << message->type();
}
if (!channel_.get()) {
delete message;
return false;
}
return channel_->Send(message);
}
|
bool GpuChannel::Send(IPC::Message* message) {
DCHECK(!message->is_sync());
if (log_messages_) {
DVLOG(1) << "sending message @" << message << " on channel @" << this
<< " with type " << message->type();
}
if (!channel_.get()) {
delete message;
return false;
}
return channel_->Send(message);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
790613cb3725005dda8f7fbfaa344a9e99a8f2a8
|
Replaces the % character with \x when generating Windows shortcuts via
File->"Create application shortcuts." The \x is converted back to % in
handling the --app switch.
BUG=23693
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/515028
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@35377 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual std::wstring GetButtonLabel(InfoBarButton button) const {
return l10n_util::GetString(IDS_SESSION_CRASHED_VIEW_RESTORE_BUTTON);
}
|
virtual std::wstring GetButtonLabel(InfoBarButton button) const {
return l10n_util::GetString(IDS_SESSION_CRASHED_VIEW_RESTORE_BUTTON);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_cb_notify_lock_done(struct nfsd4_callback *cb, struct rpc_task *task)
{
/*
* Since this is just an optimization, we don't try very hard if it
* turns out not to succeed. We'll requeue it on NFS4ERR_DELAY, and
* just quit trying on anything else.
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
rpc_delay(task, 1 * HZ);
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
|
nfsd4_cb_notify_lock_done(struct nfsd4_callback *cb, struct rpc_task *task)
{
/*
* Since this is just an optimization, we don't try very hard if it
* turns out not to succeed. We'll requeue it on NFS4ERR_DELAY, and
* just quit trying on anything else.
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
rpc_delay(task, 1 * HZ);
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5087
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5087/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11601c08e92732d2883af2057c41c17cba890844
|
11601c08e92732d2883af2057c41c17cba890844
|
[IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
|
void IndexedDBConnection::RemoveTransaction(int64_t id) {
transactions_.erase(id);
}
|
void IndexedDBConnection::RemoveTransaction(int64_t id) {
transactions_.erase(id);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1547/
|
CWE-311
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=21c856b75d81eff61aa63b4f036bb64a85bf6d46
|
21c856b75d81eff61aa63b4f036bb64a85bf6d46
| null |
int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
}
|
int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7616
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7616/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cf01fb9985e8deb25ccf0ea54d916b8871ae0e62
|
cf01fb9985e8deb25ccf0ea54d916b8871ae0e62
|
mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
struct mempolicy *__mpol_dup(struct mempolicy *old)
{
struct mempolicy *new = kmem_cache_alloc(policy_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/* task's mempolicy is protected by alloc_lock */
if (old == current->mempolicy) {
task_lock(current);
*new = *old;
task_unlock(current);
} else
*new = *old;
if (current_cpuset_is_being_rebound()) {
nodemask_t mems = cpuset_mems_allowed(current);
if (new->flags & MPOL_F_REBINDING)
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_STEP2);
else
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_ONCE);
}
atomic_set(&new->refcnt, 1);
return new;
}
|
struct mempolicy *__mpol_dup(struct mempolicy *old)
{
struct mempolicy *new = kmem_cache_alloc(policy_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/* task's mempolicy is protected by alloc_lock */
if (old == current->mempolicy) {
task_lock(current);
*new = *old;
task_unlock(current);
} else
*new = *old;
if (current_cpuset_is_being_rebound()) {
nodemask_t mems = cpuset_mems_allowed(current);
if (new->flags & MPOL_F_REBINDING)
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_STEP2);
else
mpol_rebind_policy(new, &mems, MPOL_REBIND_ONCE);
}
atomic_set(&new->refcnt, 1);
return new;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned long mem_cgroup_read_events(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
enum mem_cgroup_events_index idx)
{
unsigned long val = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
val += per_cpu(memcg->stat->events[idx], cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
spin_lock(&memcg->pcp_counter_lock);
val += memcg->nocpu_base.events[idx];
spin_unlock(&memcg->pcp_counter_lock);
#endif
return val;
}
|
static unsigned long mem_cgroup_read_events(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
enum mem_cgroup_events_index idx)
{
unsigned long val = 0;
int cpu;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
val += per_cpu(memcg->stat->events[idx], cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
spin_lock(&memcg->pcp_counter_lock);
val += memcg->nocpu_base.events[idx];
spin_unlock(&memcg->pcp_counter_lock);
#endif
return val;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8539
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8539/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd
|
KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key,
unsigned int key_len, const u8 *iv,
unsigned int ivsize)
{
int ret;
desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
}
desc->flags = 0;
ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
return ret;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize);
return 0;
}
|
static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key,
unsigned int key_len, const u8 *iv,
unsigned int ivsize)
{
int ret;
desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(blkcipher_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to load %s transform (%ld)\n",
blkcipher_alg, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
return PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
}
desc->flags = 0;
ret = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(desc->tfm, key, key_len);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("encrypted_key: failed to setkey (%d)\n", ret);
crypto_free_blkcipher(desc->tfm);
return ret;
}
crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(desc->tfm, iv, ivsize);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5139
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5139/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9e417dae2833230a651989bb4e56b835355dda39
|
9e417dae2833230a651989bb4e56b835355dda39
|
Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
[email protected],[email protected]
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Reset() {
state_ = NOT_BLOCKED;
callback_.Reset();
auth_callback_.Reset();
}
|
void Reset() {
state_ = NOT_BLOCKED;
callback_.Reset();
auth_callback_.Reset();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2061/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/commit/11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee
|
11d21349a4e7e38a025849479b36ace7c2eec2ee
|
Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]>
|
free_key_ctx_bi (struct key_ctx_bi *ctx)
{
free_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt);
free_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt);
}
|
free_key_ctx_bi (struct key_ctx_bi *ctx)
{
free_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt);
free_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt);
}
|
C
|
openvpn
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18351
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18351/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/07fbae50670ea44e35e1d554db1bbece7fe3711f
|
07fbae50670ea44e35e1d554db1bbece7fe3711f
|
Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
|
void AddAdditionalRequestHeaders(
net::HttpRequestHeaders* headers,
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpRequestHeaders> embedder_additional_headers,
const GURL& url,
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value navigation_type,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const std::string& method,
const std::string user_agent_override,
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node) {
if (!url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
return;
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDataSaverHoldback)) {
bool is_reload =
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD ||
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE ||
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL;
if (is_reload)
headers->RemoveHeader("Save-Data");
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->IsDataSaverEnabled(browser_context))
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing("Save-Data", "on");
}
if (embedder_additional_headers)
headers->MergeFrom(*(embedder_additional_headers.get()));
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing("Upgrade-Insecure-Requests", "1");
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kUserAgent,
user_agent_override.empty()
? GetContentClient()->GetUserAgent()
: user_agent_override);
if (!NeedsHTTPOrigin(headers, method))
return;
url::Origin origin;
if (frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame()) {
origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
} else if ((frame_tree_node->active_sandbox_flags() &
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin) ==
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kNone) {
origin = frame_tree_node->frame_tree()->root()->current_origin();
}
headers->SetHeader(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kOrigin, origin.Serialize());
}
|
void AddAdditionalRequestHeaders(
net::HttpRequestHeaders* headers,
std::unique_ptr<net::HttpRequestHeaders> embedder_additional_headers,
const GURL& url,
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value navigation_type,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const std::string& method,
const std::string user_agent_override,
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node) {
if (!url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
return;
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDataSaverHoldback)) {
bool is_reload =
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD ||
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE ||
navigation_type == FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL;
if (is_reload)
headers->RemoveHeader("Save-Data");
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->IsDataSaverEnabled(browser_context))
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing("Save-Data", "on");
}
if (embedder_additional_headers)
headers->MergeFrom(*(embedder_additional_headers.get()));
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing("Upgrade-Insecure-Requests", "1");
headers->SetHeaderIfMissing(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kUserAgent,
user_agent_override.empty()
? GetContentClient()->GetUserAgent()
: user_agent_override);
if (!NeedsHTTPOrigin(headers, method))
return;
url::Origin origin;
if (frame_tree_node->IsMainFrame()) {
origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
} else if ((frame_tree_node->active_sandbox_flags() &
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin) ==
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kNone) {
origin = frame_tree_node->frame_tree()->root()->current_origin();
}
headers->SetHeader(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kOrigin, origin.Serialize());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7
|
Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
|
PaintArtifactCompositor::CompositedLayerForPendingLayer(
const PaintArtifact& paint_artifact,
const PendingLayer& pending_layer,
gfx::Vector2dF& layer_offset,
Vector<std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl>>& new_content_layer_clients,
Vector<scoped_refptr<cc::Layer>>& new_scroll_hit_test_layers) {
auto paint_chunks =
paint_artifact.GetPaintChunkSubset(pending_layer.paint_chunk_indices);
DCHECK(paint_chunks.size());
const PaintChunk& first_paint_chunk = paint_chunks[0];
DCHECK(first_paint_chunk.size());
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> foreign_layer = ForeignLayerForPaintChunk(
paint_artifact, first_paint_chunk, layer_offset)) {
DCHECK_EQ(paint_chunks.size(), 1u);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(foreign_layer);
return foreign_layer;
}
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> scroll_layer = ScrollHitTestLayerForPendingLayer(
paint_artifact, pending_layer, layer_offset)) {
new_scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
return scroll_layer;
}
std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl> content_layer_client =
ClientForPaintChunk(first_paint_chunk);
gfx::Rect cc_combined_bounds(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds));
layer_offset = cc_combined_bounds.OffsetFromOrigin();
auto cc_layer = content_layer_client->UpdateCcPictureLayer(
paint_artifact, paint_chunks, cc_combined_bounds,
pending_layer.property_tree_state);
new_content_layer_clients.push_back(std::move(content_layer_client));
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(cc_layer);
cc_layer->SetContentsOpaque(pending_layer.rect_known_to_be_opaque.Contains(
FloatRect(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds))));
return cc_layer;
}
|
PaintArtifactCompositor::CompositedLayerForPendingLayer(
const PaintArtifact& paint_artifact,
const PendingLayer& pending_layer,
gfx::Vector2dF& layer_offset,
Vector<std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl>>& new_content_layer_clients,
Vector<scoped_refptr<cc::Layer>>& new_scroll_hit_test_layers) {
auto paint_chunks =
paint_artifact.GetPaintChunkSubset(pending_layer.paint_chunk_indices);
DCHECK(paint_chunks.size());
const PaintChunk& first_paint_chunk = paint_chunks[0];
DCHECK(first_paint_chunk.size());
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> foreign_layer = ForeignLayerForPaintChunk(
paint_artifact, first_paint_chunk, layer_offset)) {
DCHECK_EQ(paint_chunks.size(), 1u);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(foreign_layer);
return foreign_layer;
}
if (scoped_refptr<cc::Layer> scroll_layer = ScrollHitTestLayerForPendingLayer(
paint_artifact, pending_layer, layer_offset)) {
new_scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->scroll_hit_test_layers.push_back(scroll_layer);
return scroll_layer;
}
std::unique_ptr<ContentLayerClientImpl> content_layer_client =
ClientForPaintChunk(first_paint_chunk);
gfx::Rect cc_combined_bounds(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds));
layer_offset = cc_combined_bounds.OffsetFromOrigin();
auto cc_layer = content_layer_client->UpdateCcPictureLayer(
paint_artifact, paint_chunks, cc_combined_bounds,
pending_layer.property_tree_state);
new_content_layer_clients.push_back(std::move(content_layer_client));
if (extra_data_for_testing_enabled_)
extra_data_for_testing_->content_layers.push_back(cc_layer);
cc_layer->SetContentsOpaque(pending_layer.rect_known_to_be_opaque.Contains(
FloatRect(EnclosingIntRect(pending_layer.bounds))));
return cc_layer;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1999014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1999014/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75
|
bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75
|
avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int find_body_sid_by_offset(MXFContext *mxf, int64_t offset)
{
int a, b, m;
int64_t this_partition;
a = -1;
b = mxf->partitions_count;
while (b - a > 1) {
m = (a + b) >> 1;
this_partition = mxf->partitions[m].this_partition;
if (this_partition <= offset)
a = m;
else
b = m;
}
if (a == -1)
return 0;
return mxf->partitions[a].body_sid;
}
|
static int find_body_sid_by_offset(MXFContext *mxf, int64_t offset)
{
int a, b, m;
int64_t this_partition;
a = -1;
b = mxf->partitions_count;
while (b - a > 1) {
m = (a + b) >> 1;
this_partition = mxf->partitions[m].this_partition;
if (this_partition <= offset)
a = m;
else
b = m;
}
if (a == -1)
return 0;
return mxf->partitions[a].body_sid;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
file_size_ = 0;
psnr_ = 0.0;
n_frames_ = 0;
}
|
virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
file_size_ = 0;
psnr_ = 0.0;
n_frames_ = 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2517/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
208c72f4fe44fe09577e7975ba0e7fa0278f3d03
|
nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
|
void nl80211_notify_dev_rename(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return;
if (nl80211_send_wiphy(msg, 0, 0, 0, rdev) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_config_mcgrp.id, GFP_KERNEL);
}
|
void nl80211_notify_dev_rename(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return;
if (nl80211_send_wiphy(msg, 0, 0, 0, rdev) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_config_mcgrp.id, GFP_KERNEL);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0349
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0349/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
0a9ab9bdb3e891762553f667066190c1d22ad62b
|
Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static void hidp_recv_ctrl_frame(struct hidp_session *session,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned char hdr, type, param;
int free_skb = 1;
BT_DBG("session %p skb %p len %d", session, skb, skb->len);
hdr = skb->data[0];
skb_pull(skb, 1);
type = hdr & HIDP_HEADER_TRANS_MASK;
param = hdr & HIDP_HEADER_PARAM_MASK;
switch (type) {
case HIDP_TRANS_HANDSHAKE:
hidp_process_handshake(session, param);
break;
case HIDP_TRANS_HID_CONTROL:
hidp_process_hid_control(session, param);
break;
case HIDP_TRANS_DATA:
free_skb = hidp_process_data(session, skb, param);
break;
default:
__hidp_send_ctrl_message(session,
HIDP_TRANS_HANDSHAKE | HIDP_HSHK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_REQUEST, NULL, 0);
break;
}
if (free_skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
static void hidp_recv_ctrl_frame(struct hidp_session *session,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned char hdr, type, param;
int free_skb = 1;
BT_DBG("session %p skb %p len %d", session, skb, skb->len);
hdr = skb->data[0];
skb_pull(skb, 1);
type = hdr & HIDP_HEADER_TRANS_MASK;
param = hdr & HIDP_HEADER_PARAM_MASK;
switch (type) {
case HIDP_TRANS_HANDSHAKE:
hidp_process_handshake(session, param);
break;
case HIDP_TRANS_HID_CONTROL:
hidp_process_hid_control(session, param);
break;
case HIDP_TRANS_DATA:
free_skb = hidp_process_data(session, skb, param);
break;
default:
__hidp_send_ctrl_message(session,
HIDP_TRANS_HANDSHAKE | HIDP_HSHK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_REQUEST, NULL, 0);
break;
}
if (free_skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::SendUpdateFaviconURL(
blink::WebIconURL::Type icon_types_mask) {
if (frame_->Parent())
return;
WebVector<blink::WebIconURL> icon_urls = frame_->IconURLs(icon_types_mask);
if (icon_urls.empty())
return;
std::vector<FaviconURL> urls;
urls.reserve(icon_urls.size());
for (const blink::WebIconURL& icon_url : icon_urls) {
urls.push_back(FaviconURL(icon_url.GetIconURL(),
ToFaviconType(icon_url.IconType()),
ConvertToFaviconSizes(icon_url.Sizes())));
}
DCHECK_EQ(icon_urls.size(), urls.size());
Send(new FrameHostMsg_UpdateFaviconURL(GetRoutingID(), urls));
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::SendUpdateFaviconURL(
blink::WebIconURL::Type icon_types_mask) {
if (frame_->Parent())
return;
WebVector<blink::WebIconURL> icon_urls = frame_->IconURLs(icon_types_mask);
if (icon_urls.empty())
return;
std::vector<FaviconURL> urls;
urls.reserve(icon_urls.size());
for (const blink::WebIconURL& icon_url : icon_urls) {
urls.push_back(FaviconURL(icon_url.GetIconURL(),
ToFaviconType(icon_url.IconType()),
ConvertToFaviconSizes(icon_url.Sizes())));
}
DCHECK_EQ(icon_urls.size(), urls.size());
Send(new FrameHostMsg_UpdateFaviconURL(GetRoutingID(), urls));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_rx_wb_interrupt_cause(E1000ECore *core, int queue_idx,
bool min_threshold_hit)
{
if (!msix_enabled(core->owner)) {
return E1000_ICS_RXT0 | (min_threshold_hit ? E1000_ICS_RXDMT0 : 0);
}
return (queue_idx == 0) ? E1000_ICR_RXQ0 : E1000_ICR_RXQ1;
}
|
e1000e_rx_wb_interrupt_cause(E1000ECore *core, int queue_idx,
bool min_threshold_hit)
{
if (!msix_enabled(core->owner)) {
return E1000_ICS_RXT0 | (min_threshold_hit ? E1000_ICS_RXDMT0 : 0);
}
return (queue_idx == 0) ? E1000_ICR_RXQ0 : E1000_ICR_RXQ1;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387
|
Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static void IPv6SupportResults(IPv6SupportStatus result) {
static bool run_once = false;
if (!run_once) {
run_once = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.IPv6Status", result, IPV6_SUPPORT_MAX);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.IPv6Status_retest", result,
IPV6_SUPPORT_MAX);
}
}
|
static void IPv6SupportResults(IPv6SupportStatus result) {
static bool run_once = false;
if (!run_once) {
run_once = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.IPv6Status", result, IPV6_SUPPORT_MAX);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.IPv6Status_retest", result,
IPV6_SUPPORT_MAX);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4127/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int parse_path_selector(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct priority_group *pg,
struct dm_target *ti)
{
int r;
struct path_selector_type *pst;
unsigned ps_argc;
static struct dm_arg _args[] = {
{0, 1024, "invalid number of path selector args"},
};
pst = dm_get_path_selector(dm_shift_arg(as));
if (!pst) {
ti->error = "unknown path selector type";
return -EINVAL;
}
r = dm_read_arg_group(_args, as, &ps_argc, &ti->error);
if (r) {
dm_put_path_selector(pst);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = pst->create(&pg->ps, ps_argc, as->argv);
if (r) {
dm_put_path_selector(pst);
ti->error = "path selector constructor failed";
return r;
}
pg->ps.type = pst;
dm_consume_args(as, ps_argc);
return 0;
}
|
static int parse_path_selector(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct priority_group *pg,
struct dm_target *ti)
{
int r;
struct path_selector_type *pst;
unsigned ps_argc;
static struct dm_arg _args[] = {
{0, 1024, "invalid number of path selector args"},
};
pst = dm_get_path_selector(dm_shift_arg(as));
if (!pst) {
ti->error = "unknown path selector type";
return -EINVAL;
}
r = dm_read_arg_group(_args, as, &ps_argc, &ti->error);
if (r) {
dm_put_path_selector(pst);
return -EINVAL;
}
r = pst->create(&pg->ps, ps_argc, as->argv);
if (r) {
dm_put_path_selector(pst);
ti->error = "path selector constructor failed";
return r;
}
pg->ps.type = pst;
dm_consume_args(as, ps_argc);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2008-1950
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2008-1950/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnutls.git;a=commitdiff;h=bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b
|
bc8102405fda11ea00ca3b42acc4f4bce9d6e97b
| null |
is_read_comp_null (gnutls_session_t session)
{
if (session->security_parameters.read_compression_algorithm ==
GNUTLS_COMP_NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
is_read_comp_null (gnutls_session_t session)
{
if (session->security_parameters.read_compression_algorithm ==
GNUTLS_COMP_NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebPageProxy::setToolTip(const String& toolTip)
{
String oldToolTip = m_toolTip;
m_toolTip = toolTip;
m_pageClient->toolTipChanged(oldToolTip, m_toolTip);
}
|
void WebPageProxy::setToolTip(const String& toolTip)
{
String oldToolTip = m_toolTip;
m_toolTip = toolTip;
m_pageClient->toolTipChanged(oldToolTip, m_toolTip);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
void perf_event_release_pmc(void)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&active_events, &pmc_grab_mutex)) {
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) == 0)
on_each_cpu(start_nmi_watchdog, NULL, 1);
mutex_unlock(&pmc_grab_mutex);
}
}
|
void perf_event_release_pmc(void)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&active_events, &pmc_grab_mutex)) {
if (atomic_read(&nmi_active) == 0)
on_each_cpu(start_nmi_watchdog, NULL, 1);
mutex_unlock(&pmc_grab_mutex);
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11383
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11383/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
9d348bcc2c4bbd3805e7eec97b594be9febbdf9a
|
Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
|
INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
if (len < 4) {
return;
}
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
|
INST_HANDLER (lds) { // LDS Rd, k
if (len < 4) {
return;
}
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 0);
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d);
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16513
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16513/
|
CWE-704
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498
|
b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498
| null |
static int hasharray(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *m1, gs_md5_state_t *md5)
{
int i, code;
ref ref1;
for (i=0;i < r_size(m1);i++) {
code = array_get(imemory, m1, i, &ref1);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
code = r_type(&ref1);
if (code < 0)
return code;
switch(r_type(&ref1)) {
case t_null:
break;
case t_boolean:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.boolval, sizeof(ref1.value.boolval));
break;
case t_integer:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.intval, sizeof(ref1.value.intval));
break;
case t_real:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.realval, sizeof(ref1.value.realval));
break;
case t_name:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.pname, sizeof(ref1.value.pname));
break;
case t_string:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)ref1.value.const_bytes, r_size(&ref1));
break;
case t_array:
case t_mixedarray:
case t_shortarray:
if (!hasharray(i_ctx_p, &ref1, md5))
return 0;
break;
case t_oparray:
break;
case t_operator:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.opproc, sizeof(ref1.value.opproc));
break;
case t__invalid:
case t_dictionary:
case t_file:
case t_unused_array_:
case t_struct:
case t_astruct:
case t_fontID:
case t_save:
case t_mark:
case t_device:
return 0;
default:
/* Some high frequency operators are defined starting at t_next_index
* I think as long as the 'type' of each is the same, we are OK
*/
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
static int hasharray(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *m1, gs_md5_state_t *md5)
{
int i, code;
ref ref1;
for (i=0;i < r_size(m1);i++) {
code = array_get(imemory, m1, i, &ref1);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
code = r_type(&ref1);
if (code < 0)
return code;
switch(r_type(&ref1)) {
case t_null:
break;
case t_boolean:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.boolval, sizeof(ref1.value.boolval));
break;
case t_integer:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.intval, sizeof(ref1.value.intval));
break;
case t_real:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.realval, sizeof(ref1.value.realval));
break;
case t_name:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.pname, sizeof(ref1.value.pname));
break;
case t_string:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)ref1.value.const_bytes, r_size(&ref1));
break;
case t_array:
case t_mixedarray:
case t_shortarray:
if (!hasharray(i_ctx_p, &ref1, md5))
return 0;
break;
case t_oparray:
break;
case t_operator:
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&ref1.value.opproc, sizeof(ref1.value.opproc));
break;
case t__invalid:
case t_dictionary:
case t_file:
case t_unused_array_:
case t_struct:
case t_astruct:
case t_fontID:
case t_save:
case t_mark:
case t_device:
return 0;
default:
/* Some high frequency operators are defined starting at t_next_index
* I think as long as the 'type' of each is the same, we are OK
*/
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5747
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5747/
|
CWE-125
|
https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=74d9f1ba37010face4bd1449df4d60dd84450b06
|
74d9f1ba37010face4bd1449df4d60dd84450b06
| null |
int FAST_FUNC sprint_nip6(char *dest, /*const char *pre,*/ const uint8_t *ip)
{
char hexstrbuf[16 * 2];
bin2hex(hexstrbuf, (void*)ip, 16);
return sprintf(dest, /* "%s" */
"%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s",
/* pre, */
hexstrbuf + 0 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 1 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 2 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 3 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 4 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 5 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 6 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 7 * 4
);
}
|
int FAST_FUNC sprint_nip6(char *dest, /*const char *pre,*/ const uint8_t *ip)
{
char hexstrbuf[16 * 2];
bin2hex(hexstrbuf, (void*)ip, 16);
return sprintf(dest, /* "%s" */
"%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s:%.4s",
/* pre, */
hexstrbuf + 0 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 1 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 2 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 3 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 4 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 5 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 6 * 4,
hexstrbuf + 7 * 4
);
}
|
C
|
busybox
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4080
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4080/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bfdc0b497faa82a0ba2f9dddcf109231dd519fcc
|
bfdc0b497faa82a0ba2f9dddcf109231dd519fcc
|
sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc: Eugene Teo <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int proc_put_char(void __user **buf, size_t *size, char c)
{
if (*size) {
char __user **buffer = (char __user **)buf;
if (put_user(c, *buffer))
return -EFAULT;
(*size)--, (*buffer)++;
*buf = *buffer;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int proc_put_char(void __user **buf, size_t *size, char c)
{
if (*size) {
char __user **buffer = (char __user **)buf;
if (put_user(c, *buffer))
return -EFAULT;
(*size)--, (*buffer)++;
*buf = *buffer;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6345
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6345/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
8b74d439e1697110c5e5c600643e823eb1dd0762
|
net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void llc_save_primitive(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 prim)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *addr;
/* save primitive for use by the user. */
addr = llc_ui_skb_cb(skb);
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
addr->sllc_family = sk->sk_family;
addr->sllc_arphrd = skb->dev->type;
addr->sllc_test = prim == LLC_TEST_PRIM;
addr->sllc_xid = prim == LLC_XID_PRIM;
addr->sllc_ua = prim == LLC_DATAUNIT_PRIM;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, addr->sllc_mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &addr->sllc_sap);
}
|
void llc_save_primitive(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 prim)
{
struct sockaddr_llc *addr;
/* save primitive for use by the user. */
addr = llc_ui_skb_cb(skb);
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
addr->sllc_family = sk->sk_family;
addr->sllc_arphrd = skb->dev->type;
addr->sllc_test = prim == LLC_TEST_PRIM;
addr->sllc_xid = prim == LLC_XID_PRIM;
addr->sllc_ua = prim == LLC_DATAUNIT_PRIM;
llc_pdu_decode_sa(skb, addr->sllc_mac);
llc_pdu_decode_ssap(skb, &addr->sllc_sap);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5207
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5207/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705
|
9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705
|
mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
static inline struct hlist_head *m_hash(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
unsigned long tmp = ((unsigned long)mnt / L1_CACHE_BYTES);
tmp += ((unsigned long)dentry / L1_CACHE_BYTES);
tmp = tmp + (tmp >> m_hash_shift);
return &mount_hashtable[tmp & m_hash_mask];
}
|
static inline struct hlist_head *m_hash(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
unsigned long tmp = ((unsigned long)mnt / L1_CACHE_BYTES);
tmp += ((unsigned long)dentry / L1_CACHE_BYTES);
tmp = tmp + (tmp >> m_hash_shift);
return &mount_hashtable[tmp & m_hash_mask];
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0008e75b613a252c8a5e2cca58c8376bf0e0a6a8
|
0008e75b613a252c8a5e2cca58c8376bf0e0a6a8
|
Disables PanelBrowserTest.MinimizeTwoPanelsWithoutTabbedWindow on
windows as it's causing other interactive ui tests to fail.
BUG=103253
[email protected]
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8467025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@108901 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual void ModelChanged() {
std::vector<DownloadItem*> downloads;
download_manager_->SearchDownloads(string16(), &downloads);
if (downloads.empty())
return;
EXPECT_EQ(1U, downloads.size());
downloads.front()->Cancel(false); // Don't actually need to download it.
saw_download_ = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(waiting_);
MessageLoopForUI::current()->Quit();
}
|
virtual void ModelChanged() {
std::vector<DownloadItem*> downloads;
download_manager_->SearchDownloads(string16(), &downloads);
if (downloads.empty())
return;
EXPECT_EQ(1U, downloads.size());
downloads.front()->Cancel(false); // Don't actually need to download it.
saw_download_ = true;
EXPECT_TRUE(waiting_);
MessageLoopForUI::current()->Quit();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14041
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14041/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/e5285319229a5d77bf316bb0d3a6cbd3cb8666d9
|
e5285319229a5d77bf316bb0d3a6cbd3cb8666d9
|
pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
|
static INLINE OPJ_UINT16 swap16(OPJ_UINT16 x)
{
return (OPJ_UINT16)(((x & 0x00ffU) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00U) >> 8));
}
|
static INLINE OPJ_UINT16 swap16(OPJ_UINT16 x)
{
return (OPJ_UINT16)(((x & 0x00ffU) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00U) >> 8));
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3835
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3835/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
7558d03e6498e970b761aa44fff6b2c659202d95
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::queue_meta_buffer(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
struct pmem &Input_pmem_info)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned long address = 0,p2,id;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In queue Meta Buffer");
if (!psource_frame || !pdest_frame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("convert_queue_buffer invalid params");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen > 0) {
if (dev_use_buf(&Input_pmem_info,PORT_INDEX_IN,0) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: in dev_use_buf");
post_event ((unsigned long)psource_frame,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone)
ret = empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp,psource_frame);
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
psource_frame = NULL;
if (!psource_frame && m_opq_meta_q.m_size) {
m_opq_meta_q.pop_entry(&address,&p2,&id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* ) address;
}
} else {
psource_frame = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
|
OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::queue_meta_buffer(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
struct pmem &Input_pmem_info)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned long address = 0,p2,id;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In queue Meta Buffer");
if (!psource_frame || !pdest_frame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("convert_queue_buffer invalid params");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen > 0) {
if (dev_use_buf(&Input_pmem_info,PORT_INDEX_IN,0) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: in dev_use_buf");
post_event ((unsigned long)psource_frame,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone)
ret = empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp,psource_frame);
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
psource_frame = NULL;
if (!psource_frame && m_opq_meta_q.m_size) {
m_opq_meta_q.pop_entry(&address,&p2,&id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* ) address;
}
} else {
psource_frame = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-9289
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9289/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1fa2337a315a2448c5434f41e00d56b01a22283c
|
1fa2337a315a2448c5434f41e00d56b01a22283c
|
[media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
struct dvb_frontend *cx24116_attach(const struct cx24116_config *config,
struct i2c_adapter *i2c)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = NULL;
int ret;
dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
/* allocate memory for the internal state */
state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cx24116_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (state == NULL)
goto error1;
state->config = config;
state->i2c = i2c;
/* check if the demod is present */
ret = (cx24116_readreg(state, 0xFF) << 8) |
cx24116_readreg(state, 0xFE);
if (ret != 0x0501) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Invalid probe, probably not a CX24116 device\n");
goto error2;
}
/* create dvb_frontend */
memcpy(&state->frontend.ops, &cx24116_ops,
sizeof(struct dvb_frontend_ops));
state->frontend.demodulator_priv = state;
return &state->frontend;
error2: kfree(state);
error1: return NULL;
}
|
struct dvb_frontend *cx24116_attach(const struct cx24116_config *config,
struct i2c_adapter *i2c)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = NULL;
int ret;
dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
/* allocate memory for the internal state */
state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cx24116_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (state == NULL)
goto error1;
state->config = config;
state->i2c = i2c;
/* check if the demod is present */
ret = (cx24116_readreg(state, 0xFF) << 8) |
cx24116_readreg(state, 0xFE);
if (ret != 0x0501) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Invalid probe, probably not a CX24116 device\n");
goto error2;
}
/* create dvb_frontend */
memcpy(&state->frontend.ops, &cx24116_ops,
sizeof(struct dvb_frontend_ops));
state->frontend.demodulator_priv = state;
return &state->frontend;
error2: kfree(state);
error1: return NULL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4387
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4387/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47
|
2811ebac2521ceac84f2bdae402455baa6a7fb47
|
ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct dst_entry *ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct in6_addr *final_dst,
bool can_sleep)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_check(sk, inet6_sk(sk)->dst_cookie);
int err;
dst = ip6_sk_dst_check(sk, dst, fl6);
err = ip6_dst_lookup_tail(sk, &dst, fl6);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (final_dst)
fl6->daddr = *final_dst;
if (can_sleep)
fl6->flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP;
return xfrm_lookup(sock_net(sk), dst, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6), sk, 0);
}
|
struct dst_entry *ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi6 *fl6,
const struct in6_addr *final_dst,
bool can_sleep)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = sk_dst_check(sk, inet6_sk(sk)->dst_cookie);
int err;
dst = ip6_sk_dst_check(sk, dst, fl6);
err = ip6_dst_lookup_tail(sk, &dst, fl6);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (final_dst)
fl6->daddr = *final_dst;
if (can_sleep)
fl6->flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP;
return xfrm_lookup(sock_net(sk), dst, flowi6_to_flowi(fl6), sk, 0);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1700
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1700/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
685c3980d31b5199924086b8c93a1ce751d24733
|
content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::ApplyPreferences() {
WebPreferences prefs = render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences();
ExportLayoutTestSpecificPreferences(prefs_, &prefs);
render_view()->SetWebkitPreferences(prefs);
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_OverridePreferences(routing_id(), prefs));
}
|
void BlinkTestRunner::ApplyPreferences() {
WebPreferences prefs = render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences();
ExportLayoutTestSpecificPreferences(prefs_, &prefs);
render_view()->SetWebkitPreferences(prefs);
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_OverridePreferences(routing_id(), prefs));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5517/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
08dff7b7d629807dbb1f398c68dd9cd58dd657a1
|
mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Keping Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int is_mem_section_removable(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn);
struct page *end_page = page + nr_pages;
/* Check the starting page of each pageblock within the range */
for (; page < end_page; page = next_active_pageblock(page)) {
if (!is_pageblock_removable_nolock(page))
return 0;
cond_resched();
}
/* All pageblocks in the memory block are likely to be hot-removable */
return 1;
}
|
int is_mem_section_removable(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn);
struct page *end_page = page + nr_pages;
/* Check the starting page of each pageblock within the range */
for (; page < end_page; page = next_active_pageblock(page)) {
if (!is_pageblock_removable_nolock(page))
return 0;
cond_resched();
}
/* All pageblocks in the memory block are likely to be hot-removable */
return 1;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7425
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7425/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167
|
7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167
|
scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
static int arcmsr_hbaB_polling_ccbdone(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct CommandControlBlock *poll_ccb)
{
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *arcmsr_cdb;
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb;
uint32_t flag_ccb, poll_ccb_done = 0, poll_count = 0;
int index, rtn;
bool error;
polling_hbb_ccb_retry:
poll_count++;
/* clear doorbell interrupt */
writel(ARCMSR_DOORBELL_INT_CLEAR_PATTERN, reg->iop2drv_doorbell);
while(1){
index = reg->doneq_index;
flag_ccb = reg->done_qbuffer[index];
if (flag_ccb == 0) {
if (poll_ccb_done){
rtn = SUCCESS;
break;
}else {
msleep(25);
if (poll_count > 100){
rtn = FAILED;
break;
}
goto polling_hbb_ccb_retry;
}
}
reg->done_qbuffer[index] = 0;
index++;
/*if last index number set it to 0 */
index %= ARCMSR_MAX_HBB_POSTQUEUE;
reg->doneq_index = index;
/* check if command done with no error*/
arcmsr_cdb = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset + (flag_ccb << 5));
ccb = container_of(arcmsr_cdb, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
poll_ccb_done |= (ccb == poll_ccb) ? 1 : 0;
if ((ccb->acb != acb) || (ccb->startdone != ARCMSR_CCB_START)) {
if ((ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED) || (ccb == poll_ccb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: scsi id = %d lun = %d ccb = '0x%p'"
" poll command abort successfully \n"
,acb->host->host_no
,ccb->pcmd->device->id
,(u32)ccb->pcmd->device->lun
,ccb);
ccb->pcmd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
arcmsr_ccb_complete(ccb);
continue;
}
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: polling get an illegal ccb"
" command done ccb = '0x%p'"
"ccboutstandingcount = %d \n"
, acb->host->host_no
, ccb
, atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount));
continue;
}
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_report_ccb_state(acb, ccb, error);
}
return rtn;
}
|
static int arcmsr_hbaB_polling_ccbdone(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct CommandControlBlock *poll_ccb)
{
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *arcmsr_cdb;
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb;
uint32_t flag_ccb, poll_ccb_done = 0, poll_count = 0;
int index, rtn;
bool error;
polling_hbb_ccb_retry:
poll_count++;
/* clear doorbell interrupt */
writel(ARCMSR_DOORBELL_INT_CLEAR_PATTERN, reg->iop2drv_doorbell);
while(1){
index = reg->doneq_index;
flag_ccb = reg->done_qbuffer[index];
if (flag_ccb == 0) {
if (poll_ccb_done){
rtn = SUCCESS;
break;
}else {
msleep(25);
if (poll_count > 100){
rtn = FAILED;
break;
}
goto polling_hbb_ccb_retry;
}
}
reg->done_qbuffer[index] = 0;
index++;
/*if last index number set it to 0 */
index %= ARCMSR_MAX_HBB_POSTQUEUE;
reg->doneq_index = index;
/* check if command done with no error*/
arcmsr_cdb = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset + (flag_ccb << 5));
ccb = container_of(arcmsr_cdb, struct CommandControlBlock, arcmsr_cdb);
poll_ccb_done |= (ccb == poll_ccb) ? 1 : 0;
if ((ccb->acb != acb) || (ccb->startdone != ARCMSR_CCB_START)) {
if ((ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED) || (ccb == poll_ccb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: scsi id = %d lun = %d ccb = '0x%p'"
" poll command abort successfully \n"
,acb->host->host_no
,ccb->pcmd->device->id
,(u32)ccb->pcmd->device->lun
,ccb);
ccb->pcmd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
arcmsr_ccb_complete(ccb);
continue;
}
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: polling get an illegal ccb"
" command done ccb = '0x%p'"
"ccboutstandingcount = %d \n"
, acb->host->host_no
, ccb
, atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount));
continue;
}
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE0) ? true : false;
arcmsr_report_ccb_state(acb, ccb, error);
}
return rtn;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-1547
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1547/
|
CWE-311
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=30c22fa8b1d840036b8e203585738df62a03cec8
|
30c22fa8b1d840036b8e203585738df62a03cec8
| null |
void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
switch (group->pre_comp_type) {
case PCT_none:
break;
case PCT_nistz256:
#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistz256);
#endif
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
case PCT_nistp224:
EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp224);
break;
case PCT_nistp256:
EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp256);
break;
case PCT_nistp521:
EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp521);
break;
#else
case PCT_nistp224:
case PCT_nistp256:
case PCT_nistp521:
break;
#endif
case PCT_ec:
EC_ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.ec);
break;
}
group->pre_comp.ec = NULL;
}
|
void EC_pre_comp_free(EC_GROUP *group)
{
switch (group->pre_comp_type) {
case PCT_none:
break;
case PCT_nistz256:
#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
EC_nistz256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistz256);
#endif
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
case PCT_nistp224:
EC_nistp224_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp224);
break;
case PCT_nistp256:
EC_nistp256_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp256);
break;
case PCT_nistp521:
EC_nistp521_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.nistp521);
break;
#else
case PCT_nistp224:
case PCT_nistp256:
case PCT_nistp521:
break;
#endif
case PCT_ec:
EC_ec_pre_comp_free(group->pre_comp.ec);
break;
}
group->pre_comp.ec = NULL;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18358
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18358/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
da790f920bbc169a6805a4fb83b4c2ab09532d91
|
Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
|
HttpNetworkTransactionTest()
: ssl_(ASYNC, OK),
old_max_group_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_group(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)),
old_max_pool_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_pool(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)) {
session_deps_.enable_http2_alternative_service = true;
}
|
HttpNetworkTransactionTest()
: ssl_(ASYNC, OK),
old_max_group_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_group(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)),
old_max_pool_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_pool(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)) {
session_deps_.enable_http2_alternative_service = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void voidMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodOptionalLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, optionalLongArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg(optionalLongArg);
}
|
static void voidMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodOptionalLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, optionalLongArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->voidMethodOptionalLongArg(optionalLongArg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
static void LongOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
bool is_null = false;
int32_t cpp_value(impl->longOrNullAttribute(is_null));
if (is_null) {
V8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, cpp_value);
}
|
static void LongOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
bool is_null = false;
int32_t cpp_value(impl->longOrNullAttribute(is_null));
if (is_null) {
V8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, cpp_value);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/YanVugenfirer/kvm-guest-drivers-windows/commit/723416fa4210b7464b28eab89cc76252e6193ac1
|
723416fa4210b7464b28eab89cc76252e6193ac1
|
NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
|
void CNBL::PushMappedNB(CNB *NB)
{
m_MappedBuffersDetached--;
m_MappedBuffers.Push(NB);
}
|
void CNBL::PushMappedNB(CNB *NB)
{
m_MappedBuffersDetached--;
m_MappedBuffers.Push(NB);
}
|
C
|
kvm-guest-drivers-windows
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10012
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10012/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
3095060f479b86288e31c79ecbc5131a66bcd2f9
|
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
|
mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
int authenticated;
u_int plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
free(passwd);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
auth_method = "none";
else
auth_method = "password";
/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
|
mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
int authenticated;
u_int plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
free(passwd);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
auth_method = "none";
else
auth_method = "password";
/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
|
C
|
src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-14879
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-14879/
|
CWE-120
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
9ba91381954ad325ea4fd26b9c65a8bd9a2a85b6
|
(for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
|
open_interface(const char *device, netdissect_options *ndo, char *ebuf)
{
pcap_t *pc;
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_CREATE
int status;
char *cp;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_CREATE
pc = pcap_create(device, ebuf);
if (pc == NULL) {
/*
* If this failed with "No such device", that means
* the interface doesn't exist; return NULL, so that
* the caller can see whether the device name is
* actually an interface index.
*/
if (strstr(ebuf, "No such device") != NULL)
return (NULL);
error("%s", ebuf);
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_TYPE
if (Jflag)
show_tstamp_types_and_exit(pc, device);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_PRECISION
status = pcap_set_tstamp_precision(pc, ndo->ndo_tstamp_precision);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set %ssecond time stamp precision: %s",
device,
tstamp_precision_to_string(ndo->ndo_tstamp_precision),
pcap_statustostr(status));
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_IMMEDIATE_MODE
if (immediate_mode) {
status = pcap_set_immediate_mode(pc, 1);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set immediate mode: %s",
device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#endif
/*
* Is this an interface that supports monitor mode?
*/
if (pcap_can_set_rfmon(pc) == 1)
supports_monitor_mode = 1;
else
supports_monitor_mode = 0;
status = pcap_set_snaplen(pc, ndo->ndo_snaplen);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set snapshot length: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
status = pcap_set_promisc(pc, !pflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set promiscuous mode: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
if (Iflag) {
status = pcap_set_rfmon(pc, 1);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set monitor mode: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
}
status = pcap_set_timeout(pc, 1000);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: pcap_set_timeout failed: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
if (Bflag != 0) {
status = pcap_set_buffer_size(pc, Bflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set buffer size: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_TYPE
if (jflag != -1) {
status = pcap_set_tstamp_type(pc, jflag);
if (status < 0)
error("%s: Can't set time stamp type: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
else if (status > 0)
warning("When trying to set timestamp type '%s' on %s: %s",
pcap_tstamp_type_val_to_name(jflag), device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#endif
status = pcap_activate(pc);
if (status < 0) {
/*
* pcap_activate() failed.
*/
cp = pcap_geterr(pc);
if (status == PCAP_ERROR)
error("%s", cp);
else if (status == PCAP_ERROR_NO_SUCH_DEVICE) {
/*
* Return an error for our caller to handle.
*/
snprintf(ebuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "%s: %s\n(%s)",
device, pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
pcap_close(pc);
return (NULL);
} else if (status == PCAP_ERROR_PERM_DENIED && *cp != '\0')
error("%s: %s\n(%s)", device,
pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
else
error("%s: %s", device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
} else if (status > 0) {
/*
* pcap_activate() succeeded, but it's warning us
* of a problem it had.
*/
cp = pcap_geterr(pc);
if (status == PCAP_WARNING)
warning("%s", cp);
else if (status == PCAP_WARNING_PROMISC_NOTSUP &&
*cp != '\0')
warning("%s: %s\n(%s)", device,
pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
else
warning("%s: %s", device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION
if (Qflag != -1) {
status = pcap_setdirection(pc, Qflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: pcap_setdirection() failed: %s",
device, pcap_geterr(pc));
}
#endif /* HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION */
#else /* HAVE_PCAP_CREATE */
*ebuf = '\0';
pc = pcap_open_live(device, ndo->ndo_snaplen, !pflag, 1000, ebuf);
if (pc == NULL) {
/*
* If this failed with "No such device", that means
* the interface doesn't exist; return NULL, so that
* the caller can see whether the device name is
* actually an interface index.
*/
if (strstr(ebuf, "No such device") != NULL)
return (NULL);
error("%s", ebuf);
}
if (*ebuf)
warning("%s", ebuf);
#endif /* HAVE_PCAP_CREATE */
return (pc);
}
|
open_interface(const char *device, netdissect_options *ndo, char *ebuf)
{
pcap_t *pc;
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_CREATE
int status;
char *cp;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_CREATE
pc = pcap_create(device, ebuf);
if (pc == NULL) {
/*
* If this failed with "No such device", that means
* the interface doesn't exist; return NULL, so that
* the caller can see whether the device name is
* actually an interface index.
*/
if (strstr(ebuf, "No such device") != NULL)
return (NULL);
error("%s", ebuf);
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_TYPE
if (Jflag)
show_tstamp_types_and_exit(pc, device);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_PRECISION
status = pcap_set_tstamp_precision(pc, ndo->ndo_tstamp_precision);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set %ssecond time stamp precision: %s",
device,
tstamp_precision_to_string(ndo->ndo_tstamp_precision),
pcap_statustostr(status));
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_IMMEDIATE_MODE
if (immediate_mode) {
status = pcap_set_immediate_mode(pc, 1);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set immediate mode: %s",
device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#endif
/*
* Is this an interface that supports monitor mode?
*/
if (pcap_can_set_rfmon(pc) == 1)
supports_monitor_mode = 1;
else
supports_monitor_mode = 0;
status = pcap_set_snaplen(pc, ndo->ndo_snaplen);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set snapshot length: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
status = pcap_set_promisc(pc, !pflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set promiscuous mode: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
if (Iflag) {
status = pcap_set_rfmon(pc, 1);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set monitor mode: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
}
status = pcap_set_timeout(pc, 1000);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: pcap_set_timeout failed: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
if (Bflag != 0) {
status = pcap_set_buffer_size(pc, Bflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: Can't set buffer size: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SET_TSTAMP_TYPE
if (jflag != -1) {
status = pcap_set_tstamp_type(pc, jflag);
if (status < 0)
error("%s: Can't set time stamp type: %s",
device, pcap_statustostr(status));
else if (status > 0)
warning("When trying to set timestamp type '%s' on %s: %s",
pcap_tstamp_type_val_to_name(jflag), device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#endif
status = pcap_activate(pc);
if (status < 0) {
/*
* pcap_activate() failed.
*/
cp = pcap_geterr(pc);
if (status == PCAP_ERROR)
error("%s", cp);
else if (status == PCAP_ERROR_NO_SUCH_DEVICE) {
/*
* Return an error for our caller to handle.
*/
snprintf(ebuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "%s: %s\n(%s)",
device, pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
pcap_close(pc);
return (NULL);
} else if (status == PCAP_ERROR_PERM_DENIED && *cp != '\0')
error("%s: %s\n(%s)", device,
pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
else
error("%s: %s", device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
} else if (status > 0) {
/*
* pcap_activate() succeeded, but it's warning us
* of a problem it had.
*/
cp = pcap_geterr(pc);
if (status == PCAP_WARNING)
warning("%s", cp);
else if (status == PCAP_WARNING_PROMISC_NOTSUP &&
*cp != '\0')
warning("%s: %s\n(%s)", device,
pcap_statustostr(status), cp);
else
warning("%s: %s", device,
pcap_statustostr(status));
}
#ifdef HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION
if (Qflag != -1) {
status = pcap_setdirection(pc, Qflag);
if (status != 0)
error("%s: pcap_setdirection() failed: %s",
device, pcap_geterr(pc));
}
#endif /* HAVE_PCAP_SETDIRECTION */
#else /* HAVE_PCAP_CREATE */
*ebuf = '\0';
pc = pcap_open_live(device, ndo->ndo_snaplen, !pflag, 1000, ebuf);
if (pc == NULL) {
/*
* If this failed with "No such device", that means
* the interface doesn't exist; return NULL, so that
* the caller can see whether the device name is
* actually an interface index.
*/
if (strstr(ebuf, "No such device") != NULL)
return (NULL);
error("%s", ebuf);
}
if (*ebuf)
warning("%s", ebuf);
#endif /* HAVE_PCAP_CREATE */
return (pc);
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e
|
Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SetWindowFocus(bool window_has_focus) {
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_SetWindowFocus(instance_id_,
window_has_focus);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
|
void WebPluginDelegateProxy::SetWindowFocus(bool window_has_focus) {
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_SetWindowFocus(instance_id_,
window_has_focus);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4819
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4819/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/render/render.c?id=5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
|
5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
| null |
SProcRenderQueryDithers (ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
|
SProcRenderQueryDithers (ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2871
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2871/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
bb9cfb0aba25f4b13e57bdd4a9fac80ba071e7b9
|
Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool HTMLInputElement::isWeekField() const
{
return m_inputType->isWeekField();
}
|
bool HTMLInputElement::isWeekField() const
{
return m_inputType->isWeekField();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-4655
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4655/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563
|
82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563
|
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.
The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.
Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.
Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
if (replace) {
err = snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(file, &info->id);
if (err)
return err;
}
if (card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->card = card;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
|
static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info, int replace)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_kcontrol kctl, *_kctl;
unsigned int access;
long private_size;
struct user_element *ue;
int idx, err;
if (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)
return -ENOMEM;
if (info->count < 1)
return -EINVAL;
access = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :
(info->access & (SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_INACTIVE|
SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));
info->id.numid = 0;
memset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
err = 0;
if (_kctl) {
if (replace)
err = snd_ctl_remove(card, _kctl);
else
err = -EBUSY;
} else {
if (replace)
err = -ENOENT;
}
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(&kctl.id, &info->id, sizeof(info->id));
kctl.count = info->owner ? info->owner : 1;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_USER;
if (info->type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED)
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_enum_info;
else
kctl.info = snd_ctl_elem_user_info;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ)
kctl.get = snd_ctl_elem_user_get;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE)
kctl.put = snd_ctl_elem_user_put;
if (access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE) {
kctl.tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv;
access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK;
}
switch (info->type) {
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER:
private_size = sizeof(long);
if (info->count > 128)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER64:
private_size = sizeof(long long);
if (info->count > 64)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned int);
if (info->count > 128 || info->value.enumerated.items == 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_BYTES:
private_size = sizeof(unsigned char);
if (info->count > 512)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958:
private_size = sizeof(struct snd_aes_iec958);
if (info->count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
private_size *= info->count;
ue = kzalloc(sizeof(struct user_element) + private_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ue == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
ue->card = card;
ue->info = *info;
ue->info.access = 0;
ue->elem_data = (char *)ue + sizeof(*ue);
ue->elem_data_size = private_size;
if (ue->info.type == SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED) {
err = snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(ue);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(ue);
return err;
}
}
kctl.private_free = snd_ctl_elem_user_free;
_kctl = snd_ctl_new(&kctl, access);
if (_kctl == NULL) {
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
return -ENOMEM;
}
_kctl->private_data = ue;
for (idx = 0; idx < _kctl->count; idx++)
_kctl->vd[idx].owner = file;
err = snd_ctl_add(card, _kctl);
if (err < 0)
return err;
down_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
card->user_ctl_count++;
up_write(&card->controls_rwsem);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2015-1335
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1335/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
592fd47a6245508b79fe6ac819fe6d3b2c1289be
|
CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
static inline void cleanup_cgroups(char *path)
{
int i;
char **slist = subsystems;
if (cgm_supports_multiple_controllers)
slist = subsystems_inone;
for (i = 0; slist[i]; i++)
cgm_remove_cgroup(slist[i], path);
}
|
static inline void cleanup_cgroups(char *path)
{
int i;
char **slist = subsystems;
if (cgm_supports_multiple_controllers)
slist = subsystems_inone;
for (i = 0; slist[i]; i++)
cgm_remove_cgroup(slist[i], path);
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.