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3-96 | 146 | Chapter 4
(cid:122) Routine logistical reports and requests are sent digitally.
(cid:122) Routine reports from subordinates to the BCT before and following combat are sent digitally.
(cid:122) Orders,plans,and graphics should be done face-to-face,if possible. If theseproducts are digitally
transmitted, they should be followed by frequency modulation voice call to alert recipients that
critical information is being sent. The transmitting element should request a verbal
acknowledgement of both receipt and understanding of the transmitted information by an
appropriate Soldier,who usually is not the computer operator.
(cid:122) Obstacle and CBRN 1 reports should be sent initially by voice followed by digital reports to
generate a geo-referenced message portraying the obstacle or contaminated area across the
network.
Friendly Common Operational Picture
4-283. The creation of the friendly COP is extensively automated,requiring minimal manipulation by CPs
or platform operators. Each platform creates and transmits its own position location and receives the friendly
locations,displayed as icons,of all the friendly elements in that platform’s wide area network. This does not
necessarily mean that all friendly units in the general vicinity of that platform are displayed because some
elements may not be in that platform’s network. For example,a combat vehicle in a BCT probably will not
have information on an artillery unit in another division operating nearby because the two are in different
networks. The COP provided by the JCR/JBC-P(a situational awareness and command and control system)
transmitted to CPs across the BCT utilizes a separate satellite-based network to provide position location
information. The BCT S-6 ensures the proper alignment and interoperability between the command and
control applications and the networks the BCT utilizes. (See ATP6-02.53 for additional information on
tactical radio networks.)
4-284. Commanders must recognize limitations in the creation of the friendly COP which results from
vehicles or units that are not equipped with the JCR. The following are two aspects to consider:
(cid:122) Not all units will be equipped with all command and control system components, particularly
multination partners and organizations. It is likely analog units or organizations—those operating
in an area of operations without compatible digital-based command and control systems—will
enter the BCT’s area of operations.
(cid:122) Most dismounted Soldiers will not be equipped with a digital device that transmits information.
4-285. The following are ways to overcome these limitations:
(cid:122) A digitally equipped element tracks the location of specified dismounts and manually generates
and maintains an associated friendly icon.
(cid:122) The main CP tracks analog units operating within the area and generates associated friendly icons.
The main CP must keep the analog equipped unit informed of other friendly units’locations and
activities.
(cid:122) Adigitally equipped platform acts as a liaison or escort for analog units moving or operating in
the same area. Battalion and squadron,and higher elements must be informed of the association
of the liaison officer icon with the analog unit.
(cid:122) Do not use friendly positional information to clear fires because not all elements will be visible.
Friendly positional information can be used to deny fires and can aid in the clearance process,but
it cannot be the sole source for clearance of fires. This holds true for all Army command and
control systems.
Enemy Common Operational Picture
4-286. The most difficult and critical aspect of creating the COP is creating the picture of the enemy. The
enemy COP is the result of multiple inputs (for example,frequency modulation spot reports,UAS and Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS] reports, reports from JCR-equipped platforms in
subordinate units,electronic or signalsintelligence feeds) and inputs from BCT information collection efforts
through the BCT S-2. Enemy information generation is a complex process requiring automated intelligence
all source inputs and detailed analysis from within the BCT. |
3-96 | 147 | Mission Command
4-287. Generation of the enemy COP occurs at all echelons. At BCT level and below, the primary
mechanism for generating information is the JBC-P. When an observer acquires an enemy element, they
create and transmit a spot report,which automatically generates an enemy icon that appears throughout the
network. Only those in the address group to whom the report was sent receive the text of the report,but all
platforms in the network can see the icon. As the enemy moves or its strength changes, the observer must
update this icon. If the observer must move,the observer ideally passes responsibility for the icon to another
observer. If multiple observers see the same enemy element and create multiple reports,the S-2 or some other
element that has the capability must eliminate the redundant icons.
4-288. Unit SOPs must clearly establish who has the ability,authority,and responsibility to create and input
enemy icons. Without the establishment of these procedures,it is highly probable that the enemy COP will
not be accurate.
4-289. JBC-Pspot reports must include the BCT S-2 in the address group for the data to be routed through
the CP server into the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A)to feed the larger intelligence
picture. Frequency modulation reports received at a CP can be inputted manually into the DCGS-Adatabase
by the S-2 section. JBC-P and frequency modulation voice reports are the primary source of enemy
information in the BCT’s area of operations.
4-290. Fusion of all the intelligence feeds normally occurs at BCT and higher levels. The BCT S-2 routinely
(every 30 minutes to every hour) sends the updated enemy picture to subordinate units down to platform
level. Since the fused DCGS-Adatabase focuses on the deep areas of the battlefield;its timeliness may vary.
Subordinate elements of the BCT normally use only the JBC-Pgenerated COP. Companies and troops stay
focused entirely on the JCR/JBC-P generated COP. Battalion and squadron leaders and staffs refer
occasionally to the JCR/JBC-P generated intelligence picture to keep track of enemy forces they might
encounter in the near future,but not yet in the close or deep area.
4-291. Automation and displays contribute enormously to the ability to disseminate information and display
it in a manner that aids comprehension. However,information generation must be rapid for it to be useful.
Information also must be accompanied by analysis;pictures alone cannot convey all that is required,nor will
they be interpreted the same by all viewers. The BCT S-2 and section must be particularly careful about
spending too much time operating aDCGS-Aterminal while neglecting the analysis of activities for the BCT
and subordinate commanders and other staff members. (See ATP 6-02.53 and ATP 6-02.60 for additional
information.) The success of the BCT’s intelligence effort depends primarily on the ability of staffs to—
(cid:122) Analyze enemy activities effectively.
(cid:122) Develop and continuously refine effective IPB.
(cid:122) Create effective collection requirements management.
(cid:122) Execute effective collection operations management.
Graphics and Orders
4-292. The advent of digitization does not mean that acetate and maps have no use and will disappear,at
least not in the near future. Maps remain the best tools when maneuvering and fighting on the battlefield,and
for controlling and tracking operations over a large area. The combination of a map with digital information
and terrain database is ideal;both are required and extensively used.
4-293. Army command and control system components support the creation and transmission of operation
orders. BCT staff sections normally develop their portions of orders and send them to the S-3 where they are
merged into a single document. The S-3 deconflicts,integrates,and synchronizes all elements of the order.
Once the order is complete,it is transmitted to subordinate,higher,and adjacent units. The tactical internet
does not possess high transmission rates and therefore orders and graphics should be concise to reduce
transmission times. Orders transmitted directly to JCR/JBC-P-equipped systems within the battalion or
squadron must meet the size constraints of the order formats in the JCR/JBC-P. Graphics and overlays are
constructed with the same considerations for clarity and size.
4-294. Digital graphics must interface and be transmittable. The interface and commonality of graphics will
continue to evolve technologically and will require further software corrections. The following guidelines
apply when creating graphics: |
3-96 | 148 | Chapter 4
(cid:122) Create control measures based on readily identifiable terrain,especially if analog units are part of
the task organization.
(cid:122) Boundaries are important,especially when multiple units must operate in close proximity or when
it becomes necessary to coordinate fires or movement of other units.
(cid:122) Intent graphics that lack the specificity of detailed control measures are an excellent tool for use
with warning and fragmentary orders and when doing parallel planning. Follow them with
appropriately detailed graphics,as required.
(cid:122) Use standardized colors to differentiate units. This is articulated in the tactical SOP. For example,
BCT graphics may be in black,battalion A in purple,battalion B in magenta,and battalion C in
brown and so forth. This adds considerable clarity for the viewer. Subordinate company and team
colors are then specified.
(cid:122) Use traditional doctrinal colors for other graphics (green for obstacles, yellow for contaminated
areas,and so forth).
4-295. In order to accelerate transmission times when creating overlays, use multiple smaller overlays
instead of a single large overlay. System operators can open the overlays they need, displaying them
simultaneously. The technique also helps operators in reducing screen clutter. The S-3 should create the
initial graphic control measures on a single overlay and distribute it to the staff. The overlay is labeled as the
operations overlay with the appropriate order number. Staff elements should construct their appropriate
graphic overlays using the operations overlay as a background but without duplicating the operations overlay.
This avoids unnecessary duplication and increase in file size and maintains standardization and accuracy.
Each staff section labels its overlay appropriately with the type of overlay and order number. Before overlays
are transmitted to subordinate,higher,and adjacent units,the senior battle captain or the XO checks them for
accuracy and labeling. Hard copy (traditional acetate) overlays are required for the CPs and any analog units.
Transmit graphics for on-order missions or branch options to the plan before the operation as time permits.
If time is short,transmit them with warning orders.
Digital Standard Operating Procedures
4-296. The BCT SOP should contain standards for digital operations,in addition to analog operations. Most
of digital operating procedures are established at the BCT level with the battalion SOP complying and adding
detail when required. One of the critical requirements when task organized to another unit is to receive and
disseminate that units SOP.
4-297. To create a common picture, JCR/JBC-P must have the same information filter settings. This is
particularly important for the enemy COP so that as icons go stale, they purge at the same time on all
platforms. Standard filter settings shouldbe established in unit SOPs and be the same throughout the BCT.
For enemy offensive operations,the filter setting times should be short;for enemy defensive operations,the
setting times should be longer,reflecting the more static nature of the enemy picture.
4-298. The standardization of friendly and enemy situational filter settings is of great importance in
maintaining a COP. JCR/JBC-P provides three methods for updating individual vehicle locations: time,
distance, and manual. When the system is operational, it automatically updates friendly icons using time,
distance traveled, or both, based on the platform’s friendly situational filter settings. The unit should
standardize filter settings across the force based on both the mission and the function of the platform or
vehicle. Use shorter refresh rates for combat vehicles and vehicles that frequently move and longer refresh
rates for static vehicles such as CPs. Tailoring the frequency of these automatic updates reduces the load on
the tactical internet,freeing more capacity for other types of traffic.
4-299. The BCT node is probably the most effective place to standardize the situational filter settings using
the BCT tactical SOP. There are no set rules for what these settings should be. The commander must establish
them based on the unit’s experience using JCR/JBC-Pand the capacity of the tactical internet. Subordinate
units should use the capability to update a vehicle’s position manually only when a platform’s system is not
fully functional,and it has lost the ability to maintain its position automatically. |
3-96 | 149 | Mission Command
Reporting and Tracking of Battles
4-300. Having all platforms and units on the battlefield send spot reports digitally may result in mass
confusion. However, to eliminate confusion, there should be one designated individual within the unit
authorized to initiate digital spot reports. While the designated individual will be somewhat removed from
the fight,that individual can assist those who execute the direct firefight by filtering multiple reports of the
same event.
4-301. Another technique,used at company level,to eliminate duplicate reporting problems is to limit the
creation of enemy icons through digital spot reports to reconnaissance and security elements and the company
leadership (commander, XO, or first sergeant) or other designated individual. Others report to their higher
headquarters,which creates and manages the icon. At company level,the XO,first sergeant,or CP personnel
become the primary digital reporters. These assignments cannot be completely restrictive. Unit SOPs and
command guidance must allow for and encourage Soldiers who observe the enemy and know they are the
sole observer (because there is no corresponding enemy icon displayed in the situational COP) to create a
digital spot report. BCT and subordinate unit SOPs should define the schedule for report submissions, the
message group for the reports,and the medium (digital system or verbal) used.
4-302. Battle tracking is the process of monitoring designated elements of the COP tied to the commander’s
criteria for success. Battle tracking requires special attention from all staff officers, and normally done
digitally and manually with situation maps and boards. The XO and S-3 must continue to monitor the progress
of the operation and recommend changes as required.
4-303. The BCT XO establishes a schedule for routine systems updates. For example,the S-2 section should
continuously update the DCGS-A database and should transmit the latest COP to the network every 30
minutes during operations if the commander, S-3, or reconnaissance and security elements need it. Staff
sections should print critical displays on an established schedule. These printed snapshots of the COP are
used for continuity of battle tracking in the event of system failures and can contribute to after-action reviews
and unit historical records.
4-304. SOPs define the technical process for creating,collating,and transmitting orders and overlays,both
analog and digital and in degraded environments. For interoperability and clarity,BCT SOPs should define
the naming convention and filing system for all reports,orders,and message traffic. This significantly reduces
time and frustration associated with lost files or changes in system operators or the environment. Information
systems will inevitably migrate to a web-based capability. This allows information in a database to be
accessed by users as needed or when they are able to retrieve it. For example, the S-2 may transmit an
intelligence summary to all subordinates. Inevitably, some will lose the file or not receive it. The S-2 can
simultaneously post that same summary to an established homepage so users can access it as required. If this
technique is used,the following are a few things to consider—
(cid:122) Posting a document to a homepage does not constitute communications. The right people are
alerted when the document is available.
(cid:122) Keep documents concise and simple. Elaborate digital slide presentationstake longer to transmit,
causing delays in the tactical internet.
(cid:122) The amount of information entered in a database and personnel who have access is carefully
controlled,both to maintain security and to keep from overloading the tactical internet.
(cid:122) Assign responsibility to personnel who are authorized to input and delete both friendly and enemy
unit icon information.
4-305. In combat against a peer enemy,the probability of losing digital connectivity for short and extended
periods if high. The BCT commander and staff must be able to transition to pure analog means of battle
tracking immediately upon loss of digital capability and degraded capability. Procedures for integrating
digital and analog units and operations within degraded environments are essential and should consider the
following:
(cid:122) Frequency modulation and joint network node/CP node are theprimary communications mediums
with the analog unit.
(cid:122) Hard copy orders and graphics are required. |
3-96 | 150 | Chapter 4
(cid:122) Graphic control measures require a level of detail necessary to support operations of a unit without
situational information. This requires more control measures tied to identifiable terrain,especially
during operations within degraded environments.
(cid:122) Liaison teams are critical in both digital and analog situations through direct liaison with the
partner unit(s).
(cid:122) The staff must recognize that integrating an analog unit into a digital unit requires retention of
most of the analog control techniques. In essence,both digital and analog control systems must be
in operation, with particular attention paid to keeping the analog unit apprised of all pertinent
information that flows digitally.
(cid:122) The staff establishes redundant communication, especially when the BCT shares its area of
operations with other entities that have cultural differences and lack of or degraded
communications.
Considerations Concerning the Degradation of BCT Commandand ControlSystems
4-306. As the staff supports the commander in the exercise of command and control, assists subordinate
units,and informs units and organizations outside the BCT,a broad array of actors and activities challenge
theBCT’s freedom of action in cyberspace and space. Enemies and adversaries utilize cyberspace and space
to degrade the BCT’s capability to communicate and operate commandand controlsystems. The ability for
adversaries and enemies to operate in the cyberspace and space domains increases the need for the BCT to
maintain the capability to conduct offensive and defensive cyberspace operations (see paragraph 4-329) to
affect the operational environment and to protect friendly command and control systems. For example,enemy
global positioning satellite jamming capabilities could render precision fires and blue force tracker
inaccurate.
4-307. During the operations process, the BCT and its subordinate units prepare for degraded command
and controlsystems and reduced access to cyberspace and space capabilities. Considerations concerning the
BCT in denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of cyberspace and the EMS and other effects that
degrade friendly command and control systems include—
(cid:122) Enemy capabilities (cyberspace, space, EW) to degrade, planned and targeted against command
and control systems. Enemy efforts include jamming, spoofing, intercepting, hacking, and
direction finding (leads to targeting).
(cid:122) Friendly effects that degrade include—
(cid:131) Lack of familiarity with Army command and controlsystems.
(cid:131) Lack of protection or countermeasures at BCT and below echelons.
(cid:131) Lack of understanding of threat capabilities and doctrine for employment.
(cid:131) Terrain and weather,and other environmental variables.
4-308. Key indicators that BCT commandand controlsystems are being degraded include—
(cid:122) Reliable voice communications are degraded.
(cid:122) Increased latency for data transmissions.
(cid:122) Frequent and accurate targeting by threat lethal and nonlethal effects.
(cid:122) Increased pings/network intrusions.
(cid:122) Inconsistent digital COP,for example spoofing.
(cid:122) Inaccurate Global Positioning System (GPS) data/no satellite lock and inconsistency between
inertial navigation aids and GPS-enabled systems.
4-309. BCT efforts tocounter the effects of degraded mission command systems include—
(cid:122) Train to recognize indicators that it is happening.
(cid:122) Develop contingency plans and rehearse implementation during the planning process and
preparations.
(cid:122) Maintain analog COP at all echelons.
(cid:122) Train to operate from the commander’sintent,and analog graphics and synchronization matrixes.
(cid:122) Keep plans as simple as possible so thatthey are less susceptible to friction. |
3-96 | 151 | Mission Command
4-310. BCT efforts to prevent degraded command and control systems include—
(cid:122) Minimize length of frequency modulation transmissions.
(cid:122) Use terrain to mask transmission signatures.
(cid:122) Employment of directional antennas.
(cid:122) Require physical presence of leaders at briefings, for example distribute information via analog
means in person.
(cid:122) Use of camouflage and deception in all domains.
(cid:122) Use ofcommunications windows to reduce transmissions.
(cid:122) Employment of encryption/cypher techniques.
AIR GROUND OPERATIONS
4-311. Air and ground forces must integrate effectively and properly plan, coordinate, synchronize, and
conduct operations with a combination of lethal joint fires and nonlethal actionsto minimize the potential for
fratricide, allied casualties, noncombatant casualties, and un-intended excessive collateral damage.
Integration,the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging
as a whole (JP 1),maximizes combat power through synergy of both forces. The integration of air operations
into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver may also require integration of other Services or
multinational partners. Integration continues through planning,preparation,execution,and assessment. The
BCT commander and staff must consider the following framework fundamentals to ensure effective
integration of air and ground maneuver forces:
(cid:122) Understanding capabilities and limitations of each force.
(cid:122) SOPs.
(cid:122) Habitual relationships.
(cid:122) Regular training events.
(cid:122) Airspace management.
(cid:122) Maximizing and concentrating effects of available assets.
(cid:122) Employment methods.
(cid:122) Synchronization.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
4-312. Airspace management is the coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of airspace of
defined dimensions (JP 3-52). Airspace management is essential to integrate all airspace uses (manned and
unmanned aircraft and indirect fires). Properly developed airspace coordinating measures facilitate
reconnaissance and security operations and the BCT’s employment of aerial and surface-based fires
simultaneously as well as unmanned assets to maintain surveillance. Airspace management includes
identifying airspace users’ requirements and processing airspace coordinating measures requirements to
satisfy thesynchronization of operational timelines and events.It is critical to process airspace coordinating
measures requirements per higher headquarters battle rhythm to meet joint force suspense to get airspace
requirements integrated into the theater airspace control system and published on the airspace control order.
(SeeFM 3-52 and ATP3-52.1for additional information.)
DIVISIONJOINT AIR-GROUND INTEGRATION CENTER
4-313. The BCT commander uses the division JAGIC to ensure continuous collaboration with unified
action partners to integrate fires and to use airspace effectively. The BCT fire support cell sends requests for
division level Army and joint fires to the JAGIC in the current operations integrating cell of the division.
Upon receipt of the request for fire or joint tactical air strike request (DD Form 1972 [Joint Tactical Air
Strike Request]), the JAGIC develops targeting solutions and coordinates airspace requirements.
Additionally, the JAGIC conducts collateral damage estimation and reviews available ground and air
component fires capabilities to determine the most effective attack method. (SeeATP 3-91.1 for additional
information on the JAGIC.) |
3-96 | 152 | Chapter 4
AIR DEFENSE AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT ANDBRIGADE AVIATION ELEMENT
4-314. The ADAM element and BAE, located within the BCT fire support cell, provides the BCT
commander and staff with the aerial component of the COP. These elements coordinate airspace management
requirements with higher headquarters and enable air and missile defense and aviation considerations
throughout the operations process. By providing the BCT commander and staff with near real time situational
awareness of the airspace dimension, these elements allow the commander to optimize the air battle and
airspace management at all levels.
4-315. The ADAM element integrates within the BCT’s fire support cell and always deploys with the BCT.
Upon mission notification,the ADAM element conducts an assessment to determine if air and missile defense
augmentation from the division air and missile defense battalion is required. The element conducts
continuous planning and coordination proportionate with the augmented sensors deployed within the
brigade’s area of operations. The ADAM element and tailored air and missile defense augmentation force
provide the active air defense within the BCT’s area of operations. (See ATP 3-01.50 for additional
information.)
4-316. The BAE plans and coordinates the incorporation of Army aviation into the ground commander’s
scheme of maneuver and synchronizes aviation operations and airspace coordinatingmeasures. The element
provides employment advice and initial planning for aviation missions to include employment of UASs,
airspace planning and coordination, and synchronizationwith other air liaison officers and the fire support
coordinator. The BAE coordinates directly with the supporting combat aviation brigade or aviation task force.
The combat aviation brigade commander exercises an informal oversight role for the brigade aviation officer
and the BAE. The combat aviation brigade commander interfaces with the supported BCT commander to
ensure the BAE is manned properly to meet the BCT commander’s intent. (SeeFM3-04 and ATP 3-04.1 for
additional information.)
COMBAT AVIATIONBRIGADE
4-317. The combat aviation brigade is a modular and tailorable force organized and equipped to integrate
and synchronize operations of multiple aviation battalions. The combat aviation brigade can operate as a
maneuver headquarters and can employ subordinate battalions and other augmenting forces in deliberate and
hasty operations. The combat aviation brigade headquarters provides tailored support to adjacent supported
maneuver commanders at the BCT level and below when employed in this role. Whilea BAE works directly
for the BCT commander as a permanent member of the BCT staff, aviation liaison teams represent the
supporting aviation task force at designated maneuver headquarters for the duration of a specific operation.
If collocated with a BAE, the liaison team normally works directly with the brigade aviation officer as a
functioning addition to the BAE staff section. Effective employment of liaison officers is imperative for
coordination and synchronization. Often aviation liaison teams coordinate with the BAE and proceed to a
supported ground maneuver battalion or squadron location.
4-318. Air-ground integration is merging air and ground operations into one fight. The goal is to apply
aviation capabilities according to the BCT commander’s intent. Ideally, integration begins early in the
planning process with the BAE’s involvement. The BAE advises the BCT commander on aviation
capabilities and on how to best use aviation to support mission objectives. The employment of aviation assets
is dependent upon providing the supporting aviation units with a task and purpose,integrating them into the
BCT commander’s scheme of maneuver. This integration allows the aviation commander and staff to identify
the best available platform(s) for the mission, to identify the proper utilization of aviation assets, and to
increase the BCT’s maneuver capabilities, as well as the commander’s ability to conduct command and
control on the move. BCT planners, down through the supporting aviation unit to the individual aircrews,
should consider theseimperatives as elements of air-ground operations. A failure to properly consider these
imperatives can result in the lack of synchronization, wasted combat power, the loss of friendly forces by
enemy actions,or fratricide. (SeeFM 3-04 and ATP 3-04.1 for additional information.)
4-319. Combat aviation brigade attacks may be in close proximity or in direct support of ground maneuver
forces or the attacks may be against enemy forces not in direct contact with friendly ground forces
(interdiction). Army aviation attacks are coordinated attacks by Army attack reconnaissance aircraft (manned
and unmanned) against targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces. Army aviation attacks are not |
3-96 | 153 | Mission Command
synonymous with close air support flown by joint aircraft. Detailed integration with ground forces is required
due to the close proximity of friendly forces.Interdiction is an action to divert,disrupt,delay,or destroy the
enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces,or to otherwise
achieve objectives (JP 3-03). Interdiction is at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration
with ground forces is not required.
4-320. Air-ground operations include the movement of maneuver forces. An air assaultis the movement
of friendly assault forces by rotary-wing or tiltrotor aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize
and hold key terrain (JP 3-18). Air assaults use the firepower, mobility, protection, and total integration of
aviation assets in their air and ground roles to attain the advantage of surprise. Air assaults allow friendly
forces to strike over extended distances and terrain to attack the enemy when and where it is most vulnerable.
By their very nature,air assaults are high risk,high payoffoperations that are resource intensive and require
extensive planning and preparation to be successful. (SeeFM 3-99 for additional information.)
4-321. Army air movements are operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing assets for
other than air assaults (FM 3-90-2). Air movements are a viable means of transport and distribution to support
maneuver and sustainment conducted to reposition units,personnel,supplies, equipment, and other critical
combat elements. In addition,to airdrop and air landing,these operations include external carry by sling-load.
Army rotary wing aircraft conduct airdrop and air landing movement as well as sling-load operations. Sling
operations are unique to helicopters with external cargo hooks. The utility and cargo helicopters of the combat
aviation brigade supplement ground transportation to help sustain continuous operations. The aviation unit
performs air movements on a direct support or general support basis with utility and cargo aircraft. The same
general planning considerations that apply to air assaults apply to air movements. (SeeFM 3-04 for additional
information.)
4-322. The combat aviation brigade has an organic air ambulance medical company,also referred to as the
medical company (air ambulance),found in the general support aviation battalion. The air ambulance medical
company has a company headquarters and four forward support medical evacuation platoons or forward
support medical evacuation teams. Air ambulance aircraft are equipped with medical personnel and
equipment enabling the provision of en route care of patients. Air ambulance medical company assets can
collocate with AHSsupport organizations,the aviation task force,the supported BCT,or higher to provide
air ambulance support throughout the area of operations. (See ATP 4-02.3 and FM3-04 for additional
information.)
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS
4-323. The military intelligence company within the BCT distributes intelligence support teams regardless
of which element of decisive action (offense, defense, or stability) currently dominates. Dependent on the
situation,these teams can be employed down to maneuver company level. The intelligence support teams’
mission is to provide basic analytic support,develop basic-level intelligence products,serve as a conduit for
effective intelligence communications,and when resourced,manage some information collection programs.
Some of those information collection programs include friendly force debriefings,basicdocument and media
exploitation,and biometric and forensic collections(when properly equipped and trained).
4-324. The BCT can employ anywhere from two intelligence analysts,for example to a maneuver company,
or a large team of intelligence analysts as an intelligence support team to support,based on the situation,a
maneuver battalion or squadron, BEB, field artillery battalion, BSB, or to further augment the BCT
intelligence cell or brigade intelligence support element. A supported maneuver unit or element may
subsequently augment the intelligence analysts with nonmilitary intelligence Soldiers to form a larger
intelligence support team. When this occurs,it is critical that the appropriate S-2 section thoroughly train all
nonmilitary intelligence personnel on intelligence support team activities.
4-325. The BCT S-3 and S-2 work together with the battalion and squadron S-3s and S-2s to determine the
intelligence support teams’task organization,based on the mission variables of METT-TC,using standard
command and support relationships as part of the overall BCT intelligence architecture. Planning
considerations for the intelligence support team includes the supported unit’s—
(cid:122) Commander’s guidance.
(cid:122) Decisive and shaping operations and main and supporting efforts. |
3-96 | 154 | Chapter 4
(cid:122) Specific tasks and the requirement for quick analysis at the point of action or to help manage a
unit’s information collectioneffort.
(cid:122) Ability to provide transportation and logistical support.
(cid:122) Communications capacity for the intelligence support teams.
(cid:122) Use of a specific intelligence support team to support or train with a specific unit.
CYBERSPACE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES
4-326. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing
cyberspace and EW operations. Incorporating CEMA throughout all phases of an operation is key to
obtaining and maintaining freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and the EMS while denying the same to
enemies and adversaries. CEMA synchronizes capabilities across domains and warfighting functions and
maximizes complementary effects in and through cyberspace and the EMS. Intelligence,signal,information
operations, cyberspace, space, protection, and fires operations are critical to planning, synchronizing, and
executing cyberspace and EW operations. CEMA optimizes cyberspace and EW effects when integrated
throughout operations. This section provides an understanding of cyberspace and EW operations, and the
roles, relationships, responsibilities, and capabilities within the BCT CEMA cell. (See FM 3-12 and
ATP3-12.3 for additional information.)
Note. In alignment with JP 3-85, this publication introduces the following doctrinal terms:
electromagnetic warfare, electromagnetic attack, electromagnetic protection, and electromagnetic
support, replacing electronic warfare, electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic
warfare support,respectively. JP 3-85 replaced JP 3-13.1.
CYBERSPACE AND ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
4-327. Cyberspaceis a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12).
Friendly,enemy,adversary,and host-nation networks,communications systems,computers,cellular phone
systems,social media,and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace can be described
in three layers: physical network layer (geographic land,air,maritime,or space where elements or networks
reside),logical network layer (components of the network related to each other in a way abstracted from the
network),and cyber-persona layer (digital representations of individuals or entities in cyberspace).
4-328. Theelectromagnetic spectrumis the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to
infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands (JP 3-85). Superiority in cyberspace and the
EMS to support BCT operations results from effectively synchronizing DODIN operations, offensive
cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, electromagnetic attack, EP, electromagnetic
support,and spectrum management operations. Through CEMA,the BCT plans,integrates,and synchronizes
these missions,supports and enables the command and control system,and provides an interrelated capability
for information and intelligence operations.
Note. The Army plans, integrates, and synchronizes cyberspace operations through CEMA as a
continual and unified effort. The continuous planning, integration, and synchronization of
cyberspace and EW operations, enabled by spectrum management operations, can produce
singular, reinforcing, and complementary effects. Though the employment of cyberspace
operations and EW differ because cyberspace operates on wired networks,both operate using the
EMS.
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS
4-329. Cyberspace operationsarethe employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is
to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Cyberspace operations range from defensive to |
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offensive. These operations establish and maintain secure communications, detect and deter threats in
cyberspace to the DODIN,analyze incidents when they occur,react to incidents,and then recover and adapt
while supporting Army and joint forces from strategic to tactical levels while simultaneously denying enemy
and adversary effective use of cyberspace and the EMS. The Army’s contribution to the DODIN is the
technical network that encompasses the Army information management systems and information systems
that collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide. Army cyberspace
operations provide support to,and receive support from,joint cyberspace operations. The close coordination
and mutual support with joint cyberspace operations provides Army commanders and staffs enhanced
capabilities for operations.
4-330. A cyberspace capability is a device,computer program,or technique,including any combination of
software, firmware, or hardware, designed to create an effect in or through cyberspace. The analysis of
mission variables specific to cyberspace operations enables the BCT to integrate and synchronize cyberspace
capabilities to support the operation. For cyberspace operations, mission variables provide an integrating
framework upon which critical questions can be asked and answered throughout the operations process. The
questions may be specific to either the wired portion of cyberspace,the EMS,or both. For example—
(cid:122) Where can we integrate elements of cyberspace operations to support the BCT’s mission?
(cid:122) What enemy vulnerabilities can be exploited by cyberspace capabilities?
(cid:122) What are the opportunities and risks associated with the employment of cyberspace operations
capabilities when terrain and weather may cause adverse impacts on supporting information
technology infrastructures?
(cid:122) What resources are available (internal and external) to integrate, synchronize, and execute
cyberspace operations?
(cid:122) How can we synchronize offensive and defensive cyberspace operations and related desired
effects with the scheme of maneuver within the time available for planning and execution?
(cid:122) How can we employ cyberspace operations without negative impacts on noncombatants?
(cid:122) How can an Army cyberspace operations support team support cyberspace operations in the BCT
area of operations?
4-331. Cyberspace operations provide a means by which BCT forces can achieve periods or instances of
cyberspace superiority to create effects to support the commander’s objectives. The employment of
cyberspace capabilities tailored to create specific effects is planned, prepared, and executed using existing
processes and procedures. However,there are additional processes and procedures that account for the unique
nature of cyberspace and the conduct of cyberspace operations to support BCT operations. The BCT
commander and staff, along with subordinate commanders and staffs, apply additional measures for
determining where,when,and how to use cyberspace effects.
4-332. Commanders and staffs at each echelon will coordinate and collaborate regardless of whether the
cyberspace operation is directed from higher headquarters or requested from subordinate units. The BCT’s
intelligence process,informed by the division and corps intelligence process,provides the necessary analysis
and products from which targets are vetted and validated and aimpoints are derived. Because of the BCT
IPB, informed by echelons above brigade IPB and joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment, network topologies are developed for enemy, adversary, and host-nation technical networks.
In the context of cyberspace and the EMS, network topology are overlays that graphically depict how
information flows and resides within the operational area and how the network transports data in and out of
the area of interest.
4-333. As part of CEMA, staffs at each echelon perform a key role in target network node analysis. As
effects are determined for target and critical network nodes,staffs prepare,submit,and track the cyber effects
request format (known as CERF)or electromagneticattack request format (see paragraph 4-336). The CERF
is the format forces use to request effects in and through cyberspace. Effects in cyberspace can support
operations in any domain. Execution orders provide authorization to execute cyberspace effects. Support in
response to CERFs may be from joint cyberspace forces such as the combat mission teams,from other joint
or service capabilities,or from service retained cyberspace forces.
4-334. The CERF will elevate above the corps echelon and integrate into the joint targeting cycle for
follow-on processing and approval. The joint task force, combatant command, and U.S. Cyber Command |
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staff play a key role in processing the CERF and coordinating follow-on cyberspace capabilities. (See
FM3-12 for additional information.)
Note.The distinctions between cyberspace and EW capabilities allow eachto operate separately
and support operations distinctly. However, this also necessitates synchronizing efforts to avoid
unintended interference. Any operational requirement specific to electronic transfer of information
through the wired portion of cyberspace must use a cyberspace capability for affect. If the portion
of cyberspace uses only the EMS as a transport method,then it is an EW capability that can affect
it. Any operational requirement to affect an EMS capability not connected to cyberspace must use
an EW capability.
ELECTROMAGNETICWARFARE
4-335. Electromagneticwarfareis military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy
to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). The commander integrates EW
capabilities into operations through CEMA. EW capabilities are applied from the air, land, sea, space, and
cyberspace by manned,unmanned,attended,or unattended systems. EW capabilities assist the commander
in shaping the operational environment to gain an advantage. For example,EWmay be used to set favorable
conditions for cyberspace operations by stimulating networked sensors,denying wireless networks,or other
related actions. Operations in cyberspace and the EMS depend on EW activities maintaining freedom of
action in both. (See ATP 3-12.3.) EW consists of three functions, electromagnetic attack, EP, and
electromagneticsupport.
ElectromagneticAttack
4-336. Electromagneticattack involves the use of electromagnetic energy,directed energy,or antiradiation
weapons to attack personnel,facilities,or equipment with the intent of degrading,neutralizing,or destroying
enemy combat capability. Electromagneticattack is a form of fires. The electronicattack request formatand
the electromagneticattack 5-line briefing formatare used to request specific electromagneticattack support
and on-call electromagnetic attack support. The staff requests electromagnetic attack effects via normal
request processes and provides specific effects requests using the electronic attack request format. The
electronic attack request format normally accompanies DD Form 1972. For more information on
DDForm1972see ATP 3-09.32, figure 1. (See FM 3-12,table D-1 for an example of the electronicattack
request formatand table D-2 for an example of the electronic attack 5-line briefing.)
Note. Once FM 3-12 is revised, the electromagnetic attack request format and electromagnetic
attack 5-line briefing format will replace the electronic attack request formatand electronic attack
5-line briefing format, respectively.
4-337. Electromagneticattack includes—
(cid:122) Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EMS.
(cid:122) Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary
destructive mechanism.
(cid:122) Offensive and defensive activities,including countermeasures.
4-338. Examples of offensive electromagneticattack include—
(cid:122) Jamming enemy radar or electronic command and control systems.
(cid:122) Using antiradiation missiles to suppress enemy air defenses. (Antiradiation weapons use radiated
energy emitted from a target,as the mechanism for guidance onto the target.)
(cid:122) Using electronic deception to confuse enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
acquisition systems.
(cid:122) Using directed-energy weapons to disable an enemy’s equipment or capability. |
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4-339. Defensive electromagnetic attack uses the EMS to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and
equipment. Examples include self-protection and other protection measures such as the use of expendables
(flares and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, directed-energy infrared countermeasures, and counter
radio-controlled improvised explosive device(IED)systems.
ElectromagneticProtection
4-340. EP involves the actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of
friendly or enemy use of the EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. For
example,EP includes actions taken by the commander to ensure friendly use of the EMS,such as frequency
agility in a radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in radar. The commander avoids confusing EP with
self-protection. Both defensive electromagneticattack and EP protect personnel,facilities,capabilities,and
equipment. However, EP protects from the effects of electromagnetic attack (friendly and enemy) and
electromagnetic interference,while defensive electromagneticattack primarily protects against lethal attacks
by denying enemy use of the EMS to guide or trigger weapons.
Commander’s ElectromagneticProtection Responsibilities
4-341. EP is a command responsibility. The more emphasis the commander places on EP,the greater the
benefits, in terms of casualty reduction and combat survivability, in a hostile environment or degraded
information environment. The commander ensures support and consolidation areas on and practices sound
EP techniques and procedures. The commander continually measures the effectiveness of EP techniques and
procedures used within the BCT throughout the operations process. Commander EP responsibilities are—
(cid:122) Review all information on jamming and deception reports, and assess the effectiveness of
defensive EP.
(cid:122) Ensure the BCT S-6 and S-2, in coordination with the EWO, report and properly analyze all
encounters of electromagnetic interference,deception,and jamming.
(cid:122) Analyze the impact of enemy efforts to disrupt or destroy friendly communications systems on
friendly operation plans.
(cid:122) Ensure the BCT staff exercises communications security (see ATP 6-02.75) techniques daily.
Subordinate units should—
(cid:131) Change network call signs and frequencies often (in accordance with the signal operating
instructions).
(cid:131) Use approved encryption systems,codes,and authentication systems.
(cid:131) Control emissions.
(cid:131) Make EP equipment requirements known through quick reaction capabilities designed to
expedite procedure for solving,research,development,procurement,testing,evaluation,
installations modification,and logistics problems as they pertain to EW.
(cid:131) Ensure quick repair of radios with mechanical or electrical faults;this is one way to reduce
radio-distinguishing characteristics.
(cid:131) Practice network discipline.
Staff ElectromagneticProtection Responsibilities
4-342. The BCT staff assists the commander in accomplishing EP requirements. Specifically, the staff
responds immediately to the commander and subordinate units. The staff—
(cid:122) Keeps the commander informed.
(cid:122) Reduces the time to control,integrate,and coordinate operations.
(cid:122) Reduces the chance for error.
4-343. The BCT staff provides information, furnishes estimates, and provides recommendations to the
commander. Specific staff officer responsibilities include the—
(cid:122) S-2. Advise the commander of enemy capabilities that could be used to deny the unit effective use
of the EMS. Keep the commander informed of the BCT’s signal security posture. |
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(cid:122) S-3. Exercise staff responsibility for EP. Include electromagnetic support and electromagnetic
attack considerations throughout the operations process and evaluate EP techniques and
procedures employed. Ensure EP training is included in all unit-training programs, the MDMP,
and troop leading procedures during operations.
(cid:122) S-6. Exercise staff responsibility for signal security and support EP. The S-6 in coordination with
theEWO—
(cid:131) Prepares and conducts the unit EP training program.
(cid:131) Ensures alternate means of communications for those systems most vulnerable to enemy
jamming.
(cid:131) Ensures distribution of available communications security equipment to those systems most
vulnerable toenemy information gathering activities.
(cid:131) Ensures measures are taken to protect critical friendly frequencies from intentional and
unintentional electromagnetic interference.
Signal Security
4-344. EP and signal security are closely related; they are defensive arts based on the same principle. If
adversaries and enemies do not have access to the EEFI, they are much less effective. The BCT’s goal of
practicing sound EP techniques is to ensure the continued effective use of the EMS. The BCT’s goal of signal
securityis to ensure the enemy cannot exploit the friendly use of the EMS for communication. Signal security
techniques are designed to give the commander confidence in the security of BCT transmissions. Signal
security and EP are planned by the BCT based on the enemy’s ability to gather intelligence and degrade
friendly communications systems. (SeeATP 6-02.53 for additional information.)
Communications Planning Considerations
4-345. The BCT staff,specifically the S-6 in coordination with the S-2,S-3,and EWO,assesses threats to
friendly communications during the communications planning process. Planning counters the enemy’s
attempts to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of friendly communications systems. Ultimately, the
commander, subordinate commanders, and staff planners and radio and network operators are responsible
for the security and continued operation of all command and control systems.
4-346. When conducting communications planning, the S-6 uses spectrum management tools to assist in
EMS planning and to define and support requirements. The S-6 coordinates all frequency use before any
emitter is activated to mitigate or eliminate electromagnetic interference or other negligible effects and
considers the following when conducting EMS management planning:
(cid:122) Transmitter and receiver locations.
(cid:122) Antenna technical parameters and characteristics.
(cid:122) Number of frequencies desired and separation requirements.
(cid:122) Nature of the operation (fixed,mobile land,mobile aeronautical,and over water or maritime).
(cid:122) Physical effectsof the operational environment (ground and soil type,humidity,and topology).
(cid:122) All EMS-dependent equipment to be employed to include emitters,sensors,and unmanned aerial
sensors.
(cid:122) Start and end dates for use.
4-347. The PACE plan is a communication plan that exists for a specific mission or task,not a specific unit,
as the plan considers both intra-and inter-unit sharing of information. ACPestablishes a PACE plan with
each unit it is required to maintain communications with during a mission. The PACE plan designates the
order in which an element will move through available communications systems until contact can be
established with the desired distant element. The S-6 develops a PACE plan for each phase of an operation
to ensure that the commander can maintain command and control of the formation. The plan reflects the
training,equipment status,and true capabilities of the formation. The BCT S-6 evaluates its communication
requirements with the subordinate units and their S-6 to develop an effective plan. Upon receipt of an order,
the S-6 evaluates the PACE plan for two key elements as follows:
(cid:122) Does the BCT have the assets to execute the plan? |
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(cid:122) How can subordinate units’nest with the plan when they develop their own plan?
4-348. Accurate PACE plans are crucial to the commander’s situational awareness. A subordinate unit
(considerations include those for host nation or multinational forces) that is untrained on a particular
communication system or lacks all of the subcomponents to make the system mission capable, does not
ensure continuity of command and controlby including the communication system in the PACE plan. The
commander’s ability to exercise command and control during an operation can suffer due to communications
systems that are in transitor otherwise unavailable. If the BCT or a subordinate unit does not have four viable
methods of communications,it is appropriate to issue a PACE plan that may only have two or three systems
listed. If the unit cannot execute the full PACE plan to its higher command, it must inform the issuing
headquarters with an assessment of shortfalls,gaps,and possible mitigations as part of the mission analysis
process during the MDMP. During COA development, the S-6 nests the subordinate unit’s plan with the
BCT’s plan whenever practical. This aids in maintaining continuity of effort. (See FM 6-02 for additional
information.)
Terrain Analysis
4-349. The BCT S-6 analyzes the terrain and determines the method(s) to make the geometry of the
operations work support the commander’s plan. Adhering rigidly to standard CP deployment makes it easier
for the enemy to use the direction finder and aim jamming equipment. Deploying units and communications
systems perpendicular to the forward line of own troops enhance the enemy’s ability to intercept
communication by aiming transmissions in the enemy’s direction. When possible, install terrestrial
line-of-sight communications parallel to the forward line of own troops. This supports keeping the primary
strength of U.S. transmissions in friendly terrain.
4-350. Single-channel tactical satellite systems reduce friendly CP vulnerability to enemy direction efforts.
Tactical satellite communication (see ATP 6-02.54) systems are relieved of this constraint because of their
inherent resistance to enemy direction finder efforts. When possible,utilize terrain features to mask friendly
communication from enemy positions. This may require moving headquarters elements farther forward and
using more jump or TACsto ensure the commander can continue to direct units effectively.
4-351. Location of CPs requires carefully planning as CP locations generally determine antenna locations.
The proper installation and positioning of antennas around CPs is critical. Disperse and position antennas
and emitters at the maximum remote distance and terrain dependent from the CP to ensure that not all of a
unit’s transmissions are coming from one central location system design.
4-352. Establish alternate routes of communication when designing communications systems. This involves
establishing sufficient communications paths to ensure that the loss of one or more routes does not seriously
degrade the overall system. The commander establishes the priorities of critical communications links.
Provide high priority links with the greatest number of alternate routes. Alternate routes enable friendly units
to continue to communicate despite the enemy’s efforts to deny them the use of their communications
systems. Alternate routes can also be used to transmit false messages and orders on the route that is
experiencing electromagnetic interference,while they transmit actual messages and orders through another
route or means. A positive benefit of continuing to operate in a degraded system is that the problematic
degraded system causesthe enemy to waste assets used to impair friendly communication elsewhere. Three
routing concepts,or some permutation of them,can be used in communications as follows:
(cid:122) Straight-line system. Provides no alternate routes of communications.
(cid:122) Circular system. Provides one alternate route of communications.
(cid:122) Grid system. Provides as many alternate routes of communications as can be practically planned.
4-353. Avoid establishing a pattern of communication. Enemy intelligence analysts may be able to extract
information from the pattern,and the text,of friendly transmissions. If easily identifiable patterns of friendly
communication are established,the enemy can gain valuable information.
4-354. The number of friendly transmissions tends to increase or decrease according to the type of tactical
operation being executed. Execute this deceptive communication traffic by using false peaks, or traffic
leveling. Utilize false peaks to prevent the enemy from connecting an increase of communications with a
tactical operation. Transmission increases on a random schedule create false peaks. Tactically accomplish
traffic leveling by designing messages to transmit when there is a decrease in transmission traffic. Traffic |
3-96 | 160 | Chapter 4
leveling keeps the transmission traffic constant. Coordinate messages transmitted for traffic leveling or false
peaks to avoid operations security violations, electromagnetic interference, and confusion among friendly
equipment operators.
4-355. During operations,dismounted tactical unit area coverage and distance extension is a major concern
to the commander. Communications inside buildings or over urban terrain is a challenge. For these
conditions,the multiband inter/intra team radio system provides a “back-to-back”(two radios) retransmission
(known as RETRANS) capability for communications security and plain text modes. Beside two radios,the
only hardware required for RETRANS is a small cable kit and someelectronic filters. When configured for
RETRANS operations, a true digital repeater form. Since the radios repeat the transmitted digits and since
the radios do not have to have any communications security keys loaded in them,the radios do not degrade
signal quality.(SeeATP 6-02.72 for additional information.)
4-356. Automated Communications Engineering Software equipment and subsequent signal operating
instructions development resolve many problems concerning communications patterns;they allow users to
change frequencies often, and at random. This is an important aspect of confusing enemy traffic analysts.
Enemy traffic analysts are confused when frequencies,network call signs,locations,and operators are often
changed. Communications procedures require flexibility to avoid establishing communications patterns. (See
ATP 6-02.53 for additional information.)
Control of Electromagnetic Emissions
4-357. The control of electromagnetic emissions is essential to successful defense against the enemy’s
attempts to destroy or disrupt the BCT’s communications. Emission control is the selective and controlled
use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while
minimizing,for operations security. When operating radios,the BCT exercises emission control at all times
within all echelons and only transmitwhen needed to accomplish the mission. Enemy intelligence analysts
look for patterns they can turn into usable information. Inactive friendly transmitters do not provide the
enemy with useable intelligence. Emission control can be total;for example,the commander may direct radio
silence whenever desired. Radio silenceis the status on a radio network in which all stations are directed to
continuously monitor without transmitting,except under established criteria (ATP 6-02.53).
4-358. Radio operators keep transmissions to a minimum (20 seconds absolute maximum, 15 seconds
maximum preferred) and transmit only mission-critical information. Good emission control makes the use of
communications equipment appear random and is therefore consistent with good EP practices. This technique
alone will not eliminate the enemy’s ability to find a friendly transmitter;but when combined with other EP
techniques,it makes locating a transmitter more difficult.
Replacement and Concealment
4-359. Replacement involves establishing alternate routes and means of doing what the commander
requires. Frequency modulation voice communications are the most critical communications used by the
commander during enemy engagements and require reserving critical systems for critical operations. The
enemy should not have access to information about friendly critical systems until the information is useless.
4-360. The BCT utilizes alternate means of communication before enemy engagements. This ensures the
enemy cannot establish a database to destroy primary means of communication. If the primary means
degrades, replace primary systems with alternate means of communication. Replacements require
preplanning and careful coordination; if not, compromise of the alternate means of communication occurs
and is no longer useful as the primary means of communication. Users of communications equipment require
knowledge of how and when to use the primary and alternate means of communication. This planning and
knowledge ensurethe mostefficient use of communications systems.
4-361. The BCT commander and subordinate commanders ensure effective employment of all
communications equipment,despite the enemy’s concerted efforts to degrade friendly communication to the
enemy’s tactical advantage. Operation plans should include provisions to conceal communications personnel,
equipment,and transmissions. As it is difficult to conceal most communications systems,installing antennas
as low as possible on the backside of terrain features and behind manmade obstacles help conceal
communications equipment while still permitting communication. |
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Training and Procedures Countering Enemy ElectromagneticAttack
4-362. EP includes the application of training and procedures for countering enemy electromagneticattack.
Once the threat and vulnerability of friendly electronic equipment to enemy electromagnetic attack are
identified,the commander takes appropriate actions to safeguard friendly combat capability from exploitation
and attack. EP measures minimize the enemy’s ability to conduct electromagnetic support and
electromagnetic attack operations successfully against the BCT. To protect friendly combat capabilities,
units—
(cid:122) Regularly brief friendly force personnel on the EW threat.
(cid:122) Ensure that they safeguard electronic system capabilities during exercises, workups, and
predeployment training.
(cid:122) Coordinate and deconflict EMS usage.
(cid:122) Provide training during routine home station planning and training activities on appropriate EP
active and passive measures under normal conditions,conditions of threat electromagneticattack,
or otherwise degraded networks and systems.
ElectromagneticSupport
4-363. Electromagneticsupport is a division of EWinvolving actions tasked by or under direct control of
the BCT commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and
unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting,
planning, and conduct of future operations. Electromagnetic support assists the BCT in identifying the
electromagnetic vulnerability of an enemy or adversary’s electronic equipment and systems. The commander
takes advantage of these vulnerabilities through EW operations.
4-364. Electromagnetic support systems are a source of information for immediate decisions involving
electromagneticattack,EP,avoidance,targeting,and other tactical employment of forces. Electromagnetic
support systems collect data and produce information to—
(cid:122) Corroborate other sources of information or intelligence.
(cid:122) Conduct or direct electromagneticattack operations.
(cid:122) Initiate self-protection measures.
(cid:122) Task weapons systems.
(cid:122) Support EP efforts.
(cid:122) Create or update EW databases.
(cid:122) Support information-related capabilities.
CYBERSPACE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES CELL
4-365. The CEMA cell, within the BCT staff, synchronizes cyberspace and EW operations for effective
collaboration across staff elements. It includes the EWO (who is also the cyberspace planner),the spectrum
manager, the EW technician, and EW noncommissioned officers. The section participates in the planning
and targeting process, leads the CEMA working group to support the MDMP, as the cyberspace planner
requests nonorganic resource effects. CEMA effects must be briefed and rehearsed, to include a shared
understanding of CEMA capabilities, collaborating CEMA targets across all warfighting functions (while
validating them for the targeting process),and integrating CEMA into schemes of maneuver and phases of
the operation. Listed below in paragraphs 4-366 through 4-368 is each member of the CEMA section with
key duties and responsibilities (for a full list,seeFM 3-12).
4-366. The EWO cyberspace planner plans, integrates, synchronizes, and assesses cyberspace and EW
operations as the commandersdesignated staff officer. The EWO cyberspace planner—
(cid:122) In coordination with the appropriate legal support,advises the commander on effects in cyberspace
(including associated rules of engagement,impacts,and constraints).
(cid:122) Nominates offensive cyberspace operations and EW targets for approval from the fire support
coordinator and commander. |
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(cid:122) Advises the commander on how cyberspace and EW effects can affect the operational
environment.
(cid:122) Provides recommendations on CCIRs.
(cid:122) Assists the S-2 during IPB.
(cid:122) Provides information requirements to support planning, integration, and synchronization of
cyberspace and EW operations.
4-367. The EW technician or noncommissioned officer plans, coordinates, and supports EW as part of
CEMA. EW personnel—
(cid:122) Provide information collection requirements to the S-2 to support the assessment, planning,
preparation,and execution of EW.
(cid:122) Support the fire support coordinator to ensure the integration of electromagnetic attack with all
other effects.
(cid:122) Plan and coordinate EW operations across functional and integrating cells.
(cid:122) Maintain a current assessment of available EW resources.
4-368. The CEMA section spectrum manager’s role is to plan and synchronize EP, integrating and
synchronizing operational spectrum considerations across cyberspace and EW operations,collaborating with
the S-6. The CEMA spectrum manager—
(cid:122) Leads, develops, and synchronizes the EW-EP plan by assessing EA effects on friendly force
emitters.
(cid:122) Mitigates harmful impact of EA on friendly forces through coordination with higher and
subordinate units.
(cid:122) Synchronizes cyberspace operations to protect radio frequency enabled transport layers.
(cid:122) Collaborates with staff,subordinate,and senior organizations to identify unit emitters for inclusion
on the joint restricted frequency list. |
3-96 | 163 | Chapter 5
Reconnaissance and Security
Reconnaissance and security is essential to all operations. Brigade combat teams
(BCTs) develop and sustain situational understanding to defeat the enemy.
Reconnaissance and security forces within the BCT provide flexibility, adaptability,
and depth to the maneuver commander’s plan by synchronizing and integrating
combined arms teams based on a relevant understanding of the situation. BCT
commanders understand the tactical, human, and political environment, visualize
operations, develop the situation, and identify or create options to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative through reconnaissance and security. Reconnaissance and security
forces protect the force being protected from surprise, reduce the unknowns in any
situation, and answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) to
enable the commander to make decisions, and direct forces to achieve the mission.
SECTION I – RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY FORCES
5-1. Reconnaissance and security forces,through effective information collection,help develop and sustain
the BCT’s understanding of the operational environment within its area of operation to defeat adaptive and
determined enemies and set conditions to consolidate tactical gains. Forces conducting security operations
normally orient on the force or facility being protected, while forces conducting reconnaissance normally
orient on the enemy and terrain. This section addresses the planning and preparation for,and the employment
of reconnaissance and security forces within the BCT. It addresses the commander’s guidance,information
collection,air-ground operations,and sustainment for reconnaissance and security.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY OPERATIONS
5-2. BCTs conduct combined arms reconnaissance and security operations utilizing theirCavalry squadron
and organic maneuver battalions. By employing reconnaissance and security forces, in the context of the
mission variables of mission,enemy,terrain and weather,troops and support available,time available,civil
considerations (METT-TC),the BCT commander can fight,collect,and exploit information and develop the
situation against a broad range of threats. The resulting tactical effects of these combined arms provide the
BCT commander with tactical depth,freedom to maneuver,and flexibility. As the eyes and ears of the BCT
commander, reconnaissance and security forces can also better enable decision-making by confirming or
denying the CCIRs, as well as identify and develop opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative
and consolidate gains. Reconnaissance and security operations enable the BCT commander to—
(cid:122) Understand the tactical,human,and political dynamics within an area of operations.
(cid:122) Visualize operations in the context of mission variables.
(cid:122) Achieve tactical depth.
(cid:122) Develop the situation through action in close contact with enemy and civilian populations.
(cid:122) Execute decisive operations with higher degrees of flexibility,adaptability,synchronization,and
integration.
(cid:122) Identify or create options to seize,retain,and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains.
5-3. The BCT commander and maneuver battalion commanders use reconnaissance and security forces,the
BCT’sCavalry squadron and the maneuver battalions’scout platoon,respectively,to develop the situation
under conditions of uncertainty in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Additional
collection enablers internal to the BCT (although not inclusive) can include maneuver battalions,engineers, |
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the target acquisition radar platoon, and the tactical unmanned aircraft system (known as TUAS) platoon;
and signals intelligence,geospatial intelligence,and human intelligence(HUMINT)assets from the military
intelligence company. Reconnaissance and security forces enable the BCT’s fight to gain a position of
relative advantage over the enemy and to strike the enemy in a time,manner,and place where the enemy is
not prepared. The BCT commanderthen preventsthe enemy’s recovery by rapidly following up with a series
of actions that destroy enemy capabilities, seize decisive terrain, protect populations and critical
infrastructure,and degrade the integrity of the enemy force,and then defeat or destroy the force before the
enemy can recover.
5-4. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential in providing the BCT commander with the
freedom of action required to conduct decisive action (offensive and defensive operations and stability
operations tasks). Knowing when,where,and how to conduct decisive action,as well as protecting fleeting
opportunities to do so, is a result of effective reconnaissance and security operations. Additionally, BCT
reconnaissance and security forces accomplish a secondary mission to defeat enemy reconnaissance and
surveillance efforts through counterreconnaissance. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that
encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.
Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations
(FM3-90-1). Counterreconnaissance prevents hostile observation of a force or area and is an element of most
local security measures. Counterreconnaissance involves both active and passive elements and includes
combat action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units and surveillance assets.
5-5. During decisive action, reconnaissance and security forces must provide information for the BCT to
develop an accurate understanding of the tactical situation. Effective reconnaissance and security operations
assist the BCT to ease transitions and mitigate information gaps between units. In other words,if the BCT is
to conduct operations characterized by flexibility,lethality,adaptability,depth,and synchronization,then the
BCT commander must have the combat information on the enemy,the terrain,and indigenous populations
to do so.With this information,the commander can maneuver to positions of relative advantage,and apply
effective firepower against enemies to accomplish the mission. Effective reconnaissance and security
operations allow the commander to direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses,while simultaneously
protecting friendly forces,infrastructure,and populations. In the end,reconnaissance and security operations
allows the commander to confirm information requirements,identify or create options,and employ the most
appropriate forms of maneuver to defeat enemy forces.
5-6. The BCT commander and staff identify information gaps during the military decision-makingprocess
(MDMP)and continuously assess,adapt,add,and delete requirements throughout theoperation. During the
process, the BCT staff identifies specified,implied,and essential tasks necessary for mission success during
mission analysis,while reviewing available assets and when identifying resource and information shortfalls.
During mission analysis,the staff identifies certain critical facts and assumptions that aid in the development
of initial CCIRs. The CCIRs include priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information
requirements. CCIRs and essential element of friendly information(EEFI)facilitate timely decision-making
during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and the MDMP,as well as the targeting,
risk management(RM),and operations and intelligence processes.
5-7. Priority intelligence requirements are information requirements necessary to understand an adversary
or enemy and the operational environment. They identify information about the threat,terrain,weather,and
civil considerations that the commander considers most important. Priority intelligence requirements have
an impact upon future decisions. Friendly force information requirements identify information about friendly
forces and supporting capabilities and information that affects future courses of action(COAs)and decisions
from a friendly perspective. The BCT staff assigns tasks to prioritize, manage, and develop collection of
information requirements based upon identified information requirements leading to future decisions. As the
staff identifies requirements necessary for successful execution, they recommend and assign tasks for
reconnaissance forces so the commander can make decisions and capitalize on opportunities.
5-8. Surveillance and intelligence operations (two of four primary means of information collection)
conducted to satisfy validated information requirements (normally specified in the information collection
plan [see paragraph 4-156]) enable reconnaissance and security efforts within the BCT. These requirements,
assigned to surveillance and intelligence operations collection assets,drive intelligence production to support
the commander’s situational awareness and understanding. Surveillance assets (see paragraph 5-64) assigned |
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or distributed to the BCT,for example,can monitor and collect information on geographic areas well beyond
the BCT area of operations for early warning of threat actions. Intelligence operations (see paragraph 5-90),
tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers (within and external to the BCT), collect
information about the intent,activities,and capabilities of threats and about relevant aspects of the operational
environment to support the BCT commander’s decision-making.
COMMANDER’S RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY GUIDANCE
5-9. The BCT commander’s reconnaissance guidance and security guidance gives a clear understanding of
the reconnaissance and security organization’s task,purpose,and end state,specifically the BCT’sCavalry
squadron. Reconnaissanceguidanceand security guidance explains tempo,the level of detail,and covertness
required,the reconnaissance objective,and guidelines for engagement,disengagement,bypass criteria,and
displacement criteria. The commander develops reconnaissance guidance and security guidance based on the
BCT mission, commander’s intent, timeline, and enemy to satisfy information requirements and identify
opportunities to seize,retain,and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains. The BCT commander specifies
different reconnaissance guidance and security guidance for each phase of an operation and adjusts the
components of the guidance when appropriate. The commander’s reconnaissance guidance and security
guidance consists of the following components:
(cid:122) Tempo,level of detail,and covertness required.
(cid:122) Focus (reconnaissance objective and security objective).
(cid:122) Engagement,disengagement,and bypass criteria.
(cid:122) Displacement criteria.
TEMPO,LEVEL OF DETAIL,COVERTNESS REQUIRED
5-10. Tempo, the level of detail, and covertness required of the Cavalry organization to accomplish
reconnaissance or security operations are described in four ways: rapid, deliberate, stealthy, and forceful.
(See figure 5-1onpage 5-4.) Tempois the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with
respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). Rapid and deliberate are levels of detail that are mutually exclusive in all
cases,as one cannot be rapid and deliberate at the same time. However,Cavalry organizations can oscillate
between the two from phase to phase or even within sub phases of an operation. Stealthy and forceful indicate
mutually exclusive levels of covertness. Commanders choose the appropriate type of reconnaissance or
security operations,balanced with the mission variables of METT-TC,to complete the mission.
5-11. Rapid action dictates that the level of detail for reconnaissance and security operations is limited to a
prescribed list of critical tasks or priority intelligence requirements. Rapid action is appropriate when time is
of the essence and only a limited number of critical tasks or information requirements are necessary to
accomplish the mission.
5-12. Deliberate action implies that the organization must accomplish all critical tasks to ensure mission
success. Deliberate action allows the organization more time to answer all information requirements. Detailed
and thorough reconnaissance and security operations require time intensive,comprehensive,and meticulous
mounted and dismounted efforts to observe reconnaissance objectives and develop the situation.
5-13. Stealthy action emphasizes avoiding detection and engagement dictated by restrictive engagement
criteria. Stealthy reconnaissance and security operations typically take more time than aggressive
reconnaissance and security operations. Stealthy reconnaissance or security operations utilize dismounted
scouts to take maximum advantage of cover and concealment to reduce signatures that lead to compromise.
The BCT commander uses stealthy reconnaissance or security operations when time is available, detailed
reconnaissance and stealth is required, enemy forces are likely to be in a specific area, when dismounted
scouts encounter danger areas, and when restrictive terrain limits effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance
or security operations.
5-14. Forceful action develops the situation by employing reconnaissance and security forces, technical
means, and direct and indirect-fire systems that can move rapidly to develop the situation. Forceful
reconnaissance and security operations require firepower, aggressive exploitation of action on contact,
security,and training to survive and accomplish the mission. Forceful reconnaissance and security operations |
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are appropriate when time is limited,detailed reconnaissance is not required,terrain is open,environmental
conditions allow for mounted movement, and when dismounted movement cannot complete the mission
within existing time constraints. Forceful reconnaissance and security operations do not preclude the
judicious use of dismounted movement to reduce risk as long as the organization maintains the tempo of the
operation.
Figure 5-1. Variations of action
FOCUS
5-15. Focus for reconnaissance and security serves as a guide to indicate the tasks associated with the type
of reconnaissance and security operation conducted although not a set checklist. Focus does not limit the
reconnaissance and security forces’ ability to collect on and report all information but instead allows
commanders to prioritize tasks to accomplish, and the assets used to accomplish them. Commanders help
refine the focus of reconnaissance and security by describing the reconnaissance objective and security
objective.
Reconnaissance Objective
5-16. Reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other
mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information
(ADP3-90). The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by stating the most
important result of the reconnaissance effort. A reconnaissance objective focuses the Cavalry (or other
maneuver organization) organization’s area of emphasis. Four categories form the area of emphasis—threat,
infrastructure,terrain and weather effects,and civil considerations. The commander often assigns more than
one category to Cavalry units even though the commander recognizes that a broad focus in multiple areas
dilutes the Cavalry organization’s ability to collect information. Narrowing the scope of operations helps to
focus the Cavalry organization to acquire the information to develop the situation for future operations. |
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5-17. Threat focused reconnaissance prescribes the identification of the enemy’s locations, composition,
disposition,and strength within an assigned area of operations. Infrastructure dictates gathering information
pertinent to the understating of the operational environment. Terrain and weather effects confirm step two
(describe environmental effects on operations) of the IPB process and is accomplished by analyzing and
determining the influences that the five military aspects of terrain and the military aspects of weather will
have on future operations. The five military aspects of terrain are observation and fields of fire,avenues of
approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). The military aspects of weather
include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, humidity, and atmospheric pressure (as
required). Civil considerations reflect the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within the operational
environment on the conduct of military operations. The commander and staff analyze civil considerations in
terms of the following characteristics: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events,
expressed in the memory aid (ASCOPE). (SeeATP 2-01.3 and ATP 3-34.80 for additional information.)
Security Objective
5-18. Similar to a reconnaissance objective,the security objective clarifies the intent of the security effort by
stating the most important result of the security effort. A security objective focuses the Cavalry (or other
maneuver organization) organization’s area of emphasis. Three categories form the area of emphasis—the
protected force, activity, and facility. As in reconnaissance, the commander often assigns more than one
category to Cavalry units even though the commander recognizes that a broad focus in multiple areas dilutes
theCavalry organization’s ability to conduct the security mission(s). The BCT commander narrows the scope
of the security mission(s) by providing clear security guidance that offers freedom of action and direction to
focus the Cavalry organization’s area of emphasis. Focusing the Cavalry organization’s area of emphasis
helps to ensure it can accomplish stated objectives within the required timeframe. The commander does this
by providing a clear understanding of the Cavalry organization’s task, purpose, and end state, and the
protection requirements of the security mission. The ultimate goal of any security mission is to provide early
and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver
space within which to react to the enemy,and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively
use the protected force.
ENGAGEMENT,DISENGAGEMENT,AND BYPASS CRITERIA
5-19. During reconnaissance and security operations, engagement, disengagement, and bypass criteria
prescribe events and conditions that require initiation of engagement with the enemy, disengagement from
enemy contact,or bypassing the enemy. Engagement,disengagement,and bypass criteria outlines parameters
forCavalry units to engage the enemy with direct or indirect fire based on the level of threat,levels of risk,
required levels of covertness,and preservation of the force.
5-20. Engagement criteriaare protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an
enemy force (FM 3-90-1). Regardless of engagement criteria,it is not enough to state in the operation order
that engagement criterion is either restrictive or permissive; the operation order must describe conditions
relative to the enemy situation to ensure complete understanding.
5-21. Disengageis a tactical mission task where a commander has the unit break contact with the enemy to
allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement (FM 3-90-1). Disengagement criteria
describe the events and conditions that necessitate disengaging from enemy contact or temporarily breaking
enemy contact to preserve the force. Compromised Cavalry units or scouts who find themselves in a position
of disadvantage provide no information or security valueand should temporarily break contact to re-establish
observation as soon as the tactical situation permits. As with engagement criteria, specific conditions are
described that require disengagement.
5-22. Bypass criteria are measures established by higher echelon headquarters that specify the conditions
and size under which enemy units and contact may be avoided (ADP3-90). Bypass criteria describes the
events and conditions that necessitate maneuver around an obstacle,position,or enemy force to maintain the
momentum of the operation. Bypass criteria describes the conditions that necessitate maneuver so as not to
decisively engage or fallbelow a certain combat strength when deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy
force. |
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DISPLACEMENT CRITERIA
5-23. Displacement criteria define triggers for planned withdrawals, passage of lines, or reconnaissance
handovers (battle handover for security operations) between units. As with engagement,disengagement,and
bypass criteria, the conditions and parameters set in displacement criteria integrate the BCT commander’s
intent with tactical feasibility. Conditions and parameters are event-driven, time-driven, or enemy-driven.
Displacement criteria conditions and parameters are key rehearsal events due to the criticality of identifying
the triggers to anticipate during the BCT’s mission. An example of event-driven conditions and parameters
are associated priority intelligence requirements being met, enemy contact not expected in the area, and
observed named area of interest (NAI) or avenue of approach denied to the enemy. Time-driven conditions
and parameters ensure the time triggers are met (for example, latest time information is of value). An
observation post compromised by threat or local civilian contact is a threat-driven condition. Failure to dictate
conditions and parameters of displacement,nested within the higher scheme of maneuver,results in mission
failure.
COMBINED ARMS, AIR-GROUND RECONNAISSANCE AND
SECURITY
5-24. The commander uses information and intelligence from combined arms, air-ground reconnaissance
(and when available air and ground surveillance and military intelligence assets internal and external to the
BCT) and security to reduce uncertainty and facilitate rapid decision-making. Reconnaissance collects
information so the commander can understand the situation, visualize the battlefield, and shape decisions.
Security protectsthe force,provide reaction time,and maneuver space to enable decisions and prudent use
of combat power. The commander uses air-ground reconnaissance and securityto answer priority intelligence
requirements to fill information gaps,mitigate risk,prioritize tasks,and allocate resources. Lastly,air-ground
reconnaissance and security create advantageous conditions for future operations that seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.
5-25. Army attack reconnaissance aircraft,both manned and unmanned,provide direct fire,observation,and
rapid movement during reconnaissance and security and counterreconnaissance. Army attack reconnaissance
units conduct Army aviation attacks to destroy high-value targets (HVTs)andHPTswithin a target area of
interest (TAI). Army aviation attack reconnaissance aircraft can provide additional observation to assist
reconnaissance and security forces, specifically the Cavalry squadron in maintaining contact. Utility and
cargo helicopters support reconnaissance and security operations through air movements,(including casualty
evacuation and emergency resupply operations) depending on the enemy’s air defense threat.
Note.The same general planning considerations that apply to air assaults apply to air movements.
(SeeFM 3-99 for additional information.)
5-26. Air-ground operations require detailed planning of synchronized timelines,aviation task and purpose,
and airspace management (see ATP 3-04.1). Shared graphics ensure common operational language,reduce
fratricide risk,reduce the chance of an accidental compromise of a ground unit,and increase the effectiveness
of mixing collection sources. Development of detailed mission statements for the supporting aviation is
essential for aviation commanders and staffs to employ the right platforms and munitions. Understanding the
threat and the commander’s intent and desired effects drives the aviation units’ task organization of air
elements and selection of weapon systems. Aircraft fuel consumption rates, forward arming and refueling,
and fighter management can limit aircraft availability.
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY FORCE SUSTAINMENT
5-27. Sustainment for reconnaissance and security forces requires deliberate planning. Logistics units
supporting reconnaissance and security operations must contend with long lines of communication,dispersed
forces, poor trafficability, and contested terrain. Planners must consider protection requirements to protect
sustainment units against bypassed enemy forces and the effects of extended lines of communications.
Reconnaissance and security force sustainment must be rehearsed and wargamed. |
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5-28. Reconnaissance and security forces often require a basic load in excess of the typical three days of
supply configuration due to mission requirements. Supplies can be pre-positionedin collocated trains with a
maneuver battalion’s echelon support. In restricted terrain,the most important commodities are likely classI
(subsistence-priority to water) and class III (petroleum, oils, and lubricants [POL]) and depending on the
enemy situation and terrain class V (ammunition). Possible examples of restricted terrain requiring an
increased basic load include moderate-to-steep slopes or moderately-to-densely spaced obstacles, swamps,
and rugged terrain and operation in urban terrain.
5-29. Forces conducting reconnaissance generally have a greater requirement for class III and class V for
indirect-fire assets and antiarmorsystems. Similar to offensive operations,reconnaissance requires refuel on
the move(known as ROM). Security forces have a greater reliance on class V and reduced requirements for
class III during security operations. Reconnaissance and security forces generally do not have large barrier
class IV (construction and barrier materials) requirements. Possible exceptionsfor security forces are during
the execution of long-term guard missions or during a defensive cover.
5-30. When units task organize,particularly from outside the BCT,planners must incorporate and rehearse
supporting logistics assets. The nature of reconnaissance and security operations stresses medical evacuation
and requires wargaming and close coordination with external assets. Casualty evacuation (see ATP 4-25.13)
planning and requirements for reconnaissance and security forces focuses on ground movement assets and
must balance with survivability and stealth. Planners plan for and utilize aviation casualty backhaul as aircraft
become available. (Seechapter 9for additional information.)
SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE
5-31. Reconnaissanceis a mission undertaken to obtain,by visual observation or other detection methods,
information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance
employs many tactics,techniques,and procedures throughout the course of an operation,one of which may
include an extended period of surveillance.
PURPOSE OF RECONNAISSANCE
5-32. The purpose of reconnaissance is to gather information so the commander can create plans, make
decisions, and issue orders. The BCT commander’s focus for reconnaissance usually falls in three general
areas: CCIRs,targeting,and voids in information. The BCT staff,primarily the S-2 in coordination with the
S-3,identifies gaps in available intelligence based on the initial IPB (see ATP 2-19.4,appendix G) and the
situationally dependent CCIRs. The BCT’s reconnaissance effort and the IPB process are interactive and
iterative, each feeding the other. For example, the IPB process helps determine factors that affect
reconnaissance during collection,such as—
(cid:122) Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit enemy weaknesses.
(cid:122) Key terrain,choke points,obstacles,and hazard areas.
(cid:122) Enemy positions,especially flanks that can be exploited.
(cid:122) Observation points.
5-33. Conversely,reconnaissance drivesthe refinement of IPB results(see paragraph 4-157)as appropriate
by confirming or denying priority intelligence requirements that support tentative plans. The results of the
IPB process contribute to the BCT’s security by developing products that help the commander protect
subordinate forces, including identification of key terrain features, manmade and natural obstacles,
trafficability and cross-country mobility analysis, line-of-sight overlays, and situation templates. For
example, line-of-sight overlays help protect the force. If an enemy cannot observe the friendly force, the
enemy cannot engage the friendly force with direct fire weapons. Situation templates also help protect the
force. If a commander knows how fast an enemy force can respond to the unit’s offensive actions, unit
operations can be sequenced,so they occur at times and places where the enemy cannot respond effectively.
This occurs through determining enemy artillery range fans, movement times between enemy reserve
assembly area locations and advancing friendly forces,and other related intelligence items. |
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5-34. The commander, with the support of the staff, employs the appropriate combinations of mounted,
dismounted,and aerial manned (and unmanned) reconnaissance (and surveillance) to obtain the information
required to answer the CCIRs (priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information
requirements) and to support the targeting process. At the same time,reconnaissance forces must be prepared
to conduct counterreconnaissance (see paragraph 5-4) and continuously develop detailed information on both
the enemy and terrain. Reconnaissance forces fight for information as in a reconnaissance in force (see
paragraph 5-52) designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength,dispositions,and reactions.
5-35. Surveillance complements and informs reconnaissance as reconnaissance complements and informs
surveillance by cueing (see paragraph 5-64) the commitment of capabilities against specific locations or
specially targeted enemy units. Throughout planning and preparation,the BCT S-3 and S-2 integrate actions
within the BCT’s overall information collection plan (see paragraph4-146) and other higher and lateral
information collection efforts to ensure that each asset is used effectively. The S-2 develops an initial
synchronization plan to acquire information to help answer priority intelligence requirements based on the
available reconnaissance and surveillance assets supporting the intelligence scheme of support. The S-3,in
coordination with the commander,assigns specific intelligence acquisition tasks to specific units for action.
5-36. The S-2 and S-3, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop a synchronized and integrated
information collection plan that satisfies the commander’s maneuver, targeting, and information
requirements. Asstated earlier,the S-3 is overall responsible for the information collectionplan. The S-3 is
also responsible for ground and air reconnaissance assets, which includes engineers, chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), artillery, and Army attack reconnaissance aircraft. The S-2’s primary
responsibility is to integrate ground surveillance systems and special electronics mission aircraft. The brigade
civil affairs operations staff officer’s (S-9) primary responsibility is planning civil reconnaissance and the
integration of civil informationinto the common operational picture (COP). The commander’s requirements,
dictated by the mission variables of METT-TC,commonly include—
(cid:122) Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy force, to include
high-priority targets and enemy reconnaissance, security,and surveillance capabilities.
(cid:122) Locations of obstacles, prepared fighting positions, enemy engineer units, earth moving
equipment,breaching assets,and barrier material.
(cid:122) Probable locations of enemy reconnaissance objectives.
(cid:122) Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy indirect-fire weapon systems and units.
(cid:122) Locations of gaps,assailable flanks,and other enemy weaknesses.
(cid:122) Locations of areas for friendly and enemy air assault and parachute assault operations.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy air defense gun and missile units and air defense radars.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy EWunits.
(cid:122) Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
(cid:122) ASCOPErelated information about civilians located within the unit’s area of operations.
(cid:122) Likely withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
(cid:122) Anticipated timetable schedules for the enemy’s most likely COAand other probable COAs.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy command and control centers, intelligence nodes, reconnaissance, security,
and surveillance systems, and the frequencies used by the information systems linking these
systems.
(cid:122) Locations of enemy sustainment assets.
5-37. When reconnaissance forces (and surveillance assets) cannot answer the commander’s information
requirements. The commander’s options include—
(cid:122) The S-2 sending a request for information to higher and adjacent units.
(cid:122) The commander committing additional resources.
(cid:122) The commander deciding to execute task with the current information.
5-38. CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance is the detection, identification, reporting, and marking of
CBRN hazards. CBRN reconnaissance consists of search,survey,surveillance,and sampling operations. Due
to limited availability and number of the CBRN reconnaissance vehicles within the BCT, the commander |
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considers alternate means of conducting CBRN reconnaissance such as reconnaissance elements,engineers,
and maneuver units. (See ATP 3-11.37.) At a minimum, the commander and staff consider the following
actions when planning and preparing for CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance:
(cid:122) Use the IPB process to orient on CBRN enemy NAI.
(cid:122) Pre-position reconnaissance and surveillance assets to support requirements.
(cid:122) Establish command and support relationships.
(cid:122) Assess the time and distance factors for the conduct of CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance.
(cid:122) Report all information rapidly and accuratelyto higher.
(cid:122) Plan for resupply activities to sustain CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
(cid:122) Determine possible locations for post-mission decontamination.
(cid:122) Plan for fire support requirements.
(cid:122) Plan fratricide prevention measures.
(cid:122) Establish medical evacuation procedures.
(cid:122) Identify CBRN warning and reporting system procedures and frequencies.
RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
5-39. Reconnaissance operations validate the IPB process by confirming or denying natural and manmade
obstacles,trafficability of routes,viability and utility of key terrain,and enemy composition,disposition,and
strength. As mission analysis identifies information gaps,the BCT commander and staff develop information
requirements to fill those gaps. During the operations process,information requirements develop into priority
intelligence requirements, which further develop tasks that, when executed, answer priority intelligence
requirements. The commander and staff continuously reevaluate information gaps and refocus the
reconnaissance effort with the seven reconnaissance fundamentals. The commander establishes priorities for
assessment in planning guidance, CCIRs (priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information
requirements),EEFI,and decision points. The commander utilizes one of the five typesof reconnaissance as
they collect and assess information. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS
5-40. Reconnaissance fundamentals,discussed in paragraphs 5-41to 5-46,remind planners and practitioners
of the inherent characteristics required to execute successful reconnaissance. Failure to understand the
following seven fundamentals results in incomplete reconnaissance and missed opportunities.
Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance
5-41. The BCT conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation,
reconnaissance fills gaps in information about the enemy, the terrain, and civil considerations. During an
operation,reconnaissance provides the BCT commander with updated information that verifies the enemy’s
composition,dispositions,and intentions as the battle progresses. After an operation,reconnaissance forces
maintain contact with the enemy to determine the enemy’s next move and collect information, including
terrain and civil considerations, necessary for planning subsequent operations. When current operational
information is adequate,reconnaissance forces gather information for branches and sequels to current plans.
As operations transition from a focus on one element of operations to another, the nature of priority
intelligence requirements and information requirements change. Reconnaissance over extended distances and
time may require pacing reconnaissance assets (surveillance assets can enable this effort) to maintain the
effort, or rotating units to maintain continuous coverage. The human and technical assets used in the
reconnaissance effort must be allowed time for rest, resupply, troop leading procedures, and preventive
maintenance checks and services. The commander must determine not only where, but also when, the
maximum reconnaissance effort is required and pace the commitment of available reconnaissance assets to
ensure adequate assets are available at those critical times and places. |
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Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve
5-42. Never keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. The BCT commander commits reconnaissance forces and
assets with specific missions designed to help reduce uncertainty through the collection of information related
to priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. Although noncontiguous operations may
necessitate orientation of reconnaissance assets in multiple directions, reconnaissance forces maximize all
assets at their disposal to information collection focused on the CCIRs. This does not mean that all
reconnaissance forces and assets are committed all the time. The BCT commander uses reconnaissance forces
and assets based on their capabilities and the mission variables of METT-TC to achieve the maximum
coverage needed to answer CCIRs. At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position
reconnaissance forces and assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places.
Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective
5-43. The BCT commander orients reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective in the
area of operations. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying
the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a
reconnaissance objective. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on priority intelligence
requirements resulting from the IPB process and the capabilities and limitations of the reconnaissance force
or asset. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location,such as the
cross-country trafficability of a specific area, a specific enemy or adversary activity to be confirmed or
denied,or a specific enemy or adversary unit to be located and tracked. When the reconnaissance force does
not have enough time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific typeof reconnaissance,it uses the
reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities. The commander may need to provide additional
detailed instructions beyond the reconnaissance objective,such as the specific tasks and their priorities. The
commander issues additional guidance to the reconnaissance force or specifies these instructions in tasks to
subordinates in a warning order,fragmentary order,or the operation order.
Report Information Rapidly and Accurately
5-44. Reconnaissance assets acquire and report accurate and timely information on the enemy,terrain,and
civil considerations of the area over which the commander conducts operations. As information may quickly
lose its value over time,the BCT commander must have accurate reports quickly to make informed decisions
as to where to concentrate combat power. Rapid reporting allows the staff maximum time to analyze
information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements,tied to decision
points, define a latest time information is of value date-time group. Reconnaissance forces report exactly
what they see and, if appropriate, what they do not see. Seemingly, unimportant information may be
extremely important when combined with other information. Reports of no enemy activity are as important
as reports of enemy activity. Failing to report tells the commander nothing.
Retain Freedom of Maneuver
5-45. Reconnaissance forces must maintain battlefield mobility, as fixed reconnaissance forces are
ineffective. Reconnaissance forces must have clear engagement criteria that support the BCT commander’s
intent. They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and
follow standard operating procedures (SOPs). Initiative and knowledge of both the terrain and the enemy
reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and help maintain freedom of movement. Before initial contact,
the reconnaissance force adopts a movement technique designed to gain contact with the smallest friendly
element possible. This movement technique provides the reconnaissance force with the maximum
opportunity for maneuver and enables the force to avoid having the entire reconnaissance force decisively
engaged. The IPB is used to identify anticipated areas of contact. Indirect fires to provide suppression,
obscuration,and to destroy point targets is a method reconnaissance forces use to retain freedom of maneuver.
Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact
5-46. Once reconnaissance forces gain contact with the enemy, it maintains that contact unless the
commander directing the reconnaissance orders a change of mission,disengagement or displacement criteria
is met,when the force conducts areconnaissance handover,or the survival of the unitis at risk. Contact can |
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range from surveillance to close combat. Surveillance,combined with stealth,is often sufficient to maintain
contact and can limit exposure of reconnaissance assets. Units conducting reconnaissance avoid combat
unless it is necessary to gain essential information, in which case the reconnaissance force uses maneuver
(fire and movement) to maintain contact while avoiding decisive engagement. Maintaining contact provides
real time information on the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength,and actions that allow the staff to
analyze and make recommendations to the commander.
Develop the Situation Rapidly
5-47. When reconnaissance forces make contact with an enemy force or obstacle,it must act instinctively to
develop the situation and quickly determine the threat it faces. For an enemy force, reconnaissance forces
must determine the enemy’s composition,disposition,activities,and movements and assess the implications
of that information to allow the BCT commander freedom of action. For an obstacle,reconnaissance forces
must determine the type and extent of the obstacle and whether fire is covering the obstacle. Obstacles can
provide information concerning the enemy force, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires.
Reconnaissance forces, in most cases, develop the situation using actions on contact—a series of combat
actions, often conducted simultaneously, taken on contact with the enemy to develop the situation
(ADP3-90)—in accordance with the commander’s plan and intent. Actions on contact are deploy and report,
evaluate and develop the situation, choose a COA, execute selected COA, and recommend a COA to the
higher commander.
TYPESOF RECONNAISSANCEOPERATIONS
5-48. The five types of reconnaissance operations, discussed in paragraphs 5-49 through 5-53, are zone
reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, and special
reconnaissance. Each type of reconnaissance operation provides a specific level of detail in information
collection specific to the mission, conditions, and end state of the BCT commander. All types of
reconnaissance operations satisfy priority intelligence requirements to understand and visualize the
environment,develop the situation,create options,and identify opportunities to seize,retain,and exploit the
initiative.
Zone Reconnaissance
5-49. Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain
detailed information on all routes,obstacles,terrain,and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries
(ADP3-90). Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate and time-intensive operation that takes more time to conduct
than any other typeof reconnaissance. The BCT commander assigns a zone reconnaissance when the enemy
situation is vague or when information related to terrain,infrastructure,or civil considerations is limited. A
zone reconnaissance conducted over an extended distance begins at the line of departure and concludes at a
specified limit of advance. The BCT commander specifies information requirements based upon time
constraints and commander’s intent and relates reconnaissance objectives to follow-on missions.
Reconnaissance forces find and report enemy activities within the area of operations for the zone
reconnaissance,reconnoiter specific terrain,and report all information in a timely manner.
Area Reconnaissance
5-50. Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed
information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area (ADP 3-90). The commander assigns
an area reconnaissance when information on the enemy situation is limited,when focused reconnaissance in
a given area likely yields specific information related to decision points, or when information that is more
thorough is required in a designated area. The commander defines the area as anNAI to focus the unit on a
relatively small area such as a building, bridge, or key terrain. Area reconnaissance allows for focused
reconnaissance over a wide area concentrated in specific locations that answer priority intelligence
requirements and develop the situation to provide the commander with options. An area reconnaissance
differs from a zone reconnaissance in that the unitsconducting an area reconnaissance first move to the area
in which the reconnaissance will occur. In a zone reconnaissance the units conducting the reconnaissance
startfrom a line of departure. |
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Route Reconnaissance
5-51. Route reconnaissanceistype of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified
route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route (ADP 3-90). A route
can be a road, highway, trail, mobility corridor, avenue of approach,or axis of advance. Routes begin at a
start point and end at a destination release point. The commander assigns a route reconnaissance either as a
discrete mission or as a specified task of a zone or area reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance is not to be
confused with route classification,which requires technical measurements and analysis typically performed
by mission tailored engineer reconnaissance teams. Typically,a route classification is included as a specified
task for the engineer reconnaissance team as part of an assigned route reconnaissance. Reconnaissance forces
collect information about roads,bridges,tunnels,fords,waterways,and other natural and manmade terrain
features that can affect traffic flow. Route reconnaissance provides the commander with detailed information
on the route and terrain that can influence the route to prevent surprise,determine trafficability for follow-on
forces,and to confirm or deny running estimates made during the operations process.
Reconnaissance in Force
5-52. Reconnaissance in forceis a type of reconnaissanceoperation designed to discover or test the enemy’s
strength,dispositions,and reactions or to obtain other information (ADP 3-90). A reconnaissance in force is
a limited objective operation normally conducted by a battalion-sized or larger task force. The BCT
commander assigns a reconnaissance in force when the enemy is operating within an area and the commander
cannot obtain adequate intelligence by any other means. Reconnaissance in force is an aggressive
reconnaissance, which develops information in contact with the enemy to determine and exploit enemy
weaknesses. The commander plans for the extrication of the force or the exploitation of success in advance.
For example, the BCT commander positions forces to extricate the reconnaissance in force element if
required or to seize on opportunities identified by the element.
Special Reconnaissance
5-53. Special reconnaissanceis reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in
hostile,denied,ordiplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of
strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional
forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance operations support the collection of the joint task force commander’s
priority intelligence requirements. Special reconnaissance may occur beforeconventional forces entering a
designated area of operations, such as during an airborne or air assault operation, or other anti-assess or
area-denial operation (see FM 3-99). A special operations liaison may provide a responsive reporting
capability in situations where the special operations task force commander has been requested to provide
intelligence information that supports the intelligence requirements of a conventional force commander. The
BCT commander and staff must understand when, where, and why the force is conducting special
reconnaissance operations to establish unity of purpose. The BCT and the special operations forces element
may establish a liaison capacity to understand collection task prioritization, and to understand associated
reporting requirements and mechanisms. Reconnaissance forces often may be the first friendly units to
encounter special operations forces because of their forward proximity in the BCT’s area of operations.
Depending on the command relationship, conventional reconnaissance forces may operate in conjunction
with special operations forces. (SeeFM 3-18 for additional information.)
Note. A special operations forces element will not suspend or alter their collection efforts to
support another collection plan unless directed to do so by the joint task force commander.
RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER
5-54. Reconnaissance handover is the action that occurs between two elements in order to coordinate the
transfer of information and/or responsibility for observation of potential threat contact,or the transfer of an
assigned area from one element to another (FM 3-98). Reconnaissance handover facilitates observation or
surveillance of enemy contact or an assigned NAI or TAI. Reconnaissance handover is associated with a
trigger, coordination point, or phase line (PL) designated as the reconnaissance handover line. (See |
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figure5-2.) A reconnaissance handover lineis a designated phase lineon the ground where reconnaissance
responsibility transitions from one element to another (FM 3-98). The reconnaissance handover line ensures
control and chain ofcustody from the initial force to the force assuming responsibility and control.
Figure 5-2. Reconnaissance handover, example
5-55. Reconnaissance handover prevents gaps or seams to emerge that the enemy can exploit. Once
handover is complete,the reconnaissance force transferring control either passes to the rear through the main
body assuming responsibility for the reconnaissance objective as a rearward passage of lines or continues
further into the zone to continue the reconnaissance mission. Reconnaissance handover assures that
information requirements are transferred between units to maintain initiative,tempo,and to ease transitions.
Well-plannedand executed reconnaissance handover eases transitions in plans,phases,and priorities of effort
and mitigates information gaps between units.
RECONNAISSANCE-PULL VERSES RECONNAISSANCE-PUSH
5-56. Reconnaissance-pullis reconnaissance that determines which routes are suitable for maneuver,where
the enemy is strong and weak,and where gaps exist,thus pulling the main body toward and along the path
of least resistance. This facilitates the commander’s initiative and agility (FM 3-90-2). In reconnaissance-pull
(see figure 5-3 on page 5-14), the commander uses the products of the IPB process in an interactive and
repetitive way. The commander obtains combat information from available reconnaissance assets to
determine a preferred COAfor the tactical situation presented by the mission variables of METT-TC. |
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Figure 5-3. Reconnaissance-pull, example
5-57. Reconnaissance-push is reconnaissance that refines the common operational picture, enabling the
commander to finalize the plan and support shaping and decisive operations. It is normally used once the
commander commits to a scheme of maneuver or course of action (FM 3-90-2). In reconnaissance-push (see
figure 5-4), the commander uses the products of the IPB process in an interactive way with combat
information from reconnaissance assets in support of a COA. |
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Figure 5-4. Reconnaissance-push, example
5-58. The chief reason for preferring one method tothe other is the time available or confidence in the IPB.
The time required to develop a COAcan give the enemy enough time to recover and prepare so that taking
an objective may cause higher casualties than necessary. Commanders balance the time needed to develop a
COA with the need to act rapidly and decisively on the battlefield. There is no available model that a
commander can use to determine how much enough is;that determination is part of the art of command (the
creative and skillful exercise of authority through decision-makingand leadership).
SURVEILLANCE
5-59. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, cyberspace, surface, or subsurface areas,
places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means (JP 3-0). Surveillance
may be a stand-alone mission or part of a reconnaissance mission (particularly area reconnaissance). Both
reconnaissance and surveillance produce raw data and information, some of which may be combat
information that meets one or more of the CCIRs or intelligence requirements. A key difference between
surveillance missions and reconnaissance is that surveillance is tiered and layered with technical assets and
it is passive and continuous. Reconnaissance is active in the collection of information (such as maneuver)
and usually includes human participation. |
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COLLECTION EFFORT
5-60. Surveillance is one of the four tasks of the information collection effort to assist in answering
requirements. Although surveillance platforms, devices, and assets change with technology, the general
principles behind surveillance do not. When the BCT commander and staff systematically integrate the
passive collection of information through surveillance, it enhances reconnaissance and security operations
throughout the area of operations. The observation and data gained through surveillance contributes
simultaneously to a greater understanding of the adversary or threat,while also increasing the protection of
friendly forces, yielding time and space to react to the enemy. Weather, temperature, meteorological data,
atmospherics, and other factors can hinder or increase visual effects in surveillance. The commander and
staff account for these considerations when planning and integrating assets capable of observation.
COLLECTION INTEGRATION,SYNCHRONIZATION,ANDCOLLABORATION
5-61. While reconnaissance missions are specifically conducted to obtain information about the threat or the
operational environment, surveillance missions consist of the systematic observation of places, persons, or
things. To ensure these two types of missions are fully integrated into the overall collection effort,the BCT
S-2 and S-3 staffs must continuously collaborate to synchronize the employment of assigned and allocable
platforms and sensors against specified collection targets. The S-2,in coordination with the S-3,ensures raw
data is routed to the appropriate processing and exploitation system so that it may be converted into useable
information and disseminated to the user in a timely fashion. The S-2 is responsible for identifying potential
collection targets and prioritizing anticipated collection requirements that are then used to drive surveillance
and reconnaissance mission planning. The S-3 deconflicts the physical employment of the various platforms
with other operations to be conducted within the land,air,and maritime domains.
5-62. Decision points (see chapter 4) are events or locations where decisions are required during mission
execution. Decision points relate information requirements to identified critical events and are linked to NAIs
and TAIs. Priorities for the apportionment and allocation of collection capabilities to subordinates are
typically based on a decision point and the CCIRs (priority intelligence requirements and friendly force
information requirements) and EEFIsupporting a decision point (see figure 5-5). The S-3 recommends to the
commander the apportionment of platforms to subordinate echelons toinform their planning efforts and in
collaboration with the S-2 makes recommendations regarding their allocation during execution. Adaptive
collection planning by the S-2 and continuous collaboration between the S-2 and S-3 staffs during
development of the information collection plan provides for the effective management and optimal
employment of all available platforms, sensors, and associated intelligence processing, exploitation, and
dissemination capabilities (see paragraph 4-156).
Note. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination is not exclusive to military intelligence
organizations; other branches employ sensor collection capabilities. Intelligence processing,
exploitation, and dissemination is the way the intelligence warfighting function processes
collected data and information, performs an initial analysis (exploitation), and provides
information in a useable form for further analysis or combat information (see chapter 2) to
commanders and staffs. (SeeADP 2-0 for additional information.) |
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Figure 5-5. Information requirements
5-63. An integrated collection plan that fully optimizes the use of all available United States,unified action
partner,and host-nation collection capabilities assets is essential to persistent surveillance. Information from
BCT reconnaissance and security forces, to include internal forward and engaged combat forces, can be
integrated with intelligence obtained from information collection assets external to the BCT. In many
situations,even negative reporting from operational forces may be valuable (for example,a lack of contact
with adversary forces may be just as significant as positive contact). Likewise, special operations forces
provide a unique manned and unmanned deep look capability,especially useful in areas where other sensors
are not available or cannot provide situational awareness. Based on operational requirements,the BCT S-2,
in coordination with the division assistant chief of staff, intelligence, identify the priority intelligence
requirements and associated reporting criteria to focus special operations forces assets. The continuous
real-time monitoring of the status,location,and reporting of intelligence platforms and sensors by the BCT
S-2 and higher headquarters assistant chief of staff, intelligence provides real-time cross cueing (see
paragraph 5-64) and a basis for re-tasking and time-sensitive decision-making. (SeeATP2-01 for additional
information.)
ASSET MANAGEMENT
5-64. When allocating information collection assets, no single asset can answer every intelligence
requirement,and there are rarely enough assets to cover every requirement. The BCT staff,and division and
battalion staffs,use a mix of reconnaissance management methods,such as cueing,mixing,redundancy,and
task organizing,in an attempt to use limited assets most effectively and collect the most critical information
with the fewest assets as quickly as possible. While several technical systems can perform reconnaissance,
most systems are considered surveillance platforms. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the
commitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially targeted enemy units.
5-65. Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide
information that directs follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system(FM 3-90-2).
Cueing helps to focus limited reconnaissance assets,especially limited ground reconnaissance assets,which
can rarely examine every part of a large area closely. Electronic,thermal,visual,audio,and other technical |
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assets with wide-area surveillance capabilities,often working from aerial platforms,can quickly determine
areas of enemy concentration or areas where there is no enemy presence. These assets may cue ground and
air reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas to confirm and amplify information developed by
technical assets. For example, JSTARS and Guardrail-equipped (signals intelligence collection platform)
aircraft can cover large areas and cue ground reconnaissance or unmanned aircraft once they identify an
enemy force. The BCT commander may dispatch ground reconnaissance or unmanned aircraft (RQ-7
Shadow UAS,brigade echelon asset or RQ-11 Raven UAS,company echelon asset) to verify the information
and track the enemy for targeting purposes. Similarly, a ground reconnaissance asset can cue surveillance
assets. The commander uses reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and uses the complementary
capabilities of other assets,such as surveillance assets to verify and expand information.
5-66. Mixing is using two or more different assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement
(FM3-90-2). Employing a mix of systems not only increases the probability of collection,but alsotends to
provide information that is more complete. For example,a JSTARS aircraft may detect and locate a moving
enemy tactical force,while the division assistant chief of staff,intelligence analysis and control element uses
organic and supporting assets to determine its identity, organizational structure, and indications of future
plans. When available from echelons above division and corps, a U2 Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar
System provides high-resolution, multimode, long-range, air-to-ground radar that provides operators with
critical intelligence. This all weather,day or night capability detects and accurately locates fixed and moving
ground targets with precision. Employing a mix of systems is always desirable if the situation and available
resources permit. Mixing systems can also help uncover military deception attempts by revealing
discrepancies in reports from different collectors.
5-67. Redundancy is using two or more like assets to collect against the same intelligence requirement
(FM3-90-2). Based on the priority of the information requirement,the commander must decide which NAI
justifies having more than one asset covering it. When more than one asset covers the same NAI,a backup
is available ifone asset cannot reach the NAI in time,the first asset suffers mechanical failure,or the enemy
detects and engages the first asset. Redundancy also improves the chances of information collection.
5-68. To increase the effectiveness and survivability of an information collectionasset,the commander may
task organize it by placing additional assets under a subordinate unit’s control. For example,to conduct an
area reconnaissance of possible river crossing sites at extended distances from the division’s current location,
a ground Cavalry troop of an attached Armored brigade combat team(ABCT)can be task organized with a
signal retransmission (known as RETRANS) element, an engineer reconnaissance element, a joint fires
observer, and a tank platoon. The engineers provide additional technical information on proposed crossing
sites;the signal RETRANS elements allow the Cavalry troop’s combat net radios to reach the division main
command post(CP). The joint fires observer provides additional observation, lazing, and fire coordination
capabilities. The tank platoon provides additional combat capabilities and protection for the Cavalry troop.
VULNERABILITY
5-69. The BCT staff,led by the S-2 and in coordination with the S-3,evaluates the collector’s vulnerability
to threat forces,not only in the target area but also along the entire route of travel. It is important to evaluate
the threat’s ability to locate,identify,and destroy collection assets. For example,a helicopter’s capabilities
may make it a suitable collection asset;however,its vulnerabilities could make it too risky to use if the enemy
possesses surface-to-air missiles. Another consideration is the signature associated with the collection asset.
For example,a UAS engine emits an uncommon noise that is distinctly identifiable and may alert the target
they are under surveillance.
SECTION III – SECURITY OPERATIONS
5-70. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate
warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within
which to react to the enemy and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their
protected forces (ADP 3-90). The main difference between the conduct of security operations and
reconnaissance is that the conduct of security operations orients on the protected force or facility, while
reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security missions protect the BCT from observation,indirect |
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fires, harassment, surprise, and sabotage. At the same time, security forces conducting security operations
provide information about the size, composition, location, and movement of enemy forces including
information about the terrain and populations within a BCT’s area of operations. Effective security operations
can also draw enemy forces into exposed positions,trade space for time,allow the BCT to concentrate forces
elsewhere, deceive the enemy, attrite enemy forces, and hold, deny, or control key terrain. Security forces
must be prepared to destroy enemy reconnaissance efforts and fight for information to seize,retain,or exploit
the initiative. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS
5-71. Five fundamentals of security operations establish the framework for security operations. These
fundamentals, discussed below, provide a set of principles that remind planners and practitioners of the
inherent characteristics required to execute security operations. These fundamentals include provide early
and accurate warning,provide reaction time and maneuver space,orient on the force or facility to be secured,
perform continuous reconnaissance,and maintain enemy contact.
PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING
5-72. The security force detects, observes, and reports threat forces that can influence the protected force.
Early detection and warning through rapid reporting enables the BCT commander to make timely and
well-informeddecisions to apply forces relative to the threat. As a minimum,security forces should operate
far enough from the protected force to prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging the protected
force with direct fires. The BCT commander and staff plan for the positioning of ground security, aerial
scouts, and UASs to provide long-range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach. The
commander reinforces and integrates them with available intelligence collection systems,such as unattended
ground sensors,surveillance systems,and moving target indicators to maximize warning time.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE
5-73. Security forces provide the protected force with enough reaction time and maneuver space to
effectively respond to likely enemy actions by operating at a distance from the protected force and by offering
resistance (within its capabilities and mission constraints) to enemy forces. Providing the security force with
an area of operations that has sufficient depth to operate enhances its ability to provide reaction time and
maneuver space to the protected force. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to
respond from the information provided by the IPB process and the protected force commander’s guidance
regarding time the protected force requires to react to enemy COAs based on the mission variables of
METT-TC. Reaction time and maneuver space relates to decision points driven by information requirements
and indicators given the latest time information is of value parameters to ensure the commander makes
decisions that place maximum firepower at the decisive point in a timely manner.
ORIENT ON THE FORCE,AREA,ORFACILITY
5-74. While reconnaissance forces orient on the enemy, security forces orient on the protected force by
understanding their scheme of maneuver and follow-on mission. The security forcefocuses all its actions on
protecting and providing early warning operating between the protected force and known or suspected enemy.
The security force moves as the protected force moves and orients on its movement. The value of terrain
occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it provides to the protected force. In addition to
orienting on a force,security operations may orient on an area or facility.
PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE
5-75. Reconnaissance fundamentals are implicit in all security operations. Security forces continuously seek
the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. Security forces use continuous reconnaissance to gain and maintain
enemy contact,develop the situation,report rapidly and accurately,retain freedom of maneuver to provide
early and accurate warning,and provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force. Security
forces conduct area reconnaissance or zone reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or enemy preparations
for action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain with the ultimate goal to determine the enemy’s |
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COAand to assist the protected force in countering it. Terrain information focuses on its possible use by the
enemy or the friendly force, either for offense or for defense. Civil consideration is a key focus for
information during the elements (offense,defense,and stability) of decisive action. Stationary security forces
use combinations of observation posts,aviation,patrols,intelligence collection assets,and battle positions to
perform reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform zone,area,or route reconnaissance along with using
observation postsand battle positions to detect enemy movements and preparations.
MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT
5-76. Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless the main force
commander specifically directs it. However, the individual security asset that first makes contact does not
have to maintain that contact,if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force
commander ensures that subordinate security assets hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset
to another in this case. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy’s activities to
assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy COAs and to prevent the enemy from
surprising the protected force. Depth in space and time enables security forces to maintain continuous visual
contact,to use direct and indirect fires,and to maneuver freely.
TYPES OF SECURITY OPERATIONS
5-77. Security operations provide the protected force with varying levels of protection and are dependent
upon the size of the unit conducting the security operation. All security operations provide protection and
early warning to the protected force. Security operations encompass four types: screen, guard, cover, and
area security.
5-78. Security operations conducted in the security area—that area occupied by a unit’s security elements
and includes the areas of influence of those security elements (ADP 3-90)—by one force or a subordinate
element of a force that provides security for the larger force are screen,guard,and cover. The screen,guard,
and cover security operations,respectively,contain increasing levels of combat power and provide the main
body with increasing levels of security. The more combat power in the security force means less combat
power for the main body. Normally,the BCT commander designates a security area in which security forces
provide the BCT with reaction time and maneuver space to preserve freedom of action. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for
additional information.)
SCREEN
5-79. Screenis a type of security operationthat primarily provides early warning to the protected force (ADP
3-90). The screen provides the least protection of any security mission;it does not have the combat power to
develop the situation. A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks, or the rear of
stationary and moving forces. The commander can place a screen in front of a stationary formation when the
likelihood of enemy action is small,the expected enemy force is small,or the main body needs only limited
time,once it is warned,to react effectively. If a significant enemy force is expected or a significant amount
of time and space is needed to provide the required degree of protection,the commander assigns and resources
a guard mission instead of a screen.
5-80. A screening force observes,identifies,and reports enemy actions. The unit performing a screen may
engage, repel, or destroy an enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance element within its capabilities,
augmented by indirect fires, Army aviation attacks, or close air support, but otherwise fights only in
self-defense. The screen has the minimum combat power necessary to provide the desired early warning,
which allows the commander to retain the bulk of the main body’s combat power for commitment at the
decisive place and time. The depth of the screen is critical to allow reconnaissance handover of threat contact
from one element to another without displacement from established observation posts. Screening forces use
depth to delay,impede,and harass the enemy with indirect fires or air support to cause the enemy to deploy
early and to prevent the enemy from identifying,penetrating,and exploiting the screen.
5-81. Within an assigned area of operations, a security force normally conducts a screen by establishing a
series of observation posts and patrols to ensure adequate observation of designate NAIs and TAI. The
commander uses reconnaissance patrols (mounted,dismounted,and aerial),relocates observation posts,and |
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employs technical assets to ensure continuous and overlapping surveillance. The commander also employs
terrain data base analytical support systems to ensure the integration of friendly reconnaissance and
surveillance assets to provide the necessary coverage. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
GUARD
5-82. Guard is a type of security operation done to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while
preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body(ADP 3-90). Units performing
a guard task cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and functional and multifunctional
supportassets of the main body. A guard force differs from a screen in that it routinely engages enemy forces
with direct and indirect fires. A screening force primarily uses indirect fires or air support to destroy enemy
reconnaissance elements and slow the movement of other enemy forces.
5-83. The BCT commander assigns a guard mission when expecting contact or has an exposed flank that
requires greater protection than a screen can provide. The three types of guard operations are advance,flank,
and rear guard. The commander can assign a guard mission to protect either a stationary or a moving force.
The guard force commander normally conducts the guard mission as an area defense, a delay, a zone
reconnaissance,or a movement to contact mission in the security area to provide reaction time and maneuver
space to the main body. A guard operates within the range of the main body’s fire support weapons,deploying
over a narrower front than a comparable sized screening force to permit concentrating combat power. Guards
are most effective when air assets are integrated. The commander’s intent and end state determinethe nature
and extent of required augmentation. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
COVER
5-84. Coveris a type of security operation done independent of the main body to protect them by fighting to
gain time while preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body (ADP 3-90).
Security forcesprotect the main body by fighting to gain time,observe and reportinformation,and prevent
enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. In Army doctrine,acovering forceis a
self-containedforce capable of operating independently of the main body,unlike a screen or guard force to
conduct the cover task (FM 3-90-2). A covering force performs all the tasks of screening and guard forces.
5-85. Adivisioncovering forceis usually a reinforced BCT that performs reconnaissance or othersecurity
missions. The covering force area is the area forward of the forward edge of the battle area out to the forward
positions initially assigned to the covering force. It is here that the covering force executes assigned tasks
(FM 3-90-2). The width of the covering force area is the same as the main body’s area of operations. An
adequately reinforced combined arms battalion, ABCT or Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) Cavalry
squadron,or SBCT Infantry battalion may perform a covering force mission if the division area of operations
is narrow enough. These reinforcements typically revert to their parent organizations on passage of the
covering force. BCTs and battalions typically organize a guard force instead of a covering force because their
resourcesare limited.
5-86. A covering force’s distance forward of the main body depends on the main body commander’s
intentions and instructions,reinforcements,the terrain,the enemy location and strength,and the main body
and covering force’s rate of march. Covering forces often become decisively engaged with enemy forces and
therefore,must have substantial combat power to engage the enemy and accomplish the mission. A covering
force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard force,fights longer and more often and defeats
larger enemy forces. (SeeFM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
AREA SECURITY
5-87. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, lines of
communications, and activities within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Area security operations allow
commanders to provide protection to critical assets without a significant diversion of combat power.
Protected forces range from echelon headquarters through artillery and echelon reserves to the sustaining
base. Protected installations can be part of the sustaining base or they can constitute part of the area’s critical
infrastructure. |
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5-88. During the offense, various military organizations may be involved in conducting area security
operations in an economy-of-force role to protect lines of communications, convoys, or critical fixed sites
and radars. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrainoriented. A route security force
may prevent an enemy force from impeding,harassing,or destroying lines of communications. Establishing
a movement corridor for traffic along a route or portions of a route is an example of route security operations.
5-89. Areas to secure range from specific points, (bridges and defiles) and terrain features (ridgelines and
hills),to large civilian population centers and their adjacent areas. Population-centric area security missions
are common across the range of military operations. Population-centric area security operations typically
combine aspects of the area defense and offensive operations to eliminate the power to produce internal
defense threats. (See chapter 8,section IV for a detailed discussion.)
Note.Area security activities take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units
(regardless of their location) within an area of operations. For example, the BCT would link all
local security activities conducted by its subordinate units to its broader area security activities.
(See paragraph 8-126for further information on establishinglocal security measures.)
SECTION IV – INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
5-90. Intelligence operationsare the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units through the intelligence
disciplines to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements (ADP 2-0). They are also one of the four
primary tactical tasks and missions the Army conducts as part of information collection,along with the other
three primary tasks: reconnaissance,surveillance,and security operations. Intelligence drives operations and
operations support intelligence;this relationship is continuous. The BCT commander and staff need accurate,
relevant,and predictive intelligence in order to understand threat centers of gravity,goals and objectives,and
COAs. Precise intelligence is also critical to target threat capabilities at the right time and place and to open
windows of opportunity across domains during large-scale combat operations. The commander and staff
must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths,weaknesses,organization,equipment,and tactics to plan
for and execute BCT operations.
EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSETS
5-91. Successful intelligence operations,like reconnaissance fundamentals and the fundamentals of security,
include effective and efficient employment of military intelligence assets,based on the following guidelines:
(cid:122) Maintain readiness—the training of military intelligence personnel,the maintenance and status of
their equipment (by dedicated field service representatives if necessary), and any necessary
augmentation from outside personnel,or sustainment related resources for mission success.
(cid:122) Ensure continuous intelligence operations—before,during,and after execution of all operations;
intelligence operations focus on every relevant aspect of the operational environment before
execution, constant updates for the commander verifying threat composition, disposition, and
intention during execution, and after execution maintaining contact with threat forces to collect
necessary information for planning subsequent operations while protecting the BCT.
(cid:122) Orient on requirements—as the commander prioritizes intelligence operations by providing
guidance and intent, military intelligence personnel identify and update priority intelligence
requirements,ensuring they tie to the concept of the operation and decision points,focus on most
critical needs, and consider the latest time the information is of value. The staff assists the
commander in approving requests beyond a BCT’s capabilities,as well as seeking higher echelon
intelligence operations when needed.
(cid:122) Provide mixed and redundant coverage—the commander integrates assets to ensure careful
employment by layering through cueing (follow-on collection of more detail by another system),
redundancy (using two or more like assets against the same requirement),and mixing (using two
or more different assets against the same requirement) for maximum efficiency in information
collection. This ensures a balance of requirements,available capabilities,and areas to be covered. |
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(cid:122) Gain and maintain sensor contact—intelligence operations must gain and maintain sensor contact
when it occurs,andthe collection asset is able to observe or receive a signal.
(cid:122) Report information rapidly and accurately—military intelligence staff closely collaborates with
the signal staff to ensure communications plans incorporate military intelligence processing,
exploitation, and dissemination and collection assets. The staff must test for value all relevant
information within the area of interest in the operational environment,while quickly assessing it.
Each collection asset must have a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as
PACE) communications plan (see chapter 4).
(cid:122) Provide early warning—to ascertain threat COAand timing,the commander and staff orient assets
to observe the right locations for indicators to yield early timely and complete reporting.
(cid:122) Retain freedom of movement—collection assets require battlefield mobility for mission
accomplishment, refraining from close combat, as decisive engagement reduces or stops
collection. Knowledge of terrain,weather,and threat reduce this likelihood,as does IPB to identify
likely contact areas.
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
5-92. The intelligence warfighting function executes the intelligence process by employing intelligence
capabilities. All-source intelligence and single-source intelligence are the building blocks by which the
intelligence warfighting function facilitates situational understanding and supports decision-making. As the
intelligence warfighting function receives information from a variety of capabilities, some of these
capabilities are commonly referred to as single-source capabilities. Single-source capabilities are employed
through intelligence operations with the other means of information collection (reconnaissance,surveillance,
and security operations). Intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities (see
paragraph4-254) process information and prepare it for subsequent analysis. The intelligence producedbased
on all of those capabilities is called all-source intelligence.
ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
5-93. Army forces conduct operations based on all-source intelligence assessments and products developed
by intelligence staffs. All-source intelligence is the integration of intelligence and information from all
relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations (ADP 2-0). In joint
doctrine,all-source intelligence is intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate
all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence (JP 2-0).
All-Source Analysis
5-94. The fundamentals of all-source intelligence analysis comprise intelligence analysis techniques and the
all-source analytical tasks: situation development, generating intelligence knowledge, IPB, and support to
targeting and information operations. Within the BCT,the intelligence staff determines the significance and
reliability of incoming information,integrates incoming information with current intelligence holdings,and
through analysis and evaluation determines changes in threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable
COAs. The intelligence staff supports the integrating processes (IPB,targeting,RM,information collection,
and knowledge management [see paragraph 4-145]) by providing all-source analysis of threats,terrain and
weather,and civil considerations. The intelligence staff uses all-source intelligence todevelop the products
necessary to aid situational understanding, support the development of plans and orders, and answer
information requirements.
All-Source Production
5-95. Fusion—consolidating, combining, and correlating information together (ADP 2-0)—facilitates
all-source production. Fusion occurs as an iterative activity to refine information as an integral part of
all-source analysis. All-source intelligence production is continuous and occurs throughout the intelligence
and operations processes. Most of the products from all-source intelligence are initially developed during
planning and updated, as needed, throughout preparation and execution based on information gained from
continuous assessment. |
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All-Source and Identity Activities
5-96. Identity activities (as described in joint doctrine) are a collection of functions and actions that
appropriately recognize and differentiate one person from another to support decision-making. For example,
they may include the collection of identity attributes and physical materials;their processing and exploitation;
all-source analytic efforts, production of identity intelligence and criminal intelligence products; and
dissemination of those products to inform and assess, and the appropriate action at the point of encounter.
These all-source activities result in the discovery of true identities; link identities to events, locations, and
networks;and reveal hostile intent. These outputs enable tasks,missions,and actions that span the range of
military operations.
SINGLE-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE
5-97. Single-source intelligence includes the joint intelligence disciplines and complementary intelligence
capabilities. Intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities are a critical aspect of
single-source intelligence activities that ensure the results of collection inform single-and all-source analysis.
Military intelligence units can conduct intelligence operations with a single intelligence discipline or
complementary intelligence capability or as a multifunction intelligence operation,which combines activities
from two or more intelligence disciplines or complementary intelligence capabilities.
5-98. Command and support relationships direct the flow of reported information during intelligence
operations along various echelon specific transmission paths or channels. Channels assist in streamlining
information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the right people.
Commanders and staffs normally communicate through three channels: command,staff,and technical. (See
ADP 6-0 and ATP 6-02.71 for additional information.)
Intelligence Disciplines and Complementary Intelligence Capabilities
5-99. Intelligence disciplines, supported by military intelligence personnel, include—counterintelligence,
geospatial intelligence,HUMINT,measurement and signature intelligence,open-source intelligence,signals
intelligence,technical intelligence. Intelligence disciplines support reconnaissance,surveillance,and security
operations through which intelligence units and staffs complete tasks in intelligence operations. Additionally,
complementary intelligence capabilities such as biometrics-enabled, cyber-enabled, and forensic-enabled
intelligence, along with document and media exploitation, ensure the successful accomplishment of
intelligence tasks. (See ADP 2-0 for a detailed description of capabilities and disciplines.)
5-100. As the BCT’s organic intelligence organization, the military intelligence company (see
paragraph1-24) supports the BCT and its subordinate units through collection and analysis of information
and dissemination of intelligence, signals intelligence, and HUMINT. The military intelligence company
provides continual input for the BCT commander by enabling the BCT S-2 in maintaining the threat portion
of the COP. Military intelligence company elements working in the intelligence cell (see chapter 3)
collaborate with the BCT operations staff to integrate information collection tasks and coordinate
requirements as directed by the BCT S-3. The military intelligence company commander directs the
employment of the company in accordance with missions and guidance from the BCT headquarters. The
military intelligence company commander locates where best to exercise command and control of company
intelligence assets. The military intelligence company CP is usually co-located with the BCT main CP to
facilitate control of company intelligence assets and maximize support to the BCT intelligence cell. The
military intelligence company CP includes the company headquarters element and representatives from each
platoon. During BCT operations, the analysis platoon normally augments the BCT intelligence cell under
control of the BCT S-2. (SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.)
5-101. Military intelligence units, external to the BCT, conduct both reconnaissance and surveillance
missions. They provide electronic intercept, UASs sensor feeds, and HUMINT, counterintelligence, and
downlinks from theater of operations and national assets. Theater and national-level reconnaissance and
surveillance systems provide broadcast dissemination of information and intelligence and provide near real-
time imagery as a part of an integrated intelligence effort. Artillery and air defense target acquisition radars
complement military intelligence surveillance systems as a part of that effort. HUMINT collection (see
chapter 8 for information on HUMINT collection teams) occurs through face-to-face interrogation of |
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captured enemy soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and debriefing of friendly Soldiers, such as
scouts and special operations forces.(SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.)
Technical Channels
5-102. Technical channels, while not a command or support relationship, often affect intelligence
operations. For intelligence operations,technical channels are the transmission paths between paths between
intelligence units and sections performing a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels
control the performance of technical functions. They neither constitute nor bypass command authorities;
rather,they serve as the mechanism for ensuring the execution of clearly delineated technical tasks,functions,
and capabilities to meet the dynamic requirements of decisive actions. (See FM 2-0 for additional
information.)
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY ACROSS ALL DOMAINS
5-103. During reconnaissance and security operations, the BCT commander and staff, as well as
subordinate commanders and staffs,consider intelligence operations to collect information across all relevant
or necessary domains (air,land,maritime,space,and cyberspace). The BCT commander attempts to leverage
advantages in one or multiple domains,such as seizing key terrain or denying enemy freedom of movement
and action in the maritime and air domains, disrupting cyber access, or controlling narratives to influence
population support. The BCT’s higher headquarters (usually division or corps) supplements the information
collection capabilities of the military intelligence company in one or multiple domains. Even as aggressive
air-ground reconnaissance and security operations remain the key means of information collection,
intelligence operations in multiple domains can increase the commander’s situational understanding. The aim
is to integrate information collection by all means (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and
intelligence operations) in all domains throughout the depth of the battlefield to prevent surprise,protect the
force,and preclude enemy options.
5-104. Within the space domain, intelligence operations capabilities can provide information collection,
earlywarning,environmental monitoring,and satellite-basedcommunications,positioning,navigation,and
timing. Such activities enable freedom of action for operations in all other domains,and operations in other
domains can create effects in and through thespace domain. The BCT commander considers the use of such
capabilities in this domain for reconnaissance and surveillance operations, but also an enemy’s use of
capabilities. Reconnaissance and security forces must be prepared to operate in a denied, degraded, and
disrupted operational environment. For example, in the space domain enemies will deny U.S. and partner
space-based intelligence, reconnaissance, Global Positioning System (GPS), and secure satellite
communications. Since space operations are inherently joint,the BCT commander and staff must not assume
U.S. forces will have unconstrained use of space-based capabilities. (See FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army
space operations.)
5-105. In the cyberspace domain,capabilities yield the same advantages to friendlyforces and enemies and
are therefore key for intelligence operations during reconnaissance and security operations. Cyberspace is
highly vulnerable for several reasons, including ease of access, network and software complexity, lack of
security considerations in network design and software development, and inappropriate user activity (see
paragraph 4-329). Access to cyberspace by an individual or group with a networked device is easy,and an
individual with a single device may be able to disable an entire network. An enemy could implant malicious
code on the United Statesand its partners disrupting logistics,communications,reconnaissance,battlefield
information systems,and ultimately security measures in other domains. Vulnerabilities in the systems that
operate in cyberspace contribute to a continuous obligation to manage risk and protect portions of cyberspace.
5-106. Within the air domain, enemy forces will employ integrated air defense capabilities, particularly
man-portable systems that are difficult to detect,or capabilities which are resistant to electronic suppression.
UASs, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, in addition to airborne and air assault operations all fall under this
domain. From a security standpoint,intelligence operations must consider enemy use of each of these systems
during planning in order to protect the force. From a surveillance, reconnaissance,and securitystandpoint,
the BCT commander and staff consider thesame assets or capabilities within U.S. and partner forces in order
to support intelligence operations. |
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5-107. The maritime domain,though mostly higher echelon Army and Navy forces,still holds intelligence
operations considerations for a BCT. Reconnaissance can occur by assets with capabilities of lift,
sustainment, and ship-to-shore fires to support maneuver (for targeting). Ground forces can also provide
direct or indirect fires in littoral areas in support of maritime operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance
must also occur on similar assets owned by the enemy in this domain,while friendly units conduct security
operationsto protect against these,while also protecting U.S. and partner maritime domain assets.
5-108. In the land domain,adversaries employ precision and extended range munitions,requiring BCTs to
rapidly transition from movement to maneuver,and disperse forces to avoid enemy fire. The enemy will use
advanced multifunctional mines to deny friendly freedom of movement and maneuver while protecting its
own land force. The enemy will deploy camouflage, deception, and security forces to mitigate collection
capabilities. Surveillance and reconnaissance focus upon all of these to allow for successful intelligence
operations, while security incorporates such considerations into planning for the safety of information
collection forces. BCTs will not only operate in the land domain but will also provide a large amount of
information about the land domain to higher echelons. |
3-96 | 189 | Chapter 6
Offense
The brigade combat team (BCT) conducts offensive operations to defeat and destroy
enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive actions
impose the BCT commander’s will on the enemy. Offensive actions capitalize on
accurate and timely intelligence and other relevant information regarding enemy
forces, weather and terrain, and civil considerations. Protection tasks, such as security
operations, operations security, and information protection prevent or inhibit the enemy
from acquiring accurate information about friendly forces. As the commander
maneuvers forces to advantageous positions before contact, contact with enemy forces
before the decisive operation is deliberate and designed to shape the optimum situation
for the decisive operation. When committed, the decisive operation is a sudden,
shattering action that capitalizes on subordinate initiative and a common operational
picture (COP). This chapter addresses the characteristics of the offense, common
offensive planning considerations, forms of maneuver, offensive operations, and
planning considerations when transitioning to other tactical operations.
SECTION I – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
6-1. Successful offenses share the following characteristics: surprise,concentration,tempo,and audacity.
Offensive characteristics, used in concert, create the foundation for an effective offense in any operational
environment. The tactical vignette below is an example of this foundation and illustrates why U.S. forces
must be able to transition from one type of military action (counterinsurgency) to another (close combat)
seamlessly and rapidly.
6-2. Close combat,as experienced by Russian forces in Grozny and U.S. forces in Fallujah illustrate two
approaches for conducting the offense in urban terrain. In each case,noncombatants were told to evacuate in
advance of the attack,and anyone left was a de facto enemy fighter. These geographically remote cities were,
in effect, besieged and then stormed, with attacks supported by massive firepower. The result was high
casualties on both sides and rubbled cities. The 2008 battle for Sadr City offers a different approach. The
challenges during the battle for Sadr City were in some cases even more formidable than the challenges posed
by Grozny and Fallujah.
The Battle for Sadr City
Sadr City is part of Baghdad and has an estimated population of 2.4 million. Forcing
noncombatants to evacuate was not an option,there was nowhere for them to go. However,
the approach to ridding Sadr City of Jaish al-Mahdi fighters’was quite different from that
used in Grozny or Fallujah. The operation in Sadr City focused on enemy fighters and their
capabilities,rather than seizingand clearing the city.
The trigger for the battle was Jaish al-Mahdi fighter’s response to the Iraqi government’s
offensive against insurgents in Basra. Jaish al-Mahdi fighters launched their own
offensive, overrunning Iraqi government security forces and firing rockets and mortars
into the International Zone, also known as the Green Zone. In response, a U.S. Army
brigade and Iraqi security forces (army and police), featuring Abrams tanks, Bradley
fighting vehicles, and Strykers, along with engineers, civil affairs, and psychological
operations personnel and other support troops, attacked Jaish al-Mahdi fighters. The
command and control arrangements gave the brigade commander direct access to crucial |
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joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, and fire support including
attack helicopters, fighter aircraft, armed Predator unmanned aircraft systems, and
Shadow unmanned aircraft systems. This arrangement gave the brigade commander a
short decision response time,rapidly increasing the tempo of attacks to disrupt Jaish al-
Mahdi operations.
An early priority was to stop the rocket and mortar attacks on the International Zone. Jaish
al-Mahdi fighters could launch these attacks quickly and almost at will. These attacks
simply required pulling a vehicle into a firing position,unloading the rocket and its firing
rail,firing off the rocket,and driving back to a hide position. U.S. forces quickly realized
that the International Zone was at the extreme end of the 107-millimeter (mm) rocket’s
range. Thesolution was to force Jaish al-Mahdi fighters out of their firing positions and
back into Sadr City. This approach did not stop Jaish al-Mahdi infiltration. The brigade
then employed an innovative but straightforward approach: It walled off two
neighborhoods south of Sadr City,including the one containing the Jamilla market where
Jaish al-Mahdi fighters obtained much of their resources. This inventive plan consisted of
T-wall sections, each twelve feet tall and weighing 9000 pounds. The wall became
impenetrable; a nearly five-kilometer long barrier that denied Jaish al-Mahdi fighters
what had been terrain and avenues of movement crucial to its operations. The fighting was
particularly intense and required the brigade commander to commit Abrams tanks and
Bradley fighting vehicles to dislodge Jaish al Mahdi fighters and protect the soldiers
building the wall. As soon as the wall started to go up, Jaish al Mahdi fighters instantly
recognized the threat posed to their operations and launched numerous attacks to stop its
construction. Thewall,in the words of one U.S. commander,became a terrorist magnet.
U.S. forces fought from a position of advantage, massing the effects of combat power to
defeat the Jaish al-Mahdi fighters’assaults. Whilethe construction of the T-wall ultimately
squelched the rocket attacks by defeating Jaish al-Mahdi fighters, U.S. forces waged an
intense and instructive concentration of counterfire operation.
Key to the counterfire operation was giving the brigade commander direct access to joint
intelligence,surveillance,and reconnaissance assets so that the commander could identify
firing locations almost immediately without having to consult with another headquarters.
The commander could also pass intelligence rapidly by using secure communications down
to the company level. The commander could attack enemy firing points around the clock
with a formidable array of assets, including Apache helicopters, air component fighter
aircraft, and armed Predator unmanned aircraft systems. Brigade intelligence analysts
honed their techniques over time and learned to follow Jaish al-Mahdi rocket teams to
their source rather than attack them immediately. This tactic allowed the U.S. forces to
strike ammo dumps and senior leaders at a time or place the enemy did not expect. This
tactic had a profound effect,more so than if they had destroyed a vehicle and a few fighters.
The overall results were impressive. In about two months,U.S. and Iraqi forces obliterated
Jaish al-Mahdi fighters, killing an estimated 700, won back significant numbers of the
population, and re-established control of what had been an insurgent stronghold. U.S.
forces killed in action numbered fewer than ten. Furthermore,the Multi-national Division-
Baghdad exploited the success of the combat gains in Sadr City with an intensive campaign
of providing local security and reconstruction, all complemented by information
operations. In addition to the key lessons highlighted above, other key lessons emerged.
First, persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, security operations, and
responsive precision strikes were crucial to success because they were integrated at low
levels. Second, ground maneuver forces were essential. Aggressive ground maneuver
forced the enemy to react and enabled U.S. forces to seize control of the terrain south of
Sadr City and to erect the barrier. Finally, capable indigenous forces were decisive in
securing gains. Their presence signaled that Iraqis were in charge, not coalition forces
that would leave eventually.
Jerry Salinger |
3-96 | 191 | Offense
SURPRISE
6-3. As in the vignette above, the BCT commander achieves surprise by striking the enemy at a time or
place the enemy does not expect or in a manner that the enemy is unprepared. The commander assesses the
enemy’s intent to prevent the enemy from gaining situational understanding. The BCT identifies and avoids
enemy strengths while attacking enemy weaknesses.
6-4. The BCT strikes the enemy where and when the enemy least expects it through night attacks,
infiltrations,or rapid insertion of airborne or air assault forces or in a manner the enemy is unprepared,for
example in mass,leading with tanks,or attacking earlier or later than anticipated.Thus,forcing the enemy
to deal with multiple forms of contact or to take advantage of their lack of unpreparednessfora specifictype
ofcontactat a specific time and place.
6-5. The BCT focuses assigned or attached reconnaissance and security forces and information collection
efforts,and exploits echelon above brigade enablers,for example space and cyberspace capabilities,to gain
accurate and timely information about the enemy. The BCT then capitalizes on this information by
maneuvering forces to advantageous positions on the battlefield and by imposing lethal and nonlethal effects
to undermine the integrity of the enemy’s tactical plan and thereby manufacture an advantage through the
presentation of a tactical problem that the enemy is not prepared to,or limits the enemy’s ability to react.
CONCENTRATION
6-6. Concentration,as displayed in the vignette above,is themassing of overwhelming effects of combat
power to achieve a single purpose. During the offense, the BCT commander must avoid set patterns or
obvious movements that would indicate the timing or direction of the attack. The commander designates,
sustains,and shifts the decisive operation or main effort as necessary. The BCT concentrates combat power
against the enemy using company level enhanced digital communications and information systems.
Simultaneously, the BCT synchronizes information from adjacent units, higher headquarters, and unified
action partners. Synchronizing allows the BCT to gain an understanding of the terrain and threat forces in its
area of operations and to concentrate assigned or attached and echelon above brigade information collection
capabilities to enable the commander’s specific information requirements.
6-7. The division commander assists the BCT commander to achieve concentration by task organizing
additional resources from augmenting units or forces from within the division. The division commander,
through the division artillery headquarters,may provide additional artillery support from the division artillery
(when tasked organized) or a field artillery brigade. If lacking external resources, the division commander
for example,may direct the organic field artillery battalion of the BCT in reserve to reinforce the fires of the
field artillery battalion organic to the BCT conducting the main effort until the reserve is committed. Another
example is to direct the division artillery target acquisition platoon radars (when tasked organized) to provide
coverage while BCT radars are moving.
TEMPO
6-8. Commanders build the appropriate tempo to provide the necessary momentum for successful attacks
that achieve the objective. Controlling or altering tempo,as demonstrated in the vignette,by the commander’s
direct access to crucial joint intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance assets was essential to retaining
the initiative and maintaining the rapid tempo of the operation. During the offense,rapid tempo focuses on
key pieces of information and terrain at the tactical level. A rapid tempo entails a small number of tasks and
allows attackers to penetrate barriers and defenses quickly to destroy enemy forces in-depth before they can
react. A rapid tempo allows the BCT to deliver multiple blows in-depth from numerous directions to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative. Blows from multiple directions and multiple domains cause a multiple
dimensional and domain dilemma for the enemy.
6-9. Commanders adjust the tempo to achieve synchronization. Speed is preferred to keep the enemy off
balance. Establishing the conditions for offensive actions may require slowing the tempo as the pieces are
set in place. Once ready,the tempo is increased,and the action takes place rapidly. |
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6-10. The BCT operations staff officer (S-3), in coordination with the commander, ensures combat
operations flow smoothly during phases or transitions (sequels) between offensive and defensive operations.
The right mix of forces available to quickly transition combat operations between the offense and defense
enables the tempo necessary to maintain momentum.
AUDACITY
6-11. As seen in the vignette a simple but boldly executed plan of action,walling off the two neighborhoods
south of Sadr City, demonstrated audacity through action to seize the initiative and press the battle. The
offense favors the bold execution of plans. The BCT commander exercisesaudacity by developing inventive
plans that produce decisive results while violently applying combat power.The commander compensates for
any lack of information to develop the plan by developing the situation aggressively to seize the initiative,
and then continuously engage in combat to exploit opportunities as they arise.
6-12. Audacity is a willingness to take bold risks. The BCT commander displaysaudacity by accepting risk
commensurate with the value of the BCT’s objective. Thecommander must understand when and where to
take risks and avoid hesitation when executing the plan.
SECTION II – COMMON OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-13. The BCT commander begins with a designated area of operations, identified mission, and assigned
forces. The commander develops and issues planning guidance based on visualization relating to the physical
means to accomplish the mission. The following paragraphs discuss activities, functions, and specific
operational environments as the framework for discussing offensive planning considerations. (SeeFM3-90-1
for additional information.)
COMMAND AND CONTROL
6-14. As with all operations, the BCT commander drives the operations process through the activities of
understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing. The BCT commander uses the
principles of mission command (specificallymutual trust and sharedunderstanding [see paragraph 4-2]) and
inspires the BCT to accomplish the mission. The BCT commander develops shared understanding,by clearly
stating theintent,assigns responsibility,delegates authority,and allocates resources to enable subordinates
to take disciplined initiative,accept prudent risk,and act on mission orders to achieve success. For example,
a movement to contact includes the general plan,direction,objectives,general organization of forces,general
guidance of actions on contact,bypass criteria,and other guidance as required. The commander’slocation is
also specified. (SeeADP 6-0 and FM 6-0 for additional information.)
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
6-15. The BCT commander and staff use four components of the operational framework to help
conceptualize and describe the concept of operations in time,space,purpose,and resources. (See chapter 2.)
First,the commander is assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second,the commander
can designatedeep,close,rear,andsupportareas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and
space. Third, within this area, the commander conducts decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to
articulate the operation in terms of purpose. (See figure 2-4onpage 2-26.) Inthe fourth and final component,
the commander designates the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.
(SeeFM 3-0 for additional information.)
Note. The BCT does not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless
tasked to do so,usually within a division consolidation area. |
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OPERATIONS PROCESS
6-16. Command and control within the operations process involves a continuous development process of
estimates, decisions, assigning tasks and missions, executing tasks and missions, and acquiring feedback.
The operations process includes deriving missions, formulating concepts, and communicating the
commander’s intent successfully. Information products and the interpretations result in decisions and
directives. Based on the commander’s guidance,the staff recommends—
(cid:122) Suspected enemy locations and courses of action(COAs).
(cid:122) Formation and task organization of forces (planned two levels down,tasked one level down).
(cid:122) Information collection plan(enemy’s strength,disposition,and location).
(cid:122) Decision points:
(cid:131) To support changes in the movement formation.
(cid:131) To counter/take advantage of enemy action.
(cid:131) To commit/not commit additional assets.
(cid:122) Security plans to protect the main body.
(cid:122) Priorities of fire.
(cid:122) Bypass criteria.
(cid:122) Missions(task and purpose)for subordinate units.
(cid:122) Control measures.
INFORMATION
6-17. Command and control involves acquiring and displaying information. All units continually acquire
information about the mission,enemy,terrain and weather,troops and support available,time available,civil
considerations (METT-TC) through a variety of means. Units send and receive information, manage the
means of communicating the information,and filter and maintain the information in a form that is convenient
to the decision-making process. The commander records decisions as plans and orders that serve as input to
thecommand and controlprocess at the next lower echelon. Feedback from subordinate units provides input
to the BCT’s command and control process thus contributing to an ongoing process. (See FM 3-90-1 for
additional information.)
CONTROL MEASURES
6-18. The BCT commander and staff select control measures,including graphics,to control subordinate units
during operations associated with offensive operations (including subordinate tasks and special purpose
attacks) and form of maneuver to establish responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate units’actions
from impeding one another. The commander and staff establish control measures that foster coordination and
cooperation between forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action. Control measures should
foster decision-making and subordinate unit initiative. For example,the lateral boundaries of the unit making
the decisive operation are narrowly drawn to help establish the overwhelming combat power necessary at the
area of penetration.
6-19. The commander assigns, as a minimum, an area of operations to every maneuver unit, a line of
departure or line of contact;time of the attack or time of assault;phase lines(PLs);objective;and a limit of
advance to control and synchronize the attack. The commander can use a battle handover line—a designated
phase line where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to the moving force and vice versa
(ADP3-90)—instead of a limit of advance if the commander knows where the likely commitment of a
follow-and-assume force will occur. The commander locates the limit of advance beyond the enemy’s main
defensive position to ensure that suitable terrain in immediate proximity to the objective is denied to the
enemy,and that maneuver space is available for consolidation and reorganization in anticipation of an enemy
counterattack. If the operation results in opportunities to exploit success and pursue a beaten enemy, the
commander adjusts existing boundaries to accommodate the new situation. (See section IV for a discussion
of control measures associated with offensive operations.) |
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AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
6-20. Airspace management begins with the development of a unit airspace plan. There are two airspace
control methods: positive and procedural. The Army primarily conducts procedural control of airspace use.
Preplanned airspace coordinating measures that are integrated with each Army echelon’s unit airspace plan
and approved on the theater airspace control order makes procedural control highly effective. Although
echelon above brigade units may exercise positive control methods over small areas for limited periods of
time,BCTs are not able to perform positive control of airspace over any of their assigned area of operations
without significant augmentation. Positive control is a method of airspace control that relies on positive
identification,tracking,and direction of aircraft within an airspace,conducted with electronic means by an
agency having the authority and responsibility therein (JP 3-52). Procedural controlis a method of airspace
control which relies on a combination of previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures (JP 3-52).
Properly developed airspace coordinating measures facilitate the BCT’s employment of aerial and
surface-based fires simultaneously. (See JP 3-52, FM 3-52, and ATP 3-52.1 for additional information on
airspace control and ATP 3-91.1 for information on the joint air-ground integration center[JAGIC].)
JOINT,INTERORGANIZATIONAL,AND MULTINATIONAL TEAMS
6-21. The operational environment may require the BCT to maintain direct links withjoint and multinational
forces and U.S. and foreign governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in the conflict,crisis,
or instability. In many situations,such as when an adversary or enemy is primarily employing unconventional
activities, the BCT benefits from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities residing within these
organizations.
6-22. The BCT headquarters or subordinate elements actively participate in civil military operationsand may
synchronize their operations with those of different civil military organizations. Unity of effort with these
organizations is essential and facilitates best through the exchange of a liaison officer. The fact that the BCT’s
communications systems may not be compatible with the civil-military organization increases the need for
an exchange of knowledgeable liaison officers who are properly equipped to communicate according to the
table of organization and equipment.
MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER
6-23. The BCT commander conducts movement and maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to create
opportunities to increase friendly fire effects. The commander makes unexpected maneuvers,rapidly changes
the tempo of ongoing operations, avoids observation, and uses deceptive techniques and procedures to
surprise the enemy. The commander overwhelms the enemy with one or more unexpected blows before the
enemy has time to react in an organized fashion. Attacking the enemy force from an advantageous position
in time and space, such as engaging the enemy from a location or at a time when unprepared, facilitates
defeating the enemy force.
SEIZE,RETAIN,AND EXPLOIT THE INITIATIVE
6-24. The offense is the most direct means of seizing,retaining,and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical
and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action directed
toward enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on speed,surprise,and shock. If that operation fails to destroy an
enemy,operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. The offense compels an enemy to react,creating
new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit.
6-25. The commander maneuvers to close with and destroy the enemy by close combat and shock effect.
Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. Close combat encompasses all
actions that place friendly forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses fire and
movement. Swift maneuver against several points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce
paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders. The key to success is to strike hard and fast,
overwhelm a portion of the enemy force, and then quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus
maintaining the momentum of the attack without reducing the pressure on the enemy. |
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6-26. During combined arms operations,commanders compel the enemy to respond to friendly action. Such
friendly actions nullify the enemy’s ability to conduct their synchronized,mutually supporting reactions. The
offense involves taking the fight to the enemy and never allowing enemy forces to recover from the initial
shock of the attack.
6-27. The commander integrates and synchronizes all available combat power to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative, and to sustain freedom of movement and action. The commander employs joint capabilities
across multiple domains when provided,such as close air support and surveillance assets to complement or
reinforce BCT capabilities.
6-28. Air-ground operations (see chapter 4) support the commander’s objectives. Relationships, common
understanding,and mutual trust enhance the planning,coordination,and synchronized employment of ground
and air maneuver. Air-ground operations require detailed planning of synchronized timelines,aviation task
and purpose, and airspace management. Aircraft are limited in time due to fuel requirements and fighter
management of aircrew duty day. The commander and staff use friendly timelines and synchronization
matrixes to ensure air assets are at the rightplace at the right time,that they nest with the ground maneuver
plan,and provide the desired effects to support the BCT mission. Aviation commanders and staffs use these
timelines to manage aircrew duty day and aircraft readiness.
SCHEME OF MANEUVER
6-29. The scheme of maneuver covers the actions from before line of departure to consolidation and
reorganization. The BCT operation order scheme of maneuver paragraph addresses the following:
(cid:122) Task and purpose of subordinate elements.
(cid:122) Reconnaissanceand surveillance effortsand security operations.
(cid:122) Actions at known or likely enemy contact locations.
(cid:122) Scheme of fires.
(cid:122) Direct fire control measures.
(cid:122) Fire support coordination measures and airspace coordinating measures.
(cid:122) Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
(cid:122) Methods for moving through and crossing dangerous areas.
(cid:122) Movementformation and known locations where the formation changes.
(cid:122) Employment of battlefield obscuration.
(cid:122) Actions and array of forces at the final objective or limit of advance.
(cid:122) Decision points and criteria for execution of maneuver options (attack,report and bypass,defend
and retrograde),that may develop during execution.
6-30. On the objective once seized,assault forces conduct consolidation and reorganization. Consolidation
is the organizing and strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy
(FM3-90-1).Reorganizationis all measures taken by the commander to maintain unit combat effectiveness
or return it to a specified level of combat capability (FM 3-90-1). During consolidation and reorganization,
the BCT forces execute follow-on missions as directed. One mission is to continue the attack against targets
of opportunity in the objective area. Whether a raid,attack (as a hasty or deliberate operation),or movement
to contact,BCT subordinate units’posture and prepare for continued action and to defeat local counterattacks.
The BCT commander may pass follow-on forces through assault forces or have them bypassed by other
forces to continue the attack. On the objective,assault forces may be tasked to establish support by fire and
attack by fire positions. BCT subordinate commanders or assault force leaders identify initial support by fire
and attack by fire positions to reinforce the unit’s limit of advance and to support follow-on missions.
MOBILITY
6-31. Engineer priority of support typically is to mobility,although it may rapidly change to countermobility
in anticipation of an enemy attack. Engineer reconnaissance teams,from the brigadeengineer battalion (see
chapter 1,section I),join reconnaissance and security forces (see chapter 5) to reconnoiter obstacles based
on an analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC. Planned suppression and obscuration fires support
breaching operations. Additional combat engineers, task organized for breaching, reducing obstacles, and |
3-96 | 196 | Chapter 6
making expedient repairs to roads,trails,and ford sites may travel with the advance guard during a movement
to contact. The combat engineers’ purpose is to ensure that the advance guard and main body during a
movement to contact, or an assault force during an attack remain mobile. (SeeATP 3-34.22 for additional
information.)
6-32. Mobility planning based upon the mission variables of METT-TC includes identifying requirements
for military police support and augmentation. Military police contribute to the maneuver and mobility by—
(cid:122) Preserving the freedom of movement over main supply routes (see ATP 3-39.10).
(cid:122) Improving the protection of high-risk personnel and facilities during security and mobility (see
ATP 3-39.30).
(cid:122) Providing temporarydetention operations (see FM 3-63) for detained individuals.
(cid:122) Integrating police intelligence through operations (see ATP 3-39.20) to enhance situational
understanding,protection,civil control,and law enforcement efforts.
(cid:122) Providing military working dogs (patrol explosive detection dog) support to route clearance (see
ATP3-39.34).
6-33. The BCT provost marshal is responsible for requesting and coordinating military police assets and
activities for the BCT. Mobility planning should integrate the security and mobility support discipline to
support the BCT, when required, with a distribution of military police forces throughout the area of
operations. (SeeFM 3-39 for additional information.)
PASSAGE OF LINES
6-34. Apassage of linesis an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s
combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). Maneuver
forces conduct passage of lines when at least one of the mission variables of METT-TC does not permit the
bypass of a friendly unit. A passage of lines is a complex operation requiring close supervision and detailed
planning,coordination,and synchronization between the commander of the unit conducting the passage and
the unit being passed.A passage of lines occurs under two conditions:
(cid:122) A forward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while
moving toward the enemy (ADP 3-90).
(cid:122) A rearward passage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while
moving away from the enemy (ADP 3-90).
6-35. BCT units conduct a passage of lines to sustain the tempo of an offensive operation or to transfer
responsibility from one unit to another to maintain the viability of the defense. Units also conduct passage of
lines to transition from a delay or security operation by one force to a defense or to free a unit for another
mission or task. A passage of lines involves transferring the responsibility for an area of operation between
two commanders. That transfer of authority usually occurs when roughly two-thirds of the passing force has
moved through the passage pointor on meeting specific conditions agreed to by the commanders of the unit
conducting the passage and the unit being passed.
MOVEMENTFORMATIONS
6-36. A movement formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the
general configurationof a unit on the ground (ADP 3-90). The sevenmovementformations are column,line,
echelon (left or right),box,diamond,wedge,and vee.
6-37. Movementformations are threat-or terrain-based. The BCT may use more than one formation within
a given movement,especially if the terrain or enemy situationchanges during a movement. For example,a
battalion may use the column formation during the passage of lines and then change to another formation
such as the wedge. Companies within the battalion formation may conduct movement-using formations
different from that of the battalion. For example, one company may be in a wedge, another in an echelon
right,and yet another in a column. Other factors,such as the distance of the move or enemy dispositions may
prompt the commander to use more than one formation.Distances between units are METT-TC dependent. |
3-96 | 197 | Offense
6-38. Movement formations allow the unit to move in a posture suited to the commander’s intent and
mission. The commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of each formation to determine the
appropriate formation for a situation. A series of movementformations may be appropriate during the course
of an attack. All movement formations use one or more of the three movement techniques, which are
traveling,traveling overwatch,and bounding overwatch.
6-39. During operations, the commander designates a movement formation to establish a geographic
relationship between units and to posture for an attack. The commander considers probable reactions on
enemy contact, indicates the level of security desired, and establishes the preponderant orientation of
subordinate weapon systems when directing formations. The commander provides flexibility to subordinate
units to shift from one formation to another based on changes to METT-TC. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional
information.)
TROOP MOVEMENT
6-40. Troop movement is the movement of Soldiers and units from one place to another by any available
means (ADP 3-90). The BCT commander must be able to move forces to a position of advantage relative to
the enemy. Troop movement places troops and equipment at the destination at the proper time, ready for
combat. METT-TC dictates the level of security required and the resulting speed of movement. (See
FM3-90-2 for additional information.) The three types of troop movement are administrative movement,
tactical road march,and approach march.
Administrative Movement
6-41. Administrative movement is a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expedite their
movement and conserve time and energy when no enemyground interference is anticipated (ADP 3-90). The
commander only conducts administrative movements in secure areas. Examples of administrative movements
include rail and highway movement in the continental United States.Once units deploy into a theater of war,
commanders normally do not employ administrative movements. Since these types of moves are nontactical,
the echelon assistant chief of staff,logistics or brigade/battalion logistics staff officer(S-4)usuallysupervises
the movement. (SeeFM 4-01for additional information.)
Tactical Road Marches
6-42. Atactical road marchis a rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of operations to prepare
for combat operations (ADP 3-90). The unit maintains security against enemy air attack and prepares to take
immediate action against an enemy ambush,although contact with the enemy ground forces is not expected.
6-43. The march column is the organization for a tactical road march. All elements use the same route for a
single movement under control of a single commander. The commander organizes a march column into four
elements: reconnaissance,quartering party,main body,and trail party.
Approach March
6-44. Anapproach marchis the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is intended
(ADP 3-90). An approach march emphasizes speed over tactical deployment. Commanders employ an
approach march when they know the enemy’s approximate location,since an approach march allows units
to move with greater speed and less physical security or dispersion.
6-45. Units conducting an approach march are task organized before the march begins (for example, in an
assembly area) to allow transition to another movement technique without slowing the tempo. Units likely to
occupy assembly areas are units preparing to conduct a tactical movement or to move forward to execute a
forward passage of lines (additionally includes a unit establishing a tactical reserve,completing a rearward
passage of lines,and conducting reconstitution). The approach march terminates at a march objective,such
as an attack position,assembly area,or assault position,or an approach march and can be used to transition
to an attack. Follow and assume and reserve forces may conduct an approach march forward of a line of
departure. |
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INTELLIGENCE
6-46. The BCT commander considers the entire area of operations, the enemy, and information collection
activities (intelligence operations,reconnaissance,security operations,and surveillance) necessary to shape
an operational environment and civil conditions (see chapter 5). Intelligence helps commanders visualize the
operational environment,organize forces,and control operations to achieve objectives. Intelligence answers
specific requirements focused in time and space. Intelligence leaders within the BCT ensure that the
intelligence warfighting function operates effectively and efficiently. The intelligence staff officer is the BCT
commander’s primary advisor on employing information collection assets and driving information collection
(see chapter 5).
6-47. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of
sensors and assets as well as the intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination of capabilities in
direct support of current and future operation. The information collection plan should be the first
consideration for the conduct of an offensive task. The BCT staff must integrate,synchronize,and coordinate
the plan among the BCT subordinate units,with the higher echelon assets,and the other elements executing
the overall information collection plan.
6-48. Information identified early and incorporated into the information collection plan includes potential
enemy missions,COAs,objectives,defensive locations,uses of key terrain,avenues of approach and routes,
enemy engagement areas (EAs), population locations and characteristics, and obstacles. Information
collection supports situational understanding and intelligence support to targeting and information
capabilities across all domains. Information collection efforts result in the timely collection and reporting of
relevant and accurate information, which supports intelligence production and the commander’s decision
points. Information collection can disseminate as combat information,also.
6-49. Commanders use reconnaissance, security operations, surveillance, and intelligence operations to
obtain information. All activities that help to develop understanding of the area of operations are information
collection activities. Planners must understand all collection assets and resources available to them and the
procedures to request or task collection from those assets and resources. For example, effective
reconnaissance and security operationsin the offense by the Cavalry squadron allows the BCT commander
to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and to direct subordinate unitsinto the fight at opportune times
and places.Units within the squadron conducting reconnaissance and security orient on reconnaissance and
security objectives. They fight for information to provide the commander with the necessary information to
keep other BCT maneuver units free from contact as long as possible, so that they can concentrate on
conducting the BCT’s decisive operation. (See ATP 3-20.96 for additional information on the role of the
Cavalry squadron within the intelligence warfighting function.)
6-50. Intelligence operations conducted by the military intelligence company (see chapter 1, section I)
supports the BCT and its subordinate commands. The military intelligence company commander validates
the ground collection and dissemination plan for military intelligence company organic and assigned
collectors in support of the commander’s offensive concept of operations. The company’s scheme of
information collection supports information requirements regarding locations, composition, equipment,
strengths, and weaknesses of defending enemy forces. The company, through collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence information,supports the BCT and its subordinate units to locate high-payoff
targets (HPTs) and enemy reconnaissance,armor,air assault,and air defense and withdrawal routes of enemy
forces. The company provides analysis and intelligence synchronization support to the BCT intelligence staff
officer (S-2) to locate enemy command and control facilities and electromagnetic warfare (EW) systems,
obstacles, security zone, and main defensive area. Prior to and during movement and maneuver to an
objective area, the company supports the BCT S-2 with maintaining a timely and accurate picture of the
enemy situation to increase the BCT commander’s situational understanding and to support the lethal and
nonlethal targeting process. (SeeFM 2-0and ATP 2-19.4 for additional information.)
FIRES
6-51. The BCT,in coordination with the field artillery headquarters,positions its field artillery batteries to
provide continuous indirect fires. Battalions do the same with their heavy mortars. Companies often have
their mortars follow behind the forward platoons, so they are prepared to provide immediate indirect fires. |
3-96 | 199 | Offense
Army attack reconnaissance helicopters and close air support may be available to interdict enemy
counterattack forces or to destroy defensive positions.
6-52. The BCT plans for, integrates, coordinates, and synchronizes joint fires capabilities (sensors and
weapon systems) into the BCT’s scheme of maneuver to achieve synergy and provide redundancy in coverage
from a particular asset. By definition,maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through
movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.
6-53. During the offense, using preparation fires, counterfire, suppression fires, and cyberspace and EW
assets provides the BCT commander with numerous options for gaining and maintaining fire superiority. The
commander uses long-range artillery systems (cannon and rocket) and air support (rotary- and fixed-wing)
to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the enemy’s defensive positions. (SeeFM3-09 and FM 3-12
for additional information.)
6-54. Fires can be time- or event-driven. The two types of triggers associated with a target are tactical
(event-driven) and technical (time-driven). A tactical trigger is the maneuver related event or action that
causes the initiation of fires. This event can be friendly, or enemy based and is usually determined during
COAdevelopment. A technical trigger is the mathematically derived solution for fires based on the tactical
trigger to ensure that fires arrive at the correct time and location to achieve the desired effects. Triggers can
be marked using techniques similar to those for marking target reference points(TRPs).
6-55. The tactical air control party(TACP)is collocated with the fire support cell at the BCT main command
post (CP). Air liaison officers and joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) make up the TACP. The air
liaison officer is the BCT commander’s principal air support advisor. The air liaison officer leverages the
expertise of the TACPwith linkage to the higher (division and corps) echelon to plan,prepare,execute,and
assess air support for BCT operations to include the integration of all forms of unified action partner fires.
Joint fires observers may assist JTACswith conducting Type 2 or 3 terminal attack control of close air support
or with the proper authorization, conduct autonomous terminal guidance operations. (See JP 3-09.3 for
additional information.)
6-56. Considerations for supporting the scheme of maneuver during the offense include—
(cid:122) Weight the main effort.
(cid:122) Consider positioning fires assets to exploit weapons ranges.
(cid:122) Prevent untimely displacement when fires are needed the most.
(cid:122) Provide counterfire.
(cid:122) Provide early warning and dissemination.
(cid:122) Provide wide area surveillance.
(cid:122) Provide fires to protect forces preparing for and assets critical to offensive actions.
(cid:122) Disrupt enemy counterattacks.
(cid:122) Plan fires to support breaching operations.
(cid:122) Plan fires to deny enemy observation or screen friendly movements.
(cid:122) Allocate responsive fires to support the decisive operation.
(cid:122) Allocate fires for the neutralization of bypassed enemy combat forces.
(cid:122) Plan for target acquisition and sensors to provide coverage of named area of interest (NAI),target
area of interest(TAI),and critical assets.
6-57. The BCT’s brigade aviation element (BAE) and air defense airspace management (ADAM) element,
normally located in the fire support cell, are key monitoring and managing assets for the airspace over the
area of operations. The ADAM and BAE element must process a unit airspace plan on time and maintain
communications with the airspace element at Division JAGIC. The element must execute airspace
management procedures per higher headquartersin accordance withAppendix 10 (Airspace Control)to have
responsive fires from direct support artillery and mortars, and for the employment of other supporting
airspace users (for example,unmanned aircraft system [UAS],close air support,and aviation). The BAE and
ADAM element assist the commander to coordinate and employ air and missile defense and aviation assets
to support the BCT’s scheme of maneuver. (SeeFM 3-04 and ATP3-01.50 for additional information.) |
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SUSTAINMENT
6-58. The BCT commander and staff normally plan for increased sustainment demands during the offense.
Sustainment planners synchronize and coordinate with the entire BCT staff to determine the scope of the
operation. Sustainment planners develop and continually refine the sustainment concept of support.
Coordination between staff planners must be continuous to maintain momentum,freedom of action,prolong
endurance, and extended operational reach. The brigade support battalion (BSB) commander anticipates
where the greatest need may occur to develop a priority of support that meets the BCT commander’s
operational plan. Sustainment planners may consider positioning sustainment units in close proximity to
operations to reduce critical support response times. Establishment of a forward logistics element (FLE)
provides the ability to weight the main effort for the operation by drawing on all sustainment assets across
the BCT. The commander and staff may consider alternative methods for delivering sustainment during
emergencies. (See chapter 9for a detailed discussion.)
6-59. Logistics within the BCT is planning and executing the movement and support of forces,synchronized
with, and in support of, operations. During the offense, the most important commodities typically are fuel
(class III bulk),ammunition (class V),and repair parts (class IX). Movement control is critical to ensuring
supply distribution. The concept of support must include a responsive medical evacuation plan (see
ATP4-02.2) and resupply plan. Long lines of communication,dispersed forces,poor trafficability,contested
terrain,and congested road networks are factors that impede the transportation system. The BCT commander
must consider all of these factors when developing the distribution plan that supports the operational plan.
(SeeFM 4-0for additional information.)
6-60. Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force, promote the moral and
ethical values, and enable the fighting qualities of the BCT during the conduct of operations. Personnel
services staff planning is a continuous process that evaluates current and future operations from the
perspective of the personnel services provider. Providers consider how the information being developed
impacts personnel services that support each phase of the operation. During the offense, unit casualty
reporting and personnel accountability demand will increase along with the demands to accomplish other
support tasks due in great part to a higher tempo in maneuver and extended lines of communication. Personnel
services complement logistics by planning and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel.
Personnel services within the BCT include human resources support,financial management operations,legal
support,and religioussupport. (SeeFM 1-0 and ATP 1-0.1 for additional information.)
6-61. The burden on health service support (casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics)
increases due to the intensity ofoffensive actions and the increased distances over which support is required
as the force advances. The BCT has organic medical resources within maneuver unit headquarters (brigade
surgeon’s section), the BCT (Role 2 medical company), and subordinate battalions or squadron (medical
platoons). The commander reallocates medical resources as the tactical situation changes. Within the
echelons above brigade, the medical command (deployment support) (MEDCOM [DS]) or the medical
brigade (support) (known as MEDBDE [SPT]) serves as the medical force provider and is responsible for
developing medical force packages for augmentation to the BCT as required. Slight differences exist between
the medical capabilities or resources of the three BCTs due to differences in types and quantities of vehicles
and numbers of personnel assigned; however, the mission remains the same for all health service support
units or elements and they execute their mission in a similar fashion. (See ATP 4-02.5, ATP 4-02.2, and
FM4-02 for additional information.)
6-62. BCT planners must consider protection requirements to protect sustainment units against bypassed
enemy forces. Planners must also factor time and distance when developing the offensive plan. The BSB and
its supporting sustainment units must balance maintaining manageable distances to resupply the maneuver
battalions and squadron and receiving resupply from their next higher sustainment echelon. The BSB
commander must articulate to the BCT commander any potential sustainment shortfall risks as the BCT’s
offensive movement extends logistic lines of communication. The BSB receives its resupply from the
supporting divisionsustainment support battalion(known as DSSB)within the division sustainment brigade.
During the offense, the BSB must synchronize the operational plan with supporting higher sustainment
echelons to ensure that echelons above brigade sustainment support is responsive as the maneuver plan is
incorporated. (See chapter 9for a detailed discussion.) |
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6-63. Transportation shortfalls can occur during the offense. BCT planners integrate a combination of surface
and aerial delivery methods to meetdistribution requirements. Distribution managers synchronize the BCT’s
movement plans and priorities according to the commander’s priority of support. Regulating traffic
management through movement control is essential to coordinate and direct movements on main supply
routes and alternate supply routes. (See chapter 9for a detailed discussion.)
6-64. The anticipated nature and tempo of the missions during the conduct of offensive operationsnormally
associates with a higher casualty rate and an increase in requirements for medical resources and nonstandard
transportation support. Additional combat and operational stress control teams may be required to treat
casualties following operations. Higher casualty rates increase the emphasis on personnel accountability,
casualty reports, and replacement operations. The offense support plan must incorporate religious support.
Religious support through counseling and appropriate worship can help reduce combat and operational stress,
increase unit cohesion,and enhance performance.
PROTECTION
6-65. Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the
physical environment. Conduct of survivability operations in the offense (fighting and protective position
development) is minimal for tactical vehicles and weapons systems. The emphasis lies on force mobility.
Camouflage and concealment typically play a greater role in survivability during offensive operationsthan
the other survivability operations. Protective positions for artillery, air and missile defense, and logistics
positions,however,still may be required in the offense. Stationary CPs,and other facilities for the exercise
of commandand control,may require protection to lessen their vulnerability. The use of terrain provides a
measure of protection during halts in the advance,but subordinate units of the BCT still should develop as
many protective positions as necessary for key weapons systems, CPs, and critical supplies based on the
threat level and unit vulnerabilities. During the early planningstages,geospatial engineer teams can provide
information on soil conditions,vegetative concealment,and terrain masking along march routes to facilitate
the force’ssurvivability. (SeeATP 3-37.34 for additional information.)
6-66. BCT forces engage in area security operations to protect the forces, installations, routes, areas, and
assets across its entire area of operations. Area security normally is an economy-of-force mission, often
designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping
operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Area security operations often focusonanNAIsin
an effort to answer CCIRs,aiding in tactical decision-making and confirming or denying threat intentions. In
the offense, security forces engaged in area security operations typically organize in a manner that
emphasizes their mobility,lethality,and communications capabilities. (See chapter 8,section IV.) As in all
operations, the commander has the inherent responsibility to analyze the risks and implement control
measures to mitigate them. The BCT commander and staff must understand and factor into their analysis
how the execution of the operation could adversely affect Soldiers. Incorporating protection within the risk
management (RM) integrating process ensures a thorough analysis of the risk and the implementation of
controls to mitigate their effects. RMintegration during the activities of the operations process is the primary
responsibility of the operations officer and protection officer within the BCT. (See ATP 5-19.)
6-67. Air and missile defense planning in support of the BCT integrates protective systemsby using the six
employment guidelines, mutual support, overlapping fires, balanced fires, weighted coverage, early
engagement,and defense in-depth,and additional considerations necessary to mass and mix air and missile
defense capabilities. The BCT’s ADAM element is a key monitoring and managing asset for the airspace
over the BCT’s area of operations. The ADAM element is usually located in the fire support cell with the
BAE. The ADAM element assists the commander to employ air defense assets to support the scheme of
maneuver. (SeeATP 3-01.50 for additional information.)
6-68. The purpose of operations security is to reduce the vulnerability of the BCT from successful enemy
exploitation of critical information. Operations security applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or
employ units of the BCT. The operations security process is a systematic method used to identify,control,
and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with the conduct of the
offense. Tailored to the operations security process,intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a useful
methodology for the intelligence section to perform mission analysis on friendly operations. IPB provides |
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insight into potential areas where the adversary could collect information and identify essential element of
friendly information(EEFI). (SeeADP 3-37 for additional information.)
6-69. Identification of EEFI assists operations security planners to ensure all operations security related
critical unclassified information is included in the critical information list. Unlike security programs that seek
to protect classified information and controlled unclassified information, operations security is concerned
with identifying,controlling,and protecting unclassified information that is associated with specific military
operations and activities. The BCT’s operations security program and any military deception or survivability
efforts should, as a minimum, conceal the location of the friendly objective, the decisive operation, the
disposition of forces, and the timing of the offensive operation from the enemy or mislead the enemy
regarding this information. (SeeJP3-13.3 for additional information.)
6-70. The task provides intelligence support to protection alerts the commander to threats and assists in
preserving and protecting the force. Intelligence support to protection includes providing intelligence that
supports measures, which the BCT takes to remain viable and functional by protecting the force from the
effects of threat activities. Intelligence support to protection includes analyzing the threats,hazards,and other
aspects of an operational environment and utilizing the IPB process to describe the operational environment
and identify threats and hazards that may influence protection. Intelligence support develops and sustains an
understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that affect the operational
environment. (SeeFM 2-0 and ATP 2-01.3 for additional information.)
6-71. Information collection can complement or supplement protection tasks (see chapter 5, section I).
All-source analysts that the BCT receives depend on information collection assets internal and external to
the BCT for accurate and detailed information about threats and relevant aspects of the operational
environment. All-source analysts make the most significant contributions when they accurately assess
possible threat events and actions. Assessments facilitate the commander’s visualization and support
decision-making. Intelligence planners use the plan requirements and assess collection task (see ATP 2-01)
to answer specific requirements focused in time and space and identifying any threats to mission
accomplishment. The intelligence staff of the BCT provides the commander with assessments that consider
all aspects of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. The commander should receive an
estimate regarding the degree of confidence the intelligence officer places in each analytic assessment using
assessments. (SeeFM 2-0 for additional information.)
6-72. The BCT commander and staff synchronize and integrate the planning and employment of sensors and
assets (specifically reconnaissance and security forces) as well as the intelligence processing, exploitation,
and dissemination capabilities in direct support of current and future operations. These assets and forces
collect,process,and disseminate timely and accurate information to satisfy the CCIRs and other intelligence
requirements. (See chapter 5.) When necessary, ground- and space-based reconnaissance and surveillance
activities focus on special requirements,such as personnel recovery (see paragraphs 6-86to 6-90) or ad hoc
groupings such as patrols, ground convoys, combat outposts, and human intelligence (HUMINT) teams or
civil affairs teams.
6-73. Within the BCT,physical securityis that part of security concerned with physical measures designed
to safeguard personnel;to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,installations,material,and documents;
and to safeguard them against espionage,sabotage,damage,and theft (JP 3-0). The BCT employs physical
security (see ATP 3-39.32) measures in-depth regardless of which element of decisive action (offense,
defense, or stability) currently dominates to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all
locations and situations against various threats through effective security policies and procedures. This total
system approach is based on the continuing analysis and employment of protective measures, including
physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices,
biometrically-enabled base access systems, CP security, defensive positions both hasty and deliberate, and
nonlethal capabilities. The goal of physical security systems is to employ security in-depth to preclude or
reduce the potential for sabotage,theft,trespass,terrorism,espionage,or other criminal activity. To achieve
this goal, each security system component has a function and related measures that provide an integrated
capability for—
(cid:122) Deterrence to a potential aggressor.
(cid:122) Detection measures to sense an act of aggression.
(cid:122) Assessment of an unauthorized intrusion or activity. |
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(cid:122) Delay measures to protect assets from actual or perceived intrusion.
(cid:122) Response measures to assess:
(cid:131) Unauthorized acts.
(cid:131) Report detailed information.
(cid:131) Defeat an aggressor.
6-74. Subordinate units of the BCT may be involvedin area security in an economy-of-force role to protect
lines of communications,convoys,and critical fixed sites and radars during the conduct of the offense. Units
identify antiterrorism measures through mission analysis to counter terrorist tactics. The BCT commander,
with the assistance of the antiterrorism officer and staff, assesses the threat, vulnerabilities, and criticality
associated with conducting the offense. The BCT’s protection cell provides staff oversight and recommends
the emplacement of security forces to thwart identified threats and to conduct populace and resource control.
The protection cell increases overall protection through implementation of antiterrorism measures to protect
the force. Staff members weight the probability of terrorist organizations attacking forces en route to execute
offensive operationswithin the protection cell. Staff members analyze the susceptibility of terrorist attacks
on other BCT subordinate units along lines of communications with the reduction of available combat forces
other than an economy of force role by security forces. (SeeATP 3-37.2 for additional information.)
6-75. Military police support to protection, when requested and received, includes security and mobility
support (see ATP 3-39.30),detention (specifically detainee operations [see FM 3-63]),and police operations
(see ATP 3-39.10). The security and mobility support discipline,discussed earlier under mobility,provides
the BCT with a distribution of military police forces throughout the area of operations. These military police
forces support mobility operations, and conduct area security, local security, main supply route regulation
enforcement,and populace and resource control. Military police forces,when assigned,patrol aggressively
and conduct reconnaissance to protect units,criticalfacilities,high-riskpersonnel,and civilian populations
withinthe BCT’s area of operations. Military police support planning includes identifying requirements for
task organization of military police elements. (SeeFM 3-39 for additional information.)
6-76. Military police support to the offense includes missions and tasks that support uninterrupted
movement,allow maneuver forces to preserve combat power so that it may be applied at decisive points and
times,and foster rapid transitions in operations. Military police operations supporting the offense include the
simultaneous application of military police capabilities. Military police operations in close support of
maneuver forces are the primary focus duringoffensive operations;however,military police apply all three
disciplines simultaneously to some degree. The primary focus is support that enables movement and
maneuver,provides detention tasks to support captured or detained individuals,and provides protection.
6-77. Military police operations during the conduct of the offense include early shaping operations to
establish conditions for preparing follow-on efforts for civil security and civil control. Military police
operations,in concert with other elements,begin the initial efforts to—
(cid:122) Restore and maintain order in areas passed by maneuver forces.
(cid:122) Assess the criminal environment and begin the identification of criminal elements.
(cid:122) Identify and establish rapport with existing host-nation police or friendly security elements.
6-78. Force health protection encompasses measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and
physical well-being of Soldiers. (SeeATP 4-02.8.) Force health protection measures enable a healthy and fit
force, prevent injury and illness, protect the force from health hazards, contributes to esprit de corps,
resilience, and a professional organizational climate to sustain or create forward momentum or eliminate
negative momentum,and include the prevention aspects of—
(cid:122) Preventive medicine (medical surveillance,occupational and environmental health surveillance).
(cid:122) Veterinary services (food inspection, animal care missions, prevention of zoonotic disease
transmissible to humans).
(cid:122) Combat and operational stress control.
(cid:122) Dental services (preventivedentistry).
(cid:122) Laboratory services (area medical laboratory support). |
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Note. AR 600-20 addresses the policy and ADP 1 addresses the expectation commanders and
staffs will strive to create for a professional command climate within a culture of trust. Prevention
and mitigation of “moral injury”is part of leadership and a command responsibility.
6-79. Soldiers must be physically and behaviorally fit;therefore,programs must promote and improve the
capacity of personnel to perform military tasks at high levels, under extreme conditions, and for extended
periods. Preventive and protective capabilities include physical exercise,nutritional diets,dental hygiene and
restorative treatment, combat and operational stress management, rest, recreation, and relaxation geared to
individuals andorganizations. (SeeATP 4-02.3.)
6-80. Countering weapons of mass destruction is the efforts against actors of concern to curtail the
conceptualization,development,possession,proliferation,use,and effects of weapons of mass destruction,
related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery (JP 3-40). At the tactical level combined
arms teams conduct specialized activities to understand theenvironment,threats,and vulnerabilities;control,
defeat, disable, and dispose of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and safeguard the force and manage
consequence. (SeeATP 3-90.40for additional information.)
6-81. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) is described as actions undertaken in a hostile or
uncertain environment to systematically locate,characterize,secure,and disable,or destroy WMD programs
and related capabilities. Collecting forensic evidence from the WMD program during CWMD is a priority
for ascertaining the scope of a WMD program and for follow-on attribution. Nuclear disablement teams
(specialized forces) perform site exploitation and disable critical radiological and nuclear infrastructure
during CWMD. (SeeATP3-37.11for additional information.)
6-82. CWMD missions require extensive collaborative planning, coordination, and execution oversight by
the BCT commander and staff,and subordinate commanders. CWMD will likely involve teams of experts to
include both technical forces (but are not limited to,chemical,biological,radiological,and nuclear [CBRN]
reconnaissance teams, hazardous response teams, CBRN dual-purpose teams, and explosive ordnance
disposal elements) and specialized forces (but are not limited to,technical escort units,nuclear disablement
teams, and chemical analytical remediation activity elements). Associated planning will begin at echelons
above the BCT characterized by centralized planning and decentralized execution of CWMD missions to
ensure that the right assets are provided. (See FM3-94, ATP 3-91, and ATP 4-32.2 for additional
information.)
6-83. CWMD operations may be lethal or nonlethal as indicators are identified that meet the CCIRs and
priority intelligence requirements suggesting that a site contains sensitive information. CWMD operations
may develop intelligence that feeds back into the planning process to include the IPB and targeting process.
The priority for CWMD activities is to reduce or eliminate the threat. CWMD operations may be conducted
under two circumstances—planned and opportunity. While planned operations are preferred, some
operations involving WMD sensitive sites may occur because the opportunity presents itself during
operations to accomplish another mission. Not every operation requires destruction tasks—tactical isolation
or exploitation may be the only elements executed. Nonetheless, the BCT commander and staff, and
subordinate commanders always consider each element of CWMD operations (isolation, exploitation,
destruction, monitoring, and redirection) and its relevance to the situation. A particular element may be
unnecessary, but making that judgment is the appropriate level commander’s responsibility. (See
ATP3-11.23for additional information.)
6-84. An explosive ordnance disposal company, when tasked, provides explosive ordnance disposal,
protection planning,and operations support to the BCT and subordinate battalions. The explosive ordnance
disposal company supporting the BCT may provide an operations officer and noncommissioned officer to
the BCT to provide appropriate explosive ordnance disposal planning and to perform liaison officer duties
that include facilitating cooperation and understanding among the BCT commander, staff, subordinate
battalions and the squadron, and explosive ordnance disposal battalion and company commanders. The
explosive ordnance disposal company coordinates tactical matters to achieve mutual purpose, support,and
action. In addition,the company ensures precise understanding of stated or implied coordination measures to
achieve synchronized results. (SeeATP 4-32,ATP 4-32.1,and ATP 4-32.3 for additional information.) |
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6-85. Explosive ordnance disposal elements supporting subordinate maneuver units can neutralize hazards
from conventional unexploded ordnance,explosives and associated materials,improvised explosive devices
(IEDs),booby traps containing both conventional explosives and CBRN explosives that present a threat to
those units. These elements may dispose of hazardous foreign or U.S. ammunition, unexploded ordnance,
individual mines, booby-trapped mines, and chemical mines. Breaching and clearance of minefields is
primarily an engineer responsibility. (See ATP 4-32.2 and ATP 4-32.3 for additional information about
unexploded ordnance procedures.)
Note. (See chapter 7 for information on the CBRN environment, CBRN defense measures, and
CBRN working group.)
6-86. The BCT commander is committed to the safety and security of the members of and attached to the
BCT. The commander emphasizes personnel recovery throughout the operations process to prevent forces or
individual Soldiers from becoming isolated,missing,or captured. Individuals or groups become isolated for
a variety of reasons, including their own behavior, enemy actions, and interaction with the physical
environment. The BCT commander and staff must guard against treating personnel recovery as episodic,
must anticipate requirements, and integrate personnel recovery throughout all operations. The commander
develops three interrelated categories of information to exercise command and control of personnel recovery:
personnel recovery guidance,isolated Soldier guidance,and evasion plan of action.
6-87. The BCT commander and staff must have an understanding of the complex, dynamic relationships
among friendly forces and enemies and the other aspects of the operational environment (including the
populace). This understanding helps the commander visualize and describe the intent for personnel recovery
and to develop focused planning guidance. Effective personnel recovery planning guidance accounts for the
operational environment and the execution of operations. Personnel recovery guidance provides a framework
for how the BCT and subordinate units synchronize the actions of isolated personnel and the recovery force.
As the commander develops personnel recovery guidance for subordinate units,the commander must ensure
that subordinates have adequate combat power for personnel recovery. The commander must also define
command relationships with the requisite flexibility to planand execute personnel recovery operations.
6-88. The commander translates personnel recovery guidance into recommendations usually known as
isolated Soldier guidance. Isolated Soldier guidance focuses on awareness, accountability, and rapid
reporting of isolation incidents. Isolated Soldier guidance anticipates the potential situation. As with
personnel recovery guidance,there is no set format. At the BCT level,where there are no dedicated personnel
recovery staff officers and noncommissioned officers, the guidance is a part of the general protection
guidance. The commander gives guidance for developing isolated Soldier guidance during initial planning
and establishes isolated Soldier guidance for operations in any area with a risk of isolation.
6-89. The commander determines if units or individuals require an evasion plan of action. Typically,evasion
plans of action contain specific instructions developed for short-term aviation operations (air movements and
air assaults) and ad hoc groupings such as combat and reconnaissance patrols, ground convoys, combat
outposts, and HUMINT teams or civil affairs teams. These operations and ad hoc groupings develop an
evasion plan of action when the risk of isolation is elevated and make modification to the plan when
conditions change.
6-90. Personnel recovery guidance, isolated Soldier guidance, and evasion plan of action apply also to
civilians and contractors. Because the isolated person may include Department of Defense civilians and
contractors authorized to accompany the force, the BCT commander and staff must develop a
communications program to inform these individuals. Civilian and contractor members of the organization
need the guidance necessary for their safety, especially the isolated Soldier guidance that enables them to
contribute to prevention, preparation, and self-recovery if they become isolated. When dealing with local
national or third-country national contractors,culture and language complicates this process. (SeeFM3-50
for additional information.)
6-91. The conduct of offensive operationsoften requiresthe temporary resettlement of dislocated civilians
(see FM 3-39and FM 3-57) and the conduct of detainee operations (see FM 3-63). The BCT can expect to
accumulate a sizeable number of dislocated civiliansor detainees,all with varying classifications,depending |
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on the situation. The BCT monitors the actual number closely to avoid devoting too many or too few
resources to the performance of dislocated civilian operations or detainee operations. The BCT protection
cell works with the sustainment cell to ensure resources are available to construct and operate dislocated
civilian camps or detention facilities for individuals acquired during the conduct of the mission. Military
police and civil affairs organize to establish and support dislocated civilian operations and detainee
operations.
SECTION III – FORMS OF MANEUVER
6-92. Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of
doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the
enemy (ADP 3-90). The forms of maneuver are envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration,
and frontal assault. Combined arms organizations synchronize the contributions of all units to execute the
forms of maneuver to accomplish the mission. The BCT commander generally chooses one form to build a
COA. The higher commander rarely specifies the specific offensive form of maneuver; however,
commander’s guidance and intent, along with the mission, may impose constraints such as time, security,
and direction of attack that narrows the form of maneuver to one option. The area of operations’
characteristics and the enemy’s dispositions also determine the offensive form of maneuver selected. A single
operation may contain several forms of maneuver,such as a frontal assaultto clear an enemy security zone,
followed by a penetration to create a gap in the enemy’s defense.
Note. Flank attack is no longer used as a defined Army term or listed as a form of maneuver.
Commanders seek to engage an enemy’s assailable flank—a flank exposed to attack or
envelopment (ADP 3-90). An exposed flank usually results from the terrain, the weakness of
forces, the technical capability of an opponent, or a gap between adjacent units. See
paragraphs6-93 through 6-95 for additional information.
ENVELOPMENT
6-93. Anenvelopmentis a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy
defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be destroyed in
their current positions (FM 3-90-1). At the BCT level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying
specific enemy forces,and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. The BCT commander’s decisive operation
focuses on attacking an assailable flank. The operation avoids the enemy’s front, which is generally the
enemy’s strength,where the effects of fires and obstacles are the greatest. The BCT commander prefers to
conduct an envelopment instead of a penetration or a frontal assault because the attacking force tends to
suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. If no assailable flank is
available,the attacking force creates one.
6-94. The BCT commander uses boundaries to designate areas of operations for each unit participating in
the envelopment. The commander designates PLs, supportbyfire and attack byfire positions, and contact
points. The commander also designates appropriate fire support coordination measures,such as a restricted
fire line orboundaries between converging forces,and any other control measures the commander feels are
necessary to control the envelopment. The three variations of envelopment are single envelopment,double
envelopment,and vertical envelopment.
Note. An encirclement, no longer listed as a type of envelopment, typically results from
penetrations and envelopments, or is an extension of exploitation and pursuit operations. See
paragraphs 6-99 through 6-101 forinformation on encirclements.
SINGLE ENVELOPMENT
6-95. Singleenvelopmentis a form of maneuver that results from maneuvering around one assailable flank
ofa designated enemy force (FM 3-90-1). The commander envisioning a single envelopment organizes forces |
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into the enveloping force and the fixing force. (See figure 6-1.) The commander also allocates forces to
conduct reconnaissance, security, reserve,and sustaining operations. The enveloping force, conducting the
decisive operation,attacks an assailable enemy flank and avoids the enemy’s main strength en route to the
objective. The fixing force conducts a frontal assaultas a shaping operation to fix the enemy in its current
positions to prevent its escape and reduce its capability to react against the enveloping force. (SeeFM3-90-1
for additional information.)
Figure 6-1. Single envelopment
DOUBLE ENVELOPMENT
6-96. Double envelopmentresults from simultaneous maneuvering around both flanks of a designated enemy
force (FM 3-90-1). A commander executing a double envelopment organizes friendly forces into two
enveloping forces and one fixing force in addition to allocating reconnaissance, security, reserve, and
sustaining forces. (See figure 6-2on page 6-20.) The commander typically designates the more important of
the two enveloping forces as the main effort for resources. The enveloping force is the commander’s decisive
operation if its action accomplishes the mission. Maneuver control graphics,and appropriate fire coordination
measures, such as a restrictive fire line or boundary between converging forces and communications are
essential to mission accomplishment and preventing fratricide during this envelopment. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for
additional information.) |
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Figure 6-2. Double envelopment
VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT
6-97. Vertical envelopment is a variation of envelopment whereairdropped or air-landedtroops,attack the
rear and flanks of a force, to cut off or encircle that force. For a discussion of airborne and air assault
operations,see FM 3-99. A vertical envelopment,airborne assault or air assault (see figure 6-3),allows the
commander to threaten the enemy’s rear areas causing the enemy to divert combat elements to protect key
terrain,vital bases or installations,and lines of communications. An airborne assaultis the use of airborne
forces to parachute into an objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated
objectives (JP 3-18). An air assault is the movement of friendly assault forces by rotary wing or tiltrotor
aircraft to engage and destroyenemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain (JP 3-18). Vertical envelopment
allows the commander to—
(cid:122) Overcome distances quickly,overfly barriers,and bypass enemy defenses.
(cid:122) Extend the area over which the commander can exert influence.
(cid:122) Disperse reserve forces widely for survivability reasons while maintaining their capability for
effective and rapid response.
(cid:122) Exploit combat power by increasing tactical mobility.
6-98. Entry operations,airborne operations or air assault operations,occupy advantageous ground to shape
the operational area and accelerate the momentum of the engagement. An airborne operationis an operation
involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution |
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of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission (JP 3-18). An air assault operation is an operation in which
assault forces,using the mobility of rotary-wing or tiltrotor aircraft and the total integration of available fires,
maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize and
hold key terrain (JP 3-18). An enemy may or may not be in a position to oppose the maneuver. While the
commander should attempt to achieve an unopposed landing when conducting a vertical envelopment, the
assault force must prepare for the presence of opposition. (SeeFM 3-99 for additional information.)
Figure 6-3. Vertical envelopment (example air assault)
ENCIRCLEMENT
6-99. Encirclement is a result of envelopment where a force loses its freedom of maneuver because an
opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement. The
commander conducts offensive encirclements to isolate an enemy force. Typically,encirclements result from
penetrations and envelopments, or are extensions of exploitation and pursuit operations. As such,
encirclements are not a separate form of offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing operation.
Encirclements may be planned sequels or result from exploiting an unforeseen opportunity. Encirclements
usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms conducting a double envelopment. However,
encirclements can occur in situations where the attacking commander uses a major obstacle, such as a
shoreline, as a second encircling force. Although a commander may designate terrain objectives in an
encirclement,isolating and defeating enemy forces are the primary goals. Ideally,an encirclement results in
the surrender of the encircled force. This minimizes friendly force losses and resource expenditures. |
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6-100. Encirclement operationsare operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an
opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforcement
(ADP3-90). An encirclement operation usually has at least two phases-the actual encirclement and the action
taken against the isolated enemy. The commander considers adjusting subordinate units’task organizations
between phases to maximize unit effectiveness in each phase. The first phase is the actual encirclement that
isolates the enemy force. The organization of forces for an encirclement is similar to that of a movement to
contact or an envelopment. The commander executing an encirclement operation organizes encircling forces
into a direct pressure force and one or more encircling arms. (See figure 6-4.)
6-101. The commander organizes an inner encircling arm only if there is no possibility of the encircled
forces receiving relief from enemy forces outside the encirclement. The commander organizes both inner and
outer encircling arms if there is any danger of an enemy relief force reaching the encircled enemy force. The
commander assigns the outer encircling arm a security mission, an offensive mission to drive away any
enemy relief force, or a defensive mission to prevent the enemy relief force from making contact with the
encircled enemy force. Once the encirclement is complete, these inner or outer encircling arms form a
perimeter. (See FM 3-90-2 for additional information.)
Figure 6-4. Encirclement operations
TURNING MOVEMENT
6-102. Aturning movementis a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s
principle defensive positions by seizing objectives behind the enemy’s current positions thereby causing the
enemy force to move out of their current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat (FM 3-90-1). A |
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turning movement differs from an envelopment in that the turning movement force seeks to make the enemy
displace from current locations,whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in its current location
from an unexpected direction. A turning movement is particularly suited when forces possess a high degree
of tactical mobility. Commanders frequently use a turning movement to transition from an attack to an
exploitation or pursuit.
6-103. The BCT commander organizes friendly forces into a turning force, a main body, and a reserve.
Either the turning force or the main body can conduct the decisive operation based on the situation. Normally,
a turning force conducts the majority of its operations outside of the main body’s supporting range and
distance; therefore, the turning force must contain sufficient combat power and sustainment capabilities to
operate independently of the main body for a specific period. The turning force seizes vital areas to the
enemy’s rear before the main enemy force can withdraw or receive support or reinforcements. The maneuver
of the turning force causes the enemy to leave its position.
6-104. The commander organizes the main body,so the turning force is successful. The main body conducts
operations, such as attacks to divert the enemy’s attention away from the area where the turning force
maneuvers. The main body can be the decisive or shaping operation. The commander organizes the reserve
to exploit success of the turning force or the main body. The reserve also provides the commander with the
flexibility to counter unexpected enemy actions.
6-105. The BCT commander establishes boundaries to designate the area of operations for each force
participating in the turning movement. (See figure 6-5.) The commander designates control measures,such
as PLs, contact points, objectives, limit of advance, and appropriate fire support coordination measures to
synchronize the operation. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
Figure 6-5. Turning movement |
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INFILTRATION
6-106. An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement
through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those enemy
positions while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-90-1). Infiltration occurs by
land, water, air, or a combination of means. Moving undetected by enemy forces is paramount to success.
Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable amount of time. Limits
on the size and strength of an infiltrating force mean that the force can rarely defeat an enemy force alone.
The commander uses infiltration to—
(cid:122) Support other forms of maneuver.
(cid:122) Attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear.
(cid:122) Secure key terrain in support of the decisive operation.
(cid:122) Disrupt or harass enemy defensive preparations or operations.
(cid:122) Relocate maneuver units by moving to battle positions around an EA.
(cid:122) Reposition to attack vital facilities or enemy forces from the flank or rear.
6-107. The infiltrating force’s size, strength, and composition are limited usually. The infiltrating unit
commander organizes the main body into one or more infiltrating elements. The largest element that is
compatible with the requirement for stealth and ease of movement conducts the infiltration. This increases
the commander’s control, speeds the execution of the infiltration, and provides responsive combat power.
The exact size and number of infiltrating elements are situation dependent. The commander with the
responsibility for the infiltration considers the following factors when determining how to organize friendly
forces. Smaller infiltrating elements are not as easy to detect and can get through smaller defensive gaps.
Even the detection of one or two small elements by the enemy does not prevent theunit from accomplishing
its mission in most cases. Larger infiltrating elements are easier to detect,and their discovery is more apt to
endanger the success of the mission. In addition, larger elements require larger gaps to move through as
opposed to smaller elements. A unit with many smaller infiltrating elements requires more time to complete
the infiltration and needs more linkup points than a similar size unit that has only a few infiltrating elements.
Many infiltrating elements are harder to controlthan fewer,larger elements. The commander may establish
security forces that move ahead of,to the flanks of,and/or to the rear of each infiltrating element’s main body
to provide early warning,reaction time,and maneuver space. The sizes and orientations of security elements
are situation dependent. Each infiltrating element is responsible for its own reconnaissance effort,if required.
Sustainment of an infiltrating force normally depends on the force’s basic load of supplies and medical and
maintenance assets accompanying the infiltrating force. After completing the mission, the commander
reopens lines of communication to conduct normal sustainment operations.
6-108. The commander responsible for the infiltration establishes routes and boundaries to designate the
area of operations for the unit(s) conducting the infiltration.(See figure 6-6.)The commander also designates
additional control measures as necessary to synchronize the operations of subordinates. Additional control
measures include one or more infiltration lanes,a line of departure or points of departure,movement routes,
linkup or rally points, objective rally point (known as ORP), assault positions, objectives, and a limit of
advance. (See ATP3-21.10 for a detailed discussion of infiltration missions and special purpose attacks.) |
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Figure 6-6. Infiltration
6-109. Aninfiltration laneis a control measure that coordinates forward and lateral movement of infiltrating
units and fixes fire planning responsibilities (FM 3-90-1). Single or multiple infiltration lanes can be planned.
Using a single infiltration lane—facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly, reduces susceptibility to
detection,reduces the area requiring detailed intelligence,and increases the time required to move the force
through enemy positions. (See figure 6-7 on page 6-26.) Using multiple infiltration lanes—reduces the
possibility of compromise,allows more rapid movement,and makes control more challenging. |
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Figure 6-7. Infiltration lane
PENETRATION
6-110. Apenetrationis a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses
on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-90-1). Destroying the continuity of the enemy’s
defense causes the enemy’s isolation and defeat in detail. The penetration extends from the enemy’s security
zone through the main defensive positions and the rear area. A commander executes a penetration when time
pressures do not permit an envelopment,there is no assailable flank,enemy defenses are overextended,and
weak spots are detected in the enemy’s positions through reconnaissance, surveillance, and security
operations.
6-111. Penetrating a well-organizedposition requires massing overwhelming combat powerat the point of
penetration and combat superiority to continue the momentum of the attack. The BCT commander designates
a breach force,support force,assault force,and a reserve. The commander can designate these elements for
each defensive position that requires penetration. The commander assigns additional units follow and support
or follow-and-assume missions to ensure rapid exploitation of initial success. The commander designates
forces to fix enemy reserves in their current locations and isolate enemy forces within the area selectedfor
penetration. (See figure 6-8.) |
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Figure 6-8. Penetration
6-112. The commander assigns, as a minimum, an area of operations to every maneuver unit, a line of
departure or a line of contact, a time of the attack or a time of assault, a PL, an objective, and a limit of
advance to control and synchronize the attack. (See figure 6-9on page 6-28.) The commander can use a battle
handover line instead of a limit of advance if the commanderknows where to commit a follow-and-assume
force. The commander designates the limit of advance beyond the enemy’s main defensive position. If the
operation results in opportunities to exploit success and pursue a beaten enemy, the commander adjusts
existing boundaries to accommodate the new situation. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.) |
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Figure 6-9. Expanding the penetration
FRONTAL ASSAULT
6-113. Afrontal assaultis a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy
force or fix a larger enemy force inplace over a broad front. The BCT commander uses a frontal assaultasa
shaping operation in conjunction with other forms of maneuver. The commander employs a frontal assault
to clear enemy security forces, overwhelm a depleted enemy during an exploitation or pursuit, and to fix
enemy forces in place. The BCT commander conducts a frontal assaultwhen assailable flanks do not exist.
While a penetration is a sharp attack designed to rupture the enemy position,the BCT commander designs a
frontal assault to maintain continuous pressure along the entire front until either a breach occurs or the
attacking forces succeed in forcing back the enemy. Frontal assaults conducted without overwhelming
combat power areseldom decisive. (See figure 6-10.)
6-114. A unit conducting a frontal assaultnormally has a wider area of operations than a unit conducting
a penetration does. A commander conducting a frontal assault may not require any additional control
measures beyond those established to control the overall mission. Control measures include an area of
operations defined by unit boundaries,and an objective,at a minimum. The commander uses other control
measures necessary to control the attack,including attack positions,lines of departure,PLs,assault positions,
limits of advance, and direction of attack or axis of advance for every maneuver unit. (See FM 3-90-1 for
additional information.) |
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Figure 6-10. Frontal assault
SECTION IV – OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
6-115. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures
provide control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures can be permissive (allowing
something to happen) or restrictive (limiting how something is done). Some control measures are graphic. A
graphic control measureis a symbol used on maps and displaysto regulate forces and warfighting functions
(ADP 6-0).(See ADP 1-02 for illustrations of graphic control measures and rules for their use.)
COMMON OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES
6-116. Control measures provide the ability to respond to changes in the situation. They allow the attacking
commander to concentrate combat power at the decisive point. At a minimum,commanders include an area
of operations, defined by unit boundaries, and an objective to control their units and tailor their use to the
higher commander’sintent. The commander can also use any other control measure necessary to control the
operation,including those listed in figure 6-11on page 6-30,illustrating a BCT’s use of the following control
measures:
(cid:122) Assembly area.
(cid:122) Assault positions.
(cid:122) Attack positions.
(cid:122) Axis of advance.
(cid:122) Battle handover line.
(cid:122) Boundaries.
(cid:122) Contact point.
(cid:122) Coordinated fire line. |
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(cid:122) Direction of attack or axis of advance for every maneuver unit.
(cid:122) Free-fire area.
(cid:122) Limit of advance.
(cid:122) Line of contact.
(cid:122) Line of departure.
(cid:122) No-fire area.
(cid:122) PL.
(cid:122) Probable line of deployment.
(cid:122) Restrictive fire line.
(cid:122) Support by fire.
Figure 6-11. Common offensive control measures |
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EMPLOYING CONTROL MEASURES
6-117. Effectively employing control measures requires a BCT commander and staff to understand their
purposes and ramifications, including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of
action and initiative. Each measure should have a specific purpose. Commanders use graphic control
measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and airspace management to assist the
division’scontrol of airspace. Well-planned fire control measures permit the proper distribution of fires and
prevent multiple weapons from firing upon prominent targets while less prominent targets escape destruction.
The BCT uses both fire support coordination measures and direct fire control measures.
6-118. Commanders maintain tight control over operations conducted under limited-visibility conditions to
prevent fratricide,noncombatant casualties,and excessive or unintended collateral damagedue to a loss of
situational awareness by small units. These conditions require commanders to impose additional control
measures beyond those used in daylight.
EMPLOYMENT DURING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-119. When executing a movement to contact, commanders start movement from line of departure as
specified in the operation order, and control movement using PLs, contact points, and checkpoints as
required. They control the depth of the movement to contact using a limit of advance or forward boundary,
placed on suitable terrain for the force to establish a hasty defense where it will not be at risk to
enemy-controlled terrain features. Additionally, commanders can designate boundaries and a series of PLs
that successively become the new rear boundary of the forward security element. The same applies to the
main body and rear security element,to delineate limits of responsibility.
6-120. In an attack,before the line of departure or line of contact, a commander may designate assembly
areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive actions or waits for the establishment of the
required conditions to initiate the attack. Depending on conditions and risk,a commander may use an axis of
advance,a direction of attack,or point of departure to further control maneuver forces. Between the probable
line of deployment and the objective,a commander may designate a final coordination line,assault positions,
attack by fire and support by fire positions,or a limit of advance beyond the objective if the commander does
not wish to conduct exploitation or pursuit operations.
6-121. For an exploitation, a commander will likely use more permissive fire support coordination
measures. Commanders use targets and checkpoints as required. Moving the coordinated fire line as the force
advances is especially important,as is placement of the forward boundary. Placing the forward boundary too
deep could limit higher echelon forces and effects,which would normally assist the BCT.
6-122. Pursuit control measures include an area of operations for each maneuver unit, PLs to designate
forward and rearward boundaries for the direct-pressure force,and often a route,axis of advance,or an area
of operations for the encirclement force to move parallel in order to get ahead of the fleeing enemy.
Commanders establish a boundary or restrictive fire line between the force conducting the encirclement and
the force exerting the directpressure before the encircling force reaches its objective. Commanders may also
establish a free-fire area,or a no-fire area.
ATTACK AND ASSAULT POSITIONS
6-123. Anattack positionis the last position an attacking force occupies or passes through before crossing
the line of departure (ADP 3-90). An attack position facilitates the deployment and last-minute coordination
of the attacking force before it crosses the line of departure. Assault position is a covered and concealed
position short of the objective from which final preparations are made to assault the objective (ADP 3-90).
Such final preparations can involve tactical considerations,such as a short halt to coordinate the final assault,
reorganize to adjust to combat losses, or make necessary adjustments in the attacking force’s dispositions.
Ideally assaulting units do not stop in a planned assault position unless necessary. |
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Note. A rally point and an ORP differ from an assault position,in that,an assault point is a position
short of an objective from which final preparations are made beforethe immediate assault of an
objection. A rally pointis an easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble
and reorganize if they become dispersed (ATP3-21.20). Forces conducting a patrol, or an
infiltration commonly use this control measure. The objective rally pointis an easily identifiable
point where all elements of the infiltrating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective
(ADP3-90). An ORP is typically near the infiltrating unit’s objective; however, there is no
standard distance from the objective to the ORP. It should be far enough away from the objective
so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit’s attack preparations. An assault position,
when designated, is generally positioned in the last covered and concealed position prior to the
objective and after leaving the ORP,when an ORP is used. Infiltrating units move to an ORPto
consolidate their combat power,refine the plan,and conduct any last-minute coordination before
to continuing the mission. The unit then conducts those tasks needed to accomplish its mission,
which could be an attack, raid, ambush, seizing key terrain, capturing prisoners, or collecting
specific combatinformation.
NO-FIREAREA,FREE-FIREAREA,ANDRESTRICTIVE FIRELINE
6-124. Ano-fire areais an area designated by the appropriate commander into which fires or their effects
are prohibited (JP 3-09.3). Its purpose is to identify locations and facilities required for consolidation of gains.
Afree-fire areais a specific region into which any weapon system may fire without additional coordination
with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09). Its purpose is to enclose a bypassed or encircled enemy. A
restrictive fire line is a specific boundary established between converging, friendly surface forces that
prohibits fires or their effects from crossing (JP 3-09). Its purpose is to prevent interference between
converging friendly forces,such as what occurs during a linkup operation.
LINE OF CONTACT AND LINE OF DEPARTURE
6-125. Theline of contactis a general trace delineating the location where friendly and enemy forces are
engaged (ADP 3-90). In the offense,aPLas a line of contact is often combined with the line of departure. In
the defense,a line of contact is often synonymous with the forward line of troops. A line of departureis in
land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements (JP 3-31). Its purpose is to
coordinate the advance of the attacking force, so its elements strike the enemy in the order and at the time
desired.
PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT AND LIMIT OF ADVANCE
6-126. A probable line of deployment is a phase line that designates the location where the commander
intends to deploy the unit into assault formation before beginning the assault (ADP 3-90). Usually a linear
terrain featuresperpendicular to the direction of attack,it is used primarily at the battalion level and below
when the unit does not cross the line of departure in its assault formation. A limit of advanceis a phase line
used to control forward progress of the attack (ADP 3-90). The attacking unit does not advance any of its
elements or assets beyond the limit of advance,but the attacking unit can maneuver its security forces to that
limit. Commanders use a limit of advance to prevent overextending the attacking force and reduce the
possibility of fratricide and friendly fire incidents by fires supporting the attack.
SECTION V – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-127. The BCT conducts offensive operationsto defeat ordestroy enemy forces and gain control ofterrain,
resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Offensive operations are movement to contact, attack,
exploitation,and pursuit. BCTs conduct operations according to the capabilities and limitations inherent in
their organizational structure and the knowledge of the situation (enemy) or the advantage relationship to
enemy (see figure 6-12). |
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Figure 6-12. Knowledge of situation (enemy) and advantage relationship to enemy
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
6-128. Amovement to contactis a typeoffensive operationdesigned to develop the situation and establish
or regain contact (ADP 3-90). A movement to contact employs purposeful and aggressive movement,
decentralized control, and the hasty deployment of combined arms formations from the march to create
favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. Close air support, air interdiction, and counterair
operations are essential to the success of large-scale movements to contact. Local air superiority or, as a
minimum,air parity is vital to the operation’s success. The fundamentals of a movement to contact are—
(cid:122) Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
(cid:122) Make initial contact with the smallest force possible,consistent with protecting the force.
(cid:122) Make initial contact with small,mobile,self-contained forces to avoid decisive engagement of the
main body on ground chosen by the enemy. (This allows the commander maximum flexibility to
develop the situation.)
(cid:122) Task organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any
direction.
(cid:122) Keep subordinate forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
(cid:122) Maintain contact regardless of the COAadopted once contact is gained.
6-129. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. A meeting engagement is a combat
action that occurs whena moving force,incompletely deployed for battle,engages an enemy at an unexpected
time and place (ADP 3-90). In a meeting engagement, the force that reacts first to the unexpected contact
generally gains an advantage over its enemy. However, a meeting engagement may also occur when the
opponents are aware of each other and both decide to attack immediately to obtain a tactical advantage or
seize key or decisive terrain. A meeting engagement may also occur when one force attempts to deploy into
a hasty defense while the other force attacks before its opponent can organize an effective defense.
Acquisition systems may discover the enemy before the security force can gain contact. No matter how the
force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative. Prompt execution of battle drills at
platoon level and below,and standard actions on contact for larger units,can give that initiative to the friendly
force.
6-130. The BCT commander considers requirements for maneuver (fire and movement) upon contact. The
commander develops decision points to support changes in the force’s movement formation or a change from
an approach march to a movement formation. Using both human and technical means to validate decision
points,the commander must determine theacceptable degree of risk,based on the mission. The commander’s
confidence in the products of the IPB process and the acceptable risk determines the unit’s movement
formation and scheme of maneuver. In a high-risk environment,it is usually better to increase the distance
between forward elements and the main body than to slow the speed of advance. Once the commander makes
contact with the enemy, the commander has five options: attack, bypass, defend, delay, or withdraw (see
paragraph 6-152). Search and attack and cordon and search are subordinate tasks of movement to contact. |
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Note.Figures 6-13 through 6-16on pages 6-36 through 6-42introduce a fictional organization of
forces scenario as a discussion vehicle for illustrating one of many ways that a Stryker brigade
combat team (SBCT) can conduct a movement to contact. These figures illustrate example
movement formations and movement techniques that maneuver battalions/squadrons and
subordinate companies/troops use when part of the BCT’s main body and security forces.
Illustrated movement formations and movement techniques, and the distances between units are
notional, they are used only for discussion purposes.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
6-131. The BCT commander organizes friendly forces into security forces and a main body in a movement
to contact. (See figure 6-13.) A maneuver battalion organizes its forces the same as the BCT when conducting
a movement to contact independently. When the battalion moves as part of the BCT,a maneuver battalion
moves as part of the main body or with the requisite attachments, whichmay be part of the security force.
TheCavalry squadron normally moves as part of the security force. |
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Figure 6-13. Notional organization of forces for a movement to contact |
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Security Forces
6-132. The securityforces for a BCT conducting a movement to contact,normally consists of the advance
guard and,if required,flank and rear security forces. The advance guard has sufficient forces to protect the
main body from surprise attack. The positioning of flank andrear forces depends on the proximity of friendly
units to the flank or rear and to the enemy.
Advance Guard
6-133. An advance guard is a task organized combined arms unit that precedes the main body and provides
early warning, reaction time, and maneuver space (see figure 6-14). The BCT commander organizes an
advance guard to lead the BCT with or without a covering force from a higher echelon. When a covering
force from a higher echelon is employed forward of the BCT,the advance guard maintains contact with the
covering force. The advance guard requires antiarmorand engineer support and remains within range of the
main body’s indirect-fire systems. The advance guard reduces obstacles to create passage lanes,repairs roads
and bridges, and locates bypasses. For obstacles not covered by fire, the advance guard can either seek a
bypass or create the required number of lanes to support its maneuver or the maneuver of a supported unit’s
maneuver. For obstacles covered by fire,the unit can either seek a bypass or conduct a breaching operation. |
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Figure 6-14. Notional organization of forces—SBCT advance guard
6-134. The advance guard fixes the enemy to protect the deployment of the main body when the main body
commits to action. The advance guard forces the enemy to withdraw,or destroys small enemy groups before |
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they can disrupt the advance of the main body. When the advance guard encounters large enemy forces or
heavily defended areas, it takes prompt and aggressive action to develop the situation and, within its
capability, defeat the enemy. The commander of the advance guard force reports the location, strength,
disposition,and composition of the enemy and tries to find the enemy’s flanks,gaps,or other weaknesses in
the enemy’s position.
Covering Force
6-135. A covering force’s mission is to protect the main body, provide early warning, reaction time, and
maneuver space before committing the main body. The covering force is task organized to accomplish tasks
independent of the main body. The covering force commander reports directly to the establishing commander
(division or corps). The BCT normally does not have the organic resources or capabilities to establish a
covering force. A covering force,if established,moves well ahead of the BCT’s advance guard and usually
beyond the main body’s fire support range. (See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on the covering force.)
Note. In Army doctrine, a covering force is a self-contained force capable of operating
independently of the main body,unlike a screening or guard force, to conduct the cover task. A
covering force performs all the tasks of screening and guard forces. (See paragraph 5-85 for
information specific to a division covering force.)
Flank and Rear Security
6-136. The BCT establishes flank and rear security elements when their flanks or security area are
unprotected. The BCT may use Cavalry organizations for flank security,or main body forces may provide
flank (see figure 6-15) and rear security forces. |
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Figure 6-15. Notional organization of forces—SBCT security forces (main body right flank) |
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Main Body
6-137. The bulk of the BCT’s combat power is in the main body. The main body follows the advance guard
and keeps enough distance between itself and the advance guard to maintain flexibility. The movement
formations and movement techniques maneuver battalions/squadrons and subordinate companies/troops (see
figure 6-16) use when part of the main body are always METT-TC dependent, keeping in mind the elements
of the main body must be responsive to the actions of the advance guard. The BCT commander may designate
a portion of the main body as the reserve. |
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Figure 6-16. Notional organization of forces—SBCT main body (right flank battalion) |
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6-138. After the security force makes contact,the BCT commander receives information from the security
force in contact. Based upon that information the commander directs a COA consistent with the higher
commander’s intent and within the main body’s capability. Elements of the main body initiate direct and
indirect fires to gain the initiative. The commander emplaces fires assets to respond immediately to calls for
fire.
6-139. A portion of the main body composes the BCT commander’s sustaining base. The commander tailors
the sustainment base to the mission. The commander decentralizes the execution of sustainment support,but
that support must be continuously available to the main body. Sustainment support includes using preplanned
logistics packages(LOGPACs).
PLANNING
6-140. The BCT commander and staff plan for amovement to contact in the same manner as any offensive
operations,however,time to plan may be constrained. Planning for a movement to contact begins,as with
all operations, with a thorough understanding of the area of operations through a detailed IPB. The staff
integrates the IPB,targeting,andRM(see chapter 4for a detailed discussion) and information collection (see
chapter 5 for a detailed discussion) throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP). IPB is the
systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy,terrain,weather,and civil considerations in
an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. Targeting is the process by which the staff
(specifically the BCT targeting work group) selects and prioritizes targets and matches the appropriate
response to them considering operational requirements and capabilities. RM is the commander’s and staff
process to identify, assess, and control risks arising from operational factors and to make decisions that
balance risk cost with mission benefits. The staff (specifically the BCT S-3, in coordination with the BCT
S-2) integrates information collection into the concept of operations and manages the information collection
effort through integrated staff processes and procedures.
6-141. The BCT staff,in coordination with the commander,develops and executesAnnex L (Information
Collection) to the operation order. Annex L describes how information collection activities support the
mission throughout the conduct of the operations described in the base order. Annex L synchronizes activities
in time,space,and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the commander’s intent for reconnaissance,
surveillance,security operations, and intelligence operations (including militaryintelligence disciplines,see
paragraph 5-90). The BCT commander and staff collaborate with the Cavalry squadron,military intelligence
company,and security force assets to synchronize the information collection effort to allow the main body
to focus on the conduct of the movement to contact.
6-142. The BCT intelligence staff officer and S-2 section develop feasible threat COAs that address all
aspects of the enemy’s potential capabilities. The S-2 section,assisted by BCT engineer and air defense staff
representatives, analyzes the terrain to include enemy air avenues of approach. The plan addresses actions
the commander anticipates based upon available information and intelligence and probable times and
locations of enemy engagements.
6-143. BCT reconnaissance and security forces detect the enemy; then confirm or deny the enemy’s
presence making contact with the enemy using the smallest elements possible. A successful information
collection effort integrates reconnaissance and security forces with HUMINTcollection operations,signals
intelligence collection, target acquisition assets, and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance (manned and
unmanned) assets. The BCT commander may task organize reconnaissance and security forces with
additional combat power allowing them to develop the situation on contact with the enemy. Additional
combat power may include Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Stryker vehicles, weapons troop or
Infantry weapons companies,or an Infantry rifle company. The unit’s planned movement formation should
contribute to the goal of making initial contact with the smallest force possible and provide for efficient
movement of the force.
6-144. The commander directs the establishment of decision points,branches,and sequels based upon the
CCIRs to ensure flexibility in the plan. The commander controls the movement to contact by using control
measures to provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and to allow the commander
to rapidly concentrate combat power at the decisive point. |
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6-145. The BCT commander may task a forward security force to conduct zone reconnaissance where the
main body is to traverse. Based on the commander’s decision points, the security force conducts
reconnaissance or target handover with the main body to maintain contact with the enemy. This handover
allows the BCT to manage transitions between phases of the operation, or follow-on tasks and allows the
security force to conduct tasks that support the BCT scheme of maneuver.
6-146. The commander tailor’s organic sustainment assets to the mission. Battalion and company trains
may be combined and accompany the main body. METT-TC determines the type and amount of supplies
transported in these trains. Locating the combat trains with the battalion permits rapid resupply of the
maneuver units than if they were further to the rear. Commanders, however, may decide to assign combat
units to combat trains for their security if they determine that the combat trains do not have sufficient combat
power to counter the anticipated threat.
PREPARATION
6-147. The BCT staff,specifically the S-2,constantly refines the enemy situation during preparation based
on information and integrated intelligence products. One of the primary concerns of the BCT S-3 and S-2
during preparation is to ensure the commander and staff have the latest information and that the COP is
accurate, and the plan is still valid. The commander ensures, through confirmation briefs, backbriefs and
rehearsals, that subordinates understand the commander’s intent and their individual missions as new
information becomes available. Simple,flexible plans that rely on standard operating procedures(SOPs)and
battle drills,and plans that units rehearse against likely enemy COAsare essential to success.
6-148. The commander rehearses the operation from initiation to occupation of the final march objective or
limit of advance. The commander prioritizes rehearsals of maneuver options, enemy COAs, and primary,
secondary,and tertiary communications systems at all levels.Actions to consider during rehearsals include—
(cid:122) Making enemy contact (advance guard).
(cid:122) Making contact with an obstacle not identified and reported (advance guard).
(cid:122) Making enemy contact (flank security force).
(cid:122) Reporting requirements,engagement,and bypass criteria.
(cid:122) Fire support.
(cid:122) Maneuver.
(cid:122) Unit transitions.
(cid:122) Sustainment.
EXECUTION
6-149. The BCT maneuvers aggressively within its area of operations or along its axis of advance. Speed
and security requirements must balance based on the effectiveness of the information collection effort,
friendly mobility,effects of terrain,and enemy capabilities. The COP enables close tracking and control of
the movement and location of units. The BCT (typically the tactical command post [TAC {graphic}])
continually monitors the location and movement of security forces. This monitoring of security forces ensures
adequate security for the main body and ensures the security forces are within supporting range of main body
maneuver forces and fire support assets. The BCT also controls the movement of sustainment assets,
adjusting movement to meet support requirements, to avoid congestion of routes, and to ensure
responsiveness.
Scheme of Maneuver
6-150. Movement to contact startsfrom a line of departure or a specified point(s) at the time specified in
the operation order. A limit of advance or a forward boundary controls the depth of the movement to contact.
PLs, contact points, and checkpoints control the rate of movement. Fire support is planned throughout the
movement to contact to provide accurate and continuous fires. Actions on contact,(see paragraph 5-47),are
planned for and rehearsed. Subordinate echelons must quickly react to contact,develop the situation,report,
and gain a position of advantage over the enemy. Maneuvering unit commanders coordinate forward passage
through friendly forces in contact as required. |
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6-151. The primary focus of a movement to contact is the enemy force,which may be stationary or moving.
Objectives can designate the movement of subordinate units and identify suspected enemy positions.
Although an axis of advance can guide movement, there is the risk of enemy forces outside the axis being
undetected and inadvertently bypassed. During a movement to contact, the intent of the commander is to
maneuver quickly to defeat the enemy before the enemy can react. The commander avoids piecemeal
commitment of the main body unless failure to do results in mission failure or prevented by restricted or
severely restricted terrain. The BCT commander uses the advance guard to fix the enemy while the main
body maneuvers to seek the assailable flank. The commander focuses on the enemy’s flanks and rear before
the enemy can counter these actions.
Maneuver Options
6-152. The commander makes the decision to execute a maneuver option based on the progress of the
advance guard’s initial engagement. The movement to contact generally ends with the commitment of the
main body. The tactical options available to the BCT after contact are addressed in the following paragraphs.
6-153. Attack. The commander directs an attack when the BCT has greater combat power than the enemy
does or when the commander assesses that the BCT can reach a decisive outcome. The commander can direct
an ambush against a moving or infiltrating force that is not aware of the presence of the friendly force.
6-154. Defend. The commander directs a defense when the BCT has insufficient combat power to attack.
The commander also directs a defense when the enemy’s superior strength forces the BCT to halt and prepare
for a more deliberate operation.
6-155. Bypass. The commander provides criteria detailing conditions for bypassing enemy forces. The unit
in contact can bypass if authorized,but,if the bypassed force represents a threat,the unit must fix or contain
it until released by the higher commander.
6-156. Delay. A delaying force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy’s momentum
andinflicting maximum damage on the enemy,without decisively engaging,in principle. Once the advance
guard (fixing force) makes contact with the enemy,the enemy may attempt a frontal counterattack in response
to the BCT’s movement to contact. In this case,the fixing force defends itself or conducts a delay while the
main body of the BCT maneuvers to attack.
6-157. Withdraw. The commander directs a withdrawal when the BCT lacks the combat power to attack or
defend,to improve a tactical situation,or to prevent a situation from worsening. Both direct-and indirect-fire
assets from main body forces provide support to cover the withdrawal of the advance guard or lead elements
of the main body. The commander also may employ obscuration to assist with breaking contact with the
enemy.
Bypassed Forces
6-158. Bypassed forces present a serious threat to forces that follow the maneuver elements, especially
sustainment elements. Units conducting a movement to contact do not bypass enemy forces unless authorized
by higher authority. Bypass criteria, if established, are measures established by higher headquarters that
specify the conditions and size under which enemy units may be bypassed. The BCT distributes the location
and strengths of enemy forces throughout the area of operations so following units can move around these
threats. Bypassed enemy units are kept under observation unless otherwise directed by the commander. The
destruction or containment of the bypassed enemy forces becomes the responsibility of the higher commander
if the commander permits the lead elements to bypass.
Actions at Obstacles
6-159. Once the unit detects an obstacle, the obstacle is immediately reported, and its location and
description distributed. The element quickly seeks a bypass. If a bypass is available,the unit in contact with
the obstacle marks the bypass; the unit reports the route of the bypass around the obstacle, also. The BCT
breaches consistent with the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
(described by the memory aid SOSRA) to create breach lanes and continue the movement to contact.
Engineers support the breach effort by reducing the obstacle,improving the lanes,and guiding the main body |
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through the obstacle. (SeeATP 3-90.4 for additional information.) Civil affairs,military police, or tactical
psychological operations (PSYOP) teams may redirect civilians away from the route of advance when the
movement of displaced civilians causes reduced mobility.
Five Step Sequence
6-160. FM 3-90-1 discusses executing all four offensive operations in a five-step sequence, listed below.
This sequence is for discussion purposes only and is not the only way of conducting offensive operations.
Offensive operationstendto overlap each other during the conduct of offensive actions. Normally the first
three of these steps are shaping operations or supporting efforts, while the maneuver step is the decisive
operation or main effort. Follow through is normally a sequel or a branch to the plan based on the current
situation.
Step 1,Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact
6-161. The advance guard focuses on identifying the enemy’s composition,strength,and dispositions. The
forces provide the commander with combat information. The commander can then maneuver units to
positions of advantage to commit friendly forces under optimal conditions.
Step 2,Disrupt the Enemy
6-162. On contact, the advance guard maneuvers to disrupt or defeat the enemy to prevent enemy from
conducting a spoiling attack or organizing a coherent defense. The advance guard commander gathers as
much information as possible about the enemy’s dispositions, composition, strengths, capabilities, and
probable course(s) of action.
Step 3,Fix the Enemy
6-163. The advance guard prevents the enemy from maneuvering against the main body. If unable to defeat
the enemy, the advance guard reports the enemy strength and disposition and establishes a base of fire for
the subsequent attack by the main body.
Step 4,Maneuver
6-164. If the advance guard cannot defeat the enemy with a frontal or flank assault or an engagement of an
enemy’s assailable flank, the commander quickly maneuvers the main body to attack. This offensive
maneuver seeks to achieve a decisive massing of effects at the decisive point,orat several decisive points if
adequate combat power is available. The commander aims the decisive operation toward the decisive point,
which can consist of the immediate and decisive destruction of the enemy force,its will to resist,seizure of
a terrain objective, or the defeat of the enemy’s plan. The commander attempts to defeat the enemy while
still maintaining the momentum of the advance. The main body commander resumes the movement to contact
after a successful attack. The intent is to deliver an assault before the enemy can deploy or reinforce their
engaged forces.
Step 5,Follow Through
6-165. The unit transitions back to a movement to contact and continueto advance if the enemy is defeated.
The movement to contact terminates when the unit reaches its final objective or limit of advance;otherwise,
it must transition to another offensive or defensive operation.After committing the reserve,the commander
develops a plan to reconstitute another reserve force once the original reserve force is committed,most often
accomplished with a unit out of contact.
SEARCH AND ATTACK
6-166. Search and attack is a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the
characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-90-1). The BCT conducts a search and attack to destroy
enemy forces,deny the enemy certain areas,protect the force,or collect information. Although the battalion
is the echelon,that usually conducts a search and attack,the BCT assists its subordinate battalions by ensuring
the availability of indirect fires and other support. |
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CORDON AND SEARCH
6-167. Cordon and search is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a
target area and searching suspected locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy
forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1). The BCT normally assigns a cordon and search mission to a battalion.
The BCT supports the cordon and search by conducting shaping operations and providing additional
resources to the unit conducting the cordon and search. A cordon and search may support site exploitation
(see ATP3-90.15).
ATTACK
6-168. Anattackis a type ofoffensive operationthat destroys or defeats enemy forces,seizes and secures
terrain, or both (ADP 3-90). Although an attack may be a deliberate operation or a hasty operation, both
synchronize all available warfighting functions to defeat the enemy. The main difference between a hasty
and a deliberate operation (see chapter 2) is preparation and planning time.
6-169. The key difference between a movement to contact and an attack is the amount of information known
about the enemy. Information enables the commander to have more control, to better synchronize the
operation,and to employ combat power more effectively than in a movement to contact. The commander has
the advantage of being extremely deliberate and refined in task organization,assignment of tactical mission
tasks,and the scheme of maneuver.
6-170. The BCT executes subordinate forms of the attack to achieve different results. These subordinate
forms of the attack have special purposes and include the ambush,counterattack,demonstration,feint,raid,
and spoiling attack (see paragraph 6-197). The commander’s intent and the mission variables of METT-TC
determine the specific attack form. The commander can conduct these forms of attack,except for a raid,as a
hasty or a deliberate operation.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
6-171. The BCT commander determines the scheme of maneuver and task organizes the force to give each
subordinate unit the combat power to accomplish its assigned missions. The commander normally organizes
the attacking force into a security force,a main body,and a reserve. The commander completes any changes
in task organization early in the process to allow subordinate units to conduct rehearsals with their attached
and supporting elements.
Security Forces
6-172. The BCT executes most attacks while in contact with the enemy which reduces the requirement for
a separate forward security force. The commander commits security forces during an attack only if the attack
is likely to uncover one or more flanks or the rear of the attacking force as it advances. The commander
designates a flank or rear security force and assigns it a guard or screen mission depending on METT-TC.
Main Body
6-173. The BCT commander allocates forces based on the assigned tasks, the terrain, and the size of the
enemy force that each avenue of approach—a path used by an attacking force leading to its objective or to
key terrain. Avenues of approach exist in all domains (ADP 3-90)—can support (probable force ratio). The
BCT attacks to destroy enemy forces or to seize key terrain. The scheme of maneuver identifies the decisive
operation or main effort. During the course of the attack,the unit(s) executing the decisive operation or main
effort may change based upon conditions or plans.
6-174. Maintaining mobility in an attack is critical. The assistant brigade engineer (known as ABE) officer
must plan and allocate mobility resources to the main body and security forces. The commander designates
a breach, assault, and support force as the initial decisive operation if the commander anticipates or has
identified the need to conduct a breach during the attack. The breaching fundamentals applied to ensure
success when breaching against a defending enemy are SOSRA. These obstacle reduction fundamentals
always apply,but they may vary based on METT-TC. The commander isolates and secures the breach area, |
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breaches the enemy’s defensive obstacles, seizes the point of penetration, and rapidly passes through
follow-on forces to continue the attack. (SeeATP 3-90.4 for additional information.)
6-175. The commander arranges forces in-depth and designates a reserve. The commander controls the field
artillery battalion, long-range fire support systems, and any breaching assets to retain flexibility until the
point of breachis identified. The commander focuses all available resources to support achievement of the
decisive operation.
6-176. The commander designates subordinate units to conduct shaping operations for the execution of the
decisive operation. The commander allocates only the combat power needed to accomplish the mission since
overwhelming combat power cannot be executed everywhere. Shaping operations disrupt enemy defensive
preparations through aggressive combatpatrolling,feints,limited-objective attacks,harassing indirect fires,
and air strikes. The commander uses shaping operations to isolate the enemy and destroy the enemy’s ability
to mutually support or reinforce enemy positions. (See figures 6-17and 6-18on page 6-48.)
Figure 6-17. Notional organization of forces for the breach |
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Figure 6-18. Notional organization of forces for the assault
Reserve
6-177. A reserve is that portion of a body of troops that is withheld from action at the beginning of an
engagement,to be availablefor a decisive movement (ADP 3-90). The reserve is not a committed force and
is not used as a follow and support force or a follow and assume force. The commander uses the reserve to
exploit success,to defeat enemy counterattacks,or to restore momentum to a stalled attack.
6-178. Once committed,the reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the BCTs decisive operation.
The commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by the revised
situation. Often a commander’s most difficult and important decision concerns the time,place,and conditions
for committing the reserve.
6-179. In an attack,the commander prioritizes the positioning of the reserve to reinforce the success of the
decisive operation,then to counter enemy counterattacks. The reserve must be able to move quickly to areas
where it is needed in different contingencies. This is most likely to occur if the enemy has strong
counterattack forces. Once committed, the reserve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s
decisive operation or main effort,and the commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from
units made available by the revised situation.
Sustainment
6-180. The BCT commander resources sustainment assets to support the attacking force. The BSB
commander and BCT subordinate maneuver commanders organize sustainment assets to support the BCT’s
concept of support. The BSB commander controls the sustainment for the BCT with priority of support to |
3-96 | 237 | Offense
the decisive operation or main effort. The BSB commander positions sustainment units well forward in an
attack whenever possible to provide immediate support. As the BCT advances, sustainment units and
capabilities echelon support forward to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units (see chapter 9).
PLANNING
6-181. The BCT commander and staff plan for an attack in the same manner as discussed in paragraph
6-125 for a movement to contact. As with the movement to contact, planning for an attack begins with a
thorough understanding of the area of operations through a detailed IPB. The staff integrates the IPB,
targeting, and RM (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion) and information collection (see chapter 5 for a
detailed discussion) throughout the MDMP. The BCT commander allocates resources as required to provide
the maximum possible combat power to the decisive operation or main effort. Units conducting shaping
operations or supporting operations should have sufficient combat power to conduct their mission.
6-182. Fire support planning (see chapter 4) directly supports the BCT’s concept of operations to engage
enemy forces, movement formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. The
commander uses a blend of friendly information management, knowledge management, and information
collection operations to take advantage of the range,precision,and lethality of available weapon systems and
information superiority,thus achieving fire superiority. The commander focuses fire support effects to gain
and maintain fire superiority at critical points during the attack and to maintain freedom of maneuver.
Responsiveness and flexibility requirethat the BCT must have the ability to rapidly clear fires.
6-183. Army attack reconnaissance aviation units (see chapter 4) conduct shaping operation attacks to assist
the BCT in finding,fixing,and destroying the enemy. Attack reconnaissance aviation units support ground
forces in contact through Army aviation attacks. During a meeting engagement, attack reconnaissance
aviation units provide information to help develop the situation. Assault helicopter battalions support ground
force maneuver through air movement and air assault missions.
PREPARATION
6-184. The BCT uses the available time before the attack to conduct reconnaissance,precombat checks and
inspections,and rehearsals. The BCT conceals attack preparations from the enemy. The commander and staff
refine the planbased on continuously updated intelligence. Subordinates conduct parallel planning and start
their preparation for the attack immediately after the BCT issues a fragmentary order. As more intelligence
becomes available, the commander revises orders and distributes them; thereby giving subordinates more
time to prepare for the attack.
EXECUTION
6-185. For discussion purposes, the execution of the attack is addressed using the following five-step
sequence,gain and maintain enemy contact,disrupt the enemy,fix the enemy,maneuver,and follow through.
This sequence is not the only method of executing an attack. These steps may overlap or be conducted
simultaneously. Normally the first three of these steps are shaping operations or supporting efforts,while the
maneuver step is the decisive operation or main effort. Follow through is normally a sequel or a branch to
the plan based on the current situation.
Step 1,Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact
6-186. The commander positions maneuver forces and information collection assets to maintain observation
of enemy reactions to maneuver on the objective. Information collection focuses on areas the enemy may use
to reposition forces,commit reserves,and counterattack. For example,the commander may infiltrate or insert
reconnaissance and securityforces to observe the objective or routes that an enemy reserve may use. As the
BCT attacks, reconnaissance and security forces report enemy reactions, repositioning, and battle damage
assessment. The BCT may task the reconnaissance forces to target and engage enemy repositioning forces,
reserves,counterattacking forces,and other HPTswith indirect fires. Early identification of enemy reactions
is essential for the BCT to maintain momentum and the initiative during the attack. To regain contact with
the enemy during an attack,the BCT commander may use the Cavalry squadron to regain contact and provide
information on the enemy’s current location,disposition,and movement. |
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Step 2,Disrupt the Enemy
6-187. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy weakens their entire force and allows the BCT
commander to attack the remaining weakened enemy force. The commander can disrupt the enemy’s
defenses using a variety of methods including:
(cid:122) Gaining surprise.
(cid:122) Avoiding enemy security forces.
(cid:122) Using suppressive,interdiction,preparation,and counterair fires against enemy formations,strong
points,and assembly areas.
(cid:122) Destroying target acquisition systems.
(cid:122) Taking advantage of limited visibility,concealment,and cover by masking the approach.
(cid:122) Using augmented cyberspace operations and EWassets to degrade enemy command and control
systems.
(cid:122) Using military deception to conceal the exact time and location of the attack.
(cid:122) Using precision fires (precision guide munitions, multiple launch rocket system/high mobility
artillery rocket system, M982 Excalibur) against HPTs in-depth coordinated with long-range
surveillance and precision observation teams.
Step 3,Fix the Enemy
6-188. The primary purpose in fixing the enemy is to prevent the enemy from maneuvering to reinforce the
unit targeted for destruction. Fixing the enemy into a given position or COA limits the enemy’s ability to
respond to the attack effectively. Fixing the enemy usually is a shaping operation. To conserve combat power,
the BCT commander carefully considers which enemy elements to fix and targets only the elements that can
affect the point of attack.
6-189. The BCT commander fires on supporting and rear positions to isolate the objective. The commander
uses the fires to suppress the enemy’s suspected command and control centers, fire support systems, and
reserve. The commander degrades the enemy’s command and control systems through cyberspace
electromagnetic activities (CEMA),also.
Step 4,Maneuver
6-190. The BCT commander maneuvers forces to gain positional advantage to seize,retain,and exploit the
initiative and consolidate gains. The commander avoids the enemy’s strength,employing tactics that defeat
the enemy by attacking through a point of relative weakness,such as a flank or rear. The key to success is to
strike hard and fast,overwhelm a portion of the enemy force,and quickly transition to the next objective or
phase,thus maintaining the momentum of an attack without reducing pressure on the enemy.
6-191. The coordination between fire and movement is critical to massing combat power. As maneuver
forces approach the enemy defense,the commander shifts fires and obscurants to suppress and obscure the
enemy. Proper timing and adjustment of fires enable the maneuver force to close on the enemy’s positions.
The commander echelons fires to maintain effective suppression on the objective(s) up to the last possible
moment while reducing any possibility of fratricide. The key to a successful attack is the suppression of the
enemy force by indirect and direct fires that shift in the front of the assault force as it reaches its limit of
advance. Maneuver forces and information collection assets provide battle damage assessment to the
commander. The commander may need to adjust the speed of the approach to the objective based on reports
from forward reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
6-192. The BCT employs fires to weaken the enemy’s position. The BCT sets conditions for success before
closure within direct fire range of the enemy. Initially,fires focus on the destruction of key enemy forces that
affect the concept of operations,such as to destroy the enemy positions at the point of penetration during an
attack.
6-193. Fires allow the commander to destroy enemy security forces and weaken or neutralize enemy
reserves. Fires can emplace artillery delivered obstacles to block enemy reserve routes to the objective,
support breaching operations, isolate the objective, and suppress enemy positions. The commander can |
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employ obscuration and screening fires to deceive the enemy of the BCT’s actual intentions. Obscuration
fires (placed on or near enemy positions) decrease an enemy’s capability to visually sight friendly forces.
Screening fires (delivered in areas between friendly and an enemy force) degrade enemy detection,
observation,and engagement capabilities to enable friendly maneuver and action. The commander employs
fires to disrupt enemy counterattacks and neutralize bypassed enemy combat forces. The commander
employs fires to conduct CEMA to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability. The BCT
neutralizes the enemy’s indirect fires through counterfire.
6-194. Fires assets are usually positioned forward so they can cover the objective and beyond without
having to displace. The field artillery battalion positions its batteries as close as possible to the line of
departure. The battalion heavy mortars position themselves close to assault units and are prepared to displace
forward as required. Attached platoons from Infantry weapons companies or SBCT weapons troop may
displace by sections and closely follow the maneuver companies. Close air support and Army aviation attacks
identify and attack preplanned targets.
Step 5,Follow Through
6-195. After seizing an objective,the BCT commander has two alternatives: exploit success and continue
the attack or terminate the operation. Normally,the BCT maintains contact and attempts to exploit its success.
Indirect and direct fires may continue to suppress other enemy positions. Follow-on forces, which may or
may not be part of the BCT,can conduct a forward passage of lines to continue the attack.
6-196. The most likely on-order mission is to continue the attack after seizing an objective. During
consolidation,the commander continues the MDMP(or rapid decision-making and synchronization process,
chapter 3) in preparation for any on order missions assigned by a higher headquarters.
SUBORDINATE FORMS OF THE ATTACK
6-197. The BCT can launch subordinate forms of the attack with various purposes to achieve different
results. Special purpose attacks are ambush,counterattack,demonstration,feint,raid,and spoiling attack.
6-198. Anambushis an attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or
temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-90-1). The three forms of an ambush are point ambush,area ambush,and
antiarmorambush. An ambush isgenerallyconducted at the small unit level and takes the form of an assault
to close with and destroy the enemy,or it might be an attack by fire only,executed from concealed positions.
An ambush does not require seizing or holding the ground. Ambushes are generally executed to reduce the
enemy force’s overall combat effectiveness through destruction, although other reasons could be to harass
and capture the enemy or capture enemy equipment and supplies.
6-199. Acounterattackis an attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force,for
such specific purposes as regaining groundlost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units,and with
the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy’s purpose in attacking. In sustained
defensive actions, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives
(FM3-90-1). The commander plans counterattacks as part of the BCT’s defensive plan, or the BCT might
be the counterattack force for the higher headquarters. The BCT must provide the counterattack force with
enough combat power and mobility to affect the enemy’s offense.
6-200. A demonstration in military deception, is a show of force similar to a feint without actual contact
with the adversary,in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary (JP 3-13.4).
The BCT commander uses demonstrations and feints in conjunction with other military deception activities.
The commandergenerally attempts to deceive the enemy and induce the enemy commander to move reserves
and shift fire support assets to locations where they cannot immediately affect the friendly decisive operation
or take other actions not conducive to the enemy’s best interests during the defense. The BCT commander
must synchronize the conduct of these forms of attack with higher and lower echelon plans and operations to
prevent inadvertently placing another unit at risk. Both forms are always shaping operations,but afeint will
require more combat power and usually requires ground combat units for execution. (See FM 3-90-1 for
additional information.) |
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6-201. Afeintin military deception,is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted
for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action
(JP3-13.4). The principal difference between a feint and a demonstration is that in a feint the BCT
commander assigns the force an objective limited in size,scope,or some other measure. The force conducting
the feint makes direct fire contact with the enemy but avoids decisive engagement. The planning,preparing,
and executing considerations for demonstrations and feints are the same as for the other forms of attack. The
commander assigns the operation to a subordinate unit and approves plans to assess the effects generated by
thefeint,to support the operation. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
6-202. A raid is an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an
adversary (Army uses the term enemy instead of adversary),capture personnel or equipment,or to destroy a
capability culminating with a planned withdrawal (JP 3-0). The BCT plans raids and usually executes them
at battalion level and below. The raiding force may operate within or outside of the BCT’s supporting range,
and it moves to its objective by infiltration. The raiding force quickly withdraws along a different route once
the raid mission is completed.
6-203. A spoiling attack is a tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the
enemy is in the process of forming orassembling for an attack (FM 3-90-1). The BCT commander conducts
a spoiling attack during the defense to strike the enemy while in assembly areas or attack positions preparing
for offensive mission or has temporarily stopped. The BCT commander employs organic fires, as well as
other available units,to attack the enemy’s assembly areas or other positions. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional
information.)
EXPLOITATION
6-204. Exploitationis a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed
to disorganize the enemy indepth (ADP 3-90). Exploitation is the bold continuation of anattack designed to
increase success and take advantage of weakened or collapsed enemy defenses. The purpose of exploitation
can vary,but generally,an exploitation capitalizes on a temporary advantage,on preventing the enemy from
establishing an organized defense, or preventing the enemy from conducting an orderly withdrawal. An
exploitation should prevent reconstitution of enemy defenses, prevent enemy withdrawal, secure deep
objectives,and destroy enemy command and control facilities,logistics,and forces.
6-205. The conditions for exploitation develop very quickly. The commander capitalizes on opportunities
using information collected to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The commander designates priority
intelligence requirements tied to decision points that seek out the following:
(cid:122) A significant increase in enemy prisoners of war.
(cid:122) An increase in abandoned enemy equipment and material.
(cid:122) The overrunning of enemy artillery,command and control facilities,and logistics sites.
(cid:122) A significant decrease in enemy resistance or in organized fires and maneuver.
(cid:122) A mixture of support and combat vehicles in formations and columns.
(cid:122) An increase in enemy movement rearward,including reserves and fire support units.
6-206. The commander plans the exploitation to maintain pressure on the enemy. To accomplish this,the
BCT attacks over a broad front to prevent the enemy from establishing a defense,organizing an effective rear
guard,withdrawing,or regaining balance. The BCT secures objectives,severs escape routes,and destroysall
enemy forces. (See figure 6-19.) The commander may employ the reserve as an exploitation force. |
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Figure 6-19. Notional organization of forces for an exploitation
6-207. Decentralized execution is characteristic of the exploitation; however, the commander maintains
enough control to prevent overextension of the command. Minimum control measures are used. Tactical air
reconnaissance and Army aircraft maintain contact with enemy movements and advise the commander of
enemy activities. Interdiction, close air support, Army aviation attacks, and deep artillery fires can attack
moving enemy reserves,withdrawing enemy columns,enemy constrictions at choke points,and enemy forces
that threaten the flanks of the exploiting force. The commander must consider the security of ground supply
columns and an aerial resupply may be necessary. Exploiting forces take advantage of captured supplies
whenever possible.
6-208. Failure to exploit success aggressively gives the enemy time to reconstitute an effective defense or
regain the initiative using a counterattack. BCT mounted elements may move rapidly to positions of
advantage to block enemy forces. If available, Army aviation assets can move forces to blocking positions
andUASscan maintain contact. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.) |
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PURSUIT
6-209. Pursuit is a type of offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to
escape,with the aim of destroying it (ADP 3-90). The commander orders a pursuit when the enemy force can
no longer maintain its position and tries to escape. Normally,the commander does not organize specifically
for pursuit operations ahead of time, although the unit staff may plan for a pursuit mission as a branch or
sequel to the current order. The plan must be flexible for subordinate elements of the BCT to react when the
situation presents itself. Subordinate elements are made as self-sufficientas resources will permit.
6-210. Two options exist when conducting a pursuit. Both pursuit options involve assigning a subordinate
the mission of maintaining directpressure on the rearward moving enemy force. The first option is a frontal
pursuit that employs only direct pressure. (See figure 6-20.) The second is a combination that uses one
subordinate element to maintain direct pressure and one or more other subordinate elements to encircle the
retrograding enemy. (See figure 6-21 on page 6-56.) The combination pursuit is more effective, generally.
The subordinate applying direct-pressure or the subordinate conducting the encirclement can conduct the
decisive operation in a combination pursuit. |
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Figure 6-20. Notional organization of forces for a frontal pursuit |
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Figure 6-21. Notional organization of forces for a combination pursuit
6-211. During the pursuit, the commander exerts unrelenting pressure to keep the enemy force from
reorganizing and preparing its defenses. The BCT may be a part of a corps or division pursuit, either
functioning as the direct pressure or encircling force. An aggressive pursuit leaves the enemy faced with the
options of surrendering or facing complete destruction. Pursuits require swift maneuvers and attacks.
6-212. The pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. The primary function of a pursuit is to
complete the destruction of the enemy force. Although the BCT may pursue a physical objective,the mission
is the destruction of the enemy’s main force. Pursuits include the rapid shifting of units,continuous day and
night movements,hasty operations,containment of bypassed enemy forces,and large numbers of prisoners. |
3-96 | 245 | Offense
A pursuit includes a willingness to forego some synchronization to maintain contact and pressure on a fleeing
enemy.
6-213. A mobility advantage over the enemy is vital to the BCT’s effectiveness in pursuit. A combination
of Armored or Stryker forces, combined with Infantry conducting air assaults, can be extremely effective
when cutting off the enemy forcing them to either surrender or bedestroyed. The range,speed,and weapons
load of attack reconnaissance aviation units makes them uniquely useful in an exploitation or pursuit to
extend the ground commander’s reach. Dismounted movement over difficult terrain allows Infantry units to
seize blocking positions. (SeeFM 3-90-1 for additional information.)
SECTION VI – TRANSITIONS
6-214. Decisive action involves more than simultaneous execution of all tasks. Decisive action requires the
commander and staff to consider the BCT’s capabilities and capacities relative to each assigned task. The
commander considers the mission,determines which tactics to use,and balances the tasks of decisive action
while preparing the commander’s intent and concept of operations. The commander determines which tasks
the force can accomplish simultaneously, if phasing is required, what additional resources the force may
need,and how to transition from one task to another.
6-215. Transitions between tasks of decisive action require careful assessment, prior planning, and unit
preparation as the commander shifts the combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
Commanders first assess the situation to determine applicable tasks and the priority for each. When
conditions change, commanders adjust the combination of tasks of decisive action in the concept of
operations.
6-216. A transition occurs when the commander makes an assessment that the unit must change its focus
from one element of decisive action to another. A commander halts the offense when the offense results in
complete victory and the end of hostilities reaches a culminating point,the BCT is approaching a culminating
point due to operational reach (see chapter 9),or the commander receives a change in mission from a higher
commander. This change in mission may be a result of the interrelationship of the other instruments of
national power,such as a political decision.
6-217. All offensive actions that do not achieve complete victory reach a culminating point when the
balance of strength shifts from the attacking force to its opponent. Usually,offensive actions lose momentum
when friendly forces encounter and cannot bypass heavily defended areas. Offensive actions also reach a
culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with
expenditures,Soldiers become physically exhausted,casualties and equipment losses mount,and repairs and
replacements do not keep pace with losses. Offensive actions also stall when reserves are not available to
continue the advance,the defender receives reinforcements,or the defender counterattacks with fresh troops.
Several of these actions may combine to halt an offense. When the offensive action halts,the attacking unit
can regain its momentum,but normally this only happens after difficult fighting or after an operational pause.
6-218. The commander plans a pause to replenish combat power and phases the operation accordingly,if
the commander cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before subordinate forces reach their
culminating points. Simultaneously, the commander attempts to prevent the enemy from knowing when
friendly forces become overextended.
TRANSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
6-219. Once offensive actions begin,the attacking commander tries to sense when subordinate units reach,
or are about to reach,their respective culminating points. The commander must transition to a focus on the
defense (see chapter 7) before subordinate units reach this point. The commander has more freedom to choose
where and when to halt the attack, if the commander can sense that subordinate forces are approaching
culmination. The commander can plan future activities to aid the defense,minimize vulnerability to attack,
and facilitate renewal of the offense as the force transitions to branches or sequels of the ongoing operation.
For example, some subordinate units may move into battle positions before the entire unit terminates its
offensive actions to start preparing for ensuing defensive operations. The commander can echelon
sustainment assets forward to establish a new echelon support area. |
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