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Ermenegildo Zegna Group Reports Strong Fiscal Year 2021 Results | Strong Overall Performance with 2021 Results One Year Ahead of Plan1 2022 Outlook confirmed: Low-teens Revenue Growth and continued improvement in Adjusted EBIT2 after exceeding own expectations in 2021
MILAN -- ( BUSINESS WIRE) -- Ermenegildo Zegna N.V. ( NYSE: ZGN) ( “ Zegna Group, ” “ the Group, ” or “ the Company ”), the first Italian luxury fashion house listed on the New York Stock Exchange ( NYSE) and owner of the Zegna and Thom Browne brands, today filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ( “ SEC ”), reporting Adjusted EBIT2 of €149 million, with an incidence on revenues of 11.5%, above the guidance of “ around 10% ” published on February 1, 2022. Diluted Loss per share2 was €0.67 and Adjusted diluted earnings per share2 was €0.33. Adjustments from the reported Loss for the year of €128 million to the Adjusted Profit of €75 million relate to net charges of €203 million, mostly non-cash accounting adjustments, of which €205 million related to the December 2021 Business Combination3. As reported on February 1, 2022, the Group’ s overall performance exceeded the Plan1 shared last year ahead of the start of public trading, with revenues up 27% year-over-year, totaling approximately €1,292 million.
Ermenegildo “ Gildo ” Zegna, Chairman and CEO of the Zegna Group, said: “ 2021 was an epic year for the Zegna Group, and I am very proud of the journey that has brought us here today. I am also especially proud that we continue to achieve significant milestones while staying true to our roots and the heritage of sustainability my grandfather instilled in the Company 111 years ago. The Zegna brand continues to strengthen its position as a global leader in the luxury industry, and our continued focus on luxury leisurewear – ca. 50% of the brand’ s revenues – enhanced by the One Brand strategy, now in full swing, and by a further increase in pricing in-season, has proven to be successful with both recurring and new customers. In addition to the strength shown by our namesake brand, I am extremely pleased by the growth of Thom Browne, and the significant appeal this iconic brand has among younger consumers around the world. ”
“ I am deeply saddened by the tragic events in Ukraine, which all of us are following closely and with great concern. Zegna Group joined forces with the Camera Nazionale della Moda Italiana and provided a significant donation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the onset of this tragedy. We also committed to integrate as many as 30 Ukrainian refugees in our factories beginning in April 2022.
“ However, ” he added, “ ours is a multi-year journey and as we continue to monitor the ongoing developments of the COVID-19 pandemic around the world, especially the recent spike in China, we are already ahead of our Plan and remain positive about our growth in 2022. I am particularly excited to see our US and UAE business continue to grow while our business in Europe continues to see a post-lockdown rebound. We remain vigilant, but our 2021 results and our flexibility give me confidence that we are on the right track to reaching the targets set out in our Plan last year and the Group’ s longer-term ambitions even sooner than we anticipated. ”
Key Highlights from 2021
Net Revenues: For the year ended December 31, 2021, Zegna Group posted revenues of €1,292 million, up 27% from 2020. This strong performance was driven by a continued rebound of the Zegna segment, whose revenues increased 23% year-over-year to €1,035 million. The other primary driver was the exceptional performance of the Thom Browne segment, whose revenues were up 47% over 2020, reaching €264 million.
( Loss) /Profit for the year and Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss) 2: The Group’ s 2021 Loss for the year was €128 million due to mostly non-cash accounting adjustments, including of €205 million related to the December 2021 Business Combination3. Adjusted Profit was €75 million. For additional information regarding Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss), which is a non-IFRS measure, please see page 4.
Adjusted EBIT 2: The Group’ s Adjusted EBIT for the year was €149 million, up more than 7 times from €20 million recorded in 2020. Adjusted EBIT percentage incidence on revenues for the year exceeded the Group’ s prior guidance thanks to higher full-price sales in the mix and higher realized efficiencies. Adjusted EBIT for the Zegna segment was €111 million. As a percentage of revenues, Adjusted EBIT was 10.7% compared to 7.8% in 2019. This was driven by better sales mix, cost efficiencies and positive operating leverage. For the Thom Browne segment, Adjusted EBIT2 was €38 million, more than doubled from €16 million in 2019 due to a lower pace of cost growth in the 2019-2021 period, compared to the 64% increase in sales in the same period. Compared to 2020, Adjusted EBIT in 2021 grew 31% from €29 million. As a percentage of revenues, Adjusted EBIT was 14.4%, down slightly from the level of 16.1% in 2020. The strength in Thom Browne’ s top line was partly offset, as expected, by an increase in costs driven by higher volumes and growth-related expenses, including costs for expanding the direct-to-consumer store network and investments to improve central administrative functions and processes. For additional information regarding Adjusted EBIT, which is a non-IFRS measure, see page 4.
Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus), Trade Working Capital and Capital Expenditure: Cash Surplus2 was €145 million as of December 31, 2021, with €139 million in proceeds from the Business Combination3, compared to Net Financial Indebtedness2 of €7 million as of December 31, 2020. Trade Working Capital2 at year-end was €276 million, 21% of revenues, compared to 27% on December 31, 2020. Capital expenditure for 2021 totaled €48 million4, up from €39 million in 2020, reflecting mainly investments in the store network, the IT and production areas. For additional information regarding Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus), Trade Working Capital and Capital Expenditure, which are non-IFRS measures, see page 4.
Fiscal Year 2022 Outlook
The start of 2022 has been marked by considerable geopolitical uncertainty, adding to the volatility of the ongoing global health crisis. Assuming no further deterioration or geographic extension of the war in Ukraine, a normalization of the COVID-19 pandemic in Greater China before the summer, and no other unforeseen events, the Group is forecasting revenue growth in the low-teens. The Group also expects to continue to see improvement in its Adjusted EBIT building on the accelerated expansion achieved in 2021, when the Group delivered an Adjusted EBIT of 11.5% as a percentage of revenues, exceeding its own guidance of “ around 10% ”.
Annual Report on Form 20-F
The Form 20-F, including financial statements for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021, can be downloaded from the Company’ s website ( www.zegnagroup.com) under the section Investors / Financials / SEC Filings, or from the SEC’ s website ( www.sec.gov). Shareholders may request a hard copy of complete audited financial statements contained in the Form 20-F, free of charge, through the contacts below.
Investor Day on May 17
The Company will host an investor day on May 17, 2022, at Oasi Zegna, where it expects to unveil its sustainability strategy and its medium- to long-term financial goals.
Conference Call
As previously announced, at 8:00 a.m. ET ( 2:00 p.m. CET), the Company plans to host a webcast and conference call. A live webcast of the conference call will also be available on the Company’ s website at ir.zegnagroup.com. To participate in the call, please dial:
Italy dial-in number ( Local): 39 069 450 0327 United States: 1 844 200 6205 United States ( Local): 1 646 904 5544 United Kingdom ( Toll Free): 44 808 189 6484 All other locations: +1 929 526 1599 Access code: 512734
An online archive of the broadcast will be available on the website shortly after the live call and will be available for twelve months. An online archive of the broadcast will be available on the website shortly after the live call and will be available for twelve months.
1 The Zegna Group’ s Plan was published at the time of the announcement of the business combination between the Company and Investindustrial Acquisition Corp. ( “ IIAC ”). The Group’ s Plan was also disclosed in the Company’ s registration statement on Form F-4 filed with the SEC ( File No. 333-259139), under “ Certain Unaudited Zegna Prospective Financial Information ”. 2 Adjusted EBIT, Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss), Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus), Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share, Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share, Trade Working Capital and Capital Expenditure are non-IFRS financial measures. See the Non-IFRS Financial Measures section starting on page 4 of this communication for the definition of such non-IFRS measures and a reconciliation of such non-IFRS measures to the most directly comparable IFRS measures. 3 “ Business Combination ” means the business combination between Zegna and Investindustrial Acquisition Corp., which was completed on December 17, 2021. 4 Excludes the purchase of the building in New Bond Street, London that was subsequently part of the Disposition of certain of Zegna’ s businesses, completed on November 1, 2021 through the statutory demerger under Italian law to a new company owned by its then existing shareholders.
Non-IFRS Financial Measures
Zegna’ s management monitors and evaluates operating and financial performance using several non-IFRS financial measures including: adjusted earnings before interest and taxes ( “ Adjusted EBIT ”), adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss), Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Share, Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus), Trade Working Capital and Capital Expenditure. Zegna’ s management believes that these non-IFRS financial measures provide useful and relevant information regarding Zegna’ s financial performance and financial condition, and improve the ability of management and investors to assess and compare the financial performance and financial position of Zegna with those of other companies. They also provide comparable measures that facilitate management’ s ability to identify operational trends, as well as make decisions regarding future spending, resource allocations and other strategic and operational decisions. While similar measures are widely used in the industry in which Zegna operates, the financial measures that Zegna uses may not be comparable to other similarly named measures used by other companies nor are they intended to be substitutes for measures of financial performance or financial position as prepared in accordance with IFRS.
Adjusted EBIT
Adjusted EBIT is defined as profit or loss before income taxes plus financial income, financial expenses, exchange losses/ ( gains), result from investments accounted for using the equity method, impairments of investments accounted for using the equity method, adjusted for income and costs which are significant in nature and that management considers not reflective of underlying operating activities, including, for one or all of the years presented, costs related to the Business Combination, severance indemnities and provision for severance expenses, impairment of property, plant and equipment and right-of-use assets, certain costs related to lease agreements and certain other items.
The following table sets forth a reconciliation of ( Loss) /Profit for the year to Adjusted EBIT for the periods indicated.
2021
2020
2019
( 127,661)
( 46,540)
25,439
30,702
14,983
43,794
( 45,889)
( 34,352)
( 22,061)
43,823
48,072
37,492
7,791
( 13,455)
2,441
( 2,794)
4,205
1,534
-
4,532
-
205,059
-
-
15,512
3,000
-
8,996
12,308
9,777
8,692
19,725
8,858
4,884
7,535
-
149,115
20,013
107,274
( 1)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss)
Adjusted Profit/ ( Loss) represents profit or loss adjusted for income and costs ( net of tax effects) which are significant in nature and that management considers not reflective of underlying activities, including, for one or all of the years presented, costs related to the Business Combination, severance indemnities and provision for severance expenses, impairment of property, plant and equipment and right-of-use assets, certain costs related to lease agreements, gains on the Thom Browne option realized in connection with the exercise of the option, impairment of equity method investments and certain other items ( as further described below), as well as the tax effects of the adjusting items ( calculated based on the applicable tax rates of the jurisdictions where the adjustments relate).
The following table sets forth a reconciliation of ( Loss) /Profit for the year to Adjusted Profit for the periods indicated.
2021
2020
2019
( 127,661)
( 46,540)
25,439
205,332
-
-
15,512
3,000
-
8,996
12,308
9,777
8,692
19,725
8,858
( 20,675)
-
-
-
4,532
-
4,884
7,535
-
( 19,758)
( 5,312)
( 1,027)
75,322
( 4,752)
43,047
( 1)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
( 7)
( 8)
Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share
Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share represent basic earnings per share and diluted earnings per share adjusted for income and costs ( net of tax effects) which are significant in nature and that management considers not reflective of underlying activities, including, for one or all of the years presented, costs related to the Business Combination, severance indemnities and provision for severance expenses, impairment of property, plant and equipment and right-of-use assets, certain costs related to lease agreements, gains on the Thom Browne option realized in connection with the exercise of the option, impairment of equity method investments and certain other items ( as further described below), as well as the tax effects of the adjusting items ( calculated based on the applicable tax rates of the jurisdictions where the adjustments relate).
Zegna’ s management uses Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share to understand and evaluate Zegna’ s underlying performance. Zegna’ s management believes this non-IFRS measure is useful because it excludes items that it does not believe are indicative of its underlying performance and allows it to view operating trends, perform analytical comparisons and benchmark performance between periods. Accordingly, management believes that Adjusted Basic and Diluted Earnings per Share provides useful information to third party stakeholders in understanding and evaluating Zegna’ s operating results.
For the calculation of both Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share, basic earnings per share and diluted earnings per share the number of ordinary and potential ordinary shares outstanding for all periods reflects the share split performed as part of the Business Combination.
The following table sets forth the calculation of Adjusted Basic and Diluted Earnings per Share and provides a reconciliation of ( Loss) /Profit for the year to these non-IFRS measures for the periods indicated.
2021
2020
2019
( 127,661)
( 46,540)
25,439
205,332
-
-
15,512
3,000
-
8,996
12,308
9,777
8,692
19,725
8,858
( 20,675)
-
-
-
4,532
-
4,884
7,535
-
( 19,758)
( 5,312)
( 1,027)
75,322
( 4,752)
43,047
8,669
4,063
3,720
66,653
( 8,815)
39,327
203,499,933
201,489,100
201,561,100
0.33
( 0.04)
0.20
204,917,880
201,489,100
201,561,100
0.33
( 0.04)
0.20
( 1)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
( 2)
( 3)
( 4)
( 5)
( 6)
( 7)
( 8)
( 9)
Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus)
Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus) is defined as the sum of financial borrowings ( current and non-current), derivative financial instruments and bonds, loans and certain other financial liabilities ( recorded within other non-current financial liabilities in the consolidated statement of financial position), net of cash and cash equivalents, derivative financial instruments and certain other current financial assets.
The following table sets forth the calculation of Net Financial Indebtedness/ ( Cash Surplus) as of the dates indicated:
2021
2020
471,646
558,722
157,292
106,029
14,138
13,192
7,976
8,065
651,052
686,008
( 459,791)
( 317,291)
( 1,786)
( 11,848)
( 334,244)
( 350,163)
( 795,821)
( 679,302)
( 144,769)
6,706
Trade Working Capital
Trade Working Capital is defined as current assets less current liabilities adjusted for derivative assets and liabilities, tax assets and liabilities, cash and cash equivalents, assets and liabilities held for sale, borrowings, lease liabilities, and other assets and liabilities.
The following table sets forth the calculation of Trade Working Capital at December 31, 2021 and 2020:
2021
2020
1,384,531
1,239,156
( 702,316)
( 535,454)
682,215
703,702
1,786
11,848
14,966
15,611
340,380
350,163
68,773
66,718
459,791
317,291
-
17,225
( 157,292)
( 106,029)
( 106,643)
( 92,842)
( 14,138)
( 13,192)
( 33,984)
-
( 14,093)
( 8,325)
( 28,773)
( 33,362)
( 124,356)
( 76,637)
-
( 16,725)
275,798
271,958
160,360
138,829
338,475
321,471
( 223,037)
( 188,342)
Capital Expenditure
Capital expenditure is defined as the sum of cash outflows that result in additions to property, plant and equipment and intangible assets.
The following table shows a breakdown of capital expenditure by category for each of the years ended December 31, 2021, 2020 and 2019:
2021
2020
2019
79,699
27,630
46,113
14,627
11,524
13,392
94,326
39,154
59,505
About Ermenegildo Zegna Group
Founded in 1910 in Trivero, Italy by Ermenegildo Zegna, the Zegna Group designs, creates and distributes luxury menswear and accessories under the Zegna brand, as well as womenswear, menswear and accessories under the Thom Browne brand. Through its Luxury Textile Laboratory Platform – which works to preserve artisanal mills producing the finest Italian fabrics – the Zegna Group manufactures and distributes the highest quality fabrics and textiles. Group products are sold through over 500 stores in 80 countries around the world, of which 297 are directly operated by the Group as of December 31, 2021 ( 245 Zegna stores and 52 Thom Browne stores). Over the decades, Zegna Group has charted Our Road: a unique path that winds itself through era-defining milestones that have seen the Group grow from a producer of superior wool fabric to a global luxury group. Our Road has led us to New York, where the Group has been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since December 20, 2021. And while we continue to progress on Our Road to tomorrow, we remain committed to upholding our founder’ s legacy – one that is based upon the principle that a business’ s activities should help the environment. Today, the Zegna Group is creating a lifestyle that marches to the rhythm of modern times while continuing to nurture bonds with the natural world and with our communities that create a better present and future.
Forward Looking Statements
This communication, including the section “ Outlook ”, contains forward-looking statements that are based on beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to the Company. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by the following words: “ may, ” “ will, ” “ could, ” “ would, ” “ should, ” “ expect, ” “ intend, ” “ plan, ” “ anticipate, ” “ believe, ” “ estimate, ” “ predict, ” “ project, ” “ potential, ” “ continue, ” “ ongoing, ” “ target, ” “ seek ” or the negative or plural of these words, or other similar expressions that are predictions or indicate future events or prospects, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words. Any statements that refer to expectations, projections or other characterizations of future events or circumstances, including strategies or plans, are also forward-looking statements. These statements involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from the information expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. Although the Company believes that it has a reasonable basis for each forward-looking statement contained in this communication, the Company cautions you that these statements are based on a combination of facts and factors currently known and projections of the future, which are inherently uncertain. In addition, risks and uncertainties are described in the Company’ s filings with the SEC. These filings may identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Most of these factors are outside the Company’ s control and are difficult to predict. In light of the significant uncertainties in these forward-looking statements, you should not regard these statements as a representation or warranty by the Company and its directors, officers or employees or any other person that the Company will achieve its objectives and plans in any specified time frame, or at all. The forward-looking statements in this communication represent the views of Zegna as of the date of this communication. Subsequent events and developments may cause that view to change. However, while Zegna may elect to update these forward-looking statements at some point in the future, the Company disclaims any obligation to update or revise publicly forward-looking statements. You should, therefore, not rely on these forward-looking statements as representing the views of the Company as of any date subsequent to the date of this communication.
FY 2021 Summary Tables
Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS
for the years ended December 31, 2021, 2020 and 2019
( Euro thousands)
For the years ended December 31,
2021
2020
2019
Revenues
1,292,402
1,014,733
1,321,327
Other income
8,260
5,373
7,873
Cost of raw materials and consumables
( 309,609)
( 250,569)
( 309,801)
Purchased, outsourced and other costs
( 353,629)
( 286,926)
( 371,697)
Personnel costs
( 367,762)
( 282,659)
( 331,944)
Depreciation, amortization and impairment of assets
( 163,367)
( 185,930)
( 177,068)
Write downs and other provisions
( 19,487)
( 6,178)
( 1,017)
Other operating costs
( 180,836)
( 30,399)
( 49,034)
Operating ( Loss) /Profit
( 94,028)
( 22,555)
88,639
Financial income
45,889
34,352
22,061
Financial expenses
( 43,823)
( 48,072)
( 37,492)
Foreign exchange ( losses) /gains
( 7,791)
13,455
( 2,441)
Result from investments accounted for using the equity method
2,794
( 4,205)
( 1,534)
Impairments of investments accounted for using the equity method
-
( 4,532)
-
( Loss) /Profit before taxes
( 96,959)
( 31,557)
69,233
Income taxes
( 30,702)
( 14,983)
( 43,794)
( Loss) /Profit for the year
( 127,661)
( 46,540)
25,439
Attributable to:
Shareholders of the Parent Company
( 136,001)
( 50,577)
21,749
Non-controlling interests
8,340
4,037
3,690
Basic earnings per share in Euro
( 0.67)
( 0.25)
0.11
Diluted earnings per share in Euro
( 0.67)
( 0.25)
0.11
Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.
CONSOLIDATED CASH FLOW STATEMENT
for the years ended December 31, 2021, 2020 and 2019
( Euro thousands)
For the years ended December 31,
2021
2020
2019
Operating activities
( Loss) /Profit for the year
( 127,661)
( 46,540)
25,439
Income taxes
30,702
14,983
43,794
Depreciation, amortization and impairment of assets
163,367
185,930
177,068
Financial income
( 45,889)
( 34,352)
( 22,061)
Financial costs
43,823
48,072
37,492
Exchange losses/ ( gains)
7,791
( 13,455)
2,441
Write downs and other provisions
19,487
6,178
1,017
Write downs of the provision for obsolete inventory
29,600
37,735
6,691
Result from investments accounted for using the equity method
( 2,794)
4,205
1,534
Impairments of investments accounted for using the equity method
-
4,532
-
Losses arising from the sale of fixed assets
1,153
1,091
970
Other non-cash expenses/ ( income), net
230,812
( 27,698)
( 6,420)
Change in inventories
( 27,554)
( 39,486)
( 5,400)
Change in trade receivables
( 12,294)
35,675
( 8,377)
Change in trade payables including customer advances
31,426
( 38,485)
( 11,002)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities
19,973
( 10,031)
( 11,285)
Interest paid
( 17,487)
( 21,023)
( 26,872)
Income taxes paid
( 63,300)
( 36,425)
( 30,907)
Net cash flows from operating activities
281,155
70,906
174,122
Investing activities
Payments for property plant and equipment
( 79,699)
( 27,630)
( 46,113)
Proceeds from disposals of property plant and equipment
3,791
1,125
-
Payments for intangible assets
( 14,627)
( 11,524)
( 13,392)
Payments for investment property
-
-
( 325)
Proceeds from disposals of non-current financial assets
1,536
45,979
-
Payments for purchases of non-current financial assets
( 4,431)
-
( 6,987)
Proceeds from disposals of current financial assets and derivative instruments
92,021
253,201
327,422
Payments for acquisitions of current financial assets and derivative instruments
( 76,058)
( 166,334)
( 167,308)
Acquisition of Investments at equity method
( 313)
-
-
Business combinations, net of cash acquired
( 4,224)
( 2,245)
( 9,336)
Net cash flows ( used in) /from investing activities
( 82,004)
92,572
83,961
Financing activities
Proceeds from borrowings
123,570
265,352
130,841
Repayments of borrowings
( 160,210)
( 221,029)
( 272,851)
Repayments of non-current financial liabilities
( 4,287)
-
-
Payments of lease liabilities
( 100,611)
( 90,699)
( 110,460)
Purchase of own shares from Monterubello
( 455,000)
-
-
Proceeds from issuance of ordinary shares upon Business Combination
310,739
-
-
Proceeds from issuance of ordinary shares to PIPE Investors
331,385
-
-
Payments of transaction costs related to the Business Combination
( 48,475)
-
-
Cash distributed as part of the Disposition
( 26,272)
-
-
Payments for acquisition of non-controlling interests
( 40,253)
-
-
Sale of shares held in treasury/ ( Purchase of own shares)
5,959
( 945)
( 94)
Dividends paid to non-controlling interests
( 548)
( 1,731)
( 14,922)
Dividends to owners of the parent
( 102)
-
-
Net cash flows used in financing activities
( 64,105)
( 49,052)
( 267,486)
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents
7,454
( 7,761)
1,698
Net increase/ ( decrease) in cash and cash equivalents
142,500
106,665
( 7,705)
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the year
317,291
210,626
218,331
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the year
459,791
317,291
210,626
Ermenegildo Zegna N.V.
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION
at December 31, 2021 and 2020
( Euro thousands)
At December 31
2021
2020
Assets
Non-current assets
Intangible assets
425,220
387,847
Property, plant and equipment
111,474
244,127
Right-of-use assets
370,470
351,646
Investments at equity method
22,447
21,360
Deferred tax assets
108,210
71,901
Investment property
-
49,754
Other non-current financial assets
35,372
49,263
Total non-current assets
1,073,193
1,175,898
Current assets
Inventories
338,475
321,471
Trade receivables
160,360
138,829
Derivative financial instruments
1,786
11,848
Tax receivables
14,966
15,611
Other current financial assets
340,380
350,163
Other current assets
68,773
66,718
Cash and cash equivalents
459,791
317,291
1,384,531
1,221,931
Assets held for sale
-
17,225
Total current assets
1,384,531
1,239,156
Total assets
2,457,724
2,415,054
Liabilities and Equity
Share capital
5,939
4,300
Retained earnings
498,592
893,236
Other reserves
96,679
( 295,772)
Equity attributable to shareholders of the Parent Company
601,210
601,764
Equity attributable to non-controlling interest
43,094
43,270
Total equity
644,304
645,034
Non-current liabilities
Non-current borrowings
471,646
558,722
Other non-current financial liabilities
167,387
220,968
Non-current lease liabilities
331,409
314,845
Non-current provisions for risks and charges
44,555
39,956
Employee benefits
42,263
29,347
Deferred tax liabilities
53,844
70,728
Total non-current liabilities
1,111,104
1,234,566
Current liabilities
Current borrowings
157,292
106,029
Other current financial liabilities
33,984
-
Current lease liabilities
106,643
92,842
Derivative financial instruments
14,138
13,192
Current provisions for risks and charges
14,093
8,325
Trade payables and customer advances
223,037
188,342
Tax liabilities
28,773
33,362
Other current liabilities
124,356
76,637
702,316
518,729
Liabilities held for sale
-
16,725
Total current liabilities
702,316
535,454 | general |
Airbus, Qatar jetliner feud enters UK court spotlight | The Gulf carrier will on Thursday ask a UK judge to extend an order that prevents Airbus revoking a contract for 50 A321neo jets, pending fuller hearings.
Airbus took the exceptionally rare step of halting the order in January in retaliation for Qatar's refusal to accept delivery of larger A350s, citing a breakdown in relations that has the makings of a corporate divorce trial.
Qatar has grounded 23 of the A350 jets, voicing concerns over the safety impact of gaps in a layer of lightning protection left exposed by cracked and bubbling paint.
It says it will not take further deliveries until the cause is formally explained and is suing Airbus for steadily rising compensation that now exceeds $ 1 billion.
The world's largest planemaker has acknowledged quality problems with the jets but insists the damage is well within safety tolerances, noting that European regulators consider them airworthy and other airlines continue to fly them.
Airline chiefs contacted by Reuters did not share Qatar's concerns over airworthiness of the A350 but voiced growing alarm over the scale of the dispute which has disturbed a broad industry consensus over safety and generated a trail of intricate filings.
`` It is not good for the industry. They both need to get it out of the courtroom and find an agreement, '' the chief executive of one Airbus customer told Reuters.
Several industry players have offered to mediate but so far there are no signs of any breakthrough, though neither side has definitively closed the door to discussion and Airbus has said it wants an `` amicable '' settlement.
Thursday's hearing will be the first in-person clash after procedural sessions were held online because of COVID-19 restrictions.
'DANGEROUS GAME '
Statements filed in advance of the unusual hearing shed new light on industrial planning and details of aircraft negotiations that are typically kept under wraps.
The case has also shone a spotlight on delicate relations between France, where Airbus is based, and one of its closest Gulf allies at a time when Qatar's role as a gas producer has come to the fore as Europe seeks to reduce its reliance on Russia.
In order to decide on Qatar's request for an injunction, a judge will weigh which side has most to lose if the A321 contract is scrapped and to what extent the plane is unique in its category. That issue goes to the heart of Airbus's battle for sales with rival Boeing in the busiest part of the market.
Airbus has outsold Boeing about four to one at the top end of the market for single-aisle jets and Chief Operating Officer Christian Scherer said last year the A321neo had `` unmatched capabilities ( and) operating economics ''.
In statements pre-filed to the court, however, Airbus said Qatar Airways could replace the cancelled A321neos with the rival Boeing 737 MAX, which it provisionally ordered in December, or Airbus jets available from leasing companies.
The case has also given a glimpse of the stakes involved as leasing companies handle an uneven recovery while waiting for lease rates to catch up with the levels they planned before the pandemic.
Airbus told the court leasing companies are looking for homes for 80 A320s and 48 A321s in 2023 - a relatively high number a year before delivery, according to market sources.
`` It shows that lessors believe the lease market is going to move up and are holding back before placing airplanes acquired before the pandemic - but it's a dangerous game, '' said aviation adviser Bertrand Grabowski.
Qatar Airways, in turn, revealed normally closely held details of product plans for the A321neo, including pedal controls for seats and toilets adapted from those on the luxurious A380 superjumbo. Such details are usually jealously guarded until airlines are ready to reveal them in a highly competitive travel industry.
After the glare of proceedings at the High Court in London this month, the two sides are heading for a potentially uncomfortable meeting at the airline industry's largest annual event in June, relocated to Qatar because of travel restrictions in China.
Willie Walsh, the head of the International Air Transport Association, said on Wednesday he did not expect the dispute to distract from the meeting which is likely to focus on the impact of the Ukraine conflict.
( Reporting by Tim Hepher; Editing by Shri Navaratnam)
By Tim Hepher | business |
Boeing 737 MAX lands in China amid uncertainty over model's return | * Flight from Guam arrived in Shanghai - tracking websites
* Airplane meant for China Eastern subsidiary Shanghai Airlines
* China Eastern 737-800 crash could delay MAX return - analysts
April 7 ( Reuters) - A Boeing Co 737 MAX meant for China Eastern Airlines subsidiary Shanghai Airlines landed in Shanghai on Thursday, flight tracking websites showed, amid uncertainty over when the model will resume flying in China.
Flight BOE631 from Guam came more than three weeks after the first 737 MAX bound for a Chinese customer since a 2019 grounding began its journey from Seattle to Boeing's completion plant in Zhoushan.
The plane, painted in Shanghai Airlines livery, had been stuck on the ground in Guam since March 15 due to a minor technical issue. It landed at 12:02 p.m. Shanghai local time ( 0402 GMT), tracking websites showed.
Boeing said it was bringing the plane to its facility in Zhoushan to be closer to its customer and support a smooth and convenient delivery process.
`` The airplane will be delivered only when the customer is ready, '' Boeing said in a statement.
China Eastern did not respond immediately to a request for comment.
The flight to Shanghai, which is in the middle of a strict COVID-19 related lockdown, came as Chinese authorities scrutinise China Eastern's safety processes following the crash of a 737-800 on March 21 that killed all 132 people on board.
While that model is the predecessor to the MAX, analysts have expressed concern it could set back Boeing's efforts to regain ground in the world's biggest aircraft market and deliver more than 140 737 MAX jets already constructed for Chinese customers.
China's aviation regulator in early December provided airlines with a list of fixes required before its return to commercial flying, which it predicted would occur by the beginning of this year. So far, however, there have been only test flights.
China Eastern has grounded all 223 of its 737-800 planes as a precaution while the crash is investigated. Chinese authorities are leading the investigation but the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is helping them to read the plane's black boxes.
Depending on the results of the probe, China Eastern risks consequences including fines, aircraft groundings and unfavourable treatment when applying for new routes and airport slots, Morningstar analyst Cheng Weng said.
China Eastern has not released any forecast of when it expects MAX deliveries to resume, though rival China Southern Airlines said last week it could take some of the planes this year. ( Reporting by Jamie Freed in Sydney; additional reporting by Eric M. Johnson in Seattle and Stella Qiu in Beijing Editing by Shri Navaratnam) | business |
Copper prices fall as hawkish Fed boosts the dollar | - Copper prices fell on Wednesday as fears of rapid U.S. interest rate rises, slowing economic growth and more sanctions on Russia dented risk appetite and sent the dollar to its strongest level in almost two years.
Benchmark copper on the London Metal Exchange ( LME) was down 1.2% at $ 10,335 a tonne at 1601 GMT.
Hawkish comments from the U.S. Federal Reserve had `` taken the steam out of the rally, '' said Saxo Bank analyst Ole Hansen. `` The market is worried about an economic slowdown, '' he said.
But copper, which is used in power and construction, remained near a record high of $ 10,845 reached last month and Hansen predicted further price rises because supply is tight and more metal will be needed for the world to decarbonise.
MARKETS: Global share prices fell, U.S. Treasury yields hit multi-year highs and the dollar strengthened as investors waited for the minutes of the Fed's March meeting.
A stronger U.S. currency makes dollar-priced metals more expensive for overseas buyers.
SANCTIONS: Expectations of new sanctions on Russian energy exports pushed oil prices higher.
CHINA: China, the biggest metals consumer, is facing its most severe COVID-19 wave since the Wuhan outbreak and Chinese manufacturing and services activity shrank in March.
`` The ( Chinese) market is entering what has traditionally been a peak season for demand, '' said Paul Adkins at AZ Global Consulting. `` That peak season is under some threat. ''
GERMANY: German industrial orders fell more than expected in February, data showed.
`` Though we expect metals prices and demand to remain robust in the developed markets in the near term, we believe that recession risks in 2023 are rising, '' Citi analysts said.
ZINC: On-warrant inventories of zinc in LME-registered warehouses tumbled to 45,850 tonnes from more than 100,000 tonnes a week ago, highlighting fears of tight supply. < MZNSTX-TOTAL >
LME zinc was down 0.9% at $ 4,267 a tonne but up around 20% this year having reached a record high in March.
OTHER METALS: LME aluminium was down 0.3% at $ 3,453.50 a tonne, nickel rose 0.6% to $ 33,495, lead fell 0.4% to $ 2,418 and tin was 0.4% lower at $ 44,000.
( Reporting by Peter Hobson; additional reporting by Brijesh Patel in Bengaluru; editing by Amy Caren Daniel, Jason Neely and David Evans) | business |
Attorney General Merrick Garland tests positive for Covid | Attorney General Merrick Garland tested positive for Covid on Wednesday, just hours after speaking in person at a news conference alongside FBI Director Christopher Wray and other top Biden administration officials.
Garland, who is not symptomatic, asked to be tested for the virus after learning he may have been exposed, the Department of Justice said in a statement. He is fully vaccinated and boosted against Covid and will work from home while isolating for five days, the department said.
The attorney general is not considered to be a close contact of President Joe Biden, a DOJ official told CNBC. Biden's most recent Covid test, taken on Monday, came back negative, the White House told reporters later Wednesday.
Garland's positive test comes after several people in Biden's orbit, including press aides Jen Psaki and Karine Jean-Pierre, had Covid in recent weeks. The virus has also affected Vice President Kamala Harris: her communications director Jamal Simmons tested positive for Covid and Harris is considered a close contact, her office said Wednesday.
Harris will follow CDC guidance and continue with her public schedule, according to her spokeswoman Kirsten Allen.
Garland over the weekend reportedly went to a white-tie dinner attended by hundreds of politicians and journalists, a growing number of whom have since tested positive for Covid.
Another attendee in Biden's Cabinet, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, tested positive earlier Wednesday.
Reps. Joaquin Castro of Texas and Adam Schiff of California, who were also at the dinner, announced their own positive Covid test results on Tuesday.
The Gridiron Club and Foundation dinner Saturday night hosted more than 600 political elites and media figures who flocked to the four-star Renaissance Hotel in downtown D.C.
The traditional event features high-profile figures — including U.S. presidents — cracking political jokes usually aimed at other lawmakers and the press.
An annual event that has been held in various forms for more than a century, the Gridiron dinner Saturday night was the first one to be held since the start of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020.
The Gridiron Club did not respond to CNBC's requests for comment earlier Wednesday regarding Raimondo and other attendees testing positive for Covid.
Asked whether Biden has been near anyone who attended the Gridiron dinner, a White House official told CNBC its policy is to disclose when someone who later tests positive for Covid has had close contact with the president.
Garland's previous meeting with Biden was a week earlier at an outdoor signing ceremony in the White House Rose Garden, the official said.
The attorney general on Wednesday revealed an indictment charging Konstantin Malofeyev, a Russian oligarch accused of funding separatist efforts in the Crimean peninsula, with violating U.S. sanctions.
At that news conference, Garland was flanked by Wray, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco and other senior Biden administration officials, raising concerns about Covid exposure among the top brass of U.S. national security.
`` FBI Director Wray is aware of Attorney General Garland's positive COVID-19 test today. At this time, the Director is experiencing no symptoms, '' the FBI told CNBC in a statement. `` Director Wray, who is fully vaccinated and boosted, will continue to follow CDC guidance and take all necessary precautions. ''
Also joining Garland were Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicholas McQuaid, FBI Cyber Section Chief Philip Frigm and Klepto Capture Task Force Director Andrew Adams.
Less than a week earlier, CIA Director William Burns tested positive for Covid after meeting with Biden in a meeting described by the agency as `` socially distanced. ''
Burns was not considered a close contact to the president and wore an N-95 mask during their meeting, the agency said.
— CNBC's Amanda Macias and Christina Wilkie contributed to this report. | business |
FDA halts Vir, GSK antibody use in response to COVID subvariant's spread | Drugmakers and regulators are trying to stay ahead of frequent mutations in the coronavirus that can disable once-effective treatments for COVID-19. The latest decision to withdraw the emergency clearance for sotrovimab completely came after the FDA twice limited the drug's use to specific regions that weren't yet host to the BA.2 subvariant.
Lilly and Regeneron were the first companies to win authorization of antibody therapies for COVID-19 and the medicines were initially quite effective. When former President Trump contracted the virus in October 2020, he received Regeneron's drug.
The treatment picture changed with omicron, which could evade Lilly and Regeneron's medications. Officials then turned to the still-effective sotrovimab. The U.S. government bought up 600,000 doses, and demand around the world soared.
As of a few months ago, U.S. authorities were shipping about 50,000 doses of sotrovimab to states and territories every week. Shipments of Lilly's bebtelovimab quickly shot up to the same level after the drug's authorization in February. Distributions of both treatments decreased in recent weeks as supplies dwindled and authorities waited for new funds from Congress to buy more.
Vir and GSK plan to seek FDA authorization for a higher dose of sotrovimab they think can prove effective versus BA.2. And even as sotrovimab loses its emergency clearance, another company is trying to break into the treatment market despite doubts that its product works against omicron. Adagio Therapeutics said last week it's planning to ask the FDA to authorize its antibody treatment, known as adintrevimab.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
The first quarter ended with biotechs raising just $ 711 million combined in IPOs, less than in the same period in each of the previous three years and a signal that valuations have tumbled during the sector’ s downturn.
For the first time in years, biotechs no longer have an easy path onto Wall Street, a market reversal that could change what the next generation of young drugmakers looks like.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
The first quarter ended with biotechs raising just $ 711 million combined in IPOs, less than in the same period in each of the previous three years and a signal that valuations have tumbled during the sector’ s downturn.
For the first time in years, biotechs no longer have an easy path onto Wall Street, a market reversal that could change what the next generation of young drugmakers looks like.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more. | tech |
U.S. yields rise with eyes on upcoming Fed minutes | - U.S. Treasury yields rose on Wednesday with traders focused on the expected minutes of the most recent Federal Reserve meeting for clues on the pace and scope of the Fed's plans to reduce its bond holdings.
Fed Governor Lael Brainard said on Tuesday she expects rapid reductions to the Fed's balance sheet and that the process could start in early May, sending yields on the 2-, 5- and 10-year Treasuries to multi-year highs, while helping reverse last week's inversion of the 2-10 yield curve.
The Fed's recent rate hike, and market expectations for more, mainly affect the short end of the curve, while selling duration held in the U.S. central bank's balance sheet would pressure yields higher on the long end.
Wednesday's move higher in yields `` is a continuation from yesterday when ( yields) reacted to Governor Brainard's comment about a rapid unwind of the balance sheet. I think that phrasing took the market a little bit by surprise, '' said Lou Brien, market strategist at DRW Trading in Chicago.
Brien said he expects the recent steepening on the 2-10 curve to reverse.
`` The trend we 've seen is going to continue. The balance sheet is going to be a more technical trade based on how they unwind it, but on the longer run the rate hikes are going to call the tune for the 2-10, '' Brien added.
The Fed is due to release minutes of its March meeting at 2 p.m. Washington time ( 1800 GMT). On that meeting, the U.S. central bank raised rates for the first time since 2018 and pivoted from an easy policy to battle the effects of the coronavirus pandemic to a more aggressive stance on fighting inflation.
The yield on 10-year Treasury notes was up 7.4 basis points to 2.628% while the 2-year note yield was up 2 basis points at 2.524%, leaving the 2-10 curve at 10.12 basis points, after starting the week inverted.
The yield on the 30-year Treasury bond was up 7.8 basis points to 2.660% after touching 2.68%, its highest since May 2019.
The breakeven rate on five-year U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities ( TIPS) was last at 3.27%, after closing at 3.262% on Tuesday.
The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate was last at 2.857% and the U.S. dollar 5-years forward inflation-linked swap, seen by some as a better gauge of inflation expectations due to possible distortions caused by the Fed's quantitative easing, was last at 2.623%. ( Reporting by Rodrigo Campos; Editing by Will Dunham) | business |
FDA advisers grapple with how to update COVID-19 vaccines | A group of advisers to the Food and Drug Administration agreed Wednesday that COVID-19 vaccines will likely need to be updated to keep pace with a fast-changing coronavirus, but said they would need more information to guide future decisions.
The FDA convened the group, made up of independent vaccine and public health experts, to provide input on how drugmakers should adapt their vaccines to better guard against variants like omicron, or others that might emerge over time.
The question is an urgent one, as roughly half of U.S. adults who received a two-dose vaccine series have yet to get a third dose, which has been shown to restore some protection and boost waning antibody levels. The FDA authorized booster doses for all adults in November and last month cleared a fourth dose for older adults and people who are immunocompromised.
`` Coming into the fall season, only half of the population overall has received a third dose, '' meaning the other half won't have durable protection, said Peter Marks, head of the FDA office that reviews vaccines, at Wednesday's meeting.
`` That's a lot of vaccine, '' he added. `` Do you modify your vaccine composition so that, when you do boost those people, you give them the best chance of having longer-lasting protection? ''
Experts on the panel attempted to answer that question, but struggled with how to determine the best composition and to assess whether it remained sufficiently safe and effective for broad use.
`` We're looking at a conundrum here, '' said Ofer Levy, a physician and director of a vaccine program at Boston Children's Hospital. `` It's going to be hard to generate all the data we want in short order when a new variant emerges. ''
According to many of the advisers, the best data on which to base decisions are what's known as a `` correlate of protection, '' or a defined level of immune response that establishes whether someone is protected from disease or infection. So far, that information has been hard to obtain, although researchers are trying.
Without an established threshold for immunity, the FDA and other health agencies have had to rely on comparing antibody levels following vaccination, a process that Marks termed a `` poor person's immune correlate of protection. ''
In debating COVID vaccine modifications, FDA officials and the agency's advisers drew parallels to the system the U.S. and other countries use to update influenza vaccines each year. The process typically begins in February or March with the selection of the strains expected to be circulating the following winter, and allows for drugmakers to manufacture enough doses for fall vaccination drives.
Similarly, if U.S. health agencies hope to have updated COVID vaccines ready by the fall, clinical trials testing those shots will likely need to begin by next month for drugmakers to report results and have new doses made in time, a government official told the committee.
`` If you're not on your way to that clinical trial by the beginning of May, I think it's going to be very difficult to have, collectively across manufacturers, enough product to meet that demand, '' said Robert Johnson, deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, or BARDA.
Both Pfizer and Moderna are testing versions of their vaccines that are tailored to omicron, and Moderna is also studying a `` bivalent '' formulation that targets omicron and the original coronavirus strain.
While the advisory committee did not vote on any specific proposals, they did resolve to meet again on the issue and some members suggested they play a more active role in guiding the update process.
`` I feel like, at some level, the companies dictate the conversation here, '' said Paul Offit, director of the vaccine education center at Children's Hospital of Philadelphia. `` It really has to come from us. ''
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
The first quarter ended with biotechs raising just $ 711 million combined in IPOs, less than in the same period in each of the previous three years and a signal that valuations have tumbled during the sector’ s downturn.
For the first time in years, biotechs no longer have an easy path onto Wall Street, a market reversal that could change what the next generation of young drugmakers looks like.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
The first quarter ended with biotechs raising just $ 711 million combined in IPOs, less than in the same period in each of the previous three years and a signal that valuations have tumbled during the sector’ s downturn.
For the first time in years, biotechs no longer have an easy path onto Wall Street, a market reversal that could change what the next generation of young drugmakers looks like.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more. | tech |
Stocks fall, dollar strengthens after Fed minutes | The benchmark U.S. 10-year Treasury yield rose, but was off its session high after the minutes, while oil prices fell sharply on the day.
Trading was choppy on Wall Street following the minutes, with stocks briefly paring losses and then extending them. The Nasdaq ended down more than 2%, leading declines among the major indexes.
`` There's nothing new here from what I see... But clearly we 've got rate hikes ahead of us, and we have a shrinking balance sheet ahead of us, '' said Tim Ghriskey, senior portfolio strategist at Ingalls & Snyder in New York.
`` The Fed is determined to rein in inflation, and we just hope and pray that there will be a soft landing of the economy and not a hard landing that sends us into a recession. ''
According to minutes of the March 15-16 policy meeting, Fed officials `` generally agreed '' to cut up to $ 95 billion a month from the central bank's asset holdings as another tool in the fight against surging inflation, even as the war in Ukraine tempered the first U.S. interest rate increase.
In March, the Fed raised rates for the first time since 2018 and pivoted away from an easy monetary policy during the coronavirus pandemic.
The United States imposed more sanctions on Russia on Wednesday, as Russian forces bombarded cities in Ukraine.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 144.67 points, or 0.42%, to 34,496.51, the S & P 500 lost 43.97 points, or 0.97%, to 4,481.15 and the Nasdaq Composite dropped 315.35 points, or 2.22%, to 13,888.82.
The pan-European STOXX 600 index lost 1.53% and MSCI's gauge of stocks across the globe shed 1.22%.
In the Treasury market, the yield on the 2-year note, which moves with rate hike expectations, was little changed on the day after rising and falling about 8 bps in each direction. The 10-year yield held most of the session's gains, and the 2-10 yield curve steepened.
The yield on 10-year Treasury notes was last up 5.5 basis points to 2.609% while the 2-year note yield was unchanged at 2.504%, leaving the 2-10 curve at 10.28 basis points, after starting the week inverted.
The dollar index, which measures the greenback's value against six major currencies, climbed to 99.7780, its strongest level in nearly two years. It was last up 0.1% at 99.588.
Europe's single currency benefited earlier from strong euro zone producer prices for February, which surged 31.4% year-on-year in February.
The euro was last slightly down at $ 1.0896, after briefly touching a nearly one-month low of $ 1.0874.
Oil futures fell sharply as the dollar rose after the Fed minutes and as the oil market girded for member states of the International Energy Agency ( IEA) to release 120 million barrels from strategic reserves to quell price gains.
Brent crude futures settled down $ 5.57, or 5.2%, at $ 101.07 a barrel, while U.S. crude fell $ 5.73, or 5.6%, to $ 96.23 a barrel.
( Additional reporting by Sinead Carew, Rodrigo Campos and David Gaffen in New York; Huw Jones in London and Bansari Mayur Kamdar and Praveen Paramasivam in Bengaluru; Editing by Alexander Smith, David Holmes, Emelia Sithole-Matarise and David Gregorio)
By Caroline Valetkevitch | business |
UK shares break 3-day winning streak on U.S. rate hike worries | ( For a Reuters live blog on U.S., UK and European stock markets, click LIVE/ or type LIVE/ in a news window)
* Hawkish Fed view sparks selloff in equities
* Imperial Brands gains after H1 trading update
* Avon Protection worst hit among small-cap stocks
* FTSE 100 down 0.3%, FTSE 250 off 1.2%
April 6 ( Reuters) - Britain's main stock indexes snapped three sessions of gains on Wednesday as investors feared an aggressive U.S. monetary policy tightening and new Western sanctions on Russia would slow economic growth.
The blue-chip FTSE 100 index closed 0.3% lower, dragged down by Unilever which fell 1.1% after Barclays cut its price target on the Dove soap maker's stock.
However, gains in AstraZeneca and consumer staple stocks helped limit losses on the index.
Tobacco company Imperial Brands gained 3.3% to top the FTSE 100 after it forecast higher first-half profit.
Shares of rival British American Tobacco also rose 2.4%.
Market participants were cautious ahead of the minutes of the Fed's March meeting due at 1800 GMT which may indicate just how fast and how far policymakers will proceed in shrinking the size of its massive balance sheet and hiking interest rates to tackle inflation.
`` Interest rates are definitely a risk but they are more of a risk in the United States. We suspect the outcome for Europe will be slightly more benign because it is structurally more at the risk of a recession, '' said Francis Ellison, portfolio manager at Columbia Threadneedle Investments.
A survey showed British households ' financial situation is now the most precarious since the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic in the second quarter of 2020, due to a surging cost of living.
The domestically-focused mid-cap FTSE 250 index ended 1.2% down, while a gauge of euro zone stocks fell 2.3%.
Overall, the FTSE 100 has outperformed this year as surging commodity prices boosted mining and energy stocks, while financials got a lift from rate hikes from the Bank of England.
Hyve Group jumped 8.2% after the events group said it would sell its Russian business following boycott warnings from customers.
Design and engineering company Avon Protection slumped 19.1% after it said first-half profitability was hit by weaker-than-expected sales and higher costs.
Meanwhile, Britain froze the assets of Russian banks Sberbank and Credit Bank of Moscow, and said it would end all imports of Russian coal and oil by the end of 2022. ( Reporting by Sruthi Shankar and Devik Jain in Bengaluru; Editing by Subhranshu Sahu, Uttaresh.V and Emelia Sithole-Matarise) | business |
Explainer: The Fed's 'QT ' plan: Then and now | Minutes from the central bank's meeting last month, released Wednesday, showed policymakers were presented a range of options for reducing the size of its balance sheet. That stash of assets has roughly doubled in size during the coronavirus pandemic as the Fed used purchases of Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities to smooth market functioning and augment the effects of its interest rates cuts.
Here's a rundown of what appears to be in the cards and how it differs from the 2017-2019 `` QT '' period.
EARLIER START
The Fed appears poised to kick off this QT round just one meeting after lifting its benchmark short-term interest rate for the first time since 2018.
Last time, the launch of QT in the fall of 2017 occurred nearly two years after its first rate hike, which took place in December 2015.
LARGER CAPS
Fed officials `` generally agreed '' on a plan to cut about $ 95 billion a month from its holdings, split between $ 60 billion of Treasuries and $ 35 billion of MBS.
That is roughly double the maximum pace of $ 50 billion a month targeted in the 2017-2019 cycle. Back then, the split was $ 30 billion of Treasuries and $ 20 billion of MBS.
FASTER RAMP-UP
In the last cycle, it took a full year for the Fed to reach its maximum reduction rate of $ 50 billion a month. It started with $ 10 billion a month ( $ 6 billion Treasuries/ $ 4 billion MBS) and increased that by $ 10 billion a quarter until it reached its maximum rate in the fall of 2018.
This time, it will go from zero to $ 95 billion in the space of three months... `` or modestly longer if market conditions warrant. '' The minutes did not spell out precisely how the caps would be `` phased in, '' a detail likely to be set out at the May 3-4 Federal Open Market Committee meeting that is seen launching the process.
BIGGER BALANCE SHEET, BIGGER SHRINKAGE
When the Fed kicked off its first-ever QT undertaking, its total balance sheet was around $ 4.5 trillion in size. In nearly two years of QT, it managed to bring that down by about $ 650 billion to a bit over $ 3.8 trillion before it brought the program to a stop.
This time, the annualized monthly rate of reduction works out to more than $ 1.1 trillion a year in balance sheet roll offs. That means it will likely surpass the total of the entire 2017-2019 QT cycle by the end of this year or early 2023. Many economists see officials targeting about $ 3 trillion in total balance sheet shrinkage over a three-year span.
DIFFERENT TREASURIES MIX
The Fed's Treasuries portfolio is shorter in maturity this time than in the previous QT round by about two years, according to New York Fed data. That is in part owing to the substantial purchases of T-bills, particularly early on in the crisis, to help restore market stability.
The minutes showed officials are eyeing redemptions of Treasury bills, which mature in a year or less, when the redemption of coupon securities, which are notes and bonds with maturities greater than one year, are below the cap. T-bills are highly valued by private investors and reducing the Fed's stock of them would facilitate more issuance of them by the U.S. Treasury.
In addition, officials generally don't view T-bills as a needed part of their holdings required to ensure an ample supply of reserves for the banking system under their current operating framework.
SELL THOSE PESKY MORTGAGE BONDS?
The minutes showed officials expect redemptions of MBS to run below the $ 35 billion a month cap. That is because U.S. mortgage interest rates have already risen substantially, which has slowed the rate of `` prepayments '' that typically occur when rates are low and homeowners are enticed to refinance their existing loans. That triggers a loan payoff and shortens the maturity of a mortgage bond. Conversely, when rates rise, fewer bonds will mature each month.
Officials `` generally agreed, '' however, that it would be appropriate to consider outright sales of MBS `` after balance sheet run off was well underway to enable suitable progress toward a longer-run... portfolio composed primarily of Treasury securities. ''
( Reporting by Dan Burns; Editing by Andrea Ricci)
By Dan Burns | business |
Is Micro-Fulfillment Still Growing? | Strategic Real Estate. Applied Technology. Tailored Service. Creativity. Flexibility. These fundamentals reflect everything we provide at Phoenix Logistics. Most logistic competitors work to win 3PL contracts, then attempt…
Retailers have implemented numerous strategies to keep up with the steady uptick in e-commerce sales the sector has experienced since the onset of the pandemic.
While the most notable approach has been a dogged pursuit of traditional warehouses in primary consumer markets, real estate stakeholders have also become more creative.
From vertical warehouses to store fulfillment, retailers have stepped outside traditional fulfillment models to place inventory closer to online shoppers and meet demands for same-day, next-day, and two-day shipping.
Micro-fulfillment has gained significant traction since the e-commerce boom began. A micro-fulfillment center places the most popular SKUs in a small fulfillment center - usually less than 10,000 square feet - located centrally within a population center.
Micro-fulfillment centers have popped up in various places during the pandemic, such as disused retail or office spaces. Additionally, retailers or logistics providers can bring these facilities online within weeks, allowing them to quickly alleviate stress on fulfillment networks.
Since the expansion of micro-fulfillment happened in response to unexpected growth during the COVID-19 pandemic, some retail stakeholders have wondered about the permanence of the fulfillment model. Yet, even as the U.S. moves away from restrictive COVID-19 safety measures, the sector still managed 14.2% growth in 2021. In response, micro-fulfillment doesn’ t seem to be going anywhere.
If industrial real estate were widely available in key markets, perhaps that would put a damper on the popularity of micro-fulfillment. But warehouse vacancy remains at record lows, while industrial real estate demand remains at all-time highs. As a result, even conservative estimates place any sort of balance of supply and demand in warehousing about two years out. This factor should give micro-fulfillment plenty of time to normalize itself in fulfillment networks.
Research and Markets estimate that micro-fulfillment center installations will grow more than 20 times by 2030, with more than 80% of those installations deployed in North America. This data suggests that micro-fulfillment will become a staple of e-commerce fulfillment practices within the next few years.
Micro-fulfillment centers may provide a convenient way to quickly get top-selling goods to consumers, but that doesn’ t make them right for every e-tailer. To determine if micro-fulfillment is right for your online sales, explore the advantages and disadvantages of the model.
Of course, micro-fulfillment is not without its drawbacks. Some of these include:
Partnering with a third-party logistics ( 3PL) provider can help you manage increased fulfillment network complexity and mitigate any other risks associated with micro-fulfillment while still allowing you to reap all the benefits.
Strategic Real Estate. Applied Technology. Tailored Service. Creativity. Flexibility. These fundamentals reflect everything we do at Phoenix Logistics. We provide specialized support in locating and attaining the correct logistics solutions for every client we serve. Most logistic competitors work to win 3PL contracts, and then attempt to secure the real estate to support it. As an affiliate of giant industrial real estate firm Phoenix Investors, founded by Frank P. Crivello, we can quickly secure real estate solutions across its portfolio or leverage its market and financial strength to quickly source and acquire real estate to meet our client’ s needs. | general |
The Great Renegotiation: Millions of employees quit old jobs for better ones | The “ Great Resignation, ” they call the tens of millions of Americans who’ ve quit their jobs. Yet the bigger and better news is the huge number of people being hired.
To be sure, Americans have been saying “ I quit ” in record numbers. Almost 57 million people left jobs — many more than once — in the 14-month period from January 2021 to February 2022. That’ s a 25% spike vs. a similar time span before the pandemic.
Yet the overwhelming majority of these job quitters had other jobs lined up or quickly found work elsewhere.
Nearly 89 million people were hired in the past 14 months,
government data shows
, reflecting a record number of job openings and a ravenous hunger for labor. There’ s almost two open jobs for every unemployed person in America.
MarketWatch
“
“ People aren’ t resigning to sit on the sidelines. The are resigning to take different job. ”
”
— Robert Frick, Navy Federal Credit Union
“ People aren’ t resigning to sit on the sidelines, ” said corporate economist Robert Frick at Navy Federal Credit Union in northern Virginia. “ The are resigning to take different job. ”
Hiring surge
The hiring wave began more than a year ago. The U
.S. added 431,000 new jobs in March
, the government said last week, extending a streak of large job gains going back to the start of 2021.
The unemployment rate also sank to 3.6% last month — just a tick above a 53-year-low — from nearly 15% just two years ago.
All of the hiring took place against the backdrop of high covid cases and the reluctance of millions of formerly employed people to return to the labor market. Hiring might have taken place even faster, economists say, if the pandemic had petered out and generous government unemployment benefits were ended sooner.
Read:
The U.S. jobs market is scorching hot. Here’ s where the flames are highest
Nonetheless, the economy is on track to recover all 22.4 million jobs lost early in the pandemic by early summer. And then start adding even more.
“ In hindsight I would not choose the term, ‘ The Great Resignation. ‘ It is overly negative, ” said senior economist Daniel Zhao of the labor-research firm Glassdoor. “ The fact is, people are looking for work and finding work. ”
Zhao did not come up with the term, of course, but it’ s gained popularity in the media as a way to explain what’ s happening in the labor market. But it gives an incomplete picture at best, economists say.
“ I have always called ‘ The Great Resignation’ a major misnomer, ” said chief economist Gregory Daco of EY-Parthenon. “ We are in ‘ The Great Renegotiation.’ People are quitting for better conditions, pay and flexibility. ”
“
“ I have always called ‘ The Great Resignation’ a major misnomer. We are in ‘ The Great Renegotiation.’
”
— Gregory Daco, EY-Parthenon
Nick Bunker, research director at job-search site Indeed, agreed.
“ Resign has this negative connotation, ” he said. “ It’ s more of a ‘ Great Job Hop.’ “
Rising wages
Higher pay tells part of the story. Hourly wages began to surge early in the economy recovery — well before the spike in inflation — and they’ ve risen at the fastest pace since the early 1980s. Wages have shot up 5.6% in the past year.
By contrast, wages grew an average of just 2.3% a year in the decade preceding the pandemic.
Job switchers have fared the best. A study of 5,000 workers by the tax-advisory firm Grant Thornton found that 40% switched jobs after getting pay increases of 10% or higher.
The willingness of companies to offer more flexible arrangements such as remote work also reflects the reality of today’ s labor market — one that is likely to survive in post-pandemic times. Many employees, for instance, want to be able to work at home part of the time.
“ One thing that is relatively new for the labor market is remote work or flexible work, ” Bunker said. “ There are people who value that quite a bit. ”
What all the flux in the labor market underscore is that employees have leverage over employers for the first time in decades. And they are taking advantage of it.
“ Now that employees are looking hard for talent, there are more opportunities to go from one job to another, ” said Daco, who is one of those millions of people who’ ve switched jobs in the past year.
He left his old job several months ago, Daco said, mainly for a new challenge and the chance to do something different.
Switching careers
The same is true for millions of other Americans. Lots of people have left industries in which face-to-face contact with customers is required, for example, and moved to jobs with less visibility to the public.
Fear of COVID was the biggest reason early on, but the combination of the pandemic and tight labor market has made people reevaluate their careers, analysts say.
Consider leisure and hospitality.
The biggest job losses early in the pandemic took place at restaurants, hotels, theaters and the like that cater to large crowds. Even now, employment in the sector is still 1.8 million below its record peak of almost 17 million.
Where did these workers go? Many ended up at transportation or professional jobs with little direct exposure to the public.
The number of people employed by transportation and warehouse companies — think UPS
UPS,
-0.90%
or Amazon
AMZN,
-2.11%
— has jumped to 6.4 million from 5.8 million before the pandemic. Job gains have been even larger at white-collar businesses.
“ This is not just about replacing jobs that were lost during the pandemic, ” said Zhao, pointing to rising employment in transportation. “ Clearly there are new jobs being created. ”
How long can all the quitting and job-hopping go on?
As long as the economy is expanding,
the labor market remains tight
and companies have to compete aggressively for workers.
“
“ If we are saying the Great Resignation is a result of the hot jobs market, we should expect lots of resignations to continue so long as job openings are high. ”
”
— Daniel Zhao, Glassdoor
“ If we are saying the Great Resignation is a result of the hot jobs market, we should expect lots of resignations to continue so long as job openings are high, ” Zhao said.
Worker power
What’ s less clear is how long the surge in wages will last.
More people are expected to return to the labor force, for one thing, and ease the upward pressure on wages. Companies are also investing extra in automation, either as a substitute for labor or to help make workers more productive.
Don’ t expect wage growth to slow to precrisis levels anytime soon, however. Not with such a tight labor market and
U.S. inflation running at a 40-year high
. Workers are likely to keep asking for more money.
“ From an employers point of view this is very disappointing, ” Frick said. “ From an employees point of view, it’ s great. They have more power. ” | business |
Japan's Nikkei hits 3-week low on Fed, China worries | - Japan's Nikkei stock index fell to a three-week low on Thursday, as investors fretted over prospects of faster U.S. monetary tightening, the war in Ukraine and COVID-19 lockdowns in China.
The Nikkei had dropped 2% to 26,803.34 by the midday break and was on course for its worst session since March 11, with chipmakers and auto companies among the worst performers. Of the benchmark's 225 components, 195 stocks fell versus 30 that gained.
`` A lot of uncertainty is still swirling around external events, '' including the Federal Reserve and the Ukraine conflict, said a trader at a domestic securities firm.
`` It's difficult for stocks to recover in such an environment. ''
Overnight, Wall Street slid after minutes of the Fed's March meeting showed deepening concern among policymakers that inflation had broadened through the economy, with many of them advocating bigger rate hikes.
Meanwhile, the United States imposed more sanctions on Moscow as Russian forces bombarded Ukrainian cities, while Shanghai extended a strict citywide lockdown to fight a COVID outbreak.
Japan's broader Topix fell 2% to 1,884.41. Pharma was the only one among the Tokyo Stock Exchange's 33 sub-sectors to rise, adding 1.48%.
The sector was led higher by Astellas Pharma, which was also the Nikkei's biggest percentage gainer with a 4.53% rally after Jefferies reiterated its `` outperform '' rating for the stock.
Among losers, Honda was the biggest percentage decliner, dropping 5.56% after Mizuho downgraded the stock to '' hold '' and lowered its price target. Toyota slipped 1.69% and Nissan lost 2.26%.
Chip giant Tokyo Electron fell 4.75% to be the biggest drag on the Nikkei by index points, tracking a decline in U.S. peers overnight. Advantest slumped 5.33%.
Uniqlo store operator Fast Retailing also stood out with a 3.2% slide, while startup investor SoftBank Group shed 2.44%. Sony retreated 3.42%. ( Reporting by Tokyo markets team; Editing by Subhranshu Sahu) | business |
Uber chases'superapp ' by adding planes, trains and rental cars | In this article
Uber is driving ahead with its plan to become a travel `` superapp ''.
The San Francisco-headquartered firm announced Wednesday that it is adding trains, buses, planes and car rentals to its U.K. app this year. The move is part of a pilot that could be expanded to other countries at a later date if it goes well.
While Uber won't provide these travel services itself, it will allow users to book them through its app following software integrations with platforms that sell tickets.
The tech giant, which may take a cut on each booking, said it plans to announce various partners in the coming months.
Uber said the integrations will help to boost app usage among its users in the U.K, who also have the choice of using apps like Bolt and Free Now. The U.K. is one of Uber's largest markets outside the U.S.
Jamie Heywood, Uber's boss in the U.K., said in a statement that Uber hopes to become `` a one-stop-shop for all your travel needs. ''
`` You have been able to book rides, bikes, boat services and scooters on the Uber app for a number of years, so adding trains and coaches is a natural progression, '' he said.
He added: `` Later this year we plan to incorporate flights, and in the future hotels, by integrating leading partners into the Uber app to create a seamless door-to-door travel experience. ''
Uber also plans to let people buy Eurostar train tickets through the app. Eurostar allows travelers to commute from London to Paris and other cities via the Channel Tunnel.
The announcement comes after a recent win for Uber.
On March 26, Uber secured a 30-month license to continue operating in London, ending a protracted battle with city regulators over whether the ride-hailing app was `` fit and proper. ''
But the company is behind schedule on its `` superapp '' plans.
In 2018, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi said he wanted to add more transport options to the app.
`` It's fair to say that Covid made it a little bit hard for us to progress as quickly as we would like, '' Heywood reportedly told The Financial Times.
In premarket trading Wednesday, Uber's share price was down 1.6% to $ 34.40 at 6:40 a.m. ET. | business |
Cape Town residents take to public housing call centre | The City of Cape Town’ s call centre for public housing matters is growing, with more than 19 000 calls recorded per year. This, says the city, equates to 75 calls per day.
The Human Settlements Call Centre assists residents with affordable housing rental enquiries and relief, and helps with applications for housing opportunities.
In addition, call centre agents are able to log service requests for a tenant’ s repair enquiries, assisting with applications for council-owned rental properties and social housing opportunities, as well as with registering on the city’ s housing needs register, among others.
During an oversight visit to the call centre yesterday, councillor Malusi Booi, the city’ s mayoral committee member for human settlements, lauded the call centre staff for assisting residents with their public housing matters.
“ On a daily basis, the officials go beyond their call of duty to ensure residents have the correct information, ” says Booi.
“ We thank the officials for their sterling work as we continue to serve the most vulnerable residents in our communities. Good customer service is more important than ever, especially since the COVID-19 crisis over the past two years. ”
The city has a notable contact centre sector – also referred to as the business process outsourcing sector – with a number of international clients setting up operations in the Mother City.
Additionally, the Western Cape Provincial Government has earmarked the call centre sector as a priority industry for employment creation within the province.
Councillor Albert Anda Ntsodo points out the human settlements call centre officials play a key role in keeping the city’ s residents informed and ensuring the most vulnerable residents receive assistance.
“ There is always room for improvement and the city is working hard to see how its services and customer interactions can be enhanced. We thank the officials for their hard work and for always going the extra mile. ”
To contact the human settlements call centre, citizens can call 021 444 0333, or send a WhatsApp to 063 299 9927. | general |
Regeneron, in search of an eye gene therapy, turns to a young biotech | Excluding its coronavirus antibody drug, Regeneron has long counted Eylea as its top-selling product. Last year, net sales of the eye therapy totaled $ 5.8 billion in the U.S. and $ 3.6 billion across the rest of the world, where Regeneron's partner Bayer is in charge of commercialization.
First approved in 2011 for a certain kind of AMD, Eylea's market dominance has persisted for roughly a decade, outselling rival treatments like Roche's Lucentis. But challenges are mounting. The Food and Drug Administration last fall approved Susvimo, a refillable implant that continuously administers a formulation of Lucentis and that could be seen, at least by some patients, as a more convenient option than Eylea, which is administered every month or two as an injection into the eye. More recently, Roche received FDA approval for a new AMD drug called Vabysmo that can be given as infrequently as once every four months.
Key patents protecting Eylea are also set to expire over the next few years, opening the door to copycat competition. Already, several biosimilar versions of Eylea developed by Viatris, Novartis ' generics unit Sandoz, and partners Biogen and Samsung Bioepis have advanced to late-stage testing.
Additionally, the FDA in September cleared for market Biogen and Samsung's biosimilar to Lucentis. The drug is expected to launch this year, and may offer patients with AMD and certain other eye diseases a lower-cost treatment option.
Against these headwinds, Regeneron has been working to reinforce Eylea's position in the market. It's testing, for example, a higher dose of the drug with the hope of extending the time between dosing.
With the ViGeneron deal, Regeneron may be further hedging its bets by investing in gene therapy's potential to treat eye conditions. It's not alone, either. Biogen linked up with ViGeneron in early 2021, while AbbVie and Novartis have recently either partnered with or bought small biotechs developing genetic medicines for the eye.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
Biotech CEOs Paul Hastings and Jeremy Levin explained the goals behind a letter supported by more than 400 executives and investors that calls for drugmakers to stop working with Russian companies.
Six CAR-T cell therapies are now approved in the U.S., and their continued emergence has helped fueled further research into next-generation approaches.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more.
Biotech CEOs Paul Hastings and Jeremy Levin explained the goals behind a letter supported by more than 400 executives and investors that calls for drugmakers to stop working with Russian companies.
Six CAR-T cell therapies are now approved in the U.S., and their continued emergence has helped fueled further research into next-generation approaches.
Topics covered: Pharma, biotech, FDA, gene therapy, clinical trials, drug pricing and much more. | tech |
Strive Masiyiwa’ s daughter gets Econet board seat | Zimbabwean-born telecoms mogul Strive Masiyiwa’ s daughter Tsitsi has been appointed to the board of Econet Wireless, a company founded by her father.
Econet Wireless Zimbabwe is a subsidiary of Econet Group, a telecoms and technology group with operations and investments in 29 countries in Africa and Europe.
Announcing the appointment yesterday, the company said: “ The board of Econet Wireless Zimbabwe is pleased to announce the appointment of Miss Elizabeth Tanya Masiyiwa to the board of Econet Wireless Zimbabwe. The appointment is with effect from 1 April 2022. ”
The appointment comes a month after her billionaire father resigned from the board of the Zimbabwe business. He has been on the board since the formation of the company in 1993.
In detailing the new board member’ s experience, Econet said: “ Miss Masiyiwa is a senior executive, social entrepreneur and philanthropist. She serves on a number of boards, including Higherlife Foundation, where she is head of design and innovation, and the Harvard University Leadership Council for the Centre of African Studies.
“ Miss Masiyiwa holds BSc ( Hons) degree in banking and international finance from Bayes Business School, City University London, and a Masters of Social Entrepreneurship from Hult International Business School, and is currently completing the Executive MBA from Cambridge Judge Business School, Cambridge University. ”
It added she has worked in various organisations, spearheading investment and funding programmes as well as the human capital development of those organisations.
“ She currently holds a number of leadership positions in both local and international organisations. Miss Masiyiwa brings a wealth of experience to the board. ”
As for the businessman, Masiyiwa remains executive chairman and founder of Econet Group.
The 60-year-old also chairs Liquid Telecom, a Pan-African fibre-optic operator, a subsidiary of Econet, and was recently named among Africa’ s richest businesspeople.
Masiyiwa is also African Union Special Envoy to the continent’ s COVID response, appointed by president Cyril Ramaphosa. | general |
Lorne Steinberg's Top Picks: April 6, 2022 | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
The war in Ukraine and the accompanying sanctions by most western countries will result in higher inflation and slower growth than previously forecast. At the same time, many companies are rethinking their supply chain strategies, and although globalization is not dead, there will be more focus on security of supply versus simply efficiency.
In response to the elevated inflation rate, it appears that the Fed will raise rates and unwind its balance sheet more aggressively than anticipated. Simply put, this is the end of the “ zero-interest rate ” era. However, this is not necessarily bad for investors.
The higher rates will impact borrowers, and probably cool down the housing market, but wages are rising and consumers are in good enough financial shape to handle the increased cost.
The bond market is indicating that the current elevated inflation rate will prove to be transitory, and that inflation will abate at least somewhat over the next year. Several sectors of the market have sold off, and offer excellent value. These include banks, technology and consumer cyclicals, all of which should do well over the coming years.
Lorne Steinberg, president of Lorne Steinberg Wealth Management, discusses his top picks Adobe, Kering SA, and The Middleby Corporation.
Most recent purchase price and date: March 7, 2022 @ US $ 442.856
Adobe is best known as the inventor of the PDF, but they are a diversified software company focused on its three major divisions: Creative cloud, document cloud and experience cloud. The company has leading market shares in its major businesses, with strong growth and free cash flow.
It continues to invest heavily in R & D while using excess cash for share buybacks and acquisitions. Revenues have more than doubled over the past five years while margins have expanded.
The shares sold off with much of the technology sector, giving investors the opportunity to buy this technology market leader at a compelling entry price.
Most recent purchase price and date: March 7, 2022 @ 530.3651 EUR
Kering is the luxury fashion house which owns Gucci, Saint Laurent, Bottega and several other brands. Gucci accounts for over 50 per cent of sales, but the company has done an excellent job revitalizing tired brands, such as YSL ( now Saint Laurent), which is driving earnings growth.
The company is in strong financial shape, with a net cash position. It has a good track record at acquiring underperforming brands, and over the past few years it has used its free cash to raise the dividend and buy back shares. These shares have sold off due to COVID lockdowns in China and the Ukraine war. The shares are significantly undervalued with excellent growth prospects.
Most recent purchase price and date: Nov 17, 2020 @ US $ 136.1197
Middleby is a global leader in commercial kitchen equipment, and also sells high-end consumer brands such as Aga and Viking. The company’ s earnings proved to be surprisingly resilient during the pandemic, as the decline in commercial foodservice was partially offset by the food processing division.
The company has been a smart buyer of complementary brands over the years, and the business has tripled in size over the past decade. Europe accounts for about 25 per cent of sales, and the shares have declined due to recent events. This is a great opportunity to buy a best-in-class business at a significant discount to fair value.
Lorne Steinberg, president of Lorne Steinberg Wealth Management, discusses his past picks: CVS Health, Electronic Arts, and Goldman Sachs.
Here are nine things you need to know about Budget 2022.
The federal government is taking sharper aim at real estate investors and property flippers in a bid to help halt the country’ s long-standing – and worsening – housing affordability problem.
The Liberal government is scaling back its strategy to single out Canada's most profitable banks and insurers with targeted tax measures, resulting in about $ 4 billion less in revenue than originally planned.
Talk of an upcoming recession is raising angst after a closely watched indicator flashed a warning sign, but experts say it could be a needed spark for investors to take a more active look at their portfolios.
The Toronto Blue Jays are preparing for their first home opener game at the Rogers Centre in front of a full stadium of fans since 2019. Mark Shapiro, president and CEO of the Toronto Blue Jays, says they’ re looking to reimagine their home stadium after receiving approval for significant upgrades over the next two years. He says fan experience needs to be compelling and it can’ t just rely on the team’ s position in the league. He also says they’ re looking at new revenue opportunities with teams now allowed to feature advertising on jerseys for the first time, adding it’ s important to grow revenue, so they can grow the team.
TD Bank plans to give most employees the option to return to the office this month and is aiming for workers to officially transition to their new working models by June.
A new study finds there’ s a growing acceptance of cryptocurrency-related investments among Canadian institutional investors, but firms are showing restraint in how much they’ re allocating towards those assets. | general |
Oil selloff accelerates as IEA sets coordinated global release | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
Oil fell to the lowest since mid-March after the International Energy Agency said it will deploy 60 million barrels of oil from emergency stockpiles to bolster the historic release announced by the Biden Administration.
West Texas Intermediate closed below $ 97 a barrel after earlier rising as high as $ 104 on Wednesday. The IEA’ s Fatih Birol said members will release 120 million additional barrels of oil, including about 60 million from the U.S. Meanwhile, government data showed U.S. crude stockpiles rose by more than 2 million barrels last week.
“ The IEA’ s consideration of releasing more SPR barrels beyond the U.S. is another bearish factor today, as the planned amount of released supplies is adding up, at this point, easing some of the supply fears, ” said John Kilduff, co-founder at Again Capital LLC.
Oil prices have often struggled to find direction in a market with lower liquidity as headlines send futures swinging in both directions. Volatility remained heightened as oil executives testify in the U.S. on oil and gas prices before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Average retail gasoline prices hit a record last month, according to data from the American Automobile Association.
“ Oil executives are talking to Congress right now, so there’ s some seesaw on that news, ” said Rohan Reddy, a research analyst at Global X Management.
Crude surged by a third in the first quarter as the Russian invasion and backlash from the EU and U.S. roiled markets. While the U.K. and Washington have moved to bar Russian crude, it’ s harder for the EU to follow suit given the region’ s high level of dependence.
In recent sessions, prices have come off the highs seen in early March with Washington and the IEA tapping strategic petroleum reserves to try to calm markets, while the coronavirus outbreak in China has also contributed to a pullback.
Still, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel said that measures on Russian oil will be needed sooner or later, as he condemned reports of atrocities.
“ Everything to me points to the market being in a pretty difficult place on the supply side, ” said Callum MacPherson, head of commodities at Investec Plc. “ The main bearish point I can see is the China Covid outbreak, everything else looks pretty bullish. ”
The coronavirus outbreak in top oil importer China is hurting energy demand as cities including Shanghai have been placed under lockdown. The country reported more than 20,000 new cases for Tuesday.
This U.S. legislation is a game changer: Curaleaf executive chairman
U.S. democratic senators to unveil draft cannabis reform bill on Wednesday: Report | general |
Indian Morning Briefing: Asian Markets Lose Ground After Fed Minutes | Technology stocks lost ground as investors digested more details about the Federal Reserve's plan to raise interest rates.
The technology-focused Nasdaq Composite Index lost 2.2%. The S & P 500 gave back 1%, while the blue-chip Dow Jones Industrial Average slipped about 0.4%.
The S & P 500's technology sector fell 2.55%.
Government bonds kept selling off, with yields rising for a fourth straight session, on the prospect of further rate hikes by the Fed, after the worst quarter for U.S. bonds in more than 40 years.
The Fed raised interest rates in March for the first time since 2018. Minutes from the meeting showed that central-bank officials last month had considered raising rates by a half-percentage point but decided on a quarter-point rise in light of the uncertainty surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Japanese stocks were down in morning trade, dragged by electronics and auto stocks, as concerns continued about the Fed's tightening pace and higher corporate-borrowing costs. Fed officials have signaled that they could raise rates by a half-percentage point at their meeting early next month. Investors remain focused on the war in Ukraine and its impact on commodity prices. The Nikkei Stock Average was down 1.7% at 26886.17.
South Korea's Kospi fell 0.7% to 2715.73 in early trade, tracking Wall Street's decline overnight. The Fed's minutes signaling that half-percentage-point rate increases are on the table were weighing on investor sentiment. Most growth stocks, including tech and internet companies, retreated on the increasing likelihood of the U.S. central bank's aggressive policy tightening.
Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index rose 0.6% to 22219.92, reversing opening losses, amid hopes for supportive policies from China. There appears to be expectations that the Chinese government will support economic growth via monetary policy such as lowering RRR, KGI Research said. The Hang Seng TECH Index was up 1.4% at 4649.18.
Chinese stocks were lower in morning trade, tracking broad declines among other regional equities. The Shanghai Composite Index slipped 0.2% to 3275.81, the Shenzhen Composite Index dropped 0.4% to 2119.89 and the ChiNext Price Index declined 0.7% to 2616.49. Coronavirus developments in China remain in focus as case numbers rise despite tighter restrictions. `` Unfortunately, there is little sign that the virus situation will be contained any time soon, '' Commerzbank said, noting that the government is struggling to find a balance between containing the virus and facing economic pains.
JPY strengthened against most G-10 and Asian currencies amid risk-off sentiment spurred by overnight losses on Wall Street and this morning's declines in U.S. stock futures. The Asia session faces some downward pressure as market participants continue to digest rate increases and balance sheet run-off in upcoming FOMC meetings, IG said. This may remain the center of focus, given a relatively quiet economic calendar today, while more comments from Fed officials expected, IG added. AUD/JPY fell 0.4% to 92.61, SGD/JPY edged 0.1% lower to 90.94 and USD/JPY was down 0.1% at 123.64.
Gold edged higher in early Asian trading, supported by likely technical buying despite headwinds of expected Fed rate rises. `` Gold's pain of aggressive monetary tightening is almost fully priced in, '' Oanda said. However, an `` aggressive hawkish Fed could tentatively send gold below the $ 1,900 level, '' it reckoned. `` Gold will eventually become attractive once traders start to debate whether the Fed will choose to continue to fight inflation after a couple of super-sized rate hikes or tap on the brakes as growth concerns brew, '' Oanda added. Spot gold rose 0.1% to $ 1,925.01 an ounce.
Oil rose in early Asian trading, recovering some of their losses after the International Energy Agency announced another release of crude from its emergency stockpiles, ANZ Research said. The bank said prices remain supported as the IEA warns of a large drop in Russian oil exports which could leave the global crude market short of 3 million barrels a day. `` Restrictions on Russian oil exports appear to be tightening, '' it said. `` The likelihood of Iranian oil helping fill the gap is also diminishing, '' ANZ added. Front-month Brent gained 1.1% to $ 102.21/bbl, while WTI rose 1.0% to $ 97.23/bbl.
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Read our editorial policy to learn more about our process. | business |
BURUNDI: Builders and contractors blame each other for delays with Jiji and Mulembwe dams | Rehabilitation work on the Kariba dam is expected to be further delayed because of new geological complications experienced by French contractor Razel-Bec. The project is deemed essential to averting a collapse. [... ]
Eager to boost his country's influence, the French president wants to attract international institutions and private foundations active in development aid to Paris. Among the major organisations being courted are the World Bank and the Global Partnership for Education. [... ]
The former AfDB boss and now banking consultant Donald Kaberuka believes African countries should pay for their Covid-19 vaccines via Afreximbank, led by Benedict Oramah, rather than depend on international hand-outs. [... ]
Repeatedly delayed since 2014, construction of the hydro-electric projects in south-west Burundi is finally set to begin on September 23. [... ]
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A pioneer on the web since 1996, Africa Intelligence is the leading news site on Africa for professionals. | general |
MOZAMBIQUE: Nyusi no longer stonewalling Russia | Mozambique's ruling party will be holding its next congress, a key moment in the country's political calendar, this September. How this shapes the party's powerful political commission will have a huge impact on President Filipe Nyusi's future and the choice of his successor for the 2024 presidential election. [... ]
For several weeks, Russian diplomats all over Africa have been using all the means at their disposal to justify their country's invasion of Ukraine and limit its impact on Russia's interests on the continent. [... ]
While President Filipe Nyusi is hard at work to give the coalition in Cabo Delgado more fighting power, his staff reassures private investors. [... ]
As the US attempts to restore ties with the Mozambican army, Russia's deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov has offered Maputo Moscow's help in training the country's soldiers. Despite the official withdrawal of the paramilitaries from Wagner in 2020, Russian soldiers have never completely vacated Mozambican soil. [... ]
As negotiations between the Malian junta and Wagner step up a notch, Paris is making last-ditch efforts to prevent the arrival of Russian paramilitaries in Bamako. Emmanuel Macron gave Vladimir Putin a stern warning during a phone call last month. [... ]
As it struggles to establish robust cooperation with southern African countries, despite Moscow's historical ties with the region, Russia is relying heavily on the networks and finances of locally based miners. [... ]
Bruno Morgado, who has solid connections within the ruling party, is gearing up to import Covid-19 vaccines. [... ]
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A pioneer on the web since 1996, Africa Intelligence is the leading news site on Africa for professionals. | general |
TURKEY/HORN OF AFRICA: Covid-19 stalls Erdogan and MbZ's grand diplomatic designs | No less than a dozen African foreign affairs ministers will travel to Turkey's Antalya Diplomatic Forum, from 11 to 13 March, invited by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. [... ]
The Egyptian president snubbed an African Union summit and instead attended the Beijing Olympics in the company of his financial sponsor, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Sisi is continuing his strategy of encircling his Ethiopian rival and consolidating his position in Sudan and Djibouti. [... ]
Ahead of the African Union summit to be held in Addis Ababa on 5-6 February, the UAE's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan has been busy trying to shape a role for the UAE as a mediator in the region. [... ]
Aware that control of the skies is its main, if not only, asset in the face of the Tigrayan TPLF-led assault, the Ethiopian federal government has bought drones from various suppliers as well as hastily refurbished its attack aircraft. [... ]
As the UAE improves relations with Turkey, a silent tussle is forming between the Gulf frenemies UAE and Qatar for a stake in Turkey's flagship defence firm, Aselsan. [... ]
Africa Intelligence uses cookies to provide reliable and secure features, measure and analyse website traffic and provide support to the website users.Apart from those essential for the proper operation of the website, you can choose which cookies you accept to have stored on your device.Either “ Accept and close ” to agree to all cookies or go to “ Manage cookies ” to review your options. You can change these settings at any time by going to our Cookie management page.
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A pioneer on the web since 1996, Africa Intelligence is the leading news site on Africa for professionals. | general |
EMEA Morning Briefing: Fed Rate Signals to Weigh on Mood | Europe is primed for a cautious opening session after the latest Fed minutes confirmed views the central bank may tighten policy aggressively over the coming months. In Asia, shares were lower; the dollar was flat and Treasury yields eased back from three-year highs. Oil and metals were slightly firmer.
European shares face further weakness Thursday after U.S. tech stocks sunk and bonds sold off following the latest Fed minutes.
The Federal Reserve raised interest rates in March for the first time since 2018. Minutes from that meeting showed that central-bank officials last month considered raising rates by a half-percentage point but decided on a quarter-point increase in light of the uncertainty surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
`` Many participants noted that one or more [ half-percentage-point ] increases in the target range could be appropriate at future meetings, particularly if inflation pressures remained elevated or intensified, '' the minutes said.
Aidan Whitehead, head of equity trading at JMP Securities said Wednesday's selloff was `` massive de-risking '' as money managers raise cash in a highly uncertain global economy. `` The uncertainty is driving the volatility, and there's so much of it, particularly when it comes to rates. ''
The Fed minutes also revealed that policy makers tentatively plan to reduce the central bank's balance sheet by about $ 95 billion per month, starting as soon as May, and that officials could eventually resort to selling off mortgage-backed securities on the Fed's balance sheet.
The dollar was little changed while the yen strengthened, with the Asia session facing some downward pressure as market participants continued to digest rate increases and the balance sheet run-off in upcoming FOMC meetings, IG said.
Navellier & Associates said: `` It's very unfortunate that interest rates are rising like they are. This is going to strengthen the dollar long term. The Fed can not fight the market. So if market rates go up, the Fed has to catch up with them. ''
The money manager said 50 basis-point rate increases may be normal until the Fed is in sync with market rates and that `` we're probably going to get some inflation relief in the fall. ''
The euro could extend its recent losses even if Emmanuel Macron wins the presidential election, BMO Capital Markets said.
As of late Wednesday, the EUR/USD was about 1.1% lower in the week-to-date but the bulk of the move doesn't reflect worries about Macron's shrinking lead in opinion polls.
`` Rather, the main focus for the FX market is still the war, and the increasing likelihood of EU energy-related sanctions which are currently being proposed by Brussels, '' BMO said.
There are enough euro-negative factors at play to send EUR/USD to 1.08 in one month from 1.0914 currently, even with a Macron victory. A shock win by Marine Le Pen would cause an even sharper EUR/USD fall, BMO said.
The 10-year Treasury yield eased back below 2.6%, having climbed to another three-year high Wednesday after the Fed minutes.
`` The market was bracing itself for something a little more hawkish, '' said David Petrosinelli, senior trader at InspereX in New York. `` There had been some talk around $ 100 billion or higher in monthly bond runoffs. ''
As a result of the minutes, the market was calmed by the idea that policy makers are `` not going to take a hammer to the market, '' Petrosinelli said.
Read: Treasury Yields Extend Climb Into Fourth Session.
Also Read: Russia, U.S. Face-Off Boosts Default Risk.
Oil recovered some of its Wednesday losses in early Asian trading and ANZ Research said rices remain supported as the IEA warned of a large drop in Russian exports that could leave the global crude market short of 3 million barrels a day.
`` Restrictions on Russian oil exports appear to be tightening. The likelihood of Iranian oil helping fill the gap is also diminishing, '' ANZ said.
Read: U.S. Allies to Release Close to 60 Million Barrels of Oil From Reserves.
Gold edged higher, supported by likely technical buying despite headwinds of expected Fed rate rises.
`` Gold's pain of aggressive monetary tightening is almost fully priced in, `` OANDA said. However, an `` aggressive hawkish Fed could tentatively send gold below the $ 1,900 level. ''
OANDA said gold will `` eventually become attractive once traders start to debate whether the Fed will choose to continue to fight inflation after a couple of super-sized rate hikes or tap on the brakes as growth concerns brew. ''
Copper was higher with prices supported by a tight supply outlook.
`` Global inventories [ are ] at critically low levels, '' Fitch said. Production is also likely lackluster, with only `` small increases in output [ which ] will be driven by Chinese production while Latin American production will continue to lag. ''
Fitch, which raised its average 2022 copper-price forecast to $ 10,000 a ton from $ 9,200 a ton previously, said that `` China's zero Covid policy is likely to invoke uncertainty in the country's copper production outlook. ''
Fitch also said nickel prices on the LME could consolidate in the $ 30,000- $ 40,000 a ton range in the second quarter as Western sanctions on Russia support prices. Fitch expects prices to drop to under $ 30,000 a ton by year's end amid weaker consumption growth in the medium term.
Fitch raised its 2022 average forecast to $ 27,500 a ton from $ 17,000 a ton, which compares with $ 18,466 in 2021. `` Ultimately, Western sanctions on Russia mean that the supply outlook for nickel over the coming years has deteriorated. ''
The lithium-mining industry is likely to gravitate closer to spot pricing, especially if the commodity's rally continues, UBS said.
Today, there is a big difference between spot prices and the average price miners receive, in large part because a greater proportion of sales are often locked in early at a fixed price. For comparison, UBS highlighted the iron-ore market, where evolving market dynamics eventually made the difference between spot and fixed prices unworkable.
Now, some lithium producers are also signaling a shift away from fixed prices, which are less common among new entrants than incumbent suppliers. `` Overall, this should see a further narrowing between industry realization and the spot price. ''
Federal Reserve officials signaled they could raise rates by a half-percentage point at their meeting early next month and begin reducing their $ 9 trillion asset portfolio as part of their most aggressive effort in more than two decades to curb price pressures.
Minutes from the Fed's March 15-16 meeting, released Wednesday, showed that many officials last month were prepared to raise rates by a half-point but opted for a smaller, quarter-point increase because of concern over the fallout from Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
U.S. Allies to Release Close to 60 Million Barrels of Oil From Reserves
PARIS-U.S. allies are planning to release close to 60 million additional barrels of oil from their reserves, officials familiar with the matter said, joining the Biden administration in an effort to tame prices after they rose sharply when Russia invaded Ukraine.
The 31-member nations of the International Energy Agency-which include the U.S., most of Europe, Australia, Japan, Mexico and others-are planning to announce a new reserve release totaling 120 million barrels, officials said, the largest release in the IEA's 47-year history. Around half of that amount will come from U.S. reserves, which were included in Washington's previously announced decision to release 180 million barrels of oil over six months.
Russia, U.S. Face-Off Boosts Default Risk
The derivatives market is flashing signals that the tit-for-tat between the U.S. Treasury and the Kremlin is increasing the likelihood of a Russian government default after Russia's Ministry of Finance announced Wednesday it will restrict the ability of some foreign investors to convert their payments into dollars.
The cost of buying a five-year derivatives contract for protection against a Russian government default, also called a credit-default swap, jumped on Wednesday to around 75% of the total value of the debt insured, according to data from ICE Data Services.
MIAMI BEACH, Fla.-Uncertainty about how cryptocurrency regulation will roll out in the future, particularly in the U.S., remains a significant barrier for wider adoption of digital assets such as bitcoin, said panelists Wednesday at one of the largest bitcoin conferences of the year.
But speakers at the Bitcoin 2022 conference in Miami Beach, Fla., were optimistic that more policy makers and regulators were seeking to better understand the technology and to support innovation in the sector.
Six weeks after Russia invaded Ukraine, the European Union is taking its first steps to reduce Russian energy imports, depriving Moscow of some of the revenue that covers much of its budget and helps fund its military campaign.
But the EU can't agree to sanction the bloc's biggest business dealings with Russia: the purchase of oil and natural gas. The EU, which imports around 60% of its energy needs, is making large payments to Russia, boosted by higher oil-and-gas prices during the war.
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Peter Sagan abandons Sarthe, Wout van Aert hopeful for Paris-Roubaix | Get access to more than 30 brands, premium video, exclusive content, events, mapping, and more.
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Peter Sagan waved goodbye to the Circuit de la Sarthe on Wednesday. Photo: Dario Belingheri/Getty Images
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Peter Sagan abandoned the Circuit de la Sarthe on Wednesday while Wout van Aert got the green light to return to training.
The updates come as the two stars are racing against time to start Paris-Roubaix on April 17.
Both riders have been racked with illness, with van Aert coming down with a COVID-19 diagnosis that sidelined him for Tour of Flanders, while Sagan continues to be dogged by health problems.
The three-time world champion did not finish Gent-Wevelgem and also skipped Tour of Flanders. The TotalEnergies star lined up at the Circuit de la Sarthe with the hopes of honing his form ahead of Roubaix.
His departure Wednesday will cast a pall on his chances to race the “ Hell of the North, ” which is being delayed by one week due to French presidential elections.
Van Aert, meanwhile, cleared a medical checkup after what doctors said were light COVID-19 symptoms.
The winner of Omloop Het Nieuwsblad and E3 Saxo Bank Classic was sidelined for Flanders, but officials are hopeful he will be able to race Roubaix.
Jumbo-Visma officials also confirmed he will not start Amstel Gold Race on Sunday, with Tiesj Benoot, Tom Dumoulin, and Christophe Laporte taking leadership duties.
Mathieu van der Poel, hot off winning Dwars door Vlaanderen and Flanders on Sunday in a dramatic duel with Tadej Pogačar, confirmed he will race Amstel Gold Race this weekend as well as Paris-Roubaix.
Get the latest race news, results, commentary, and tech, delivered to your inbox. | general |
Oil futures: Prices retreat on US crude stock build, IEA strategic oil release | Crude oil futures retreated sharply Wednesday as the IEA said its other members would follow the US with a further release of strategic oil inventories, while the latest report from the EIA report showed a build in US crude stocks last week.
Front-month June ICE Brent futures were trading at $ 102.01/barrel ( 1930 GMT), compared to Tuesday's settle of $ 106.64/b.
At the same time, May NYMEX WTI was trading $ 97.13/b, versus Tuesday's settle of $ 101.96/b.
The International Energy Agency said it would release 120 million barrels of crude oil as part of coordinated action among its members, a figure first reported by Quantum on Monday, although the volume includes part of the already-announced US inventory release of up to 180 million barrels over six months.
In effect, IEA members other than the US are expected to release an additional 60 million barrels.
Meanwhile, the latest US oil inventory data from the Energy Information Administration Wednesday showed a 2.4 million barrels build in commercial crude oil stocks, topping the 1.56 million/b build announced by the American Petroleum Institute.
Prices were higher earlier in the day as new sanctions against Russia were expected to target coal and Russian-owned vessels docking at EU ports, along with further financial restrictions, but at least for now are holding back on oil and gas.
`` The threat of European sanctions on Russian oil remains an upside risk for crude prices despite the firm opposition in the short term from certain member states., '' said Craig Erlam, senior market analyst at Oanda, referencing opposition from Germany and Austria against oil and gas sanctions.
EU Council President Charles Michel said Wednesday, however, that the European Union will have to ban oil and gas imports from Russia to put pressure on Moscow to stop its war in Ukraine.
Covid also weighed on markets as China's financial centre of Shanghai extended restrictions on transportation as cases surged to more than 13,000, with no end to the lockdown in sight. | general |
Southern Company Launches `` Mother Earth is Hiring '' Campaign to Celebrate Earth Month | Originally published at southerncompany.mediaroom.com. Southern Company ranked No. 20 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021.
Southern Company launched a campaign on LinkedIn called “ Mother Earth is Hiring ” today, highlighting hundreds of thousands of environmental job and volunteer opportunities currently available across the U.S. The showcase page works to champion the good energy and positive momentum organizations are making toward their environmental and sustainability goals and calls on companies and individuals to join in on this critical work.
“ Southern Company has a long-standing commitment to sustainability and transparency. In recent years, we have enhanced our disclosure of key environmental, social and governance topics to better inform stakeholders of the many initiatives underway at Southern Company and our operating companies, ” said Southern Company Director of Sustainability Strategy and Planning, Sarah Stashak. “ By highlighting employment opportunities that can better our planet, the Mother Earth platform is yet another way of demonstrating our commitment. ”
Through the month-long initiative, Southern Company aims not only to connect jobseekers with potential new positions, but also to inspire individuals who hadn’ t previously considered pursuing a sustainability career or volunteer program. LinkedIn’ s data analytics and AI technology will pull all types of positions dedicated to environmental causes, including energy efficiency, water conservation, clean air, sustainable forestry and much more.
“ We hope this campaign will reach and inspire individuals, jobseekers and volunteers who care about the environment but may feel overwhelmed about where to begin, ” said Southern Company Brand Director, Emily O’ Brien. “ Protecting our planet is a job we all must take on, and the Mother Earth platform opens the door to real, meaningful action. ”
The Mother Earth initiative is just one piece of Southern Company’ s overarching sustainability commitment. Southern Company is committed to reducing its greenhouse gas ( GHG) emissions to provide customers and communities with a clean energy future. The company supports this objective by actively advancing a net zero by 2050 goal in direct alignment with the commitments of the Paris Agreement and has an interim target to achieve 50% GHG emissions reduction by 2030 relative to 2007 levels. The net zero goals include direct GHG emissions across the electric and natural gas businesses. To reach net zero by 2050, Southern Company is focused on transitioning its generating fleet, making the necessary related investments in transmission and distribution grids, advancing energy efficiency and investing in clean energy technologies. To learn more about Southern Company’ s sustainability priorities visit https: //www.southerncompany.com/sustainability.html.
“ Southern Company’ s efforts to raise awareness of the need for more partners and people to help address the impacts of a changing climate is commendable, ” said National Fish and Wildlife Foundation ( NFWF) Southern Regional Director, Jay Jensen.
“ We hope Southern Company’ s long history of support for wildlife, biodiversity and all things conservation will inspire individuals and other corporations to become more involved in supporting landscape-scale restoration and conserving our nation’ s natural heritage. For nearly 20 years Southern Company has supported NFWF efforts and has contributed to restoring, sustaining and enhancing over 1.7 million acres of wildlife habitat. Southern Company’ s two decades of support of NFWF reinforces that we all can make a difference when working together to protect and restore America’ s amazing and irreplaceable natural resources. ”
The Senate confirmed Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court on Thursday, marking a historic moment as she is the first Black female justice in the nation’ s highest court. The confirmation also gave President Joe Biden bipartisan endorsement as he promised to diversify the Supreme Court. Jackson was confirmed in…
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Originally published at about.att.com. Anne Chow is the CEO of AT & T Business. AT & T is a Hall of Fame company. Women’ s History Month is a time to reflect on women’ s accomplishments and the progress we’ ve made as a society. Over the past few weeks, I’ ve heard and read so many…
Originally published at sanofi.com. Sanofi U.S. ranked No. 27 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. Sanofi launches its Diversity, Equity & Inclusion ( DE & I) Board, the first-of-its-kind in the pharmaceutical industry to feature outside advisors. Sanofi’ s DE & I Board will include three of the most influential voices in the DE & I…
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Raytheon Technologies Employees Volunteer To Serve Veterans | Originally published at raytheonmissilesanddefense.com.
Supporting those who protect us: That’ s what motivates people who pitch in at The Greater Boston Food Bank Veterans Market in Newton, Massachusetts on the third Friday of every month.
Things are tough right now. A fifth of American households going hungry includes someone who has served or is currently serving in the U.S. military. That’ s why Ahyoung Choe and her fellow Raytheon Technologies employees help provide much-needed food.
“ My dad is a U.S. Navy veteran, so I’ m keeping the pride in my family strong in our support for all veterans and military families, ” said Ahyoung Choe. She’ s a senior mechanical engineer at Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a business of Raytheon Technologies.
Choe spent much of childhood living on the U.S. Navy base in Yokosuka, Japan. “ So, my experiences there also sparked my passion for helping veterans, both through volunteering and in doing my part to deliver quality products to the military. ”
The Greater Boston Food Bank, or GBFB, Veterans Market has been held at the American Legion Nonantum Post 440 in Newton since 2016, mainly providing for veterans but also for others who have no military connection.
Raytheon Technologies “ has been with us from the beginning, ” said Christina Peretti, Assistant Director of Community Investment for GBFB, the largest hunger-relief organization in New England. “ That commitment is incredible. I know the company does such important work, and to place such importance on employees volunteering really says a lot about its people and its values. ”
Carol Pingree, whose family includes veterans, agrees. As assistant manager of American Legion Post 440 in Newton, she coordinates the Veterans Market there in partnership with GBFB, which delivers the food for distribution each month. “ It’ s a tremendous boost to have Raytheon Technologies folks volunteer with us — shows a true commitment to our veterans. ”
Rich Peyton, a Senior Systems Engineer at Raytheon Missiles & Defense, volunteers at The GBFB Veterans Market in Newton every month.
“ It’ s a great bunch of people here. I like volunteering, actually seeing the folks you’ re helping out, ” he said. “ Before the Veterans Market even opens, there’ s usually a long line of people waiting to pick up the food, ” added Peyton, whose father, brother and sister all served in the military.
Putting food on the table has long been a challenge for many families across the United States. According to the nation’ s largest hunger-relief charity, Feeding America, 12 million children were among more than 37 million without enough food before COVID-19.
Since the pandemic started in 2020, that total number, which includes active and retired military members, has risen by 17.1 million and Feeding America stepped up its investment in nationwide programs to alleviate food insecurity. The same year, Raytheon Technologies contributed to that funding increase — with a $ 5 million donation — while also continuing to encourage its employees to help out at other initiatives across the United States to ease the burden.
Military veterans frequently turn out to assist at food banks. At the American Legion in Newton, Post 440 member and U.S. Army veteran Philip De Vincentis is a regular volunteer: “ One time you’ re flying high; another time you might be scraping bottom. You do what you have to do to handle the circumstances in your life. ”
But some are reluctant to receive assistance because they worry it’ s seen as a “ handout, ” De Vincentis said. That stigma is a barrier The Greater Boston Food Bank is working to overcome. It’ s one reason the organization uses the term, Veterans Market, in its three locations: Newton, Melrose and Revere.
“ They are very proud. A lot of veterans say, ‘ There’ s someone who needs it more than me,’ ” said Peretti. “ To that, we say ‘ This is here for you as a member of your community.’ So, we’ ve moved away from the term, food pantry, to more of a community focused on inclusive welcoming. ”
Peretti, whose grandfathers both fought in World War II, coordinates these veteran-focused programs and more than 30 other mobile markets across Eastern Massachusetts, which have been part of the Feeding America network since 1982.
“ But none of this would happen without our partners, like the American Legion Post 440, like Raytheon Technologies, like all the volunteers, ” Peretti said.
“ We have the food, ” she added. “ But if our partners weren’ t there to provide support, a warehouse full of food doesn’ t do anything. So, we need organizations and their volunteers who know the community and who can reach out and distribute food to people who need it. Nobody is turned away. ”
The Senate confirmed Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court on Thursday, marking a historic moment as she is the first Black female justice in the nation’ s highest court. The confirmation also gave President Joe Biden bipartisan endorsement as he promised to diversify the Supreme Court. Jackson was confirmed in…
As the saying goes, the news never stops — but there’ s a lot of it out there, and all of it doesn’ t always pertain to our readers. In this weekly news roundup, we’ ll cover the top news stories that matter most to our diversity focused audience. 1. Sexual Assault Awareness…
You’ ve probably heard of Autism Awareness Month, which has been celebrated every April since the Autism Society of America ( ASA) first observed it in 1970. But did you know the organization made the shift to Autism Acceptance Month in 2021? Facts About Autism Once referred to as Autism Spectrum Disorder, …
Originally published at boeing.com. Boeing Company ranked No. 17 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. When Connie So sees launch coverage of Boeing satellites, the CST-100 Starliner or even footage of the International Space Station, she knows her hands have played a vital and meticulous…
Originally published at basf.com. BASF ranked No. 12 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. BASF Venture Capital GmbH ( BVC), the corporate venture company of BASF Group, announced today a strategic investment in Oceanworks, a sustainable plastic solutions provider that brings traceability and transparency through digitalization…
Originally published at about.att.com. Anne Chow is the CEO of AT & T Business. AT & T is a Hall of Fame company. Women’ s History Month is a time to reflect on women’ s accomplishments and the progress we’ ve made as a society. Over the past few weeks, I’ ve heard and read so many…
Originally published at sanofi.com. Sanofi U.S. ranked No. 27 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. Sanofi launches its Diversity, Equity & Inclusion ( DE & I) Board, the first-of-its-kind in the pharmaceutical industry to feature outside advisors. Sanofi’ s DE & I Board will include three of the most influential voices in the DE & I…
In early 2021, employment experts across the nation started to notice a troubling new trend: a growing number of workers were quitting their jobs en masse. As the months went on, the phenomenon — fueled by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic — continued, with more and more workers resigning from jobs…
As the saying goes, the news never stops — but there’ s a lot of it out there, and all of it doesn’ t always pertain to our readers. In this weekly news roundup, we’ ll cover the top news stories that matter most to our diversity focused audience. 1. How the World…
The Indianapolis Colts recently made news by creating a program to promote diverse coaches in the National Football League by earning fellowships on the Colts’ coaching staff. The Colts named the Tony Dungy Diversity Fellowship after the head coach who led the team to victory in Super Bowl LXI, making…
@ abbvie announces that Laura Schumacher, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, and Chief Legal Officer at AbbVie, has be… https: //t.co/NXtkzA4RSN March 30, 2022
In new research from @ PwC, 64% of next-generation ( NextGen) family-owned companies say their brand has the opport… https: //t.co/ZCyF3ty0ih March 30, 2022
Authenticity is encouraged in the # workplace given the benefits derived, including greater employee engagement and… https: //t.co/AzrhILUenA March 29, 2022
According to recent research by @ HarvardBiz, the difference in wages between # BIPOC workers and their counterparts… https: //t.co/tEkUpuwYoh March 27, 2022 | general |
CAMEROON: 2021 a bumper year for Yaoundé's Covid spending | The powerful businessman, who has close ties to the ruling RDPC party, is the central figure in a state audit of how Covid-19 funds were spent or misspent. He could face criminal proceedings. [... ]
President Paul Biya is pursuing his plans to get rid of ministers who show themselves too ready to join the race to succeed him. First to go is former defence minister Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo ' o. [... ]
Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, the all-powerful secretary-general at the president's office, has a key weapon in his running battle against certain rival ministers and advisors to Paul Biya: the authority to sign directives on behalf of the president. [... ]
In October, 86-year-old Paul Biya, who has been in power for 37 years, embarked upon a final seven-year term after an election that was a foregone conclusion. Although it is by no means clear who will succeed him, the fact [. [... ]
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Consumer Defensive Resilient, but Mostly Fairly Valued | Strong brands are in the best position to weather any challenges.
The consumer defensive sector proved relatively resilient despite turbulent market conditions in the first quarter, sliding 2% through March 25, while the broader equity market dropped a more sizable 5%.
As such, investors seeking opportunities in the sector will find a dearth of options, with our consumer defensive coverage trading at our median fair value estimates versus the 2% discount for our North American coverage. This translates to 30% of our consumer defensive coverage rated 4 or 5 stars, with the majority falling in the consumer products and beverage aisles. We suspect shares have been hampered by inflation and uncertainty about firms ' ability to withstand such pronounced margin pressure. But we think these concerns are overblown, given the enhanced levels of brand investment firms began employing even before the pandemic took hold.
And despite stepped-up prices at the shelf to offset these higher costs ( related to raw materials, wages, packaging, transportation, and logistics), consumer demand remains elevated. According to IRI, consumer purchases ( by dollar sales) across a diverse array of product categories remain on an upward trajectory versus a year ago. However, we don’ t expect this trend to persist, as more consumers may opt to trade down to lower-price private-label products as pocketbooks become strained. But we contend that firms with strong brand intangible assets that instill value through ongoing brand-building initiatives ( such as research, development, and marketing) are poised to navigate these challenges relatively unscathed.
Although demand has been heated, stock at the shelf remains deficient, stemming from supply chain disruptions and labor shortages, which are unlikely to be alleviated over the near term. As illustrated by the IRI CPG Supply Index, 10% of total consumer packaged goods have been out of stock the past few months, with edible items reapproaching the worst in-stock level during the pandemic. However, we surmise operators have been employing multiple levers by which to catch up, including selectively adding capacity, funneling volumes through co-manufacturers, and narrowing their product set to focus on the fastest-turning stock-keeping units. We view these steps as a prudent way to support the entrenched retail relationships leading brands boast.
At a 30% discount to our valuation, we think investors should consider wide-moat Kellogg. Years before COVID-19 came on the scene, Kellogg started taking steps to alter its mix toward more attractive areas ( from a category and geographic perspective), which we believe the market fails to appreciate. More specifically, over the past decade, Kellogg has strategically shifted its product mix away from the mature cereal aisle toward on-trend snacking. In addition, this wide-moat operator has pursued inorganic means to build out its reach in faster-growing emerging markets ( which now account for around 25% of its sales base).
Shares of narrow-moat Boston Beer, a leader in U.S. high-end malt beverage and adjacent categories, trade about 49% below our intrinsic valuation. We posit that the firm has shown a proclivity to augment its portfolio in alignment with the latest growth vectors and capture a disproportionate share of the economic rents generated from this growth by being one of the first movers. While seltzer trends have slowed, we think Boston Beer's sales will remain supported by secular consumption shifts ( such as the desire for a low-sugar footprint and varied flavor profiles), evidenced by the recent launch of the hard seltzer Truly Margarita).
Beyond Meat shares are attractive, trading at a 50% discount to our $ 98 fair value estimate. We think investor fears about slowing U.S. retail demand for plant-based meat are unwarranted, as the slowdown appears to be the result of the pandemic-driven surge in 2020. In our view, growth should reaccelerate in 2022 with the expanded launch of McDonald's McPlant in multiple geographic regions and the co-creation of products with Yum Brands for various fast-food chain restaurants across the world. As primary growth drivers, we expect these deals will collectively result in over $ 200 million in incremental annual revenue by 2025.
Erin Lash does not own ( actual or beneficial) shares in any of the securities mentioned above. Find out about Morningstar’ s editorial policies.
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KPMG's Andrés Jiménez on How Banks can Break the Chain of Environmental Crime | Originally published at home.kpmg. Andrés Jiménez is a Forensic Partner of KPMG Colombia. KPMG ranked No. 16 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021.
There are innumerable steps that can be taken at a local, regional and international level to mitigate and even halt the effects of climate change, reduce pollution and ensure a safe, clean planet for future generations. Consequently, it can seem overwhelming for corporations to identify the best approach to making a difference. But, for financial institutions in particular, a key part of this is taking ownership of their own impact on the chain of environmental crime.
In this age of readily available information, some people claim that there are less excuses for the lack of awareness or avoidance of the issues. On the other hand, having an excess of information doesn’ t allow companies to provide quick answers to keep up with the pace of the economy and their clients. How can they find the correct balance?
It is well documented that practices such as illegal mining and logging can cause serious environmental damage, as well as harm people and economies, and cause devastating effects to the planet, its population and its ecosystems. However, these practices will struggle to survive if doing the right thing is easier than doing business as usual with the already known negative consequences for the environment. I believe banks can play a key role in this matter.
Usually, gold is mined in jurisdictions such as Latin America and Africa and is later exported to the US, Europe and/or the Middle East. As with any other export operation, companies that acquire the gold have to use the international financial system to pay for the goods they’ ve received.
The challenge arises when companies that must pay for the gold and banks that have to process the transactions on their behalf are conducting due diligence.
Generally, somebody conducting due diligence would want to ensure the payment they’ re processing isn’ t from an entity with links to terrorist organizations or one that’ s included on a restrictive list, and that no economic sanctions are being violated.
Additional risks and tasks to banks have been emphasized in the last couple of years as the fight against corruption and tax evasion were brought to the top of the international agenda. Regulators sent strong messages to international financial institutions in this regard. According to regulators, banks weren’ t doing enough and, in some cases, that message was delivered by way of heavy monetary penalties.
Nowadays, at the top of the international agenda of governments, corporations and regulators is the achievement of the ESG agenda. Financial institutions must also react and adapt to it.
Under the ESG agenda, companies need to assess the level of impact of their operations and the integrity of their supply chains. Also, they need to be able to track and trace their products to ethical and sustainable standards.
In the gold mining industry, this means that companies have to ensure that their product isn’ t coming from an illegal source and they’ re not financing any illegal activities.
So, what’ s the role of banks in all of this and how can they navigate this growing complexity? Is it enough that they conduct the same level of due diligence to any other import/export transaction? In my opinion, the answer is no. This poses a greater risk and should be dealt with differently.
Certain industries are riskier than others. Depending on the level of risk, banks ask questions about the practices, people and organizations along value chains.
But it’ s important to ask the right questions to uncover the risks and the skeletons in the closet. Companies must dig deep to ensure they’ re not trading in commodities that have been illegally mined or extracted, and to be certain they’ re not funding environmental crimes, even inadvertently.
That’ s not always easy. KPMG’ s Forensic services professionals not only know which questions to ask, but where to direct the questions. We can advise on the next steps your organization should take for positive change.
It can seem like an impossible task to identify every potentially damaging transaction, but with the help of KPMG professionals, the process can be less onerous. This process relies on a risk-based approach. The first steps should include knowing which activities and markets are riskier than others and identifying riskier clients. When these assessments are made, by asking the right questions at the right time, it can be easier to minimize exposure.
For example, in Latin America, many Colombian companies are heavily exposed to the mining industry. Strategic forensic work can help detect whether a banking client could be involved in unethical transactions. This is where KPMG’ s regional expertise and relationships come into play. Our in-depth knowledge about the industries and regional laws can help your organization navigate these issues.
The desire from the top to make a difference and root out the issues should feed into a culture of environmental responsibility throughout a business. Banks can use their power to help change behavior.
Awareness of potential consequences within certain industries can help make an impact. KPMG professionals work with C-suite executives so they understand not just the importance of caring about the future of the planet, but how they can work with their teams to make positive changes and avoid serious consequences.
I believe technology has an ever-increasing role to play in helping banks to be part of the solution. Artificial intelligence ( AI) can be a great investment for performing due diligence at scale. When used in conjunction with KPMG professionals, AI technology can detect suspected unlawful financing by seeking out information on the profiles of individuals and corporations and using the data to track and link suspicious transactions.
The Senate confirmed Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court on Thursday, marking a historic moment as she is the first Black female justice in the nation’ s highest court. The confirmation also gave President Joe Biden bipartisan endorsement as he promised to diversify the Supreme Court. Jackson was confirmed in…
As the saying goes, the news never stops — but there’ s a lot of it out there, and all of it doesn’ t always pertain to our readers. In this weekly news roundup, we’ ll cover the top news stories that matter most to our diversity focused audience. 1. Sexual Assault Awareness…
You’ ve probably heard of Autism Awareness Month, which has been celebrated every April since the Autism Society of America ( ASA) first observed it in 1970. But did you know the organization made the shift to Autism Acceptance Month in 2021? Facts About Autism Once referred to as Autism Spectrum Disorder, …
Originally published at basf.com. BASF ranked No. 12 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. BASF Venture Capital GmbH ( BVC), the corporate venture company of BASF Group, announced today a strategic investment in Oceanworks, a sustainable plastic solutions provider that brings traceability and transparency through digitalization…
Originally published at about.att.com. Anne Chow is the CEO of AT & T Business. AT & T is a Hall of Fame company. Women’ s History Month is a time to reflect on women’ s accomplishments and the progress we’ ve made as a society. Over the past few weeks, I’ ve heard and read so many…
Originally published at sanofi.com. Sanofi U.S. ranked No. 27 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. Sanofi launches its Diversity, Equity & Inclusion ( DE & I) Board, the first-of-its-kind in the pharmaceutical industry to feature outside advisors. Sanofi’ s DE & I Board will include three of the most influential voices in the DE & I…
In early 2021, employment experts across the nation started to notice a troubling new trend: a growing number of workers were quitting their jobs en masse. As the months went on, the phenomenon — fueled by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic — continued, with more and more workers resigning from jobs…
As the saying goes, the news never stops — but there’ s a lot of it out there, and all of it doesn’ t always pertain to our readers. In this weekly news roundup, we’ ll cover the top news stories that matter most to our diversity focused audience. 1. How the World…
The Indianapolis Colts recently made news by creating a program to promote diverse coaches in the National Football League by earning fellowships on the Colts’ coaching staff. The Colts named the Tony Dungy Diversity Fellowship after the head coach who led the team to victory in Super Bowl LXI, making…
Originally published at news.abbvie.com. Laura Schumacher is the Vice Chairman, External Affairs and Chief Legal Officer at AbbVie. AbbVie ranked No. 15 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. AbbVie is honored to announce that Laura Schumacher, Vice Chairman, External Affairs and Chief Legal Officer at…
@ abbvie announces that Laura Schumacher, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, and Chief Legal Officer at AbbVie, has be… https: //t.co/NXtkzA4RSN March 30, 2022
In new research from @ PwC, 64% of next-generation ( NextGen) family-owned companies say their brand has the opport… https: //t.co/ZCyF3ty0ih March 30, 2022
Authenticity is encouraged in the # workplace given the benefits derived, including greater employee engagement and… https: //t.co/AzrhILUenA March 29, 2022
According to recent research by @ HarvardBiz, the difference in wages between # BIPOC workers and their counterparts… https: //t.co/tEkUpuwYoh March 27, 2022 | general |
Hershey Partners With AIM-Progress Africa Hub to Aid Child Access to Nutrition | Originally published at thehersheycompany.com. The Hershey Company ranked No. 10 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021.
The African Union ( AU) has declared 2022 to be the Year of Nutrition. With high levels of malnutrition in Africa, the AU is committed to strengthening resilience in nutrition and food security on the African continent and to strengthening agri-food systems.
AIM-Progress Africa hub, along with regional facilitator Partner Africa, is enabling member companies in the region to come together, exchange best practices, launch projects and ensure positive impact at a wider scale. Africa hub co-chairs, Goodwill Shandu, The Coca-Cola Company and Phangisa Matsebula, AB InBev, are leading the support of these activities. With this agenda in mind, the AIM-Progress newsletter highlighted a project from The Hershey Company that focuses on improving children’ s access to nutrition, while simultaneously contributing to the fight against child labour and strengthening agri-food systems.
A: Energize Learning is a project funded entirely by The Hershey Company, which is partnering with Project Peanut Butter, an NGO focused on children’ s nutrition, to produce and distribute daily via schools in Côte d’ Ivoire and Ghana a vitamin-fortified, peanut butter-based snack called “ ViVi ” that provides children with 30% of their daily recommended vitamin intake.
A: Since 2015, when the project first started, we have seen children respond very enthusiastically to ViVi. Research has shown that children who receive ViVi have significantly lower rates of childhood anaemia. Because of ViVi’ s popularity, children are motivated to attend school and to remain at school throughout the day instead of staying at home after the lunch break. Better educated children mean children who are more likely to achieve their full potential, breaking free of the cycle of poverty and illiteracy that is among the identified root causes of child labour. The more hours that children spend in school mean fewer hours during which they may be tempted to perform hazardous tasks on their families’ farms.
A: The Hershey Company is proud of the support that it provides to local producers of peanuts, currently offering them a secure market for about 100 tons of peanuts annually. The project is supporting local capacity to deal with a range of food safety issues, including aflatoxin and food packaging and handling. We also source locally grown and locally processed cocoa ( as a flavoring) and several other materials and ingredients for ViVi that have been produced in-country, adding to the economic impact of the project at the community level. We are optimistic that this impact will grow as the project evolves and expands in Côte d’ Ivoire.
A: The Hershey Company and Project Peanut Butter have engaged in strong partnerships with the Ghana School Feeding Program and the National Nutrition Council in Côte d’ Ivoire. These partnerships, which extend down to the level of school principals in the targeted communities, are allowing us now to provide ViVi free of charge to more than 45,000 school children daily. The construction of state-of-the-art ViVi production facilities in both countries also is a very significant element of the Energize Learning project’ s success.
A: The importance of understanding and aligning with priorities established by national governments can not be overestimated and is essential for obtaining requisite local support.
The Senate confirmed Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court on Thursday, marking a historic moment as she is the first Black female justice in the nation’ s highest court. The confirmation also gave President Joe Biden bipartisan endorsement as he promised to diversify the Supreme Court. Jackson was confirmed in…
As the saying goes, the news never stops — but there’ s a lot of it out there, and all of it doesn’ t always pertain to our readers. In this weekly news roundup, we’ ll cover the top news stories that matter most to our diversity focused audience. 1. Sexual Assault Awareness…
You’ ve probably heard of Autism Awareness Month, which has been celebrated every April since the Autism Society of America ( ASA) first observed it in 1970. But did you know the organization made the shift to Autism Acceptance Month in 2021? Facts About Autism Once referred to as Autism Spectrum Disorder, …
Originally published at press.humana.com. Humana ranked No. 13 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. The Humana Foundation, philanthropic arm of Humana Inc. for the past 40 years, continued its $ 5.5 million investment in six communities across the United States to improve greater health equity outcomes…
Originally published at newsroom.hilton.com. Hilton ranked No. 1 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. Hilton, one of the world’ s leading hospitality companies, was today named the “ Best Workplace for Women in Greater China ” for the third consecutive year by Great Place To Work, the global…
Originally published at boeing.com. Boeing Company ranked No. 17 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. When Connie So sees launch coverage of Boeing satellites, the CST-100 Starliner or even footage of the International Space Station, she knows her hands have played a vital and meticulous…
Originally published at basf.com. BASF ranked No. 12 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. BASF Venture Capital GmbH ( BVC), the corporate venture company of BASF Group, announced today a strategic investment in Oceanworks, a sustainable plastic solutions provider that brings traceability and transparency through digitalization…
Originally published at about.att.com. Anne Chow is the CEO of AT & T Business. AT & T is a Hall of Fame company. Women’ s History Month is a time to reflect on women’ s accomplishments and the progress we’ ve made as a society. Over the past few weeks, I’ ve heard and read so many…
Originally published at sanofi.com. Sanofi U.S. ranked No. 27 on The DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity list in 2021. Sanofi launches its Diversity, Equity & Inclusion ( DE & I) Board, the first-of-its-kind in the pharmaceutical industry to feature outside advisors. Sanofi’ s DE & I Board will include three of the most influential voices in the DE & I…
In early 2021, employment experts across the nation started to notice a troubling new trend: a growing number of workers were quitting their jobs en masse. As the months went on, the phenomenon — fueled by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic — continued, with more and more workers resigning from jobs…
@ abbvie announces that Laura Schumacher, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, and Chief Legal Officer at AbbVie, has be… https: //t.co/NXtkzA4RSN March 30, 2022
In new research from @ PwC, 64% of next-generation ( NextGen) family-owned companies say their brand has the opport… https: //t.co/ZCyF3ty0ih March 30, 2022
Authenticity is encouraged in the # workplace given the benefits derived, including greater employee engagement and… https: //t.co/AzrhILUenA March 29, 2022
According to recent research by @ HarvardBiz, the difference in wages between # BIPOC workers and their counterparts… https: //t.co/tEkUpuwYoh March 27, 2022 | general |
Bahrain Victorious terminate Alejandro Osorio’ s contract for breach of COVID-19 rules | Get access to more than 30 brands, premium video, exclusive content, events, mapping, and more.
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Bahrain-Victorious have terminated Alejandro Osorio’ s contract with immediate effect after claiming the rider committed ‘ multiple contract breaches.’
In a short statement posted on Twitter, the team confirmed that the 23-year-old was no longer part of the roster.
Bahrain Victorious have terminated their agreement with Alejandro Osorio following multiple contract breaches.
The team wishes Alejandro the best for his future.
The Colombian had only joined the team at the start of the season, penning a two-year deal after leaving Caja Rural. He raced just eight days for Bahrain Victorious, completing the UAE Tour and then adding a DNF at Strade Bianche.
According to the team, Osorio’ s contract ended last week when official documents were sent to the UCI in Aigle, Switzerland.
“ He can come out with his explanation and if he wants to talk he can explain, ” team manager Milan Erzen told VeloNews.
“ It’ s not one thing but from the beginning, he made many wrong things and we can’ t accept that. He put riders and staff in difficult situations. Especially about COVID and everything. ”
“ The letter went to the UCI one week and that’ s it. Some things you can’ t accept. We have 100 people on our team and the rules are for everyone. We gave him one warning after a couple of things but he made them again. So we decided to terminate the contract. It’ s more than during the races; he went outside the COVID bubble. We have all the documents. ”
At this time, Osorio had no comment about the contract termination.
Osorio, a climber, won a stage at the Baby Giro in 2018.
Get the latest race news, results, commentary, and tech, delivered to your inbox. | general |
Fashion editor's picks: what we're coveting right now | We earn a commission for products purchased through some links in this article.
Always on the lookout for the most exciting fashion launches, unique collaborations and limited-edition collections? Us too. That's why we are rounding up the items that are currently sitting at the top of our fashion team's wish lists to help inspire and inform your shopping decisions.
Whether it is the arrival of new-season pieces that we 've had an eye on since they first came down the catwalk, capsule classics that we know are going to become our wardrobe heroes or those one-of-a-kind buys that you won't want to miss out on, this is an edit of pieces we truly love.
Below, we round up the items dominating our fashion team's wish lists.
Model, author and activist Emily Ratajkowki has teamed up with Superga to rework three of the footwear brand's most popular styles. `` I’ ve been wearing the brand for years so this collaboration felt completely natural to me, ” said Ratajkowski, who is also the label's newest ambassador. One style that the model has turned her attention to is the timeless Cotu Classic canvas trainer ( pictured) which is the perfect casual wardrobe staple. As well as being vegan, the style is also royal-approved, regularly seen gracing the feet of the Duchess of Cambridge.
Looking for something special to add to your jewellery box? This beautiful Pas De Deux necklace from Wald Berlin is a perfect choice for embracing ladylike pearls with a modern twist. The design has been handmade in Germany by the brand's fair-trade Women and Grandmothers Collective, and created with a combination of sweetwater pearls and a gold chain, putting a chic twist on the classic style.
Bring spring into your jewellery box with this beautiful new collaboration from Stine Goya and Georg Jensen, who have teamed up on a collection of floral-inspired pieces. The Daisy, a Georg Jensen jewellery icon, has been re-imagined by Goya, who has created a series of colourful necklaces, earrings and bracelets. The collection has been crafted in sterling silver, just like the original Daisy, but they have then been hand-painted with enamel in a collection of fresh and soft hues.
If you are in the market for a new-season tote that will instantly put a spring in your step, make sure to check out Givenchy's new Kenny bag, which was seen on the house's SS22 catwalk. The Kenny is a supple bourse-style leather handbag that can instantly be taken from day to night. We love the small Kenny in white, but there are plenty of other options too.
For more designer handbags, see our edit here.
In perhaps the coolest collaboration to have come out of 2022 so far, Jimmy Choo has teamed up with Mugler on an exclusive collection of footwear that is sure to be an instant sell-out. The two brands have come together on statement shoes that are designed to `` stimulate the senses ''.
`` There’ s an inherent connection there between the language of Mugler and the language of Jimmy Choo – our roots in the 1990s, the resonance those have today with a younger generation, but the urge to update, to re-engineer and not just revive, '' Jimmy Choo creative director Sandra Choi explained of the collection.
See more from the collaboration here.
For spring/summer 2022, Miuccia Prada has reimagined the 1980’ s New Balance 574 sneaker in a unique collaboration with the trainer brand. The shoes debuted on the SS22 Miu Miu catwalk – and come in three different colours.
Forgive us for wishing winter away, but Sleeper's new collection has us pining for spring. The beloved Ukrainian label has just released its cult Atlanta dress in a number of new colourways, including this beautiful style with printed pansies ( which is available for pre-order now). The dress is 100 per cent linen and comes with a matching scrunchie. Bring on the warmer weather.
Bulgari's signature round watch, the LVCEA, has been updated for 2022 in two striking new colourways - including this deep blue - as unveiled during the recent LVMH watch week. The classic style pays homage to the sundials of ancient Rome and features a mesmerising 3D geometric dial designed to capture and enhance the light. If you're looking for a talking-point timepiece, look no further.
January is the time for reflection and resetting, and Vrai's new 'intention ' medallion is here to help you do just that. The delicate pendant features a modern interpretation of a classic compass, designed to be used as part of your daily manifesting rituals and help guide you towards your goals. The glittering central diamond is ethically created by the Vrai team at the brand's zero-emission foundry in America's Pacific West, and cut and polished to the highest international standards of craftsmanship - no mining required. Good for your soul in more ways than one.
Michael Kors has collaborated with Ashya, a young accessories brand founded by American/Jamaican design duo Ashley Cimone and Moya Annece. Together, the two brands have created two exclusive designs, the Multi Bag and this Bolo Bag, both of which are available to shop now.
This collaboration is part of a celebration of Kors ' 40th anniversary. He wanted to celebrate the milestone by supporting the future of the fashion industry. Thinking back to his own beginnings, he decided to provide a unique opportunity to an emerging brand—offering them the global reach, distribution and platform of the Michael Kors company to help bring their brand to a larger audience.
`` Anniversaries make you think about both the past and the future, ” says Kors. `` I began my business in New York City in 1981, and now I find it very exciting to be able to turn the spotlight on the next generation of designers working here in New York City. When I first saw the work of Ashley and Moya at Ashya, their thoughtfulness and unique point of view impressed me immediately. ''
The gender-neutral bags have been designed in Ashya's signature silhouettes and feature a custom print that incorporates the MK Signature logo print in a new pattern inspired by WestAfrican weaving techniques.
This time of year, all we want to do is cosy up in comfortable knitwear, and that's why we could not be more excited about Blake Ldn's latest collection. Filled with new colourways in some of the brand's signature silhouettes, as well as some new shapes, everything has been hand-knitted by the independent label, and would make a great addition to your cosy winter wardrobe.
Shop the entire collection here.
Dior's new bag collection, Dior Vibe, was created with the most luxurious kind of practicality in mind. Fusing the convenience of sportswear holdalls with the quality associated with a luxury handbag, Maria Grazia Chiuri's new design delivers the best of both worlds. Crafted out of leather and foam inserts, the bag has a lightness to it that adds to its convenience, while the rubber base was inspired by sneakers. Given that the world is now opening up once more, the spacious bowling bag was surely designed with travel in mind; it's the perfect size for all those weekend staycations you might be rearranging for 2022.
Loewe has collaborated for a second time with Studio Ghibli on a collection which pays tribute to the much-loved film Spirited Away. Bringing to life many of the beloved characters from the movie on ready-to-wear items, as well as blankets, scarves and the brand's most iconic handbags, these limited-edition pieces will bring life into your wardrobe.
Shushu/Tong has collaborated with footwear and accessories label Charles & Keith on a new collection to kick off the spring/summer season. The capsule features two pairs of bags and shoes centred around the key motif of the rose, exploring its ephemeral beauty, fragility, and charm.
`` The rose has become a significant symbol in literature and art, usually representing love and desire, '' Liushu Lei and Yutong Jiang of Shushu/Tong said. `` Traditionally, roses only bloomed once a year, which means it was destined to live for a short period of time. A fragile, withering rose exudes fleeting beauty. Sharp thorns line its soft, delicate branches; this danger is a metaphor for the price we sometimes need to pay for love. ''
Claridge's, one of London's most refined and long-established hotels, has just launched its first collection of pyjamas. And naturally, these aren't your average PJs. Created in collaboration with Rebecca Marks of Green Wolf Studio, the pure cotton sets feature art-deco fan prints in a variety of sweet candy colours, finished with mother of pearl buttons, white contrast piping and the hotel crest in gold. Available for men, women and children, there are also matching robes available if you really want to treat yourself. It's all the luxury of a Claridge's hotel suite without having to leave the house.
Manolo Blahnik first launched the iconic Maysale mule in 1991 and the elegant shoe, with its glistening buckle, quickly became one of the brand's most popular styles. In celebration of the label's 50th anniversary, the Maysale has been given a high-octane makeover in gold, along with numerous other Manolo Blahnik signature styles, as part of a celebratory 'Gold ' collection. A piece of fashion history perfect for the festive season.
This winter, Canada Goose is expanding into footwear. The label is on a mission to become a multi-seasonal and multi-functional global luxury lifestyle brand, which is known for more than just its coats. Inspired by Canada Goose’ s most memorable outerwear styles, the brand is aiming to keep you protected from head to toe with the collection, which is made up of two styles, including the Journey Boot ( pictured here) and the Snow Mantra Boot.
Scandi favourite By Malene Birger has launched its first jewellery collection. Designed by creative Director Maja Dixdotter, the drop consists of a bold ring and pair of earrings ( seen here), as well as a slender bracelet and necklace that can be worn alone or layered – all offered in both 925 sterling silver and 14-karat plated gold. The refined, minimalist pieces would make a lovely addition to your everyday wardrobe.
Still on the hunt for the perfect Christmas party dress? We suggest you head down to Harrods, where Khaite has launched its first retail space in London. The design is inspired by New York of the 1980s, and features Khaite's most recent collection, from knitwear to denim, and its beautiful selection of elegant eveningwear.
One of our go-to brands for beautiful basics, Sunspel, has just opened its first stand-alone womenswear pop-up store on Upper James Street, Soho, where it will be selling its elevated, understated British knitwear and loungewear.
We have got an eye on this particular lambswool cardigan, which makes a great piece to cosy up in this winter season.
If you're not already following Sara Shakeel on Instagram, then we suggest you amend that immediately. The artist, who has been coined the 'Queen of Crystals ', uses glitter to create physical and digital collages, giving her followers a bit of extra sparkle in their feeds. And now, Shakeel has collaborated with Linda Farrow on a capsule collection of sunglasses, lending her signature sparkle to the brand's trademark Debbie style in three different iterations. Shop them all here.
We are always on the lookout for chic classics that make for sensible additions to our wardrobes, and that's why Totême's new evening capsule with Net-a-Porter has caught our attention. The edit – which features 15 occasion-wear pieces – has been designed with the festive season in mind, but a twist of the trademark minimalism that the Scandi brand is so well-known for, meaning you truly will be able to wear these pieces again and again.
Fancy treating your feet this Christmas? It doesn't get much more luxurious than beloved loungewear designer Olivia von Halle's new slipper collection, which would make the perfect Christmas gift for that special someone, or yourself. There are a number of different designs, including beautiful feathered options, but our favourites have got to be these velvet zebra slippers with sequin embellishments.
Sustainable knitwear brand Sheep Inc and London-based menswear designer Daniel Fletcher have joined forces to promote positive change in the fashion industry by being more responsible. The two brands have produced a naturally carbon negative and 100 per cent traceable limited-edition beanie. Available in two styles, the cosy hat is modelled on Sheep Inc's signature knit and channels an optimism reminiscent of Fletcher's current collection, with the positive affirmation to `` be well ''. Thanks to Sheep Inc’ s stringent supply chain and focus on regenerative farming, 100 per cent of the profits will be donated to mental health charity, the Be Well Collective.
Simone Rocha has given her trademark egg bag a festive makeover this Christmas season, transforming the pearly accessory into the perfect party bag. Designed exclusively with Harrods, the bag features a faux pearl crossbody strap and pearl beaded leather wristlet with a logo-engraved clasp fastening. Whether you're buying for yourself of a very lucky loved one, this is the ultimate festive fashion treat.
Loewe has, for the first time, created a capsule collection for a retail partner, teaming up with Net-a-Porter on 'The Crafted Collection '. The 25-piece drop features some of the brand's trademark designs reimagined for the new season, many made with a sense of winter cosiness in mind.
`` We’ re excited to partner with Net-a-Porter on a capsule collection of women’ s ready-to-wear and accessories designed to capture a sense of cosiness and modern luxury, '' says Jonathan Anderson, creative director at Loewe. `` In addition to working with signature Loewe fabrics, including wool, cashmere and shearling, we’ ve reimagined some of our most iconic bags such as the ‘ Flamenco’ and ‘ Basket’. ''
Shop the entire collection here.
Bamford has today launched its homegrown Merino knitwear collection, which is a first-of-its-kind capsule range made from British merino wool grown, sheared, spun and knitted entirely in the UK. The collection features this chic hoodie, as well as a ribbed beanie and a matching scarf. This collection is the first in this brand’ s history as it uses natural fibres sourced from the farm of its sister company Daylesford Organic.
`` Homegrown Merino makes tangible Bamford’ s vision for beautifully made clothing that has a fully traceable and transparent product journey, '' the brand said of the release. `` The new collection heralds the homecoming of the UK knitwear industry, bringing the spinning, processing and knitting of the wool fibre closer to the merino flock’ s home in the Cotswolds. ''
Find out more about the collection, here.
Luxury online retailer Mytheresa has teamed up with Acne Studios on a 20-piece winter capsule collection, which is filled with the cosiest pieces to hunker down in. `` My thoughts were on what happens when we emerge from isolation, all soft, sleepy and sensual, '' Jonny Johansson, founder and creative director of Acne, said of the designs. From this beautiful puffy purple coat to knitted jumpers, toasty gloves and furry boots, this is a great collection to check out if you need to expand on your winter classics.
With Nothing Underneath, a shirt label loved by fashion insiders ( and worn by none other than Meghan Markle), has just launched beautiful silk shirts for autumn, which are the perfect addition to your capsule wardrobe. The design is made in 100 per cent Mulberry silk, and comes in both black and white. I 'll be wearing mine to dress up my jeans for the office and out to dinner.
Handbag label Mashu is moving into a season-less approach, hoping to explore and evolve its sustainability and ethical targets, with its most sustainable collection yet and a complete overhaul of operational structure. The new collection – which is available to shop here – interprets the brand’ s trademark silhouettes with a new perspective, ensuring styles are functional all-year round, and with designs that can fluidly adapt to the different seasons, while the materials used have also been given an overhaul.
Partywear favourite The Attico has been slowly expanding its edits over the past few seasons, and has decided that now is the perfect moment to add handbags. Specifically, bags that are `` ideal for a last-minute, hectic yet sparkly lifestyle '', creative directors Giorgia Tordini and Gilda Ambrosio said of the collection. The first handbag drop from the brand is made up of a number of different styles, including this beautiful daytime tote, which is big enough to carry everything you will possibly need. See the whole collection here.
The Outnet has joined forces with Victoria Beckham on a 25-piece capsule, which is predominantly made from excess fabric from the brand's archive. The collection features plenty of the label's trademark modern silhouettes. From form-fitting dresses and chunky knitwear ( including this beautiful blue rollneck which I will be adding to my wish-list immediately) to classic shirting, tailored trousers and outerwear, there is something for everyone in this collection.
`` This collaboration was a wonderful opportunity for us to repurpose excess fabric in a new, exciting way, '' Beckham said. `` We’ re always looking for ways in which we can be more responsible with our collections and creatively challenge ourselves. This collaboration allowed us to do both of those things which is really exciting for us as a brand. It’ s a celebration of our past with a future-thinking approach. ''
One of my favourite mid-range designer bag brands, Chylak has just released its autumn/winter collection, which features plenty of new shapes, including this lovely Dumpling bag, which is a great day-to-night option. Inspired by romance and normality, Zofia Chylak wanted to celebrate the end of lockdown with these new designs.
`` I felt the need to create something more romantic this time, '' she said. `` We’ ve all been dreaming of going out and meeting up with friends and family again – and this is my idea of the bags we’ ll be wearing while returning to normalcy. Much more nostalgic and less conservative than usual. ''
If you didn't get your loungewear collection quite up to scratch during lockdown, then let me introduce you to a seriously luxurious option for relaxing around the house in, Commando's new vegan silk collection. The style has been made using recycled cotton linter fibres and boasts a flattering high-rise waistband, relaxed fit and banded hem. I 'll be teaming them with the matching top and my slippers on cosy evenings in.
If you are on the lookout for some beautiful new jewellery to cherish forever, then Vashi's latest collection ( the first to be designed under the direction of Liz Olver, the brand's new director of product design) is a great place to start.
There are 18 designs in the 'Made With Love ' collection, including this lovely pair of knot stud earrings. Every piece can be personalised with an engraving, customised with a design detail or can simply be used it as inspiration to explore creating something bespoke. Find out more about that here.
French label Maje has teamed up with Los Angeles-based brand Varley for the first time. The two companies have joined forces on a very retro-inspired activewear collection, which is made up of leotards, leggings, sports bras and loungewear, all of which will help you to look your best in the gym or at home. I am a particular fan of the leopard-print pieces, including this fun leotard, which I 'll be teaming with the matching leggings.
For its October collaboration, The Yellow World has teamed up with Parisian label Alfie on an exclusive collection which has been created using deadstock Prada fabric. The sustainable capsule is made up of a striking backless yellow cami, and these chic cream flares, both of which are limited edition, so don't hang around if you want to get your hands on them.
On the lookout for a pair of winter boots that are just as practical as they are stylish? Alexander McQueen's Tread Slick collection might be just what you are after. The fashion house's trusty style comes in a number of different iterations, from lace-up and knee-high to embellished and colourful, all complete with a chunky rubber tread sole. This simple white pair would be a very versatile addition to your wardrobe.
Arket has teamed up with Swedish rainwear experts Tretorn on a collection of jackets, boots and accessories that will cater to even the wettest of winters. The pieces have all been inspired by by vintage fishermen’ s parkas and robust raincoats that you might find in the Swedish countryside, and will be an excellent choice for a proper waterproof investment.
`` The Nordic climate can be very unpredictable, but it doesn’ t necessarily stop people from going about their lives and being out in nature if they have suitable clothing, '' Anna Teurnell, Arket's head of design, told us. `` This collection celebrates the rainwear tradition by bringing tried-and-true elements of heritage garments and incorporating them into new styles for the modern family. ''
On the lookout for a new coat? Let me introduce you to one of my new favourite outerwear brands, Margot92. The label – which is based in New York City – is known for making small-batch, impeccably crafted outerwear from the finest natural materials. The current collection is inspired by Eighties ' silhouettes and power dressing – and has a number of standout pieces, including this beautiful bright blue wool coat, which I 'll be wrapping myself in from now until spring.
JW Pei has fast become an A-list favourite. The affordable accessories label boasts fans including Emily Ratajkowski, Hailey Bieber, Irina Shayk and Bella Hadid – and the Los Angeles-based brand has just released its latest accessory, a style called 'The Fei’. The minimalist vegan design is a top-handled longline bag, and is available in a number of different colours and prints. I 've got my eye on this purple option, which will no doubt be just as popular with the fashion set as the brand's cult 'Gabbi ' style.
Due to the fact that Christmas was effectively cancelled last year, there is no such thing as getting into the festive spirit too early this time around. That's why I felt immediately drawn to this sparkly co-ord from Sleeper's holiday collection, which is complete with a statement collar and ruffled cuffs. I 'll be wearing this set all season long, including on Christmas morning and New Year's Eve.
Recent reports suggested that consumers spent more money on jewellery during the pandemic - in a suggested attempt to add a little sparkle to Zoom meetings - which could explain my renewed fascination with all things bling. As we enter October, I 'm already thinking ahead to party season ( because, let's face it, we didn't really get one last year), and am considering investing in a little sparkle to celebrate with. British jewellery brand Fenton specialises in ethically sourced coloured gemstones to suit a range of budgets, but for those in the market for something really special, the label's new elevated cocktail collection features one-of-a-kind pieces celebrating the finest jewellery craftsmanship and the joy of colourful stones. Could the cocktail ring be the new cocktail dress?
Fendi made a splash at Milan Fashion Week this season thanks to a world-first collaboration with fellow Italian fashion house, Versace. Closer to home, and the brand has taken over Harrods with a dedicated pop-up space - which, true to form, features some exclusive product, all in a very chic grey colourway. I 've got my eye on this Fendi First bag, designed by current creative director Kim Jones, but featuring the brand's signature Karligraphy monogram created by Karl Lagerfeld in 1981. It's the perfect blend of classic and contemporary.
The Fendi First bag with Karligraphy monogram in grey is available exclusively at Harrods. The pop-up runs until 30 September.
If, like me, you are always on the lookout for more sustainable options, Riley Studio is a great name to know for wardrobe basics. From the brand's boxy white tees to its new flannel shirt ( both of which are created using 100 per cent recycled materials), the label is committed to creating gender-neutral wardrobe staples that are kind on the planet, and a great option to consider when you're in need of some capsule classics.
`` We don’ t compromise on design or sustainability, we create products for life, not just a season. ''
Valentino is committed to supporting Unicef's vaccine delivery efforts. The fashion house has created a new charitable hoodie, of which all profits will go towards helping those less fortunate receive a Covid-19 vaccine.
`` Getting vaccinated has become the most effective way to fight this global pandemic, as well as a symbol of respect for others and social responsibility, '' Valentino's creative director Pierpaolo Piccioli said. `` One can not hide behind the concept of freedom by deciding not to get vaccinated. Freedom must always be protected, and we must all fight for freedom but respecting others: the freedom to be ourselves, the freedom of thought, the freedom of love, the freedom to express and fight for our own ideas. Unfortunately, not all countries have equal access to Covid-19 vaccines. With this collaboration, Valentino supports Unicef in the delivery efforts of life-saving Covid-19 vaccines. ''
You can buy the hoodie here – and can donate to Unicef's efforts, here.
One of my favourite independent handbag labels, Agneel, has just launched its latest style, The Dena, a rectangular silhouette which can be worn either as a shoulder bag or a crossbody – and which makes a great back-to-the-office buy. The classic style is available in six different colourways and materials, including this chic croc-effect leather, which I can't wait to add to my new-season wardrobe.
Ever since it first launched a few years ago, Wandler has been such a favourite with fashion editors, creating some of the most beautiful shoes and bags around. And now, the label is slowly moving into new territory with its first ready-to-wear collection, focussing solely on denim jeans and leather trousers. The pieces – which are all available on Matches Fashion – will make a great versatile addition to any wardrobe. I 've personally got my eye on the barrel silhouette, which I know will uplift my day-to-day looks.
If you're anything like me, your post-lockdown approach to fashion is all about dressing up at any opportunity. With this in mind, I am trying to invest in pieces that are not only timeless, but all about glamour. I spied this beautiful silk, tulip-shaped skirt in Giorgio Armani's autumn collection, which I 'll be pairing with a dressy top and kitten heels in the evening, but also making it work for the office with an oversized knit.
High-street favourite Ghost, which is known best for its ladylike printed dresses and silk gowns, is stepping into a more casual direction with the launch of Go By Ghost, an athleisure-oriented collection filled with pieces designed specifically for yoga, Pilates and barre. If you also prefer a more muted colour palette when it comes to your gym gear, I 'd definitely recommend a look at the collection.
Mansur Gavriel has been responsible for more than a few cult handbags over the years, and its latest offering, 'The Candy Bag ' has definitely caught my eye. The new silhouette – which currently comes in five different colourways, including this punchy powder blue – has been made with a high-shine glossy finish and is a great size for toting around all day long.
Autumn is almost upon us, which is building my excitement for those countryside walks in the cold, meaning it is definitely time to dig out our knitwear, boots and warmest coats. If you, like me, are in the market for some new outerwear that ticks the boxes for both comfort and style, then Alexa Chung's latest collaboration with Barbour might be just the ticket. The launch – which features pieces inspired by the beauty and practicality of outfits worn by pioneers and explorers in the early 20th century – is available to shop now, and is a great collection to consider for your new-season buy.
You can tell a good collaboration by how authentic it feels, which is the very essence of Harris Reed's new collection for Missoma. Every piece, whether the delicate pearls or charming jewelled snakes, has the gender-fluid designer written all over it. In fact, their own personal jewellery formed the inspiration for this new collection, Harris told us. I personally am a big fan of these serpent drop earrings from the collection, handcrafted from recycled metal, which I 'll be wearing with a red lip and a sleek updo.
If The Yellow World is not yet on your radar, then let me tell you why it should be. The site – which was founded by Evie Henderson – solely features collaborations between herself and the most exciting designers. This month, she is teaming up with Made Some Souvenirs ( a brand founded on a love of travel, souvenir shopping and photographing tourism) on a capsule of vintage-inspired T-shirts. Just as most pieces on The Yellow World, they are limited edition, so I recommend you get them while you can.
Dior has taken over Harrods for the month of August, with a pop-up boutique exclusively unveiling its autumn/winter 2021 collection. The bold space features colourful scenography by Italian artist Marco Lodola, with a playful nod to Harrods ' location in the heart of the capital, in the form of red London buses and black taxis. Also taking centre-stage at the pop-up is Dior's heritage 'Mizza ' motif, a striking leopard print originally inspired by Mizza Bricard, a muse to Christian Dior, who admired her daring elegance. The motif is seen adorning the pop-up walls and displays – either in its original classic shade or in a chic grey version – as well as across jackets, skirts, shirts and, of course, bags, such as the Lady D-Lite, which is at right the top of my wish list.
Much-loved footwear label Manu Atelier has collaborated with Scandi favourite Rotate Birger Christensen on a capsule collection, featuring nine pairs of shoes which aim to fuse retro with femininity. The designs have brought together Manu Atelier’ s striking silhouettes with Rotate's trademark colourful prints – and have been designed to take customers from day to night effortlessly. I love this turquoise pump ( which also comes in white), while the collection also features chunky-heeled boots and strappy floral sandals.
If you are in the market for a new personalised accessory, let me direct you to Loveness Lee's new collection of initial necklaces. Each unisex pendant has been handcrafted in London and sustainably made with certified recycled sterling silver, locally sourced materials and then finished in a choice of argenti silver or 18ct gold plating. They are designed to be worn by everyone and can be styled up layered together, but also look great alone.
Marylebone concept store Koibird has announced its new theme for the autumn/winter season, with a selection of collections and designers which all celebrate the idea of the party, and are getting me in the mood for going out out.
`` After a period in which many celebrations were put on hold, a new sense of freedom is starting to emerge, with Koibird's AW21 edit looking to champion both the life of the party and the soul of the home, '' the retailer explained in a press release. `` The notion of the traditional gathering has changed in 2021, with the cultural appetite for connection, conversation and community proving more palpable than ever. ''
The edit includes pieces from Area, Rodarte, Mach & Mach, Sandra Mansour, Rowen Rose and Rosie Assoulin, as well as emerging brands such as Ami Amalia, Ksenia Schnaider and Completedworks, while there are also plenty of homeware buys also included in the collection to go along with the theme. See the entire 'Koibird hosts a party ' collection here.
In April, Michael Kors hosted a star-studded 40th anniversary show, where it took over Broadway with a catwalk that featured the likes of Bella Hadid and Naomi Campbell. And now, the special MK40 collection, which is made up of all archive pieces, is available to shop – with a special twist.
`` The MK40 Reissue Capsule combines timeless fashion, modern technology and a little bit of storytelling all at the same time, '' Michael Kors explained. `` When you scan the QR code, you’ ll be able to connect with the garment’ s history and have a piece of that story right in your closet. ''
The collection is dropping throughout the next few weeks, and this beautiful zebra coat is already available. Inspired by a design in the autumn/winter 1994 collection, you can find out all about its history, here. | general |
COVID-19: Kazakhstan stays in ‘ green’ zone | All regions of Kazakhstan remain in the ‘ green’ zone, Kazinform has learnt from the Interdepartmental commission fighting to stop the spread of COVID-19 in Kazakhstan, Trend reports citing Kazinform.
All regions are outside the ‘ red’ and ‘ yellow’ zones, the highest and the second highest in the three-tier system used in Kazakhstan in terms of spread of the coronavirus infection.
The cities of Nur-Sultan, Almaty and Shymkent, as well as Akmola, Almaty, Aktobe, Atyrau, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Kostanay, Kyzylorda, Mangistau, North Kazakhstan, Pavlodar, Turkestan, West Kazakhstan, and Zhambyl regions stay in the safe ‘ green zone’. | general |
North Sea consortium PBS relocates to new office in Westhill | A North Sea energy services consortium has announced the relocation of its Aberdeenshire headquarters.
PBS is comprised of Paris-headquartered Ponticelli UK, Brand Energy and Infrastructure Services and Danish firm Semco Maritime.
Staying within Westhill, just outside Aberdeen, where the consortium was previously located, the office move has been hailed as a “ significant milestone ”.
It can accommodate PBS’ growing workforce, allows for future expansion and will also “ drive innovation ”, allowing for a new hybrid way of working.
As listed on its website, PBS is now located on Prospect Road at the Arnhall Business Park – numerous other oil and gas companies also have offices at the site.
Andreas Christophersen, PBS director said: “ This move represents another significant milestone for our business. The new office space better accommodates our growing team, enabling us to continue to provide industry-leading support and service to our clients. The additional space will also help drive innovation and provide the opportunity for further expansion.
“ While COVID forced office-based businesses to explore flexible working arrangements, PBS have embraced this change and implemented a hybrid home/office-working policy to remain in place beyond COVID restrictions.
“ As ‘ normal’ continues to make its long-awaited come back, I look forward to seeing more people in our new office and getting to meet more of them in person. ”
PBS employs around 600 workers contracted out to French supermajor TotalEnergies.
Its employees provide support across the company’ s North Sea portfolio, including on Culzean, Dunbar, Elgin Franklin and North Alwyn. | general |
Uzbekistan Airways to resume regular flights to Paris | Uzbekistan Airways will resume regular return flights from Tashkent ( Uzbekistan) to Paris ( France), Trend reports via the company’ s statement.
Flights will be operated from April 29 to June 10 twice a week - on Tuesdays and Fridays.
In March 2020, Uzbekistan closed air and road communications with all foreign countries due coronavirus pandemic.
Previously, Uzbekistan Airways resumed regular direct flights between Baku ( Azerbaijan) and Tashkent ( Uzbekistan), which were also suspended due to the coronavirus pandemic. | general |
For Luxury Brands, Balancing Demand Remains The Real Challenge | Last month, Hermès announced plans to increase its production capacity with the addition of two new leather goods workshops in France. Its announcement in March followed the news in its latest results that sales growth at the French luxury goods group eased in the last quarter of 2021 because its self-imposed production caps kept the company from meeting demand for its handbags.
Its shares fell by 7 percent on the day, its worst trading day since September 2016 and its lowest price in more than eight months, Reuters reported at the time.
The company said in February that it caps volume growth in its leather goods production at 6 to 7 percent per year, preferring instead to have long waiting lists for its products rather than accelerate production. However, with its announcement in March - the addition of two production sites based in L’ Isle d’ Espagnac in Charente and Loupes in Gironde which are set to open between 2025 and 2026 - that may be about to change.
The workshops are in addition to three other sites already under construction in France, adding to Hermès ' long-term plans to meet the burgeoning demand it faces for its products.
Likewise, an announcement from LVMH in February to increase its production in France with two new workshops expected to open before the end of the year demonstrates the kind of voracious demand that the luxury market is seeing at the moment, particularly as the market rebounds from the challenges seen at the start of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
Despite the uncertainty experienced by the global markets, demand for iconic luxury goods during the past two years has grown. Data from our special report The Deep Dive found that interest in iconic products is at an all-time high, with Google searches for “ Cartier Love Bracelet ” up by 27 percent during the period of January to October 2021 ( 3,404,000 searches) or by 20 percent for “ Louis Vuitton Neverfull ” iconic bag ( 1,655,000 searches for this query).
More recently, further data analysed by DLG for this article shows that interest in the Hermès Birkin and Kelly bags has grown by 37 percent and 86 percent respectively, when comparing Google searches from March 2019 - February 2020, to March 2021 - February 2022. Likewise, for Louis Vuitton, interest in its Capucine bag rose by 162 percent in the same period, 62 percent for the Twist bag and 36 percent for its Alma bag, demonstrating that demand for luxury goods is still going strong.
If anything, what we have witnessed is that meeting and balancing demand has become one of the main challenges that luxury brands now face, particularly when it comes to forward planning and determining the pace at which one produces. Make too little and you can’ t meet customer demand. Make too much and you have a surplus of products that could end up damaging your brand equity.
“ Brands have to be very tuned in to the customer's psyche right now, ” said Robert Burke, CEO, and Chairman of consultancy Robert Burke Associates. “ Luxury consumers have gone through a great deal of change over the past two years; in terms of how they view their assets and in terms their spending habits. ”
Part of being in sync with their customers is knowing how to achieve the right balance, Burke added. “ Consumers understand supply and demand. There is a balance and a scale that you have to hit to not put off the customer because of excessive wait times or unavailability. ”
“ But right now, they’ re very frustrated with supply chain issues, ” he continued. “ The more wealthy they are, the less tolerance they have… And if they don't buy from you, they have enough disposable income to spend it on another brand. And that's just the reality. ”
The first thing to note is the reality. During the pandemic, it was hard to anticipate what demand there would be for luxury goods, whether those products could continue to be made due to COVID restrictions and if brands could even sell their products to customers when stores were closed, resulting in many brands deciding to scale back so that they could assess how best manage the situation.
However, as the past two years have shown, luxury is experiencing a rebound and now brands have to once again pivot to a new strategy, particularly one that focuses on markets with significant growth potential like the United States.
“ I think a lot of the brands were surprised by the magnitude of the rebound over the past 18 months, and so they got into a situation where the volumes were incredibly tight, and they thought that it was appropriate to add some production capacity, ” said Erwan Rambourg, managing director and global head of Consumer & Retail Equity Research at HSBC.
“ Demand in the sector has been incredibly resilient, ” Rambourg added. “ Most companies are still seeing very, very buoyant demand in the United States, which is linked to the recruitment of a younger, more diverse consumer than pre-COVID. ”
It comes as little surprise that brands like Hermès and Louis Vuitton are scaling up production, particularly as demand from markets like the United States continues to help drive quarterly sales growth. “ They're looking at the long term, ” said Burke. “ They're confident that if demand stays the same or grows, which it probably will, they 'll be positioned to supply the demand. ”
“ No one knows what will happen in six months, but if they need to pull back on production, the margins are good enough, ” said Burke. “ What they don't want to do this is short term or long term is miss out on any momentum by being too scarce. ”
“ Both brands, rightfully so, are very confident that once the customer goes down this luxury path of buying their product, they will continue, ” Burke said of Hermès and Louis Vuitton. “ They're not going to flood the market with their products, because that would go against everything they stand for, but they're pretty bullish that customers are going to end up being a repeat customer. And we're also bullish specifically because we believe that the United States is an opportunity to grow further for luxury brands right now. ”
Another way that some brands are trying to manage demand is through their pricing, as seen with Chanel, which has once again increased the prices on some of its products in early March, after raising its prices three times in 2021.
“ The volumes have been so tight that there have been a lot of brands recently increasing prices, ” said Rambourg, noting the moves of Chanel, Louis Vuitton, Hermès, and Rolex. “ Pretty much every brand has increased their prices and pretty much every brand has made the case that the volumes are not affected by their price increases given how buoyant the demand is, ” he added.
But this short-term approach of raising prices carries the risk of putting off the luxury consumer, particularly if brands don’ t keep the pace of their peers.
“ If at some stage, the consumer becomes accustomed to the idea that she will be paying as much for Chanel as for Hermès, it creates a precedent that people might think: oh, actually, Chanel is a better brand. Because if people think that prices are reflective of quality, then it becomes a risk for a brand that Hermès not fighting with their prices where they would be completely legitimate in doing so, ” said Rambourg.
A better approach to take is perhaps the one seen at Louis Vuitton, which has managed to protect its brand equity and pricing by hyper-segmenting its consumers and the product offering.
Not only has Louis Vuitton been so good at hyper-segmenting the product into different handbag ranges and developing more accessible price points, but they also diversified into jewellery, sneakers, and fragrances, said Rambourg.
“ They’ re also been super specific about who they are communicating to, ” he added. So, if I 'm a Vuitton consumer, I will get messages that I that will make me think I 'm the only one buying a Vuitton product, even though I 'm one of millions, obviously.
“ Even within their stores, the experience is specific, ” he continued. “ They have very big stores where they can accommodate uber-wealthy individuals in a VIP salon who are accustomed to drinking the champagne they prefer with their sales associates that they 've been seeing for the past 20 years and up-and-coming first-time purchasers who will be treated differently, but the idea is they all leave the store being delighted by the experience. ”
Looking forward, what remains clear is that luxury brands must work on ensuring that they stand out from others in the competitive market, particularly in the United States where demand is increasing further.
“ There's a more diverse customer base, there's more emerging wealth and the US has proven that its secondary cities are very, very valuable, ” noted Burke. The US is not completely dependent on international tourism, so that's a very encouraging aspect, and places like Short Hills, New Jersey, and Nashville, Tennessee Dallas, and Austin have done incredibly well. ”
For Rambourg, brands will need to distinguish themselves through their creativity. “ No one needs luxury. Absolutely no one needs luxury. So, give me a reason to step up from this sofa here and go to a store. Anyone can live without it, but at the same time it's part of who we are as human beings to aspire to beautiful things, ” said Rambourg.
“ Luxury has a feel-good factor, ” he added. “ People need escapism, people need to put their minds on something positive. The perception of many luxury brands is very joyful and very positive and enables you to change a bit your outlook on the world. And so, for me, the gap between the winners and the losers is just creativity. The willingness to be bold, to be creative, and to take risks. But that's the reason people push the door of those stores. ”
Additional reporting by Louise-Anne Fort. | general |
Scotland's salmon sector hit by post-Brexit labour shortages | Scotland’ s farm-raised salmon sector has joined calls from the food and drink industry for more flexibility in the UK’ s immigration system to help address labour shortages.
Tavish Scott, chief executive of Salmon Scotland, has called on the UK Government to add fish processing to its shortage occupation list to make it easier for firms to recruit labour from the EU. Scott warned fish processing is suffering from a workforce “ squeeze ”, particularly in the farm-raised salmon sector
In a letter to the UK’ s Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Secretary, George Eustice, Scott joined the chief executives of four other Scottish food and drink organisations in calling for the recommendations of a new report by Westminster’ s Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee to be urgently implemented.
Read also: Salmon Scotland urges UK government to remove post-Brexit bureaucracy “ plaguing the system ”
The recommendations include urging the UK Government to work with industry leaders to address labour shortages and to develop a long-term labour strategy
The letter, signed by Salmon Scotland, Quality Meat Scotland, Seafood Scotland, Scotland Food & Drink and National Farmers Union Scotland warned that the Scottish food and drink industry is suffering from “ acute labour shortages ”.
“ This labour force issue is affecting the ability of our producers and manufacturers to serve customers both at home and abroad, restricting growth and curbing exports, ” the letter states.
Read also: Salmon Scotland reveals three challenges hurting Scottish producers
“ Our members have the ability to thrive and help the country recover from both the long-term effects of Covid and the additional costs of Brexit caused by non-tariff barriers. But, to do this, we need proper access to labour and this can only come with the help and support from the government, ” the statement from the group of organisations said.
“ Fish processing, particularly in the farm-raised salmon, is suffering from a labour squeeze, and we want the government to help by implementing the recommendations in the committee’ s report, ” Scott said. “ We want to see more flexibility in the UK’ s immigration policy, and a long-term strategy to ease this situation in the years to come, ” the Salmon Scotland chief executive added.
post @ salmonbusiness.com | general |
Finnair reports 24% increase in salmon carried despite air freight cost rise | Finnair has reported a 24% increase in salmon carried throughout the company’ s network in March, compared with the same period a year prior, as cargo carriers are forced to increase air freight costs amid global disruption to services.
The company’ s traffic figures released on Wednesday showed that cargo figures were hit by the closure of Russian airspace in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine but, despite the impact, have remained strong.
“ The Russian airspace was closed at the end of February due to the counter sanctions related to the war in Ukraine, which resulted in route and frequency cancellations in Asian traffic in March, ” Finnair stated in a press release. However, “ robust demand for cargo ” has meant that Finnair could “ continue operating to most of its Asian destinations despite the longer routings. ”
Read also: Market turmoil and air freight trouble are hammering the salmon price down by ten percent
Speaking exclusively to SalmonBusiness, Finnair confirmed that, despite the impact of “ consecutive disruptions ” that “ have broken supply chains, ” the company has managed to “ offer new solutions ” for customers shipping cargo between Europe and Asia.
“ Within a week from the airspace closure, we were able to return to some of our Asian key markets, such as Japan and South Korea, although with fewer weekly frequencies, ” a representative for Finnair stated.
Although Finnair has been able to continue transporting salmon, increasing the amount carried, the airline acknowledged that the need to take a “ detour has a significant financial impact, ” as fuel, crew and navigation costs rise.
With operational costs being higher and limited capacity with reduced trips, the company has been required to increase air freight prices in line with other cargo carriers.
The company acknowledged that the 24% year-on-year rise in salmon carried in March is, in part, bolstered by the reduced demand seen during the Covid pandemic, as disruption and a reduction in flights that were “ economically and operationally viable ” during the pandemic impacted the company’ s cargo services.
Read also: Air freight reductions cause steep price premium for salmon to China
Prior to the Covid pandemic, Finnair had reported a record year in seafood volumes carried by the company’ s cargo company during 2019.
“ Naturally everyone hopes that the current situation – the war and the airspace closure as well as the pandemic situation – will be over soon. We hope that we will be able to fully return our routes and frequencies to our important Asian markets as soon as possible, ” the Finnair spokesperson stated.
post @ salmonbusiness.com | general |
Kaiser Permanente Named Among World's Most Ethical Companies for a 4th Time | Originally published at about.kaiserpermanente.org. Kaiser Permanente is a Hall of Fame company.
For the fourth consecutive year, Kaiser Permanente has been named one of the World’ s Most Ethical Companies by the Ethisphere Institute, an independent group that monitors business ethics.
Kaiser Permanente is 1 of 135 honorees worldwide, and 1 of only 2 organizations recognized in the Integrated Healthcare System category in 2022.
This distinction honors organizations with practices that improve communities, build capable and empowered workforces and foster corporate cultures focused on ethics and a strong sense of purpose.
“ The global pandemic had a particularly significant impact on the health care industry. Our strong ethical foundation allows us to deliver on our mission in even the most challenging of times, ” said Shakeya A. McDow, Interim Senior Vice President and Chief Compliance and Privacy Officer for Kaiser Permanente.
Kaiser Permanente has received the award each of the 4 years that it has participated in the selection process. Honorees are scored based on 5 key competencies: The strength of their ethics and compliance program; their environmental and societal impact; their culture of ethics; the quality of their governance; and their leadership and reputation.
“ I want to thank all our 240,000 employees and physicians who, despite the historic challenges of the past 2 years, make it possible for Kaiser Permanente to continue providing high-quality, affordable health care to our 12.5 million members and to keep serving our communities, ” McDow said. “ This latest World’ s Most Ethical Companies designation is a testament to our collective commitment to continually earning the trust that so many people place in Kaiser Permanente. ”
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@ abbvie announces that Laura Schumacher, Vice Chairman, External Affairs, and Chief Legal Officer at AbbVie, has be… https: //t.co/NXtkzA4RSN March 30, 2022
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“ We Will Erase You from This Land ”: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone | Share this via Facebook Share this via Twitter Share this via WhatsApp Share this via Email Other ways to share Share this via LinkedIn Share this via Reddit Share this via Telegram Share this via Printer
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Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone
( Nairobi, April 6, 2022) – Amhara regional security forces and civilian authorities in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone have committed widespread abuses against Tigrayans since November 2020 that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. Ethiopian authorities have severely restricted access and independent scrutiny of the region, keeping the government’ s campaign of ethnic cleansing largely hidden.
The report, “ ‘ We Will Erase You From This Land’: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone, ” documents how newly-appointed officials in Western Tigray and security forces from the neighbouring Amhara region, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, systematically expelled several hundred thousand Tigrayan civilians from their homes using threats, unlawful killings, sexual violence, mass arbitrary detention, pillage, forcible transfer, and the denial of humanitarian assistance. These widespread and systematic attacks against the Tigrayan civilian population amount to crimes against humanity as well as war crimes.
Geflüchtete, die vor dem Tigray-Konflikt in Äthiopien geflohen sind, kommen am 11. Dezember 2020 mit einem Bus im Flüchtlingslager Um Raquba im Ostsudan an. © 2020 Yasuyoshi Chiba via AFP/Getty Images
( Nairobi, April 6, 2022) – Amhara regional security forces and civilian authorities in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone have committed widespread abuses against Tigrayans since November 2020 that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said in a new report released today. Ethiopian authorities have severely restricted access and independent scrutiny of the region, keeping the government’ s campaign of ethnic cleansing largely hidden.
The report, “ ‘ We Will Erase You From This Land’: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’ s Western Tigray Zone, ” documents how newly-appointed officials in Western Tigray and security forces from the neighbouring Amhara region, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, systematically expelled several hundred thousand Tigrayan civilians from their homes using threats, unlawful killings, sexual violence, mass arbitrary detention, pillage, forcible transfer, and the denial of humanitarian assistance. These widespread and systematic attacks against the Tigrayan civilian population amount to crimes against humanity as well as war crimes.
Goitom, a 42-year-old ethnic Tigrayan farmer, lived in Adi Goshu, a town in Western Tigray, a large and fertile district known for growing sesame, sorghum, and cotton in Ethiopia's northern Tigray region. On January 17, 2021, he watched helplessly from his home as Amhara Special Forces and local militias beat up and detained Tigrayans in his town. Tigrayans had already faced months of intimidation by local authorities and Amhara security forces, and so Goitom ran to a nearby forest to escape the latest onslaught until the situation subsided. He waited a day and then called his relatives back in Adi Goshu, who informed him that the forces had rounded up dozens of Tigrayans and summarily executed them at the Tekeze bridge. He said:
Fearful for his life if he remained, Goitom, like thousands of other Tigrayans who were forced to flee - others were simply expelled from the territory - headed east across the Tekeze River to northwestern Tigray to escape Amhara authorities and regional security forces. Far from the world's attention, Goitom was among the first wave of Tigrayans fleeing abuses in the Western Tigray Zone - waves that have recurred while the conflict, and the world's attention, has moved on.
Since the outbreak of armed conflict on November 4, 2020, - pitting forces aligned with Ethiopia's federal government against those affiliated with Tigray's regional government led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front ( TPLF) - hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans living in Western Tigray have been displaced from their homes through threats, intimidation, and a campaign of violence and forcible removal.
In communities across the region, Amhara security forces acting under newly appointed Amhara and Walqayte officials have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, rape and other acts of sexual violence. The widespread pillage of crops and livestock, and the looting and occupation of Tigrayan homes, destroyed sources of livelihood. Tigrayans have faced mass arrest and prolonged arbitrary detention in formal and informal detention sites where detainees were killed, tortured, and ill-treated. Regional authorities have also imposed discriminatory rules that deny Tigrayans basic services and access to humanitarian aid, and measures that seem designed to suppress their rights and presence from the area. Tigrayans endured ethnic-based slurs that targeted their Tigrayan identity and were banned from speaking their language, Tigrinya. People with disabilities and older people have been especially affected.
This report is based on 427 interviews and other research conducted between December 2020 and March 2022 by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, as well as previous research used for background and context. The organizations found that since November 2020 in Western Tigray, civilian authorities, and Amhara regional security forces, with the acquiescence and possible participation of Ethiopian federal forces, committed numerous grave abuses as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tigrayan civilian population that amount to crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. These crimes include murder, enforced disappearances, torture, deportation or forcible transfer, rape, sexual slavery and other sexual violence, persecution, unlawful imprisonment, possible extermination, and other inhumane acts.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that Amhara regional officials and regional special forces and militias, with federal forces ' complicity, are responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans from Western Tigray. Although not a formal legal term or a recognized crime under international law, `` ethnic cleansing '' was defined by the final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts on the former Yugoslavia as a purposeful policy by an ethnic or religious group to remove, by violent and terror-inspiring means, the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. As this report makes clear, the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray was conducted through resort to serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Simmering tensions in Western Tigray and rights abuses over many years, mainly by Tigray regional security forces against ethnic Amharas and Walqaytes ( Tigrinya and Amharic-speaking people historically inhabiting the highland areas of Western Tigray) served as a backdrop for the eventual physical violence and expulsion of Tigrayan communities from the area. The takeover by Amhara regional officials of Western Tigray Zone - an administrative area bordering Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, and neighboring Amhara region to the south - represents a violent reversal of changes to Ethiopia's contested internal boundaries enacted by the TPLF-led Ethiopian federal government in 1992.
At that time, Ethiopia's internal boundaries were redrawn following the recommendations of a government boundary commission, and the districts that make up Western Tigray, which previously fell under the administrative authority of the former Begemdir province, were incorporated into the Tigray regional state. Ever since, Amhara activists living in the Western Tigray Zone, and in the Amhara region, resisted the government decision. In response, the government suppressed, at times through violence and force, those attempting to assert their Amhara identity in the territory and raise their claims with the regional and federal government. The outbreak of conflict, in November 2020, brought these longstanding and unaddressed grievances to the fore: Amhara regional forces, along with Ethiopian federal forces, seized these territories and displaced Tigrayan civilians in a brutal ethnic cleansing campaign.
When the armed conflict started on November 4, 2020, fierce fighting, initially centered on the Western Tigray administrative Zone, and pitted Tigrayan forces against Ethiopian National Defense Forces ( ENDF) and allied forces from the Amhara region - including Amhara regional police special forces ( ASF), Amhara militias, and irregular militia known as `` Fanos. '' Federal and allied forces shelled towns and villages, including Humera town from the Eritrean border. Tigrayan forces detained and allegedly summarily executed suspected government informants in the course of fighting but were quickly pushed out of Western Tigray.
Within about 10 days, the Ethiopian federal forces and allied forces perpetrated numerous abuses amounting to war crimes against Tigrayan communities throughout the Zone. Forces destroyed villages and settlements, looted property, livestock, and harvests, and subjected Tigrayan civilians, suspected TPLF sympathizers, and local Tigrayan militia members, to extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture and other ill-treatment. These abuses drove tens of thousands of Tigrayans to flee to neighboring Sudan to the west, and central Tigray to the east.
Mai Kadra, a town near the border with Sudan, was the site of the first publicly reported large-scale massacre. Starting from mid-afternoon on November 9, Tigrayan militia and local residents brutally beat, stabbed, and hacked with knives, machetes, and axes, scores of Amhara civilians. Later that same evening, Amhara attackers retaliated, killing and injuring Tigrayans. The violence left approximately 229 people dead. An additional 100 people, primarily Amhara residents and laborers, who had been injured were brought to nearby hospitals and health centers. A joint investigation by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC) and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) similarly found that more than 200 people were killed.
After federal and allied forces took control of Mai Kadra on November 10, Amhara Special Forces and militias, over the following days, targeted Tigrayans in a wave of revenge killings. The Tigrayan residents who had not fled were detained in official and makeshift detention facilities. Tigrayan property was pillaged and occupied, while security forces obstructed the provision of relief to detained Tigrayan residents before organizing their eventual expulsion from West Tigray in late December 2020.
The November 9 massacre in Mai Kadra was uniquely tied to a combination of local factors, including preexisting tensions in the town among and between residents and laborers from out of town, the proximity of the town to fast-evolving fighting between the warring parties, and widespread rumors. Differing accounts of what occurred during the massacre fueled further hatred, mutual fear, and mistrust well beyond the town. Accounts of the massacre served as a tool of mobilization to support and justify war efforts by federal and Amhara regional authorities. In other places in Western Tigray, the accounts of what had transpired in Mai Kadra precipitated revenge attacks on Tigrayans. The persecution of Tigrayans in the town, in the days after November 9, including the targeted killings, the looting, the mass detentions, and the subsequent organized expulsion of the town's Tigrayan population, would repeat as a pattern and unfold across the territory in the year that followed.
For the many Tigrayan men, women, and children who remained behind in Western Tigray, the abuses did not stop after federal and allied forces established control of the Zone. The Amhara regional authorities took over the administration of the area, which until now remains under their authority. Interim authorities were also drawn from the local Walqayte and Amhara community in Western Tigray, as well as from the Amhara region.
The newly appointed authorities imposed a regime of ethnically targeted restrictions on movement and access to farmland, as well as on speaking Tigrinya - the local language of Tigrayans. Tigrayan residents described how newly appointed authorities and security forces in Western Tigray restricted, and at times outright blocked, their access to the critical aid that was available. Amhara and Fano militias, in some cases alongside non-Tigrayan residents and Eritrean federal forces, pillaged crops and tens of thousands of livestock - the backbone of economic survival and livelihoods of the largely farming communities in the area - leaving Tigrayans with little to survive on, and no choice but to leave. Authorities and security forces began detaining Tigrayans by the thousands.
In several towns, including Humera, Ruwassa, Adi Goshu, Adebai, and Baeker, the plans to remove Tigrayans from the area were a matter of public discussions and displays. Local administrators openly discussed such plans during public town meetings. Signs were displayed demanding that Tigrayans depart, and pamphlets distributed issuing Tigrayans a 24-hour or 72-hour ultimatum to leave or be killed. Interim authorities and security force officials repeated slogans such as `` Tigrayans belong east of the Tekeze River, '' and `` This is Amhara land, '' further underscoring that Tigrayans were being pushed out.
On January 17, 2021, Fano militia and local Walqayte and Amhara residents rounded up dozens of male Tigrayan residents of Adi Goshu. Amhara Special Forces ( ASF) took about 60 of them to the Tekeze River bridge that same day, and summarily executed them. This is the massacre Goitom escaped from. Residents and the few survivors believed the killings were a revenge attack after ASF forces suffered heavy losses during fighting with Tigrayan forces near the river the previous night. The persecution of Tigrayans in Adi Goshu escalated in the aftermath of the massacre, prompting a mass exodus from the town. For several weeks, Tigrayans who fled across the Tekeze bridge could see the bodies, which had remained unburied, and served as a terrifying reminder of the atrocities committed.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that the authorities in Western Tigray deprived Tigrayan communities of resources key to their survival, and coerced people to depart for Sudan or other parts of Tigray. In some places, local authorities provided the means to forcibly remove Tigrayans from the area, organizing the trucks or buses that took Tigrayans from their homes or places of detention to the Tekeze bridge, the crossing marking the limits of the area newly under the Amhara authorities ' control. Before allowing Tigrayans to cross, Amhara security forces manning the final checkpoint on the bridge confiscated their identification cards and the property documents that linked them to land in Western Tigray, warning them not to return. They also prevented Tigrayans who were fleeing the violence in other parts of Tigray from entering Western Tigray.
The forcible displacement escalated during late February and March and led to a surge in the numbers of internally displaced Tigrayans in towns east of the Tekeze River, such as Shire, Sheraro, and Axum in central and northwestern Tigray, where, for months, many lived in overcrowded displacement sites. By June 2021, a preliminary assessment carried out by the federal interim administration of Tigray estimated that 723,000 internally displaced persons ( IDPs) from Western Tigray had been registered in other parts of Tigray, while the UN refugee agency ( UNHCR) had registered 51,207 refugees in Eastern Sudan by January 2022. Meanwhile, interim authorities and Amhara regional officials called for the settlement of Amhara residents into Western Tigray, with promises of available homes and land.
As Tigrayan forces recaptured many parts of Tigray in late June, Amhara authorities and forces escalated the arbitrary arrests and killings of the remaining Tigrayan residents, particularly in the border town of Humera and nearby towns and villages. By August, as Tigrayan residents were being rounded up and killed, dozens of mutilated bodies with restraints appeared in the Tekeze River, which marks the de facto border between Western Tigray and Sudan. In November, the roundups and forced displacements escalated again in Humera, Adebai, and Rawyan towns, as Amhara Special Forces, Fano militia, in some cases alongside Eritrean forces, detained men and removed many women, children, and older Tigrayans from their homes, before forcibly expelling them towards the Tekeze River. Thousands of other adult and adolescent men and women remained in detention facilities, facing life-threatening torture, starvation, and denial of medical care in overcrowded sites.
The scale of the forced displacements and flight, the way the abuses were carried out, and the number of areas where they occurred within the Zone, all indicate a degree of control, coordination, and purpose among the authorities overseeing the Amhara regional forces and militias that appear aimed at terrorizing and directly removing Tigrayans from Western Tigray.
The Ethiopian government's efforts to halt these grave abuses or punish those responsible have been grossly inadequate. Federal and regional authorities dismissed allegations of ethnic cleansing, including in response to a February 2021 statement by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that `` acts of ethnic cleansing had been committed in Western Tigray. '' Since then, federal authorities investigated the reports of the mass killing of Amhara residents and communities in Mai Kadra but have taken little action to investigate ongoing human rights violations against Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray. Instead, the government's continued dismissal of accounts from refugees who fled their homes to Sudan, and its characterization of credible reports of killings and detentions in Western Tigray as `` fake, '' has only further obfuscated the lived realities that survivors and victims endure.
Although Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch contacted a range of Ethiopian federal government officials and agencies to seek their response to the findings set out in this report, only the Amhara Regional Government responded. Their response letter did not provide any contrary evidence or rebut our specific findings, but rather denounced allegations against `` the people, governance, and security forces, '' as `` unfounded '' and `` bothersome. '' It described our conclusions as `` baseless, '' and the `` accusations to expel Tigrayans, '' from what it characterized as the Amhara region, as `` cynical. ''
The crimes outlined in this report, while not a full and comprehensive accounting of the abuses that occurred in Western Tigray, require meaningful accountability and redress. Ethiopian authorities should facilitate safe and unhindered access to humanitarian agencies, while granting independent human rights monitors - including the Commission of Inquiry established by the African Commission for Human and Peoples ' Rights, and the United Nations-established International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia -access to conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, including Western Tigray.
Ensuring accountability for these abuses needs a coordinated global response. The United Nations, the African Union, and Ethiopia's international and regional partners must take concrete steps to press for the immediate protection of all communities, including at-risk Tigrayan communities who remain in the area. They must also immediately support the work of the UN's independent International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia and ensure its operationalization to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and alleged war crimes carried out by all parties to the conflict in northern Ethiopia since November 2020. Many of the Tigrayans interviewed for this research hoped that the abuses would end, and that the world would finally know of their suffering. States should ensure that their suffering is not being ignored and press for credible justice and redress for the serious crimes that were committed.
ASF
Amhara Special Forces, regional paramilitary police force
Awraja
Imperial sub-provincial administrative unit
Derg
The military junta that overthrew Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie and ruled present-day Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1974 to 1991
EHRC
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
ENDF
Ethiopian National Defense Forces
EPRDF
Ethiopian Peoples ' Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETB
Ethiopian birr, calculated at 1 equal's approximately $ 40 US dollars as of March 2021
Fano
Irregular Amhara militia
IDPs
Internally displaced persons
IOM
International Organization for Migration
Kebele
`` Neighborhood '' in Amharic and references the smallest administrative subdivision at the neighborhood level
Militia
Armed community security that are not part of the regional police force, but which have played a role in Ethiopia's internal security at the local, community level
MSF
Medecins Sans Frontieres ( Doctors Without Borders)
NDRMC
National Disaster Risk Management Commission
OCHA
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODP
Oromo Democratic Party
OHCHR
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Prosperity Party
A political party in Ethiopia that was established on December 1, 2019, to replace the former ruling coalition the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front ( EPRDF)
Salug
`` Salug '' is a term used to describe laborers, smugglers, and bandits in Sudan and in some parts of Ethiopia, including Western Tigray
TDF
Tigray Defense Forces
Tekeze River
Also referred to as Setit River in Sudan, crosses several points in Tigray region, marking the border with Eritrea and at points, Sudan, and delineates the West Tigray Zone from the Northwestern Zone in Tigray
TPLF
Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TSF
Tigrayan Special Forces, a regional paramilitary police force
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UN refugee agency
Welkait, Wolkait, or Walqayt
An administrative district located in northwestern Ethiopia. Since 1992 `` Welkait '' encompasses a district located within the Tigray region. The term may also informally be used to refer to a wide swath of territory now bordering Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, and Amhara region to the south. During the imperial era, the districts that make up the area of Western Tigray, including Welkait, fell under the Semien sub-province
Walqayte, Welkitae, Wolkatot
Refers to a group of people historically inhabiting the highland areas of Welkait, who speak Tigrinya and Amharic
Woyane
A word in Tigrinya ( language spoken in Ethiopia's Tigray region and in Eritrea) connoting `` resistance. '' The uprising against Haile Selassie in 1941 was known as the first Woyane rebellion, and the resistance against the Derg as the second. The term has been frequently associated with the TPLF, including after the TPLF began claiming to be heirs to the first Woyane rebellion
WFP
World Food Program
Woreda
District level administrative unit
This report presents the findings of joint research by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, documenting gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, perpetrated in Western Tigray between November 2020 and December 2021. The report documents specific incidents and trends but is not a comprehensive survey of all violations that took place in the region during this period. The organizations do not take a position on the dispute between warring parties or which group, or authorities should control a territory.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch formally sought access to Tigray and the Amhara region from the Ethiopian government but received no response. Because of this lack of access, we were unable to conduct in-person interviews within Tigray or to visit the sites of alleged violations to examine physical or digital evidence. Documentation of abuses in Western Tigray was also constrained by other factors, including ongoing efforts by Ethiopian federal and allied forces to block the routes to Sudan for fleeing Tigrayans, and the restrictions and fear of movement within Tigray, which together limited the ability of witnesses to travel outside the region. Sporadic government restrictions on electricity and communications in Ethiopia and poor communications network in Sudan often hindered the ability of researchers to document abuses in real time.
In total, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch conducted 427 interviews, including 409 interviews with survivors of abuses, their family members, and witnesses. Researchers separately carried out 18 interviews with representatives of international organizations, journalists, as well as other informed sources. Five separate research missions to Sudan in December 2020 and January, May and June 2021 allowed researchers to interview Tigrayan refugees. Finally, researchers conducted remote telephone interviews between March 2021 and March 2022, primarily with Tigrayans displaced from Western Tigray in the region and to Sudan, as well as with residents from the Amhara region.
To provide as broad a perspective as possible, researchers interviewed people from a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, ages, genders, and geographical areas in the Western Tigray Zone.
Researchers sought to identify safe locations to carry out interviews both remotely and in person and assessed the security concerns and risks facing interviewees before proceeding with the interviews. Interviews with victims were conducted in English, Tigrinya, and Amharic, with the help of several different and trusted interpreters where needed. Researchers informed all interviewees of the purpose of the research and the ways in which the information would be used and offered anonymity for their reporting. While all interviewees quoted or mentioned in this report agreed that their statements could be used, many expressed extreme fear and anxiety about potential reprisals should their identity be revealed.
Names and other identifying details have been withheld to protect interviewees ' security, and in the footnotes to this report, all interviewees, unless otherwise noted, have been assigned pseudonyms. None of the interviewees received financial or other incentives for speaking with us, and all spoke voluntarily, giving informed consent to be interviewed and being made aware of their right to discontinue the interview at any point. In 15 cases, researchers interviewed children between the ages of 10 and 17, where we sought to obtain the consent of a parent or relative in the case of younger children and identified service providers to assist children in cases of referrals. Where appropriate and feasible, researchers identified and referred interviewees to service providers to obtain appropriate psychosocial and medical support.
The reliability and credibility of each source was carefully assessed. Researchers probed the veracity of their statements by corroborating information from several other sources and determining consistency with overall patterns that emerged during the research, including with other types of evidence. Individual cases or incidents used in the report are based on at least one credible source of direct information, which in most cases was independently corroborated by at least one other credible source of information. Reports of major incidents are based on multiple accounts from witnesses and victims, allowing for in-depth fact-finding and detailed event reconstruction. In some cases, researchers carried out follow-up interviews with the same witness for further clarification.
Researchers also reviewed medical reports, and forensic analysis, as well as satellite imagery, videos and photographs that provided direct information concerning incidents, or which corroborated accounts of military presence, destruction, looting, and executions. Due to the communication restrictions detailed above, there were few videos and photographs to analyze. Researchers conducted targeted searches on social media platforms using keywords in Amharic, Tigrinya, and English to find relevant information, as well as received videos and photographs directly from sources. Researchers verified five videos sent directly to researchers and six videos posted to Facebook or YouTube used in this report. Researchers identified exactly where they were filmed - through matching landmarks visible in the footage with landmarks visible from satellite imagery, when they were recorded - by analyzing relevant metadata, timestamps from social media platforms, witness interviews and changes in the built environment visible in satellite imagery - and what they showed, including through an evaluation of whether it captured situations in their entirety. Other relevant material included academic articles, books, media and government reports, court documents, official government decisions, and information collected by other credible experts and independent human rights investigators that could corroborate details or patterns of abuse described in the report.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch solicited responses from the federal government, the Amhara regional government, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front, regarding this report's findings. On February 25, 2022, we sent letters to the Ethiopian federal government, federal agencies, including the National Disaster Risk Management Commission ( NDRMC), and the Refugee and Returnee Services ( RRS), as well as Amhara regional authorities, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front summarizing our findings and seeking a response.
At the time of publication, only the Amhara Regional Government had responded. We have included their response as an annex to this report.
The administrative boundaries of Western Tigray have been contested for decades.
The Western Zone of Tigray region consists of three administrative districts - Welkait, Tsegede, and Kafta Humera- forming a swathe of land bordering Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, and the Northern Gondar Zone of the neighboring Amhara region to the south. [ 1 ] The Tekeze River crosses several points in the Zone, marking the border with Eritrea and at points, Sudan, and delineating the Zone from the Northwestern Zone in Tigray. [ 2 ]
During the imperial era, which ended in 1974, the Kafta Humera, Welkait, and Tsegede areas were known collectively as Semien Awraja, which was alternatively administered as a separate entity or as part of Begemdir province. [ 3 ] The Semien Awraja was sparsely populated, and for decades, imperial rulers and members of the nobility maintained shifting control of the territories. [ 4 ]
By the 1950s, the Begemdir and Semien were one province. [ 5 ] The provincial administrative arrangement of these boundaries remained largely in place until the downfall of the emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The military government that replaced him, known as the `` Derg, '' renamed the Begemdir and Semien province as Begemdir province. [ 6 ] The Derg also established an institute for the study of Ethiopian nationalities ( ISEN), to carry out research on Ethiopian nationalities and determine the basis for the constitution, state structure, and administrative setup of the country. [ 7 ]
In 1975, a number of political parties and rebel fronts began a series of armed revolts against the Derg. [ 8 ] By May 1991, a coalition, known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front ( EPRDF), overthrew the Derg, marking an end to 17 years of brutal repression, violence, and conflict. [ 9 ]
After securing control of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city, the EPRDF sought to address longstanding issues around identity, as well as the relationship of the central state to various peoples and regions in the periphery.
On July 1-5, 1991, the EPRDF convened a national conference in Addis Ababa where political parties and representatives of academic institutions attended. [ 10 ] The participants adopted a Transitional Charter, which recognized the rights of self-determination to Ethiopia's `` nations, nationalities and peoples. `` [ 11 ] The Charter also laid the foundation for the creation of federal administrative units - regions - `` on the basis of nationalities '' giving each nationality the right to `` administer their own affairs within their own defined territory. `` [ 12 ]
In 1992, the transitional government formed a Boundary Commission that established 14 new regions, the boundaries of which drew on the ethnographic and historical data gathered by the Derg's institute on nationality studies in the 1980s. [ 13 ]
Most of Derg-era Begemdir province became part of the newly formed Amhara regional state, whereas other parts of Begemdir province, including Welkait, Tsegede, and Kafta Humera territories, were incorporated into Tigray as part of the current day Western Tigray Zone. Some Walqayte and Amhara residents in the newly established Western Tigray Zone viewed these changes as an annexation, believing that the districts that make up Western Tigray should have fallen under the Amhara region. [ 14 ]
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution subsequently recognized nine self-governing federal states constructed largely, though not exclusively, along ethno-linguistic lines. [ 15 ]
Disputes over whether state power in Ethiopia should be centralized, as well as demands for ethnic equality and self-determination, have been at the heart of mobilization and tensions in Ethiopia for decades prior to 1991. [ 16 ] The decentralization of power in the 1991 Transitional Government Charter and the subsequent federal arrangement in the Ethiopian Constitution were meant to address longstanding demands for ethnic equality and self-administration. However, segments of the Ethiopian population criticized it as introducing ethnicity into politics in Ethiopia, as controversy and competing visions over the federal arrangement of the country, as well as violence due to boundary, self-administration, and identity disputes increased after 1992.
Despite its stated commitment to the right to self-governance of every `` [ n ] ation, [ n ] ationality and [ p ] eople '' across Ethiopia, the TPLF-led EPRDF coalition, that governed Ethiopia from 1991 to 2018, suppressed the groups that advocated for such autonomy, and held onto power with an iron grip, using excessive force to quell dissent, and carried out serious abuses that may amount to crimes against humanity, including abuses in the Gambella region in 2003, and in the Somali region in 2007. [ 17 ] Between 1992 and 2017, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council ( EHRCO) issued 41 regular and special reports that focused on serious violence along ethnic lines and security force abuses in all regions of the country, including some cases where violence crossed regional borders. [ 18 ]
Since September 2018, there have been several instances of inter-communal violence, boundary and resource disputes, and armed skirmishes in many regions of the country, including in Oromia, Harar, Afar, Somali, the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples ' Region ( SNNPR), Amhara, and Benishangul-Gumuz. [ 19 ] Federal and regional government forces often responded to the violence with excessive and lethal force. [ 20 ] The bouts of violence resulted in large-scale displacements, with over 1.4 million people internally displaced in Ethiopia due to conflict in 2019 alone. [ 21 ]
The Welkait, Kafta Humera, and Tsegede areas comprise a vast lowland area conducive to the cultivation of sesame, cereals, and cotton, and have for decades attracted migration and settlement, including large numbers of seasonal migrant workers from Tigray, Begemdir, and other provinces to work on large farms beginning in the 1950s. [ 22 ] Migrant workers also settled in the area. [ 23 ]
From the 1990s onwards, the settlement patterns and policies adopted by the TPLF-led EPRDF in the Welkait, Kafta Humera, and Tsegede districts fueled grievances and tensions, particularly among Walqayte and Amhara communities in the districts.
In the 1990s, the EPRDF government facilitated the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees who had fled to neighboring countries in the face of escalating conflict of the late 1970s and famine of the 1980s. [ 24 ] The Tigrayan refugees who fled to Sudan began to return in 1993. [ 25 ]
Between 1993 and 1996, around 30,000 Tigrayans who had been refugees in Sudan were settled in villages in the Kafta Humera district on agricultural land that had been nationalized under the Derg. [ 26 ] Public land was made available for returnees, most of whom were farmers. [ 27 ] They settled in places such as Humera, the area's commercial agriculture and trading center; in the village of Rawyan, a short distance south of Humera; and on old farmland in Adebai and Mai Kadra. [ 28 ]
By 1996, the Mai Kadra area hosted 746 returnee households, while Rawyan hosted 18,107. There was no host community in Rawyan, but roughly 400 Amhara inhabitants lived in Mai Kadra at the time resettlement began, after having themselves been resettled there by the Derg around 1975. [ 29 ] Smaller settlement sites were later established for returnees near Bereket - a village located across large-scale farms west of Mai Kadra, as well as in Abderafi in the Amhara region. [ 30 ] TPLF fighters who fought against the Derg were also resettled as part of demobilization programs. [ 31 ] Around 30,000 former TPLF fighters, for instance, received agricultural plots in the western lowland areas around Dansha town, in several resettlement sites now known as `` Division. `` [ 32 ]
The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 1998-2000 triggered a wave of displacement from towns in Western Tigray along the Eritrean border, with thousands of those displaced settling in towns such as Baeker and Mai Kadra. [ 33 ] In 2002, the federal government identified 15,000 additional households for resettlement along the Tekeze River in Western Tigray in 2002, following drought and insecurity, which triggered another wave of intra-regional resettlement in three regions ( Amhara, Tigray, and Oromia). [ 34 ]
The arrival of new residents became a source of friction. Some Walqayte and Amhara communities in Western Tigray challenged the incorporation of Kafta Humera, Tsegede, and Welkait districts into the Tigray region, citing historical claims to the territory, and viewed Tigrayan settlement into Welkait, Kafta Humera, and Tsegede areas as an attempt by the TPLF to alter the demographic makeup of the areas and thereby consolidate its claim to it. [ 35 ] At the same time, proponents of the Zone's incorporation into Tigray cited a 1985 map published by the Derg, as well as population and housing censuses of 1994 and 2007, that all depict the ethnic composition of the area as predominantly Tigrayan or Tigrinya speaking. [ 36 ]
In late 2011, the demands of groups that felt politically, economically, and culturally marginalized, repressed for years by the TPLF-led EPRDF government, came to the fore. At the time, Muslim Ethiopians, alleging government interference in religious affairs, began protesting. [ 37 ] In 2015, non-violent protests which raised economic, cultural, and political grievances shared by the Oromo community, swept throughout the Oromia region, and triggered a heavy-handed security response.
Amhara nationalism was also beginning to take shape as a political force by 2015: younger people expressed their distinct Amhara identity, they demanded better political representation, and the protection of Amhara minorities outside the Amhara region. They also began to challenge the internal geographic boundaries of the Ethiopian federal state. [ 38 ]
At the same time, members of Walqayte communities in Western Tigray and in the Amhara region established the `` Welkait Identity Question Committee '' in Gondar city, Amhara region. `` Its members aimed to assert their identity and advocate for an end to discrimination against their community. `` [ 39 ] An unpublished document by the group in March 2015, claimed that more than 20,000 Amhara residents of the Western Tigray Zone were forcibly displaced in 1991, some finding refuge in Sudan after 1991, others in the Amhara region. [ 40 ]
The committee also claimed to have collected the signatures of about 25,000 Walqayte residents in Western Tigray who authorized the committee to represent them. [ 41 ] It brought its grievances over the administrative boundaries to the Tigray regional government and the federal government, including the House of Federation - the upper chamber in Ethiopia's parliament tasked with addressing such questions, specifically disagreements over administrative boundaries between regional states - but received no response. [ 42 ]
The group gained traction after November 2015 when widespread popular protests swept through Ethiopia. [ 43 ] Beginning in Oromia in opposition to the federal government's plans to expand Addis Ababa's municipal boundaries, the protests also spread to the Amhara region in 2016. [ 44 ] Ethiopian security forces responded to protests across both regions with excessive and lethal force. [ 45 ]
In February 2016, Col. Demeke Zewdu, a leading figure of the Welkait Identity Question Committee, publicly called for the demands of the Walqayte to be recognized and denounced their condition in Tigray as `` second-class citizens. `` [ 46 ]
Authorities sought to arrest Colonel Demeke in Gondar on July 12, 2016, for alleged terrorism offenses. [ 47 ] With his allies, including his close friend Maj. Dejene Maru ( a current major in the Amhara Special Forces), Demeke resisted arrest and fought with government security forces. [ 48 ] The two days of clashes that ensued resulted in the deaths of at least 11 people, including at least six members of the security forces. [ 49 ] Demeke's supporters blocked roads leading to his residence, as businesses and vehicles belonging to Tigrayan-affiliated companies came under attack. [ 50 ]
The arrest of Demeke and other Welkait Identity Committee members marked a turning point in the Amhara region, prompting thousands of people to take to the streets in the days and weeks that followed. [ 51 ] A massive rally in Gondar on July 31 which called for Demeke's release saw protesters chanting anti-government slogans and expressing solidarity with the Oromo protest movement. [ 52 ] Demonstrators also demanded that the pre-1991 borders in the area be restored and to return districts such Welkait and Tsegede to the Amhara regional state. [ 53 ]
By August 2016, the protests spread to other cities in the Amhara region, including Bahir Dar. The government used excessive and lethal force in response, as it had in Oromia. In just one day on August 7, government security forces killed at least 30 people in Bahir Dar. [ 54 ] Protesters also targeted foreign businesses with links to the federal government. [ 55 ] Human rights abuses intensified, with authorities detaining thousands of protesters without charge or access to family or legal representation. [ 56 ] Those released reported torture in detention. [ 57 ]
By August 2016, the claims over Western Tigray transformed into a wider Amhara demand and became a source of friction between the federal government and Amhara regional authorities. [ 58 ]
As protests grew throughout the country, Tigrayan communities faced growing anti-government resentment, including violence. [ 59 ] Demonstrators in the Amhara region blocked key access roads for transporting goods from Addis Ababa to Tigray. [ 60 ] Tigrayan homes and businesses were attacked, while threats, fear, and rumors drove Tigrayan communities to leave the Amhara and Oromia regions. [ 61 ]
The UN estimated that approximately 16,000 Tigrayans were displaced from the Gondar area in 2016. [ 62 ] Tigrayans also experienced increased identity-based attacks and displacement in other towns in Amhara. [ 63 ]
By 2019, the threats and sporadic clashes between residents had in some places turned into calls for Tigrayans to leave, driving further displacement. [ 64 ]
In Tigray, fights over land would occasionally break out between Amharas and Tigrayans, while local and regional government security forces beat, interrogated, or arrested those `` agitating '' for the government to acknowledge and deal with the Welkait identity question. [ 65 ] Residents complained of beatings, harassment, and arrests for speaking in Amharic and playing Amharic songs. [ 66 ]
The arrests intensified with the Amhara protests and drove further Amhara displacement, as local and regional Tigrayan authorities cracked down on individuals and residents with actual or presumed affiliation with the Welkait identity movement. [ 67 ]
In 2016, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council published a report that documented multiple grave human rights violations against the Amhara and Walqayte residents of Western Tigray Zone, including extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, confiscation of land and arbitrary detention. [ 68 ]
Tensions continued in 2019. Houses and cars were burned in Dansha in Western Tigray, and a deadly clash between Tigrayan Special Forces and unidentified armed groups prompted increased militarization and checkpoints along the main roads of Tigray. [ 69 ] Humanitarian agencies noted the growing displacement of Amhara internally displaced persons from Dansha, and other areas in Tigray, and recorded 5,000 IDPs in a March 2019 report. [ 70 ]
Following years of protests and interparty discord, the EPRDF, led by Hailemariam Desalegn, agreed to reform in early 2018. In April, Ethiopia's parliament selected Abiy Ahmed as prime minister. The government continued the reform process initiated by Abiy's predecessor, including the return of exiled political parties; the release of opposition politicians, activists, and journalists in detention; and the revision of repressive laws. But security force abuses continued, as did communal violence, at times manifesting along ethnic lines and often resulting from historical grievances and competition over resources and land. Violence resulted in millions displaced in 2018-2020. [ 71 ]
In the last 15 years, Ethiopia's regional states have established regional special police forces, known as `` Liyu Police, '' in Amharic. [ 72 ] Emerging first in the Somali region in 2007, special police forces have proliferated throughout Ethiopia and have become increasingly militarized. [ 73 ]
The protests and intra-party fractures within the EPRDF coalition resulted in a security vacuum that persisted following the 2018 change of government. Armed informal militia, unidentified groups, and regional special forces grew increasingly active across the country and operated with a level of impunity. [ 74 ]
In the Amhara region, `` Fano, '' an Amhara nationalist movement that was active during the 2016-2018 protests, emerged as an armed informal militia. [ 75 ] Since 2018, government security forces - both at the federal and the regional levels - had largely tolerated violence by Fano. [ 76 ] In 2018 and 2019, Fano, at times with the complicity of Amhara Special Forces ( ASF), became responsible for widespread violence, including mass killings and the destruction of property perpetrated against communities of Qimant, an ethnic group in the Amhara region. [ 77 ]
In 2018, the Amhara Democratic Party ( ADP) - a partner within the EPRDF coalition - appointed Brig. Gen. Asaminew Tsige, a proponent of Amhara nationalism, to head the Amhara region's administrative and security apparatus. This role empowered him to oversee and control the region's security organs, including the ASF, the regular police, and the militia. [ 78 ] Asaminew built up regional security forces and reportedly `` formalized and empowered former bandits and rebel fighters into the Fano structure; reintegrated previously dismissed members of the national defense forces and trained and armed tens of thousands of militias. `` [ 79 ]
At times, some Fanos came into conflict with the security forces, leading in some cases to armed clashes. On March 24, 2020, the Gondar City Security Council denounced Fanos ' involvement in illegal activities including kidnapping, killing, confiscation of property, and extortion of businesspeople, among other crimes. [ 80 ] The council gave Fanos until March 29, 2020, to surrender or face law enforcement actions. [ 81 ] One Fano leader said in response that the government was trying to dismantle the Fanos organization and assimilate it to the government security structure. [ 82 ] He vowed not to disarm until the demands of the Amhara people were answered, especially the return of `` Welkait, Raya, Dera and Metekel borders '' to the Amhara region. [ 83 ]
Relations between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF soured after Abiy's rise to power. As chair of the Oromo Democratic Party ( ODP) - one of the EPRDF political parties-and chairman of the EPRDF, Abiy set out to distance himself from the legacy of EPRDF rule upon his appointment as prime minister. He apologized for the human rights abuses of the past, described the behavior of security agencies as `` terrorist acts, '' and removed TPLF members from the upper ranks of the security sector. [ 84 ] The TPLF in turn objected to the government's targeting of TPLF leaders for prosecutions for past human rights violations, and to federal probes into TPLF-linked companies, refused to hand over wanted officials to the federal government, [ 85 ] and denounced the probes as politicized and selective. [ 86 ]
The TPLF leadership opposed other federal government measures. It saw Ethiopia's rapprochement with Eritrea in 2018 as a major threat. [ 87 ] In a speech in July in which he accepted Abiy's overture for peace, Eritrea's president, Isaias Afewerki, said it was the `` end of the TPLF's shenanigans, '' and `` game over. `` [ 88 ] In the aftermath of the peace agreement, Eritrea's borders remained heavily fortified and issues around trade and the demarcation of the border remained unsettled. [ 89 ]
TPLF leaders also denounced the government's dissolution of the EPRDF coalition to form the Prosperity Party in December 2019. They saw this as the federal government's attempts to build up a centralized state and rejected the federal government's accusations that it was fomenting unrest and supporting ethnic violence and armed insurgencies elsewhere in the country. [ 90 ]
Tensions between the Tigray and Amhara regions continued in 2018. Since the Amhara protests, major roads leading into Tigray remained blocked, while Amhara demands that the disputed territories in Tigray be returned to the Amhara region continue to gain salience among Amhara regional officials and opposition groups. [ 91 ]
Actions by TPLF authorities also intensified tensions with the federal government. In 2018, the federal government created an Administrative Boundary and Identity Issues Commission that was tasked with analyzing causes of administrative boundaries conflicts, self-government, and identity issues. [ 92 ] The creation of the Boundary Commission met stiff resistance from members of the parliament, but also the TPLF, which denounced the move as illegitimate, arguing that the commission's mandate overlapped with the House of Federation's. [ 93 ] Questions have also been raised regarding the commission's independence, including its accountability to the Office of the Prime Minister. [ 94 ] In June 2020, the commission signed an agreement with Addis Ababa University to undertake a study on administrative boundaries and identity issues. [ 95 ] The commission however was unable to engage universities in Tigray, first due to the lack of response by Tigray regional authorities, and then as a result of the ongoing conflict. [ 96 ]
Tensions rose dramatically when the TPLF opposed the government's decision to indefinitely postpone the August 2020 elections in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and decided to conduct its own regional election in Tigray in September 2020, in defiance of the federal government's decision. TPLF authorities further claimed that Abiy's administration would have no authority after the expiration of its term in October 2020 and that it would not adhere to federal laws and regulations. The federal parliament declared the regional election null and void, ordered a stoppage of communication between the federal and the Tigray government, and froze federal budget transfers, including donor-funded social-welfare programs to the Tigray regional government. [ 97 ]
Several initiatives to mediate between the TPLF and the federal government, including by religious leaders and elders, were unsuccessful. [ 98 ] The government rejected the TPLF's preconditions for mediation, which included a comprehensive national dialogue, the formation of an inclusive transitional government led by someone other than Prime Minister Abiy to oversee national elections, and the release of political opposition leaders. [ 99 ] TPLF leaders also sought an end to federal control over regional security operations. [ 100 ] Federal authorities also did not accept the TPLF's interpretation of the constitution and sought acknowledgment by Tigrayan authorities that the Tigray regional elections held in September 2020 were illegal. [ 101 ]
Tensions reached a breaking point in late October 2020 when the TPLF leadership alleged that Ethiopia and Eritrea were planning an attack on the region. [ 102 ] On October 20, 2020, Ethiopian authorities announced the reconfiguration of military commands, with a regional military command in Bahir Dar, in the Amhara region. [ 103 ] When Abiy sought to restructure and appoint new army commanders for the ENDF's northern division based in Tigray, TPLF leaders rejected the move. [ 104 ]
Tensions continued to rise days before the outbreak of conflict in early November 2020. Amhara and Tigray regional forces mobilized along the Amhara-Tigray borders, while calls by European Union leaders to `` reduce tensions, eliminate inflammatory language, and abstain from provocative military deployments, '' went unheeded. [ 105 ] On November 4, 2020, Abiy said on national TV that the Tigray security forces had attacked the ENDF's Northern Command at several military bases in the region, and that he had consequently launched a `` law and order operation '' against the Tigray regional paramilitary police and militia loyal to the TPLF in response. [ 106 ]
The Ethiopian military offensive in Western Tigray that began on November 4, 2020, against forces affiliated with the region's ruling party - the Tigray People's Liberation Front ( TPLF) - was carried out with the direct support and close coordination of Amhara Special Forces ( ASF), Amhara militias, and Fano armed groups from the Amhara region, and in some areas, Eritrean forces.
TPLF-affiliated fighters for their part were comprised of Tigray Special Forces ( TSF) and Tigrayan local militias. The initial fighting and violence to control territories in Western Tigray prompted the displacement of Tigrayan and Amhara communities, both internally and to Sudan, with an exodus of over 42,000 refugees into Sudan estimated within the first three weeks of the conflict. [ 107 ]
State Security Forces and Armed Groups in Western Tigray
As the fighting drew nearer to the towns of Rawyan, Humera, and Mai Kadra, Tigrayan Special Forces ( TSF), militias, local officials, and in some cases residents, arrested ENDF soldiers as well as local non-Tigrayan residents in Western Tigray on suspicion of working as federal government informants and passing information to Ethiopian federal and allied Amhara forces using Sudanese sim cards. [ 115 ] One Humera resident said that Tigrayan militias took at least two suspected informants when they fled the shelling of the town on November 9: `` when everything fell apart, militias took the informants to Axum, I saw them there when I fled there a week later. `` [ 116 ] In other cases, it was not clear what happened to those detained by the TSF and militias. [ 117 ] The bodies of at least five men, allegedly to have been summarily killed during the initial offensives, including a militia and one wealthy Amhara investor from Humera, were found in mid-November in Idriss - a town approximately 25 kilometers east of Humera. [ 118 ]
The ENDF, the ASF and Amhara and Fano militias were able to quickly assume control of most of Western Tigray in the first 10 days following the initial offensive. [ 119 ] Eritrean forces were also present in some towns and villages near the Eritrean border.
Timeline of November Fighting in Western Tigray
Displaced Tigrayan civilians across Western Tigray gave strikingly similar accounts of artillery attacks by Ethiopian military and allied forces on towns and villages before their capture. [ 128 ] Though Ethiopian officials repeatedly said that Ethiopian federal forces in November 2020 had focused on military targets and not caused civilian casualties, attacks during the capture of towns in many cases appeared indiscriminate. [ 129 ] Artillery shells struck civilians and residential homes, businesses, and near schools. The shelling took place despite the withdrawal or lack of significant presence or defense by Tigrayan forces. [ 130 ]
The settlement of Division, near the Amhara regional border, and which was established to host retired and demobilized TPLF fighters and those with disabilities, many of them in their 60s-and 70s, came under a barrage of artillery. [ 131 ] On November 6, Desta, a 50-year-old farmer, witnessed heavy shelling damaging homes and killing residents. `` Shelling hit houses, sorghum storages, and shops in the town center, '' he said. Berhane a local accountant, saw his neighbor's two sons killed, and their house, located behind the commercial bank, damaged. `` They were dead, hit by the shelling [ at the entrance ] of their compound, killing the people and the sheep, '' he said. [ 132 ] Hailemariam, a doctor working in nearby Meareg hospital said he had to treat `` around 12. unarmed civilians, two were children. with bullet injuries. `` [ 133 ]
Ethiopian forces, accompanied by Amhara Special Forces and militia, continued to capture towns and villages surrounding Division and near the Sudanese border, before making their way north, toward the Eritrean border. On November 9 and 10, heavy artillery fire from Eritrea hit the town of Humera, in the tri-border area with Sudan and Eritrea. [ 134 ] The shelling struck homes and businesses, killed and wounded residents, and forced scores to flee to Sudan, to neighboring towns in Tigray, and to rural areas surrounding Humera. [ 135 ] Abadi, a 26-year-old driver, was in kebele 02 and sought shelter amid storm drains and bridges when the shelling began. [ 136 ] When he returned to his neighborhood, he saw the bodies of his neighbors, Ato Teklu and his son Goitom, who had been killed by shells that struck their home, as well as the body of a 3- or 4-year-old girl from another family, he said. `` Their bodies were scattered so we wrapped them with tarpaulin and buried them in one hole. `` [ 137 ]
Doctors working at Humera's Kahsay Aberra hospital began receiving a stream of patients throughout the day on November 9. Seyoum, a doctor working at the hospital, explained:
Some residents displaced by shelling and fighting fled towards Rawyan, a town seven kilometers south of Humera. Hoping to find safety, they only encountered more artillery fire. [ 139 ] `` There was heavy bombardment on the road between Humera and Rawyan, '' said Mehari, a 31-year-old farmer. `` Bombs fell in front of us, around 100 meters away. Many people fell during the chaos. I got separated from my family. `` [ 140 ]
After the outbreak of fighting, residents, elders, local officials, and militias in Rawyan sought to negotiate with the Ethiopian military forces stationed at the military camp in town - one of several in the Western Tigray Zone. [ 141 ] But negotiations broke down as Ethiopian troops and allied Amhara forces drew nearer to Rawyan. On November 10, residents awoke to the sounds of shelling and gunfire. [ 142 ] Artillery fire from the direction of the military camp fell near the bridge and Saint Mary's church as people began to flee. [ 143 ]
Many Tigrayans faced indiscriminate shelling while fleeing. Tewolde was running under the bridge in Rawyan when an older woman fell to the ground in front of him. `` She was trampled by the stampede of people fleeing, '' he said. [ 144 ] Haben, a 39-year-old farmer, ran with his children towards Bereket across farmland when he was hit by fragments from a mortar shell. `` The fragments hit me in nine places, '' he said. `` They are still in my body. They hit me on the thigh, calf, ankle, and finger. `` [ 145 ]
During the first month of fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered towns in Tigray accompanied by Amhara security forces and militia. They deliberately killed Tigrayan residents in at least 11 towns across Western Tigray, including in at least three large-scale attacks in Division, Adebai, and Mai Kadra. While the vast majority of the victims of the killings appeared to be men, women and children were not spared. [ 146 ]
The killings broadly took three forms. As occurred in other towns across Tigray in the initial phases of the conflict, security forces shot at and killed and wounded civilians when they entered towns, including Tigrayans trying to escape or flee. [ 147 ] Security forces, also sometimes extrajudicially, executed individuals they suspected to be fighters, residents they believed were supporting Tigrayan fighters, and retired fighters. [ 148 ] Lastly, Ethiopian and allied forces targeted prominent community figures such as government officials, investors, and business owners, at times as a result of denunciations. [ 149 ] Coming in the wake of the indiscriminate shelling of the towns, which triggered the displacement of Tigrayan and Amhara communities in Western Tigray, the killings created an atmosphere of terror and precipitated the initial flight of Tigrayans after the capture of towns. [ 150 ]
In 11 towns in Western Tigray, Ethiopian soldiers, Amhara Special Forces, and militias, entering towns with little resistance, fired weapons, and shot at civilians. [ 151 ] As Ethiopian government forces and allied Amhara forces entered Adebai via the main road on November 11, 2020, [ 152 ] `` People were panicked and began to run, '' recalled Hailay, a 30-year-old animal trader from the town. [ 153 ] Residents - including women and children - were frequently fired on without warning and killed. `` A young woman tried to run when the Ethiopian military shot at her from a distance, '' Zemariam said. `` There was also a mentally ill person [ person with a mental health condition ]. They shot him. It seemed random. I did not hear any commands. `` [ 154 ] Ethiopian soldiers shot at Tsegay, a 42-year-old bajaj ( motor rickshaw) driver as he fled on his vehicle with his 11-year-old son, fatally wounding the boy. Tsegay said:
In Division, five residents described how at least 17 men, ranging in age from their 20s to their 70s, were killed in the neighborhood of Dedebit on November 6, after it was captured by Ethiopian and allied Amhara forces. [ 156 ] Tesfay Teklu, a 60-year-old man, was among those killed. `` His wife was sick so he couldn't leave home, '' explained Desta. `` [ Tesfay ] was on the doorstep and immediately put his hands up. One Fano struck him with a machete on the side of his neck and he fell. Then they hit him with stones, and he died. `` [ 157 ] Teame, from Division, reported that he found the bodies of Berhe, and a man known as `` Jamaica, '' both of whom worked as security guards at a storage house, shortly after he fled the shooting. [ 158 ] Other residents recalled seeing their bodies and burying them. [ 159 ]
Fano militias fatally shot a woman named Letay while she was fleeing May Gaba around November 15. `` She fell on the ground with her six-month-old baby on her back, '' said Atsbaha. `` Her body stayed out for three days.. The baby was crying [ when we returned ], which is when we realized [ the baby ] was still alive, so we took the baby and buried [ the mother ] after three days. `` [ 160 ]
Witnesses said that similar killings of residents took place in Rawyan and Adi Goshu. [ 161 ]
Once they took control of at least seven towns, Ethiopian federal forces and Amhara forces worked together to interrogate, detain, and sometimes summarily execute men suspected of being TPLF fighters or sympathizers. [ 162 ] A farmer, 50, in Division, recalled that he saw two Fano fighters and an Ethiopian soldier kill Haile, a nurse at the Meareg hospital, after accusing him of taking medicines to the TPLF: `` They. tied his hands at the back with a rope and led him out of the compound.. I heard gunshots. After some minutes, I went with three others and found Haile's body on the road, about 100-150 meters away from the hospital. He had been shot in the back. `` [ 163 ]
A 54-year-old man recalled witnessing a summary execution. Ethiopian troops took him from his home in Rawyan, beat him, and handed him over to Amhara Special Forces in Humera. `` I was in so much pain, '' he said. `` There were pools of blood in my shoe. '' He then said he saw the ASF fighters behead a man he knew - a chef at a local hotel. [ 164 ]
Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara forces and their local allies detained and/or extrajudicially executed Tigrayan men and boys whom they suspected of sympathizing with the TPLF, of fighting or being affiliated to the TPLF, or for wearing military-style clothing. [ 165 ] After the shelling stopped in Humera, a construction worker ventured out of his hiding place and reported seeing four armed men in civilian clothes kill his former classmate, Tekelgn, near the Humera high school:
Ethiopian soldiers `` shot at people running, those wearing military boots, those wearing khaki, '' said Hailay, a farmer in Adebai. '' He said the federal forces, working together with Fanos, killed his neighbor Gerezighar Araye and his son Goitom:
Those who fled towns said security forces stopped them at checkpoints and checked their bodies for injuries or marks suggesting they had carried a rifle on their shoulders or weight on their hips. [ 168 ] `` I saw one man being checked [ by Ethiopian soldiers ], a carpenter, '' whose work involved carrying heavy tools, said a 21-year-old driver from Rawyan. `` They maybe found a scar, because they shot him. `` [ 169 ]
Kalayou said a mixed group of security forces, including Ethiopian soldiers, Amhara militias, and Fanos stopped him and his friends, at a petrol station near Rawyan on November 11, checked their bodies for marks or scars, beat them, and accused them of being TPLF members. [ 170 ]
In some cases, Ethiopian security forces mutilated the dead bodies of TPLF officials, Tigrayan fighters or suspected supporters [ 171 ]. Kahsay said that after fleeing with her children and arriving in Humera town in early November, `` We saw a man in a Tigray special force uniform. They had his legs chained to a car. They dragged his body through the streets while we heard the sounds of gunshots. `` [ 172 ]
Ethiopian and allied forces extrajudicially executed prominent community leaders and local business owners. [ 173 ] At times, non-Tigrayan local residents helped identify prominent individuals in the community. [ 174 ] For example, on November 10, a wealthy farmer named Isaias was driving his tractor on the bridge on the main road out of Rawyan towards Baeker and Mai Kadra when Ethiopian troops and Fano militia stopped him. According to three witnesses, one town resident identified Isaias. [ 175 ] Tesfatsion recalled that the resident reported Isaias as `` exploitative '' and `` hating the Amharas. `` [ 176 ] `` A Fano hit [ Isaias ] on the head with a machete and he fell to the ground. Other Fanos hit him too, '' said Merhawi, who watched the killing from his home. `` There were about 15 Fanos around him but not all hit him. Then they left, and he stayed lying on the ground. `` [ 177 ]
Religious figures in Rawyan who in early November 2020 had participated in the negotiations with the Ethiopian military were also among those killed. [ 178 ] `` Someone [ in the town ] pointed them out. This happened once the soldiers took over the town... We heard gunfire and wanted to go out and get the bodies, but the Ethiopian soldiers stopped us, '' said Tesfatsion, who said that he later saw a sheikh's body. [ 179 ]
Fano and other militias killed Tesfaye, a shoe seller in Dansha known for his charity work, outside his workplace, near Saint Mikael church, said Berhane, who witnessed the attack. `` First, they struck his head with a machete. His brain was coming out, '' he said. `` There were a lot of them, and they surrounded him. They dragged him by his legs, holding onto his feet. After they dragged him some distance, they left him there. His brain was completely out of his head. `` [ 180 ]
Federal and allied forces systematically destroyed entire neighborhoods in Division. [ 181 ] Residents described how Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara forces and Walqayte militias deliberately set fire to houses, destroying mender ( neighborhoods) 1 and 2 around November 6 and 7, 2020. This shocked many Division residents, as the settlement was run by the Ethiopian military, and many residents received veteran pensions.
Hadgu, from Division, said that on November 6, `` most of mender 1 houses were burned. `` [ 182 ] Witnesses said that the destruction involved the federal forces, Fanos, and Walqayte militias. [ 183 ] A 25-year-old driver from the settlement said that they selectively targeted Tigrayan houses: `` We did not expect this. They went to private houses. They were looking for Tigrayan houses... [ T ] he Amhara [ residents ] showed which houses belonged to Tigrayans. `` [ 184 ] A shop owner, 22, said federal forces burned down his house as they entered Division, forcing him to flee the village. He and other residents collected a list of 88 houses that the ENDF burned that day. [ 185 ]
Berihu saw around 80 to 100 Fano fighters, all armed - some in civilian clothes, others in the old ENDF uniforms: `` First they came and took over and started looting. They looted these neighborhoods [ mender 1 and 2 ] and then burned them - I was there when mender 1 and 2 were burned.. They used [ fuel ] to burn. `` [ 186 ] Kiros, a 63-year-old farmer, said he could only watch as non-Tigrayan residents from neighboring villages destroyed his house:
[ They ] said: `` This is not your land! We own this place! Your land is on the other side of Tekeze. Go there! Live there! You can claim what you want there, but you have nothing to claim here. '' Me and my friends managed to save materials from the roof, and then we went to the Amhara Special Forces and told them the Walqayte [ were ] stealing everything from the house. Instead of protecting us, the Amhara Special Forces took what we had salvaged from the house. [ 187 ]
Three residents returned to Division to find that their houses had been destroyed. [ 188 ] Teame, a 74-year-old farmer and retired TPLF fighter, fled to Sheglil during the shelling but returned two weeks later. `` I found [ mender 1 ] was burned [ down ], including my house, '' he said. `` Sometimes I feel they burned it to terrify people, because our mender is the first mender you find when you come from the direction of Dansha.... They know that this place is for [ veterans ] with disabilities and that our house was built by the ENDF. `` [ 189 ]
Mai Kadra, one of the larger farming towns in Western Tigray Zone, was the site of the first publicly reported large-scale massacre in early November 2020. In subsequent days and months, strikingly different accounts of what had unfolded in Mai Kadra emerged. Federal and regional authorities seized on the narrative of an atrocity committed by Tigrayan forces to provide further arguments for its offensive, while Tigrayan communities insisted that they too were harmed. But the massacre that took place resulted from a unique combination of local circumstances, including preexisting tensions in the town and news of the advance and abuses by Ethiopian and allied Amhara forces as fighting spread in Western Tigray. [ 190 ]
Tensions between neighbors and residents in Mai Kadra, which had steadily grown for several years, surged in the initial days of the war. News of the imminent advance of Ethiopian federal forces and allied forces, and of attacks by Amhara and Fano militia on neighboring towns south of Mai Kadra, created an atmosphere of intense fear among Tigrayans. On the morning of November 9, tensions rose sharply following news that the Ethiopian military and allied forces were several kilometers from the town after having routed Tigrayan forces. Tigrayan youth began carrying out neighborhood searches, monitoring newcomers in the town. By the afternoon, Amhara daily workers opportunistically looted Tigrayan businesses. The rising tensions caused many Tigrayans and Amhara to hide in their homes or flee to the countryside. Beginning at 3 p.m. and continuing into the evening, Tigrayan men and youth with knives, machetes, and axes, beat, stabbed, and hacked Amhara residents, killing scores and injuring about 100. By evening, armed Amharas also attacked Tigrayan residents in town.
Differing estimates have emerged of the number of those killed. The number of Amharas killed ranged from around 200 to over 1,000. [ 191 ] A team of federal police investigators and prosecutors deployed to Mai Kadra in December 2020 concluded that 229 civilians were killed. [ 192 ] The joint investigation by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC) concluded that more than 200 civilians were killed. [ 193 ] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch researchers spoke with an expert involved in the investigation who described the exhumation of 229 bodies found in three mass grave sites behind the Abune Aregawi church. [ 194 ] The expert evaluated 40 bodies, the majority of which showed blunt force head injuries, and found three identification cards of those killed from the Amhara region. [ 195 ]
After Ethiopian military forces and allied Amhara security forces and militias captured the town by 10 a.m. on November 10, these forces targeted the remaining Tigrayan residents in a brutal wave of revenge killings, arbitrary detentions, pillage, and eventual mass expulsion - a pattern that would repeat against Tigrayan communities across the Western Tigray Zone in the year that followed.
Located near the border with Sudan, some 30 kilometers south of Humera town, Mai Kadra served as a resettlement site under both the Derg and EPRDF regimes. [ 196 ] Until the outbreak of the war in November 2020, it had an estimated population of around 40,000 people, consisting of Tigrayan, Amhara, and Walqayte residents. [ 197 ] Although communities lived alongside one another, neighborhoods were largely formed along ethnic lines and intercommunal tensions had built up over the years. [ 198 ]
As in other towns in this fertile agricultural district, most of Mai Kadra's residents worked as farmers, growing sesame, sorghum, and other cereals on the farms surrounding the town. Mai Kadra's population would swell for several weeks or months of the year when farm laborers from around Ethiopia, including from other areas in Tigray and the Amhara region, came in pursuit of seasonal work, typically tilling land owned by wealthier farmers or investors. [ 199 ]
There were tensions along ethnic lines well before the November 9 and 10 massacres over issues such as the administration and unequal distribution of farmland, the corrupt practices of local officials, and the abusive behavior of security forces in response to the demands raised by the Welkait Identity Committee. [ 200 ]
The strains became more visible following the 2016-2018 Amhara protests. [ 201 ] Amhara and Walqayte residents said that local authorities suppressed the Amharic language and targeted establishments that played Amharic songs, while the local police harassed and arrested individuals with perceived or actual affiliation with the Welkait Identity Committee in the town. [ 202 ]
Tigrayan, Walqayte, and Amhara residents complained that administrators did little to curb acts of violence and grievances over the unequal distribution of land and took measures that contributed to local tensions. [ 203 ] Abrehet, a 70-year-old Tigrayan woman explained that the unequal treatment began as early as the 1990s: `` The [ federal government ] gave Tigrayan families and households two or three hectares of farmland. But Walqayte and Amhara farmers had much more, like 20-30 hectares, sometimes over 50 hectares. `` [ 204 ] Tensions began to grow, however, in 2015. A 43-year-old Walqayte farmer said he joined the Welkait Identity Committee after his land was taken away by administrators. `` They took 20 hectares from me and 20 hectares from Eyerus. We were farming the land until ( 2016). '' [ 205 ] Haben, a Tigrayan farmer, criticized corrupt land practices after 2018, but blamed administrators he said were linked to the federal government for granting Walqayte people more land: `` A Tigrayan would get two hectares, while a Walqayte person would get five hectares of land, '' he said. [ 206 ]
By 2018, these tensions led to mobilization along ethnic lines in certain neighborhoods in Mai Kadra. `` There were different signs that people were forming in groups, a Tigrayan group, Walqayte group, Amhara groups. Small groups of people, but divided by ethnicity, '' recalled Abrehet. [ 207 ]
Complaints over land fueled tensions across neighborhoods; in particular, they pitted Tigrayan residents of the Samre neighborhood against the Walqayte residents of Bole sefer neighborhood, explained Amanuel. [ 208 ] `` There were [ agricultural ] investors in town with [ commercial ] interests, '' said Tesfay, a Tigrayan student. `` They were agitating.. They started fanning differences in 2018-2019.. They started mobilizing youth in Bole and in other areas. `` [ 209 ] In May 2018, attempts by town administrators to give land in the Tigrayan neighborhood of Samre to Walqayte youth from Adi Remets, another town in the district, further inflamed the situation. [ 210 ]
Fights broke out between the groups on a few occasions in 2018 and 2019. [ 211 ] In 2018, a group of young Tigrayan men staged a demonstration, making their way through different neighborhoods and demanding the administration distribute land for houses. Abrehet said:
In June 2019, Hiruy, a Walqayte resident, said that clashes between Tigrayan and Walqayte residents mainly involved the use of `` stones and sticks, '' but at times also weapons, and that property was occasionally destroyed. [ 213 ] On June 19, 2019, Tigrayan youth and residents looted homes in the Bole neighborhood, where Walqayte predominately lived. `` It was the youth that did this, but they were accompanied and protected by the militia, special force, and police, '' added Zelalem. [ 214 ]
Farmers and seasonal workers also took part in the violence. [ 215 ] Biniyam, a 30-year-old Amhara resident, explained how laborers collecting harvests confronted each other after workers from the predominantly Tigrayan neighborhood of Samre grazed their cows on his brother's sorghum's field in 2018:
A 21-year-old Tigrayan resident, explained that such disputes were a `` normal '' occurrence at the time. He recalled how `` Amhara and Tigrayan salugs [ laborers ] did not like each other. [ 217 ]
The communications blackout in Tigray after November 4, 2020, deprived Mai Kadra residents of reliable information about the conflict unfolding in the Zone. Mai Kadra's proximity to the Sudanese border, however, enabled some residents who owned Sudanese SIM cards to access the Sudanese network. [ 218 ] But, as in other towns in Western Tigray located near the Sudanese border, Tigrayan militias in Mai Kadra issued orders that `` no one should use Sudanese SIM cards, '' taking their continued use as a way to identify alleged government informants and artillery spotters. Two witnesses recounted how militia and local residents in the town searched for informants who used phones after November 4. [ 219 ]
Between November 6 and 8, Ethiopian federal forces and allied Amhara forces advancing in Western Tigray encountered stiff resistance from Tigrayan militias and Special Forces around Banat and Lugdi - both farmland areas in the unsettled border Zone between Ethiopia and Sudan, around 10 to 15 kilometers west of Mai Kadra. [ 220 ] Residents said that Mai Kadra administrators and volunteers provided food, water, and other logistical assistance to the Tigrayan Special Forces and militias fighting nearby, while wounded Tigrayan fighters came to Mai Kadra's health facilities for treatment. [ 221 ]
Despite the blackout, information about events in the nearby areas trickled in as people fleeing fighting arrived in Mai Kadra. Farmers and seasonal workers, including a large number of Amharas, fled the fighting around Banat and Lugdi, and found refuge in Mai Kadra. [ 222 ] Tigrayans fleeing violence further south and southeast of the town also passed through Mai Kadra and gave word of fighting and killings elsewhere in Tigray and along the boundaries with the Amhara region, particularly in Dansha, Tigray ( 71 kilometers away), and in Abderafi, Amhara ( 42 kilometers away). After hearing unconfirmed reports of Tigrayans killed by Amharas in Dansha, Abrehet, a 70-year-old housewife, decided to flee. [ 223 ]
Tensions and fear mounted. [ 224 ] `` The situation in Mai Kadra was not good, '' said a 32-year-old teacher. `` Many people came in and out [ of the town ]. The situation was very stressful and out of the normal. `` [ 225 ] A Tigrayan doctor in the town explained the atmosphere:
In the absence of a regular security presence, youth groups began organizing by neighborhood, residents said. [ 227 ] `` There were youth volunteers who decided to protect the town since there was a gap in security, so they were searching for new faces, and monitoring new people, '' recalled a 25-year-old Tigrayan student. [ 228 ]
Their actions left Amhara residents in the town also fearing for their safety. `` The [ Tigrayans ] were coming around our area holding axes and machetes, '' said a 30-year-old Amhara woman who lived near Gimb Sefer. [ 229 ] `` Residents of our neighborhood were worried and asking our Tigrayan neighbors why this was happening. They responded that groups are coming to rob and that the [ youth groups ] would stop them. `` [ 230 ] Biniyam, an Amhara resident also living in Gimb Sefer neighborhood, said local youth from the Samre neighborhood also `` began to search and inspect individual houses. '' He added that the local youth registered `` Amharas from other areas residing in Amhara homes.... They registered who was armed and who was not. They also actually put restrictions not to move from area to area. from going to the farmland. `` [ 231 ]
On November 8, residents began learning of an impending ENDF attack on the town. `` We started hearing that they were really getting close, '' said Asmelesh, a doctor in Mai Kadra. `` Some people were scared, others were saying: 'This is just rumors. ' '' [ 232 ]
On the morning of November 9, residents began their daily routine - heading to work in the fields or in town. Yehansu, a teacher, awoke at 7 a.m. and was eating breakfast at a restaurant in the neighborhood of Gijet when he saw `` injured Tigrayan and ENDF soldiers loaded on tractors. also tired Tigrayan fighters coming to Mai Kadra '' from the front. [ 233 ] A 15-year-old grade 8 student, who was excited to be back in class that week after several months of school closures due to the Covid-19 pandemic, said: `` Around fourth period, I could hear boom, boom [ at a distance ]. Our teacher told us to just go back home. `` [ 234 ] Araya, who worked as a daily laborer, was heading to the nearby farmland that morning when he saw other laborers return with their tractors towards the town. `` I was afraid because I could hear gunshots in every direction, '' he said. [ 235 ]
Between 10 a.m. and noon, according to two Tigrayan residents, word spread that the Ethiopian federal forces advance on the town was imminent. [ 236 ] The news, combined with the return of laborers from the farmland to `` Hawelty '' - a square in the center of town - contributed to a sharp rise in tensions. Yehansu, a Tigrayan, said he passed through Gimb Sefer neighborhood in the center of town and recalled the uneasy atmosphere:
A 32-year-old Tigrayan resident said that the Amhara daily workers seemed to be `` celebrating '' that they would prevail against the Tigray administration. [ 238 ]
While Tigrayan militia and special police were at the battlefront, an unclear number of Tigrayan militia present in the town announced to residents that `` thieves were coming '' that day and ordered them `` to protect themselves and their houses, '' according to two residents. [ 239 ] Tigrayan youth groups, Tesfay said, began `` monitoring the new people '' that morning, and took some to the police station in Bole neighborhood, because they had `` four or five Sudanese sim cards each. `` [ 240 ]
The reaction of Tigrayan residents to the news of the Ethiopian military's advance stoked fears among Amhara residents. Mahlet said that at 10 a.m., she noticed that other Amhara residents, in her neighborhood of Gimb Sefer, were disturbed by the announcement from Tigrayan militias. She and other neighborhood residents appealed to their local kebele officials, an Amhara man named Dessalegn and another named Tamir, who reassured them. `` The kebele officials said nothing will happen, '' she said. `` They said to stay at home. `` [ 241 ]
Around noon, a 58-year-old Tigrayan priest who lived near Abune Aregawi, a church that lies north of Hawelty square and close to Gimb Sefer, encountered a Tigrayan laborer fleeing from Abderafi. The priest recounted that the laborer warned him it was time to `` escape for [ their ] lives, '' after he witnessed Fano and Walqyate militia kill his friend in farmland near Mai Kadra and said that `` others coming after them would steal and loot. `` [ 242 ] By then residents, particularly those living on the edges of Mai Kadra, noticed people fleeing from the center of town, warning others to do the same. [ 243 ]
The teacher, Yehansu, said: `` Everyone was worried and asking [ for information ] from those who were coming [ into town ] because the telecommunications were down. Everyone was worried and afraid. because we are Tigrayans, the ENDF soldiers will beat us or kill us. `` [ 244 ]
By then, the climate of intense distrust between communities and perceptions of imminent threat had turned Mai Kadra into a tinderbox.
About 2 p.m., three Tigrayan residents noticed the Amhara daily workers gathering together in Bole, a predominantly Walqayte neighborhood, and in Gimb Sefer and Sarmender where Amharas live. [ 245 ] `` they said the Tigray militia and forces are about to flee. Our brothers are coming so let us be ready. A lot of people were afraid, '' explained a 32-year-old Tigrayan resident. [ 246 ]
Also, around 2 p.m., six Amhara men eating at a small restaurant in Hawelty square left without paying. The Tigrayan owner started screaming, drawing the attention of several residents and youth. `` I asked what's going on, '' said Kibreab, a 50-year-old Tigrayan farmer who saw a large crowd giving chase to six men in the square. `` I can't estimate the number of people running after them, because it was many people, especially young men. `` [ 247 ]
Biniyam, an Amhara resident, was also near the square and witnessed a large crowd give chase. He said:
Tigrayan residents brought the six captured men to the police station in Bole neighborhood, finding it empty except for two officers. [ 249 ] Deciding against holding them there, a group of older men accompanied the six to Sarmender, a predominantly Amhara neighborhood. Kibreab, one of the men there, noticed that a group of angry Tigrayan youth had been following them and gathering along the road. He explained: `` We, the older residents, walked with them, [ the six ], so people would not fight with them. We took them to Sarmender and let them go free, to avoid conflict. `` [ 250 ]
Shortly after, around 3 p.m., Amhara seasonal workers began looting in Bole and Samre neighborhoods. According to four residents, word of the Ethiopian military forces ' advance into Mazoria, a rural area around 10 to 15 kilometers away from Mai Kadra, had reached the town. [ 251 ] Yibrah, who saw around 20 to 30 Amhara youth loot shops along Ketena 05 in the Bole neighborhood, believed the news of the advance prompted opportunistic daily laborers to begin looting. [ 252 ] At a house in Ketena 05, the local militia found a group of around 30 laborers in one house. The militia members `` checked their ID cards and detained them in the Eyasu Berhe school, '' said a 34-year-old driver who helped in the arrest. [ 253 ]
Tigrayan and Amhara residents said that the initial bout of mass killings began in Gimb Sefer, in the center of town, near the health center, shortly after 3 p.m. and lasted until around 5 p.m. [ 254 ]
Several witnesses and survivors interviewed, as well as media reports, described how Tigrayan seasonal workers, local militias, and armed youth killed Amhara and Walqayte residents and laborers on the street and during house-to-house searches in Gimb Sefer.
According to local and international media accounts and the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, local Tigrayans approached the home of a former Amhara militia, named Abiy Tsegaye, calling him out before striking him in the head with a machete, then shooting him in the chest, and setting fire to his home. [ 255 ] A 30-year-old Amhara woman living in Gimb Sefer said that Abiy was among the first killed: `` After the [ Tigrayan attackers ] killed him, they burned his body. Then they burned seven houses after [ killing ] him. `` [ 256 ]
Satellite imagery of Mai Kadra recorded between November 9 and 10 ( 11:17 a.m. to 11:11 a.m.) and analyzed by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, shows visible damage and burning to a cluster of homes in the Gimb Sefer neighborhood, about 200 meters southeast of the main intersection at Hawelty square. Satellite imagery recorded on November 11 shows additional damaged houses in the Gimb Sefer neighborhood.
Biniyam, an ethnic Amhara, was hiding alongside his brother and around 35 other laborers in the corrugated iron sheets of their roof. His brother's wife and three children, including an infant, were in the home. Biniyam said that a group of what he estimated to be 40 people repeatedly came looking for his brother, eventually killing him as he watched:
Mahlet, Biniyam's sister-in-law, added that the attackers `` seemed prepared '' as `` they had hammers to open the doors. '' She said the group insulted her, called her slurs such as `` donkey, '' frightening her and her children. [ 258 ]
When the group of attackers returned, her husband was unable to tolerate the shouts and cries of the children and came down from the roof. Biniyam recalled:
A 33-year-old Amhara laborer said he was at home when a group of Tigrayans came to his house, asked for an ID and told him they 'd take him to the police station. He recounted that they subsequently beat him, struck him on the head with an axe, and broke his hands. [ 260 ] Other survivors similarly described attackers hitting them in the head with sticks and axes, while militia members shot at those trying to escape. [ 261 ]
A 29-year-old Amhara seasonal worker was sitting outside at a cafe in Gimb Sefer, around 4:30 p.m., when he witnessed Tigrayan laborers and residents gather and attack a young man. He said:
The day laborer added: `` Militias were assisting them. They weren't protecting us. ''
Tewodros similarly fled the attacks by escaping to different houses before finally hiding in the home of an old Tigrayan man when the attackers went searching door-to-door. `` The baby inside the house we hid in started to cry. We were trying to make him stop crying. The [ attackers ] then came to the house and checked inside. Noticing no one, they left. `` [ 263 ]
Hanna was at home with her husband, Zerihun, when attackers she described as youth and militias came to their house around 4 p.m. and asked for their IDs and mobile phones. [ 264 ] `` They took my husband and his brother outside.. There were also other Amharas. They beat my husband four times with a machete on his head. He was like a corpse when brought to Gondar, '' she explained. [ 265 ] Her husband Zerihun, survived. Zerihun recalled the attack:
These killings prompted an immediate mass exodus from the town. Yehansu, said between 3 and 4 p.m., he saw: `` that everyone was leaving Mai Kadra. I saw that people were running out of the town and all the cars were just moving out and taking anyone that was running.. Everyone was panicking.... People were trying to get away from whatever was coming. `` [ 267 ]
Violence appeared to subside around Hawelty square and the center of town and residents returning to town around 5 p.m. recalled seeing a large number of bodies in the area. Amanuel entered Mai Kadra and saw several bodies near the square, in Bole, Gimb Sefer, and near the beer shops in Ketena 4. [ 268 ] A 30-year-old health worker returning to Mai Kadra that afternoon saw `` the road to the health center from the Kela [ checkpoint ] was strewn with dead bodies. `` [ 269 ]
Attacks, however, continued elsewhere in the town in an atmosphere of intense confusion. By then Amhara daily workers and attackers began targeting Tigrayans, according to six residents. [ 270 ]
Terhas, a 28-year-old Tigrayan farmer, said she ran from house-to-house with her 4-year-old son and a friend. She reported seeing dead bodies around Ketena 5 neighborhood in the southwest of the town. `` There were no other forces around, only Fanos and Salugs, '' she said. [ 271 ] While running, she recognized the body of a Tigrayan guard from the town's Commercial Bank. She recounted the killing of a Tigrayan man who sold water: `` They first struck his back and then his neck and threw him in a drain. '' As she approached Ketena 1, she said Amhara farmworkers she previously worked for took her to a Walqayte woman's home. `` She washed my face and that of my kid. I tried to move to another house, when I saw [ more ] people being killed.. I covered one body with my scarf. '' [ 272 ]
Tewolde, a 65-year-old farmer from Rawyan, remembered entering Mai Kadra at sunset, and was unaware of the massacre occurring in the town:
Many residents said they heard extensive shooting around sunset, but it is unclear who was doing the shooting. [ 274 ]
Mehari was hiding in his bathroom when attackers, whom he described as armed Fano wearing civilian clothes, entered his home around 1 a.m. `` They took 10 quintals [ 1000 kilograms ] of sesame and 30 of my sheep. My family was at home, they [ the attackers ] didn't say anything to them. They also took my donkey cart. [ 275 ]
A 33-year-old Tigrayan resident, was hiding in his home in Kebele 02 when he reported witnessing a large mixed group of what he described as Fano kill 15 workers, including 4 Tigrayans he knew personally, near the gate of his home. [ 276 ] `` There were about 25 of them, '' he said. `` Some had rifles and some machetes. [ The ] group of 15 young men came, maybe they were fleeing, like so many others. I saw some [ of the forces ] hitting the young men with machetes mostly and some shot. ''
The sounds of gunfire subsided by morning. The surviving residents who had not fled soon emerged from hiding to find the bodies of their family members, friends and neighbors scattered through the streets. One 44-year-old Tigrayan farmer, who lived in Gimb Sefer but recalled spending the night in Ketena 4 after being tipped off by residents not to go home, expressed fright and shock as he went home. He recalled: `` That morning I saw a lot of dead bodies and I was very shocked, so I was jumping as I passed through them. I was very shocked. thinking how I can run and save my life. I can't even estimate how many dead bodies there were. I also saw different property broken on the street. `` [ 277 ]
Kibreab, a 50-year-old Tigrayan farmer who had stayed in Mai Kadra to protect his property, recounted opening his door on the morning of November 10 and found three of his neighbors - Halefom, Berhe, and Lilay - stabbed to death. [ 278 ]
Around 10 a.m., Ethiopian federal forces approached Mai Kadra, accompanied by Amhara regional police forces and Fano militia, in a manner similar to their capture of other towns - firing their guns. Four men who had volunteered to accompany the forces described seeing bodies lining the streets. [ 279 ] `` We saw a lot of bloody, dead bodies on the streets and in the cheap [ rentals ] frequented by seasonal workers, '' said Habtamu. `` I 'm still struggling to cope with the experience. I didn't count the bodies, but I guess it to be between 100 and 150.... Most of the dead bodies I saw were found on the main road in the town's center.... There were a lot of corpses near the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia branch, in the town center. '' [ 280 ]
A video posted to Facebook on November 10, 2020, shows a similar scene described by witnesses. The video, according to the shadows visible, was filmed between noon and 1 p.m. near the town's centre. It shows five vehicles being driven in a northly direction with approximately 130 men, most of whom are wearing uniforms and can be seen carrying Kalashnikov-style military assault rifles. [ 281 ] There are several men visible riding on the trucks wearing civilian clothing. Four large white trucks, carrying at least 30 men in uniforms, and one smaller truck carrying at least 10 uniformed men drive by. One of the trucks slows down and people wearing civilian clothes can be seen passing them water. The military forces are heard and seen firing their weapons throughout the video.
Three self-described volunteers arrived with or shortly after the federal and regional forces and militia said they helped identify those wounded and still alive and arranged for trucks and an ambulance to take them to the closest health centers. [ 282 ]
Medical teams treating the injured in at least two health centers and a hospital in the Amhara region began receiving patients from Mai Kadra. The health center in Abrahajira, Amhara region, received over 100 injured patients. [ 283 ] Those with more severe injuries were referred to other hospitals, including Gondar hospital in Amhara region. [ 284 ] A doctor treating the wounded revealed that the majority of the injured were Amhara, with many of the patients having suffered from different injuries, the majority with injuries in the head and neck area. [ 285 ] He added that very few patients arrived with bullet injuries as most were wounded by sharp objects, likely knives and machetes, `` around four patients had penetrating abdominal injuries. '' [ 286 ]
As volunteers made arrangements to treat the injured, the bodies of those killed remained on the streets. Biniyam described hiding on the roof of his home when the federal forces and Amhara forces arrived. `` When they arrived, we were told not to pick up the bodies, not only that of my brother, but different bodies were seen around, '' he said. `` They told us not to pick them up until the journalists came and filmed the situation and took videos. `` [ 287 ]
Bodies lay outside for several days. [ 288 ] Tadesse, a Tigrayan farmer, 60, corroborated Tilahun's account that the arriving federal and Amhara forces told them not to bury the dead. A burial committee was established, he said, but Tigrayans killed in his neighborhood were dumped elsewhere: `` After three days the forces loaded the bodies on a tractor and took them outside of town. I saw them in a pile west of the town. These were [ Tigrayan ] neighbors I saw being killed. '' [ 289 ]
Several witnesses provided similar accounts of bodies being carried away on tractors. Senait, a Tigrayan woman in Kebele 02 said: `` When I went out, I saw around 20 to 40 dead bodies. They had been hit with axes and knives. I saw Agew residents [ an ethnic group inhabiting Ethiopia and Eritrea ] gathering the bodies and putting them in a tractor, '' [ 290 ] She added, `` This was around the big shop. The dead bodies were mainly of young men, ages 17 to 20. I couldn't recognize them. Their faces were covered with blood. `` [ 291 ]
Residents seeking shelter at the church or initially with Ethiopian military forces also witnessed a collection process whereby bodies were taken away using tractors. [ 292 ]
Terhas found shelter in Abune Aregawi church for a few days. She said the funerals of those killed on November 9 took place days later, between November 13 and 16, when bodies were buried in mass graves in the church graveyard or covered with soil in a dry riverbed near a petrol station on the way to Humera. By then the stench of decomposing bodies lingered in the air of the town. She said:
A November 12 video, posted on Facebook, shows the sun rising at around 6:30 a.m. on either November 10 or 11 and covered bodies being carried on wooden stretchers down the main road of Mai Kadra. At least another 30 bodies are filmed on stretchers in a courtyard off the main road. [ 294 ]
News of the mass killings of Amhara and Walqayte civilians in Mai Kadra spread rapidly online. The Amhara regional president described the attacks as `` a brutal genocide against the Amhara people. `` [ 295 ] Prime Minister Abiy called the killings `` the epitome of moral degeneration, '' and said without providing evidence that the perpetrators of the attacks may have fled to Sudan and were hiding among the refugees - a charge that numerous government officials and pro-government commentators later repeated. [ 296 ]
TPLF officials denied that that regular Tigrayan forces had targeted Amhara civilians but told reporters that `` local Tigrayan militias may have committed abuses. `` [ 297 ] Tigrayan residents recounted attacks by federal forces and Amhara militias in Mai Kadra. [ 298 ] Conflicting accounts of what unfolded in early November have since crystallized as federal and regional authorities have capitalized on accounts of the killings of Amhara civilians in Mai Kadra to mobilize support for the military operations in Tigray.
The Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara Special Forces, and militias responded to the violence carried out against Amhara and the Walqayte residents and laborers in Mai Kadra by targeting the broader Tigrayan population in a wave of killings, arbitrary detentions, and looting.
As in other towns in Western Tigray, local residents assisted in the killings, helping security forces by identifying Tigrayan residents. `` There were informants pointing people out: people who ran banks, people who had large farms, '' said Tesfatsion, a 45-year-old woman farmer. [ 299 ]
Terhas, while seeking shelter at the Abune Aregawi church, noticed Ethiopian solders working with non-Tigrayan residents and daily laborers to identify three Tigrayan residents they knew. She said she saw the soldiers lead the three men away and subsequently heard gunfire and screams. She explains how she later witnessed killings by a mix of Amhara Special Forces and Ethiopian federal forces:
Federal forces took positions on the main roads and around the church while Fano militiamen and Amhara Special Forces swept through Tigrayan neighborhoods, going house-to-house to apprehend people. A driver describes witnessing federal soldiers shoot and kill a 15 or 16-year-old boy near Andinet hotel in Ketena 5. [ 301 ] Five residents witnessed members of the Ethiopian military or Amhara security forces, including Fano militias, kill Tigrayan residents in Kebele 02, in the Tigrayan neighborhoods of Samre and Gijet located in the eastern part of the main road that leads to Humera. [ 302 ]
Tadesse, a 60-year-old Tigrayan farmer living in Kebele 02 witnessed what he described as Fano militia and forces wearing beige uniforms - apparent Amhara Special Forces - bring two groups of people to an open area, meters away from his home, and shoot them. He said:
As a religious figure, Berhe thought he would be safe when government forces took over the town. Hearing gunshots in his neighborhood, he recalls seeing Fano militiamen kill people at a distance:
Sheshay, a 56-year-old farmer in Ketena 2, said `` ENDF [ were ] shooting in the town while Salug went home to home killing ethnic Tigrayans. `` [ 304 ] He describes watching as an 86-year-old man named `` Aba Fano, '' was killed in Ketena 2 near the Samre school, while Salug dragged Sheshay's grandson, a militiaman, out of the house and killed him. [ 305 ] He also recounts seeing two other dead bodies. Of witnessing one of the attacks, he said:
One 27-year-old man said Fanos approached him and asked him if he was Tigrayan or Amhara. `` I told them I am Tigrayan, and they hit me with a machete, '' the man said. `` We were three, two of us survived and the other one died. I went to the church.... [ A ] n Amhara priest asked me what happened and hid me in a church hall under construction. '' [ 307 ]
Security forces stopped Tigrayans who were fleeing. After seeing people killed on the street, a 23-year-old trader tried to escape. He described a patrol of Amhara Special Forces stopping him near Rawyan, attacking him with a knife, and bringing him back to town. He said:
Killings of Tigrayans continued in the days that followed, accompanied with looting and detentions. A 53-year-old widower explained that Fano militiamen entered his home where he was with his two daughters on November 11. They pulled him out of his house and led him to the center of town, where they hit him and other Tigrayan neighbors with sticks, axes, and machetes, he said. [ 309 ] Some of the Tigrayans were shot. The widower, who survived the attacks, recalled:
The widower recognized two Tigrayans who had been killed. [ 311 ]
On the same day, around 9 a.m., a 48-year-old housewife described returning to town after having fled the initial violence when she was stopped by a group of around eight people, armed with machetes, who shouted at her. Hoping to protect herself, she claimed she was from the Amhara region. The attackers believed her and let her go. [ 312 ] When she entered her home, she saw that her property and livestock had been taken. She recalled finding the bodies of two brothers she knew from another family, and the dismembered body of her husband, a former militiaman and member of the local administration, lying near the gate of their home in Ketena 02. `` I had left town on November 9.. [ B ] y then my husband was out of Mai Kadra at the farm.... I think he was killed when he came back to check on us. His body had marks of cuts by sharp objects. He was dismembered at his hip and neck. I was not allowed to pick or bury his dead body. And there were many other dead bodies like him. The Salug were watching the dead bodies. `` [ 313 ]
Four Tigrayans, who had fled to nearby farmland or towns, said they had returned to Mai Kadra after receiving assurances from non-Tigrayan residents whom they knew. [ 314 ] A 51-year-old farmer had fled to Adebai when he was told by three elders from Mai Kadra to return since the `` town was stable. `` [ 315 ] Others, like Tedros, returned after the owner of the farm he was hiding in said that there was `` an order to return to Mai Kadra by the government forces. `` [ 316 ]
Some local residents tried to protect their Tigrayan neighbors. [ 317 ] When Tedros returned home, he said it had been broken into and many items had been looted. Amhara neighbors took his daughters to stay with them. He recounted how seven Fano militiamen came into his home and demanded that he hand over his gun. Fifteen Salug workers then arrived and began attacking him. He said:
Beginning on November 10, Tigrayan witnesses and former detainees described how a mixture of forces, including ENDF, ASF, and Fano militias, began rounding up Tigrayan residents, holding them first in makeshift locations, including hotels, bars, and restaurants, before later transporting them to a grain warehouse known as `` Abadi Foq, '' located in the southern part of town. [ 319 ] Tigrayans, estimated to be in the thousands, were detained at the site for nearly two months. [ 320 ] Three witnesses said some detainees were taken out and killed. [ 321 ]
Fano militia entered the home of Haileselassie and threatened to shoot him, before handing him over to the ENDF. He said he was kept in `` a camp '' for a day. `` I was with 40 or 50 other people. The ENDF treated us well, gave us food and drink. Then they started to move us to another area, a few meters away from where we were. While we were being moved, I saw the Fano shoot and kill a man.. He was a barber in the town. `` [ 322 ]
A Tigrayan farmer, recalled being arrested by three armed men in civilian clothes, two of whom were farmworkers he knew, who accused him of taking part in the killing of Amharas. He said:
Alongside other people, Kindihafti said she was held for a day in a bar used as a makeshift detention site at first; Ethiopian forces subsequently took her to the Abadi building where she was detained for over a month. [ 324 ] Similarly, Mekonnen recounted staying with a Walqayte neighbor who refused to hand him over to Amhara militiamen and instead took him to a hotel in the center of town that was under Ethiopian military control, thinking he would be protected. The Ethiopian military forces, however, in turn marched him and 40 others to the Abadi storage, where he was detained for nearly a month. He described the conditions there:
Ethiopian military forces also captured Tigrayans seeking to flee from other towns and detained them in Abadi storage. Gidey, a 36-year-old laborer, said he fled Bereket, west of Mai Kadra, when he was caught by the ENDF and taken, first, to an empty house, and then to the Abadi warehouse. He described being held there for over a month and interrogated about abuses against Amharas in Mai Kadra. He recalled receiving no food for the first five days of his detention. [ 326 ]
One 27-year-old Tigrayan man said he was held at Abadi warehouse for nearly two months and described accusations by town residents and beatings by guards. `` Women would come covering their faces and identify us saying 'this one killed 20, the other one killed 10, '' he recalled, adding: `` Then we would be beaten. Fanos and militias were the ones beating people. `` [ 327 ]
Terhas, a 28-year-old farmer, went to the Abadi storage after hearing that Tigrayans could gather there for refuge. [ 328 ] When she arrived there, she noticed `` so many Tigrayans in the compound, '' and soon realized it was a prison guarded by Amhara Special Forces and Fano militiamen. She said she was held there for two months. She explained what she witnessed during her detention:
After approximately one month, humanitarian workers arrived at the site, but guards, armed Fano and Amhara Special Forces, refused to allow them in at first. Eventually, they were able to enter, provide `` plumpy nuts '' ( a peanut-based therapeutic food), water trucks, and medications, and screen individuals for consultations, according to witnesses. [ 330 ]
At one point, Terhas continued, the guards began to separate detainees who were mixed or had Amhara spouses:
The detainees of the Abadi warehouse were eventually deported to central Tigray ( see Forced Displacement, Transfers and `` Ethnic Cleansing '' section).
Response of the Amhara Regional Government
The letters that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch sent to a range of federal, regional authorities and to TPLF officials included our findings regarding the events in Mai Kadra and requested information regarding the status of any investigations into the killings in the town. None of the federal agencies and the TPLF officials whom we contacted responded, but we did receive a response from the Amhara Regional Government, which described the events of Mai Kadra as `` dreadful crimes committed by the. TPLF. `` 196 The Amhara authorities claimed that `` members of Samri ( youth groups assigned for the massacre), with the help of the Tigrayan police and militia. slaughtered more than 1,600 innocents '' at Mai Kadra. Their figure, however, does not tally with victim counts found in the Joint EHRC - UNHCR Investigation Report and in the reporting of the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission. The Amhara Regional Government also declined to respond to our specific questions concerning the events of Mai Kadra and was silent regarding reprisal attacks targeting Tigrayan residents of Mai Kadra.
Within a few weeks of the capture of towns in Western Tigray, Amhara security forces and newly appointed authorities began to take various measures to drive Tigrayans from their homes.
As towns and villages in Western Tigray changed hands, Amhara regional officials and security forces facilitated the appointment of new administrators, including local residents, representatives from the Amhara region, and members of the Prosperity Party, to fill local and zonal government roles. [ 332 ] For instance, Col. Demeke Zewde, the leader of the Welkait Identity Committee ( See Background section), became the new head of security for the Western Tigray Zone, and issued orders to the militias. These officials oversaw an administration that subjected Tigrayan residents to discriminatory restrictions, threats, and intimidation that appeared designed to compel them to leave their homes and the region.
Tigrayans interviewed said that new administrators established their authority in local, town hall-style meetings that took place in November and December 2020, within days or weeks of the towns and villages changing hands. Amhara regional officials attended some of these events, appointing the new administrators, and making residents `` elect '' them by a show of hands. [ 333 ] In some meetings, Tigrayans said they were not allowed to vote. [ 334 ] In Humera, Adi Goshu, and May Gaba, the meetings ' organizers and their supporters explicitly discussed removing Tigrayans from the towns. [ 335 ]
After the Ethiopian military passed through tabia ( administrative neighborhood) Irob, a village near Ruwassa, leaving Fano militias in control, a Bahir Dar official arrived and declared to residents that the village belonged to Amhara, and was placed under the administration of the Amhara regional government, according to Andom, a 36-year-old teacher in town:
Andom said that on November 19, the Bahir Dar official appointed a local Amhara man and a local Walqayte man as the new administrators. [ 337 ]
In Adi Goshu, Amhara regional representatives and Fanos oversaw the appointment of local residents to administrative posts during a public meeting on December 10 at the Semeon Migebet restaurant, according to two residents. [ 338 ] Mihretab, a 28-year-old construction worker, in attendance, explained that the voting process excluded Tigrayans:
Security in Adi Goshu came under the authority of Maj. `` Shaleqa '' Dejene Maru, an Amhara Special Forces officer and longstanding ally of Colonel Demeke ( See Background section). [ 340 ] Filimon, a 41-year-old farmer, who attended a meeting that Dejene called on November 14, said: `` Most people had fled the town, so there were few people [ in the meeting ]. He said: 'From now on, there is nothing called Tigray here. This is the land of Gondar, of Amhara. Don't expect the previous administration. This is Amhara from now on. ' '' [ 341 ]
In Adebai, after the Ethiopian federal forces passed through the village in November, `` the Fanos were left in the town, '' said Kahsay, a 50-year-old woman, `` They called a meeting at the church. Many residents participated.... We were afraid. The force said we had to accept the new administration in the town. `` [ 342 ] An Amhara resident who was said to have fought as a soldier for the Derg administration became mayor during that meeting, according to three residents. [ 343 ]
Elsewhere, villages and towns of Western Tigray, including Rawyan, May Gaba, Baeker, and Division, also came under the authority of Walqayte and Amhara individuals, predominantly local residents, many of whom were newly armed. [ 344 ] For the ENDF and forces from the Amhara region, relying on local Amhara and Walqayte residents facilitated control. In May Gaba, Hailemichael said the new Walqayte administrators `` were the ones who knew the Tigrayans in the town.. The armed forces didn't know who was in the town, they needed the information from the Walqayte. `` [ 345 ]
The new authorities collected weapons from local militiamen and, in some places, redistributed them to local allies. [ 346 ] Andom said that in tabia Irob, the `` Bahir Dar official '' at a meeting gave an ultimatum to local Tigrayan militias to lay down their arms. The administration then `` started giving the guns to most of the Walqayte people. `` [ 347 ] In Adebai, the organizers `` said any militia found to have weapons should turn them in, '' during the first town-hall meeting after the town changed hands, recalled Zeray. [ 348 ] Amhara Special Forces in Sheglil also collected weapons from around 20 militias at a meeting. `` When the Fano first came into the city, they didn't have firearms, '' said Aregawi, a 60-year-old farmer. After one week, he said, ASF `` handed the weapons to the Fano who started going door-to-door looting. `` [ 349 ]
Initial public meetings played a crucial role in cementing the power of the new authorities, creating an atmosphere of intimidation for Tigrayan residents. In Adebai, Adi Goshu, Rawyan, May Gaba, and Humera, the authorities indicated an intent to ethnically cleanse the area of Tigrayans. [ 350 ] In May Gaba town, for instance, a local Walqayte resident assumed authority on November 20, according to two residents, and called a meeting that Tigrayans were required to attend. [ 351 ] One of the residents recalled one of the new administrators saying: `` 'You need to leave the town. We are not protecting you; we won't even try. If a single Amhara dies, we will kill 10 Tigrayans. ' '' [ 352 ] A 55-year-old farmer in attendance, recalled that the administrator said that Tigrayans needed `` to leave town the next day, and [ added ]: 'If you are found the next day, we won't protect you from whatever is coming to you. `` [ 353 ] In Adi Goshu, Walqayte residents during the December 10 meeting spoke up to say that `` First the Tigrayans should leave.. [ T ] hey should go out of the area, '' said Mihretab. He added:
The ethnic cleansing campaign was announced in meetings in Humera. [ 355 ] According to five residents, new kebele administrators held a string of public meetings in December 2020. [ 356 ] Aklile, a 30-year-old Tigrayan farmer who lived there, described one such meeting: `` I was trying to attend one of two times but it's uncomfortable, because they don't like us to participate with them in the meeting - especially the Amhara residents. `` [ 357 ] He said that on December 14, he went to a general meeting held in the kebele 1 administrative building: `` They invited the residents - not specifically Amharas or Tigrayan. But the agenda was very dangerous because it was about Tigray and how we can move Tigray people out of the Zone beyond the Tekeze bridge. `` [ 358 ]
The new kebele 1 administrator, he said, made a speech announcing the administration's decision to deport Tigrayans:
Aklile's mother, Askuwal, a 65-year-old woman, was present. She said: `` The topic was about Tigray, Tigrayan people, and it was kind of disparaging for Tigrayans because they said they don't like for Tigrayans to stay in the city. [ 360 ]
A new regime of discriminatory restrictions dramatically impacted living conditions for Tigrayans in West Tigray. `` The [ security forces ] would say 'This is not your land. You don't have any rights here. Don't expect to be treated [ well ], ' '' said Filimon, a 41-year-old farmer from Adi Goshu. `` We were not allowed to live like we used to. `` [ 361 ]
Andom said that the new administrator of tabia Irob told a meeting of residents mid-November: `` 'From now, you are not allowed to speak Tigrinya or Saho [ the language of the Irob people ], and we only speak Amharic. ' '' [ 362 ]
This ban on Tigrinya came into force across Western Tigray in November 2020, according to people from Adebai, Division, Adi Goshu, Rawyan, Baeker, and Humera. [ 363 ] In Division, said Hadgu, `` They just wrote it on placards, like the one at the police station, that we're not allowed to speak Tigrinya. `` [ 364 ] Akbret, a 38-year-old woman from Humera, said:
Interactions with the administration were required to be in Amharic. [ 366 ] Goitom, a 42-year-old farmer from Adi Goshu, recalls that on November 23, the authorities `` declared that everyone had to speak in Amharic to get service. You wouldn't get service if you didn't speak in Amharic. Not everyone knew the language - we were facing challenges. I would try to speak, but with difficulty. `` [ 367 ] Yemane, an 18-year-old male student, said that by late December in Rawyan, `` Everything [ was ] completely changed and replaced by the Amharic language. Even if you have any complaint, or application, or letter, you should write in Amharic. `` [ 368 ]
The ban, said Akbret, extended to `` listening to Tigrinya music. `` [ 369 ]
Those who dared to speak Tigrinya faced reprisals. [ 370 ] In Humera, said Tsegu, a 27-year-old male banker, Tigrayans `` were not able to move within the city since the Amhara Special Forces and Fanos were beating people who speak Tigrinya. `` [ 371 ] Tesfa, a resident of Baeker, said that in his village the new Walqayte militias were the primary enforcers: `` They were pushing people not to speak Tigrinya, even. in church. `` [ 372 ]
Gebremariam, a 14-year-old boy, described how he was stopped at a checkpoint on a road exiting Rawyan. He said:
In some locations, the new authorities selectively distributed new identification cards issued by the Amhara region, and then limited the rights of Tigrayans who were denied these cards. [ 374 ] Atsbaha, a 55-year-old farmer from May Gaba, said:
Two other Tigrayan residents confirmed that the new interim administration was not giving out IDs to Tigrayans. [ 376 ] Dawit, a 50-year-old farmer, lost his ID in May Humer village before the outbreak of the conflict and was denied a new one by the new administrator in the village. He said that [ the new administrator ] told him he was ordered `` from above, '' not to distribute the new cards to Tigrayans. [ 377 ]
The new identification cards were necessary to move through town, access essential services, or raise complaints. `` We kept asking, '' said Dawit. `` But they kept refusing. I couldn't get health treatment, so I had to come to Shire. `` [ 378 ] A 70-year-old farmer similarly was forced to leave Dansha for Shire to seek medical care: `` [ My friend's daughter ] was sick, and I tried to take her to the center in Dansha since the one in Division was destroyed. When they saw her father's name was Tigrayan, they refused service to us, and told us to go to Shire and get treatment there. `` [ 379 ]
Dawit said, `` The old ID said: 'Tigray region, ' but the new ones said the town was [ in the ] Amhara region.. The new ID brought problems for Tigrayans '':
Aklile, a 30-year-old farmer from Humera, echoed these claims. The new ID cards, he said, had `` the name of the administration of Semen [ North ] Gondar, '' adding: `` It's very difficult then, because you can't move without any ID card, so the only way you have is fleeing [ to Sudan ]. Personally, I didn't get the new one because I 'm Tigrayan - it's difficult. `` [ 381 ]
The denial of new forms of identification for Tigrayans facilitated subsequent targeting. `` It was a very good technique for them to easily recognize who is Tigray and who is Amhara, '' said Yemane, from Rawyan. `` They kept asking people for ID cards. and could easily arrest and hold the Tigrayans who didn't have an ID. `` [ 382 ]
At the same time, Amhara forces and Walqayte militias confiscated or destroyed the personal documents of many Tigrayans - an act that would make it difficult for Tigrayans to claim rights and services and ultimately continue to live their lives in the area. [ 383 ] Yonas, a 65-year-old man with disabilities from Division, said that the Amhara Special Forces in Adi Goshu destroyed his documents when they arrested him at his house. They `` saw the papers describing me and how I ended up in Adi Goshu. the papers showed I had injuries from the [ previous ] war. and they burned them, '' he said. `` They burned any paper I had. `` [ 384 ]
Amhara forces would sometimes confiscate identification cards on release from custody and at checkpoints. Leul, a 19-year-old from Adebai, said Amhara Special Forces took his ID, `` and didn't give it back '' when they released him at a checkpoint in the Kafta Sheraro Park. [ 385 ] Fikadu, a 70-year-old farmer from Division, also reported that Amhara Special Forces guarding the checkpoint on the western side of the Tekeze bridge, near Adi Goshu town, also took the ID as he tried to cross the bridge. He said that former soldiers with disabilities who fought against the Derg like himself `` have papers to show that they had injuries from the war. '' The document entitles its holder to receive assistance from a veterans ' association. He added: `` And if anyone wanted to help former freedom fighters with disabilities, [ they ] could recognize us through these papers. '' Now that his documents were gone, he said, he could not claim benefits. [ 386 ]
One woman said that Amhara forces and Walqayte militias destroyed property deeds that would entitle her to lodge a complaint about looted goods, or to reclaim her houses in the future. `` The Amhara militia, Special Forces, and Walqayte '' not only looted Tigrayan property, but also `` took IDs. [ and ] burned our papers, '' explained Berhan, a 58-year-old farmer from Division. `` [ The papers ] were not useful for them, but. would be useful for us.. The ownership papers of our house, property, land; the ones the TPLF gave us to prove that we were former fighters of the party. '' Without IDs, she said, `` we couldn't go to the Dansha to ask about [ our stolen ] property or animals.. We only had a paper. [ issued ] by the interim authority... to cross to Tekeze and Shire. `` [ 387 ]
The new authorities reflected the emergence of a new ethnic hierarchy that imposed restrictions on Tigrayans without a legal basis, underscoring the impunity with which Tigrayans could be mistreated. In Rawyan, the appointment of new authorities came with a series of discriminatory rules that prevented Tigrayans from collecting crops and harvesting the land. Yemane said that the new rules began in November, `` the season for harvesting. '' He continued: `` The administration proclaimed... that the sorghum fields belong to Amharas, so it was legal for them to harvest any of the land that they got. '' The authorities, however, said they wouldn't `` give permission to any Tigrayan farmer that has land there. `` [ 388 ]
Banks that had been closed since before the conflict reopened in Dansha in January, but a 70-year-old pensioner said he was denied service. `` I went to receive my pension. The bank was open, and it was serving other customers. But they didn't give me my pension because I am Tigrayan, '' he said. [ 389 ]
Beginning in late November 2020, the Ethiopian federal forces, Amhara Special Forces and militias including Fanos frequently stopped civilians from crossing the border to Sudan by detaining, robbing, beating, and killing them. Ethiopian soldiers often told people to return home, in an apparent attempt to present a veneer of normalcy. Witnesses said that Amhara forces and militias told Tigrayans to go beyond the Tekeze River towards eastern Tigray.
On November 25, 2020, journalists reporting from the border crossing point of Hamdayet in Sudan, along the Tekeze River, noted that Ethiopian forces were visible in Dima, the last Ethiopian village refugees reached before crossing. [ 390 ] The flow of refugees into Sudan had shrunk from 1,300 to 6,800 per day, between November 10 and 20, to a few hundred per day throughout most of December, down to a few dozen per day after that. [ 391 ]
Many of those fleeing to Sudan said they were blocked by an extensive network of checkpoints controlled by Ethiopian and Amhara forces. Samuel, a 45-year-old farmer from Humera town, said that in November 2020 `` there was no way to leave '' because `` the Fano and Amhara Special Forces were controlling all the ways out '' of the city. [ 392 ] A 56-year-old farmer who was in Adi Goshu until January also tried to go to Sudan: `` We were stopped at the checkpoint by the Amhara Special Forces just on the outskirts of Adi Goshu. They asked for our ID, they saw [ on ] our ID that we were from Division and said we could not go to Sudan or stay in Amhara land. `` [ 393 ]
Many traveling northwards from the areas of Division and Dansha were stopped and turned back at the village of Rawyan, which lies roughly nine kilometers from the border. [ 394 ] Meaza, a 45-year-old woman from Baeker, tried three times to enter Sudan. She recalled encountering Ethiopian soldiers at a checkpoint south of Rawyan in the month of Hidar ( November-December 2020): `` we told them... 'They are killing us, cleansing us! Please! ' They said: 'We don't care, it's not our business. They can kill you, it's up to them. Just go back! ' '' [ 395 ]
By January 2021, Ethiopian federal soldiers were no longer visible in Dima, the last stretch of the journey for Tigrayans fleeing to Sudan. But refugees in Sudan describe groups of Amhara Special Forces and Fanos waiting in ambush to intercept people on the move. Some of the people fleeing were detained on the way or turned back repeatedly by forces in the Dima area.
A group of civilians fleeing Division on April 19, 2021, similarly, encountered Amhara Special Forces in Humera. The Amhara Special Forces, according to one farmer, said: `` 'This is not your place - you need to go to the middle of Tigray. ' '' [ 396 ]
A 24-year-old from Shire said two of his friends were killed when his group came under attack by Amhara forces near Saint Michael church, on the outskirts of Humera and roughly five kilometers east of Dima:
Lewam, a 27-year-old woman from Rawyan, who tried to cross into Sudan on January 20 as part of a group, recounted that around 12 Fano militiamen stopped them by the river. The Fanos, she said, robbed everyone of their belongings, including bags of sesame, and beat the young men. [ 398 ]
A 19-year-old fleeing Adebai town was caught by Fano militia in Dima. He said they detained him there for 24 hours, and then jailed him for seven days in Kafta Humera. [ 399 ] Tesfakiros from Humera town similarly said he was arrested, beaten, robbed and threatened by Fano militia while travelling alone at night on the road near Dima. [ 400 ] He explained how after beating him with the stocks of their Kalashnikov-type assault rifles and debating whether to kill him, Fano militia took the 15,000 birr ( ETB) he had before sending him back to Humera. [ 401 ]
The patrols posed a threat to any Tigrayan in the area, even those who were not seeking to cross the border. Hagos, 20, was one of a small group of cattle keepers, living with their animals out in the fields of Banat, an agricultural area near the border. On January 16, 2021, he and other cattle keepers came across a patrol of Amhara and Walqayte men in a sand-colored camouflage uniform:
Hagos said that his friend, Angesom, died after being shot in the neck. Hagos received medical treatment for his bullet wound in Sudan, but he remains unable to use his hand. [ 402 ]
Many Tigrayans said they faced harassment in their daily lives from forces loyal to the Amhara region, which they believed was aimed at terrorizing Tigrayans to leave the areas. They described how Amhara Special Forces and Fano and Walqayte militias harassed them through a variety of what interviewees called `` techniques '': throwing stones at houses, shooting rifles in the air, and taunting Tigrayans with loudspeakers. These forces also used the opportunity of daily encounters with Tigrayans to beat and threaten them.
The new local authorities in some cases refused to assist Tigrayans who sought help in these cases. [ 403 ] In seven villages and towns, the harassment escalated into ultimatums giving Tigrayans 24- or 72-hours ' notice to leave the area under threat of death. [ 404 ]
Mihret said that a climate of relentless intimidation took over Humera. The forces in town `` would come to your neighborhood with speakers and taunt people to come out of their home and feel fear, '' she said. `` I felt pained hearing this profiling. `` [ 405 ] In tabia Irob, the Fanos and Walqayte who controlled the area `` kept terrifying Tigrayans [ in ] different ways, '' said Andom, a 36-year-old male teacher from the village: `` They come up to your house and throw stones and do what they want. `` [ 406 ]
Meaza, a 45-year-old woman from Baeker, said: `` They keep saying that they want to kill us, it's very difficult to go praying. `` [ 407 ] At night, Tigrayans, remaining at home, listened in fear as militias terrorized their neighborhoods. `` We prayed that the day wouldn't become night, because [ at ] night it's scary, '' said Hadgu, a 24-year-old farmer from Division. `` We heard weapons shot, because Fanos came every night and tried to loot the cattle, so they shoot at people or shoot in the air to terrorize people. `` [ 408 ]
In Humera, Genet, a 30-year-old woman from the town, remembered that on November 29, 2020 - well after the town fell under the control of federal and allied forces, `` The only thing you could hear is weapons ' fire non-stop. They kept shooting and shooting. `` [ 409 ] The harassment and threats continued for months afterwards. Selamawit, who stayed in Humera until May 2021, said, `` Humera is also still in darkness, there is no electricity... It was stressful when the sun would go down. We would hear weapon shots. Gunshots continuously every night. `` [ 410 ]
Tesfa, the 60-year-old farmer from Baeker, said the gunshots at night were just one of many `` techniques to make you feel uncomfortable living there. '' He mentioned other such tactics:
Yemane, an 18-year-old student from Rawyan, was one of five youths - including his brother and their friends - abused by Fano militiamen on January 16. He reported that they encountered a Fano group, before the curfew went into effect, who stopped, robbed, and severely beat them, telling them: `` Why don't you go to Shire [ a town in Central Tigray ]? '' When one of the young men started running, the Fanos shot at him, but missed. [ 411 ]
In Division, Tigrayan residents felt as though they had no recourse for abuses. Tsige, a 20-year-old female student, said that, since `` the administration [ of Division was ] controlled by Fano, [. ] we couldn't complain to anyone '' about what was happening in the village. [ 412 ] Teame, a 74-year-old farmer from the village, said: `` It's normal for any Walqayte or Amhara to come to your house and beat you and loot your house. There was no accountability. `` [ 413 ] In Division, Tigrayan residents had hoped that appointing local Amharas as administrators would improve their relations with non-Tigrayan residents and forces deployed in the village, said Abel, a 72-year-old farmer:
The impunity militias enjoyed from local authorities created an environment in which even ordinary residents felt empowered to threaten their Tigrayan neighbors. [ 415 ] A 37-year-old sewa ( beer) seller in May Humer village near May Gaba received threats from Walqyate residents while at work. She explained: `` Walqayte would come to my house and would say, 'Why are you in our land? We expect you to leave. `` [ 416 ]
Tsega, a 24-year-old woman from tabia Irob, recalled: `` People were beaten every day, every time. '' She recalled being assaulted by the operator of the mill where she went to mill her sorghum:
Akbret, a 38-year-old woman from Humera, said that her landlord's son threatened her with death. `` I didn't have any issues '' with her landlord, she said:
`` They were calling my little girl, who is 4, a junta, '' recalled a 33-year-old from Baeker, adding:
Between November and March, in at least 11 towns and villages, Tigrayan households received written ultimatums with deadlines to leave from Amhara security forces and militias, often alongside death threats.
Amhara Special Forces and Fano militias distributed pamphlets when they first entered Ruwassa on November 6-7, 2020. Solomon, a 46-year-old farmer, said he saw `` papers that said Tigrayans need to leave the town immediately.. They were thrown everywhere, so when we woke up in the morning, you would see it on your door, or on the way to church, everywhere. `` [ 420 ] Andom, from tabia Irob ( Ruwassa), said that during the Ethiopian calendar month of Hidar ( November - December 2020) typed leaflets were handed out, which read: `` Every Tigrayan who lives here should leave the area; if not we will massacre the same [ way ] as Mai Kadra. '' The pamphlet said it came from `` Fano Committee '' and `` Asmelash ( Welkait Identity) committee. `` [ 421 ]
Kidane, a 23-year-old university graduate, saw Walqaytes repeatedly distribute such typed pamphlets in Adi Goshu. The papers read: `` Tigrayans need to leave tomorrow, '' `` Tigrayans need to leave, or they will be killed. '' `` They would have a deadline, '' he said. [ 422 ]
In Baeker, the pamphlets were handwritten, according to a 33-year-old woman who said they were left: `` in churches and outside Tigrayan homes. The messages read: 'If you don't leave in 15 days, there will be another Mai Kadra in Baeker. We didn't know who posted these papers or put them. ' '' [ 423 ] Meaza, a 45-year-old woman, recalled: `` Every night they keep saying 'Tigrayans, go out we will kill you. Go out. Go out of the area, ' and sending this. paper. '' She added: `` Every single Tigrayan and Tigrayan house received this paper. We burned three papers before. This was the fourth one. And we finally realized that they would have no mercy on us.. And finally, we decided [ to leave ]. `` [ 424 ]
In Humera, the ultimatums warning Tigrayans to leave the area were issued on placards signed by `` the Administration of Welkait Tegede, '' said Abrahaley, a 28-year-old cashier from the town. [ 425 ] Notices calling for Tigrayans to leave were also posted on the Abune Aregawi church in Mai Kadra, and orally repeated to her by Fano militias, according to a 56-year-old woman. [ 426 ] A student, 21, said between February and March in Division, Fanos and Amhara Special Forces distributed pamphlets calling for Tigrayans to leave and also urged them to head towards Central Tigray. [ 427 ]
It seemed they were trying to kill us slowly. What did we have to wait for? There was nothing to live for and survive. So why would we stay?
Deliberate actions by security forces and local authorities deprived Tigrayan communities of their means of survival. Federal and allied forces looted Tigrayan homes, businesses, livestock, and crops as they took over towns and villages. Amhara Special Forces, Fano militias, and Eritrean military forces - when they were present - carried out the bulk of the looting, but groups in civilian clothes, some armed, others not, later joined them. [ 428 ] The pillage began after the capture of towns and villages and continued long afterwards, as security forces, particularly Fano and other militias targeted harvests and livestock. [ 429 ] Newly appointed authorities and the security forces who did not partake in the looting did little to intervene. Local authorities also denied Tigrayans the ability to plough farmland and impeded their access to food assistance and other services. [ 430 ] The consequences of their efforts to deprive Tigrayans of critical sources for survival and their livelihood were far-reaching, and ultimately effective. As Tigrayan communities faced extreme deprivation and continued threats, many began to flee Western Tigray to Central Tigray in greater numbers beginning in January 2021, with some managing to seek refuge in Sudan. [ 431 ]
Tigrayans who returned home after the shelling of their towns and villages found that their valuables, furniture, and other property were gone. Tesfa, a 60-old-farmer who returned to Baeker in mid-November 2020, said that he found his house empty: `` Carts, beds, everything was looted.... I couldn't find any mattress or bed.... We just slept on the floor. `` [ 432 ]
Two interviewees said they saw security force members loot homes and businesses, selectively targeting Tigrayan property. [ 433 ] Berihu returned to his small shop and house in Division when Walqayte militia beat him and his friends before looting the premises. [ 434 ] He recalled:
Looters carried the goods away in different ways. In tabia Irob ( Ruwassa), Fano militia used ambulances to move the goods stolen from Tigrayan homes, according to Andom, a 36-year-old teacher. [ 436 ] Atsbaha, a bank guard, 55, from May Gaba, saw Amhara Special Forces and Fano militia loot the bank in mid-November and said the effort seemed well organized. Amhara Special Forces first stole `` items they could carry in their hands, '' he said. `` The Fano [ then ] came and took items they needed to transport with their cars. '' [ 437 ]
Security forces also pillaged public and communal institutions, such as schools, courts, churches, and health centers. [ 438 ] In Division, the pillage of equipment and takeover of the hospital `` left nothing for the residents, '' according to Fikadu. [ 439 ] Fano militia in Humera, said Tesfakiros, looted computers, laboratories, and chairs from the secondary school and preparatory school, and pillaged a warehouse belonging to Guna trading company. He continued: `` There were so many sesame bags there that were looted by different trucks.... The Fanos and soldiers were assisting them. I heard them when they spoke to each other about it.... Everything moved to both Amhara and Eritrea. `` [ 440 ]
Security forces looted four of Division's churches, including Abune Aregawi, St. Gabriel, St. Mary, and St. Michael's church, according to Berihu, who said:
The pattern of pillage and looting of Tigrayan property continued after towns and villages came firmly under the control of new authorities and security forces. In Adebai, `` the Fanos started looting '' after the Ethiopian federal forces left, said Hailay, a 30-year-old animal trader from Adebai. `` They were looking for gold, they were even picking out the clothes they liked and didn't like. `` [ 442 ] In Humera, ASF and Fanos plundered homes and businesses. [ 443 ] `` They were even taking curtains from houses, '' said a 33-year-old civil servant in the town. [ 444 ] Residents from Adi Goshu, Ruwassa, May Deli, Bereket, and Korarit described comparable mass looting in these locations. [ 445 ]
Earlier destruction and looting left Tigrayans in some towns without shelter. `` They even took the corrugated iron roofs, '' said a 73-year-old farmer from May Deli, adding: `` they took... my property and burned down my daughter's house. `` [ 446 ] In Division and Mai Kadra, security forces and non-Tigrayan residents also took the iron roofs and sheets that remained of Tigrayan homes, according to three residents who later fled. [ 447 ] Terefe said he resorted to living in an `` open field. under the trees because of the lack of shelter, '' after fleeing May Lemin village. [ 448 ]
On December 16, 2020, one witness recorded the damage of property as he drove south between Dansha and May Deli towns. At one point in the video, a man can be seen bent over picking up debris left from the foundations of a house with a cart nearby. Shortly after, a man has parked his donkey cart while he is walking through the destroyed remnants of houses. The entire video films approximately 1.7 kilometers of the road and approximately 16 destroyed houses are seen on one side of the road. High resolution satellite imagery from November 18, 2020, shows the roofs visible at the start of the video still intact. By December 14, high resolution satellite imagery shows the roofs are no longer there.
Numerous Tigrayans with whom we spoke, including farmers across the Western Zone, said that the new interim authorities-imposed restrictions on harvests. In addition, Fano militias and other security forces, and in some cases non-Tigrayan farmers, systematically looted their crops and livestock. [ 449 ]
The pillage of harvests and livestock often marked the first of a series of actions by security forces in Western Tigray that left Tigrayan communities without access to and the means to secure food, medicine, or other sources of livelihood. The timing of the attacks - during harvest season ( November-December) - and its duration - continuing long after the takeover of towns - exacerbated food insecurity for Tigrayan residents.
In November 2020, Tigrayan farmers returning home harvest they had been forced to leave behind had been looted. [ 450 ] In mid-November, Aregawi, a relatively well-off farmer and beekeeper in Sheglil, spent 10 days in detention, where he was tortured. After his release, he discovered that all his harvest, livestock, and personal property had been looted. `` They didn't even leave a cup to drink water from, '' he said. `` They stole 50 quintals ( 5000 kilograms) of my honey, 70 quintals ( 7000 kilograms) of millet, 20 quintals ( 2000 kilograms) of sesame, 150,000 ETB ( about US $ 3,000), and 150 oxen. `` [ 451 ] With nothing left, Aregawi felt he had no choice but to flee to Sudan.
In Adi Goshu, one farmer said that the looting of sorghum and the harvest caused `` extreme hunger. `` [ 452 ] By June 2021, the situation felt desperate for communities in May Woini, a small village near Adi Goshu. Neguse explained: `` Most of the time we spend at home, because we can't move... We don't have food and other freedom. We want to move to any other place that is safe and accessible for food. There's no food. This has made us stressed. Things are critical. I have no words to explain it. '' [ 453 ]
Berihu, a 17-year-old boy in Division, said: `` There was not enough food to be honest and no good food, either. Because mostly we just ate the sorghum and all the mills were looted, so most of the time women would grind the sorghum with the stone and it's very difficult. `` [ 454 ] In Baeker, Semira said that for food, her family ate `` only water with salt and scrambled injera [ flat bread ]. `` [ 455 ] One 28-year-old ended up crossing the Tekeze barefoot and hungry. `` We didn't have shoes because we sold them to get money and to get food, '' he explained. [ 456 ]
Four Tigrayans in other villages separately provided similar accounts of militias and security forces waiting for farmers to collect or harvest the sorghum before stealing their crops. [ 457 ] `` They completely looted the land, '' explained Hadgu, a farmer from Division. `` We cut the sorghum together with other residents. Then, after we cut the sorghum, Fano [ militiamen ] came up to us and forced us to leave and took the cut sorghum and processed it themselves. `` [ 458 ] In farmland surrounding Mai Kadra, Rawyan, and Adi Goshu, militias were free to harvest the land themselves. [ 459 ] In early December, as Asmeret, 70, hid with her family, she could see Amhara militia and laborers come to a farmland near Mai Kadra and loot the harvest:
Witnesses in Division, Humera, Adebai, and Adi Goshu similarly saw Amhara security forces taking pillaged goods in the direction of the Amhara region. [ 461 ]
Security forces also systematically stole vast numbers of cattle and other livestock, another crucial source of food and cash income for small and large-scale farmers in Western Tigray. [ 462 ] Tigrayan farmers from nine different villages described widespread theft of harvest and livestock, which formed part of a campaign to deprive Tigrayan communities of their livelihoods and drive them from their homes. [ 463 ]
Amhara forces also prevented Tigrayans from harvesting their land or grazing their livestock using threats and, in some cases, violence, according to numerous Tigrayan residents from eight different villages and towns. [ 464 ] `` I was in my farmland with a young herder when the Fano and ASF came. They pointed a gun at me, and they beat me, too, '' said Abel, from Dansha. `` They gave me an option: 'Do you want your life or your animals? ' I chose my life, and they took my animals.... I was left with one camel and donkey and cart. `` [ 465 ] Fano militia also looted all 20 cattle belonging to the family of a 38-year-old farmer from Sheglil in the first week after the capture of the village. `` They were taken in front of my eyes. The cattle lived with us, in our compound.... The armed Fano threatened us.. We don't have any other possessions, as we are poor... they just took our cattle... They accused us of being Woyane thieves. `` [ 466 ]
Halefom said he was with 40 of his cows on the edge of Bereket village on November 25, 2020, when Fano, Amhara Liyu, and Saluq ordered him to lead his cows away. `` I refused, and they started to beat me with sticks and axe. They hit me with an axe across my right eye and hit me on the head. `` [ 467 ] Halefom lost his eye due to the attack. In May Woini village, near Adi Goshu, attempts by Amhara militiamen to steal large numbers of cattle and livestock similarly turned violent on January 29, according to two witnesses, when militia opened fire at farmers, killing around 30 people and wounding others. One 40-year-old farmer said:
In late December 2020, over a dozen Amhara militia, and in this instance Eritrean soldiers, threatened a group of 13 Tigrayans harvesting their crop in fields near Adebai, before shooting them and killing 12, said two witnesses. Hayelom, a 54-year-old farmer, described what happened:
Fitsum, who had left the group to collect the water from the river, witnessed the aftermath of the attack. He recalled: `` I saw they were walking towards the farm and after about 15 minutes I heard shooting. I stayed hidden until the soldiers went away.... I went back to the farm and saw the 13 killed, near each other in a line, some facing up, some facing down. I thought they were all dead. `` [ 470 ]
As threats and widespread theft of crops and livestock recurred, some Tigrayan farmers resorted to selling the animals they still had to gather the cash they needed to survive or leave. [ 471 ] `` People were coming from Armachiho and Tegede [ in Amhara region ] when they heard the news that Tigrayans were selling property and animals for cheap, '' said a 70-year-old farmer in Division. He continued:
The new authorities were complicit in the theft of Tigrayan property from Western Tigray. [ 473 ] Two Tigrayan farmers said they had attempted to reclaim stolen livestock and harvest but saw no credible avenues to do so because they considered that the new security forces and administrations in the Zone were involved in the theft. [ 474 ] Ayele, a 55-year-old farmer from Ruwassa, said she saw a pamphlet in town signed by Fano militia that claimed Tigrayan cattle as their own and called for Tigrayans to leave: `` We took that paper to the Ethiopian military commander. He said, 'This is the least that can happen to you. ' After this, the Fanos took all the cattle and camel I had. `` [ 475 ]
In other cases, new authorities at administrative offices issued permission papers for pillaged property, livestock, and harvests to be transported out of the western Zone. [ 476 ] A 38-year-old resident of Humera, observed such a process in early February 2021: `` Amhara Special Forces were looting cereals stored in a warehouse, such as Teklai's store. The Ethiopian military restricted the people from taking the items out of the town when they were there. [ After they left ], interim officials were giving permits for people to take out the looted items, mainly sesame from Tigrayan farmers. '' [ 477 ]
According to Neguse, an Adi Goshu administrator issued permission papers for the transport of pillaged goods out of the town:
One man saw the operations of such a checkpoint in Sanja, north of Gondar, in the Amhara region: `` They will stop looted trucks, to check if there are no drugs, but they know all is looted from [ Western Tigray ].... Some of the drivers are prevented by the ENDF if they don't have right papers. '' [ 479 ]
Aid workers and donor government officials described the initial humanitarian response in Tigray, particularly from the UN, as slow and disorganized. [ 480 ] They attributed this partly to the prevailing lack of security, but also to the overall orientation of international aid organizations in the region toward economic development instead of humanitarian assistance - a stance that affected their relationship to the government, their staffing, and their programming. [ 481 ] In particular, aid organizations operating in the region tended to follow the government's lead in framing their humanitarian response. [ 482 ] Such an approach was much less appropriate during an armed conflict, when an arms-length relationship with the government was needed. One humanitarian worker explained the shift that was needed for aid agencies to operate effectively in Tigray:
As aid agencies struggled to scale up their response in Tigray to meet urgent needs in the first months of the conflict, the three main actors in charge of food distribution in Ethiopia - the federal government's National Disaster Risk Management Commission ( NDRMC), the United States Agency for International Development ( USAID) -funded Joint Emergency Operation Program ( JEOP), and the UN's World Food Programme ( WFP) - divided up operational coverage. [ 484 ] This arrangement left NDRMC in charge of food distribution in Western Tigray, where on occasion it had previously provided assistance. [ 485 ]
The international humanitarian coverage and operational presence in Western Tigray has remained small throughout the conflict, limiting independent monitoring of the humanitarian and human rights situation and neglecting the protection role that a strong humanitarian presence can provide. [ 486 ] In May 2021, the Emergency Directors Group ( EDG), tasked by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee with advising on humanitarian coordination, and including representatives of operational UN agencies and some NGOs, discussed the possibility of establishing a base in Western Tigray. However, this did not materialize, leaving only a limited presence of non-food-focused international nongovernmental organizations ( INGOs) in the Zone. [ 487 ]
As in other parts of Tigray, aid organizations operating in Western Tigray, or those attempting to carry out assessments, faced bureaucratic restrictions, harassment, and obstruction by armed forces and groups. [ 488 ]
In January 2021, as aid agencies sought to negotiate and request clearances at local levels to enter the Tigray region, Amhara security forces operating in Western Tigray denied permission to aid agencies to access the Zone, even though clearances had been issued by the federal government. [ 489 ] Aid agencies also had to seek authorization from multiple different actors in place in Western Tigray to get access, which further impeded the humanitarian response. As one aid worker said:
Government control over food distributions in Western Tigray took place at time when Tigrayan communities, which had seen their crops and livestock pillaged, faced restrictions on movement and farming and were as a result becoming reliant on food aid for their survival. As a 67-year-old farmer from Division explained: `` Every crop we had was taken from the farm. not only the crops, but the animals too... This was the main reason we had nothing to eat. Everything we had was taken. `` [ 491 ]
Humanitarian assessments as early as December 2020 depicted a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Western Tigray. For instance, a joint government-humanitarian partner assessment mission to Dansha and Humera towns between December 20 and 30 determined that `` [ n ] early half the population visited are living in vulnerable conditions, with important gaps of food and nutrition as harvests did not take place. `` [ 492 ]
Though there was also limited public information available on food distributions and on who had access to food assistance in Western Tigray between January and March 2021-at the height of Tigrayans ' forcible displacement from the area ( see Forced Displacements, Transfers, and `` Ethnic Cleansing '' Section). The little information that was available, however, highlighted a dire humanitarian and human rights situation.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch obtained unreported humanitarian assessments of Western Tigray carried out in January 2021 that described violence, looting, and forced displacement of Tigrayan communities from the area, and an `` absence of food, healthcare, clean water, and money. `` [ 493 ]
A UN inter-agency assessment was carried out in Western Tigray for the first time in early March 2021. [ 494 ] Amhara regional authorities prevented the team from travelling to Division, citing security concerns. The March assessment nonetheless described an alarming food situation in the areas that were assessed, including Dansha, Adi Remets, Ketema Negus, Baeker, and Adi Goshu. It further noted the absence of `` reliable data on. the assistance received to date, such as information on beneficiaries covered, not covered and the estimated number of those still in need. '' [ 495 ]
The lack of independent monitoring meant aid agencies and donors had no real understanding of how much aid was in fact distributed. As one donor country official put it:
Many people reportedly received no food. In June 2021, unidentified authorities reported to an inter-agency assessment mission that no food aid had in fact been distributed to Western Tigray since February 2021. [ 497 ] An August 2021 OCHA report cited a round of food distributions by NDRMC to populations in Mai Kadra, Humera, and Dansha woredas, saying that the `` government's round 2 distribution in Western Zone [ was ] on hold due to the fluid security situation. `` [ 498 ]
Timeline of Publicly Reported Food Distributions in Tigray in 2020 and 2021
Tigrayan residents described how newly appointed authorities and security forces in Western Tigray restricted, and at times outright blocked, their access to the critical aid that was available. [ 504 ] For instance, a driver in Rawyan said people in the town were given aid only once in the beginning of the conflict:
Tsige mentioned a one-time distribution in Dansha town between January and February 2021, but the aid was refused to Tigrayan residents in nearby settlements of Division, including in Ambagala village where she was from:
A March 31 UNOCHA report corroborated reports of denials of assistance to `` people of Tigrayan origin in areas close to Dansha by local authorities and armed groups. and that groups in the area den [ ied ] partners ' access to populations stranded in areas close to the Tekeze river bordering North-western Tigray in Korarit woreda. `` [ 507 ]
Distributions reportedly arrived in Adebai on at least two occasions when Tigrayans did not receive it, first around the end of March, according to Leul who `` saw the aid coming into town. `` [ 508 ] The new authorities, including Adebai town's new mayor, were responsible for controlling the distribution and registering beneficiaries. [ 509 ] Leul and other Tigrayans who were displaced in Adebai did not receive any assistance despite being registered. He said:
The denial of assistance also applied to Tigrayan residents of Adebai town. A 17-year-old resident of Adebai said that in May `` aid came one time to Adebai, they gave it to old people, but not all old people. After that the aid came... it had the Ethiopian flag on it, so I think it was from the government aid... It was distributed to the administrators. and was always given to Amharas and not Tigrayans in the town. `` [ 512 ]
A farmer in Adi Goshu recalled that a distribution occurred in late May but was denied to Tigrayan residents. `` It was a government distribution; they didn't stay long. '' He added:
For Tigrayans in Western Tigray, the lack of food, along with limited access to health care was especially acute for people at particular risk - the displaced, women with sexual and reproductive health needs, survivors of sexual violence, children, and older people. The lack of access to local medical facilities and the threats from Fano militias made it difficult, for example, for Mihretab, who was in Adi Goshu, to help his 8-month-old child who fell ill. `` There was a lack of hospital treatment because the hospital... was moved to Humera, '' he said. `` They moved all the [ services ] there... It's very difficult to go to Humera for the hospital because most Tigrayans don't have money. `` [ 514 ] He said a pharmacist finally helped him get treatment: `` We were hiding from the Fanos. But after they found out that the pharmacist secretly [ gave ] medicine to Tigrayan people, I saw him with gauze on his face and heard they beat him [ for giving help to Tigrayans ]. ''
In Division, Ethiopian military and Amhara Special Forces and militia also took part in the occupation and looting of the Meareg hospital, affecting the ability of residents to receive care. `` Officials from the new zonal administration locked the medicine store of the hospital, '' said Takele, a staff member who fled from the hospital. `` So, patients weren't able to get medicine. `` [ 515 ]
Mobile health clinics, where they were available, served as the only way for many Tigrayan residents to receive care. Said Neguse from May Woini village: `` I never heard or saw humanitarian aid coming here. We only know when MSF comes, we get treatment. For Tigrayans it is difficult and dangerous... to [ travel ] to a hospital. If I want to get treatment, forces may arrest me and ask for money. I just generally can not enter the village [ where the health center is ]. `` [ 516 ]
Cut off from their sources of livelihood, essential services, health care, and food, many Tigrayans felt they had no option but to flee Western Tigray.
For Andom, from Division, the lack of food assistance for Tigrayans in January drove Tigrayans like himself to leave. He said:
Robel, a 40-year-old construction worker, hid in Rawyan, in fear of being targeted for abuse. He arrived in Sudan in late December. `` I was extremely hungry, starving, almost dying, '' he said. `` There was one guy with me who kept supporting me. And after we crossed the river [ into Sudan ], I came to the hospital, and they gave me glucose. `` [ 518 ] Gebreselassie, a 67-year-old pensioner in Division, also relied on support from neighbors at first, but that amount was insufficient - as mostly everyone was in a similar state. The lack of food and support forced him to leave. `` We were really starving, '' he said. `` We had no stable life, we were [ previously ] supported by government programs, but after the war broke out, no government [ was ] supporting us, no international organization. It was hard for us. `` [ 519 ]
Displaced from their homes, left without shelter, and with little to eat, Tigrayans sought refuge in places of worship. In Adebai, dozens of displaced people stayed at the Abune Aregawi church. A 45-year-old farmer displaced from Mai Kadra said the displaced people survived by drinking water from the church's well and eating food that residents donated, and some harvested food on nearby land. [ 520 ] `` Life in Adebai was extremely difficult, '' said Teame, a 74-year-old man displaced in the town. `` We begged for food to survive. `` [ 521 ]
There was little work Tigrayans could do to earn a living. Semira, a 21-year-old woman who remained in Rawyan for around five months, said everything had changed: `` There are no. facilities for taking classes, getting jobs to make money and help your family, follow your daily life in different ways - financially, economically. `` [ 522 ] `` There was no banking, no telephones, our cattle were looted. There was no work, '' said Andom in the village tabia Irob, providing a list of the limited options Tigrayans had to survive. `` The biggest thing was the lack of food; we didn't have any food to eat. `` [ 523 ] Tesfa from Baeker said: `` If they looted everything you have, you can't survive. If your cattle, your property, your bed, your food [ were stolen ], it's difficult to live, and they know what they're doing. `` [ 524 ]
The compound effect of these hardships on lives and families was devastating. `` We felt broken. We saw human indignity, suffering. We experienced displacement from our own land and own homes, own family, and from our own people, '' said Asmeret. `` We can't do anything but pray. We had the warmest family; now we have no proper hygiene, home, electricity, no children. `` [ 525 ]
Federal military and Amhara forces, following the capture and control of towns in Western Tigray Zone, carried out both targeted and mass arrests. Those apprehended included current and former government officials, wealthy individuals, and suspected Tigrayan fighters, militiamen, and supporters. Those held must be treated in accordance with international human rights law and appropriately charged or released. From November 2020 until at least December 2021, the authorities increasingly carried out mass, arbitrary arrests, and detentions of a broad spectrum of the Tigrayan population, often on an apparently discriminatory basis, who were not implicated in criminal offenses. [ 526 ]
In Mai Kadra, federal police transferred over a dozen detainees detained in Abadi, a makeshift detention site hosting thousands of Tigrayan to Adi Arkay in the Amhara region, without access to a court before their eventual transfer to Addis Ababa. [ 527 ] Twenty-two are currently facing charges under the country's terrorism law and criminal code. [ 528 ] Thousands, however, were kept in the detention Abadi warehouse for nearly two months, until some were expelled from the town at the end of December 2020.
In other towns across Western Tigray Zone, a mix of security forces, in particular Amhara Special Police, militia, and Fano, and in some cases Ethiopian federal forces, arrested and detained arbitrarily without charge thousands of Tigrayans in police stations, prisons, military camps, and other unofficial sites, including food storage facilities and schools. [ 529 ] Men were the primary targets for arrest, although those in custody included women. [ 530 ] Former detainees described people as old as 80 in detention, and six interviewees described children detained with adults, including a child as young as one. [ 531 ]
Detention Facilities in Western Tigray
Facilities in which people were detained were controlled by different security forces, including:
Ethiopian National Defense Forces ( ENDF):
Amhara Special Forces and Militias, including Fano militias:
Fano and Amhara Militias:
Tigrayans described raids and searches in neighborhoods and towns and villages across Western Tigray in which Amhara special police, militiamen, and Fanos rounded up Tigrayan men and boys after identification checks. [ 532 ] Few said they were given reasons for their arrest. `` They came to my house, it was the Ethiopian defense forces, Amhara Special Forces, and Fanos. They simply told us we were 'needed, ' '' said one construction worker from Humera. `` They were taking all the male members of the family; I was the only male in the house. My neighbor was taken. Other males in the neighborhood were also led to the penitentiary in the town. We were there for three months. `` [ 533 ]
In Bereket town, Fano militiamen rounded up Tigrayan men around November 24, according to Yirgalem, a 46-year-old farmer arrested in the town: `` There was no jail in Bereket, [ so ] they gathered all the prisoners from Western Tigray. '' Together with others, he was taken to Humera, where he was held for months. [ 534 ]
At times security forces relied on accusations by local residents and even newly arrived residents as the basis for carrying out arrests. [ 535 ] `` They asked for my ID, they checked it, and they asked if I was from Adwa. There was a woman with them, and she accused me of being a member of parliament in the town and accused me of being TPLF, '' said one shopkeeper. `` I 've lived in Humera for 49 years. I hadn't seen her before. I didn't know who she was. '' [ 536 ] In one town, at least five Tigrayans who fled during the initial offensive were detained during house-to-house searches when they returned home. [ 537 ] A farmer from Korarit returned home on January 21, and days later Fano militias arrested him. They took him to the prison in Adi Remets town and beat him with a stick. `` Many people were arrested with me for similar reasons, '' he said. `` There were old men [ detained ] too, and they told them: You are Tigrayans; you should cross the Tekeze River. `` [ 538 ]
The security forces apprehended others while they were out pursuing regular activities or while attempting to leave town in search of safety. [ 539 ] One farmer said Fano militiamen stopped him from attempting to plough his land in Humera, threatened `` to deport him from the land, '' and called Amhara special police who arrested and detained him in the Humera prison for three months. [ 540 ] On November 22, 2020, Ethiopian federal soldiers at a checkpoint near a petrol station south of Rawyan stopped Berihu, a 17-year-old student trying to seek protection in Sudan with 17 other people and detained them overnight in a storage space. He recalled:
Tigrayans, held in custody across Western Tigray, suffered physical abuse from Ethiopian security forces. Many former detainees described regular beatings, physical and psychological torture, as well as ill-treatment. [ 546 ] Three former detainees, including one held by federal forces at a military camp in Baeker, reported being forced into a painful stress position- where arms and feet are tied together behind the back- for prolonged periods, a torture method that has previously been documented in detention centers in Ethiopia. [ 547 ]
According to Aregawi, a 60-year-old beekeeper from Sheglil, on November 17, a week after federal and allied forces took control of the village of Sheglil, around six Amhara Special Forces militiamen entered his home, shouting that the land belonged to Amhara. They took his money and looted his property, he said, before detaining him with his family and a 48-year-old man at a school in the village. The ASF held him there for over a week, repeatedly torturing him.
Aregawi said:
Security forces frequently punched, kicked, or slapped detainees, or beat them with implements such as sticks, rifle butts, and heavy metal objects, often resulting in serious injuries. [ 549 ] `` They took anyone they wanted from the cell, '' said Kibrom, a contractor held in Humera prison for three months: `` They would take you to the field and you would be beaten. I was beaten three times while I was there. `` [ 550 ] Kibrom witnessed an older man - a retired militiaman whom he said was not involved in the war, being `` beaten every day. His left hand is now paralyzed. ''
A 74-year-old man who was interrogated for a week by Ethiopian federal forces in the Baeker military camp recalled similar abuse:
A 37-year-old shopkeeper described a brutal, almost daily schedule of beatings during his three-month detention at the police station in Humera:
Three former detainees held in different detention sites in Humera, including one survivor of rape, provided accounts of sexual violence in detention. [ 553 ] A 32-year-old woman in Humera was arrested by an ASF officer in November, and detained, first at a police station before being taken to two different prisons in the town. While detained, she said guards raped her and other female detainees. She said she was raped by the same three police guards every night until her release over two months later:
Two former detainees held in Geter police heard a woman crying in the next cell. Said one of the men: `` [ She ] was crying the whole night. When the sun came up, we asked her what happened. [ She told us ] it was a Walqayte officer, and the Fano and Amhara Special Force guards. They raped her. `` [ 555 ]
Detainees were subject to psychological torture, ill-treatment, humiliation, and verbal abuse. [ 556 ] Teame recalled that while in Humera jail, guards would `` cock their weapons and say: 'Bring us people to kill, we want to kill them. ' '' Their actions, Teame explained, made you `` not know when you 'll die or be killed. `` [ 557 ] A 28-year-old driver said that a mixed group of Amhara security forces detained him in a room of a house in Adi Goshu town and beat him for four days. `` They took me to a hole that looks like a grave and asked me if I had any last words, '' he said. `` They would say, 'We will shoot you and bury you in this grave. ' '' [ 558 ]
Witnesses and former detainees described enforced disappearances and apparent extrajudicial executions of detainees, particularly former local officials and militia members, and hearing the sounds of gunshots at night. [ 559 ] A man identifying as Walqayte, but who was a Tigrayan militia member at the onset of the conflict, said Ethiopian soldiers arrested him in Humera on November 12, 2020, alongside 17 Tigrayan militia members from the broader Humera area. They were detained at the Humera police station, which was controlled by the ASF, for months. He said that on January 7, 2021, the other detainees were taken out of their cells and killed: `` One of the people who was guarding the prison told me: 'It's because you're Amhara that you are spared. You would have been killed with them. ' '' [ 560 ]
`` They kept shooting guns to terrorize us, '' said Kindihafti, a female detainee held in a makeshift detention site in Mai Kadra for over a month. `` I think bullets are cheap for them. `` [ 561 ] Two former detainees said they saw individuals taken away by guards and not returning. `` They took people one by one or a few at a time and we never heard what became of them, '' said Measho, who was held in Humera prison. [ 562 ] Haftu, who was captured by federal soldiers along with friends and held in a military camp near Rawyan in early March 2021, said: `` They took one of my friends, Berihu Wereda. They accused him of being a militia. He wasn't different from the rest of us. They wanted to scare us. I have no idea where he is until now. '' [ 563 ]
Mass detentions, killings, and enforced disappearances of detainees in Humera, Adebai, and Rawyan towns increased in July 2021, coinciding with the appearance of dozens of bodies floating downstream into Sudan on the Tekeze River, and escalating again in November 2021. ( See Renewed Roundups and Extrajudicial Executions July -December 2021 section.)
Two detainees described guards showing them dead bodies as a method of intimidation. [ 564 ] `` The [ guards ] would take you out of jail at night and take you to the [ bodies ], '' said a man held in May Gaba for a month, who saw the bodies of three youths killed near a school in town. `` I saw the bodies out [ when ] I was arrested and still saw the remains [ after my release ] when I left town. `` [ 565 ]
Three detainees held in different detention sites described security forces also subjecting detainees to discriminatory measures and restrictions, including forbidding speaking in Tigrinya, exacerbating the detainees ' sense of powerlessness and humiliation. [ See Discriminatory Restrictions section. ] `` If any of us tried to speak in Tigrinya, [ the guards ] would say you can't. 'This is the language of birds. This is not for humans, ' '' said one man held in the Geter police station, referring to an insult common during the Derg period and imperial era. `` Those of us who could speak in Amharic would try to communicate with the guards, but some of us couldn't, so we would keep silent, '' he continued. `` It's hard to explain what I felt. `` [ 566 ]
A 45-year-old farmer who said he was detained first in a jail, and then a prison in Humera town over a three-month period, recalled that guards forced detainees and their visiting family members to converse in Amharic, a language that older Tigrayans, and those from rural areas, did not speak or understand well, if at all:
Former detainees who had been held in sites in five towns across Western Tigray frequently spoke of the poor conditions of detention and being subjected to forms of ill-treatment that endangered their health and safety. A shopkeeper in Adi Remets reported that he was locked for three days in a toilet. [ 568 ] Rooms where detainees were held in formal and informal sites in Adebai, Mai Kadra, and Humera were small. [ 569 ] One man, held in Humera jail for three months, described sleeping in a roughly 4-by-5-meter cell with around 60 people. [ 570 ] Another man held in the same site said the lack of sufficient space forced detainees to `` sleep on one another. `` [ 571 ] A former detainee held in Adebai said he was kept with around 30 other people in a small shed made of iron sheets. [ 572 ]
Other sites were also significantly overcrowded. [ 573 ] `` At one point the number arrested reached 60 people. It was [ a ] really hot and small room. Everyone suffered. There was suffocation, '' said one detainee from May Gaba. [ 574 ] Two people held in Mai Kadra and Adi Goshu said they were kept in the open. `` There was no ceiling, we were kept in a compound. So, when it rained, [ 575 ] and it continued for three weeks, the rain fell on us, '' said a farmer held in Adi Goshu. [ 576 ]
Authorities in both formal and makeshift detention sites limited or deprived detainees of food and water. [ 577 ] `` We were not given any water during the first few days of jail, '' said a 30-year-old farmer held in Geter police station. `` It was so hot - you can imagine how hot it was - and how much we needed water. `` [ 578 ] `` They didn't give us [ enough ] water, '' recalled 73-year-old farmer held at the same jail, who said each prisoner received two liters every three days. [ 579 ]
Food was also denied at the Geter police station. The 73-old-continued: `` We were not given any food.... [ P ] eople from the outside would try to help and bring food, but the Amhara Special Forces and Fano would threaten them not to bring food again. `` [ 580 ] Former detainees held in Mai Kadra, Adi Goshu, Bereket, and Adi Remets recalled similar deprivations and denials by guards. [ 581 ]
Detainees survived off the food that those held close to home would receive from family members or friends on the rare occasion they could visit. [ 582 ] Other relatives and friends would pass food to Walqayte and Amhara neighbors and friends to deliver to their loved ones. [ 583 ]
Because security forces had stolen the property, livestock, and harvests of Tigrayans and denied them services, families had little to share with their detained relatives. [ See Depriving Tigrayans of Means of Survival section. ] In light of the actions and statements of the authorities, the denial of food, water, and medical treatment to detainees appeared to be a form of punishing the Tigrayan population in Western Tigray. `` The [ Fano and ASF guards ] kept telling us that Tigrayans deserve to be starved and starved to death, '' said a 73-year-old farmer from Central. [ 584 ]
Two prisoners, held in Humera, resorted to selling what little items they had with them, including clothing, to stay alive. [ 585 ] `` It was one bread for four people, one liter for three days. It was a hard time to spend a week. I sold the jeans I had. I bought them for 700 ETB ( $ 17), but I sold them for 30 ETB ( $ 0.71) for food. We sold everything we could to survive, '' said a 19-year-old from Adebai. [ 586 ]
Three former Tigrayan detainees held in Geter police station said that non-Tigrayans, including Amhara and Walqayte residents appeared to receive better treatment. [ 587 ] `` They [ Walqayte and Amhara detainees ] would ask for food and get it, but we had no food for 3 to 4 days. When we were closer to death, [ the guards ] would give us food so we wouldn't die. They would say: You don't deserve any food. Death is nothing for you, we want you to suffer before you die, '' said a 28-year-old held in Humera jail. [ 588 ]
In at least three towns, the forces in control of the detention sites denied or limited prisoners ' access to medical treatment. [ 589 ] `` 'You expect us to give you medicine when we want you to die? ' '' heard a 55-year-old former detainee in May Gaba who fell ill and asked the guards for medication. [ 590 ] Terhas, who was held in a food warehouse in Mai Kadra for two months until December 2020, said there were insufficient medications to treat injuries, medical conditions, or for the clinical management of rape. `` There was one woman who told me she was raped by six people before she was detained in Baeker, '' she said. `` She was sick: when she ate any food or water, she would throw up. She was bleeding from her vagina. There wasn't enough medicine: only for [ few ] diseases, malaria, diarrhea. And there was a shortage of medications,... equipment for the woman to get treatment. `` [ 591 ]
Former detainees believed some people died in custody as a result of the deprivation of food and the denial of medical treatment. `` Six people died from hunger, '' said one man held in Geter police station. [ 592 ] Two former detainees said that deaths increased in Humera prison at the end of February 2021, pushing security forces to free some detainees. [ 593 ] One man said he was released from Humera prison at the end of Yekatit ( February 2021) `` when they saw that people were dying for not receiving medical treatment. '' He said:
The releases were sporadic and, in several cases, made conditional on extortionate payments to security forces. [ 595 ] Yirgalem said his group of detainees was freed after [ they paid a total of paid ] 15,000 ETB ( $ 375): `` There was a guy from the diaspora who was in jail with us. He paid half of the price and we paid the rest by selling clothes and cellphones. `` [ 596 ] Detainees from poor backgrounds or who were out of touch with their families risked longer detention. [ 597 ] `` Sometimes the police would negotiate, saying, 'If you have this money, we can release you, ' '' recalled a 45-year-old farmer held in Humera prison. [ 598 ] `` But we had no money, '' he said. `` I know some people who paid 20,000 ETB ( $ 500) to be released, others 105,000 ETB ( $ 2625). ''
Finally, some detainees were held for longer periods, at times spanning several months before their arranged expulsion from detention sites in Western Tigray to the Tekeze bridge [ see Organized Forced Expulsions section ]. For the Tigrayan communities who remained, the pattern of arbitrary detentions and expulsion solidified an atmosphere of oppression that prompted many to leave out of fear of being ethnically targeted for arrest and forcibly transferred. [ see Coerced Departures section. ]
Amhara forces and allied militias killed Tigrayans, at times in revenge attacks or when Tigrayans tried to protect their belongings from looting. [ 599 ] At other times, the killings seemed to have little apparent motive beyond spreading terror. This violence played a key role in motivating many Tigrayans to flee.
Meaza, a 45-year-old woman farmer from Baeker, said that on February 24, 2021, Amharic-speaking gunmen in uniform detained her brother-in-law Beyene while the family was taking refuge in Adebai, and subsequently killed him. She believed that Beyene, a retired soldier and the father of two Tigrayan fighters, was killed as a result of a denunciation:
Elsewhere, Amhara forces appeared to have deliberately shot Tigrayans at random. Berihu, a 17-year-old boy from Division, said that on December 28, 2020, he saw Amhara Special Forces kill a man on the street:
Berihu said that the brother was taken to the Maereg Hospital, but it is not known whether he survived.
Hadera, a daily laborer, said he saw seven men he knew, between the ages of 30 and 70, being taken away near a church in Bereket on December 8, 2020. [ 602 ]. He said four Fanos in green uniform tied the men's hands behind their backs and loaded the men onto the back of a pickup truck. `` They took them to the western edge of Bereket and shot them, '' he said. `` People saw the bodies and brought information to the town, and the following morning I and other villagers went to bury them and saw that these were the same... people [ I saw ] being picked up the previous day. `` [ 603 ] Some had been shot and one had been beheaded, he recounted.
Three people, who were in Adebai in January 2021, said that Amhara forces killed eight people in a sorghum field during the harvest that month. [ 604 ] `` I left Adebai because they started to kill civilians, '' said a 55-year-old farmer from May Lemin ( Ruwassa). `` My wife was very worried that they might kill me. Addisu Werede, Degu Mebrat, Gebre Giorgis were among the eight killed. Some of them are from Adebai and [ others ] from May Lemin. `` [ 605 ] In a separate incident, Leul, 19, said that Amhara Special Forces on February 11, 2021, killed `` two women. accused of being wives of militia members. '' He said their bodies were left out for two days until Eritrean soldiers, who were present in Adebai town, `` ordered the women to be buried. `` [ 606 ]
Nigisti, an 18-year-old student, returned to her hometown of Dansha in the first days of December, after fleeing the massacre by Eritrean forces in Axum in late November, only to find the remains of those killed. [ 607 ] She said:
Amhara Security Forces and militias in Humera prevented Tigrayans from burying their dead. `` They were killing Tigrayans every day. They would kill one or two or three people day, '' recalled a 67-year-old woman from the town:
Bodies were found on the side of the road at a place called Mazoria, a rural area 10 to 15 kilometers away from Mai Kadra around December 2020, according to Nigisti. She found them as she was walking from Baeker towards Dansha: `` I saw dead people around there, maybe 20 to 25. '' Horrified by the scene, she added: `` There were a lot of bodies.... All of them were burned. ''
On January 17, 2021, Fano militia and local Walqayte and Amhara residents rounded up several dozen Tigrayan men who were residents of Adi Goshu and detained them. Amhara Special Forces then took about 60 of them to the Tekeze River crossing towards Northwestern Tigray that same day and extrajudicially executed them, leaving at least four survivors. [ 610 ] At the time, Maj. Dejene Maru was the commanding Amhara Special Force officer in Adi Goshu. The massacre precipitated a mass exodus of Tigrayans from Adi-Goshu and proved to be a turning point in the ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans from the area ( See Forced Displacements, Transfers, and `` Ethnic Cleansing '' section).
Witnesses and survivors said that the massacre appeared to be a revenge attack after Amhara Special Forces suffered heavy losses during fighting with Tigrayan forces near the river the previous night. [ 611 ]
Researchers interviewed 17 witnesses of the mass arrest in Adi Goshu and three survivors of the killings at the Tekeze River, as well as several people who saw the bodies of the victims left unburied for months near the bridge. [ 612 ]
On January 16, local authorities held a mass rally in Adi Goshu to celebrate the takeover of Western Tigray. [ 613 ] According to a 22-year-old from Adi Goshu, the demonstrators were chanting: `` We returned our land, [ the border ] is up to Tekeze. `` [ 614 ] The crowd held a procession to celebrate. [ 615 ]
The situation dramatically changed the following morning. Amhara Special Forces suffered heavy losses in the area after clashing with Tigrayan fighters near the Tekeze River. News of the Amhara battle losses soon reached Adi Goshu. [ 616 ] Amhara Special Forces, Walqayte and Amhara residents, as well as werkegnas ( artisanal gold miners), then went around town, attacking Tigrayans, beating them on the streets and in their houses as they rounded them up, robbed them, and brought them to various detention sites. A 32-year-old farmer, a member of the Kunama ethnic minority in Tigray, said the forces and goldminers specifically targeted Tigrayans in town. `` After the battle they came back saying 'Let the Tigrayans leave, ' as they beat and arrested people, '' he said. `` I was hiding at home, they didn't target Kunamas. '' [ 617 ] One 19-year-old who ran to Saint Michael church for protection said that he witnessed Amhara Special Forces kill five people near the church. [ 618 ]
The assailants also attacked Tigrayan residents with sharp objects. `` It was horrific, '' explained a 41-year-old farmer who was detained. `` They would grab Tigrayans and beat them as they were taken.... They were even using sharp objects, like an axe. I was one of the people beaten that day. How can I say [ complain that ] I was beaten, when I saw people hit with an axe? `` [ 619 ]
The Fano militiamen, ASF, and gold miners collected Tigrayans at `` Habesha '' police station. [ 620 ] `` The civilians were taking other civilians to the police station, chanting 'Arrest the Tigrayans! Arrest Tigrayans by your house! Bring them to police station! ' '' said Mesfin, a 57-year-old-man from Adi Goshu, who reported that he was taken from his home by a militiaman, beaten, and taken to the police station mid-afternoon, where he was held with around 40 other people. [ 621 ] Leul, a 56-year-old-man from Adi Goshu, said that he was also among those arrested that day by civilians, including gold miners, who carried weapons, as well as by members of the Amhara Special Forces. `` The gold miners. were the ones identifying Tigrayans and giving them up to the Amhara [ Special Forces ], '' he said. `` I wasn't held in the police station. because the jail was full. `` [ 622 ] He recounted his detention in a compound near the police station alongside 60 other people. Some Tigrayans, he said, were robbed of their valuables, such as mobile phones, money, or food, either during arrest or while in detention.
The Amhara militiamen and the ASF together loaded one group of around 60 men into trucks, while the other group of detainees spent the night in custody and were released the next day. [ 623 ] Witnesses and survivors said the Amhara Special Forces drove the men in the trucks to the Tekeze River, around 35 kilometers away, led them to a field, and then shot them.
Mesfin, alongside his son and son-in-law, was among the detainees. [ 624 ] Mihretab, who had been detained by Walqayte residents and taken to the police station, was also put in one of the trucks. He said:
One of the survivors said the Amhara Special Forces told them to disembark:
Other survivors said the Amhara forces shot them on the eastern side of the river. Mihretab said: `` There were over 40 soldiers, armed men, they wore the same uniform. They took us. somewhere around the bridge, a kind of field, but we were on the ground.... We were facing a hill. `` [ 627 ] Mesfin said:
Someone in command issued instructions, recalled a 23-year-old survivor: `` They told us to hold hands with each other.... The commander came and counted to 10: 'Make groups of 10 '... and told the soldiers to count.. They made layers, made [ people ] line up, 10 per row. `` [ 629 ] Mihretab said that the forces beat them `` until they got [ them ] to the area, '' and made them line up `` in two columns, face to back. `` [ 630 ] Mesfin remembered that at this moment, he `` had given up. We all knew we were going to be killed. `` [ 631 ]
The soldiers began to shoot. `` First, there are two soldiers behind, and in front of the line, there are another two, to check out who has died, '' said Kinfe. `` They sprayed us with bullets, and we all fell into the ditch below. '' [ 632 ] Mesfin recalled: `` They shot all of us, me included.. The ones from behind started firing. I was shot in my right shoulder and right hand. Bodies were falling one after the other. I don't remember what else happened after that. `` [ 633 ]
Mihretab said that he survived by falling over as the bullets started flying: `` I fell immediately because I was in the front. '' He added:
Mihretab said he began praying. He believed that the killers left him alone because they thought he was dead. Kinfe, the 74-year-old man, said he faced another round of shooting:
The forces left rapidly, said the victims who survived the massacre. The survivors found help among sympathetic local residents. Mesfin recalled:
A 16-year-old, resident of Adi Goshu, said he lost his two cousins in the massacre: `` We heard the news of the deaths from one of the survivors from the killing. `` [ 637 ] Worku, who reported that he was detained but not loaded onto the trucks, said: `` I was lucky enough not to be in the vehicle to taken to the Tekeze.. But my son was in the group of people taken to Tekeze. He survived it, though. `` [ 638 ]
According to multiple witnesses, the bodies of the victims were visible for months, lying on the side of the highway east of the bridge. [ 639 ] A 20-year-old from Adi Goshu passed by the bridge a week after the killing. He mentioned the victims he was able to identify:
Two months later, the remains could still be seen at the location. A 57-year-old man from Mai Lemin who crossed the Tekeze bridge on March 11, 2021, said:
Researchers were not able to confirm if subsequent killings took place at the same site, or if dead bodies from the January 17 massacre were buried or had been moved at the time of writing.
Just as in mid-November, when they had prevented residents from burying their dead ( see Initial Military Offensives Section), the Amhara Special Forces and the local militias prohibited the families from mourning the victims of the massacre, several people said. [ 642 ] A 30-year-old woman whose father was among those killed only mourned her loss when she arrived in Shire. She said:
Frehiwot, whose father was killed in the massacre said: `` They took the right to bury, they took their lives... they took away their right to rest. `` [ 644 ]
A 26-year-old man who lost his father in the massacre said:
As a family member of one of those killed, he felt increased threats, eventually prompting him to leave the town. `` The Walqayte would say: 'His father is dead. Why is he here? They will want revenge, and he may kill us. Let us get rid of them. ' '' [ 646 ]
I was with other women; four men raped me.. They insulted me and they urinated on my head. They said you and your race are a foul, toilet-smelling race and should not be on our land. Then was left on my own and stranded for four days.
Widespread sexual violence has been one of the defining features of the Tigray conflict, including in Western Tigray. [ 647 ] Gang rape involving physical and verbal abuse, abduction and sexual slavery has been a key element of the ethnic cleansing campaign.
Nineteen Tigrayan survivors of rape described being assaulted by federal and allied forces in Western Tigray, including members of the Amhara Special Forces, Fano militias, the Ethiopian federal forces. Survivors said they were gang raped in their homes or while in security force custody or during prolonged captivity ( see cases of rape in detention in Detentions Section above). [ 648 ] Some survivors said they were raped after being detained while fleeing their home areas. Interviewees described being repeatedly verbally abused and denigrated for their ethnicity during the rapes and some were specifically told to leave their home areas during the attacks.
Blen, a 48-year-old woman from Dansha town, said that on February 7, 2021, Fano gunmen wearing old Ethiopian army uniforms robbed her of her money and took her from her house to rape her:
Jamila, a 27-year-old owner in Dansha, said that in early November, a half-dozen Fano militiamen carrying out neighborhood searches targeting Tigrayans entered her shop while she was working, and raped her in front of her children. She said:
Samhal, 30, tried to flee Baeker toward central Tigray in early November, when Amhara militias apprehended her:
In some cases, soldiers targeted women and girls for rape and abduction to pressure them to reveal the whereabouts of their male relatives. Leul said that in May in Adebai, seven women, including the wives and daughters of Tigrayan militiamen were `` raped by Amhara Special Forces and Eritrean troops. `` [ 652 ]
Some survivors interviewed were raped while they were held in captivity, in one case for more than a month.
Fasika, a 28-year-old mother of two from Humera, recalls that she was attempting to cross the border to Sudan in mid-December with her two daughters, ages 3 and 5, when ten Amhara militia members apprehended her and forcibly took her to a house nearby. She said:
A farmer in Adi Goshu tried to assist at least three women who had been taken by Amhara militias while trying to cross the Tekeze River to central Tigray. The militiamen raped the women and held them in captivity. The farmer said:
Etsegenet, a 16-year-old from Dansha, said that Fano militia members gang raped her for three days in Adebai town, where she and her family had fled, seeking safety. `` My mother sent me to buy injera on the street, '' she recalled, when three men armed with sticks, machetes, and rifles approached. Two wore uniforms, while one was in civilian clothes. She said:
Rape and the threat of rape were an important driver in forcing Tigrayan women, girls, and their families to flee Western Tigray. Selamawit left Humera after learning of security forces raping a woman and her two daughters whom she knew. She explained: `` The main reason I left was after this one incident.. Six people raped them, the mother, with her two daughters. I thought this could happen to me next. A lot of women were raped in the area. So, I didn't grab anything, I just left. `` [ 656 ]
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have both reported on the limited avenues for survivors of rape and other sexual violence to protection, health, livelihood, and psychosocial support and care in Tigray. [ 657 ] This is a result of conflict-related destruction and looting of healthcare services, the flight of medical providers, and in most of Tigray the government's effective siege on the region that has hobbled humanitarian efforts to provide survivors with management of post-rape care and the rehabilitation of the health sector. [ 658 ]
The outbreak of conflict in the Tigray region on November 4, 2020, triggered widespread displacement from Tigray, with more than 65,000 people fleeing to neighboring Sudan and more than two million displaced within Tigray. [ 659 ] The number of Tigrayans who sought refuge in Sudan slowed by December. However, by late February and the first two weeks of March 2021, tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans began arriving in Central Tigray's larger towns. [ 660 ] Local authorities and relief organizations reported large population influxes from Tigray's Western Zone, with about 1,500 reaching Shire every day. By late February, 45,000 new arrivals had been registered in Shire. [ 661 ]
The precise number of Tigrayans displaced from Western Tigray remains unclear. [ 662 ] In April 2021, federally appointed interim officials said that 700,000 people had left Western Tigray to other parts of the region. [ 663 ] A preliminary assessment carried out by the federally appointed interim regional administration of Tigray found that 723,000 internally displaced persons ( IDPs) from Western Tigray had been registered in other parts of Tigray by June 2021. [ 664 ] Humanitarian groups supporting displaced communities in larger towns in Central Tigray, such as Shire, estimated that many of the 460,000 IDPs were driven out from Western Tigray. [ 665 ] A July household level survey carried out by the International Organization for Migration in seven Tigray urban areas, including Shire found that 53% of surveyed IDPs originated from Western Tigray. [ 666 ] As of January 2022, 51,207 Ethiopian refugees had been registered by the UN Refugee Agency ( UNHCR) in eastern Sudan, with many reportedly displaced from Western Tigray. [ 667 ]
On March 10, 2021, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Biden administration had seen credible reports of `` acts of ethnic cleansing '' in Western Tigray. [ 668 ] Tigray's interim regional authorities, appointed by the Abiy government, acknowledged the forcible displacement of civilians from Western Tigray and called for them to end. [ 669 ] However, both Amhara regional authorities and the federal government denied that ethnic cleansing had taken place ( See Government Response Section).
The systematic nature and scale of the expulsions belies government claims. Humanitarian groups in Sheraro and Shire observed the timing and pattern of arrivals and found that those forcibly displaced arrived from similar areas around the same three-week time period. [ 670 ] Witness accounts of the escalating expulsions beginning in January 2021 show that the federal and regional authorities were on many occasions involved in, and often facilitated, the expulsion of communities from Western Tigray. These forcible expulsions continued in early November 2021, when Amhara regional forces and militias rounded up Tigrayans in Adebai, Humera, and Rawyan towns, and expelled older people, women, and children towards Central Tigray. [ 671 ]
The continued abuses by security forces against Tigrayan civilians, the transportation provided to Tigrayans including those in custody by interim administrators and Amhara regional authorities out of the region, and the repeated public threats against the Tigrayan population by regional officials and federal and regional security forces, [ 672 ] indicate a planned and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing of the Western Tigray region by the new Amhara authorities.
The authorities used various administrative methods to forcibly expel Tigrayans from Western Tigray.
In Ketema Negus town, one witness said that local kebeles issued permission or release papers to facilitate the flight to the Tekeze River of Tigrayans across towns and villages. He saw a wereda administrator issue oral instructions to an employee, explaining: `` We can not write that they shall pass checkpoints up to Shire! We can write up to the Tekeze! For Tigrayans who want to go back to Tigray, we write 'up to the Tekeze '. and that's all... After that, we don't have authority, it's none of our business. '' [ 673 ]
As restrictions in movement were in place in many parts of the Western Zone, local authorities at times issued papers allowing Tigrayans to cross the Tekeze River to Central Tigray. The authorities would at times say that papers were not in order and demand the payment of additional fees. For example, two people from Adi Goshu and Kafta Humera said Amhara Special Forces commanders and soldiers charged them for the signatures and the stamps that would allow them to cross. `` We paid ETB 8,000 ETB ( $ 200) [ first ] to leave, and when we arrived in Tekeze, the paper for passage was not signed by the commander of the special force in the Zone, '' explained one 28-year-old man. `` We had to take the paper to the commander in Adi Goshu, and he signed it, but we paid ETB 2,000 ( $ 50) before he signed the paper, and then we crossed the Tekeze. `` [ 674 ]
At times the new interim authorities also provided the means of departure, arranging transport for Tigrayan residents to leave town, several witnesses said. [ 675 ] The new mayor of Adi Remets organized the transportation of Tigrayan residents to the Tekeze, recalled a 60-year-old resident: `` He. made the decision. They called everyone, all Tigrayans who wanted to leave town, to the police station. An Isuzu FSR truck came, and we were sent [ across the ] Tekeze River to the Dedebit side. '' [ 676 ] Sindayo in Adebai said interim authorities similarly arranged transport and made Tigrayans finance their own expulsion: `` On the day I came, about seven big buses of Tigrayans left to the Tekeze. We took the buses, paying 1,000 ETB ( $ 25) per person. `` [ 677 ] Mihret in Humera had a similar experience: `` There were 10 minibuses.... The forces kept telling us to leave the Zone to go to the middle of Tigray. There was transport available, owned by Amhara drivers and arranged by the region. '' [ 678 ]
Amhara security forces and militias also accompanied and guarded the buses of expelled Tigrayans across checkpoints to the Tekeze bridge and demanded payment for the `` service. `` [ 679 ] A 66-year-old farmer who left on March 20 explained the expulsion process in Aurora town: `` We came with an FSR truck with 50 people. That didn't include the children, who didn't pay. We paid 18,000 ETB ( $ 450) to the Tekeze. We had one night [ to spend ] before crossing the Tekeze bridge. We paid 2,400 ETB ( $ 60) to the Amhara Special Police for guarding us there.... There were about 8 FSR [ trucks ] from Aurora. '' [ 680 ]
Amhara security forces began a new wave of forced expulsions in November and December 2021. Amhara militias rounded up Tigrayans in Adebai, Humera, and Rawyan towns, loaded them onto trucks and expelled older people, young children, and women east, towards the Tekeze River, according to 15 witnesses and family members of those expelled. [ 681 ] One teenaged boy who witnessed the roundups in Rawyan town and managed to escape in early December said that Fano militia started rounding up Tigrayans in the town. `` They identified the young and teenagers, they registered us, and let us go, '' he said. `` The older people. they beat them. even my parents were beaten. they took their money, mobiles, anything they had.and they transported them in trucks. `` [ 682 ]
A 55-year-old farmer from Adebai described how he tried to hide when the roundups began. He said his daughters, niece, and other Tigrayans were taken by Fano militia on November 23:
A UN assessment on December 15, 2021, estimated that 29,000 residents from Western Tigray were internally displaced to the Northwestern Zone in that wave of forced expulsions. [ 684 ]
Amhara interim authorities began expulsions from places of detention in Western Tigray in December 2020, efforts that would escalate in February 2021. The coordination and timing of bus movements, as well as the striking similarity of the witness accounts across several locations, all indicate a centrally planned operation that contributed to the ethnic cleansing campaign in Western Tigray. Security forces first gathered Tigrayan detainees and placed them on FSR Isuzu trucks or convoys of buses, which were then often escorted by Amhara Special Forces or militias, and at times Ethiopian federal forces or police, during the trip to the Tekeze bridge.
By the end of December 2020 in Mai Kadra, security forces and newly appointed authorities forcibly transferred hundreds, perhaps thousands, of those detained in the Abadi warehouse east to the Tekeze River in what may have been one of the first efforts to drive Tigrayans out of the area. [ 685 ] One 70-year-old man detained for nearly two months said: `` they told us we will be released.... I thought they were releasing us to go home, but... they loaded us on five big buses... that the [ Ethiopian military ] escorted to the Tekeze. `` [ 686 ]
Terhas, 28, whose Walqayte husband helped to get her released from the warehouse, described witnessing at least two rounds of organized forced transfers while she was still detained: `` The administration transferred some people before I was released, around December 25, 2020. Six big trucks came up to the warehouse; they put them on trucks and took them to the Tekeze. I was released on December 30, 2020, and I heard [ from people transferred ] that they transported another seven trucks to Tekeze on January 1, 2021. [ 687 ]
Yonas, who was detained in Adi Goshu, described a similar process whereby security forces and militias escorted him and other detainees towards the Tekeze after 21 days of detention: `` We were transported by a minibus owned by a civilian, and we had to pay him 200 ETB each, but still, the Amhara Special Forces and Walqayte and Fano militia were with us until we crossed [ the river ], and told us: 'Don't think of coming back to Amhara land! ' and 'If you come back you are deciding on your life. ' '' [ 688 ]
In Adi Remets town, two former detainees said Amhara officials oversaw the transportation of Tigrayans to the Tekeze. [ 689 ] Tadele, a shopkeeper recalled that non-Tigrayan residents approached the vehicle that he was on, and argued with administrators, including some from the Amhara regional administration in Bahir Dar, about their decision to transfer the Tigrayans, suggesting that they be killed instead. He said:
In May Gaba, a former traffic police officer had become an administrator in the town, according to two former residents. [ 691 ] Tesfalem, 43, who was held in custody, said the administrator arranged for the Welkait sugar factory car to transport detainees, including himself, to the Tekeze, escorted by security forces. He said:
Two residents and 11 detainees held in Humera described their transfer from detention sites starting in February 2021. [ 693 ] A 38-year-old man received a warning from a friend, who was a local militia member, of what appeared to be planned, escalating arrests in mid-February: `` He informed me not to move around from February 17-22, so that I [ wouldn't ] be arrested. They were arresting Tigrayans during those days. `` [ 694 ]
`` I was arrested on February 16, '' said Gebrekristos, who was swept up in the roundup:
Two other detainees gave similar accounts in which the authorities used the Humera penitentiary as a collection point to gather detainees and facilitate their forced transfer to central Tigray. Those expelled ranged from detainees held in custody for a few days, to others who had already been held for several months. Samuel, a 45-year-old farmer, was expelled after three months in detention. [ 696 ] `` In the last seven days of imprisonment, we were taken to the penitentiary, the main one in Humera, '' he said. `` We stayed there for one week before we were released. There were 250 of us, but after beating and torturing us, they released 180 [ including me ]. '' He continued:
Two other detainees described the same encounter. `` First, they told us that we're going to leave... There was one FSR [ truck ] and they put 180 of us on it. The rest remained in the prison. We were not chained or handcuffed. But they were armed, '' said Godofa, a bajaj driver who was detained. `` They took us to the Tekeze bridge. When we reach there, they started to argue whether they are going to kill us or not. Some were saying we were not ordered to kill them. '' [ 698 ]
The Amhara Special Forces guarding the bridge crossing threatened some Tigrayan who had been forcibly transferred not to return. Yonas, who was released in May from the Adi Goshu jail also received such a warning by the forces that escorted him and his family to the Tekeze: `` They told us that 'From now [ on ] and from here, go and do whatever you want, but don't come back to Adi Goshu. Don't think of crossing the Tekeze and coming to our land. ' '' [ 699 ]
Once dropped off, the forcibly removed Tigrayans would walk across the Tekeze bridge where they encountered Eritrean forces on the other side. [ 700 ] The soldiers allowed the Tigrayans to continue their travel on foot or in minibuses to towns in central Tigray where they hoped to find assistance.
Those whom the militias or police did not forcibly remove, but instead fled Western Tigray in the months that followed the capture of towns in November 2020, gave varying accounts of the reasons that ultimately led them to leave. But all referred to the dramatic deterioration of their living conditions as a result of the persecution Tigrayans faced, citing frequent killings, beatings, rapes, looting, destruction of their homes and property, forced transfers, and arbitrary arrests and detention. They also pointed to profiling, threats, harassment, and restrictions on the Tigrinya language. These abuses and the lack of support from the administration made Tigrayans experience overwhelming fear for their lives.
Efforts by security forces and interim authorities to remove Tigrayans generally increased throughout Western Tigray in the first months of 2021. Tsige, a 20-year-old student from Division, said that in January, `` the Amharas and Walqayte started to push us to leave the city, they pushed us to go away.. They said this area belongs to Amhara and Walqyate and we had to leave. `` [ 701 ] In tabia Irob, a pamphlet had circulated during Tehassas ( December - January 2021) threatening Tigrayans with death if they didn't leave the area within two weeks. [ 702 ] Tsega, a 24-year-old woman from the village, said that after that, a meeting took place in the tabia administrative building `` about how we can leave from this area safely.... Walqayte and Amharas were also there.. Also, Ethiopian soldiers participated. `` [ 703 ] She described the exchanges:
The episode, Tsega said, accelerated the exodus of Tigrayans: `` Most of the people had fled. But they didn't kill [ Tigrayans ] after two weeks. It was a terrifying technique. '' [ 705 ]
Specific incidents that convinced Tigrayans that things would not improve or that a threat to them was imminent triggered departures. A 46-year-old farmer in Ruwassa said he left after Fano militia twice attempted to kill him:
A 37-year-old beer seller from May Humer, near May Gaba, said she and other people in the village left mid-May after witnessing a militiaman beat up a relative of hers, a priest: `` After seeing this and other incidents, I thought: What are we expecting? Are we waiting [ for them ] to kill all of us? Why don't we cross the Tekeze while we [ can ] still have our life? `` [ 707 ]
In places such as Adi Goshuor Mai Kadra, where massacres took place, the mass killings caused Tigrayans to flee in large numbers. In Adi Remets, accounts of the mass killings of Amharas in Mai Kadra escalated the threats on Tigrayans in the town. Alula, a 60-year-old resident, heard an announcement on November 12, 2020, that `` Tigrayans would be killed. '' He recalled:
In Adi Goshu, the massacre by the Tekeze River on January 17, 2021, marked a clear turning point for Tigrayan survivors and residents, who faced increased harassment and, like Tigrayans elsewhere across Western Tigray, ultimatums to leave. [ 709 ]
On the morning of January 18, the day after the massacre, the local authorities publicly announced that Tigrayans should leave. Frehiwot, a 30-year-old woman who said she lost her father the previous day, recalled an announcement: `` [ It was ] declared. in churches. that every Tigrayan needed to leave within 72 hours or they [ the authorities ] would be taking action. `` [ 710 ]
As a result of the ultimatum, said Frehiwot, `` Every Tigrayan was terrified, selling what was in our hands, for cheap prices. Even if the item cost 1000 ETB ( $ 25), we sold [ it ] for 200 ETB ( $ 5) to save ourselves. `` [ 711 ] As the news of the massacre spread, `` We were worried about our safety, '' said Frehiwot. Worku, a 56-year-old farmer from the town, recalls: `` We had to sell every property in our house so that we can cross the Tekeze. We sold it for a very cheap price. We sold all the items we had. `` [ 712 ]
The authorities in Adi Goshu, however, soon changed their tone. Maj. Dejene Maru, the commander of Amhara Special Forces in Adi Goshu, called and led a meeting in the kebele 02 administrative office, also referred to as `` Kunama hall. `` [ 713 ]
Kidane, a 23-year-old student whose father was also among those killed, was present at the meeting. He explained how non-Tigrayans in attendance argued: `` 'Most Tigrayans need to leave! We need to deport them. This is not their land. They need to leave immediately. ' '' [ 714 ]
Interim administrators however, said it was a `` mistake to tell [ us ] to leave in three days, '' recalled a 56-year-old Tigrayan farmer. [ 715 ] `` Every Tigrayan was told to be in the meeting. We all attended, '' Frehiwot recalled, `` [ but ] they changed their mind after the deadline passed. `` [ 716 ] Worku, who was in attendance, said they nevertheless followed up with a warning:
Kahsay said that Major Dejene told Tigrayan residents during the meeting: `` If any Tigrayan wishes to stay here, you can. If you want to leave, we will escort you. `` [ 718 ] Alongside other surviving detainees from the roundup, Worku was released then.
After the meeting, `` they started to go around using a bajaj [ motor rickshaw ]... telling us not to leave, '' said Natanael, a 48-year-old farmer, but `` we were all ready to leave and [ had ] already sold our property so that we can use the money [ for ] transport. `` [ 719 ] The threat of collective punishment and the fresh awareness of the massacre meant that people found little solace in knowing the ultimatum had been revoked. `` So many Tigrayans crossed to Shire '' at that time, said Worku. [ 720 ] Frehiwot recalls: `` So many of us had sold our items, the bridge and way to Shire was open. We didn't want to stay in Adi Goshu, [ in case the ] TDF would attack the ENDF or Amhara Special Forces. `` [ 721 ]
However, the harassment and threats continued relentlessly against those who remained. A 56-year-old farmer said that even though Tigrayans were told they could stay, the assurances did not last long. `` The people from the interim administration - they were Amharas.. They said their hands were tied. The [ ASF and Fano ] started doing the evil things as before. They were beating old people, taking away property, killing people. `` [ 722 ]
One farmer stayed for just a few days but added that fear of further killings drove their flight on February 10. [ 723 ] More ultimatums emerged. Kidane, who had stayed, said that in the month after the massacre:
The campaign succeeded in pressuring many Tigrayans to leave. `` Our numbers [ in Adi Goshu ] were decreasing by the day, '' said Goitom, a 42-year-old farmer. [ 725 ] After `` the Tekeze incident happened, the Tigrayans left in big numbers, '' he said. `` There was nothing to live for. We were not part of the town; it was taken over by other people. We were not allowed to live. And so, I came to Shire. `` [ 726 ]
Elsewhere in Western Tigray, people left under pressure after they had exhausted all coping mechanisms. The military and regional forces that controlled Western Tigray had committed mass killings and other grave abuses against Tigrayans with impunity, creating a situation in which the mere rumor of a government crackdown was enough to trigger flight.
Tesfakiros, a 30-year-old shopkeeper from Humera, recalled: `` Every single minute you feel fear - are they gon na kill me? Am I going to die today? Am I going to go to jail? `` [ 727 ] When asked how her life changed after her village, tabia Irob, changed hands, Tsega, 24, said: `` If you want to buy groceries, you're scared a lot, and you can't [ sense ] whether you will be going be back home or be killed. Your brain is running about these things. It makes you feel [ like you're ] losing control. `` [ 728 ] Living in Adebai, where `` there is killing, hunger, detentions, releases, '' said Gezae, a 45-year-old male farmer who was displaced to the village, `` makes you feel hopeless. `` [ 729 ] Being banned from speaking Tigrinya, Hadgu, a 24-year-old farmer from Division, said he `` felt deep anger inside, because that's my language and identity, I can't change it. `` [ 730 ]
Many community members said they experienced deep emotional pain, sadness and thoughts of death. `` Sometimes I prefer to die, '' said Robel, a 40-year-old construction worker from Rawyan. `` Especially when you see the dead bodies, you hate living and you want to die, that's how it feels when you see the dead bodies. `` [ 731 ] Semira, a 21-year-old woman from Rawyan recalled: `` This makes your brain dark. You have no future life. Everything became closed. It's very difficult. `` [ 732 ]
Tesfakiros, the 30-year-old shopkeeper from Humera, said:
Recounting an experience common among the people interviewed, a 70-year-old farmer from Division said: `` We had hoped that things would get better, but... It seemed they were trying to kill us slowly. What did we have to wait for? There was nothing to live for and survive. So why did we stay? We decided to live and that was what made us leave. `` [ 734 ] In Ruwassa, said Andom, `` They were pushing us to leave that area. '' `` They really worked on it, '' explained his wife, Tsega. [ 735 ] Speaking of the diverse intimidation methods deployed against Tigrayans, Tesfa, a 60-year-old farmer from Baeker, said: `` They were pushing us to leave that area.. You got deported in different ways. `` [ 736 ]
Some Tigrayans planned their departures in secret; others left in haste, selling off whatever belongings had not been looted for a fraction of what they were worth. Families banded together, pooling funds to charter coaches at inflated prices. Tigrayans, said Andom from tabia Irob, paid `` a lot of money to get a contract bus - you gather money and pay all at once and that bus will take you. '' These buses, he said, `` were organized by the residents, but the drivers were Walqayte. `` [ 737 ]
Many boarded buses and minibuses heading for the Tekeze bridge, paying many times the normal price of transport as they would during peacetime. They said that drivers throughout Western Tigray - all Walqayte or Amhara - gouged them on prices. Akbret, a 38-year-old civil servant, fled eastwards, from Humera to Shire. After receiving financial support from a Walqayte friend, she paid 400 ETB ( $ 10) to reach Tekeze on a bus run by an Amhara driver. Upon reaching the Tekeze bridge, she said, `` the Amhara took the money and took me to Tekeze, and we crossed on foot. The Eritreans received us on the other side of the river. I paid another 500 ETB ( $ 12.50) to Eritreans, and I arrived in Shire. `` [ 738 ] The price of transport increased each month. Mihret said he paid 1000 ETB ( $ 25) for a minibus from Humera to Tekeze. `` Before the war, the transportation was 100-150 ETB, '' ( $ 2.50 - $ 3.75) he said. [ 739 ] Kibrom found a car to take him from Adebai to the Tekeze in April 2021. He and another friend were forced to pay 3000 ETB ( $ 75) each to cross. `` Nobody would dare cross if they didn't have the money, and then they would allow you to cross, '' he explained. [ 740 ]
Amhara Special Forces controlling the checkpoint on the western side of the bridge stole from desperate convoys of fleeing Tigrayans on the bridge. [ 741 ] `` [ The Special Forces ] would take anything they saw that was valuable in the car, '' said a 26-year-old man from Turkan. `` They were taking items from travelers: refrigerators, TVs. from Tigrayans who were in Western Tigray. `` [ 742 ]
In June 2021, Tigrayan forces gained control of much of Tigray, causing Ethiopian and Eritrean government forces to withdraw from most of the Northwestern, Central, Eastern and Southern Zones of Tigray. [ 743 ] The Western Tigray administrative Zone, however, remained under the control of Amhara regional forces and militias.
This dramatic change in the conflict by late June led in July to an increase in the persecution of Tigrayans in Humera town and in the neighboring towns of Adebai and Rawyan. Amhara forces began rounding up and detaining Tigrayan civilians, including women and children, in overcrowded prisons, police stations, and makeshift detention sites. [ 744 ]
In November 2021, the federal government declared a nationwide state of emergency as reports of fierce fighting between Tigrayan forces and Ethiopian and allied forces in Amhara and Afar regions intensified. [ 745 ] At the same time, the Tigrayans who remained in Adebai, Humera, and Rawyan towns faced a new wave of roundups, detentions, expulsions, and killings. [ 746 ]
Those who escaped the detention sites in and around Humera since June 2021 described ever-worsening conditions of detention. Former detainees described deaths of other detainees in custody due to torture, a lack of food, and the denial of medical care. [ 747 ] Three former detainees described witnessing the summary execution of detainees and residents by Amhara security forces in Humera town. [ 748 ] Several others residing in Humera confirmed finding the bodies in open areas around the town of victims they described as Tigrayans. [ 749 ]
After several months of threats and violence, local authorities in Humera in June 2021 again issued a threatening ultimatum that Tigrayans leave the town. [ 750 ]
Amhara police, militias, and Fano went house-to-house to deliver the ultimatums, asking: `` Where are the Tigrayans? '' said Fthawi, a 38-year-old teacher from the city. [ 751 ] Zemede, a 48-year-old tailor, explained:
The ultimatum `` was difficult to accept, '' said Fthawi, `` so we sent priests and other elders... [ to say ] that this is short notice, and [ there are no ] means of transport to go elsewhere. They told us to go through Eritrea, any other direction, but to leave. '' Following their complaints, an administrator called a meeting for Tigrayans in Humera. [ 753 ] Fthawi recalled:
In the ensuing days, Fano and local militias went house-to-house again, threatening Tigrayans to coerce them to attend the demonstration. Zemede said that on July 11, the militias came to his home: `` The militias [ were ] giving this message to every Tigrayan.. They told us to report to the kebele and they would be the ones leading everything. And whoever was not present in the demonstration [ must ] consider [ they are ] agreeing to getting killed. `` [ 755 ]
The demonstration took place around a week after the stadium rally. `` I participated, '' said Fthawi, `` Everyone participated. We were afraid for our lives. `` [ 756 ] He added: `` A warning had been given, if anyone remained in their homes and didn't participate in the demonstration, they would be killed. `` [ 757 ] The protest, in which local residents chanted slogans against the TPLF, was covered on an Amhara state media broadcast on July 14. [ 758 ]
Two days later, on July 16, the authorities launched a wave of sweeping arrests. Fthawi said: `` The rounding up of Tigrayans intensified. They took the [ ones ] forgotten or hidden like myself.. Everyone was being rounded up. `` [ 759 ]
Zemede recalled his arrest on July 17 by a mixed group of Amhara forces, including ASF, Fano, and local militias, even though he had attended the demonstration:
A 32-year-old tractor driver in Rawyan confirmed that the sweeps extended to his town on July 12. He recalled: `` The Fano and Amhara militia were the ones going home-to-home to collect Tigrayans. They took them to the kebele [ office ], to the school, the flour machine, and also to Humera. There was no difference at to whom they collected, it was all Tigrayan, regardless of sex. `` [ 761 ]
Zemede said he was among those swept up in Humera. He recalled:
The Yetbarek warehouse, a large sorghum processing mill and storage house on the western edges of the town, had been converted to a makeshift prison by December 2020, and was guarded by Amhara special police. [ 763 ] Other detention sites included the Bet Hintset prison, the old prison, the Setit Humera police station, the Geter police station, and the Enda Quaja camp, which is located south of the city. [ See Detentions section ].
Former detainees held in the Yetbarek warehouse estimated that thousands were held there by July 2021. [ 764 ] Zemede recalled:
A 35-year-old laborer, described being held in the same warehouse, estimates there were between 3000 and 4000 people detained there. [ 766 ] One 48-year-old said that during the last week of July, about 3000 to 4000 people were arrested, including his brother. [ 767 ] By early September 2021, `` [ t ] here were maybe 1500 Tigrayans '' in the Bet Hintset prison, said one detainee who managed to escape. `` [ M ] aybe 850 or 900 were male, and the rest were female. Maybe 150 of the were [ children ]. There were also babies with the women. `` [ 768 ] One man who recalled his detention in Bet Hintset prison in July and who escaped in mid-November, estimated he was kept in a cell with at times up to 200 people, and that there were at least eight other rooms on the same floor that were equally as crowded. [ 769 ]
One official, Belay, appeared to be screening detainees in the Yetbarek warehouse, recalled Zemede: `` Belay, the intelligence guy, came with his guards and told us that whoever had Amhara blood in them, 50 percent Amhara blood or Walqayte, was set to be free. `` [ 770 ] In the warehouse, `` at first, all of us who were in jail were Tigrayan, '' recounted one former detainee, `` and after some time they did their own research and released half-Amhara, half-Tigrayan people. And after some time, they released the half-Walqayte, [ half-Tigrayans ]. [ then ] they released the half-Eritreans. And finally, it was only the full Tigrayans who were left in the prison. '' [ 771 ] At that time, he said, the children younger than 10 were also released. [ 772 ]
Detainees described appalling conditions. Zemede said that in the kebele compound where he was held, Fano and local militias took turns guarding Tigrayans, adding: `` They didn't allow us to talk to people and whenever one of the sons or daughters of the people being held with us came to visit, if someone came closer to the gate, they started chasing us and whipping everybody. `` [ 773 ]
In the Yetbarek warehouse, continued Zemede, `` it was very nasty, very dirty. `` [ 774 ] There were no latrines, and the warehouse was so crowded that detainees could not lie down to sleep. [ 775 ] Zemede added that the guards denied medical care to detainees and would beat people when they deemed too many at once wanted to use the bathroom. The guards, said a 29-year-old detainee, `` insulted us every day, they said: 'Junta, ' 'You are junta! ', 'If we let you go, you will join the TPLF and fight against us, so we will never let you go! You will die here. ' '' [ 776 ]
As in other detention sites previously, the guards did not provide detainees with water or food and the only food detainees receives was what was brought by Amhara or Walqayte friends and relatives. [ 777 ] [ see Arbitrary Arrests, Mass Detentions, and Torture November 2020- June 2021 section ]
A 29-year-old daily laborer who was held in the warehouse, said: `` There is no food, not enough water. If you asked for any food, they [ would ] say 'Your food is a bullet. We will kill you! ' '' [ 778 ] Those who could, would pay the guards to get food, he said.
A 28-year-old driver held was held in Geter police station in Humera and explained that `` it was common for people to faint from hunger. Some people could stay three or four days without food and then faint. `` [ 779 ] He was subsequently brought to the Bet Hintset prison, where the conditions were the same: `` The most difficult was getting food. We were starving. '' [ 780 ] A 30-year-old was arrested on July 19, and also held in Bet Hintset prison. He said: `` Forget showers, we couldn't access the toilets, they didn't give us any food or water, even when our families would bring us food and water, they wouldn't give it to us. `` [ 781 ]
Former detainees held in Bet Hintset prison said that torture was routine. One man recalled being hit with `` electric wires '' on the soles of his feet and on his chest. [ 782 ] One former detainee held in Bet Hinstset for a month and a half described the torture he endured on four occasions:
In Bet Hintset, said one detainee, `` many people were. tortured to the point where they were emotionally unstable.. I think they also hit them on their head, so they were always nervous, they would be talking to themselves, they would pee or defecate on themselves. `` [ 784 ] The conditions in Enda Yetbarek were so appalling, recalled another detainee, adding that `` there are so many people that are now [ emotionally traumatized ] because they saw so many things and so many things happened to them. `` [ 785 ]
Four former detainees described how guards insulted them using dehumanizing terms and would threaten them with death. A 58-year-old farmer, was held in Adebai, where guards speaking in Amharic would say, `` You [ Tigrayans ] don't deserve air, you shouldn't even be alive, you're not humans. '' [ 786 ] A farmer who said he managed to flee Humera town after being extorted by a member of the Amhara Special Force recalled what the officer told him, `` 'Being a Tigrayan is a crime of its own. You have two options, either death or pay money. ' After I paid, when it was dark, he took me out of the jail and he told me that if I wanted to stay alive, I had to leave Humera because they have plans, they're going to kill all Tigrayans. 'All Tigrayans will be killed ', he said. He said, 'Today I took money from you, but tomorrow someone else could do worse to you. ' '' [ 787 ]
In July 2021, as the mass arrests unfolded in Humera and Rawyan, dozens of bodies began washing up in Sudan along the banks of the Tekeze River, which flows north of Humera town, where it marks the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and west, along the border with Sudan, and through Western and Northwestern Tigray Zone. [ 788 ] As of November 2021, approximately 136 bodies had been found in the river between Hamdayet and Wad al-Hiliyu; more were found in other places along the river but may not have been counted. [ 789 ]
Researchers received photographs and videos of the bodies taken by a person coordinating the collection of the bodies in August and September 2021 and sent the imagery to two forensic pathologists for analysis. Researchers also interviewed five individuals involved in, or who witnessed, the retrieval of the bodies, former residents, and aid workers. [ 790 ] The bodies appeared in various states of decomposition; they showed skin loss and discoloration as well as physical injuries. The large majority, of the bodies found in Sudan were men. [ 791 ] From descriptions provided by a man who assisted in the retrieval of the corpses, some bodies `` had their arms tied up in the backs with electric wires, '' and that 23 of the victims were men and 5 were women. A review of the photographs and videos shared similarly confirm that two bodies were bound, with their elbows tied behind the back. Most bodies were without clothes. [ 792 ] Another person involved in the retrieval of the bodies described how, out of 28 bodies found in Wad al-Hiliyu by August 3, 10 had injuries that he believed were from bullets. [ 793 ] The wounds were `` around their ears and neck, '' added Merhawi.
A forensic pathologist reviewed nine photographs, a form of analysis that is limited in comparison to what a physical analysis could reveal and observed that three of the bodies appeared to have been restrained with ligatures. One body had `` linear injuries '' likely due to chopping as a result of a blunt or sharp weapon in an `` unusual location, '' which could suggest that the arms were raised away from the torso at the time. '' At least one body displayed a gunshot wound. [ 794 ]
A medical professional involved in the retrieval in July and August said the bodies showed injuries from sharp objects. [ 795 ]
It was not possible to conclusively identify the victims found in Sudan. The recovery and handling of human remains require special attention and care, including respect for the dignity of the deceased and compliance with forensic best practices to ensure that such evidence is preserved for future identification by trained experts and for accountability.
Beatings and grossly inadequate detention conditions killed prisoners in some cases, said former detainees who witnessed the deaths. [ 796 ]
A 19-year-old detainee said that seven people - all men above 70 - died of hunger and illness in his cell while he was held in Bet Hintset. [ 797 ] Another detainee, also held in Bet Hintset prison, said one 23-year-old man died because he did not receive treatment after falling sick. He said: `` When we first got in, he was healthy, but as time went by, he started becoming thinner and weaker and [ he ] finally died. [ 798 ]
Four witnesses told of 18 men dying in Bet Hintset, Enda Yetbarek, and the Adebai farmers ' association warehouse ( an informal detention site) after guards beat them. [ 799 ] One man recalled:
A 38-year-old held at Bet Hintset, said that on October 11, two of his fellow detainees eventually died after Bet Hintset guards kicked them in the testicles. [ 801 ]
A detainee at Enda Yetbarek, said that one detainee died from complications after the guards beat him in retaliation after he attempted to escape: `` They beat him, and he wasn't able to eat or drink anything for two weeks and [ he ] died. `` [ 802 ] He added that guards at Enda Yetbarek would wait for days to remove dead bodies from detention cells or at times force other detainees to do it:
Another former detainee recounting his arrest on July 19, and detention in Bet Hintset prison, described guards forcing him and other detainees load onto tractors the corpses of fellow detainees who had died in the prison around mid-November. He recalled:
As local authorities increased their roundups and arbitrary detention of Tigrayans in July and November 2021, Amhara security forces summarily executed Tigrayans in Humera town. [ 805 ]
Feven, a middle-aged woman who owned a snack shop in Humera, was arrested in July, days after a demonstration. Her body with her eyes gouged out was found in town on the banks of the Tekeze River. A friend of hers, Temesgen, said he was among those who found her body: `` She was tied up, her hands to her back and she was also on the side of the river and her eyes were completely removed. `` [ 806 ]
The killings in Humera continued for several months. `` We always see bodies '' on the streets of Humera, recalled one resident. `` [ B ] y the Mariam bridge, Michael bridge, by the Tekeze before you get to the water.. At a school called Enda Abate, every day new bodies are found there... even yesterday when I went out, I saw bodies.... They were around the road to Adebai. `` [ 807 ]
In many cases the bodies were found on the outskirts of the town. In September, one man recalled finding the body of an acquaintance, a teacher from Humera named Asmelash, in a valley on the western edge of town close to the Enda Michael church and Enda Yetbarek warehouse. [ 808 ] `` We found him with [ gash wounds ] on his face and neck, '' he said. [ 809 ] He later helped bury Asmelash.
In November, one farmer said he saw six bodies covered in what he described as engine oil near an industrial warehouse known as `` The Shed. `` [ 810 ]
The killings and sight of bodies instilled terror among Tigrayans said, a 36-year-old farmer from Humera, adding: `` I would hear gunshots every day and we hear about the people they killed. And there were bodies on the street every day.. I lived in fear thinking they would come and get me. `` [ 811 ]
Eight former detainees mentioned the killings and enforced disappearances of Tigrayans in custody since July 2021. [ 812 ] A 20-year-old student described being arrested in mid-October and held in the kebele 2 office when Fano militia called for a detainee held in the same room and summarily shot him outside: `` I don't know who told on him, but they came in and said he was a former soldier. They took him out and I heard gunshots, and I heard him drop. Afterwards, I could see from the door in our room that his body was lying at the gate. `` [ 813 ]
At the Yetbarek warehouse, a former detainee, who was held there for two months until June or July, said he saw guards shoot two youths who tried to escape, killing a 16-year-old.
In early November, Amhara militia and local security forces shot at or otherwise attacked residents trying to flee a new wave of roundups and arrests. [ 814 ] As Adebai residents headed to the Abune Aregawi church to pray in the early morning hours of November 3, 2021, Amhara militias, Fano militias, and Eritrean military forces gathered around the church, ordering the men to stay for a meeting while telling the women to leave, according to five residents. [ 815 ] One 58-year-old farmer at the church said that Fano militias, zonal officials, including Colonel Demeke and Belay, were in attendance and gave instructions to the people present:
They waited for people to gather in the church..They started telling us that our time there was up. That they can no longer carry us with them. That we are `` juntas. '' That we were responsible for the deaths of many people and that we are no longer welcome there. The Eritrean intelligence person, said 'Tigrayans go on this side, [ while ] Amharas, Walqayte, Eritreans, Kunamas, go on the other. ' After they separated us. they started putting the younger people in vehicles, and us older people, above 60, they made us walk. [ 816 ]
A 20-year-old man, who had been warned by three Tigrayan women returning from church, confirmed that he saw younger men loaded onto trucks and older people, guarded by Fano militiamen, forced to walk towards the eastern edges of the town. [ 817 ] `` I saw them marching them to the main road, '' he said, adding. `` They were pushing them in the back and beating them. They made the trip two or three times, loading them repeatedly, [ in ] maybe one vehicle, two or three times. ''
Several Tigrayan men interviewed said that as word of the roundup spread, many people panicked and tried to flee. Some went home or to neighboring fields to evade arrest. Four people witnessed Amhara militia members shoot or attack, with machetes, axes, knives, or sticks, Tigrayans seeking to flee. A 26-year-old man said he saw armed men on motorbikes shooting at people including his 70-year-old uncle. He later saw his uncle's body, and those of two other men, including an older man he knew. `` They were shooting at anyone who was behind, '' he said. `` [ My uncle ] wasn't even running.. they still shot him. I saw the guy shooting at him and him falling. `` [ 818 ]
In Adebai, Amhara forces that rounded up residents in early November 2021 took those apprehended to detention sites: some to the town's police station, others to an Adebai farmers ' association compound located on the town's eastern outskirts, near the Enda Roto petrol station compound whose warehouse was used as a makeshift detention site.
Four witnesses described Fano militia going house-to-house searching for Tigrayans. Before fleeing, a student recounted hiding at home where he witnessed as a group of 30 to 40 armed men attacking his neighbor, a mechanic in his mid-twenties: `` they told him to come.. He had his hands up and they hit him on his shoulder with an axe. As he screamed, they dragged him and took him with them. `` [ 819 ]
In the ensuing days, Tigrayans who had escaped survived by hiding on farmland, but the attacks continued. One man described hearing gunshots on November 7 and later saw bodies near a reservoir three kilometers northeast of Adebai:
The Fanos and Walqayte militia just came. and started killing whomever they found in the bushes.. We were further [ away ]... but we were hearing a lot of gunshots. So, when it got quiet and it was dark, we went to the [ reservoir ] and saw a lot of bodies. We didn't count because we were afraid and shocked.... I would say [ I saw ] about 20 [ bodies ]. [ 820 ]
Five former detainees in Humera described how Tigrayan detainees would be removed from detention and not be seen again. [ 821 ] One former detainee recalled how Fano militiamen once forced him and others to tie up other prisoners:
Zemede was held in an administrative office in the kebele 2 neighborhood that had been turned into a makeshift detention site. He said that Belay, an official `` came to the kebele [ office ] every few hours, [ and ] counted the prisoners with his eyes.. And he took two people from us who we never saw again. `` [ 823 ] One former detainee said that at the Geter police station, `` A lot of people would be taken away and never returned to the jail. I remember that two people fainted and the soldiers took them away and they never returned, so whether they killed them or released them, we don't have any information about them. `` [ 824 ] In the Yetbarek warehouse, said Zemede, `` from time to time they would come and call out names and take people away. They used to say it was for investigation, but we never saw these people again. No one knew of their whereabouts, so we don't know if they transferred them to other prisons or killed them. `` [ 825 ] Another man, recalling his detention in the warehouse said: `` We still don't know what happened to the people taken away every night. We never saw them. We were hoping they were released but after we got out and asked around, no one had seen them. `` [ 826 ]
Together with the Amhara authorities ' expulsion of the Tigrayan community from Western Tigray, there was a concerted effort to bar Tigrayans from other parts of Tigray from entering the region. [ 827 ] By December 2020, forces loyal to the Amhara region guarded the eastern boundaries of Western Tigray, preventing the entry of internally displaced people fleeing other parts of the region. Until the withdrawal of Ethiopian and Eritrean military forces from most of Tigray in June 2021, the northern bridge over the Tekeze River, on the road linking Sheraro to Adi Goshu, formed the crossing between areas predominantly under the control of the Eritrean military and those under the control of forces loyal to the Amhara region. While Eritrean soldiers guarded a checkpoint on the eastern side of the bridge, Amhara Special Forces and Fano militias positioned on the western side, where they screened travelers on an ethnic basis. They welcomed Amharas residents, but harassed, threatened, beat, detained, and robbed Tigrayans traveling westward, before sending them back to the eastern side. [ 828 ]
A 22-year-old student who fled Axum town in central Tigray in search of refuge in Sudan, tried to cross the northern Tekeze bridge crossing with a group in late December 2020. He said Fano militias robbed him of his money and beat them with sticks and rifle stocks. [ 829 ] They subsequently detained the group for two days, then released the men but kept two young women in their custody, he recounted. [ 830 ] Fano militias also questioned a 23-year-old student as he crossed the bridge. `` They asked if we're Tigrayan or Amhara, '' he said. `` We said we're Tigrayan and they said we're not allowed to pass the bridge. [ they ] ordered us to go back. `` [ 831 ]
Non-Tigrayans, as well as Tigrayans who at the checkpoint managed to pass as Amharas or Walqayte, received starkly different treatment. `` After we arrived on the Tekeze bridge, they asked us our names and ethnicity, '' recalled a 23-year-old metalworker from Axum, describing his January 5 encounter with Amhara forces. [ 832 ] `` My friend said he's half Amhara and they let him go free. I told them I 'm pure Tigrayan and they really beat me. `` [ 833 ]
A 17-year-old from Axum hid his Tigrayan identity by pretending to be Amhara. The Amhara forces on the bridge welcomed him with open arms:
After being turned away, some Tigrayans nevertheless managed to swim across the Tekeze River bordering Sudan during the dry season when the current was slower and eventually found their ways to Sudan. [ 835 ]
Amharas and Walqayte people, whether from the area or from further afield - including the Amhara region - began occupying the homes of Tigrayans throughout the Zone almost immediately after the capture and control of towns and villages in late 2020. After fleeing initial violence, a 33-year-old restaurant owner said she returned to Baeker only to find few Tigrayans left, her property taken, and her home occupied. `` A Walqayte woman took my house, '' she said. `` She didn't have any right to claim my home. My restaurant was also taken by [ an Amhara ] Special Forces member - they were using it as if it was their own. `` [ 836 ]
Abandoned homes in Mai Kadra and Humera were marked with the words: `` Amhara house '' or `` This is ours, '' as a way of laying claim to property formerly occupied by Tigrayans, and of threatening those who would dare to return. [ 837 ] A 15-year-old girl from Mai Kadra noticed the writing on her gate:
A 38-year-old woman said she noticed Fano militia making similar markings in Humera:
A teacher in Humera recalled seeing the writings on homes around the hospital and elementary school and observed that the militias `` competed to take houses '' by writing on the doors and walls of houses, including that of his brother. He said: `` They would write: 'This is occupied, ' or 'This is taken. ' '' [ 840 ]
Between the time his house burned down during the shelling of Division and the moment he left in April 2021; Hadgu described seeing the arrival of new Amhara residents while he was forced to live under a tree with other displaced residents. `` Most of the town became empty, '' he said.
Security forces and militias took part in the occupation of homes, according to a 53-year-old businessman who remained in Humera. He saw militias and their families occupy homes, and explained that Tigrayans did not have any option but to leave:
They took over the houses they wanted... You have no one to complain to. We owned the houses, but the Fano and Amhara Special Forces would take over the houses. Amhara Special Forces [ would ] break into houses with their guns, bring their families, and stay for two to three months. [ Then ], they take everything back to Gondar. I had to leave the town because I knew they would take my property and house, and so I gave it to my neighbors, my friends who are Amharas. I wanted to give it to a friend instead of it being taken over. They are still living there. [ 842 ]
Aklile previously lived in Abderafi, a border town in the Amhara region, and said he began to recognize some of the new residents arriving from there to live in Humera. Though the process to live and occupy homes appeared random at first, with time, he explained, it became more formalized with the appointment of new authorities. [ 843 ]
The brutal forced displacement of Tigrayan communities in Western Tigray and denial of entry to the Zone to other Tigrayans coincided with the settlement of towns by hundreds of Amharas from the Amhara region and from Sudan into towns such as Adebai, Humera, and Division, as interim authorities promised available land and homes. [ 844 ]
An official in Gondar, Amhara region, told reporters in March 2021 that `` 20 buses were leaving daily '' for Western Tigray, `` each carrying 50 people. `` [ 845 ] Between February and March 2021, a Humera resident said he witnessed the arrival of over 10 trucks `` full of people '' - including many women and children - arrive in Humera town. He said the town's mayor and Colonel Demeke welcomed the arrivals as they disembarked in an open area across from the Kahsay Aberra hospital. He added that: `` they took over homes formerly belonging to Tigrayans. Some returned home when they couldn't find homes empty of property. `` [ 846 ]
Residents described authorities issuing instructions that those coming with `` furniture would be first for a house. `` [ 847 ]
In Adebai, two residents saw fleets of buses with new arrivals in May 2021. An 18-year-old in the town explained: `` New Amharas came to the town. Two full buses in Adebai. When they arrived, they were given houses in the town for free. Even if the houses had people in them, they would take them too. `` [ 848 ] A 74-year-old Tigrayan farmer displaced in Adebai, gave a similar account:
In June and July, local and international media reported that Amhara's who had been living in Sudan began returning to Ethiopia; 3,000 individuals were reported to be registered to return with 15,000 awaiting return to the Welkait and Tselemt districts. [ 850 ] While some had reportedly been previously displaced from Western Tigray, other individuals began arriving from elsewhere in Ethiopia. According to the accounts, Amhara regional officials promised to facilitate the transportation of returning communities to their chosen destination, with further pledges to provide `` required support, '' including government-chartered buses to transport some Amhara communities who had been living in exile in Sudan. [ 851 ]
In June 2021, a humanitarian assessment team confirmed seeing populations from the Amhara region moving into the Zone `` and occupy [ ing ] empty houses and land in several locations. `` [ 852 ]
As the forced displacement of Tigrayan communities from their homes and land and the settlement of new residents in Western Tigray continued, Amhara regional authorities also took steps to further solidify their claim to the territory, notably by petitioning the federal parliament to redraw the regional boundary to incorporate Western Tigray into the Amhara region in March 2021. [ 853 ]
Interim administrators in Western Tigray and Amhara regional authorities also began the process of redistributing land. In May 2021, Amhara regional authorities released a public notice calling for investors to lease farms in Western Tigray on 288 farms, many of which belonged to Tigrayans. [ 854 ] These efforts to repopulate Western Tigray placed the hopes for a prompt return of displaced Tigrayans to their homes very much in doubt.
The conflict in Tigray that began on November 4, 2020, between the Ethiopian military and its allied forces from the neighboring Amhara region and Eritrea on one side, and fighters affiliated with the Tigray People's Liberation Front on the other, is considered a non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions. The conflict is governed by international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, which provides protection to civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict by all sides to a conflict. International human rights law, such as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, remains in effect.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch found that since November 2020, Amhara regional government forces and militias and local authorities, with the participation of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, committed numerous serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law as part of a campaign of ethnic cleansing targeting the Tigrayan population of Western Tigray. These violations include war crimes and crimes against humanity. Amhara Special Forces and Fano and other militias have committed unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, forcible displacement, and other inhumane acts, including starvation, as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the Tigrayan civilian population of Western Tigray. Ethiopian federal forces in Western Tigray have committed murder, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture against the Tigrayan population, which are war crimes and may also amount to crimes against humanity.
Since November 2020, Amhara regional forces and militias operating under the interim authorities affiliated with the Amhara regional government carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing that forced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans to flee Western Tigray. The organized, forcible displacement of Tigrayans, including many first put in custody, removed much of the Tigrayan population from land that for decades and generations was their home. Though term `` ethnic cleansing '' has no formal definition under international law, a UN Commission of Experts defined it as a `` purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas '' where `` the purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups. `` [ 855 ]
The definition rests on three crucial components. `` Purposeful policy '' designates coordinated actions by individuals and groups ( whether formal or informal), acting in the pursuit of a common goal; qualifying acts as `` purposeful policy '' may rely on demonstrating the implication of government bodies, but does not require it. The second component, the `` remov [ al ]. by one ethnic or religious group. the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from a geographic area, '' indicates that the policy aims at widespread displacement of a given group by another. Finally, ethnic cleansing relies on `` violent and terror-inspiring means. ''
The UN Commission of Experts further defined the means of ethnic cleansing to include crimes such as `` murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destructions or property. `` [ 856 ] As this report demonstrates, the forces Amhara regional government forces and their local allies have, with the complicity of the Ethiopian federal forces, pursued various means to carry out their ethnic cleansing campaign.
Officials from the Amhara regional government, newly appointed interim officials, Amhara Special Forces, Fano, and ethnic Amhara and Walqayte militias, took concerted action to remove Tigrayans from Western Tigray. Those who directed or took direct part in abuses, made clear orally and in written statements their intention to remove Tigrayans `` from this land '' and beyond the Tekeze River. In addition to their role in coordinating the forcible removal and transfer of Tigrayans, Amhara regional authorities organized the repopulation of Western Tigray, providing legal cover for the pillage and looting of Tigrayan property and the distribution of land that Tigrayans had farmed. Taken together, these acts indicate a concerted policy carried out by the Amhara regional administration, with the acquiescence and possible participation of the federal government.
Serious violations of international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, committed with criminal intent-that is, deliberately or recklessly-are war crimes. War crimes, listed in the `` grave breaches '' provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and as customary law as reflected in the International Criminal Court statute and other sources, include a wide array of offenses for which individuals may be held criminally liable -deliberate, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks harming civilians; murder; torture; rape and other sexual violence; arbitrary detention; enforced disappearance; pillage and looting; using starvation as a method of war; and collective punishment, among others. Individuals also may be held criminally liable for attempting to commit a war crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, aiding, or abetting a war crime.
Responsibility also may fall on people planning or instigating a war crime. Commanders and civilian leaders may be prosecuted for war crimes as a matter of command or superior responsibility when they knew or should have known about the commission of war crimes and took insufficient measures to prevent them or punish those responsible.
Ensuring justice for serious violations is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the country whose nationals are implicated in the violations. Governments have an obligation to investigate serious violations that implicate their nationals or other people under their jurisdiction. The government must ensure that military or domestic courts or other institutions impartially investigate whether serious violations occurred, identifying and prosecuting the individuals responsible for those violations in accordance with international fair-trial standards, and imposing punishments on individuals found guilty that are commensurate with their deeds. While non-state armed groups do not have the same legal obligation to prosecute violators of the laws of war within their ranks, they are nonetheless responsible for ensuring compliance with the laws of war and have a responsibility when they do conduct trials to do so in accordance with international fair trial standards.
Crimes against humanity are part of customary international law and were first codified in the charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 1945. The purpose was to prohibit crimes `` which either by their magnitude and savagery, by their large number, or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied.endangered the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind. '' [ 857 ] Since then, the concept has been incorporated into a number of international treaties and the statutes of international criminal tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The definition of crimes against humanity varies slightly by treaty, but the definition found in the Rome Statute, which largely reflects customary international law and is therefore binding on all states includes a range of serious human rights abuses committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. [ 858 ]
Crimes against humanity include only abuses carried out as part of an attack directed against a civilian population. So long as the targeted population is of a predominantly civilian nature, the presence of some combatants does not alter its classification as a `` civilian population '' as a matter of law. [ 859 ] Rather, it is necessary only that the civilian population be the primary object of the attack by state or non-state forces. Thus, the presence of some Tigrayan fighters among the civilian population that Amhara regional forces and militias and Ethiopian federal forces targeted for attack and abuses does not discount them from being possible crimes against humanity. In Western Tigray, all these forces committed serious violations as part of the same widespread and systematic attack against the Tigrayan population.
The attack against a civilian population underlying the commission of crimes against humanity must be widespread or systematic, it need not be both. [ 860 ] `` Widespread '' refers to the scale of the acts or number of victims. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch consider the numerous serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Amhara and Ethiopian security forces against Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray since November 2020 to be `` widespread '' and part of broader operation that amount to crimes against humanity. In addition, a single occurrence of large-scale killings, such as the massacres in Humera, Mai Kadra and on the Tekeze River that claimed the lives of dozens of people, can by themselves be considered a widespread attack.
A `` systematic '' attack indicates `` a pattern or methodical plan. '' International courts have considered to what extent a systemic attack requires a policy or plan. For instance, such a plan need not be adopted formally as a policy of the state. The nature of the abuses, their broad-based character, and their frequency ( rather than the actions of individual security forces and personnel) constitute the relevant factors to assess whether the acts are reflective of a policy. [ 861 ]
The commission of crimes against humanity can serve as the basis for individual criminal liability not only in the domestic courts of the country where the crimes took place, but also in international courts and tribunals, as well as in other country's courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Individual criminal liability extends beyond those who carry out the acts to those who order, assist, facilitate, aid, and abet the offense. Under the principle of command or superior responsibility, military, and civilian officials up to the top of the chain of command can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates when they knew or should have known that such crimes were being committed but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish those responsible.
The following alleged crimes against humanity should be independently and impartially investigated and appropriately prosecuted:
Amhara civilian authorities in conjunction with the security forces and federal authorities carried out thousands of arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention of Tigrayans in various formal and informal detention sites.
Tigrayans in custody have been subjected to torture, defined by the Rome Statute as `` the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering '' that can be either physical or mental. The Rome Statute definition of torture as a crime against humanity does not require that it be inflicted with a specific prohibited purpose, such as to obtain a confession, meaning that certain acts of severe physical or mental pain or suffering would fall within the crimes against humanity definition of torture regardless of the purpose for which it is committed.
Many of the acts committed against Tigrayans amount to torture under the Rome Statute as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Acts of torture include beatings, verbal insults, deprivation of food, water, and medical care against Tigrayans held in custody in formal and informal detention centers.
Murder is prohibited as a violation of the right to life under international human rights law and as a violation of Common Article III to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Rome Statute defines an enforced disappearance as arrests or detentions of someone by a state or political organization `` followed by a refusal to acknowledge the arrest, detention, or abduction, or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, '' `` with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. `` [ 862 ] Enforced disappearances not only violate various human rights law provisions, but they put the individual disappeared at heightened risk of torture and other ill-treatment and take a terrible psychological toll on their families, who may wait long periods before finding out what happened to them. The Rome Statute defines `` extermination '' as the `` intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. `` [ 863 ]
Amhara and federal forces were implicated in the massacres of Tigrayans in their custody as well as the killings and forced disappearances of Tigrayans in their homes and at other locations throughout West Tigray. An unknown number of Tigrayans died as a result of the conditions of detention, particularly at sites in Humera town, where security forces subjected them to beatings, torture, and summary executions. The deliberate deprivation of food and medical treatment to hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of Tigrayans in custody could amount to the crime against humanity of extermination.
Rape and other acts of sexual violence committed as part of an attack on civilian population may be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Survivors of rape described being assaulated by Ethiopian military forces, as well as Amhara Special Forces, and Fano militias. Survivors described being subjected to gang rape in their homes, in some cases in custody or held in captivity for prolonged periods. Tigrayan rape survivors repeatedly described being verbally abused and denigrated for their ethnicity during the attacks and were specifically told to leave Western Tigray.
The deportation or forcible transfer `` without grounds permitted under international law. to another location, by expulsion or other coercive acts '' can amount to a crime against humanity. [ 864 ] The ICC Elements of Crimes provide that both physical and psychological force, such as `` fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person '' can characterize an act of displacement as forcible transfer. [ 865 ]
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement prohibit the `` arbitrary '' displacement of persons, which is defined as including displacement in situations of armed conflict, `` unless the security of civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. `` [ 866 ] The prohibition of displacing civilians in non-international armed conflicts is set forth in Additional Protocol II [ 867 ] and customary humanitarian law. [ 868 ] Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court, `` ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand, '' constitutes a war crime. [ 869 ]
Since November 2020, Amhara and Ethiopian security force have forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans from their homes, villages, and towns in Western Tigray, and acted to prevent their return. These actions appear aimed at permanently removing the Tigrayan population and thus change the demographic nature of Western Tigray Zone altogether.
A similar pattern of forced displacement across towns and villages in Western Tigray over several months indicates a governmental policy. Amhara interim authorities and other officials, and Amhara regional forces, at times with the support of federal forces and police, forcibly transferred Tigrayan communities, arranging the buses and trucks that removed Tigrayans from Western Tigray.
The term `` forced '' is not limited to physical force or violence, but may also include fear of violence, psychological oppression, or abuse of power against the person. Restrictions on movement, violence inflicted, denial of services and food, and a prevailing environment of harassment, threats, and intimidation by officials who called for Tigrayans to leave and security forces, made Tigrayans feel that had no choice but to flee. Such `` involuntary departures '' would still constitute forcible transfer.
Persecution is `` the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity, '' [ 870 ] based on `` political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender. or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law. `` [ 871 ] Persecution operates as an umbrella term that encompasses other constitutive acts so long as they are committed with discriminatory intent.
Security force actions in Western Tigray deprived Tigrayan communities of medical care and humanitarian services, pillaged Tigrayans ' food and other livestock necessary for their survival and denied food and medical treatment to detainees in detention sites. Together these acts, perpetrated on ground of ethnicity, may amount to the crime against humanity of persecution.
Since the adoption of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 ( the Refugee Convention), three `` durable solutions '' have emerged under international law and refugee policy to enable refugees to put an end to their refugee status and re-establish an effective link in a country. These are voluntary repatriation to the refugee's country of origin, local integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in a third country.
The UN refugee agency ( UNHCR) promotes voluntary repatriation -- the voluntary return of refugees to their home countries -- as the optimal solution to refugee crises. UNHCR has statutory responsibility to seek, promote, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees to their country of origin. [ 872 ]
The right to return to one's own country is a fundamental human right, which is recognized in several international human rights instruments. [ 873 ] The right to return is most clearly enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ICCPR) under the right to freedom of movement, which includes the right to enter one's own country. [ 874 ] The basis for the right to return under international refugee law can be found in the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, various regional refugee instruments, UN Resolutions, and Conclusions of UNHCR's Executive Committee ( ExCom). [ 875 ]
International law entitles people who are victims of the crime against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer the remedy of return to their home areas and property. The UN Security Council and other UN bodies have also repeatedly asserted the right of internally displaced persons to return to their former homes. The Security Council, in its Resolution 820 ( 1993) dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that, `` all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to do so. '' The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which are drawn from accepted principles of international law, set out provisions relating to return, resettlement and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons. Principle 28 states:
Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Such authorities shall endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons. [ 876 ]
Under international law, victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law are entitled to redress, including reparation. According to the UN Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, victims of gross violations in particular have the right to receive `` adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered. `` [ 877 ] This right draws on the broader principle of a right to concrete and effective remedy in the face of violations. [ 878 ] The African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights General Comment No. 4 also provides guidance on the right to redress for victims of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. [ 879 ]
Victims of gross violations are `` persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, '' and include `` the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization. `` [ 880 ]
Reparation includes, among other aspects, restitution and compensation. Compensation is due when restitution can not be obtained. [ 881 ]
People who have been unlawfully displaced, such as the victims of ethnic cleansing, are entitled to return to their homes and, if their homes have been destroyed, to be compensated for the loss. [ 882 ] The Ethiopian government, as the competent authority, has a duty to victims to recover their possessions and, if not possible, to provide them, or assist them in obtaining, compensation. [ 883 ]
Victims are also entitled to reparation for other rights violations committed as part of crimes against humanity and war crimes, for instance if they were detained arbitrarily, tortured, raped, their family member killed, or if their property or crops were looted. The Ethiopian government again bears primary responsibility to provide victims with, or assist them in obtaining, compensation.
The process of reparation and the right to return should not result in further human rights violations. The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, under the UN Commission on Human Rights, said that authorities have a responsibility to `` develop effective and expeditious legal and administrative procedures to ensure the free and fair exercise of this right, including fair and effective mechanisms to resolve outstanding housing and property problems. `` [ 884 ] This means that the Ethiopian government has a duty to ensure that dwellers who do not have lawful rights to occupy homes that were made vacant during the ethnic cleansing campaign do not become homeless or subject to human rights violations.
Under the TPLF-led EPRDF coalition government that was in power from 1991 to 2018, Ethiopian institutions with the mandate to investigate human rights violations, including the judiciary, the national Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and the ombudsperson were not sufficiently independent to meet that responsibility. In their responses to allegations of abuse, officials typically denied any wrongdoing and suggested that the claims were `` politically motivated. '' The government also strongly opposed international investigations, asserting that it could carry out such investigations on its own.
On coming to power in 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed inherited a federal government that was rife with serious human rights abuses, including a broken judicial system. He embarked on several legal reforms to expand civil and political rights by amending repressive laws that had been used by the previous government to clamp down on fundamental freedoms. [ 885 ] The Attorney General's office established a Legal Justice and Affairs and Advisory Council tasked with examining and proposing revisions to abusive laws and regulations. [ 886 ] The government also said that `` new legislation on police use of force and accountability '' was being drafted and was expected to `` create [ a ] clear, independent and effective complaint mechanism that would allow the submission of complaints concerning ill-treatment by security and law enforcement authorities. `` [ 887 ]
National authorities also took steps towards justice for past abuses by bringing charges against high-ranking government officials, including several members of the TPLF party, for human rights abuses. Ethiopia's Attorney General Office at the time accused intelligence officers [ 888 ] of the former government of torturing political detainees. [ 889 ] TPLF leaders criticized these investigations as selective and politicized. [ 890 ] The investigations were limited in scope, as some officials who were implicated in serious violations - including in the Somali, Oromia, and Gambella regions - never faced investigations, let alone trial. [ 891 ]
Between 2018 and 2020, high-profile political assassinations, security force abuses, and large-scale massacres along ethnic lines increased, while survivors and affected communities were rarely informed of the outcome of government investigations or provided with redress. [ 892 ] Police and investigative authorities sought to stretch or evade legal requirements: they repeatedly appealed or ignored judicial orders and transferred suspects between jurisdictions to hold them for prolonged periods. [ 893 ] Government officials were quick to cast blame for conflicts and assassinations on Ethiopia's `` internal and external enemies, '' on anti-reformists, and on political opposition or armed movements, without conducting credible investigations with a view to ensure accountability for the abuses. [ 894 ]
As reports of abuses carried out by Ethiopian federal and regional forces and Eritrean forces in Tigray mounted, Ethiopian authorities denied or downplayed them, including the presence and involvement of the Eritrean military. [ 895 ] Ethiopia also repeatedly rejected early calls for independent international investigations, saying it could carry out such investigations itself. [ 896 ] One federal government official maintained that the country did not `` need a babysitter, '' and would invite assistance `` only if it failed to investigate. `` [ 897 ] While states have a primary duty to investigate alleged war crimes committed on their territory and violations of international human rights law, investigations must meet the standards of effectiveness, independence, impartiality, and transparency to be considered adequate. [ 898 ]
For the first few months of the conflict, preliminary investigations were carried out by the national Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC), a federal body charged with investigating human rights abuses in the country. Ethiopian authorities argued that investigations by the Attorney General's Office and the EHRC were sufficient and that an international inquiry was not needed.
Government narratives of violence and abuses have focused almost exclusively on those allegedly committed by TPLF-affiliated forces. Earlier investigations into the conflict by Ethiopia's Attorney General's Office focused on alleged harm by Tigrayans - notably in Mai Kadra and during the Tigray Special Forces ' attack on federal military bases of the northern command at the onset of the war. Trials against 23 suspects allegedly responsible for the massacre of Walqayte and Amhara civilians in Mai Kadra are currently underway. [ 899 ]
In May 2021, the Attorney General's Office presented the measures that had been taken to ensure the protection of civilians as well as the status of investigations and accountability efforts undertaken so far by military prosecutors, as well by as federal and regional police and investigative authorities. [ 900 ] It mentioned investigations by military police and prosecutors into the extrajudicial executions of civilians and allegations of sexual and gender-based violence. Prosecutors reportedly pressed charges against 53 soldiers: 28 suspected in the killing of civilians and 25 suspected for committing acts of rape and gender-based violence. While trials were reportedly underway, only four soldiers had so far been convicted. [ 901 ] Transparency around these trials and investigations remain elusive. [ 902 ] It remains unclear, for instance, whether any of the cases concern abuses against civilians in Western Tigray and whether they also include violations by Amhara regional forces and militias.
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which has been undergoing reforms in recent years, has carried out several fact-finding investigations since the start of the conflict, including in Western Tigray. But the EHRC has voiced muted criticism of abuses by Ethiopian federal and regional forces. In its Mai Kadra investigation, the EHRC concluded that local Tigrayan police, militias, and an informal Tigrayan youth group were responsible for the massacre of at least 600 Amharas, but did not publish any findings about the retaliatory killings, mass arrests and detentions of Tigrayan residents, and extensive looting that was taking place at the time of their reporting. [ 903 ] Its brief monitoring report from Dansha and Humera acknowledged that some members of Amhara Special Forces, Amhara and Fano militias, Eritrean troops, and few members of the Ethiopian federal forces carried out looting of businesses. The Commission had also received multiple accounts of insults and harassment of Tigrayans. [ 904 ] It further stated that it received information that measures, `` though inadequate '' were being taken by some of these same forces, specifically ASF and militia to `` restor [ e ] peace and security in the area. `` [ 905 ] In Dansha, it noted that the security situation had `` improved '' although acknowledged that Tigrayans still expressed fear of harassment and attack. [ 906 ]
Following the joint investigation report by the EHRC and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) in November 2021 ( see International Investigations section below), the Ministry of Justice announced the establishment of an inter-ministerial taskforce to `` oversee redress and accountability measures in response to human rights violations committed in the context of the conflict in northern Ethiopia, '' and set up four committees on investigation and prosecution, refugees and IDP affairs, sexual and gender-based violence, and resource mobilization. It is unclear whether the committees will investigate the situation in Western Tigray.
In March 2021, the federal government accepted that the EHRC carry out a joint investigation with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR). In May 2021, the African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights ( ACHPR) established a Commission of Inquiry with a mandate to investigate allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the Tigray region. [ 907 ] Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry criticized the ACHPR for setting up a commission of inquiry on abuses committed in the Tigray conflict and instead requested a joint investigation. [ 908 ]
The OHCHR-EHRC completed its investigation and released its report on November 3, 2021. The report covered abuses during the first nine months of the conflict and found reasonable grounds to believe that widespread violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law had been committed by all parties to the conflict. [ 909 ] The report concluded that some of these violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. [ 910 ]
The report acknowledged that it was not a comprehensive investigation into the crisis. Its coverage of events in Western Tigray does not make any assessment of the relative scale and severity of violations of or the culpability of any of the warring parties. The report speaks about the `` modus operandi '' of Tigray Special Forces in carrying out arrests and beatings of non-Tigrayan residents in Humera during the first week of the conflict but does not describe how Amhara forces used the town as a site to arrest, detain, torture, execute, and forcibly disappear scores of Tigrayan residents in the town and in surrounding areas throughout the reporting period. [ 911 ] Similarly, the widespread pillage, denial of humanitarian aid, mass arrest, and rape of Tigrayan residents by Amhara forces is not described.
The report identifies waves of displacement, which includes both Amhara and Tigrayan populations. It speaks to fear as a driver of displacement, but also of violence. While describing the detention and transport of Tigrayans from Mai Kadra to the Tekeze, the report does not reflect the organized and coerced nature of these expulsions, nor does it establish a timeline of displacement affecting Tigrayan residents across the Western Tigray Zone or spell out who may be responsible.
The Ethiopian federal authorities ' statements concerning the alleged abuses committed against Tigrayan civilians in Western Tigray described in the report - some of which were previously reported in the media or by other organizations - have repeatedly denied or sought to downplay the role of federal and allied forces.
The Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Ministry said that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's characterization of events in Western Tigray as ethnic cleansing in March 2021 were `` completely unfounded and spurious. '' In addition, the ministry said that `` [ n ] othing during or after the end of the main law enforcement operation in Tigray can be identified or defined by any standards as a targeted, intentional ethnic cleansing against anyone in the region.. The Ethiopian government vehemently opposes such accusations. `` [ 912 ] The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the US of `` overblowing things out of proportions. `` [ 913 ]
In their media statements, Amhara regional authorities also rejected the charges of ethnic cleansing and denied allegations of abuses by Amhara forces in Western Tigray. The region's spokesman, Gizachew Muluneh, said reports of ethnic cleansing and mass displacement were `` propaganda, '' claiming that `` a few Tigrayans may be displaced, a few in number. `` [ 914 ] In response to Blinken's call for Amhara forces to leave Tigray, Gizachew said:
Gizachew acknowledged the Amhara region was administering the territory. He said that `` Tigrayans [ are ] welcome to stay '' and ignored journalists ' questions regarding abuses by Amhara forces. [ 916 ]
The authorities have denied or downplayed the violations committed by the Ethiopian federal forces. In a statement issued on May 21, 2021, Attorney General Gedion Timethewos said that `` the ENDF's effort to avoid armed confrontation in cities '' during the initial offensive `` has largely been successful in sparing. Humera, '' among other towns in Tigray, `` from the destruction that would have ensued had the ENDF engaged with TPLF forces in these cities. `` [ 917 ] The Attorney General said his office has brought charges against soldiers suspected of killing civilians or for sexual violence, and that some have been convicted. The publicly reported investigations of the Attorney General - renamed as the Ministry of Justice in October 2021) concerning Western Tigray have otherwise centered on the TPLF's attack on the northern command of the ENDF on November 3, 2020, as well as on Mai Kadra. [ 918 ]
Since November 2020, federal authorities have discredited accounts of Tigrayan refugees, overwhelmingly from Western Tigray, who fled to Sudan in the first two months of the conflict. [ 919 ] Federal authorities have also depicted mass killings in Mai Kadra as a one-sided massacre carried out by `` TPLF's troops and loyalists, '' discounting killings of Tigrayans. [ 920 ]
Finally, the federal government denied that Tigrayan civilians had been killed in Humera in mid-2021. On July 22, 2021 - days before bodies began to appear in Sudan in the Tekeze River - the `` Ethiopia Current Issues Fact Check, '' a Twitter account run by the federal government, issued a statement claiming that `` the TPLF [ was ] preparing to bury.300 bodies. in a mass grave to support their made-up propaganda of a massacre having taken place. The TPLF's digital propagandists have in the past two days already began fake claims of a massacre taking place in Humera. `` [ 921 ]
[ 1 ] The districts have slightly distinct names in Amharic and are referred to as: Tsegede is known as `` Tegede '' and Kafta Humera as `` Qabtiya '' or `` Qabtya Humera. ''
[ 2 ] Also known as the `` Setit River '' in Sudan.
[ 3 ] David Ottoway, `` From the archive,24 August 1974: Ethiopia's fallen aristocrats '', the Guardian, August 24, 2015, https: //www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/24/ethiopia-aristocracy-revolution-civil-war-1974.
[ 4 ] Christopher Clapham, `` Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, '', ( 1988), p 199.; Shiferaw Bekele, `` Monarchical Restoration and Territorial Expansion: The Ethiopian State in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century, '' at 159 in Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi ( Prunier and Fiquet ed) ( 2015). Aynalem Adugna and Helmut Kloos, `` Two Population Distribution Maps for Ethiopia Based on the 1984 Census, '' 9 Northeast African Studies 89, 90-92 ( 1987). See also Donald Crummey: Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa, ( 1986) Gebru Tareke, `` Peasant Resistance in Ethiopia: The Case of Weyane, '' 25 Journal of African History 77 ( 1984).
[ 5 ] Imperial Decree Number 1, 1942, amended as Decree Number 6, 1946
[ 6 ] While proclaiming the importance of Ethiopia's unity, the Derg at the same time acknowledged the need to recognize `` self-determination. '' Opportunities began opening for the country's marginalized ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. John Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, ( Boydell & Brewer, 2011); Getachew Assefa, `` The Constitutional Right to Self-determination as a Response to the 'Question of Nationalities ' in Ethiopia, '' International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 25, No. 1 1 2018.
In 1987, the Derg rolled out a plan to reorganize the administrative units to 25 administrative units and 5 autonomous regions. However, the plan was not fully implemented as the Derg was fighting multiple fronts in civil wars in Eritrea and Tigray. See http: //memory.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et 04 03.html. See also Mulatu Wubneh, `` Ethnic Identity Politics and the Restructuring of Administrative Units in Ethiopia '', International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 & 2, Special Issue 2017, pp. 105-138, p. 117. https: //www.jstor.org/stable/26586251.
[ 7 ] Mulatu Wubneh, `` Ethnic Identity Politics and the Restructuring of Administrative Units in Ethiopia, '' International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 & 2 ( 2017), pp.105-138 https: //www.jstor.org/stable/26586251.
[ 8 ] Gebru Tareke, `` The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa, '' African Studies Review, Vol52 Issue 3 ( 2013); Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers, ( 2011).
[ 9 ] Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia- Reckoning Under the Law, vol.6 No. 11, November 1994, https: //www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia94d.pdf; Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: End of an Era of Brutal Repression - A New Chance for Human Rights, '' June 18, 1991, https: //www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/196000/afr250051991en.pdf.
[ 10 ] John Young, `` Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia, '' Taylor & Francis, Vol.23 ( 1996), p. 531-542; see also Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: The Curtailment of Rights, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,1997), https: //www.hrw.org/reports/1997/ethiopia/Ethio97d-02.htm. Not all political parties, including those who had been opposed to the EPRDF, sent delegates.
[ 11 ] Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Negarit Gazeta, ( adopted July 22, 1991) https: //chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/the-transitional-period-charter-of-ethiopia.pdf; see also Jane Perlez, `` Talks on New Ethiopia to Affirm the Right to Secede, '' New York Times, July 4, 1991, https: //www.nytimes.com/1991/07/04/world/talks-on-a-new-ethiopia-affirm-right-to-secede.html; Markakis, Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers p. 232. The EPRDF formed at the end of 1980. It took its definitive form from 1991- 2018 comprising of four main political parties: The Tigray People's Liberation Front ( TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movements ( ANDM), the Oromo People's Democratic Organization ( OPDO), and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front ( SEPDF). Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995. `` Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa ( I.M. Lewis edition) ( 1983), Christopher Clapham, `` Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, '' 165 ( 1988).
[ 12 ] The Boundary Commission defined `` a nation, nationality or people '' as a `` group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory. The language was later included in the constitution. Article 39,46 of the Ethiopian Constitution.
[ 13 ] Sarah Vaughan, `` Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia, '' ( PH. D diss., University of Edinburgh,2003), https: //era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/id/1299/vaughanphd.pdf.
[ 14 ] `` Walqayte '' refers to a group of people historically inhabiting the highland areas collectively known as Kafta Humera, Welkait, Tsegede ( or Tegede in Amharic) who speak Tigrinya and Amharic. Semir Yusuf, `` What is Driving Ethiopia's Ethnic Conflict? '' Institute for Security Studies, ( 2019), pp. 3-4; See Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 141st Special Report: `` Stop the Violations of the Human Rights of Citizens Voicing Identity Demands! '' ( June 1, 2016), https: //ahrethio.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HRCO-141st-Special-Report-English.pdf; Ethiopian Human Rights Council, HRCO 143rd Special Report, Amharic, ( October 3, 2017), p 4-6, https: //ehrco.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/HRCO-143rd-Special-Report-Amharic-October-3-2017.pdf; See also interview with # 88 in Gondar, December 2019 ( alleging that resistance to the incorporation of the territories to Tigray began in 1992); Subsection on `` Settlement Patterns and Government Land Policies in the Contested Areas. ''
[ 15 ] The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995, https: //www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf. The interim period between the transitional government and the formal adoption of the 1995 constitution was marked by violence and insecurity in several regions, as well as a crackdown on members of the political opposition. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993, Ethiopia. https: //www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Afw-01.htm # P47 21729.
[ 16 ] Sarah Vaughan, `` Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the EPRDF's Ethiopia, '' Journal of Eastern African Studies ( 2012), https: //www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531055.2011.642520? journalCode=rjea20;
Elio Ficquet and Gerard Prunier, Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution, and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi. ( London: Hurst & Company, 2015); Goitom Gebreleul, `` Should Ethiopia Stick with Ethnic Federalism? '' Al Jazeera, April 5, 2019, https: //www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/4/5/should-ethiopia-stick-with-ethnic-federalism.
[ 17 ] The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, art 39 ( 1), https: //www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf; Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch documented grave human rights violations, including extrajudicial executions, mass arrests, torture and other forms of ill-treatment against critical voices. Human Rights Watch, One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure: Violations of Freedom of Expression and Association in Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2010), https: //www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ethiopia0310webwcover.pdf; Development Without Freedom: How Aid Underwrites Repression in Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2010), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2010/10/19/development-without-freedom/how-aid-underwrites-repression-ethiopia; They Know Everything We Do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2014), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do/telecom-and-internet-surveillance-ethiopia; Journalism is Not a Crime: Violations of Media Freedoms in Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch 2015), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/journalism-not-crime/violations-media-freedoms-ethiopia; Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: Deeper Reforms Needed, Amnesty International Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 33rd Session of the UPR Working Group, '' May 2019, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR2598652018ENGLISH.pdf; Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: 'Because I am Oromo ': Sweeping repression in the Oromia region of Ethiopia, October 28, 2014, https: //www.amnesty.org.uk/files/webfm/Documents/issues/repression in oromia - amnesty international report - 28 oct 14.pdf? VersionId=tlgBmcidqu8zAHTuJ1GAU0rzkFUfWk8U; Human Rights Watch, Such a brutal crackdown: Killings and arrests in response to the Oromo Protests ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2016), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests); Fuel on Fire: Security Force Response to the 2016 Irreecha Cultural Festival, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2017), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/20/fuel-fire/security-force-response-2016-irreecha-cultural-festival; We Are Like the Dead: Torture and other Human Rights Abuse in Jail Ogaden, Somali Regional State Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2018), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/04/we-are-dead/torture-and-other-human-rights-abuses-jail-ogaden-somali-regional. Rights groups also documented serious human rights abuses that amount to crimes against humanity in the Gambella region in 2003 and in the Somali region in 2007. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Targeting Anuak: Human Rights Violations and Crimes Against Humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2005), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2005/03/23/targeting-anuak/human-rights-violations-and-crimes-against-humanity-ethiopias; Collective Punishment: War Crimes in Ogaden area in Ethiopia's Somali Region, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,2008), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2008/06/12/collective-punishment/war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-ogaden-area.
[ 18 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Council, HRCO 143rd Special Report, October 3, 2017, pp.4-6, https: //ehrco.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/HRCO-143rd-Special-Report-Amharic-October-3-2017.pdf. The Ethiopian Human Rights Council is a nongovernmental organization in Ethiopia established in 1991. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission is the national human rights institution established by the government in 2000, reporting to Ethiopia's lower house of parliament, the House of People's Representatives.
[ 19 ] Amnesty International, Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Force in Amhara and Oromia, ( May 29,2020), p 13, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/2358/2020/en/; Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Justice Needed for Deadly October Violence, ( New York: Human Rights Watch April 1, 2020), https: //www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/ethiopia-justice-needed-deadly-october-violence.; Ethiopia Violence a Concern Despite Reform Promises, ( New York: Human Rights Watch, August 15, 2018) https: //www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/15/ethiopia-violence-concern-despite-reform-promises.; Ethiopian Human Rights Council, HRCO 143rd Special Report, October 3, 2017, https: //ehrco.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/HRCO-143rd-Special-Report-Amharic-October-3-2017.pdf.
[ 20 ] Ibid.
[ 21 ] Gedifew Sewenet Yigzaw and Endalsasa Belay Abitew, `` Causes and Impacts of Internal Displacement in Ethiopia, '' African Journal of Social Work, Vol. 9, No. 2 ( 2019), p. 36, https: //www.ajol.info/index.php/ajsw/article/view/192193.
[ 22 ] Jason W. Clay and Bonnie K. Holcomb, Politics, and the Ethiopian Famine:1984-1985, ( Cambridge,1987); Library of Congress, http: //memory.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et 04 05.html.
[ 23 ] Christopher Clapham, `` Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia '', Africa Studies Review, Vol 32 No.3 ( 1988), pp. 104, 185; See also, John Markakis and Naga Ayele, `` Class and Revolution in Ethiopia, '' Journal of Modern African Studies, ( Nottingham: Spokesman Press,1978) pp. 59.
[ 24 ] Human Rights Watch, Evil Days:30 years of war and famine in Ethiopia, ( New York: Human Rights Watch,1999), https: //www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf;
Kassahun Berhanu, `` Returnees ' Experiences of Resettlement in Humera, '' in Moving People in Ethiopia, ed. Alula Pankhurst et al. ( Boydell and Brewer, 2009), p. 199.
[ 25 ] Laura Hammond, `` Governmentality in Motion: 25 Years of Ethiopia's Experience of Famine and Migration Policy, '' Mobilities, Vol.6 No.3 ( 2011): 423, Doi: 10.1080/17450101.2011.590038.; Kassahun Berhanu, Returnees, Resettlement and Power Relations: The Making of a Political Constituency in Humera, Ethiopia, ( Vu University Press, 2001), p. 203.
[ 26 ] Ahmed Ali Egeh and Dechassa Lemessa, UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia `` Ethiopia: Update on humanitarian situation of war- and drought-affected population in Tigray, '' April 2, 2003, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-update-humanitarian-situation-war-and-drought-affected-population-tigray ( Stating that `` during 1978/79, the former Settlement Authority of the Ministry of Agriculture moved about 2,000 families from various urban centres in Western Ethiopia to Setit Humera for settlement.again in 1993/94, over 30,000 returnees from the Sudan were reintegrated in Humera area ( Adebay, Rawyan, Mikadra resettlement villages:). See also Laura Hammond, `` Humera Repatriation Report II ( Part I), United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia: Returnees in Humera, '' May 1994, https: //www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Humera Repat 2.html. John Bruce, Allan Hoben, and Dessalegn Rahmato, `` After the Derg: An Assessment of Rural Land Tenure Issues in Ethiopia, `` March 1994, https: //minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/61013/rpderg.pdf? sequence=1 & isAllowed=y.
[ 27 ] Kassahun Berhanu, Resettlement and Power Relations: The Making of a Political Constituency in Humera, ( Ethiopia: Vu Publishers,2001), p. 204.
[ 28 ] Laura Hammond, `` Humera Repatriation Report II '', Moving people in Ethiopia p. 40; Kassahun Berhanu, Resettlement and Power Relations: The Making of a Political Constituency in Humera, ( ( Ethiopia: Vu Publishers,2001), pp. 23 and 204.
[ 29 ] Kassahun Berhanu, `` Returnees ' Experiences of Resettlement in Humera, '' in Moving People in Ethiopia, ed. Alula Pankhurst et al. ( Boydell and Brewer, 2009), p. 203. See also Ahmed Ali Egeh and Dechassa Lemessa, UN-Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, `` Update on Humanitarian Situation of war and drought affected population in Tigray, Assessment Mission, '' February 2003, https: //apps.who.int/disasters/repo/9257.pdf; Laura Hammond, `` Humera Repatriation Report II ( Part I), United Nations Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia: Returnees in Humera, '' May 1994, https: //www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/Humera Repat 2.html.
[ 30 ] Laura Hammond, `` Governmentality in Motion: 25 Years of Ethiopia's Experience of Famine and Migration Policy '' Mobilities, 6 ( 2011); Kassahun Berhanu, Resettlement and Power Relations: The Making of a Political Constituency in Humera, Ethiopia ( 2001), pp. 23 and 203-04 ( host population contributed labor and construction material for temporary shelters where returnees could be housed).
[ 31 ] Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe, `` Transition from war to peace: the Ethiopian disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, '' African Security Review, Vol 26 No. 2 ( 2017), p. 143, https: //www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10246029.2017.1297580? needAccess=true
[ 32 ] World Bank, `` World Bank Discussion Paper 331, Africa Technical Department Series, '' shorturl.at/dgkwS; Alula Pankhurst and Francois Piguet, `` Moving People in Ethiopia '' 19 ( 2009); Dawit Anagaw, `` The Socio-Economic Reintegration of The Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters in The Post 1991 Conflict: The Case of Dansha-Division Settlement, Tigray, '' Addis Ababa University Thesis, 2011, http: //etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/10304? show=full.
[ 33 ] Joachim D. Ahrens, `` Evacuees from border towns in Tigray setting up in makeshift camps: Mission 9- 18 December 1998 '', UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia ( 1998), https: //www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/tigray01.html
[ 34 ] Ahmed Ali Egeh and Dechassa Lemessa, `` Update on Humanitarian Situation of war and drought affected population in Tigray, Assessment Mission, '' ( February 2003), United Nations Emergency Unit for Ethiopia, https: //apps.who.int/disasters/repo/9257.pdf.
[ 35 ] See Settlement Patterns subsection. Interview with # 88, Gondar, December 2019 ( alleging that resistance to the incorporation of the territories to Tigray began in 1992). See also `` Exclusive Interview: After Deadly Protests in Gondar What Should the Government do Next? '' Addis Standard, July 12, 2016, https: //addisstandard.com/exclusive-interview-deadly-protests-gondar-government-next/.; US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, 115th Congress, `` Democracy Under Threat in Ethiopia, '' March 9, 2017, https: //www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24585/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg24585.pdf ( Statement by Tewodrose Tirfe, co-founder of Amhara Association for America, alleging that `` The TPLF-led government has forcefully annexed historical Amhara lands of Wolkite, Tegede, Humera, Tselemti, and Raya-Azebo to Tigray. Under the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the TPLF transferred thousands of Tigray settlers to the annexed Amhara land in an attempt to change the demographic make-up of the region. ``); Laura Hammond, This Place Will Become Home: Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia, ( 2004).
[ 36 ] Giovanni Ellero, `` Il Uolcait, '' Rassegna di Studi Etiopici, Vol. 7 No.1 ( 1948), p. 89, https: //www.jstor.org/stable/41299451
[ 37 ] `` Ethiopia's Muslim protests, '' The New Humanitarian, November 15, 2012, https: //www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2012/11/15/ethiopia-s-muslim-protests.; See also Abadir M. Ibrahim and Awol Allo, `` Redefining protest in Ethiopia: what happens to the 'terror ' narrative when Muslims call for a secular state? '' Open Democracy, October 23, 2021, https: //www.opendemocracy.net/en/redefining-protest-in-ethiopia-what-happens-to-terror-narrative-when- musl/.; `` Ethiopia: Prominent Muslims Detained in Crackdown, '' Human Rights Watch news release, August 15, 2012, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/15/ethiopia-prominent-muslims-detained-crackdown #.; `` Ethiopian repression of Muslim protests must stop, '' Amnesty International, news release, August 8, 2013, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/08/ethiopian-repression-of-muslim-protests-must-stop/.
[ 38 ] Mistir Sew, `` Amhara nationalism at the polls in Ethiopia, '' Ethiopian Insight, June 7, 2021, https: //www.ethiopia-insight.com/2021/06/07/amhara-nationalism-at-the-polls-in-ethiopia/.
[ 39 ] Sonja John, `` The Potential of Democratization in Ethiopia: The Welkait Question as a Litmus Test, '' Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.56 No. 5 ( 2021), https: //journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096211007657.
[ 40 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Council 141st Special Report, `` Stop the Violations of the Human Rights of Citizens Voicing Identity Demands! '' June 1, 2016, https: //ahrethio.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HRCO-141st-Special-Report-English.pdf;
See also Demands of Welkait People, unpublished, p 25.
[ 41 ] John, `` The Potential of Democratization in Ethiopia: The Welkait Question as a Litmus Test, '' https: //journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096211007657.
[ 42 ] John, `` The Potential of Democratization in Ethiopia: The Welkait Question as a Litmus Test, '' https: //journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096211007657; See also Article 48, Article 62 sub article 3 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution.; See also Tilahun Adamu Zewudie, '' The Constitutionality of the `` Administrative boundaries and Identity issues commission Establishment Proclamation, '' Addis Standard, January 8, 2019, https: //addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Special-Edition-in-PDF-By-Tilahun-.pdf
[ 43 ] `` Ethiopia: Lethal Force Against Protesters, '' Human Rights Watch news release, December 18, 2015, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/18/ethiopia-lethal-force-against-protesters.
[ 44 ] International Crisis Group, `` Managing Ethiopia's Unsettled Transition, '' February 21, 2019, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/269-managing-ethiopias-unsettled-transition; Solomon Father, `` Government's patience is running out '', `` Voice of America -Amharic service, Feb. 13, 2016, https: //amharic.voanews.com/a/welkait-ethiopia-ethnic-group/3188960.html? fbclid=IwAR26cIjP9LON8d-8jEipWd6YSR5lR8yDcnyPLMt-NE8uDitYpI4iAI7r280 ( Residents in Mai Kadra complain over harassment by local authorities over raising the Welkait issue).
[ 45 ] Human Rights Watch, Such a Brutal Crackdown: Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia's Oromo Protests, ( New York: Human Rights Watch, 2016), https: //www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-response-ethiopias-oromo-protests # 1963 ( In December 2015 and early 2016, protester demands widened to include the release of political prisoners, economic justice, and genuine political representation, as well as administrative autonomy of the Oromia region).
[ 46 ] Zecharias Zelalem, `` Amhara Protests Stalwarts Released, Government Remains Mum on Welkait Issue, '' OPride, February 23, 2018, https: //www.opride.com/2018/02/23/amhara-protest-stalwarts-released-government-remains-mum-welkait-issue/; Salem Solomon, `` What is Fueling Ethiopia's Protests, '' Voice of America News, August 10, 2016, https: //www.voanews.com/a/what-is-fueling-ethiopia-protests/3459102.html; `` Welkait Tsegede Case Sent to Tigray Region Said Colonel Demeke, '' Voice of America News, Tigrigna News, April 8, 2016, https: //tigrigna.voanews.com/a/welkite-tsgedie-case-sent-to-tigray-region-said-colonel-demeke/3276789.html; `` Colonel Demeke Zewde on Welkit and Tsegedie Question of Identity Part 2, '' Voice of America News, Tigrigna News, March 28, 2016, https: //tigrigna.voanews.com/a/colonel-demeke-zewdu-on-welkite-and-tsegedie-question-of-identity-part-2/3258444.html;
[ 47 ] `` Welkait people demanding to be Amhara, '' video clip, You Tube, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=Ny1P5bKFI6I & t=89s; see also `` Ethiopia: Dozens killed as police use excessive force against peaceful protesters, '' Amnesty International press release, August 8,2016), https: //www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/ethiopia-dozens-killed-as-police-use-excessive-force-against-peaceful-protesters/; `` News: Several killed as Ethiopian police force attempt to arrest individuals, sparking city wide protest in Gondar, '' Addis Standard, July 14, 2016, https: //addisstandard.com/news-several-killed-ethiopian-police-force-attempt-arrest-individuals-sparking-city-wide-protest-gondar/; `` Ten killed during protests in northern Ethiopia, '' Al Jazeera, July 15, 2016, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/7/15/ten-killed-during-protests-in-northern-ethiopia; William Davison, `` Ethnic tensions in Gondar reflect the toxic nature of Ethiopian politics, '' the Guardian, December 22, 2016, https: //www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/dec/22/gondar-ethiopia-ethnic-tensions-toxic-politics ( `` When security forces tried to arrest Zewdu, who is a member of a committee campaigning over the, armed Amharas protected him and several people, including security officers, were killed. ``).
[ 48 ] See Amhara Prosperity Party Facebook Post on July 12, 2021, https: //www.facebook.com/AMHARAPPOffice/posts/3173932216177422. Dejene Maru in 2016 began fighting with government forces in between Soroka, Amhara region and Dansha, Tigray.
[ 49 ] See Amhara Prosperity Party Facebook post reflecting on the anniversary of the incident ( July 12, 2021), https: //www.facebook.com/AMHARAPPOffice/posts/3173932216177422; `` Several Killed as Ethiopian Police Force Attempt to Arrest Individuals, Sparking City Wide protest in Gondar, '' Addis Standard, July 14, 2016, https: //addisstandard.com/news-several-killed-ethiopian-police-force-attempt-arrest-individuals-sparking-city-wide-protest-gondar/; `` Another Restive Region, '' Africa Confidential, Vol. 57 No. 15 ( 2016), http: //www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11725/Another restive region; William Davison, `` Ethnic Tensions in Gondar Reflect Toxic Nature of Ethiopian Politics, '' the Guardian, December 22, 2016, https: //www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/dec/22/gondar-ethiopia-ethnic-tensions-toxic-politics.
[ 50 ] `` Another Restive Region, '' Africa Confidential, Vol.57 No. 15 ( 2016), https: //www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11725/Another restive region; https: //tesfanews.net/anti-tigrayan-revolt-spreads-across-ethiopia/
[ 51 ] Aside from Colonel Demeke Zewdu, Welkait Committee Members including Atalay Zafe, Alene Shama, Getachew Ademe, Teshager Woldemicael, and Mebratu Getahun were among those arrested in Gondar that month. Only One Ethiopia Twitter page, July 2016, https: //twitter.com/OnlyOneEthiopia/status/755561545183088640? ref src=twsrc% 5Etfw% 7Ctwcamp% 5Etweetembed% 7Ctwterm% 5E755561545183088640% 7Ctwgr% 5E% 7Ctwcon% 5Es1 & ref url=https% 3A% 2F% 2Ftesfanews.net% 2Fethiopia-whats-behind-gondar-protests% 2F.
[ 52 ] Ismail Akwei, `` Tens of thousands of protesters call for a regime change in Ethiopia, '' Africa News, July 31, 2016, https: //www.africanews.com/2016/07/31/half-a-million-protesters-call-for-a-regime-change-in-ethiopia/; `` The Centre Holds on, '' Africa Confidential, Vol.57 No.17 ( 2016), https: //www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11754/The centre holds on;
Salem Solomon, `` What is Fueling Ethiopia's Protests, '' Voice of America, August 10, 2016, https: //www.voanews.com/a/what-is-fueling-ethiopia-protests/3459102.html
[ 54 ] `` Ethiopia: Dozens killed as police use excessive force against peaceful protesters, '' Amnesty International press release, August 8, 2016, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/08/ethiopia-dozens-killed-as-police-use-excessive-force-against-peaceful-protesters/; Zecharias Zelalem, `` Amhara protest stalwarts released but government remains mum on Welkait issue, '' Opride, February 23, 2018, https: //www.opride.com/2018/02/23/amhara-protest-stalwarts-released-government-remains-mum-welkait-issue/; Ismail Akwei, '' Tens of thousands of protesters call for regime change in Ethiopia, '' Africa News, July 31, 2016, https: //www.africanews.com/2016/07/31/half-a-million-protesters-call-for-a-regime-change-in-ethiopia/; Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, `` The boundary crisis behind Ethiopia's protest, '' Africa News, August 2, 2016, https: //www.africanews.com/2016/08/02/the-powerful-vs-the-populous-the-boundary-crisis-behind-ethiopia-s-protest/.
[ 55 ] Dutch-owned Esmeralda flower farm near Bahir Dar was burned in August. Aaron Maasho, `` Foreign-owned flower farms attacked in Ethiopia unrest, '' Reuters, September 2, 2016, https: //www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-violence/foreign-owned-flower-farms-attacked-in-ethiopia-unrest-growers-idINKCN11824U.
[ 56 ] Letter from Human Rights Watch to the UN Human Rights Council on Ethiopia, `` Joint Letter to UN Human Rights Council on Ethiopia, '' September 8, 2016, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/joint-letter-un-human-rights-council-ethiopia.
[ 57 ] Ibid.
[ 58 ] `` The Centre Holds on, '' Africa Confidential, Vol.57 No.17 ( 2016), https: //www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/11754/The centre holds on.
[ 59 ] Abdi Latif Dahir, `` Ethiopia's crisis is a result of decades of land disputes and ethnic power battles, '' Quartz Africa, October 30, 2016, https: //qz.com/africa/822258/ethiopias-ordinary-tigray-minority-is-caught-in-the-middle-of-oromo-protests/.
[ 60 ] International Crisis Group, `` Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia's North, '' June 12, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b156-bridging-divide-ethiopias-north Samuel Getachew ( Interview with Debretsion Gebremichael ( Ph.D.)), `` Blocking roads and prohibiting grains from coming to Tigray is a grave crime, '' The Reporter, ( June 15, 2019), https: //www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/blocking-roads-and-prohibiting-grains-coming-tigray-grave-crime? cf chl managed tk =pmd hhTYi2CqB9kYOu6fvwh8m45sqtfEGwNTHmYcJIAvA8o-1631528610-0-gqNtZGzNAxCjcnBszRNR; `` '' Tedjemerwal '': ressorts sociaux, enjeux materiels et significations locales d'une entree en guerre, '' ( November 17, 2020), https: //polaf.hypotheses.org/7196 # identifier 36 7196.
[ 61 ] `` Ethiopia's Economic Gains Tainted by Violent Repression, '' Financial Times, February 3, 2017, https: //www.ft.com/content/31ffc7aa-e9fd-11e6-967b-c88452263daf.;
Jeffery Gettleman, `` A Generation is Protesting in Ethiopia, long a US Ally, '' New York Times, August 13, 2016, https: //www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/world/africa/ethiopia-protests.html; Yohannes Woldemariam, `` The Unenviable Situation of Tigreans in Ethiopia, '' post to `` LSE '' ( blog), March 28, 2018, https: //blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/03/28/the-unenviable-situation-of-tigreans-in-ethiopia/ ( `` Tigrean-owned businesses have been attacked in Oromia and in the Amhara region. In some cases, there are reports that innocent Tigreans have been seriously injured or murdered. Others have abandoned their livelihoods to flee to Tigray. As the situation worsens, the daily life of innocent Tigreans living in Ethiopia is increasingly precarious '').
[ 62 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021. See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ethiopia: IDP Situation Report, May 2019, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/idp situation report june 13 2019 final.pdf.
[ 63 ] For instance, Tigrayans in 2017 were beaten up and taken to prison in Abderafi, a town in north Gondar zone in the Amhara region that sits on the border with Tigray. Interviews with Haileselassie and # 214 in Sudan, December 2020. Interview with # 1, Sudan, January 2021; with Askuwal in May 2021.
[ 64 ] Interview with # 1, Sudan, January 2021 lived Abderafi, in the Amhara region until November 2020 and explained how daily workers known as salug came and told `` Tigrayan residents to leave town '' around Ethiopian New Year in 2019. Interview with # 207, Sudan, December 2020 lived in Abderafi said: `` You [ couldn't ] do your job properly as people were being abducted. They were picking up young people... The administration said: 'We can't solve the tensions and the racism ' and just told us to leave. '' See also phone interviews with Samuel and Tadele, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 65 ] Phone interview with Samuel and Tadele, Tigray, May 2021. Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021 ( Andom for instance explained that in 2016 local tensions over land grew in tabia Irob, a settlement in Ruwassa and turned into fights between Walqaytes and resettled Tigrayans and Irob communities.); See also `` The Case of Welkait, '' Voice of America Amharic Service, August 25, 2020 https: //amharic.voanews.com/a/wolkayit-arrest-tigray-8-25-2020/5557672.html.
[ 66 ] See interviews with Zelalem, # 91 Gondar, Amhara region, December 2019. Interview # 91 saying `` we stayed silent outside the house because we couldn't speak in Amharic. ''
[ 67 ] Interview with # 300, Gondar, December 2019. Interviewee was a farmer in Mai-Kadra, said that he was arrested in November 2018 and held at unofficial place of detention for nearly a month where he was tortured together with other 11 Amharas. Interview with # 87 in Gondar, December 2019. Interviewee, said he advocated for the Welkait Identity Committee, said he was displaced from Adi Remets to Gondar after facing multiple arrests in 2019, during which Tigrayan ENDF soldiers called him `` a thief and the enemy of Tigray. ``.
Interview with Hiruy, Gondar, December 2019. ( Hiruy also believed he was detained for his role in the committee and said that he and other nine people had been in pre-trial detention charged with instigating violence until the charges were withdrawn after the appointment of Prime Minster Abiy n April 2018).; See also Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 141st Special Report, `` Stop the Violations of the Human Rights of Citizens Voicing Identity Demands! '' June 1, 2016, https: //ahrethio.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HRCO-141st-Special-Report-English.pdf; `` Government's patience is running out, '' Voice of America Amharic service, February 13, 2016, https: //amharic.voanews.com/a/welkait-ethiopia-ethnic-group/3188960.html? fbclid=IwAR26cIjP9LON8d-8jEipWd6YSR5lR8yDcnyPLMt-NE8uDitYpI4iAI7r280 ( Residents in Mai Kadra complain over harassment by local authorities over raising the Welkait issue).
[ 68 ] Human Rights Council, 141st Special Report, `` Stop the Violation of Human Rights of Citizens Voicing Identity Related Demands! '' June 1,2016, pp. 7-9.
[ 69 ] Protection Cluster Ethiopia, `` Interagency Rapid Protection Assessment - Gondar, Amhara region 11-14 March 2019, '' March,2019, https: //www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Interagency-Rapid-Protection-Assessment Gondar-Amhara-Region 11-14-March-2019.pdf. ( ( `` It was also reported that Amhara IDPs are arriving in Gondar from Dansha in Tigray Region, due to the recent conflict related to the presence of trucks with Amhara plate numbers in Dansha and the surrounding areas. The conflict has caused burning of houses and cars. '')
[ 70 ] `` Protection Cluster Ethiopia: Interagency Rapid Protection Assessment -Gondar, Amhara Region 11-14 March 2019, '' March 2019, https: //www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Interagency-Rapid-Protection-Assessment Gondar-Amhara-Region 11-14-March-2019.pdf.
[ 71 ] Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: `` Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, '' May 29,2020, pp. 13-14, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/2358/2020/en/; Human Rights Watch, `` Ethiopia: Abiy's First Year as Prime Minister, Review of Conflict and Internally Displaced Persons, '' commentary, April 19, 2019, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/09/ethiopia-abiys-first-year-prime-minister-review-conflict-and-internally-displaced.
[ 72 ] European Institute for Peace, `` The Special Police in Ethiopia, '' October 2021, https: //www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SpecialPoliceEthiopia-8-Oct-2021-CLEAN.pdf.
[ 73 ] European Institute for Peace, `` The Special Police in Ethiopia, '' October 2021, https: //www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SpecialPoliceEthiopia-8-Oct-2021-CLEAN.pdf.
[ 74 ] Semir Yusuf, `` Drivers of Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Ethiopia, '' Institute for Security Studies, December 2019, https: //issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono-202-2.pdf.; See also Human Rights Watch, `` Ethiopia: Growing Uncertainty Marks Abiy's First Year in Power, '' commentary, April 2, 2019, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/02/ethiopia-growing-uncertainty-marks-abiys-first-year-power.
[ 75 ] The term `` Fano '' historically refers to armed peasants who accompanied imperial armies, without being members. During the 2016-2018 protest movement, Fano was self-described defense groups made up of young people.
[ 76 ]. Amnesty International, `` Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, '' May 29,2020, pp. 35-40, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/2358/2020/en/. ( For example, during the attack on Qimant neighborhood on January 10, 2019, that lasted for 24 hours, a joint operation of Fanosand the Amhara police forces killed Qimant residents and destroyed property. At the same time, the ENDF forces stationed nearby did nothing to stop the attack despite the repeated appeals for rescue by the Qimant community members).
[ 77 ] `` Fano Will Not Lay Down Arms If Demands Are Not Met: Chairman, '' Ezega News, March 28, 2020, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/7856/Fano-Will-Not-Lay-Down-Arms-If-Demands-Are-Not-Met-Chairman; See also Amnesty International, `` Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, May 29, 2020.
[ 78 ] Nizar Manek, `` Abiy Ahmed's reforms have unleashed forces he can no longer control, '' Foreign Policy, July 4, 2019, https: //foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/04/abiy-ahmeds-reforms-have-unleashed-forces-he-can-no-longer-control-ethiopia-amhara-asaminew-adp-adfm/. Asaminew was a former rebel fighter against Derg who was serving a life imprisonment in 2009 for an alleged coup attempt. In 2018, he was given amnesty: `` The politics behind the putsch, '' Africa Confidential, Vol.60 No.13 ( 2019), https: //www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/12687/The politics behind the putsch. Asaminew was assassinated in June 22, 20219
[ 79 ] Semir Yusuf, `` Drivers of Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Ethiopia, '' Institute for Security Studies, ( December 2019), https: //issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/mono-202-2.pdf.
[ 80 ] Amhara Police Commission Facebook post, https: //www.facebook.com/permalink.php? story fbid=1532487200245648 & id=149829718511410 ( accessed March 24, 2020)
[ 81 ] Amhara Police Commission Facebook post, https: //www.facebook.com/permalink.php? story fbid=1532487200245648 & id=149829718511410 ( accessed March 24, 2020)
[ 82 ] Ethiopia, ``??????????????????????????????????????????????????, '' Mereja, ( March 27, 2020), https: //mereja.com/amharic/v2/243595? fbclid=IwAR0w2aOiYClqTqdJsd1CLxoa7UJZ5fsjyPfSxwvZ9LaehXDDEXcuVtr.HED0.
[ 83 ] Ethiopia, ``??????????????????????????????????????????????????, '' Mereja, March 27, 2020 https: //mereja.com/amharic/v2/243595? fbclid=IwAR0w2aOiYClqTqdJsd1CLxoa7UJZ5fsjyPfSxwvZ9LaehXDDEXcuVtr.HED0. Since the outbreak of the war in November 2020, tensions between the government and the Fanos have eased significantly and the Fano militia has been one of the main forces fighting alongside the ENDF, especially in Western Tigray. The Amhara Broadcast Corporation in August reported that the scattered Fano structures have formed a front in the fight against the Tigrayan forces. Amhara Broadcasting Corporation, ``???????????????????????????????? ( Fanos operating in different organizations formed a front), '' YouTube, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=-RmaKHrv6Fo, August 27, 2021.
[ 84 ] `` Ethiopia PM: Security agencies committed 'terrorist acts, '' Al Jazeera, June 18, 2018, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/19/ethiopia-pm-security-agencies-committed-terrorist-acts. He replaced two members of the TPLF who held powerful positions in the security sector: Samora Yunis, the army chief, and brought charges against Getachew Assefa, the former intelligence chief. Getachew Assefa had been accused of enabling the rise of abusive regional security units, such as in the Somali region.
Felix Horne, `` Ethiopia Torture Victims Deserve Justice, '' Human Rights Watch News Release, July 13, 2018, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/13/ethiopia-torture-victims-deserve-justice; Zecharias Zelalem, `` It wasn't me! Under fire Abdi Iley pleads innocence in unhinged speeches amid dismissal rumors, '' Opride, July 12, 2018, https: //www.opride.com/2018/07/12/it-wasnt-me-under-fire-abdi-illey-pleads-innocence-in-unhinged-speeches-amid-dismissal-rumours/.
[ 85 ] `` Tigray Government Refuses to Hand Over Getachew Assefa - Attorney General '', Ezega News, January 5, 2018, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/6883/Tigray-Government-Refuses-to-Hand-Over-Getachew-Assefa-Attorney-General
[ 86 ] '' Tigray Government Refuses to Hand Over Getachew Assefa - Attorney General, '' Ezega News, January 5, 2018, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/6883/Tigray-Government-Refuses-to-Hand-Over-Getachew-Assefa-Attorney-General; International Crisis Group, `` Toward an End to Ethiopia's Federal-Tigray Feud, `` August 14, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b160-toward-end-ethiopias-federal-tigray-feud.
[ 87 ] International Crisis Group, `` Bridging the Divide in the Country's North, '' June 12, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b156-bridging-divide-ethiopias-north.
[ 88 ] `` President Isaias ' speech on Martyrs Day, '' Eritrea Ministry of Information, June 20,2018, https: //shabait.com/2018/06/20/president-isaias-speech-on-martyrs-day/.
[ 89 ] Goitom Gebreleul, `` Ethiopia and Eritrea's second rapproachement, '' Al-Jazeera, September 18, 2018, https: //www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/9/18/ethiopia-and-eritreas-second-rapprochement
[ 90 ] Kalkidan Yibetal, `` Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed gets a new ruling party, '' BBC News, Nov 22, 2019, https: //www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50515636. See also International Crisis Group, `` Bridging the Divide in the Country's North, '' June 12, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b156-bridging-divide-ethiopias-north ( stating that `` Several Amhara politicians, as well as other government and opposition figures, more broadly suspect the TPLF of seeking to sabotage the transition. `` The TPLF sponsors every conflict in Ethiopia '', said a federal minister from Amhara. ''). International Crisis Group, `` Toward an End to Ethiopia's Federal-Tigray Feud, '' August 14, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b160-toward-end-ethiopias-federal-tigray-feud.
[ 91 ] In June 2020, Temesgen Tiruneh, former Amhara regional president ( director general of Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service ( NISS) as of November 2020), declared his administration's plans to regain lands that were `` illegally taken '' by the Tigray region.
`` Amhara president announces plan to regain illegally taken lands, '' Ezega News, July 23,2020, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/8035/Amhara-President-Announces-Plan-to-Regain-Illegally-Taken-Lands-; See also Samuel Getachew, `` Blocking roads and prohibiting grains from coming to Tigray isa grave crime, '' the Reporter, June 15, 2019, https: //bit.ly/3JVotkG
[ 92 ] Article 4 of the Administrative Boundary and Identity Issues Commission Establishment Proclamation No.1101 /2019.
[ 93 ] Phone interview with Professor Tassew Woldehana, Addis Ababa, July 2021. According to Professor Tassew Woldehana, president of Addis Ababa University, the Tigray government filed an application at the House of the Federation against the constitutionality of the commission, which was later quashed by the House of the Federation. See also `` Identities and Boundary Commission, '' DW Amharic Service, December 12, 2018, https: //p.dw.com/p/3AS1q/.; International Crisis Group, `` Keeping Ethiopia's Transition on the Rails, '' December 16, 2019, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/283-keeping-ethiopias-transition-rails; International Crisis Group, `` Bridging the Divide in the Country's North, '' June 12, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b156-bridging-divide-ethiopias-north
[ 94 ] Federal Negarit Gazeta, Art.3 ( 3), `` A Proclamation to Establish Administrative Boundary and Identity Issues Commission, Proclamation No. 1101 /2019, '' February 8, 2019, https: //chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Proclamation-No.-1101-2019-Administrative-Boundary-and-Identity-Issues-Commission.pdf. See also Tilahun Adama Zewdie, `` Special Edition: The Constitutionality of the `` Administrative Boundaries and Identity Issues Commission Establishment Proclamation, '' Addis Standard, January 8, 2019, https: //addisstandard.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Special-Edition-in-PDF-By-Tilahun-.pdf.
[ 95 ] '' AAU To Conduct Study on Administrative, Border Issues '', ( blog), Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington D.C, June 13, 2020, https: //ethiopianembassy.org/aau-to-conduct-study-on-administrative-border-issues-june-13-2020/
[ 96 ] Phone interview with Professor Tassew Woldehana, July 2021, about the work of the Administrative Boundary and Identity Issues Commission.
[ 97 ] International Crisis Group, `` Steering Ethiopia's Crisis Away from Conflict '', October 30, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b162-steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict
[ 98 ] `` Religious Leaders to Mediate Dispute Between Federal Government and TPLF, '' Ezega News, June 15, 2020, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/7984/Religious-Leaders-to-Mediate-Dispute-Between-Federal-Government-and-TPLF; International Crisis Group, `` Steering Ethiopia's Crisis Away from Conflict, October 30, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b162-steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict; International Crisis Group, `` Toward an End to Ethiopia's Federal-Tigray Feud, '' August 14, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b160-toward-end-ethiopias-federal-tigray-feud.
[ 99 ] International Crisis Group, `` Steering Ethiopia's Tigray Crisis Away from Conflict, '' October 30, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b162-steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict.
[ 100 ] International Crisis Group, `` Steering Ethiopia's Crisis Away from Conflict, '' October 30, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b162-steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict.
[ 101 ] International Crisis Group, `` Steering Ethiopia's Crisis Away from Conflict, '' October 30, 2020, https: //www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b162-steering-ethiopias-tigray-crisis-away-conflict.
[ 102 ] `` Isaias Afwerki, Abiy Ahmed Plotting War Against Tigray Region: TPLF, '' Ezega News, October 25, 2020, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/8200/Isaias-Afwerki-Abiy-Ahmed-Plotting-War-Against-Tigray-Region-TPLF
[ 103 ] Siyanne Mekonnen, `` Analysis: Crisis Staring Tigray, Federal Governments 'In the Eye ' As Army Caught in the Mix, Relations Plummet to New Low, '' Addis Standard, October 31, 2020, https: //addisstandard.com/analysis-crisis-staring-tigray-federal-governments-in-the-eye-as-army-is-caught-in-the-mix-relations-plummet-to-new-low/; `` Ethiopia to Establish Two Additional Regiments, '' Fana news, October 20, 2020, https: //www.fanabc.com/english/nation-to-establish-two-additional-regiments/? fbclid=IwAR3qkj3lj5FWYT5OqpK3d7GfgfmmyATSg6G2ur8vk6x-8N-WF4fs 3T3enM.
[ 104 ] `` Ethiopia's Tigray blocks general's appointment in blow to Abiy, '' Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/ethiopia-tigray-blocks-generals-appointment-in-swipe-at-abiy
[ 105 ] `` Amhara region police chief reveals how region's police force guided federal steel-clad mechanized forces to join the `` war '' in Tigray, '' Addis Standard, January 4, 2021, https: //addisstandard.com/news-analysis-amhara-region-police-chief-reveals-how-regions-police-force-guided-federal-steel-clad-mechanized-forces-to-join-war-in-tigray/.; See also, Debretsion Gebremichael ( translated by Medihane Ekubamichael, '' We have prepared our military of Special Force not in need of a war, but if the worst comes, '' Addis Standard, November 2, 2020, https: //addisstandard.com/we-have-prepared-our-military-of-special-force-not-in-need-of-a-war-but-if-the-worst-comes-debretsion-gebremichael/.; `` Ethiopia: Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on the latest developments '', European Union External Action, November 2, 2020, https: //eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage en/87959/Ethiopia% 20:% 20Statement% 20by% 20the% 20High% 20Representative/Vice-President% 20Josep% 20Borrell% 20on% 20the% 20latest% 20developments.
[ 106 ] Office of the Prime Minister - Ethiopia Twitter Page, `` TPLF Attacks National Defense Force Base in Tigray, '' November 4, 2020, shorturl.at/houIM.; `` The last red-line ': Ethiopia nears civil war as PM orders military into restive Tigray region, '' France 24, November 4, 2020, https: //www.france24.com/en/africa/20201104-the-last-red-line-ethiopia-nears-civil-war-as-pm-orders-military-into-restive-tigray-region; `` Internet disrupted in Ethiopia as conflict breaks out in Tigray region, '' Netblocks, November 4, 2020, https: //netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-ethiopia-as-conflict-breaks-out-in-tigray-region-eBOQYV8Z.
[ 107 ] UNHCR, `` Ethiopia Situation: Daily New Arrivals Update, '' November 25, 2020, https: //reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR% 20Sudan% 20Eastern% 20Border% 20new% 20arrivals% 20update% 20-% 2025% 20November% 202020.pdf.
[ 108 ] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, `` A Proclamation on the Defense Forcesof the Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' No. 1100/2019, Addis Ababa, January 19, 2019, https: //chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Proclamation-No.-1100-2019-Defense-Forces-Proclamation.pdf
[ 109 ] '' The forces fighting in Ethiopia's Tigray conflict, '' Reuters, November 13, 2020, https: //www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-military-factbox/factbox-the-forces-fighting-in-ethiopias-tigray-conflict-idUSKBN27T14J.
[ 110 ] `` Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed speech before Ethiopian parliament, '' Video clip, YouTube, November 30, 2020, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=y7GCiixbUOY.
[ 111 ] Addis Standard Twitter page, https: //twitter.com/addisstandard/status/1143195376423505921? s=20 ( accessed October 25, 2020). He was reinstated as security chief of Amhara regional special police in July 2021 by Amhara regional president Agegnehu Teshager. Amhara Prosperity Party Facebook page, https: //www.facebook.com/AmharaMediaCorporation/posts/1591546951020293 ( accessed July 21, 2021),
[ 112 ] `` # ASDailyScoop: Amhara State Replaces Special Forces Commander, '' Addis Standard, February 17, 2022, https: //addisstandard.com/asdailyscoop-amhara-state-replaces-special-forces-commander/.; See also Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Special Police Execute 10, '' ( New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), https: //www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/28/ethiopia-special-police-execute-10.; European Institute of Peace, `` The Special Police in Ethiopia, '' ( October 2021), https: //www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SpecialPoliceEthiopia-8-Oct-2021-CLEAN.pdf. While the federal constitution empowers regional states to establish police and administer security in their respective regions, the militarization of regional police forces has grown over the last decade. Regional forces operate across regional states and have unclear standards for training, weapons, and oversight. The organizational structure and chain of command of the regional special forces differ from state to state. The ASF operate under the Amhara region's security bureau.
[ 113 ] European Institute of Peace, `` The Special Police in Ethiopia, '' October 2021, https: //www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SpecialPoliceEthiopia-8-Oct-2021-CLEAN.pdf ( stating that prior to the outbreak of conflict in November 2020, the special police in Tigray operated under the regional state security bureau, under Tekie Mitiku).
[ 114 ] Amhara Broadcasting Corporation, ``???????????????????????????????? ( Fanos operating in different organizations formed a front), '' video clip, You Tube, ( accessed August 27, 202) https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=-RmaKHrv6Fo.
[ 115 ] Interviews with Haben, # 201, # 203, # 204, Sudan, December 2020. Encrypted text exchanges with # 300, November 2020. Interviews with # 20, Kibreab, Sudan, January 2021; with Lewam, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with # 223, # 224, Sudan, December 2020 and with Yibrah in August 2021. Phone interview with Kibrom, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 116 ] Phone interview with # 224, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 117 ] Interviews with Haben, # 201, # 203, and # 204, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with # 223 and # 224, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 118 ] Phone interview with # 301, November 2020. Phone interview with # 223, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Kibrom, Tigray, May 2021. See also Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and UNOHCHR, `` Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC) /Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' November 3, 2021, https: //www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ET/OHCHREHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf.
[ 119 ] Ethiopian Broadcasting Media, Press Conference by Ethiopian army chief of staff, Berhanu Jula, November 18, 2020, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=qLEQJM6KgWk.
[ 120 ] `` The midnight confrontation that helped unleash Ethiopia's conflict '', France 24, November 27, 2020, https: //www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201127-the-midnight-confrontation-that-helped-unleash-ethiopia-s-conflict; `` General Tsadekan Gebretensae Exclusive Interview with Dimtsi Weyane Tigray, Broadcast on May 29, 2021, '' Tghat, June 7, 2021, https: //tghat.com/2021/06/07/general-tsadekan-gebretensae-exclusive-interview-with-dimtsi-weyane-tigray-broadcast-on-may-29-2021/.
[ 121 ] Bethelem Feleke and Eoin McSweeney, `` Ethiopia Prime Minister says Tigray ops 'limited ' as Sudan closes border, '' CNN News, November 6, 2020, https: //edition.cnn.com/2020/11/06/africa/ethiopia-abiy-sudan-border/index.html.;
`` Defense Forces Advancing to Mekele City: Ethiopian Army Chief, '' Ezega News, November 8, 2020, https: //www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/8233/Defense-Forces-Advancing-to-Mekele-City-Ethiopian-Army-Chief.
[ 122 ] Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling in Tigray Urban Areas, ( New York: Human Rights Watch, 2021), https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas.
[ 123 ] Phone interviews with Tadele and Alula, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 124 ] `` Ethiopian military seizes airport as fighting rages in Tigray, '' Al Jazeera, November 11, 2020, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/10/ethiopias-pm-not-rebuffing-calls-for-calm-as-clashes-continue.
[ 125 ] `` Ethiopia bombs Tigray arms depots, thousands flee fighting, '' France 24, November 11, 2020,
https: //www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201111-ethiopia-bombs-tigray-arms-depots-thousands-flee-fighting.
[ 126 ] '' Speech by Major Dejene Maru asserting that Amhara Special Forces `` liberated Dansha, Mai Kadra, Adi Goshu, Baeker, and Kafta Humera, '' Video Clip, You Tube, ( accessed November 21, 2021)
[ 127 ] Phone interviews with Atsbaha and Tesfalem, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 128 ] Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling in Tigray Urban Areas, ( New York: Human Rights Watch, 2021), https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/11/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areas.
[ 129 ] `` Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed Denies Civilians Killed in Tigray Operation, '' Al Jazeera, November 30, 2020, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/30/ethiopias-abiy-ahmed-denies-civilians-killed-in-tigray-operation.; Interview with State Minister Redwan Hussein Reuters Facebook page, December 2020, https: //www.facebook.com/watch/live/? ref=watch permalink & v=373363980639466.
[ 130 ] Interviews with Tewolde, Tesfatsion, # 219, # 293, # 294, # 295, # 296, Sudan, December 2020; Interviews with Berihu, Robel, # 241, Desta, Atsbaha, May 2021.
[ 131 ] Interviews with Hailemariam and Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020; Interviews with Desta, Berhane, and # 118, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interview with Tsige, Tigray, April 2021; Phone interviews with Berhan, Fikadu, Abel, Negasse, Kiros # 117, # 180, # 197, Tigray, May 2021; Interviews with Yonas and # 178 in Tigray, June 2021. Division was selected as a resettlement site for demobilized fighters that fought against the Derg regime and was comprised of mainly TPLF fighters. See Settlement Patterns subsection. See also World Bank, `` World Bank Discussion Paper 331, Africa Technical Department Series, '' shorturl.at/dgkwS; Alula Pankhurst and Francois Piguet, `` Moving People in Ethiopia, '' Journal of Refugee Studies, ( 2009); Dawit Anagaw, `` The Socio-Economic Reintegration of The Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters in The Post 1991 Conflict: The Case of Dansha-Division Settlement, '' ( Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2011). http: //etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/10304? show=full.
[ 132 ] Interview with Berhane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 133 ] Interview with Hailemariam, Sudan, December 2020 and interviews with Andom and Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 134 ] Interviews with Tewolde, Mehari, Haben, and # 219, Sudan, December 2020 and # 34, Sudan, January 2021. Interviews with # 128 and # 129, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 135 ] Interviews with Abadi, Sudan, January 2021, and with Seyoum, # 128, # 129, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Yonas, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 136 ] Neighborhood '' in Amharic and references the smallest administrative subdivision at the neighborhood. Interview with Abadi, Sudan, January 2021
[ 137 ] Interview with Abadi, Sudan, January 2021, and Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Temesgen, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 138 ] Interviews with # 297, # 211, Sudan, December 2020 and with Seyoum, # 128, and # 129, Sudan, May 2021. See also, `` Tigray Crisis: How Ethiopian doctors fled militia attacks, '' BBC News, December 17, 2020, https: //www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55236354.
[ 139 ] Interviews with Mehari and # 213, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with # 46, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 140 ] Interviews with Mehari and # 213, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with # 46, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 141 ] Interviews with Tesfatsion, # 203, # 219, Sudan, December 2020. Interview with Lewam, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 142 ] Interview with # 219, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 143 ] Interviews with Tewolde and Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020. Interviews with Yemane and Lewam in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 144 ] Interview with Tewolde in Sudan, December 2020. Interviews with Semira, Yemane, and Lewam in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 145 ] Interview with Haben in Sudan, December 2020.
[ 146 ] Interview with Tewolde, Hailay, and with Zemariam, Sudan, December 2020. Interviews with Kalayou and with # 140, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 147 ] Interviews with Tewolde, Hailay, Zemariam, Kahsay, Tsegay, # 221, # 212, # 204, # 205, Sudan, December 2020.; Interviews with Merhawi, Teame, Yemane, Mihretab, Robel, Desta, # 122, # 123, # 117, # 119, # 140, # 114 # 245, in Sudan, May and June 2021.; Phone interviews with Hailekiros, Filimon, Abebe, Worku, # 181, Atsbaha, Yirgalem, # 193, # 195, # 196, # 197, Gebreselassie, Tigray, in May and June 2021 and phone interview with Fthawi in Sudan, August 2021. See also, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians, '' ( New York: Human Rights Watch, 2021), https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians. Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum, '' February 26, 2021, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/3730/2021/en/.
[ 148 ] Interviews with Araya, Hailay, Kahsay, Andom, Tsega, Lewam, Berhane, Desta, Merhawi, Kalayou, # 126, # 19, # 221, # 204, # 245, # 114, Sudan, December 2020, January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Tsige in Tigray, April 2021, and Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 149 ] Interviews with Tesfatsion, Yemane, Mihrtab, Berhane, Merhawi, # 208, # 212, # 201, # 19, # 23, # 245, Sudan, December 2020, January, and May 2021. Phone interview with # 28 in Tigray, March 2021; and with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 150 ] International Committee of the Red Cross, `` Ethiopia: A dispatch from West Tigray and North Amhara, '' ICRC, November 27, 2020, https: //www.icrc.org/en/document/ethiopia-displaced-people-fear-for-their-lives; Catholic Relief Services, `` Catholic Relief Services ( CRS) Tigray IDP Assessment and Response Update, '' December 22, 2020, https: //www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/crs tigray idp assessment and response updaet .pdf.
[ 151 ] Interviews with Tewolde, Hailay, Zemariam, Kahsay, Tsegay, Merhawi, Andom, Yemane, Mihretab, Robel, Desta, # 122, # 123, # 117, # 119, # 245, # 140, # 114, # 212, # 204, Sudan, December 2020, May, and June 2021. Phone interviews with Hilekiros, Filimon, Abebe, Worku, # 181, Atsbaha, Yirgalem, # 193, # 195, # 196, # 197, Gebreselassie, Tigray, in May and June 2021, and with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 152 ] Interviews with Hailay, Zemariam, Kahsay, Tsgay, and Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020. Interviews with Lewam, # 114, Sudan, January 2021. Phone interviews with # 190, # 192, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 153 ] Interview with Hailay, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with # 192, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 154 ] Interview with Zemariam # 114, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021.
[ 155 ] Interview with Tsegay, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 156 ] Interviews with Fitsum, # 122, # 123, Merhawi in Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Negasse, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 157 ] Interview with Fitsum, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Negasse, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 158 ] Interview with Teame in Sudan, May 2021. Interviews with Fitsum, # 117, # 122, Merhawi, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Negasse, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 159 ] Interviews with Merhawi, Desta, Mihretab, Andom, # 122, # 117, # 119, # 140, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Negasse, Abebe, Atsbaha, and # 181, Tigray, May 2021. Account # 29, collected by aid workers with consent for public use.
[ 160 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 161 ] Interviews with Teame, Mihretab, Desta, and # 140 in Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Negasse, Abebe, Atsbaha, and # 181, Tigray, May 2021. Account # 29, collected by aid workers with consent for public use.
[ 162 ] Interviews with Araya, Hailay, Kahsay, Andom, Tsega, Lewam, Berhane, Desta, Merhawi, Kalayou, # 19, # 126, # 145, # 221, # 204, # 245, Sudan, December 2020 and January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Tsige in Tigray, April 2021, and Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 163 ] Interview with Desta, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Tsige in April 2021.
[ 164 ] Interview with # 221, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 165 ] Interview with Hailay, Merhawi, # 126, # 245, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021.Similar tactics used in Axum, see Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: The Massacre in Axum, '' February 26, 2021, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/3730/2021/en/.
[ 166 ] Interview with # 201, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 167 ] Interview with Hailay, Sudan, December 2020. Interviws with # 114 and Lewam, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 168 ] Interview with Araya, # 223, in Sudan December 2020. Interview with # 126 with Merhawi, in Sudan May 2021.; Cara Anna, `` Leave no Tigrayan: In Ethiopia, an ethnicity is erased, '' Associated Press, April 7, 2021, https: //apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023 ( Noting that `` Kidu Gebregirgis, a farmer, said he was questioned almost daily about his ethnicity, his shirt yanked aside to check for marks from the strap of a gun. He said the Amhara harvested around 5,000 kilograms ( 5.5 short tons) of sorghum from his fields and hauled it away, a task that took two weeks. ``).
[ 169 ] Interviews with Merhawi, # 245, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 170 ] Interview with Kalayou, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 171 ] Interview with Kahsay, # 14, Sudan, December 2020, and January 2021.
[ 172 ] Interview with Kahsay, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 173 ] Interviews with Tesfatsion, # 208, # 212, # 205, Sudan, December 2020, with # 23, Sudan, January 2021, and with # 245, Yemane, Mihretab, Berhane, Merhawi in Sudan, May 2021. Phone inerviews with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 174 ] Interviews with Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020 and with # 23, Yemane, Mihetab, # 137, Sudan, January, and May 2021.
[ 175 ] Interviews with # 208, Tesfatsion, Merhawi, # 245, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021
[ 176 ] Interview with Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 177 ] Interview with Merhawi, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 178 ] Interviews with Tesfatsion, Yemane, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021.
[ 179 ] Interview Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 180 ] Interview with Berhane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 181 ] Interviews with Hadgu, Berihu, Teame, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Natanael, Kiros in Tigray, March, and May 2021.
[ 182 ] Interview with Hadgu in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 183 ] Interviews with Hadgu, Berihu, in Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Fikadu, Negasse, Kiros, # 180, Tigray, April and May 2021.
[ 184 ] Phone interview with # 180, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 185 ] Phone interview with Natanael, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 186 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 187 ] Phone interview with Kiros, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 188 ] Interview with Berihu and Hadgu, May 2021. Phone interview with Negasse, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 189 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021. See also Dawit Anagaw, `` The Socio-Economic Reintegration of The Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters in The Post 1991 Conflict: The Case of Dansha-Division Settlement, Tigray, '' ( Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2011, http: //etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/10304? show=full.
[ 190 ] Robbie Corey-Boulet and Abdelmoniem Abu Idris Ali, `` Questions Linger Among the Corpses of an Ethiopian massacre, '' Agence France Presse, November 25, 2020, https: //uk.news.yahoo.com/questions-linger-among-corpses-ethiopian-150033223.html. Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, and Silvia Aloisi, `` How Ethnic Killings Exploded in an Ethiopian Town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/.
[ 191 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021. See also, Ethiopian Human Rights Council, `` EHRCO Preliminary Investigation Report on Major Human Rights Violations in and around Maikadra, '' December 25, 2020, https: //ehrco.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/EHRCO-Preliminary-Investigation-Report-on-Major-Human-Rights-Violations-in-and-around-Maikadra-1.pdf.
[ 192 ] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Office of the Prime Minister, `` Transcript: Prime Minister's Office Press Briefing 3 June 2021, '' June 3, 2021, https: //www.ethioembassy.org.uk/prime-ministers-office-press-briefing-transcript-june-3-2021//
[ 193 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN OHCHR, `` Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
( EHRC) /Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations
of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' November 3, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/report-ethiopian-human-rights-commission-ehrcoffice-united-nations-high-commissioner.
[ 194 ] Phone interview with expert, Ethiopia, March 2021. Also see Interview with # 169, Ethiopia, November 2020. A team of federal police investigators and prosecutors deployed to Mai Kadra in December 2020 concluded that 229 individuals were killed. See, for example, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Office of the Prime Minister, `` Transcript: Prime Minister's Office Press Briefing 3 June 2021, '' June 3, 2021, https: //www.ethioembassy.org.uk/prime-ministers-office-press-briefing-transcript-june-3-2021.
[ 195 ] Phone interview with expert, Ethiopia, March 2021.
[ 196 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021, and with Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020. See also Jonathan Zbedea, '' Mai Kadra, '' VOA Amharic, February 8, 2021, https: //amharic.voanews.com/a/5770001.html; Joachim D. Ahrens, `` Evacuees from border towns in Tigray setting up in makeshift camps: Mission 9-18 December 1998, UNDP Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, ( 1998), '' https: //www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/tigray01.html.
[ 197 ] Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, Silvia Aloisi, `` How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/.
[ 198 ] Interviews with Zelalem, Hiruy, Fentahun, and # 90, Ethiopia, December 2019. Interviews with # 222, Araya, Senait, Mehari Haben, # 220, Tesfatsion, Amanuel, # 243, Sudan, December 2020 and January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Abrehet and Anonymous, in, Sudan, September 2021, and with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 199 ] Interview with Haileselassie, Sudan, December 2020. See also Ethiopia National Disaster Risk Management Commission, `` Livelihoood Profile Tigray Region, Ethiopia February 2007, http: //www.ndrmc.gov.et/Livelihoods/Tigray/Downloadable/Tigray% 20Livelihood% 20Zone% 20Reports/EPL.pdf; See also African Development Bank, `` Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report for the Proposed Baeker IAIP and Mai Kadra RTC '' ( March 2018), https: //esa.afdb.org/sites/default/files/Ethiopia% 20-% 20Intergrated% 20Agro% 20Industrial% 20Park% 20Development% 20Project Tigray ESIA 26% 20March% 202018.pdf; See also Rebecca Marie Coulborn, Tesfay Gebregzabher Gebrehiwot et al., `` Barriers to access to visceral leishmaniasis diagnosis and care among seasonal mobile workers in Western Tigray, Northern Ethiopia: A qualitative study, '' PLOS Water journal, ( 2018), https: //journals.plos.org/plosntds/article? id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0006778 ( Between February and May workers would clear and prepare the farmland, some staying to weeding season. Others remained for longer periods to participate in the harvest season, which would begin in early November for sesame, or in December for sorghum.); Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, `` Rapid Investigation into Grave Human Rights Violations in Maikadra, Preliminary Findings '', November 24,2020, https: //ehrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Maikadra-Preliminary-Findings-English-1.pdf.
[ 200 ] Interviews with Zelalem, Hiruy, Fentahun, and # 90, Ethiopia, December 2019. Interviews with # 222, Araya, Senait, Mehari Haben, # 220, Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020. Interview with # 243, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Abrehet and Anonymous, Sudan, September 2021, and with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021. See also Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 141st Special Report, `` Stop the Violations of the Human Rights of Citizens Voicing Identity Demands! '' June 1, 2016, https: //ahrethio.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/HRCO-141st-Special-Report-English.pdf; Haftom Tesfay, `` Rural Land Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Case of Humera, ( LLM thesis, Addis Ababa University,2011), pp. 84-87, https: //land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/ethiopia/conflict-1/85-rural-land-dispute-settlement-mechanisms-in-tigray-the-case-of-humera/file ( Describing how the Rural Land and Proclamation directive granted power to rural land use administrative officers at the tabia ( administrative division at the village or neighborhood level) which were exposed to `` forger, fraud, and manipulation. '' Several criminal cases were instituted against individuals at the Mai Kadra rural land administrative unit as well as against the mayor of Mai Kadra.
[ 201 ] As described in the Background section.
[ 202 ] Interviews with Zelalem, Fentahun, # 91, # 298, Ethiopia, December 2019.
[ 203 ] Interview with # 89, Fentahun, Ethiopia, December 2019. Interviews with # 222, Haben, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with Abrehet, Yehansu, # 167, Sudan, September, and October 2021.
[ 204 ] Phone interview with Abrehet, Sudan, September 2021. See also Laura Hammond, `` Governmantality in Motion: 25 Years of Ethiopia's Experience of Famine and Migration Policy, '' Mobilities, Vol.6 ( 2011) p. 424. ( Stating that `` the government's attitude towards returnees was that they should not be given much special treatmentReturnees should not be given the same access to land as local people, as this would create jealousy between locals and returnees... Instead, returnees were expected to produce sesame and sorghum on smaller plots to meet most of their cash and food needs.)
[ 205 ] Interview with # 89, Gondar, December 2019.
[ 206 ] Interview with Haben, Sudan, December 2020. See also, Haftom Tesfay, `` Rural Land Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The Case of Humera, '' ( LLM thesis, Addis Ababa University), pp. 84-87, https: //land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/ethiopia/conflict-1/85-rural-land-dispute-settlement-mechanisms-in-tigray-the-case-of-humera.
[ 207 ] Phone interview with Abrehet, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 208 ] Interview with Amanuel, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 209 ] Phone interview with Tesfay, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 210 ] Interview with # 89, Ethiopia, December 2019. Phone interview with # 167, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 211 ] Interviews with Zelalem, Hiruy, in Ethiopia, December 2019; with Abrehet, Asmelesh, and # 167, Sudan, September and November 2021; and with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 212 ] Phone interview with Abrehet, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 213 ] Interview with Hiruy, Ethiopia, December 2019.
[ 214 ] Interview with Zelalem, Ethiopia, December 2019.
[ 215 ] Phone interview with # 220, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 216 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 217 ] Phone interview with # 220, Sudan, December 2020; and with Abrehet, September 2021. Salug is a term used to refer to laborers in Sudan and in some parts of Ethiopia, including western Tigray. Salug's may also refer to former laborers who engage in banditry or in human smuggling. See also Altai Consulting for the European Union, `` European Union Trust Fund Monitoring and Learning System Horn of Africa: Quarterly Report - Q3 2018, '' February 2019, p. 51 https: //ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf hoa mls q3 2018 report final.pdf.; European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa `` Cross-Border Analysis and Mapping Final Report, '' September 22, 2016, https: //blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2020/02/CROSS-BORDER-ANALYSIS-AND-MAPPING.pdf ( `` These movements are often controlled by the so-called 'Salug ', former labourers turned brokers who make a living facilitating employment of farm workers in Sudan and Ethiopia. Salug are said to have links to criminal gangs '').
[ 218 ] Keep it On, '' Shattered Dreams and Lost Opportunities: A Year in the Fight to # Keepiton, '' March 2021, https: //www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2021/03/KeepItOn-report-on-the-2020-data Mar-2021 3.pdf.
[ 219 ] Interview with Haben, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Tesfay, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 220 ] Phone interview with Habtamu, Ethiopia, November 2020. Interviews with # 218, # 299, Haben, # 220, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Yibrah and Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021. Describing border crossing at Lugdi. See United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund Allocation, `` Republic of the Sudan: Displacement, December 30, 2020, https: //cerf.un.org/what-we-do/allocation/2021/summary/20-RR-SDN-46213.
[ 221 ] Interview with Amanuel, Sudan, January 2021. Phone interviews with Tesfay, # 167, Sudan, September 2021; with in October 2021, and with Asmelesh in Sudan, November 2021.
[ 222 ] Interview with # 299, # 216, # 217, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 223 ] Phone interview with Abrehet, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 224 ] Interview with Haileselassie, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 225 ] Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 226 ] Phone interview with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 227 ] Phone interviews with Tesfay, Yehansu, and with # 166, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 228 ] Phone interviews with Tesfay, Yehansu, and with # 166, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 229 ] Phone interview with Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 230 ] Phone interview with Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 231 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 232 ] Phone interview with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 233 ] Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 234 ] Interview with # 215, Sudan, December 2020 and with # 132, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Yibrah, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 235 ] Interview with Araya, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 236 ] Phone interviews with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021 and with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 237 ] Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 238 ] Phone interview with # 167, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 239 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, with Mahlet, Tigray, September, and October 2021.
[ 240 ] Phone interviews with Tesfay, Sudan, October 2021, and with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021. According to an Amhara witness interviewed by Reuters, and in a preliminary report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, Tigrayan youth carrying knives and machetes began checking people's identification documents that morning and to look for people who owned Sudanese SIM cards.; Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, and Silvia Aloisi, `` How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-repor t/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/. See also Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, `` Rapid Investigation into Grave Human Rights Violation in Maikadra, Preliminary Findings, '' November 24, 2020, https: //docs.google.com/document/d/1vS-0N8xCDZDRAM5lzBAELTVjqfKLrzJha8xpKdqh1OE/mobilebasic.
[ 241 ] Interview with Haileselassie, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Mahlet, Ethiopia in October 2021.
[ 242 ] Interview with Berhe, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 243 ] Interview with Haileselassie, Araya, # 217, Sudan, December 2020, and with # 132, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 244 ] Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021.
[ 245 ] Interviews with Haben and # 217, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with # 167, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 246 ] Phone interview with # 167, September 2021.
[ 247 ] Interview with Kibreab, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 248 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 249 ] Interviews with Amanuel and Kibreab, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 250 ] Interview with Kibreab, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 251 ] Interview with # 217, Sudan, December 2020, and with # 152, Sudan, June 2021. Phone interviews with Yibrah and Tesfay in Sudan, September, and October 2021.
[ 252 ] Phone interview with Yibrah, Sudan, September 2021. Interview with # 239, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 253 ] Interview with # 20, Sudan, January 2021. Phone interview with Yibrah, Sudan, September 2021. On file, videos directly received of injured survivors receiving treatment in November 2020.
[ 254 ] Interviews with # 222, Senait, Haben, Amanuel, # 19, # 20, Sudan, December 2020 and Januar y2021. Phone interviews with Zerihun, Hanna, Tewodros, # 83, and # 84, Ethiopia, November 2020; with Asmeret, Tigray, May 2021; and with Tesfay, Biniyam, Mahlet Tigray, September and October 2021. Phone interview with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 255 ] Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, and Silvia Aloisi, '' How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/.; See also Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, `` Rapid Investigation into Grave Human Rights Violation in Maikadra, Preliminary Findings, '' November 24, 2020, https: //docs.google.com/document/d/1vS-0N8xCDZDRAM5lzBAELTVjqfKLrzJha8xpKdqh1OE/mobilebasic.
[ 256 ] Phone interview with Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 257 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 258 ] Phone interview with Mahlet, Tigray, October 2021. Donkey, or in Tigrinya `` adgi, '' is a derogatory term that had been used by Eritrean soldiers during the Derg to refer to ethnic Amharas and other soldiers in the Derg army. The term has been used pejoratively by Tigrinya speakers to refer to ethnic Amharas. See Munyaradizi Mawere and Ngoidzashe Marongwe, Violence, Politics and Conflict Management in Africa: Envisioning Transformation, Peace, and Unity in the Twenty-First Century, ( Langaa RPCIG,2016).
[ 259 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 260 ] Phone interview with Zerihun, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 261 ] Three videos received via encrypted channels of injured survivors in Gondar hospital in November 2020.
[ 262 ] Phone interview with # 84, Ethopia, November 2020.
[ 263 ] Phone interview with Tewodros, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 264 ] Phone interview Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 265 ] Phone interview Hanna, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 266 ] Phone interview with Zerihun, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 267 ] Phone interview with Yehansu, Sudan, October 2021
[ 268 ] Interview with Amanuel, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 269 ] Interview with # 24, Sudan, January 2021 and with # 216, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 270 ] Interviews with Mehari, Haben, Sudan, December 2020; with # 15, # 239, Sudan, January 2021 and with # 135, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 271 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021
[ 272 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021
[ 273 ] Interview with Tewolde, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 274 ] Interviews with Tedros, Sheshay, Amanuel, # 15, # 16, # 22, # 24.; with Haileselassie, Senait, # 220, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021 and with Asmelesh, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 275 ] Interview with Mehari, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 276 ] Interview with # 135, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 277 ] Interview with # 243, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 278 ] Interview with Kibreab, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 279 ] Phone interviews with Habtamu, # 169, # 171, # 170, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 280 ] Phone interview with Habtamu, # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 281 ] Facebook post in Mai Kadra town, November 10, 2020, https: //www.facebook.com/amare.setie.3/videos/3338799306226275.
[ 282 ] Phone interviews with Habtamu, # 170, # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 283 ] Phone interview with # 169, # 170, # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 284 ] Phone interview with # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 285 ] Phone interview with # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 286 ] Phone interview with # 171, Ethiopia, November 2020.
[ 287 ] Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 288 ] Interviews with Haileselassie, Senait, Tadesse, # 18, Sudan, December 2020 and May and January 2021. Phone interview with Biniyam, Tigray, September 2021.
[ 289 ] Interview with Tadesse, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 290 ] `` Agew '' peoples inhabited north-central Ethiopia, in north Gondar province, Tigray, and in Eritrea. Interview with Senait in Sudan, December 2020.
[ 291 ] Interview with Senait, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 292 ] Interview with Haileselassie, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 293 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 294 ] Facebook post in Mai Kadra town on November 12, 2020, https: //www.facebook.com/iyeruse/videos/3349829495086926
[ 295 ] Facebook post by Agegnehu Teshager on November 10, 2020. Teshager is the former Amhara regional state president and current speaker for the House of Federation, https: //www.facebook.com/permalink.php? story fbid=180459477024816 & id=112237320513699
[ 296 ] interview with State Minister Redwan Hussein, Reuters Facebook page December 2020, https: //www.facebook.com/watch/live/? ref=watch permalink & v=373363980639466. See Aggrey Mutambo, `` In address to Parliament, Abiy explains the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict, '' Nation Africa, November 30, 2020, https: //nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/in-address-to-parliament-abiy-explains-the-ethiopia-tigray-conflict-3214182? view=htmlamp; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ethiopia Blog, `` The Mai Kadra Genocide: Perpetrators Acting as Victims, '' February 25, 2021, https: //mfaethiopiablog.wordpress.com/2021/02/25/the-mai-kadra-genocide-perpetrators-acting-as-victims-february-25-2021/; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Blog, `` Statement regarding the latest'report by Amnesty International on the alleged rape and other sexual violence in the Tigray Regional State of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ( August 12, 2021), '' August 12, 2021, https: //ethiopianembassy.org/statement-regarding-the-latest-report-by-amnesty-international-on-the-alleged-rape-and-other-sexual-violence-in-the-tigray-regional-state-of-the-federal-democratic-republic-of-ethiopia-augus/.
[ 297 ] Stephen Grey, `` Special Report: In Ethiopia war, new abuses charge spotlight on Tigrayan former rulers, '' Reuters, December 28, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict-tplf-idAFL8N2TD18W.
[ 298 ] Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, Silvia Aloisi and Baz Ratner, `` Special Report: How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/; Fay Abulgasim, Nariman El-Mofty and Cara Anna, `` Shadowy Ethiopian massacre could be tip of iceberg, '' Associated Press, December 20, 2020, https: //apnews.com/article/sudan-ethiopia-massacres-d16a089f8dcb0511172b5662b9244f78.
[ 299 ] Interview with Tesfatsion, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 300 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan September 2021.
[ 301 ] Interview with # 20, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 302 ] Interview with Berhe, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with Shehsay, # 30, # 25, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 303 ] Interview with Tadesse, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 304 ] Interview with Sheshay, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 305 ] Interview with Sheshay, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 306 ] Interview with Sheshay, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 307 ] Interview with # 110, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 308 ] Phone interview # 196, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 309 ] Interviews with # 134 and # 244, Sudan, May 2021. Interview with # 220, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 310 ] Interview with # 134, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 311 ] Interviews with # 134, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 312 ] Interview with # 22, Sudan, January 2021. See also, Cara Anna, `` 'Look after my babies ': In Ethiopia, a Tigray family's quest, '' Associated Press, April 23, 2021, https: //apnews.com/article/health-ethiopia-lifestyle-africa-middle-east-abdb94e97a25e17befcc6574201a9ff3 ( Describing the account of a Tigrayan man who addressed Amhara militias in Amharic and showed an altered ID card suggesting he was Walqayte).
[ 313 ] Interview with # 22, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 314 ] Interviews with Araya, # 220, Sudan, December 2020, and with Tedros, # 15, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 315 ] Interview with # 15, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 316 ] Interview with Tedros, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 317 ] Interviews with Tedros, # 18, # 19, Sudan, January 2021 and with # 244, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview # 40, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 318 ] Interview Tedros, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 319 ] Interviews with Haileselassie, Mehari, Mekonnen, Kindihafti, Gidey # 15, # 19, # 215, Sudan, December 2020, January 2021, and May 2021. Phone interviews with Asmeret in Tigray, May 2021 and with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 320 ] Interview with Mekonnen, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021 and with phone interview with # 53, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 321 ] Interviews with Haileselassie, Mekonnen, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interview with # 110 Tigray, April 2021.
[ 322 ] interview with Haileselssie, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 323 ] Interview with # 14, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 324 ] Interview with Kindihafti, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 325 ] Interview with Mekonnen, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 326 ] Interview with Gidey, Sudan, May 2021. See also Interview with # 110 Tigray, April 2021.
[ 327 ] Interview with # 110, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 328 ] Phone interviews with Terhas Sudan, September 2021, and with # 535, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 329 ] Phone interview with Terhas, September 2021.
[ 330 ] Phone interview with Terhas, September 2021. Interview with Gidey, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 331 ] Phone interview with Terhas, September 2021.
[ 332 ] Phone interview with # 289, [ location withheld ] July 2021.
[ 333 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Berhan and Abel, May 2021, Tigray.
[ 334 ] Phone interview with # 181, Tigray, June 2021, Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 335 ] Interviews with Askuwal, Aklile, and Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with # 29, # 38, Gebrekristos, Tigray, March 2021 and with with Atsbaha, Tesfalem, in Tigray, June 2021.
[ 336 ] Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 337 ] Interviews with Andom and Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 338 ] Phone interview with Kidane, Tigray, May 2021; Interview with Mihretab in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 339 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Kidane, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 340 ] Phone interviews with Filimon and Neguse, Tigray, June 2021, and with # 289 in July 2021. `` Shaleqa '' historically referring to a military title and meaning a `` commander of a thousand. '' In the modern military it came to refer to a commander of a battalion or a major.
[ 341 ] Phone interview with Filimon, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 342 ] Interview with Kahsay, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 343 ] Phone interviews with # 188, Leul, # 190, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 344 ] Interviews with Semira, Hadgu, Gebremariam, Yemane, Tesfa, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with # 38, Tigray, March 2021 and with Hailemichael and Berhan, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 345 ] Phone interview with Hailemichael, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 346 ] Interview with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020, and interviews with Gezae, Andom, Zeray, Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 347 ] Interview with Andom, Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 348 ] Interview with Zeray, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 349 ] Interviews with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020. Phone interviews with Takele, # 26, # 185, Tigray, March and May 2021.
[ 350 ] Interview with Aklile, Yemane, Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Atsbaha, Tesfalem, # 29, Sindayo, Tigray, March and June 2021.
[ 351 ] Phone interviews with Atsbaha, Tesfalem, Tigray June 2021.
[ 352 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 353 ] Phone interviews with Atsbaha, Tesfalem, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 354 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 355 ] Interviews with Aklile, Askuwal, and Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with Mihret, and # 48, Tigray, March 2021; with # 174, May 2021; Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 356 ] Interviews with Askuwal, Aklile, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with Gebrekristos, # 174, Fthawi, Tigray, March, May, and August 2021.
[ 357 ] Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 358 ] Ibid.
[ 359 ] Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 360 ] Interview with Askuwal, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interview with Gebrekristos, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 361 ] Phone interview with Filimon, June 2021.
[ 362 ] Interview with Andom in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 363 ] Interviews with Hadgu, Tesfa, Andom, Lewam, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with Akbret, # 174, and Goitom in Tigray, May 2021.
[ 364 ] Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 365 ] Phone interview with Akbret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 366 ] Phone interview with Akbret, and # 190, Tigray, May 2021; phone interviews with Abebe, Goitom, Tigray, June 2021. Interview with Yemane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 367 ] Phone interview with Goitom, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 368 ] Interview with Yemane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 369 ] Phone interview with Akbret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 370 ] Interview with Tsegu, Gebremariam, Tesfa, Meaza, and Mihretab, Sudan, January and May 2021
[ 371 ] Interview with Tsegu, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 372 ] Interviews with Tesfa, Meaza, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 373 ] Interview with Gebremariam, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 374 ] Cara Anna, `` Leave no Tigrayan: In Ethiopia, an ethnicity is erased, '' Associated Press, ( Apr. 7, 2021), https: //apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023.
[ 375 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 376 ] Phone interview with Dawit, Tigray, June 2021. Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 377 ] Phone interview with Dawit, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 378 ] Ibid.
[ 379 ] Phone interview with Fikadu, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 380 ] Phone interview with Dawit, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 381 ] Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 382 ] Interview with Yemane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 383 ] Interviews with Teame, Andom, Meaza, Mihretab, Berhane, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interview with Mihret, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 384 ] Phone interview with Yonas, Tigray, June 2021; Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 385 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 386 ] Phone interview with Fikadu, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 387 ] Phone interview with Berhan, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 388 ] Interview with Yemane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 389 ] Phone interview with # 52, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 390 ] Anne Soy, `` Tigray Crisis: Ethiopian Soldiers Accused of Blocking Border with Sudan, `` BBC News, November 28, 2020, https: //www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55106353; Anne Soy, `` Tigray Crisis: Thousands Seek Refugee on Sudan-Ethiopia Border, '' video report, BBC News, November 27, 2020, https: //youtu.be/O46DFR8AoeIhttps: //youtu.be/O46DFR8AoeI.
[ 391 ] UNHCR, `` Ethiopia Situation: Daily New Arrivals Update, Sudan: Eastern Border, '' ( January 7, 2021), https: //reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Eastern% 20Sudan% 20Border% 20-% 20Ethiopian% 20New% 20Arrivals% 20Update% 207% 20January% 202021.pdfhttps: //reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Eastern% 20Sudan% 20Border% 20-% 20Ethiopian% 20New% 20Arrivals% 20Update% 207% 20January% 202021.pdf.
[ 392 ] Phone Interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 393 ] Phone interview with # 179, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 394 ] Interviews with Berihu, # 240, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 395 ] Interview with Meaza, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 396 ] Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 397 ] Interview with # 202, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 398 ] Interview with Lewam, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 399 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 400 ] Interview with Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 401 ] Interview with Lewam, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 402 ] Interview with Hagos, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 403 ] Phone interviews with Abel, Atsbaha, Ayele, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
[ 404 ]; Interviews with Andom, Meaza, Hadgu, Berihu, Yemane, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with Mihret, Semhal, Tigray, March and June 2021.
[ 405 ] Phone interview with Mihret, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 406 ] Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 407 ] Interview with Meaza, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 408 ] Interviews with Hadgu and Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 409 ] Interview with Genet, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 410 ] Phone interview with Selamawit, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 411 ] Interview with Yemane, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 412 ] Phone interview with Tsige, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 413 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 414 ] Phone interview with Abel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 415 ] Phone interview with Akbret and # 198, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 416 ] Phone interview with Semhal, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 417 ] Interview with Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 418 ] Phone interview with Akbret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 419 ] Phone interview with # 198, Tigray May 2021.
[ 420 ] Phone interview with Solomon, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 421 ] Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 422 ] Phone interview with Kidane, Tigray, May 2021
[ 423 ] Phone interview with # 198, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 424 ] Interview with Meaza, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 425 ] Interview with Abrahaley, Sudan, January 2021
[ 426 ] Interview with # 18, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 427 ] Phone interview with # 32, Tigray, March 2021
[ 428 ] Interview interview with Tesfa, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 429 ] Giulia Paravinci and Katharine Houreld, `` UN official accuses Eritean forces of deliberately starving Tigray, '' Reuters, June 11, 2021; `` In the fertile lands of western Tigray, farmers abandoned fields full of sorghum, teff and sesame to escape the violence, Reuters reporting shows. Some residents accused Amhara forces of stealing their crops and livestock or chasing them off their farms. '' https: //www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-un-official-accuses-eritrean-forces-deliberately-starving-tigray-2021-06-11/.
[ 430 ] OCHA, `` Ethiopia: Access Snapshot Tigray Region '', March 31, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/access snapshot -tigray region - 31 march 2021.pdf [ `` While no active fighting is reportedly taking place in the Western zone, reports of forced displacement of Tigraypopulation and denials of assistance to people of Tigray origin in areas close to Dansha by local authorities and armed groups continue to emerge. Reportedly, armed groups in the area deny partners ' access to the population stranded in areas close to the Tekezi river bordering North-Western Tigray in Korarit woreda. `` ].
[ 431 ] UNHCR, `` UNHCR relocates first Ethiopian refugees to a new site in Sudan, '' January 5, 2021, https: //www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2021/1/5ff4316c4/unhcr-relocates-first-ethiopian-refugees-new-site-sudan.html
[ 432 ] Interview with Tesfa, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 433 ] Phone interview with # 198, Tigray, May 2021. Interview with Jemila, Sudan, June 2021.
[ 434 ] Interviews with Berihu, Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021
[ 435 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 436 ] interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 437 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 438 ] Interviews with Senait, Berihu, Tesfakiros, # 209, # 205, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021; Phone interviews with Takele, Tigray, March 2021 and with Fikadu, Tsige, Tigray, May 2021; Phone interview with # 289 [ location withheld ], July 2021.
[ 439 ] Phone interview with Fikadu, Tsige, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 440 ]. Interview with Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 441 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 442 ] Interview with Hailay, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 443 ] Interview with Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with # 50, # 174, Tigray, April and May 2021.
[ 444 ] Phone interview with # 50, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 445 ] Phone interviews with Goitom, Yirgalem, # 186, # 189, # 197, Tigray, May and June 2021; Interview with # 240, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 446 ] Phone interview with # 197, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 447 ] Phone interviews with # 26, Tigray, March 2021, with # 289, April 2021, with # 197 in Tigray, May 2o21. Interview with # 17 in Sudan, January 2021.
[ 448 ] Phone interview with Terefe in Tigray, March 2021.
[ 449 ] Interviews with Aregawi, Tewolde, Mehari, # 205, Hadgu, Gebremariam, Tesfakiros, Gezae, Yemane, # 246, Fitsum, Hayelom, Sudan, December 2020, and May 2021; Phone interviews with Sindayo and # 46, Tigray, March 2021, with Asmeret in Tigray, April 2021, with Samuel, in Tigray, May 2021, and with Filimon, # 183, in Tigray June 2021. `` Tigray conflict: 'We have no food, we face death, ' '' BBC News, June 8, 2021, https: //www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57397901.
[ 450 ] Interview with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020; Phone interview with Ayele, Tigray, March 2021; Cara Anna, `` Leave no Tigrayan: An Ethnicity Erased, '' Associated Press, April 7, 2021, https: //apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023
[ 451 ] interview with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 452 ] Phone interview with # 183, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 453 ] Phone interview with Neguse, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 454 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 455 ] Interview with Semira, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 456 ] Phone interview with # 193, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 457 ] Interviews with Hadgu, Gezae, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interview with Sindayo, # 46, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 458 ] Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 459 ] Interview with Gebremariam, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Asmeret, Tigray, May 2021, and with # 183, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 460 ] Phone interview with Asmeret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 461 ] Phone interviews with # 174, Hailekiros, Worku, Asmeret, Tigray, May and June 2021. Phone interview with # 289 in July 2021. Interview with Genet, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 462 ] For a description of sources of livelihood for communities in Western Tigray - Hagos Abraham et al., `` Begait Goat Production Systems and Breeding Practices in Western Tigray, North Ethiopia '' Open Journal of Animal Sciences, vol.7 ( 2017), p. 198, https: //www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation.aspx? paperid=75753; ACAPS, `` Ethiopia: The Pre-Crisis Situation in Tigray, '' February 22, 2021, https: //www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210223 acaps secondary data review ethiopia pre-crisis situation in tigray.pdf.
[ 463 ] Interviews with # 219, # 206, Sudan, December 2020 and with Berihu, # 117, Halefom, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Abel, Negasse, Kiros, Solomon, Neguse, Gebreselassie, # 25, # 117, # 189, # 183, # 192, Tigray March, May, and June 2021.
[ 464 ] Interviews with # 206, # 219, Sudan, December 2020, and with Berihu, Gezae, Yemane, # 138, # 117, Halefom, Fitsum, Hayelom, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Samuel, # 183, Neguse, Yirgalem, # 192, Tigray, June 2021, and with # 25, Sheshay, # 17, Berhan, Fikadu, Abel, Negasse, Kiros, Solomon, # 189, Asmeret, and Gebreselassie, Tigray, # 100, March and May 2021.
[ 465 ] Phone interview with Abel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 466 ] Interview with # 206, Sudan, December 2020. `` Woyane '' is a Tigrinya term meaning `` Revolution, '' or `` Resistance. '' The first `` Woyane '' revolution by Tigrayan farmers occurred in 1943 against the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie but has been commonly associated to refer to the Tigray Peoples ' Liberation Front ( TPLF).
[ 467 ] Interview with Halefom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 468 ] Phone interview with # 183, Neguse, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 469 ] Interview with Hayelom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 470 ] Interview with Fistum, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 471 ] Phone interviews with # 178 and # 179, Tigray, May 2021; and with Terefe, Tigray, March 2021. Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 472 ] Phone interview with # 178, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 473 ] Phone interviews with # 44, Tigray, March 21, and with Hailekiros, Neguse, Tigray, June 2021. Phone interview with # 289, April 2021, and with # 154, Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 474 ] Phone interview with Ayele, # 44, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 475 ] Phone interviews with # 44, Tigray, March 21, with Neguse, Tigray, June 2021, and with # 289 April 2021.
[ 476 ] Phone interview with # 44, Tigray, March 2021. Phone interview with Neguse, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 477 ] Phone interview with # 44, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 478 ] Phone interview with Neguse, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 479 ] Phone interview with # 289 April 2021.
[ 480 ] Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia - I Always Remember That Day: ' Access to Services for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, November 2021, https: //www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/09/i-always-remember-day/access-services-survivors-gender-based-violence-ethiopias.
[ 481 ] Phone interviews with humanitarian workers, February and March 2022; Sue Lautze, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Teshome Erkineh, `` Humanitarian Governance in Ethiopia, '' Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, issue no. 46, ( 2009), ( accessed March 29, 2022), http: //www.odihpn.org/report.asp? id=3005.
[ 482 ] Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, `` December 8 briefing by Amb. Redwan Hussein and NDRMC Commissioner, Mitiku Kassa, '' December 8, 2020, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=zn5YLwYthvs; Ambassador Redwan can be seen stating: `` the agreement [ with the UN ] we entered was in belief that the UN would collaborate, and we the government would call the shots. there is no such thing as unfettered access in Ethiopia. It is led by the government. '' Phone interview with humanitarian worker, February 2022.
[ 483 ] Phone interview with humanitarian worker, February 2022.
[ 484 ] Northern Ethiopia Response Plan, May 2021, ( accessed March 29, 2022), p. 9, https: //www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/northern ethiopia response plan - may 2021.pdf.
[ 485 ] See `` Ethiopia 3W Operational Presence, '' Humanitarian Data Exchange, September 2019, https: //data.humdata.org/dataset/ethiopia-3w-operational-presence-september-2019 ( accessed March 29, 2022). See also National Disaster Risk Management Commission Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation No. 363-2015. NDRMC would lead the humanitarian response in the country through data and information it received from regional and local administrative levels. Through this framework, local administrations gather data informed by assessing the needs and vulnerabilities of the community and share that information with the federal government. See, for example, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, `` National Policy on Disaster Risk Management, '' July 2013, https: //www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a2689ea4.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022): `` Disaster risk management shall be informed by disaster risk profile information. To that effect, disaster risk profiles that contain information on each hazard, vulnerability and capacity to cope as well as other related baseline information shall be developed at the woreda level and organized in a database, periodically updated and put into practice. ''
[ 486 ] See for example, UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region: 3w Operational Presence, '' January 2022, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20220125 tigray region partners presence v5.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022); UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region: 3W Operational Presence, '' ( September 2021), https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20-% 203W% 20Operational% 20Presence% 20from% 209% 20August% 20to% 206% 20September% 202021.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022).
[ 487 ] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, `` The Emergency Directors Group '': Northern Ethiopia Scale-Up Summary Note, May 2021.
[ 488 ] See for example, June 2021 Tigray access analysis. See also Ben Parker, `` Ethiopia: A partial view of the humanitarian fallout emerges in Tigray, '' The New Humanitarian, January 12, 2021, https: //www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2021/01/12/tigray-ethiopia-humanitarian-needs-assessment-incomplete ( accessed March 29, 2022); See for instance, UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Situation Report 6 January 2021, '' January 6, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tigray-region-humanitarian-update-situation-report-6-january-2021 ( accessed March 29, 2022); UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Access Snapshot Tigray Region, '' February 28, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-access-snapshot-tigray-region-28-february-2021 ( accessed March 29, 2022); UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia- Access Snapshot Tigray Region, '' March 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/access snapshot -tigray region - 31 march 2021.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022).
[ 489 ] Ben Parker, `` Ethiopia: A partial view of the humanitarian fallout emerges in Tigray, '' The New Humanitarian; UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Situation Report 6 January 2021, '' January 6, 2021; Multi-agency initial rapid assessment to Wolkayt Tsgede Kafta Humera, Mission Report 2-8 March 2021, on file.
[ 490 ] Phone interview with humanitarian specialist, February 2022.
[ 491 ] Phone interview with Gebreselassie, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 492 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Tigray Region Humanitarian Situation Report 6 January 2021, '' January 6, 2021.
[ 493 ] January 2021 humanitarian assessment on file; UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray: Humanitarian Access Snapshot, '' April 30, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha ethiopia 210510 access snapshot tigray as of 30 april 2021 final draft ya02 copy.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022) ( describing the situation in Western Tigray in terms of people's access to aid as dire despite no reported active fighting).
[ 494 ] June 2021 access analysis on file.
[ 495 ] Multi-agency initial rapid assessment to Wolkayit Tsgede Kafta Humera, Mission Report 2-8 March 2021, on file.
[ 496 ] Phone interview with humanitarian specialist, February 2022.
[ 497 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' June 17, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2017% 20Jun% 202021.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022).
[ 498 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' August 13, 202, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2013% 20Aug% 202021.pdf ( accessed March 29, 2022).
[ 499 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' December 28, 2020, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2028% 20Dec% 202020.pdf
[ 500 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopian Humanitarian Update, '' January 26, 2021, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/card/4IQkMJOPa8/.
[ 501 ] Local beneficiaries described the distribution as inadequate; UNOCHA, `` Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' April 19, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2019% 20Apr% 202021.pdf.
[ 502 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' June 17, 2021.
[ 503 ] Ibid.
[ 504 ] Phone interviews with # 162 and Andom, Sudan, December and May 2021; Phone interviews with Tsige, Leul, # 183, and # 191, Tigray, April and June 2021; UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia- Access Snapshot Tigray Region, '' March 2021; UNOCHA, `` Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' April 19, 2021; `` The UN's warning of famine conditions did not contain an assessment on Western Tigray, now under the control of Amhara regional forces who claim the area as their own. The UN said it didn't have sufficient data from there, '' quote by Giulia Paravicini and Katharine Houreld, `` UN official accuses Eritrean forces of deliberately starving Tigray, '' Reuters, June 11, 2021, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-un-official-accuses-eritrean-forces-deliberately-starving-tigray-2021-06-11/; `` Tigray conflict: 'We have no food, we face death, ' '' BBC News, June 8, 2021, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57397901; Cara Anna, `` 'Leave no Tigrayan ': In Ethiopia, an ethnicity is erased, '' AP News, April 7, 2021, ( accessed March 29, 2022), https: //apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023.
[ 505 ] Phone interview with # 162, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 506 ] Phone interview with Tsige in Tigray, April 2021; UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia - Northern Ethiopian Humanitarian Update, '' January 26, 2021.
[ 507 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Access Snapshot, '' March 31, 2021.
[ 508 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 509 ] Phone interviews with Leul, # 191, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 510 ] Kunama are an ethnic minority in Tigray with settlements in Western and Northwestern administrative zones in Tigray, including in Adebai town.
[ 511 ] Phone interviews with Leul, # 191, Tigray, June 2021; interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 512 ] Phone interview with # 191, Tigray, June 2021, and Leul, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 513 ] Phone interview with # 183, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 514 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 515 ] Phone interview with Takele, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 516 ] Phone interview with Neguse, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 517 ] Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 518 ] Interview with Robel, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 519 ] Phone interview with Gebreselassie, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 520 ] Interview with # 243, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 521 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 522 ] Interview with Semira, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 523 ] Phone interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 524 ] Phone interview with Tesfa, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 525 ] Phone interview with Asmeret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 526 ] Giulia Paravicini, Dawit Endeshaw, Katharine Houreld, `` Ethiopia's crackdown on ethnic Tigrayans snares thousands, '' Reuters, May 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-tigrayans/.
[ 527 ] Phone interview with # 302, September 2021.
[ 528 ] Katharine Houreld, `` Could Ethiopia's capital fall to Tigrayan and allied forces? '' Reuters, November 5, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/world/africa/could-ethiopias-capital-fall-tigrayan-allied-forces-2021-11-05.
[ 529 ] Interviews with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020, and Gebremariam, # 245, Aklile, Tesfakiros, Teame, Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with Yemane, Gebrekristos, Measho, # 32, # 35, # 42, # 45, # 46, # 47, # 49, # 57, # 58, # 59, # 60, Tigray, March and April 2021; Phone interviews with Samuel, Akbret, Kibrom, Fikadu, Yonas, Tadele, Alula, Abebe, Goitom, Frehiwot, Worku, Mesfin, Kidane, Atsbaha, Yirgalem, Leul, Haftu, # 175, # 176, # 182, # 185, # 187, # 191, # 193, and # 194, Tigray, May and June 2021. Phone interviews with Terhas and # 155, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 530 ] Interview with Aklile and # 19, Sudan, January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Yemane, # 28, # 45, # 58, Tigray, March 2021. Phone interview with Kibrom, Alula, and # 187, Tigray, May and June 2021. Account # 29, collected by aid workers with consent for public use.
[ 531 ] Interview with Andom, # 117, Sudan, May 2021; Phone interviews with # 28, # 187, Tigray, March, and May 2021. Phone interview with Fthawi, # 250, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 532 ] Interview with # 17, Sudan, January 2021, and with Gebremariam, Aklile, Tzegeab, Fitsum, # 115, # 130, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Kibrom, # 175, # 176, Tigray, May 2021; with Yonas, Alula, # 173, Tigray, June 2021. Phone interview with Godafa, # 45, # 57, # 60, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 533 ] Phone interview with Kibrom, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 534 ] Phone interview with Yirgalem, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 535 ] Phone interviews with # 173, # 175, Yonas, Abel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 536 ] Phone interview with # 175, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 537 ] Phone interviews with # 175, Yonas, Yirgalem, # 187, Haftu, Tigray May and June 2021.
[ 538 ] Phone interview with # 60, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 539 ] Interview with # 117, Andom, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Gebrekristos, Yonas, Tadele, Alula, Yirgalem, # 187, # 193 # 39, # 57, 42, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
[ 540 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 541 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 542 ] Interview with # 113, Sudan, June 2021. Phone interviews with # 28, # 53, # 193, Tigray, March and May 2021; Catholic Relief Services Tigray IDP Assessment and Response Update, December 2020. https: //www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/assessments/crs tigray idp assessment and response updaet .pdf.
[ 543 ] Interview with Tzegazeab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 544 ] Phone interviews with # 28, # 53, Tigray, March 2021...
[ 545 ] Phone interview with # 28, March 2021
[ 546 ] Interviews with Andom, Tsegazeab, # 117, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with # 57, Tigray, March 2021, and # 197; Haftu; # 187; # 175; # 193, Tigray, May 2021. Account # 29, collected by aid workers with consent for public use. For the distinction between `` physical and non-physical '' torture see: UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Peter Koojimans, E/CN.4/1986/15, February 19, 1986, ( accessed October 9, 2021), https: //undocs.org/en/E/CN.4/1986/15, paras. 118-119.
[ 547 ] Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia - We are Like the Dead: Torture and other Human Rights Abuses in Jail Ogaden, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, July 4, 2018, https: //www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/04/we-are-dead/torture-and-other-human-rights-abuses-jail-ogaden-somali-regional # ftn113; Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia - They Want a Confession: Torture and Ill-Treatment in Ethiopia's Maekelawi Police Station, '' October 18, 2013, https: //www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/17/they-want-confession/torture-and-ill-treatment-ethiopias-maekelawi-police-station; Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: 'Because I am Oromo ': Sweeping repression in the Oromia region of Ethiopia, '' October 28, 2014, https: //www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/afr250062014en.pdf.
[ 548 ] Interview with Aregawi, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 549 ] Interviews with # 176; Alula; # 175; Kibrom, # 187; Alula, Atsbaha; Haftu, Tigray, May 2021. Interviews with Teame, Tsegazeab, # 115, # 117, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 550 ] Interview with Kibrom, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 551 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 552 ] Phone interview with # 57, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 553 ] Phone interviews with # 95, Tigray, 2021; and Haftu, and # 187; Tigray, May 2021; Amnesty International, `` I don't know if they realized I was a person '': Rape and sexual violence in the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, '' August 11, 2021, https: //www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR2545692021ENGLISH.PDF
[ 554 ] Phone interview with # 95, Tigray, 2021.
[ 555 ] Phone interviews with # 187, Haftu, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 556 ] Interviews with Kindihafti, Sudan, January 2021; Andom and # 115, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Samuel, # 175, Kibrom, # 176, Tadele, # 187, # 193, Atsbaha; Tesfalem, Alula, Yonas, Tigray, May and June 2021. Phone interview with # 155, Sudan, September 2021. Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency.
[ 557 ] Interview with Teame in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 558 ] Phone interview wth # 155 in Sudan, September 2021.
[ 559 ] Interviews with Meaza in Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with # 257 in Sudan, September 2021; and with Measho in Tigray, March 2021.
[ 560 ] Phone interview with # 257 September 2021.
[ 561 ] Interview with Kindihafti in Sudan, January 2021.
[ 562 ] Phone interviews with Measho in Tigray, March 2021.
[ 563 ] Phone interview with Haftu in Tigray, May 2021.
[ 564 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha in Tigray, May 2021; Interview with Teame in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 565 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 566 ] Phone interview with # 193, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 567 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 568 ] Phone interview with Tadele, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 569 ] Interview with # 14, Teame, Berihu, and # 130, Sudan, January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Atsbaha, # 176, Tigray, May and June 2021. Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency.
[ 570 ] Phone interview with # 176, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 571 ] Phone interview with Yemane, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 572 ] Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency.
[ 573 ] Phone interviews with Yemane, Atsbaha, # 176, Tigray, March and May 2021. Interviews with # 14, Teame, # 130, # 117, Sudan, January and May 2021.
[ 574 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 575 ] Phone interview with # 176, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 576 ] Phone interview with Yonas, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 577 ] Interviews with Aklile, Teame, Tzegazeab, # 130, # 117, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Samuel, Leul, Haftu, Yonas, Yirgalem, # 34, # 187, # 193, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
[ 578 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 579 ] Phone interview with # 187, Tigray, May 2021. See also Phone interviews with Yonas, Tadele, Yirgalem, and Leulin, Tigray, May and June 2021. Interviews with # 117 and Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 580 ] Phone interview with # 187, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 581 ] Interview with # 140, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Samuel, Yonas, Tadele, Tigray, May 2021. Phone interviews with Terhas, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 582 ] Phone interview with Yirgalem, Tigray, June 2021. It is common in Ethiopia that families bring food to detention centers and prisons for their relatives, to supplement meager prison rations.
[ 583 ] Phone interview with Tadele, Tigray, May 2021. See, Phone interviews with Terhas, Zemede, # 115, 250, # 252, # 280, # 281, # 278 in Sudan, August, September, November, and December 2021.
[ 584 ] Phone interview with # 187, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 585 ] Phone interviews with Leul and # 187, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 586 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 587 ] Phone interviews with Haftu, # 193, # 175.
[ 588 ] Phone interview with # 193 Tigray, May 2021.
[ 589 ] Interview with Gidey, Sudan, May 2021.Phone interviews with Atsbaha, Yirgalem, # 45, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021, and with Terhas, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 590 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha, Tigray, June 2021. Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia - I Always Remember that Day: Access to Services for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence in Ethiopia's Tigray Region, '' November 9, 2021, https: //www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/09/i-always-remember-day/access-services-survivors-gender-based-violence-ethiopias. Amnesty International, `` I Don't Know if They Realized I was a Person: Rape and Sexual Violence in the Conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, '' ( August 11, 2021), https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/4569/2021/en/.
[ 591 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 592 ] Phone interview with # 187, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 593 ] Phone interview with Yirgalem, # 187, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 594 ] Phone interview with Yirgalem, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 595 ] Interviews with Teame, Tzegazeab, # 19, # 117, Sudan January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Haftu, Yirgalem, # 39, # 185, # 187, # 193, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
[ 596 ] Phone interview with Haftu, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 597 ] Interviews Amanuel, Andom, Tzegazeab, # 19, # 117 in Sudan, January and May 2021. Phone interviews with Samuel, # 60, # 185, # 193, Tigray, March and May 2021.
[ 598 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 599 ] See section Depriving Tigrayans of Means of Survival section.
[ 600 ] Interview with Meaza, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 601 ] Interview with Berihu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 602 ] Bereket is a town in the al-Fashaga triangle, an undemarcated fertile border area disputed by Sudan and Ethiopia; Mohamind Amin, `` Sudan and Ethiopia's dispute in fertile border area threatens regional stability, '' Middle East Eye, July 2, 2021, https: //www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-ethiopia-fashaga-dispute-threatens-regional-stability.
[ 603 ] Interview with Hadera, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 604 ] Phone interview with Sindayo, # 26, # 42, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 605 ] Phone interview with # 34, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 606 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 607 ] Human Rights Watch, `` Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians, '' ( March 5, 2021) https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civilians. Amnesty International, `` The Massacre in Axum, '' ( February 26, 2021), https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/3730/2021/en/.
[ 608 ] Interview with Nigisti, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 609 ] Phone interview with # 172, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 610 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Mesfin, Kidane, # 81, # 35, # 176, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
[ 611 ] Phone interviews with Goitom, Frehiwot, Worku, Leul, # 73, # 81, # 181, # 182, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 612 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Kinfe, Filimon, Abebe, Goitom, Frehiwot, Worku, Mesfin, # 181, # 73, # 74, # 75, # 76, # 77, # 78, # 79, # 80, # 81, May and June 2021. Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency.
[ 613 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews, with Filimon, # 77, Tigray June 2021.
[ 614 ] Phone interviews # 77, Filimon, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 615 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview with Filimon in Tigray, June 2021.
[ 616 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 617 ] Phone interview with # 79, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 618 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 619 ] Phone interview with Filimon, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 620 ] Phone interviews with Frehiwot, Worku, Mesfin, Leul, # 73, # 79, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 621 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 622 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 623 ] Phone interviews with Filimon, Goitom, Frehiwot, Worku, # 73, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 624 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 625 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 626 ] Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency. Phone interview with Kinfe, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 627 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 628 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 629 ] Account # 15 shared with consent for public use by aid agency.
[ 630 ] Interview with Mihrettab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 631 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 632 ] Phone interview with Kinfe, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 633 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 634 ] Interview with Mihretab, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 635 ] Interview with Kinfe in Sudan, May 2021.
[ 636 ] Phone interview with Mesfin, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 637 ] Phone interview with # 78, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 638 ] Phone interview with Worku, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 639 ] Phone interviews with Sindayo, Samuel, Kibrom, # 31, # 32, # 33, # 35, # 42, # 81, # 172, # 176, # 188, Tigray, March and May 2021.
[ 640 ] Phone interview with # 81, Tigray, May 2021,
[ 641 ] Phone interview with # 35, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 642 ] Phone interviews with Abebe, Frehiwot, # 181, # 182, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 643 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 644 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 645 ] Phone interview with # 182, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 646 ] Phone interview with # 182, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 647 ] Amnesty International, Ethiopia: `` I don't know if they realized I was a person '': Rape and sexual violence in the conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, August 11, 2021, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr25/4569/2021/en/.
[ 648 ] Out of the 19 survivors of rape in Western Tigray with whom researchers interviewed, 15 said that they were gang raped.
[ 649 ] Phone interview with Blen in Tigray June 2021.
[ 650 ] Interview with Jemila inSudan, May 2021.
[ 651 ] interview with Samhal, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 652 ] Phone interview with Leul, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 653 ] Interview with Fasika, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 654 ] Phone interview with # 183, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 655 ] Interview with Etsegenet, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 656 ] Phone interview with Selamawit, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 657 ] Amnesty International, `` I Don't Know if They Realized I Was a Person: Rape and Sexual Violence in the Conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia; Human Rights Watch, `` I Always Remember That Day: Access to Services for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence in Ethiopia's Tigray Region.
[ 658 ] Ibid
[ 659 ] OCHA, `` Ethiopia- Tigray Region Humanitarian Update Situation Report, '' July 26, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-tigray-region-humanitarian-update-situation-report-26-july-2021.
[ 660 ] Cara Anna, `` 'People are starving ' '' New exodus in Ethiopia's Tigray region, '' AP News, March 11, 2021, https: //apnews.com/article/world-news-ethiopia-a25a50a774da284122c74a0bc1428052.
[ 661 ] OCHA, ``: `` In Western Tigray, partners report that tens of thousands of people have been displaced from the area allegedly on ethnic grounds.... Since February, thousands of residents in Western Tigray have fled the Zone amid reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances of people, particularly young men. As of 8 March, more than 45,000 people have been registered in Shire, with an influx of about 1,500 people every day... Humanitarian access and response in Western Zone is currently only possible through Amhara Region: USAID, `` Ethiopia- Tigray Conflict, '' March 31, 2021qwaZ, https: //www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/03.31.2021 - USG Tigray Fact Sheet 5.pdf, and the Norwegian Refugee Council said between 140,000-185,000 came from West Tigray over a two-week period in March 2021.
[ 662 ] Metasebia Teshome, `` Tigray region IDPs exceed a million, '' Capital Ethiopia, March 22, 2021 https: //www.capitalethiopia.com/capital/tigray-region-idps-exceed-a-million/; UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Update, '' December 2, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Northern% 20Ethiopia% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 202% 20Dec% 202021.pdf.
[ 663 ] Andres Schipani and David Pilling, `` Ethiopia: war in Tigray threatens to end Abiy's dream of unity, '' Financial Times, April 8, 2021, https: //www.ft.com/content/8f18a8bf-0999-43e6-9636-3581a8a2c249
[ 664 ] Phone interview with # 302 ( location withheld), November 2021.
[ 665 ] Medecins Sans Frontieres ( MSF), `` Ethiopia: Tigray cities fill with people fleeing violence, '' March 26, 2021, https: //www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/story/ethiopia-tigrays-cities-fill-people-fleeing-violence; Fritz Schaap, `` An Ethiopian Doctor Records the Destruction of His Homeland, '' Spiegel, March 15, 2021, https: //www.spiegel.de/international/world/chronicler-of-horrors-an-ethiopian-doctor-records-the-destruction-of-his-homeland-a-ba9139d0-d443-4dde-9458-cd18dc38cae1 - quoting humanitarian figures of between 100,000 - 150,000 Tigrayans driven from the Western zone at the time of publication in March); Northern Ethiopia Humanitarian Response Plan, '' May 2021, https: //www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/northern ethiopia response plan - may 2021.pdf - stating that `` The interim Government estimates that there are around 2 million IDPs across the region, most of whom came from the Western Zone. '' OHCHR-EHRC report ( November 3, 2021), https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OHCHR-EHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf - estimating that more than 600,000 Tigrayans fled their habitual residences in some woredas, including ncluding, Awrora, Dansha, Mai Gaba, Maikadra, Tsegede, Welkait and Humera)
[ 666 ] International Organization for Migration, `` Ethiopia- Household Level Intention Survey: Tigray Region, July 2021, https: //displacement.iom.int/reports/ethiopia-% E2% 80% 94-household-level-intention-survey-tigray-region-july-2021.
[ 667 ] UNHCR, Ethiopian Emergency Situation Update - New Arrivals - East Sudan and Blue Nile - As of 31 January 2022, https: //data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/90807.
[ 668 ] `` Top US diplomat decries 'ethnic cleansing ' in Ethiopia's Tigray, '' Al Jazeera, March 10, 2021, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/us-top-diplomat-decries-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopias-tigray.
[ 669 ] UNOCHA, `` Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, '' ( April 19, 2021), https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2019% 20Apr% 202021.pdf; Interview with Abebe Gebrehiwot, Deputy Chief Executive of Tigray Regional State, '' Tigrai TV, May 10, 2021, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=QAwEfskXhNY.
[ 670 ] UNOCHA, “ Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, ” April 19, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2019% 20Apr% 202021.pdf ( accessed April 1, 2022). UNOCHA, “ Ethiopia – Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, ” April 19, 2021. “ 'You don't belong ': land dispute drives new exodus in Ethiopia’ s Tigray, ” Reuters, March 29, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-displaced-insight-idUKKBN2BL1B9 ( accessed April 1, 2022).
[ 671 ] Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray, '' December 16, 2021, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/12/16/ethiopia-new-wave-atrocities-western-tigray.
[ 672 ] In many towns and villages, officials, security forces, and non-Tigrayan residents would proclaim that Tigrayans should go to `` towards Tigray, '' that they did not belong in the territory, and that `` Tigrayans belonged east of the Tekeze River. ''
[ 673 ] Phone interview with # 289, April 2021.
[ 674 ] Phone interview with # 193, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 675 ] Interview with # 116, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Mihret, Yonas, Sindayo, Alula, Tigray, March, May, and June 2021.
https: //tigrigna.voanews.com/a/residents-in-western-tigray-are-accusing-the-amhara-special-forces-of-abusing-thier-human-rights/5691905.html - Tigrayan residents interviewed by VOA Tigrigna service indicated that administrators arrived in town with 11 trucks to a school where displaced residents took shelter and ferried them to the Tekeze River.
[ 676 ] Phone interview with Alula, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 677 ] Phone interview with Sindayo, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 678 ] Phone interview with Mihret, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 679 ] Phone interviews with Terefe, Abel, Haftu, Asmeret, # 36, # 38, # 57, # 172, # 198, Tigray, March, April and May 2021.
[ 680 ] Phone interview with # 37, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 681 ] Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, `` Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray, '' December 16, 2021; Phone interview with # 305, Tigray, February 2022.
[ 682 ] Phone interview with # 160, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 683 ] Phone interview with # 276, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 684 ] UNHCR, `` Regional Update # 26: Ethiopia Emergency Situation, '' December 15, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-regional-update-26-ethiopia-emergency-situation-15-december-2021.
[ 685 ] Phone interviews with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021. Interview with # 53 and Kindihafti, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 686 ] Interview with # 53 and Kindihafti, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 687 ] Phone interview with Terhas, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 688 ] Phone interview with Yonas, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 689 ] Phone nterview with Tadele and Alula, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 690 ] Phone interview with Tadele, May 2021.
[ 691 ] Phone interview with Atsbaha and Tesfalem, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 692 ] Phone interview with Tesfalem, June 2021.
[ 693 ] Phone interviews with Akbret, Kibrom, Yonas, Tadele, Alula, Yirgalem, Godofa, Gebrekristos, Measho, # 175, # 45, # 57, # 58, Tigray, March, April, May, and June 2021.
[ 694 ] Phone interview with # 44, Tigray, March 2021.
[ 695 ] Phone interview with Gebrekristos, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 696 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 697 ] Phone interview with Samuel, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 698 ] Phone interview with Yemane, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 699 ] Phone interview with Yonas, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 700 ] Phone interviews with Akbret, Kibrom, Berhan, Abel, # 42, # 75, # 175, Tigray, March and May 2021.
[ 701 ] Phone interview with Tsige, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 702 ] Interviews with Andom and Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 703 ] Interview with Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 704 ] Ibid.
[ 705 ] Interview with Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 706 ] Phone interview with Solomon, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 707 ] Phone interview wiht Semhal, Tigray, June 2021. Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021
[ 708 ] Phone interview with Alula, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 709 ] Phone interviews with, Frehiwot, Worku, Kidane, and # 179, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 710 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 711 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 712 ] Phone interview with Worku, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 713 ] Phone interview with Worku, Kidane, # 73, # 80, Tigray, May and June 2021.
[ 714 ] Phone interview with Kidane, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 715 ] Phone interview with # 179, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 716 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 717 ] Phone interview with Worku, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 718 ] Phone interviews with Kahsay, Tigray, May 2021, and with Worku in Tigray, June 2021.
[ 719 ] Interview with Natanel, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 720 ] Phone interview with Worku, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 721 ] Phone interview with Frehiwot, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 722 ] Phone interview with # 179, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 723 ] Ibid.
[ 724 ] Phone interview with Kidane, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 725 ] Phone interview with Goitom, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 726 ] Phone interview with Goitom, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 727 ] Interview with Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 728 ] Interview with Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 729 ] Interview with Gezae, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 730 ] Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 731 ] Interview with Robel, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 732 ] Interview with Semira, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 733 ] Interview with Tesfakiros, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 734 ] Phone interview with # 178, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 735 ] Interviews with Andom, Tsega, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 736 ] Interview with Tesfa, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 737 ] Interview with Andom, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 738 ] Phone interview with Akbret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 739 ] Phone interview with Mihret, Tigray, April 2021.
[ 740 ] Phone interviews with # 172 and Kibrom, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 741 ] Phone interview, # 172, # 174, # 182, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 742 ] Phone interviews with # 172, # 182, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 743 ] Declan Walsh and Simon Marks, `` Ethiopian Forces Retreat in Tigray, and Rebels Enter the Capital, '' New York Times, June 28, 2021, https: //www.nytimes.com/2021/06/28/world/asia/tigray-mekelle-ethiopia-retreat.html.
[ 744 ] Phone interviews with Zemede, Ftawhi, # 250, # 115, # 256, # 261, # 281, # 278, # 280, # 282, # 283, # 284, # 303, August, November, and December 2021, and January 2022.
[ 745 ] `` Parliament approves state of emergency proclamation, '' Addis Standard, November 4, 2021, https: //addisstandard.com/update-details-of-ethiopias-state-of-emergency-proclamation/. Prior to the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency, the Amhara regional government declared its own regional state of emergency in October 2021; `` Amhara state council declares emergency, including region wide curfew, '' Addis Standard, Ocober 31, 2021, https: //addisstandard.com/update-amhara-state-council-declares-emergency-including-region-wide-curfew-suspension-of-activities-by-state-institutions/; Katharine Houreld, `` Could Ethiopia's capital fall to Tigrayan and allied forces? '' Reuters, November 5, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/world/africa/could-ethiopias-capital-fall-tigrayan-allied-forces-2021-11-05.
[ 746 ] Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, `` Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray. ''
[ 747 ] Phone interviews with # 278, # 281, # 280, and # 303, Sudan, November and December 2021 and January 2022.
[ 748 ] Phone interviews with # 277, # 279, and # 280, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 749 ] Phone interviews with Temesgen, Fthawi, # 257, # 274, # 258, # 277, # 279, # 280, # 169, Sudan and Tigray, August, November, and December 2021.
[ 750 ] Phone interviews with Zemede, Temegen, Fthawi, August 2021.
[ 751 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 752 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 753 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021. Amhara Media Corporation Facebook post by Amhara Media Corporation, June 13, 2021, https: //www.facebook.com/AmharaMediaCorporation/posts/1563797483795240.
[ 754 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan August 2021.
[ 755 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan August 2021.
[ 756 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 757 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 758 ] ``??????????????????, '' Amhara Media Corporation, video clip, YouTube, July 14, 2021, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=qaole fAJD0.
[ 759 ] Phone interviews with Fthawi, Zemede, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 760 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 761 ] Phone interview with # 165, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 762 ] Phone interview with Zemede, August 2021.
[ 763 ] Phone interview with Yirgalem, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 764 ] Phone interviews with Zemede, # 256, # 280, Sudan, August and December 2021.
[ 765 ] Phone interview with Zemede, August 2021.
[ 766 ] Phone interview with # 256, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 767 ] Phone interview with # 261, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 768 ] Phone interview with # 155, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 769 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 770 ] Phone interview with Zemede, August 2021.
[ 771 ] Phone interview with # 256, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 772 ] Phone interview with # 256, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 773 ] Phone interview with Zemede, August 2021,
[ 774 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan August 2021.
[ 775 ] Phone interview with # 280, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 776 ] Phone interview with # 250, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 777 ] Phone interviews with Zemede, # 155 # 250, # 252, # 280, # 281, # 278, Sudan, August, September, November, and December 2021.
[ 778 ] Phone interview with # 250, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 779 ] Phone interview with # 155, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 780 ] Phone interview with # 155, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 781 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 782 ] Phone interview with # 281, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 783 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 784 ] Phone interview with # 279, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 785 ] Phone interview with # 280, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 786 ] Phone interview with J # 303, Sudan, January 2022.
[ 787 ] Phone interview with # 275, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 788 ] The refugee registration center of Hamdayet, which currently hosts around 6,000 Tigrayan refugees, also lies by the riverbanks, on the Sudanese side of the border between Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and downstream from Humera. Further downstream, an irrigation dam near the Sudanese town of Wad al-Hiliyu turns the Setit River into a lake, forming eddies that encourage the beaching of floating objects.
[ 789 ] Phone interviews with three individuals involved in the retrievals of the bodies, Sudan, August - September 2021; with a journalist present during retrievals, August 2021.
[ 790 ] Phone interviews with Merhawi, # 248, # 247, # 258, # 285, August - November 2021.
[ 791 ] Phone interviews with three individuals involved in the retrievals of the bodies, Sudan, August - September 2021
[ 792 ] Phone interview with Merhawi, an individual involved in the retrieval of bodies, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 793 ] Phone interview with # 247, an individual involved in the retrieval of bodies, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 794 ] Forensic pathologist analysis of images commissioned by Amnesty International, August 2021.
[ 795 ] Phone interview with # 248, a medical professional involved in the retrieval of the bodies, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 796 ] Phone interview with # 250, # 281, # 280, # 279, Sudan, August, November, and December 2021.
[ 797 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 798 ] Phone interview with # 281, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 799 ] Phone interviews with # 281, # 303, # 278, # 280, Sudan, November, December 2021, and January 2022.
[ 800 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 801 ] Phone interview with # 281, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 802 ] Phone interview with # 280, # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 803 ] Phone interview with # 280, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 804 ] Phone interview with # 278, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 805 ] Phone interviews with Temesgen, Zemede, Merhawi, with # 257, # 258, # 250, # 279, # 277, # 280, # 281, # 248, # 247, # 285 and # 275, Sudan, in August, September, November and December 2021. Fthawi, # 155, # 159.
[ 806 ] Phone interviews with Temesgen, # 281, and # 275, November and December 2021.
[ 807 ] Phone interview with # 257, September 2021.
[ 808 ] Phone interview with # 257, September 2021.
[ 809 ] Phone interview with # 274, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 810 ] Phone interview with # 159, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 811 ] Phone interview with # 258, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 812 ] Phone interview with Zemede, # 154, # 250, # 275, # 279, # 277, # 281, Sudan August, September, November, and December2021.
[ 813 ] Phone interview with # 277, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 814 ] Accounts of the killings in Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, `` Ethiopia: New Wave of Atrocities in Western Tigray, '' December 16, 2021.
[ 815 ] Phone interviews with # 303, # 274, # 276, # 157, and # 272 in Sudan December 2021 and January 2022.
[ 816 ] Phone interview with # 303, Sudan, January 2022.
[ 817 ] Phone interview with # 157, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 818 ] Phone interview with # 274, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 819 ] Phone interview with # 274, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 820 ] Phone interview with # 270, Sudan, November 2021.
[ 821 ] Phone interviews with Zemede, # 256, # 250, # 155, Sudan, August, and September 2021.
[ 822 ] Phone interview with # 280, Sudan, December 2021.
[ 823 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 824 ] Phone interview with # 155, Sudan, September 2021.
[ 825 ] Phone interview with Zemede, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 826 ] Phone interview with # 256, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 827 ] Interviews with # 225, # 226, # 227, # 232, # 234, # 235, Sudan, January 2021. Phone interview with # 304, Sudan, February 2021.
[ 828 ] Interviews with # 225, # 226, # 227, # 231, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 829 ] Interviews with # 225, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 830 ] Interviews with # 225, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 831 ] Interviews with # 226, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 832 ] Interviews with # 227, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 833 ] Interviews with # 227, # 231, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 834 ] Interviews # 234, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 835 ] Interviews with # 233, # 237, Kibreab, and # 231, Sudan, January 2021.
[ 836 ] Phone interview with # 198, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 837 ] Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, Silvia Aloisi, `` How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions/. `` In Pictures: Inside Humera, a town scarred by Ethiopia's war, '' Al Jazeera, November 23, 2020, https: //www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2020/11/23/in-pictures-inside-a-tigray-town-scarred-by-ethiopian-conflict.
[ 838 ] Interview with # 215, Sudan, December 2020.
[ 839 ] Phone interview with Akbret, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 840 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, August 2021.
[ 841 ] Interview with Hadgu, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 842 ] Phone interview with # 174, Tigray, May 2021.
[ 843 ] Interview with Aklile, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interview # 173, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 844 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021. Phone interviews with Leul, # 190, # 191, # 289 in Ethiopia, June 2021 and with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 845 ] Katharine Houreld, Michael Georgy, Silvia Aloisi, `` How ethnic killings exploded from an Ethiopian town, '' Reuters, June 7, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ethiopia-conflict-expulsions.
[ 846 ] Phone interview with Fthawi, Sudan, August 2021.
[ 847 ] Phone interview with # 289, Ethiopia, April 2021.
[ 848 ] Phone interview with # 190, Tigray, June 2021.
[ 849 ] Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021.
[ 850 ] `` Ethiopian Returnees to Humera, '' Voice of America - Amharic Service, July 3, 2021, https: //amharic.voanews.com/a/Ethiopian -- returnees-humera-7-3-2021/5952294.html? fbclid=IwAR0RRr12mFlVQUxksUZYXwLCYyUN70PS8G5wHFEyEnyGcb5pOKbvdAKOcR4; Robbie Corey Boulet, `` Survival Struggle: Ethnic standoff drives new phase of Tigray War, '' AFP, July 13, 2021, https: //news.yahoo.com/survival-struggle-ethnic-standoff-drives-022623982.html.
[ 851 ] Phone interviews with Leul, # 190, # 191, Tigray, June 2021. Interview with Teame, Sudan, May 2021; Robbie Corey Boulet, `` Survival Struggle: Ethnic standoff drives new phase of Tigray War, '' AFP, July 13, 2021.
[ 852 ] OCHA, `` Tigray Region Situation Update: June 20, 2021, https: //reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation% 20Report% 20-% 20Ethiopia% 20-% 20Tigray% 20Region% 20Humanitarian% 20Update% 20-% 2017% 20Jun% 202021.pdf.
[ 853 ] Samuel Gebre, `` Ethiopia's Amhara Seize Disputed Territory Amid Tigray Conflict, '' Bloomberg News, March 16, 2021, https: //www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2021-03-16/ethiopia-s-amhara-seize-disputed-territory-amid-tigray-conflict.
[ 854 ] Land in Ethiopia, according to the Constitution, is state-owned, with regions afforded autonomy in the administration of land, including developing systems for the compensation, investment, and settlement of disputes. Rights to till it are traditionally given based on a blood and soil connection-in other words, proven descent from the community grants access to land.The proclamation was first posted on https: //twitter.com/GlobalGsts/status/1394299590883659778.
[ 855 ] United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 ( 1992), May 27, 1994.
[ 856 ] United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 ( 1992) ( S/25274), May 27,1994.
[ 857 ] History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War ( 1943), p. 179, quoted in Rodney Dixon, `` Crimes against humanity, '' in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( O. Triffterer, ed.) ( 1999), p. 123.
[ 858 ] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ( Rome Statute), July 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, art. 7. https: //www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/documents/rs-eng.pdf
[ 859 ] Prosecutor v. Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ( Trial Chamber), September 2, 1998, para. 582.
[ 860 ] Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ( Appeals Chamber), Case ICTR-96-4-A, ICTR Trial Chamber, September 2, 1998, para. 579; Kordic & Cerkez, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ( ICTY), Case IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, February 26,2001, para. 179; The Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Case ICTR-95-1-A, ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999, para. 123.
[ 861 ] Prosecutor v. Kunarac, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ( ICTY), Case ICTY-96-23/1 A, Appeals Chamber, June 12, 2022, para. 98.
[ 862 ] International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes ( ICC), art. 7 ( 1) ( i); Rome Statute, art. 7 ( 2) ( i).
[ 863 ] Rome Statute, art. 7 ( 2) ( b).
[ 864 ] Rome Statute, art. 7 ( 1) ( d).
[ 865 ] Rome Statute, art. 7 ( 1) ( d), n.12.
[ 866 ] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, September 2004), https: //www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.pdf.
[ 867 ] Protocol Additional of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of the victims of non-international armed conflicts ( Protocol II), art. 17. adopted June 8,1977, entered into force December 1978.
[ 868 ] International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 124.
[ 869 ] Rome Statute, art. 9 ( 2) ( b), n.8.
[ 870 ] Rome Statute, art. 7 ( 2) ( g).
[ 871 ] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7 ( 1) ( h).
[ 872 ] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ( the Refugee Convention), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 1951, entered into force April 22, 1954. international protection for refugees only ceases once a refugee has `` re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality ''; `` acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality ''; `` voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained ''; or for a `` person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence. '' The Refugee Convention, art. 1 ( c).
[ 873 ] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted December 10, 1948, art. 13 ( 2). States that `` Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. ''
[ 874 ] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted December 16,1966, art. 12 ( 4). The Human Rights Committee, the international body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR, in its General Comment on the freedom of movement, `` considers that there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one's own country could be reasonable. A State party must not, by stripping a person of nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this person from returning to his or her own country. '' UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement ( Art. 12), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, November 2, 1999, para. 20.
[ 875 ] The authoritative 1985 ExCom Conclusion on Voluntary Repatriation confirms `` the basic rights of persons to return voluntarily to the country of origin, '' while the 1994 General Conclusion on International Protection `` calls upon countries of origin, countries of asylum, UNHCR and the international community as a whole to do everything possible to enable refugees to exercise freely their right to return home in safety and dignity. ''
[ 876 ] OCHA, `` UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, '' ( September 2004), https: //www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.pdf.
[ 877 ] United Nations, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, March 21,2006,
https: //www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/BASICP~1.PDF.
[ 878 ] International Commission of Jurists, `` The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations, A Practitioner's Guide, '' Revised Edition, 2018, pp. 52-84.https: //www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Universal-Right-to-a-Remedy-Publications-Reports-Practitioners-Guides-2018-ENG.pdf; Theo van Boven, `` Victims ' Right to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United Nations Principles and Guidelines, '' p. 22. https: //www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r26214.pdf.
[ 879 ] African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights, General Comment 4, African Charter on Human and People's Rights: The Right to Redress for Victims of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment or Treatment, ( 23 February - 4 March 2017), https: //www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/achpr general comment no. 4 english.pdf.
[ 880 ] UN Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, principle 8.
[ 881 ] International Commission of Jurists, `` The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations, A Practitioner's Guide, '' Revised Edition, 2018, pp. 156.
[ 882 ] UN Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, principles 19, 20.
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ( CERD), General Recommendation XXII.
[ 883 ] UN Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons ( the Pinheiro Principles), UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, June 28, 2005 https: //www.unhcr.org/protection/idps/50f94d849/principles-housing-property-restitution-refugees-displaced-persons-pinheiro.html.
[ 884 ] UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Resolution 1998/26, August 26, 1998.
[ 885 ] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Organizations of Civil Societies Proclamation, Proclamation No. 1113/2019, Federal Negarit Gazeta, March 7, 2019, https: //www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/document/ethiopia-civil-societies-proclamation-proc-no-1113-2019. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, `` Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes, Proclamation No. 1176/2020, Federal Negarit Gazeta, March 25, 2020, https: //chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/A-PROCLAMATION-TO-PROVIDE-FOR-THE-PREVENTION-AND-SUPPRESSION-OF-TERRORISM-CRIMES.pdf. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Media Proclamation, Proclamation No. 1238/2021, Federal Negarit Gazeta, April 5, 2021, https: //chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Media-Proclamation-No.-1238-2021.pdf.
[ 886 ] The Council, Legal Justice Affairs Advisory Council ( Aug.15, 2019),
http: //ljaac.gov.et/About/CouncilStructure. Behailu Ayele, `` Council Arise to Reform Anti-terrorism, Media Law, '' Addis Fortune, June 30,2018 https: //addisfortune.net/articles/council-arise-to-reform-anti-terrorism-media-law/.
[ 887 ] UN Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Thirty-Third Session, `` National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21, '' UN Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/33/ETH/1, para. 40, February 25, 2019, https: //documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/053/56/PDF/G1905356.pdf? OpenElement.
[ 888 ] Note, Abiy Ahmed was also one of the founders and head of Information and National Security Agency ( INSA).
[ 889 ] Mahlet Fasil and Yared Tsegaye, `` Analysis: Ethiopia crackdown on corruption, human right abuses. Everything you need to know, '' Addis Standard, November 16, 2018, https: //addisstandard.com/analysis-ethiopia-crackdown-corruption-human-right-abuses-everything-need-know/.
[ 890 ] George Obulutsa, `` Powerful Ethiopian party accuses government of ethnic crackdown, '' Reuters, November 20, 2018, https: //www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics/powerful-ethiopian-party-accuses-government-of-ethnic-crackdown-idUSKCN1NP1JN.
[ 891 ] `` To Heal, Ethiopia Needs to Confront its Violent Past '', Human Rights Watch News Release, May 2020, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/28/heal-ethiopia-needs-confront-its-violent-past, `` Ethiopia: Abiy's First Year as Prime Minister, A Review of Accountability and Justice, '' Human Rights Watch, News Release, April 8, 2019, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/08/ethiopia-abiys-first-year-prime-minister-review-accountability-and-justice. Amnesty International, `` Justice, Not Repression will Break Ethiopia's Wave of Violence, November 9, 2020, https: //www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/11/oped-justice-not-repression-will-break-ethiopias-waves-of-violence/.
[ 892 ] `` Ethiopia: Justice Needed for Deadly October Violence, '' Human Rights Watch News Release, April 1, 2020, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/ethiopia-justice-needed-deadly-october-violence #: ~: text=Protests% 20erupted% 20in% 20Ethiopia's% 20capital, a% 20claim% 20the% 20police% 20denied.
[ 893 ] `` Ethiopia: Ethnic Tigrayans Forcibly Disappeared, '' Human Rights Watch News Release, August 18, 2021, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/18/ethiopia-ethnic-tigrayans-forcibly-disappeared; `` Ethiopia: Opposition Figures Held Without Charge, '' Human Rights Watch News Release, August 15, 2020, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/15/ethiopia-opposition-figures-held-without-charge; `` Ethiopia: Free Speech at Risk Amid Covid-19 '', Human Rights Watch News Release, May 6, 2020, https: //www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/06/ethiopia-free-speech-risk-amid-covid-19.
[ 894 ] Tom Gardner and Lule Estifanos, `` Political Violence Could Derail Ethiopia's Democratic Transition, '' Foreign Policy, Sept. 20, 2020, https: //foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/20/political-violence-could-derail-ethiopia-democratic-transition-assassination/.
[ 895 ] Rodney Muhumuz, `` Ethiopia denies 'ethnic cleansing, ' is open to outside probe, '' Associated Press, March 13, 2021, https: //apnews.com/article/world-news-race-and-ethnicity-antony-blinken-ethiopia-uganda-1e1b536ccc1cd686db75ae2040bbdfc0; `` Evidence mounts those Eritrean forces are in Ethiopia, '' The Economist, January 2, 2021, https: //www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/01/02/evidence-mounts-that-eritrean-forces-are-in-ethiopia.
[ 896 ] Ethiopian Authorities Reject Outside, Independent Investigation on Massacres, Addis Fortune, Dec. 8, 2020, https: //addisfortune.news/news-alert/ethiopian-authorities-reject-outside-independent-investigation-on-massacres/.
[ 897 ] Cara Anna, `` UN: Ethiopia's conflict has 'appalling ' impact on civilians, '' Associated Press, December.9, 2020, https: //apnews.com/article/international-news-coronavirus-pandemic-ethiopia-massacres-united-nations-e6f32b038f6d6a27b6a3be59a9d3343f.
[ 898 ] Turkel Commission, Second Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 3 May 200: Israel's Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law, Israel, February 203 ( Second Turkel Report), pp. 114-117 and 129, para. 82; UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law '', UN Doc. A/RES/60/47, ( December 6, 2005) ( Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy), para. II ( 3) ( b).
[ 899 ] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Attorney General, `` A Summary of Efforts to Ensure Accountability Regarding Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Norms in the Regional State of Tigray, '' ( May 21, 2021), https: //ethiopianembassy.org/a-summary-of-efforts-to-ensure-accountability-regarding-violations-of-international-humanitarian-law-and-other-legal-norms-in-the-regional-state-of-tigray-may-21-2021/.
[ 900 ] Ibid.
[ 901 ] Dr. Gedion Timothewos, Attorney General, and Billene Seyoum, Press Secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, `` Recent developments in Tigray and the upcoming elections, Press Briefing, Addis Ababa, June 3, 2021, transcript, https: //www.ethioembassy.org.uk/prime-ministers-office-press-briefing-transcript-june-3-2021/.
[ 902 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN OHCHR, `` Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC) /Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' at para 376 ( November 3, 2021), https: //www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ET/OHCHREHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf. ( `` Stating the investigative team's concerns `` that investigations conducted by Ethiopian national institutions do not match the scope and breadth of the violations it has identified through its investigations nor that those investigations which are being undertaken sufficiently comply with international standards, including with respect to transparency. ``).
[ 903 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, `` Rapid Investigation into Grave Human Rights Violation in Mai Kadra: Preliminary Findings, '' November 24, 2020, https: //ehrc.org/ethiopian-human-rights-commission-rapid-investigation-into-grave-human-rights-violation-maikadra-preliminary-findings/.
[ 904 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, `` Brief Monitoring Report on the Situation of Civilians in Humera, Dansha, and Bissober, '' ( January 17, 2021) https: //ehrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Brief-Monitoring-Report-Humera-Dansha-and-Bissober-2-1.pdf.
[ 905 ] Ibid.
[ 906 ] Ibid.
[ 907 ] African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights, `` Press Statement on the official launch of the Commission of Inquiry on the Tigray Region in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' June 16, 2021, https: //au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/40424-pr-press release coi eng.pdf.
[ 908 ] Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press statement on the African Commission on Human and Peoples ' Rights measures to investigate alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, June 17, 2021,
https: //ethiopianembassy.org/press-statement-on-the-african-commission-on-human-and-peoples-rights-measures-to-investigate-alleged-violations-of-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law-in-the-tigray-region-of-ethiopia-june-1/.
[ 909 ] Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the UN OHCHR, `` Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission ( EHRC) /Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ( OHCHR) Joint Investigation into Alleged Violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Refugee Law Committed by all Parties to the Conflict in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '' November 3, 2021, https: //www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ET/OHCHREHRC-Tigray-Report.pdf ( accessed November 3, 2021).
[ 910 ] Ibid.
[ 911 ] Ibid, para 145.
[ 912 ] `` Press Statement on allegations of 'ethnic cleansing, '' Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Twitter Page, March 13, 2021, https: //twitter.com/mfaethiopia/status/1370632020917903367/.
[ 913 ] Ibid.
[ 914 ] `` Ethiopia's Amhara rejects charge of 'ethnic cleansing ' in Tigray, '' Al Jazeera, March 12, 2021, https: //www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/11/ethiopias-amhara-rejects-charges-of-ethnic-cleansing-in-tigray.
[ 915 ] Robbie Corey-Boulet, `` Ethiopia's Amhara region rejects charge of 'ethnic cleansing ' in Tigray. '' Agence-France Press, March 11, 2021, https: //news.yahoo.com/ethiopias-amhara-region-rejects-charge-111509243.html? guccounter=1 & guce referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8 & guce referrer sig=AQAAADF6xPZr4BF 5TF0l5cgmIzwdBEQTUYqGutrP-vcFjulS70hB0wTCc0QEugYiWoyBHDvfxlF 57NKLvmuhHcugvdKIyORUM4j-uF-n6HkJAjFS-S6hKZatTHFX9SE8NF 118N3NgRWwVspJaFDvzd9-Nz20m-KfwG7bcoNqPBbOU
[ 916 ] '' 'You Don't Belong ': Land Dispute Drives New Exodus in Ethiopia's Tigray, '' Reuters, March 29, 2021, https: //www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-conflict-displaced-insight-int-idUSKBN2BL1C3.
[ 917 ] FDRE Attorney General, `` A Summary of Efforts to Ensure Accountability Regarding Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Norms in the Regional State of Tigray, '' May 21, 2021, https: //ethiopianembassy.org/a-summary-of-efforts-to-ensure-accountability-regarding-violations-of-international-humanitarian-law-and-other-legal-norms-in-the-regional-state-of-tigray-may-21-2021/.
[ 918 ] Ibid; https: //twitter.com/MOJEthiopia/status/1445945924098920460? lang=en.
[ 919 ] Twitter, Office of the Prime Minister ( November 30, 2020), https: //twitter.com/pmethiopia/status/1333352269920817153. | general |
Carrie Lam's Successor Won't Be Doing Expats Any Favours | Anyone following in her footsteps is unlikely to change the policies driving banks and bankers out of the city.
It is becoming increasingly clear that John Lee will replace Carrie Lam at the top of Hong Kong’ s government after she indicated she would not stand for a second term early this week.
Should Lee become the city's next chief executive, he is likely to face widespread condemnation by democratic governments around the world given he will not be elected by full suffrage.
But that is unlikely to faze him much. He is also likely to continue to implement many of the mainland's government policy measures, providing little relief for embattled foreigners who have faced harsh COVID-19 restrictions for over two years.
Former Security Official
A government statement released earlier today indicated that Lee, who currently serves as the city’ s chief secretary for administration, had tendered his resignation and was now on leave.
According to the South China Morning Post, Lee is the sole candidate endorsed by the mainland government and that this message has been relayed to key politicians in Hong Kong.
The newspaper reported he is a former police officer, and that he held two senior security positions in both the current and previous administration, a period which saw both the 2015 yellow umbrella movement and the widespread 2019 pro-democracy protests.
Little Relief for Expats
On the face of it, his policing background makes it likely that there will be little relief from the pressures ostensibly driving out foreign financial institutions and expatriate employees out of the city.
Many expats have complained assiduously about the harsh travel, quarantine, testing, and lifestyle restrictions in place related to COVID-19, some of which have been in place for over two years. An incident earlier this year when a mother was separated from her baby, who was infected with COVID-19, is largely considered to be a watershed moment for many families living here.
Since the start of a large scale fifth wave of infections related to the Omicron variant in January, public gatherings have been limited to two people and most public and leisure facilities have been closed, as have bars. Restaurant capacity and operating hours have been sharply curtailed.
Banks Moving Out
As finews.asia has previously reported, the exodus is well documented, particularly in the financial sector. Societe Generale indicated late last week it was relocating traders from Hong Kong to Singapore. Other global making similar moves include Bank of America, Citi and J.P. Morgan, which has even reportedly made plans for an overnight evacuation of staff from Hong Kong to Singapore.
Despite this, the government responded to detailed questions by councillor Paul Tse at the legislative assembly earlier today regarding the outflow of professionals and capital from the city.
The city’ s treasurer, Christopher Hui, replied that any outflows were likely to be temporary.
He admitted that the inflow of individuals entering Hong Kong fell during the initial stages of the pandemic in 2020 but that they were up by 20 percent last year.
Relaxed Quarantine
Hui indicated that the recent relaxation of quarantine measure and flight bans had been well received by business and the financial service sector.
He also maintained the number of non-Hong Kong companies registered in the city continued to rise and that there were no notable signs of funds flowing out of Hong Kong or the banking system. | general |
Covid booster: Scientists divided on need for fourth shots after FDA authorization | Leading U.S. scientists and physicians worry that the FDA and CDC are moving too fast in approving a fourth round of Covid shots, with little public debate that gives the vaccine makers too big a role in setting the pace with which the doses are distributed across the nation.
The top U.S. public health agencies last week endorsed a fourth Covid shot for older adults without holding public meetings, drawing criticism from leading vaccine experts who believe federal health officials haven't provided enough transparency about the reasons for the decision.
The authorization of a fourth dose for adults age 50 and older comes as the scientific community is divided over whether the data is sufficient to support another round of boosters, and whether authorizing additional shots is a sustainable public health policy, especially since protection against infection simply wears off over time. There is a debate over whether the goal of the vaccines is to prevent severe illness, which they 've largely achieved, or infection as well — a more challenging proposition.
The Food and Drug Administration authorized a second booster shot for people age 50 and older last week, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention quickly backed their distribution hours later based on data from Israel, which rolled out fourth doses months ago. Dr. Peter Marks, who heads the FDA office responsible for vaccine safety and efficacy, said shortly after the decision that another round of boosters will likely be needed in the fall.
The rapid regulatory clearance of fourth shots for older adults came just weeks after Pfizer and Moderna asked the FDA to permit them. Several FDA and CDC committee members as well as other leading experts said Pfizer and Moderna are playing too large a role in setting the agenda around U.S. vaccine policy by announcing the need for fourth doses and possibly a variant-specific vaccine before the public health agencies have made any recommendations.
Moderna CEO Stephane Bancel said during a January interview with Goldman Sachs that fourth doses would be needed in the fall as the protective antibodies from the shots wane over time. Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla told CNBC in early March, before the company filed its request with the FDA, that there's a need for a fourth dose though he said the regulators would ultimately come to their own conclusion.
`` I just think it's sort of booster mania. I think the companies are frankly acting like public health agencies, '' said Dr. Paul Offit, a member of the FDA committee and one of the nation's top vaccine experts. Offit said the CDC, which has the final say on vaccine recommendations, needs to develop a clear national strategy to reduce public confusion about what it means to be fully vaccinated at this stage in the Covid pandemic.
Michael Osterholm, a leading epidemiologist, said repeated boosting is not a sustainable public health strategy because of the challenge posed by waning immunity against infection. `` We're not gon na be able to boost our way out of this, '' said Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota.
The FDA and CDC vaccine advisory panels weigh safety and efficacy data before making recommendations to top federal health officials on the best path forward. Though the recommendations are nonbinding, the meetings provide an open forum where the public can listen to the nation's top health experts debate the pros and cons of vaccine policy, and often even participate by phoning in to voice their views.
The FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee is meeting Wednesday to debate the future of boosters. However, it will not vote on any specific recommendations, according to the FDA. The CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices did not meet before CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky signed off on the fourth shots for older adults last week.
`` It's just sort of fait accompli, '' Offit said. `` I feel that we're in a time, this sort of Covid exceptionalism, where we don't do things the way we normally do it, which is that the science precedes the recommendation. Here, it's the other way around, '' he said.
Offit said that the FDA is effectively asking the public to believe that the data supports a fourth dose by providing sufficient protection against serious illness. He said the American public benefits from hearing an open discussion about vaccine decisions, particularly at a time when many people are not taking advantage of the third dose. Offit is an infectious disease expert at Children's Hospital Philadelphia and a co-inventor of a rotavirus vaccine.
Marks, during a call with reporters last week, said the FDA did not call a committee meeting because the decision was `` relatively straightforward. '' He said data from Israel suggested a fourth dose can reduce the risk of hospitalization and death in older adults. The CDC, in a statement to CNBC, said the fourth dose was an incremental change that did not need to go before its committee.
Dr. William Schaffner, a nonvoting member of ACIP, disagreed that the CDC recommendation was an incremental change. Schaffner said clearing fourth doses for older adults is a big decision that would have benefited from a meeting of outside advisors to provide the public with transparency.
`` I think to have this decision made in-house behind closed doors without having the transparency of a full debate that a regularly called ACIP meeting would have provided – I think that's unfortunate, '' said Schaffner, an infectious disease expert at Vanderbilt University Medical Center.
Dr. James Hildreth, who is attending the FDA committee's Wednesday meeting as a temporary member, noted that the drug regulator wasn't required to call a public meeting before authorizing the shots, and the agency has seasoned experts who can determine if there is evidence to support a new authorization. However, Hildreth said moving forward without a recommendation from outside experts fuels the perception that industry is playing too big a role in the nation's vaccine strategy.
`` When the FDA makes a decision like that without calling together an outside group of experts, it just adds to the optics of the pharmaceutical companies having an impact on decisions that are being made, '' said Hildreth, president of Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee. Meharry is a clinical trial site for Novavax's vaccine as well as Moderna's shots for younger children.
Read CNBC's latest global coverage of the Covid pandemic:
While some health experts believe the central purposes of the vaccines is to prevent severe illness, others think it is important to also stop infections from the virus. The protection provided by the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines against infection has declined substantially over time, particularly in the context of omicron, which has numerous mutations that give it an enhanced capability to cause breakthrough infections and mild illness. However, the vaccines are still providing substantial protection against severe illness.
`` If you 've gotten a mild illness after you 've been vaccinated, you 've won — that's it. You 've been prevented from having serious illness, which is the stated goal of this vaccine, '' said Offit, who believes three doses were necessary for the elderly and four for the people with weak immune systems, but is skeptical of the need for additional shots right now.
But if the goal is also to prevent infection, that means, at least for now, booster shots are the only available tool to increase antibodies until a longer-lasting vaccine is available. The problem is that the vaccines eventually run into diminishing returns, according John Moore, a professor of microbiology and immunology at Weill Cornell Medical College. Moore said a three-dose regimen is fairly standard with vaccines to help boost the immune system to its peak response. A fourth shot, however, begins to hit a ceiling — at least in terms of protecting younger people against infection.
The Israeli Health Ministry and scientists at Sheba Medical Center found that a fourth dose does restore antibodies that waned off after a third dose among health-care workers ages 18 and older, but it provided little protection against infection. Pfizer cited that study, which has not undergone peer-review, among others in its statement on the FDA authorization, focusing on the increased antibodies without highlighting the issues with breakthrough infections.
Dr. Peter Hotez, a vaccine expert at the Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, strongly supports a fourth dose for older adults, pointing to a CDC study from February that found the third shot's effectiveness against hospitalization dropped from 91% to 78% after four months.
Pfizer, in its public statements on the fourth dose, cited a separate Israeli study that found a fourth dose reduced mortality by 78% in people ages 60 and over. The study from Ben Gurion University and Clalit Health Services, which has not undergone peer-review, analyzed the medical records of more than 500,000 people.
'We continue to collect and assess all available data and remain in open dialogue with regulators and health authorities to help inform a Covid-19 vaccine strategy as the virus evolves, '' Pfizer said in a statement to CNBC.
While the Ben Gurion study may point in the direction of a benefit for older adults at the moment, the evidence for boosting younger adults again is scant as the U.S. considers lowering the eligibility for fourth doses sometime later in the year.
Dr. Gili Regev-Yochay and her team of scientists at Sheba said a fourth dose `` may only have marginal benefits '' for younger people, according to a letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine. While Pfizer originally filed for adults age 65 and older, Moderna asked the FDA authorize a fourth dose for ages 18 and older. Moore called Moderna's filing `` aggressive, '' arguing that it didn't distinguish between the needs of the elderly, who may benefit from an additional dose, compared with younger adults where the data is less convincing.
Moderna CEO Bancel told CNBC last month that the company wanted to give the FDA flexibility to decide which age group would benefit most from a fourth shot right now. Moderna, in its public statements on its application for a fourth dose, pointed to data from Israel but didn't cite specific studies.
Though Hotez supports a fourth dose for older adults, he said the FDA and the CDC have not done an effective job at communicating whether the goal of the vaccines is to prevent severe illness, infection or both, and the vaccines makers have filled that void with statements on data from their clinical trials and lab studies. Hotez and a team of scientists in Texas developed a Covid vaccine, Corbevax, based on traditional protein-based technology that has received authorization in India.
Hotez also expressed frustration that the U.S. relies heavily on data from abroad, particularly Israel and the U.K. Offit also questioned why the U.S. is relying on data from countries that are smaller than the U.S. and have different demographic backgrounds.
Hildreth said the U.S. should put off additional booster doses as long as the public health situation allows so the nation can more clearly define how it measures protection against the virus and develop a long-term strategy to achieve that end. He said if the public is asked to get boosted every several months, many people will simply stop listening.
`` We don't know a specific measure we can do to say whether or not a person is truly protected, and whether or that's the same with everybody, '' said Hildreth. For example, there's no clear measure of whether a certain level of antibodies is sufficient to protect people, he said.
Beyond vaccination with the current vaccines, Pfizer and Moderna are developing shots that target omicron as well as other variants. Dr. Arnold Monto, who is chairing the FDA's committee meeting on booster strategy Wednesday, said public health authorities need to develop a consensus about what goes into the vaccines moving forward. Monto said collaboration between the vaccine makers and the government is crucial, but industry has started playing a larger public role in decisions about about what kind of vaccines should be developed to target specific Covid variants.
`` Industry has a double-headed goal. They are trying to do public good like we all are. They also have stockholders, and we need to be sure that the public health good is kept mind, '' Monto said. | business |
Samsung Earnings Top Estimates on Chip Demand, New Handsets | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
A Samsung Galaxy S22 Ultra 5G smartphone ahead of the Samsung Unpacked event in San Francisco, California, U.S., on Tuesday, Feb. 1, 2022. Samsung Electronics Co. announced three new smartphones and three new tablets on Wednesday, upgrading its hardware lineup with new screen sizes, better cameras and more storage to better compete with Apple Inc., Bloomberg
( Bloomberg) -- Samsung Electronics Co. reported preliminary earnings for the first quarter that beat analysts’ estimates on robust demand for new smartphone models and memory chips that go into servers.
Operating profit increased 50% to 14.1 trillion won ( $ 11.6 billion) for the three months ended March, South Korea’ s biggest company said Thursday in a statement. Analysts estimated 13.4 trillion won on average. Sales advanced 18% to 77 trillion won, also higher than expected. Samsung will provide net income and divisional performance when it reports full earnings on Apr. 28.
Shares opened slightly down in Seoul amid a broader selloff following comments from the U.S. Federal Reserve.
Samsung is the first major tech company to report numbers for the first quarter, a period disrupted by war in Ukraine, sanctions on Russia and resurgent Covid-19 infections in China. Still, datacenter expansions and the global shift to 5G communications continue to spur demand for semiconductors that account for a large chunk of the conglomerate’ s profit.
“ We expect solid earnings growth in 2022 on the back of healthy earnings rebound in semiconductor and display in 2H 2022, ” Peter Lee, an analyst at Citigroup, said in a note ahead of the results. “ Specifically, we expect Samsung’ s memory business to benefit from the memory pricing strength throughout 2H 2022. ”
In smartphones, another Samsung growth pillar, cumulative sales of the Galaxy S22 series are likely to exceed one million units in South Korea this week, the company said. The new flagship lineup, which made its debut in February, is selling at a 20% faster clip than the previous S21 series, according to the Suwon-based firm. In the U.S., the S22 sold 60% more than the S21 in its first three weeks on the market, according to research firm Counterpoint.
Shares of Samsung had lost about 12.5% so far this year through Wednesday, with the broader chip sector underperforming as rising economic risks clouded the outlook for consumer demand. Surging oil prices in the wake of Russia’ s invasion of Ukraine along with inflation and interest-rate hikes have driven concern about dwindling disposable income and discretionary spending.
Samsung, which produces more than a third of the world’ s DRAM and NAND memory chips, is affected not only by the cycles of the semiconductor industry but also by demand from consumers as it makes both the end products as well the chips that go into those gadgets.
The memory market is exiting a downturn earlier than expected, with prices dropping only modestly in the first quarter. DRAM prices fell 4%, less than the 6% projected, while NAND declined 3%, according to Citigroup. NAND prices are expected to rise 5% to 10% in the current quarter as supply has tightened after a contamination issue at Kioxia Holdings Corp. and Western Digital Corp.’ s joint venture fabs in Japan, research firm TrendForce predicted.
The cost of manufacturing chips has also grown as chipmakers are having to diversify sources of gases and minerals that used to be imported mostly from Ukraine. China’ s lockdown policies are causing logistics disruption, which may hurt the sourcing of components and delay the production of gadgets that use Samsung memory. Analysts have also cited the relatively slow improvement in Samsung’ s production yields of advanced nodes for contract-based chipmaking as a downside risk for the stock.
China smartphone and PC shipments may be disrupted by Covid-19 outbreaks in business hub Shanghai and ensuing logistics headwinds. 5G handset market share in the country could stay at about 80% in the coming months but further upside may be limited as rising costs could hinder adoption in entry level models. | general |
CX: the differentiating factor | While there is no question that customer experience ( CX) is vitally important to the ability of organisations to navigate the turbulent economic times in which we find ourselves, the nature of CX itself is continuously evolving in line with changed and changing customer expectations.
Many of these changes have been influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic. The events of the past two years have resulted in the growing realisation that although technology-driven CX has played a key role in helping businesses survive the disruptions of lockdowns and social distancing through the rapid adoption of digital platforms, it has also underscored the fact that people crave personal interaction.
That’ s the view of Andre Wissler, Head of Clients at Mint Group, who believes that changes in customer expectations, CX technologies and CX itself, which has been defined as “ a functional activity encompassing business processes, strategies, technologies and services that companies use… to provide a better experience for their customers and to differentiate themselves from their competitors ” will continue unabated.
Gartner described this as the “ new marketing battlefront ”.
Although much of the CX focus over the past decade has been directed at consumer-facing B2C industries, Wissler believes it is equally important for those operating in the B2B space.
“ IT channel businesses, for example, aren’ t immune from the larger economy as a whole. The urgency of CX is real and partner businesses need to understand how CX matters in today’ s market and, more specifically, to them, ” he adds.
In its 2017 Customer Experience in Marketing Survey, Gartner found more than two-thirds of marketers responsible for CX stated their companies competed mostly or completely on the basis of CX. This was expected to rise to 81% by 2019, making it increasingly difficult for organisations to differentiate themselves in this intensely CX-focused environment.
Not surprisingly, therefore, spend on CX is growing. IDC anticipated that worldwide spending on CX technologies, including CX management and related tools, would reach $ 641 billion in 2022, up from $ 508 billion in 2019.
Yet in its 2021 Future of Work Trends: Top 3 Customer Experience Trends report, Gartner noted “ 80% of B2B organisations and 65% of B2C organisations are ( only) at the beginning states of CX maturity ”.
Part of the challenge is that what constitutes CX maturity in a post-COVID world is changing too.
Wissler points out that with the option of face-to-face interactions back in play, what many in the early days of the pandemic believed had become the ‘ new normal’ of remote-everything is evolving again. On the one hand, customers were quick to embrace the ease and convenience of engaging online, but on the other, they missed the empathy inherent in personal interactions.
Now, he says, as the world opens up again, businesses are going to have to adapt their CX strategies to accommodate this revised ‘ new normal’.
Businesses will be able to create win-win scenarios for themselves and their customers by centring their customers’ experiences, making technology feel more human and ensuring a seamless integration of human and technological touch points across the entire customer journey.
“ The ability to achieve this will become a critical differentiator for every business in today’ s competitive, hyperconnected global marketplace. The end result for a business will be reflected in lead generation, conversions or long-term brand loyalty, while customers benefit from rich, personalised experiences, increased satisfaction and a rewarding relationship with the brand, ” Wissler explains.
He emphasises that effective CX involves more than warm and fuzzy feel-good optics or PR. Underpinned by integrated CX management and supporting tools, it can deliver four essential benefits by helping organisations to:
Achieve a deeper understanding of customers
Drive loyalty and retention
Maintain a competitive edge
Measure the success of initiatives
“ A remarkable customer experience is critical to the sustained growth of any business. But achieving this will always remain a challenge. In the future, CX will continue to evolve, becoming increasingly AI-driven on the one hand, yet potentially facing growing push-back from consumers against their current customer journeys being automatically defined by past digital behaviour. The bottom line is that business survival will depend on their ability to remain constantly aware of changes in what customers expect and want, and how they interpret and act on these, ” Wissler concludes. | general |
BlackHouse Media announces first ever Africa PR and Comms Report | BHM Research & Intelligence has announced that starting this year, its annual report on the public relations and communications sector in Nigeria, Africa’ s largest economy, will be expanded to cover the whole continent, adding 53 more countries with a combined economy of over $ 2 trillion and over 1 billion population.
This press release features multimedia. View the full release here: https: //www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220406005731/en/
This will be the first-ever report that will cater exclusively to the PR and communications industry within the African continent.
The Africa PR and Communications report is being compiled in partnership with the Public Relations and Communications Association ( PRCA), the Chartered Institute of Public Relations ( CIPR UK), CIPR International, the International Communications Consultancy Organisation ( ICCO), Africa Communications Week ( ACW), Wadds Incorporated, ID Africa, Plaqad Incorporated, and Magna Carta Reputation Management Consultants. Other partners are to be announced.
BHM Founder Ayeni Adekunle commented: “ Since we launched the Nigeria PR Report on January 29, 2016, we have witnessed the growth of the industry at home and abroad. Five years after, we are pleased to confirm we are now expanding our research to cover a continent that holds plenty of promise for the global communications sector. We hope the Africa PR and Communications report will quickly become the authoritative voice in the industry, providing insights, data, and useful information for those working here, as well as everyone outside looking in.’’
With 54 countries and an expected GDP of $ 5.6 trillion in four years, the continent is home to six of the top ten fastest-growing economies in the world. Africa accounts for around 17% of the world’ s population, but only about 3% of global GDP.
If Africa sustains and accelerates structural reforms, some believe the continent can emulate China’ s rapid rise over the last 50 years. It will, after all, have 24 million more people, on average, living in its cities each year between 2015 and 2045, according to the World Economic Forum.
The COVID-19 pandemic has, of course, taken a heavy toll, but the recovery is afoot.
The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area ( AfCFTA) is further proof of the continent’ s plans for the future, as it has the potential to create a continental free-trade zone with a combined Gross Domestic Product ( GDP) of USD 3.4 trillion, according to the African Union ( AU).
These advances are also being reflected in the continent’ s burgeoning PR & Communication landscape – the industry best equipped to help fix the continent’ s reputational issues.
The 2022 Africa Report will contain verified facts and statistics on the Public Relations industry, analysis that can guide governments and multinationals, resources and recommendations that assist practitioners in building better careers and business models, designed to enhance and deliver value to all stakeholders.
Ayeni adds: “ The past 28 months have been volatile for the world. It invariably highlighted our strengths and weaknesses as a continent. And the PR & communications industry was one of the first points of call in advising government and business leaders on wading through the times and supporting initiatives across the continent.
“ Yet, this only showed a glimpse of the potential of the PR & communications industry. Because beyond health and financial crisis, as an industry, there is a dire need for professionals to be embedded in every area of policymaking, advisory, and management. It is important that the industry understands the almost impossibly heavy sense of duty it has to the continent and the people.
However, we can not do any of these without data-driven insights that will enable us to give the proper advisory required. By modelling well-founded world reports such as the Holmes Report, World Development Report, Relevance Report, Edelman Trust Barometer, and others, we are hoping to create a standard global report that can easily be used for referencing details, instances and facts about the industry. ”
Moliehi Molekoa, a member of the APCR board and the Managing Director of Magna Carta, a pan-African reputation management consultancy, says “ PR professionals, now more than ever, have an increased duty to advise clients based on sound data and experience. APCR will be one of the key sources of that data. We are filling a void within the industry, and this report will better equip us as professionals as well as the businesses about the African PR landscape. It will provide valuable insights and how to build, manage and protect reputations with the overall aim of elevating the role the industry plays in brand building. ”
According to the Economist, It is expected that Africa's total population would reach nearly 2.5 billion by 2050. The continent will also be home to the world’ s largest under-25 workforce, which will open the door to immense opportunities for growth and development.
BHM Group, through this seminal industry-wide report, therefore, seeks to foster an in-depth understanding of the world’ s business, tech, commercial and communications landscapes, among others. It will tell Africa’ s story by Africans, for Africa and for anyone else hoping to gain a deeper understanding and foothold on the continent and the immense opportunities it offers.
View source version on businesswire.com: https: //www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220406005731/en/ | general |
App born at MIT and Google lands funding to drive no-code development | We’ re in something of a digital golden age, where technology encourages creativity, where the barriers to entry have been drastically reduced and where people from all walks of life can take advantage of new opportunities.
While many of today’ s innovations were once largely driven by a community of web developers, software engineers and computer programmers, the power to scale and innovate is no longer in the hands of the technical elite.
The global impact of COVID-19 forced organizations of all sizes to rethink their software capabilities, including their approach to app development. This shift enables anyone with the right tools to configure business systems without writing code, also known as “ no-code. ”
With the advent of no-code software platforms, making an idea a reality no longer requires the help of IT professionals. Instead of waiting three to six months for developers to hand-code each line of code, websites and mobile applications can be built at breakneck speed in a matter of hours or days.
No-code solutions are comparable to graphic design apps, in which data abstraction is used to ensure the complexity behind the scenes remains hidden to users. The process can be reduced to a series of drag-and-drop functionality performed in software editors.
One company that has recently emerged as one of the key player in the no-code software sector is Thunkable.
Founded in 2015, Thunkable is a no-code platform that allows users to build native mobile apps for every major operating system without needing to write a single line of code.
With the company’ s drag-and-drop interface, extensible integrations, open APIs and advanced editing capabilities, users can create an app and publish it directly to app marketplaces. Incubated at Google and MIT, Thunkable’ s goal is to change the way people build apps by making native development accessible to anyone.
So far, 7 million apps have been designed on the Thunkable platform across 184 countries worldwide. And with its series B $ 30 million funding round, the company is planning.
to improve its enterprise capabilities, develop a marketplace for creator communities and encourage the certification of individuals and curriculums.
“ At a time when the creator economy is booming and the cost of mobile apps is rising, Thunkable empowers users to do more with less, ” said Arun Saigal, CEO of Thunkable. “ Whether they want to use a pre-built template or create one from scratch, we give them the space to build a fully functional app to completion without any limitations. ”
According to Gartner, 70% of new applications developed by organizations will use low-code or no-code technologies by 2025.
This comes as no surprise, since 72% of IT leaders claim that their project backlogs are preventing them from working on more strategic projects.
With the proliferation of no-code, IT teams will no longer be the sole proprietors of how enterprises leverage technology, but serve as flexible partners who can reclaim their productivity and add real value to their day-to-day workflow. | tech |
China's Oil Demand Rose Before Lockdowns Hit | China's apparent oil demand in January-February rose 3.2% versus the same period of last year to 14.37 million barrels per day, but the rebound may not last as the country grapples with a wave of Covid-19 infections. | general |
The Opportunities Ahead for Small-Cap Investors | About the authors: Chuck Royce is chairman and portfolio manager of Royce Investment Partners. Francis Gannon the firm’ s co-chief investment officer. Royce Investment Partners is a subsidiary of Franklin Templeton.
Geopolitics, inflation, and market volatility are, by necessity, top of mind for investors these days, so we think it’ s important to put recent events into perspective. Since beginning to manage portfolios and opening our firm in 1972, we have invested through the double-digit inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as the deflationary period of the great financial crisis. From the end of the Vietnam War to the collapse of the Soviet Union, through two Persian Gulf wars to the 9/11 terror attacks, and now Russia’ s invasion of Ukraine, we have always believed in the critical importance of focusing on what we know and not worrying about what we can not control.
Here’ s how we put that into practice as small-cap specialists.
After years of accommodative monetary policy, the Federal Reserve board elected to raise the federal funds rate by 25 basis points, its first increase since December 2018. With the U.S. recording its highest rate of inflation since the 1980s at a hot 7.9% in February 2022, the Fed’ s focus has shifted from liquidity to curbing runaway inflation. This transition has sparked a good deal of market volatility, with investors looking to protect their portfolios against not only inflation, but also a reduction in liquidity and a global geopolitical conflict.
So far in 2022, small caps have been no exception to this volatility, with the small-cap Russell 2000 Index starting the year with its worst performance since 2009. Nevertheless, small caps have had an impressive record of rebounds from declines of 20% or more from previous peaks. The recent January 2022 low marked the 12th such decline since the 1979 launch of the Russell 2000. The average subsequent one-year return from the first day of the 11 previous declines was 19.6%.
The principle that informs each of our investment strategies is that, in every decade since the 1930s, small caps have beaten inflation. This is based on a comparison of the average annual U.S. consumer price index to returns for the Center for Research in Security Prices 6-10 Index, a proxy for small caps with a much longer history than the Russell 2000.
Despite these facts about small caps, large and mega caps have gotten all the glory over the past decade. In fact, amid the economic uncertainty of the Covid-19 crisis, it seems that investors have flocked from small caps to mega caps in a flight to safety. But looking forward, we expect mega caps to struggle as their valuations are particularly vulnerable to rising interest rates and constrained liquidity.
We think that the inflationary and economic growth environment of 2022 poses an opportunity for investors to increase their exposure to small caps, specifically small cap value. Select small caps are already pricing in today’ s high inflation. And, given their size, small caps also tend to be nimbler than large caps, allowing them to potentially act more quickly in a climate of contracting liquidity and Fed tightening.
Small caps are also a promising opportunity because we believe they are cheap, especially compared to large and mega cap companies. Small cap value, specifically, is priced near the bottom of its 20-year valuation range versus small-cap growth, making these companies particularly good opportunities for investors who share our view of their medium- to long-term potential.
Not all small caps should be treated equally, though. Because there are significant differences in sector exposure between small cap value and small cap growth, we expect the two indexes—the Russell 2000 Value and the Russell 2000 Growth—will behave differently in inflationary market environments. In fact, we believe these differences warrant treating them as two separate asset classes.
Small cap value could be a good investment in 2022 because of its sector exposure. Above-average inflation and economic growth are likely to favor sectors like banks and real estate, both of which are overweight in the index. In addition, the Russell 2000 Value is also underweight in industries like software and services, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences, and health care equipment and services—all areas whose performance has struggled historically with high inflation.
It’ s normal to see divergent performance between these two sister indexes. In nearly three-quarters of calendar years, the spread between Russell 2000 Growth and Russell 2000 Value has been at least 5%. The frequency and magnitude of these performance differences illustrate how their compositions interact differently depending on economic conditions.
The Russell 2000 Value Index had a fantastic year in 2021, advancing 28.3% and beating the large-cap Russell 1000 Index. Last year marked the first calendar year outperformance of the Russell 2000 Value over the Russell 2000 Growth since 2016.
While we see a lot of opportunity in this space, investors can not ignore recent performance. Small cap investors were underwhelmed by the class’ s performance in 2021, and we’ ve seen a dismal start to 2022.
The Russell 2000 enjoyed a strong year in 2021 on an absolute basis, rising 14.8%. The problem was that nearly all of 2021’ s gains came in the first quarter. In the first three months of 2021, the Russell 2000 outperformed the Russell 1000 12.7% to 5.9%, respectively. This performance was followed by a return of only 1.9% for the Russell 2000 over the rest of the year.
A lot of small cap companies are also not profitable at present; 44% of the Russell 2000 is composed of loss-making entities. If investors can bear some performance pain in the near term, they should consider a re-allocation to small cap value, as we think there may be years left in this current outperformance trend for the asset class.
With so much uncertainty—and additional volatility—around the war in Ukraine, we also think it’ s important for investors to remain focused on the long term, which we define as an investment horizon of at least two to five years. We are also mindful that small-caps typically have less international exposure than their large-cap siblings.
We remain confident that active management will be the key to success in the small cap space. Stock pickers who prioritize strong fundamentals and underlying quality in an increasingly noisy market environment should ultimately benefit. | business |
Iran reveals COVID-19 data for April 6 | As many as 4,228 people have been infected with the coronavirus ( COVID-19) in the past 24 hours in Iran, reads the statement of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education of Iran, Trend reports.
In addition, 44 people have died from the coronavirus over the past day.
At the same time, the condition of 1,483 people remains critical.
So far, more than 49.7 million tests have been conducted in Iran for the diagnosis of coronavirus.
In total, over 147 million doses of vaccines have been used in Iran so far. A total of 64 million doses have been used in the first stage, 57 million doses - in the second stage, and 26.4 million doses – in the third stage.
Iran continues to monitor the coronavirus situation in the country. According to recent reports from Iranian officials, over 7.18 million people have been infected, and 140,451 people have already died.
Meanwhile, over 6.9 million people have reportedly recovered from the disease. The country continues to apply strict measures to contain the further spread of the virus.
Reportedly, the disease was brought to Iran by a businessman from Iran's Qom city, who went on a business trip to China, despite official warnings. The man died later from the disease. The Islamic Republic announced its first infections and deaths from the coronavirus on Feb. 19.
The outbreak in the Chinese city of Wuhan - which is an international transport hub - began at a fish market in late December 2019.
The World Health Organization ( WHO) on March 11 declared COVID-19 a pandemic. Some sources claim the coronavirus outbreak started as early as November 2019. | general |
Yield Curve Inversion Doesn't Mean Automatic Recession | About the author: Gregory Daco is the chief economist at EY-Parthenon and former board director at the National Association of Business Economics. Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Ernst & Young LLP or other members of the global EY. organization.
The yield curve inversion has resurfaced as the topic du jour with many questioning whether it implies an imminent recession for the U.S. economy. While the yield curve serves as an important recessionary signal, there are four key reasons why it should be interpreted with discernment in this unusual business cycle.
The yield curve is the spread between long-term and short-term bond yields. During times of economic expansion, yields for longer-term bonds tend to be higher than yields for shorter-term bonds as investors demand extra compensation for the risk related to their longer-term investment. As a result, long-term yields will reflect short-term yields plus a premium for risk and duration.
When the long-term yields fall below short-term yields, the yield curve is said to “ invert. ” This typically reflects the fact that short-term rates are expected to decline because of a forthcoming slowdown in economic activity.
The closely watched spread between the 2-year Treasury yield and the 10-year Treasury yield ( 2s10s) fell below zero last week. Many observers claimed that a recession is around the corner.
First, it’ s important to remember that while a yield curve inversion has preceded each of the past eight recessions since the 1970s, the most recent inversion in 2019 didn’ t predict the coronavirus pandemic, but instead indicated the economy was slowing down—and hence was susceptible to downside risks.
Second, the duration between the yield curve inversion and a recession has varied between 10 months and 3 years. The average duration is around 1.5 years. So, even if the yield curve signal were taken literally, a recession would be unlikely until 2023. Indeed, the U.S. economy can only be described as robust with GDP growth trending around 4%, the labor market adding a healthy 600,000 jobs each month over the past six months, and the unemployment rate falling to 3.6% in March—just above its pre-pandemic 50-year low of 3.5%.
Third, the particulars of this business cycle make reading any economic signal a particularly delicate exercise. With the Fed’ s favored inflation gauge—core personal consumption expenditure—rising to 5.4% year over year in February, its highest level since 1982, market participants are increasingly pricing a rapid Fed tightening of monetary policy. The prevalent view is that the Fed is behind the curve in combating record-high, persistent inflation, and that it will need to play catch up by raising the federal funds rate rapidly in the coming months.
Markets are currently pricing 215 basis points of additional Fed rate hikes this year, and EY-Parthenon anticipates the Fed will want to front-load rate increases with a strong possibility of 50 basis points incremental hikes at the upcoming Federal Open Market Committee meetings in May and June. This would represent one of the fastest tightening cycles in history, raising the question as to whether the Fed will be able to manage a so-called soft-landing of monetary policy—in other words, whether a recession can be avoided.
In this context, the yield curve inversion is signaling that there is a real risk that the Fed will tighten monetary policy excessively, and perhaps too rapidly. Doing so would trigger a significant tightening of financial conditions, with real rates rising, stock prices falling, the dollar strengthening, and volatility surging. There would be severe negative spillovers onto the real economy. Indeed, in their recent communication, Fed policymakers led by Chair Jay Powell signaled an intent to regain control over inflation by cooling demand and addressing the “ unhealthy ” labor market tightness.
The paradox, however, is that markets are already starting to price Fed rate cuts in late 2023 and into 2024 on the belief that the Fed will tighten policy excessively. Indeed, it has long been our view that after pushing the federal funds rate to 3% in 2023, the Fed would be forced to cut the policy rate in 2024 ( and even late 2023 if activity slows too dramatically next year).
Fourth and finally, recession indicators that only factor economic data and abstract from any subjective interpretation don’ t signal an imminent recession. One of EY-Parthenon’ s recession indices uses the 3-month/10-year spread to calculate the probability of a recession 12 months ahead, similar to the New York Fed’ s recession index. It points to odds around 4%. This is well below the 30% threshold after which a recession has generally occurred. EY-Parthenon’ s second recession gauge with predictive power 6-months ahead is even more reassuring. This measure—using the 3-month/10-year spread, the Chicago Fed National Activity Index, and the real federal funds rate as drivers—points to odds of a recession below 1% in the next six months, well below the 50% threshold for this indicator. Our third recession gauge uses a regime-switching methodology defining two separate regimes—recessions and expansions—in which economic variables behave inversely. The probability of switching between regimes is driven by the Conference Board’ s Leading Economic Index and business cycle recessions and expansions defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research and points to odds of a recession in the next 3-months being close to zero.
A recession is by no means unavoidable. But the economy remains robust despite the headwinds from higher inflation, increased financial market volatility, and geopolitical uncertainty. Panicking today would only serve to reinforce the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy. | business |
Country registers 38 new COVID-19 cases, 59 recoveries | Azerbaijan registered 38 new COVID-19 cases in the past 24 hours, Operational Headquarters under the Cabinet of Ministers reported on April 6.
Some 59 patients have recovered and 1 patient has died in the reported period.
So far, 792,141 COVID-19 cases have been registered in the country. Some 782,143 patients have recovered, and 9,701 people have died. Currently, 297 people are under treatment in special hospitals.
Over the past day, 5,230 tests were conducted in Azerbaijan to reveal coronavirus cases.
In general, 6,726,560 tests have been conducted in Azerbaijan so far.
So far, some 13,513,935 COVID-19 vaccines have been provided to Azerbaijani citizens. In the past 24 hours, some 10,301 citizens have been vaccinated against COVID-19. | general |
Pullback Reveals Some Bargains in Tech Sector | We expect strong growth for wide-moat software companies.
The technology sector was a strong market outperformer at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and performed on par with the market in 2021. Technology underperformed the market in the first quarter of 2022, with many companies performing far worse than the overall sector. Nonetheless, technology's performance still exceeds the overall U.S. market on a trailing 12-month basis. We're still fond of secular tailwinds associated with cloud computing, 5G, and the `` Internet of Things. '' Thus, we view the technology pullback as healthy and would point investors toward high-quality wide-moat software companies, such as Salesforce.com ( CRM), ServiceNow ( NOW), and Adobe ( ADBE), among others.
As of March 25, the Morningstar US Technology Sector Index was up 22% on a TTM basis, outperforming the U.S. equity market, which is up 14%. Over the past quarter, technology underperformed the broader market, down 10% compared with the U.S. equity market's decline of 5%.
As of March 25, the median U.S. technology stock was 6% undervalued, a sharp reversal from a sector that was overvalued by 6% and 14% one and two quarters ago, respectively. Yet, while the high number of undervalued mid- and small-cap stocks lowered the median valuation, on a market-capitalization basis, overvalued large-cap stocks bring the tech sector into fair value territory.
Software remains the most attractive subsector. High-flying growth stocks from 2020 have crashed, and many now trade well below our fair value estimates. Meanwhile, more mature, higher-quality software stocks have also sold off and now provide investors with an attractive margin of safety. Many semiconductor firms are also undervalued, while hardware is fairly valued.
In software, IT departments have been focused on digital transformation, first from the secular shift to cloud computing and software as a service, followed by the coronavirus pandemic and the critical rush to implement remote working tools. We foresee enterprises using software to modernize all types of business processes, in turn leading to software industry growth at a low-double-digit CAGR.
Additionally, we see an ongoing data boom that not only bodes well for cloud computing, but also database management systems. Traditional databases like Oracle's ( ORCL) still have their place, but emerging beneficiaries will be companies with premier data-lake, data-warehouse, and data-marketplace offerings, such as Snowflake ( SNOW) and MongoDB ( MDB).
Salesforce.com ( CRM) Star Rating: ★★★★★ Economic Moat Rating: Wide Fair Value Estimate: $ 320 Fair Value Uncertainty: Medium
We believe Salesforce.com represents one of best long-term growth stories in large-cap software because of its ever-expanding portfolio of complementary solutions that allow users to completely embrace their customers, thereby building relationships, strengthening retention, and driving revenue. In our view, Salesforce will benefit further from natural cross-selling among its clouds, upselling more robust features within product lines, pricing actions, international growth, and continued acquisitions, such as the recent deals for Slack and Tableau.
ServiceNow excels at executing the land-and-expand strategy, and it continues to use its strength in workflow automation to penetrate existing customers more deeply in IT and more broadly with HR, customer-service-specific, and other back-office products. We expect both tiered offerings and vertical-specific versions to continue to provide a nice tailwind to revenue. We think ServiceNow has become a key partner in digital transformation, as shown in retention statistics, which remain at the elite level. We are impressed with ServiceNow's excellent balance between strong and highly visible revenue growth and robust and expanding margins.
ASML is one of our top semiconductor picks thanks to the increasing adoption of extreme ultraviolet lithography at large chipmakers such as TSMC and Intel to support explosive chip demand. Although the firm's first-quarter outlook is negatively affected by supply chain constraints, we think ASML will outgrow the wafer fab equipment industry in 2022 ( 20% revenue growth versus 15% for WFE). With TSMC, Intel, and Samsung all vying for process technology leadership, we expect ASML to be a primary beneficiary because it sells tools to all three chipmakers.
Brian Colello does not own ( actual or beneficial) shares in any of the securities mentioned above. Find out about Morningstar’ s editorial policies.
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Read our editorial policy to learn more about our process. | business |
ZIMBABWE/FRANCE/ZAMBIA: Kariba dam upgrade delayed again by geological problems and Covid-19 | The South African subsidiary of CMC di Ravenna and the Egyptian Orascom have blamed project owner, public company Regideso for project delays. [... ]
The Zambian authorities are shortly due to launch a feasibility study on a project to generate 40 MW of wind power. [... ]
In contrast to mega-projects like the Grand Inga dam, which are struggling to get off the ground, the Congolese authorities are elaborating plans for several dozen mini-power plants. [... ]
Eager to boost his country's influence, the French president wants to attract international institutions and private foundations active in development aid to Paris. Among the major organisations being courted are the World Bank and the Global Partnership for Education. [... ]
Cuts to French aid, a freeze on military cooperation... relations between Paris and Bangui continue to cool. France suspects several of Touadéra's close advisors of waging anti-French campaigns while Russia is not far from the picture. [... ]
The former AfDB boss and now banking consultant Donald Kaberuka believes African countries should pay for their Covid-19 vaccines via Afreximbank, led by Benedict Oramah, rather than depend on international hand-outs. [... ]
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Georgia imports additional Covid-19 Pfizer jabs | Georgia received additional Covid-19 Pfizer jabs Tuesday. The vaccines will be distributed to all regions, and their administering will begin soon, Trend reports citing 1tv.ge.
According to Tamar Gabunia, Deputy Health Minister, the immunization promotional program will continue. She said that vaccination of 65% of the population was desirable before summer.
Tamar Gabunia once again accentuated the significance of a buster dose, especially for the risk-group people and patients with chronic diseases.
Immunization was going on with Chinese Sinopharm and Sinovac jabs. Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine is administered for people aged 12+ in Georgia. | general |
Nurse staffing startup IntelyCare scores $ 115M Series C | Nurse staffing platform IntelyCare scooped up $ 115 million in Series C funding, bumping the company's valuation to $ 1.1 billion.
The round was led by Janus Henderson Investors, with participation from Longitude Capital, Leeds Illuminate, Endeavour Vision, Revelation Partners and Kaiser Permanente Ventures. The latest raise comes about two years after its $ 45 million Series B.
IntelyCare's offering matches nurses and nursing assistants with open shifts at healthcare organizations, including post-acute skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, rehabilitation facilities and senior living centers.
Nurses can choose individual shifts or pick a block of times or facilities they prefer. As employees, nurses can access medical and retirement benefits from the company, and IntelyCare will pay its portion of payroll taxes.
The startup said it will use the Series C investment to offer more employment and professional development opportunities for its nurses, including continuing education.
`` In 2016 we began working on a platform to disrupt an industry that was slow to innovate. We knew that a technology solution could change lives for both sides of the market and we're seeing that vision come to fruition as we now have over 30,000 nursing professionals working with IntelyCare at over 1,600 facilities across the country, '' IntelyCare CEO and cofounder David Coppins said in a statement.
`` We 'll use this investment to continue redefining the future of work for our nation's nurses. ”
The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on frontline providers ' mental health, worsening burnout and staffing shortages. A 2021 survey by the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses found 66% of respondents felt their experiences during the pandemic caused them to consider leaving the field.
Several tech-enabled healthcare staffing startups have been scooping up funding over the past year. Another nurse staffing company, connectRN, raised $ 76 million in a funding round late last year. Also in December, healthcare-jobs marketplace and recruiting-services startup Prolucent Health brought in $ 11.5 million in Series A funding.
In November, nurse staffing startup Trusted Health revealed it had raised a $ 94 million Series C plus a previously unannounced $ 55 million Series B.
Nomad Health, which offers a job portal for temporary healthcare workers, scooped up $ 63 million in equity and debt financing in September.
The latest news in digital health delivered daily to your inbox.
The latest news in digital health delivered daily to your inbox. | tech |
Pulse oximeters did not change outcomes for patients in COVID-19 monitoring program -- ScienceDaily | `` Compared to remotely monitoring shortness of breath with simple automated check-ins, we showed that the addition of pulse oximetry did not save more lives or keep more people out of the hospital, '' said the study's co-lead author, Anna Morgan, MD, medical director of the COVID Watch program and an assistant professor of General Internal Medicine. `` And having a pulse oximeter didn't even make patients feel less anxious. ''
COVID Watch launched at Penn Medicine in March 2020 to remotely monitor patients with COVID-19 who were well enough to stay home to recover. Twice a day for two weeks, text messages were automatically sent to these patients asking how they felt and if they were having difficulty breathing, a condition formally known as dyspnea. If patients indicated more difficulty breathing, they would be called by a nurse who would direct the patient to the ER, arrange an urgent telemedicine appointment, or suggest continued monitoring at home. More than 28,500 patients have been enrolled in the program since it came online.
`` The program made it easy to identify the sickest patients who needed the hospital, and keep the others at home safely, '' said David Asch, MD, executive director of the Center for Health Care Innovation and a professor of Medicine, Medical Ethics and Health Policy. `` The program was associated with a 68 percent reduction in mortality, saving a life approximately every three days during peak enrollment early in the pandemic. ''
But the question remained whether the program would be even better if it was based on the actual oxygen content of the blood rather than just whether patients felt short of breath.
`` Early in the pandemic, there was a prevalent theory that oxygen levels in the blood dropped before a COVID-19 patient became symptomatic and short of breath, '' said study co-lead author Kathleen Lee, MD, an adjunct assistant professor of Emergency Medicine. `` Detecting this earlier with a home pulse oximeter might provide an opportunity to get patients who are on the cusp of deteriorating to the hospital faster and initiate time-sensitive therapies to improve outcomes. ''
Using pulse oximeters was so intuitively appealing that the process got adopted even before this trial, the first randomized trial to test whether it actually worked.
`` Several health systems, and even states like Vermont and countries like the United Kingdom, have integrated pulse oximetry into the routine home management of patients with COVID-19, but there's been scant evidence to show this strategy makes a difference, '' said the research project's principal investigator M. Kit Delgado, MD, an assistant professor of Emergency Medicine and Epidemiology.
In this study, more than 2,000 patients enrolled in COVID Watch between Nov. 29, 2020, and Feb. 5, 2021, were randomized to receive standard COVID Watch care or the same program with the addition of a pulse oximeter.
The pulse oximeter didn't make the patients any better off. The researchers found no statistical difference in the main measure of the study, the average number of days enrolled patients spent alive and out of the hospital in the 30 days after they were enrolled. For patients with pulse oximeters, the measure was 29.4 days; for those without, it was 29.5. This lack of difference held across racial lines, as there was no notable difference between outcomes for Black and white patients. This is important, as Black patients have had disproportionately worse COVID-19 mortality rates during the pandemic, and recent research has raised concerns that fingertip pulse oximeters may be less likely to detect low oxygen levels in patients with dark skin pigment compared with lighter skin pigment.
The researchers cautioned that their study examined the use of pulse oximeters amid an established program of remote monitoring, noting that patients don't have access to a system like COVID Watch or on-call clinicians, self-monitoring with pulse oximeters may still be a reasonable approach until there is evidence to the contrary.
`` Overall, these findings suggest that a low-tech approach for remote monitoring systems based on symptoms is just as good as a more expensive one using additional devices. Automated text messaging is a great way for health systems to enable a small team of on-call nurses to manage large populations of patients with COVID-19, '' said the research project's co-principal investigator, Krisda Chaiyachati, MD, an assistant professor of Internal Medicine and now the physician lead for Value-based Care and Innovation at Verily. `` There are a lot of other medical conditions where the same kind of approach might really help. ''
This study was funded by the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute ( COVID-2020C2-10830), the National Institutes of Health ( K23HD090272001, K08AG065444) and the Abramson Family Foundation. | science |
Feds plan foreign homebuyer ban, billions to hike supply: CTV News | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
In most of the U.S., housing markets are exuberant. In some of the country’ s priciest neighborhoods, they’ re relatively subdued.
Several Chinese lenders have been told they can file legal cases against China Evergrande Group in local courts, in an apparent easing of a restriction that required all such lawsuits to be handled in a single court, according to people familiar with the matter.
China’ s soaring Covid infections are provoking little panic in the stock market, with investors betting that the authorities will unleash stimulus to prop up growth.
Chinese property stocks may be poised for a pullback after surging 28% in three weeks as pandemic lockdowns put a brake on economic growth. China Vanke Co. meanwhile announced a share buyback.
The billionaire Benetton family’ s motorway and airport company Atlantia SpA is poised to become the target of a bidding war in what could be this year’ s biggest deal.
The federal government is planning to unveil a significant crackdown on foreign homebuyers as part of Thursday’ s federal budget, CTV National News Ottawa Bureau Chief Joyce Napier reported Wednesday afternoon.
According to her reporting, the feds will make it illegal for all foreign nationals to purchase any residential properties in Canada for the next two years, including condos, apartments and single-family homes.
Permanent residents, foreign workers and students will reportedly be exempt from the measure, as are foreign nationals purchasing a primary residence in Canada rather than a vacation home or investment property. No cost was yet attached to this measure.
The new law would bring greater clarity to the Liberal campaign promise that pledged to bar foreign nationals from purchasing non-recreational, residential property in Canada for two years.
It remains unclear how prevalent foreign homebuyers are in influencing the Canadian residential market, as data remains scarce.
However, a crackdown on foreign homebuyers has gained political traction at the federal and provincial levels, with the federal government introducing a national one-per-cent tax on the value of non-resident, non-Canadian owned properties considered vacant or underused. That measure came into effect at the start of the year.
Provincially, Ontario recently announced it was increasing its foreign homebuyers tax to 20 per cent from 15 per cent and expanding its scope to the entire province. And the Nova Scotia government unveiled new taxes on non-resident homebuyers in its budget last month.
Further to the foreign homebuyer ban, CTV News reported the feds are setting aside $ 4 billion to help municipalities update their zoning and permitting systems to allow for accelerated construction of residential units. Ottawa is also reportedly announcing $ 1.5 billion in loans and funding for cooperative housing and a further billion dollars for the construction of affordable housing units.
The expected measures expand on some of the pledges made by the Liberal Party when it struck a support deal with the New Democrats, in particular a push for addressing housing affordability and tackling what the government describes as the “ financialization ” of housing as prices soar.
Affordability has become a hot pocket-book issue throughout the pandemic, as prices skyrocketed not only in Canada’ s largest urban centres, but in outlying communities as well. The average non-seasonally adjusted home price hit a record of $ 816,720 in February, up 20.6 per cent from a year ago; and the average home price in Toronto is now hovering just shy of $ 1.3 million. | general |
Covid Funding Bill Stalls in Senate on Fight Over Border Policy | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, a Democrat from New York, speaks during a news conference following the weekly Democratic caucus luncheon at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Tuesday, March 29, 2022. The Senate Monday passed its version of a long-stalled bill to aid the domestic semiconductor industry and bolster U.S. competitiveness with China, a key step needed to kick off negotiations with the House on final legislation., Bloomberg
( Bloomberg) -- The $ 10 billion in emergency pandemic response money sought by the White House is stalled in the Senate ahead of a two-week recess because of objections by Republicans and a few Democrats to the Biden administration’ s impending opening of the U.S.-Mexico border to asylum-seekers.
Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and other Democratic leaders have rejected a Republican demand to vote on an amendment requiring the Biden administration to continue a Covid-related requirement known as Title 42 to expel adult migrants entering the U.S. via the Mexico border, which the administration intends to lift next month.
The amendment likely would pass in the Senate with the support of all Republicans and a group of moderate Democrats, who are on record opposing the lifting of the border restriction. But that would have made the bill toxic to progressive House Democrats, who have cheered the re-opening of the border.
Members of both parties traded blame for the funding impasse, which is all but certain to put off any action until after Congress returns from a two-week recess that begins on Friday. The delay could have real-world consequences for fighting the pandemic especially if a new variant gains momentum. The White House has warned that the lack of funding will leave the country without adequate vaccines, tests and treatments to fight the virus.
Senator John Thune, the chamber’ s second-ranking Republican, said that Schumer and other Democratic leaders were “ adamantly ” opposed to a vote on a border policy amendment and that means the Covid bill will be stalled at least until the Senate returns to Washington at the end of April.
“ That’ s going nowhere, ” he said of the bill. He said the administration’ s announcement of the border policy change as the Senate was working on a Covid funding bill was a tactical mistake.
“ The timing couldn’ t have been worse, ” he said. “ It just lit people up. ”
In addition to the GOP opposition to the border policy, Senate Democrats facing close re-election contest this year -- Raphael Warnock of Georgia, Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire, Mark Kelly of Arizona and Catherine Cortez Masto of Nevada -- have objected to the lifting of Title 42. Other moderate Democrats, Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona, Jon Tester of Montana and Joe Manchin of West Virginia have also raised concerns.
Still, Schumer blamed Republicans, saying they were blocking vital aid by trying to make a political point with an amendment to a broadly supported funding bill.
“ Instead of joining Democrats to begin a simple debate on Covid legislation, Republicans wanted to kill this bill with unrelated poison pills, ” Schumer said. “ This is potentially devastating for the American people. ”
The administration has already begun clawing back shipments of monoclonal antibody treatments, which will soon run dry. And it has warned that test production will plunge this summer without new subsidies, and that more money is needed to buy vaccines in case all adults are advised to get a second mRNA booster shot.
A program funding testing and care for the uninsured has already stopped taking new claims, and new funding is needed for research on a variant-specific vaccine.
Any funding collapse could also imperil orders already announced. The administration also planned to use up to half the money to complete a previously announced order of Pfizer Inc.’ s Paxlovid treatment pill, officials familiar with the matter said this week. Without new funding, it’ s not clear if the shipments will be fulfilled, though Pfizer has said it’ s confident the U.S. will meet its commitment.
The underlying bill has Republican support after Senator Mitt Romney negotiated provisions fully paying for the new spending with repurposed prior Covid aid.
The bill pulls unspent funds from programs to protect aviation jobs and funnel money to music and theater venues. Funds will also be redirected from higher education relief and small business credit programs, along with Agriculture Department funds.
Canada joins U.S., U.K. in diplomatic boycott of Beijing games
Trudeau weighs auto-content rules as next U.S. trade flashpoint | general |
TD to let more workers back this month, with full return by June | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
Toronto-Dominion Bank plans to give most employees the option to return to the office this month and is aiming for workers to officially transition to their new working models by June.
Staff will hear more from their business-unit leaders about new work routines, whether in-office or hybrid, along with the timing of their return, according to a memo Wednesday from Kenn Lalonde, chief human resources officer at the Toronto-based bank.
“ After more than two years, it’ s time to come together again -- joining the thousands of colleagues already on-site today, ” Lalonde said in the memo. “ This will be a time of listening, learning and building our new workplaces together. ”
Toronto-Dominion is joining other Canadian financial firms including Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Manulife Financial Corp. in calling workers back to the office. Those plans are being made even as Ontario, where all of the firms are based, experiences a rise in COVID-19 cases. The province had 1,074 coronavirus hospitalizations as of Wednesday, compared with 611 two weeks ago.
“ While the COVID-19 virus will be with us for the long-term, and case counts likely to rise and fall, public health units are much better equipped to handle new waves, ” Lalonde said in the memo. | general |
Aftershock: Managing through Disruptions in Energy and Commodities |
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Uncertainties in energy and other commodity markets are cascading across the value chain and hitting consumers who depend on them.
By Jorge Leis, Peter Parry, Dave Rennard, Michael Short, and Neelam Phadke
Brief
For most companies, a critical component of their response to the Ukraine crisis is finding ways to make their businesses, operations, and supply chains more resilient. It’ s becoming increasingly prudent to prioritize resilience over low cost or efficiency. “ Just in time ” has been replaced by “ just in case. ”
Resilience is critical, but resilience is also expensive. For longer-term survival, companies still need to pay attention to the basic principles of leadership and strategy. But as they recover from the initial shock and begin to make longer-term plans, companies need to answer the question: Where is resilience worth the cost?
The answers differ for each company. Getting it right requires at least two things. First, companies need to develop a comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities to a range of disruptions, including risks to people, business continuity, asset economics, and financial performance. In some cases, these risks may originate two or three steps away from their typical planning view. For many companies, the immediate response requires understanding the supply-side shocks, including the commodities for which Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus play a key role in production and trade ( see Figure 1). These mounting supply challenges could restructure trade flows while also invigorating domestic alternatives.
The second step aims at longer-term insights and better decision making. Questions like, “ Where is resilience worth the cost? ” and, “ Should I respond to today’ s shortage with a major new capital investment? ” are best considered in the context of scenarios that reflect a set of plausible outcomes. By developing a set of tailored scenarios specifically anchored on those potential disruptions and their associated uncertainty, companies lay the groundwork for repositioning their organizations to thrive in a rapidly shifting business environment.
Companies will feel the disruption of these scenarios at three different levels.
Commodity shortages and resulting price spikes will flow through to downstream customers for whom these are key inputs ( including manufacturing, power generation, fertilizers, and many others). Because some of these commodities ( notably oil, gas, and food) are some of the broadest inputs into the overall economy, all consumers will have to pay higher prices for consumer goods. The pressure on household budgets will drive government responses in the form of subsidies, tax relief, and other measures, to try to ease the burden on the general public, and those regulatory responses will feed back into the dynamics that companies face as they decide how to navigate this set of disruptions.
In the face of these disruptions, commodity producers will look to increase capacity to displace Russian exports, customers and finished-product companies will have to absorb price shocks and supply constraints, and midstream traders will need to forge new connections as markets react and evolve ( see Figure 2). Some business customers are already experiencing shortages.
Markets will respond to the threat of commodity supply interruptions in four ways.
For each commodity, these changes carry risks, but also create new opportunities that companies will need to navigate in an uncertain and rapidly evolving market environment. We’ ll consider three fundamental inputs to the economy: gas, oil, and wheat.
Natural gas. Europe depends on Russia for 60% of its imported natural gas, and its imports consume 75% of Russia’ s exported gas volume.
The European Union has reacted quickly with proposals that could cut that dependence in half relatively quickly even in a cautious scenario, reflecting Europe’ s newfound concerns for energy security. The proposals rely heavily on bringing in more LNG, and more European purchases of LNG on the spot market will raise demand and prices beyond usual patterns.
Europe will also rely on other ways to generate electricity. Countries may decide to extend the lives of nuclear plants that had been scheduled to shut down. They may accelerate wind and solar projects, although because renewables remain intermittent power sources without scale power storage, these aren’ t perfect substitutes for gas-powered generation.
On the other hand, some substitute sources could cause Europe to backslide on its environmental goals. Swapping coal or oil for gas could reduce dependence on Russian gas supplies, but at the cost of increasing carbon emissions.
Higher prices for gas could decrease demand for it. They also could present challenges for gas-intensive European industries and provide opportunities for manufacturers in lower-cost markets, especially those that can export to Europe.
Even with these more painful measures, it will be difficult for Europe to reduce its dependence on Russian gas by much more than 60%, meaning continued dependence on some 50 billion to 70 billion cubic meters ( bcm) of Russian gas per year. Because Russia's government is disproportionately funded by oil and gas, which together comprise only 7% of Russian GDP but about 40% of the government’ s budget, both parties will want to see gas continue to flow, at least to fulfill existing contracts. It could take at least five years to fundamentally change this relationship, partly because the infrastructure will take that long to build.
This is a harsh prospect for the winter of 2022–23, and the potential threat to this critical energy source has left already tight markets on edge, manifest as increased volatility and a premium for secure supply. There are only so many wind and solar plants that can be accelerated in 2022, only so much uncontracted LNG available to reroute, and only so much new global liquefaction capacity ( for converting natural gas to LNG for transport) under construction and set to come online in the next three to four years.
For energy consumers, especially those heavily dependent on gas, project economics will also shift. Companies weighing a potential move toward electrification to reduce their carbon footprint may find the decision easier in a world where gas prices are subject to occasional and prolonged spikes up to five times the usual price.
Oil. Russia supplied about 7.8 million barrels per day ( mbd) of crude oil and refined products. About two-thirds of that flows to countries that have backed the idea of sanctions, while the rest flows to countries that have not, including China and some Central and Eastern European countries.
Before Russia’ s invasion, the price of oil was already rising as economies recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic. Crude oil prices rose from about $ 54 per barrel in January 2021 to $ 74 in December.
Uncertainty in the wake of the invasion pushed crude oil prices over $ 110 per barrel. If a substantial portion of Russia’ s oil exports were to stay off the market indefinitely, prices could go higher.
But it’ s unlikely that a significant amount of Russian oil would disappear from global markets, which are fluid and porous. Oil tankers can be easily rerouted, and even sanctioned oil has a way of finding its way to market. Refined products are even easier to reroute than oil, and they make up about 2 mbd to 3 mbd of Russia’ s total exports, all of which are likely to find markets.
Given this, in a cautious scenario, perhaps 1 million barrels of Russia’ s daily export volume would be curtailed, an amount that’ s relatively easy for the global market to adapt to. Sanctions from the US and European Union may be relatively easy to circumvent, even by lower- and middle-income countries that may be able to buy Russian liquids at a discount.
In more extreme scenarios, as much as 4 mbd could struggle to find a market. Western capital could dry up, and major Western energy companies could withdraw from Russia. As depletion and depreciation take their toll, and as foreign know-how, expertise, and hardware become scarcer in the region, supply could decrease by 3 mbd, even without direct sanctions on the industry.
Wheat. Russia and Ukraine play an important role in the global food chain ( see Figure 3). In addition to exporting critical fertilizer ingredients such as ammonia, phosphate, and potash, they together make up about 14% of global wheat production and one-quarter of the global wheat trade. Much of this wheat ships to North Africa and the Middle East. Egypt, for example, is the world’ s largest importer of wheat, importing nearly 60% of its wheat consumption, with about 80% of imports coming from Ukraine or Russia. Prices on the types of wheat that Russia and Ukraine export have gone up 40% to 60%, so Egypt and other importing countries will need to pay higher prices for wheat on the global market to feed vulnerable populations—one of many causes for concern.Wheat farmers in the Southern Hemisphere may be in a position to supplement some of the shortfall, benefiting from higher prices as they do. Shifting production from other crops to wheat could affect the prices of other commodities such as soy, barley, corn, and sunflowers, reducing volumes and raising prices. If the war continues, Northern Hemisphere farmers could face the same decisions in the next planting year, continuing the ripple effects on these commodity crops.
In thinking about whether and how to sanction Russian exports, it’ s important to remember that many food and agricultural companies and organizations feed the world as part of their mission. When food companies weigh whether to continue operating in Russia and other countries in the region, they must consider the human cost borne by people uninvolved in the conflict, such as the vulnerable communities in Egypt that rely on Russian and Ukrainian wheat for their ( subsidized) daily bread.
For sectors depending on these and other commodities, the supply disruptions are sure to cascade down the value chain, creating volatility in price and supply for many products that might not seem to be immediately affected. In some cases, the effect on downstream industries may be dramatic as companies struggle with shortage-driven business-continuity risk and spikes in input costs well beyond anything they’ ve planned for. The impacts downstream can also be hard to see when considering just the commodities. For example, palladium shortages could affect the production and costs of catalytic converters, hampering the auto industry. Companies across sectors—not just in energy and natural resources, but also in consumer goods, manufacturing, technology, retail, and logistics—should be running scenarios to prepare for uncertain outcomes.
In an extreme scenario, persistently high and frequently spiking commodity prices and deepening supply shortages could accelerate the inflation that was already underway before the war began. Consumers are likely to cut back on nonessential spending, depending on their sensitivity and exposure to price increases, and central banks will fall under greater pressure to raise interest rates. Even in a cautious scenario, commodity prices will be higher.
Across all scenarios, financial markets are likely to see even greater volatility as investors react to developments in the war and affected economies. Capital flows to Eastern Europe will diminish, and in more extreme scenarios, a liquidity crunch could escalate as investors exercise greater caution and respond to central bank moves.
The combination of reduced consumer spending and deteriorating financial conditions leads to an economic slowdown or recession in extreme scenarios. This could put governments back in the position of introducing economic stimulus measures, as they did during the Covid-19 pandemic—all while stubbornly high commodity prices could suppress any economic boost that would help consumers cope with recession.
In the more extreme scenarios, sanctions and trade interruptions would realign geopolitical blocs, with trade and investments blocs decoupling. Europe and the US are already rekindling trade relationships with some regimes that had been out of favor, including Venezuela and Iran, in order to shore up crude oil inventory. In a cautious scenario, global trade would resume, but a premium would remain for domestic or secure supply lines.
Governments are likely to implement more active industrial policies, along with interventions aimed at counteracting the harm from the conflict or to accelerate their response, particularly in nations that rely on resource imports from the conflict region. The European Union’ s REPowerEU initiative, for example, aims to speed up and streamline the process for developing renewable energy infrastructure.
In the private sector, investors and consumers are likely to further increase scrutiny on energy and supply chain issues across scenarios. Cybersecurity will receive added attention, especially in a fractured world, and the investments in protection and amelioration will increase.
The crisis is likely to accelerate the energy transition, as markets race to increase their reliance on renewables as part of a broader strategy to reduce their dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. Green energy will increasingly be associated with localization of energy supply.
Join Bain's Peter Parry Jenny Davis-Peccoud on Tuesday, April 12, as they discuss a range of possible scenarios and how to respond.
The immediate increase in energy prices makes renewables more attractive. For example, green hydrogen may be more competitive in some markets, given higher gas prices. In the near term, however, high prices for some commodities ( for example, nickel, palladium, and polysilicon) could blunt demand for renewables and energy storage. There will likely be a growing recognition of the inherent volatility of the energy transition, leading to a recognition that fossil fuels will be needed as bridge fuels ( particularly natural gas, and even coal) and a potential renaissance of nuclear energy.
The rise in energy prices will also deliver windfall profits to many fossil fuel energy companies far from the conflict. These companies will have to decide whether to reinvest these profits in producing more traditional fuels, invest them in new businesses focused on renewables, or distribute them to shareholders.
At the same time, energy security is likely to be more prominently linked to national security, with calls to redesign global supply chains and diversify away from hostile states. These shifts and the transition away from fossil fuels will clearly result in higher prices for consumers, either directly or in the form of taxes, at least over the medium term. It remains an open question how much consumers will be willing to bear, particularly in the context of underlying and accelerating inflation.
Responding to an unfolding crisis, ensuring the safety of employees, and protecting the continuity and resilience of operations has been the first order of business for companies affected by the war in Ukraine. The immediate next task must be to reposition the organization to thrive in a changed environment. In approaching this, executives can use the same themes that have guided them through the uncertainty of the past few years.
In the near term, executives can follow a simple, five-step approach for determining how to respond and begin to reposition ( see Figure 4).
The authors would like to thank Martin DeZell, Aleks Rosnev, and Jordan Friedman for their contributions to this work.
At the Reuters North American Energy Transition Conference, Bain’ s Peter Parry and Aaron Denman discuss why the region is uniquely positioned to lead the way to a lower-carbon future.
The war affects every company differently, but a set of consistent principles can help you respond today and reposition for the uncertainty of tomorrow.
Forming a series of tailored scenarios can help prepare for volatility in commodity supplies and shifting trade blocs.
Retailers’ environmental, social, and governance ( ESG) progress has the potential to accelerate.
Bain Partners Karen Harris and Dunigan O’ Keeffe discuss the many potential shocks resulting from the invasion of Ukraine and how to respond.
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© 1996-2022 Bain & Company, Inc. | business |
Study discovers molecular properties of lung surfactants that could lead to better treatments for respiratory illnesses: Synthetic lung coatings can help premature infants and adults with respiratory problems breathe easier -- ScienceDaily | The paper is published in Science Advances, a peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary scientific journal published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Both human and animal lungs naturally produce a surfactant, a substance consisting of lipids and proteins that coats the lungs and decreases the surface tension as we inhale and exhale, making it easier to breathe.
Respiratory illnesses like pneumonia or COVID-19 can impede the lung surfactant from working properly, leading to complications in breathing. A similar issue occurs in pre-term babies, who sometimes haven't yet developed the ability to produce the substance and suffer from Neonatal Respiratory Distress Syndrome. Right now, treatments consist of giving humans replacement surfactant taken from animal lungs, but researchers have been working to create synthetic surfactants to treat these conditions for years.
`` The main purpose of lung surfactant is to minimize the amount of energy required to breathe, '' said Cain Valtierrez-Gaytan, lead author on the paper and a Ph.D. student in the University of Minnesota Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science. `` As scientists, we want to determine how the various components of the surfactant interact with each other at a fundamental level so we can know what to include in a potential synthetic surfactant. ''
While lung surfactant comprises many different materials, the University of Minnesota team was initially intrigued by the role of cholesterol, a type of lipid that occurs naturally in animal and human cells.
Using a Langmuir trough along with a high-resolution optical microscope, the researchers took images of a few of the lipids that make up lung surfactant -- dipalmitoylphosphatidylcholine, hexadecanol or palmitic acid, and dihydrocholesterol -- at the monolayer level, or a film consisting of one layer of molecules at the interface between air and water. By testing how the monolayers behaved at different temperatures and pressures, they uncovered two previously unconfirmed phenomena that align with fundamental theories in materials science.
For one, the researchers found that the surfactants organize as equilibrium structures, meaning that if the crystalline parts of the molecules change shape and grow as pressure increases, they have the ability to go back to their original shape if that pressure is removed. This is a fairly rare occurrence, as monolayers typically don't return to their original structure once it's altered.
The microscope images also showed that when the pressure is increased, the crystalline parts of the monolayers `` finger '' or elongate. This is due to a chemical instability, the same instability that causes ice to splay out in fractals when a snowflake is formed. Knowing both of these properties helps the researchers better understand how fast the surfactant spreads across the lungs and how it reduces surface tension in the lungs.
`` We can use basic materials science theories, like instabilities and equilibrium, to try to understand how the lung surfactant actually works, '' said Joe Zasadzinski, senior author on the paper and a professor in the University of Minnesota Department of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science. `` Then we can make predictions based on fundamental physics as to how these materials are going to organize, which will ultimately help us formulate the next generation of clinical surfactant materials. ''
In addition to Valtierrez-Gaytan and Zasadzinski, the research team included former University of Minnesota Twin Cities alumni Mitchell Kohler ( B.S. ChemE '21) and Khanh Kieu ( B.S. ChemE '21), Augsburg University and University of Minnesota adjunct professor Ben Stottrup, and University of California, Santa Barbara postdoctoral researcher Joseph Barakat.
This research was funded by the National Institutes of Health. | science |
China Stocks Shrug Off Covid Outbreak as Traders Bet on Stimulus | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
( Bloomberg) -- China’ s soaring Covid infections are provoking little panic in the stock market, with investors betting that the authorities will unleash stimulus to prop up growth.
The benchmark CSI 300 gauge has gained more than 2% since the financial hub of Shanghai introduced a two-stage lockdown early last week. An index of Shanghai-listed developers and a Bloomberg gauge of Chinese real estate firms have both climbed more than 10% during that period.
Bets are mounting that China’ s policy makers will deploy more stimulus to shore up growth before President Xi Jinping seeks to secure a third term before year-end. A weak services sector report on Wednesday highlighted the risks for the world’ s second-largest economy, with holiday spending figures pointing to more damage ahead amid widespread Covid curbs.
“ We’ ve seen and quelled such outbreaks so many times before and have plenty of experience, it’ s only a matter of time once the nation sets its mind on it, ” said Chen Shi, a fund manager at Shanghai Jade Stone Investment Management Co. “ Looking in retrospect to 2020, the largest returns in stocks came in tandem with the period of the greatest uncertainties over the virus in the first two quarters. ”
Chen, who has been confined to his compound for more than 20 days, expects policy loosening to translate into better valuations even if earnings are impacted. The wider range of treatment options, more extensive testing and a lower fatality rate indicate that the outbreak can be contained, he said.
The domestic optimism contrasts with growing concerns from market participants elsewhere over China’ s worsening outbreak. Analysts at Morgan Stanley slashed their target for the CSI 300 Index by 16% last week, citing risk factors such as property defaults and city-wide lockdowns, according to a research note.
In terms of stimulus, the Chinese authorities have a variety of tools at their disposal, including cutting rates and taking steps to boost the property sector. Officials will use monetary policy tools at an “ appropriate time ” and consider other measures to boost consumption, according to the readout from a meeting of the State Council chaired by Premier Li Keqiang on Wednesday.
Beijing loosened home-buying rules in more than 60 municipalities in the first quarter, abandoning restrictions on the number of residences households can own to stimulate demand.
Hopeful investors may be waiting for a repeat of the dramatic rebound in 2020, when the CSI 300 Index gained nearly 40% in the four months between a low in March - when Wuhan was still in lockdown - and July, when daily cases had dwindled to the single digits.
“ There has to be loosening at this rate, and hopes are mostly around more relaxation for the property sector, as it’ s the most important part of the economy, ” said He Qi, fund manager at Huatai Pinebridge Fund Management.
“ There are long-term goals for property, then there are imminent emergencies, and the task now is first to make it through this. ”
The federal government is planning to unveil a significant crackdown on foreign homebuyers as part of Thursday’ s federal budget, CTV National News Ottawa Bureau Chief Joyce Napier reported Wednesday afternoon.
Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland may effectively tell the Bank of Canada it’ s on its own in tackling inflation when she introduces a budget Thursday that’ s expected to be full of new spending initiatives.
The U.S. Fed signaled it will reduce its massive bond holdings at a maximum pace of US $ 95 billion a month, further tightening credit across the economy as the central bank raises interest rates to cool inflation
Bay Street could be about to learn its fate in Canada’ s halls of power. | general |
Nine more COVID-19 symptoms added to list | Nine new symptoms, including sore throat, fatigue, and headache, have been added to the official list of COVID-19 symptoms on the NHS.
The new symptoms join the three symptoms of a fever, a new and persistent cough, and a loss or change in taste or smell. Extending this list may reap benefits, such as reducing infections by helping people detect whether they may have COVID. However, the end of free COVID-19 LFTs in pharmacies means that people are less likely to test to confirm if they have the virus.
As it stands, almost five million people are estimated to be infected with COVID-19.
The new signs of infection include shortness of breath, feeling tired or exhausted, an aching body, a headache, a sore throat, a blocked or runny nose, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, and feeling sick or being sick.
Up until this point, the UK only had three symptoms on the list, despite other organisations such as WHO and the CDC in the US having longer symptom lists.
Professor Tim Spector, lead scientist of the Zoe COVID-19 symptom tracker app, said in a tweet that the NHS had “ finally changed ” the symptom list after two years of lobbying. “ Pity they have the order wrong, but it’ s a start and could help reduce infections, ” he said. | tech |
Global Energy Upheaval Threatens Years of Natural Gas Shortages | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
Gas pipes and storage tanks at the Enagas SA storage and distribution hub at the Port of Barcelona in Barcelona, Spain, on Tuesday, March 29, 2022. The Iberian peninsula has only small gas connections to the rest of Europe, but has about 30% of the continent’ s liquefied natural gas regasification capacity and two pipelines linking it to northern Africa. Photographer: Angel Garcia/Bloomberg, Bloomberg
( Bloomberg) -- The natural gas market’ s delicate balance is crumbling, putting the global economy under further strain as nations struggle to secure enough fuel.
War, the energy transition, severe weather and surging demand are creating a period of upheaval that is tightening supply like never before. Nations and companies are grappling to secure enough gas amid a global power crunch as economies recover from the pandemic.
Natural gas is a key component in the global economy that keeps factories buzzing, lights on and houses warm. The competition for a finite supply of the fuel will only get worse if current conditions persist, with skyrocketing prices and supply gaps threatening to upend economies, boost inflation and grind supply chains to a halt.
“ The market of today is one of the most challenging I’ ve ever seen, ” said Susan L. Sakmar, a visiting assistant professor at the University of Houston Law Center. “ The world needs a bigger energy pie to share. Absent a global recession or more Covid lockdowns that slow growth, I suspect many parts of the world will face energy shortages. ”
The world was already facing the risk of gas shortages this winter as a post-pandemic rebound in demand outpaced supply. The crunch was years in the making: countries became more dependent on gas as utilities curbed coal consumption and expanded intermittent renewable sources, while shutting nuclear reactors in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Meanwhile, suppliers were slow to boost production.
Luckily, milder temperatures across Europe and parts of Asia this winter curbed demand for the heating fuel and allowed utilities to squeak by on existing inventories. Traders now joke that praying for mild weather will become a seasonal tradition, since a snowstorm in Beijing or heat waves in the U.K. can trigger record-breaking price swings and crippling supply deficits.
And now the war has dealt an unexpected, devastating blow to such a fragile market.
Europe’ s effort to halt most imports of Russian gas means that it will be going head-to-head with Asia for spare liquefied natural gas supply, while there isn’ t enough investment in new production to meet surging demand. The European Union’ s proposal this week to ban Russian coal imports puts further strain on the market, as power producers may need to turn more to gas to generate electricity.
Longer term, the LNG demand-supply balance is expected to get more out of whack, especially if Russian gas is removed. The global market could be short nearly 100 million tons per year by the middle of the decade, according to a Credit Suisse report last month. That’ s equal to more than the annual demand of China, the world’ s top buyer of LNG.
“ Even before the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the global LNG market was tight with record high prices, ” said James Taverner, a senior director at S & P Global. “ Market tightness is likely to persist over the next few years. Prices are likely to continue experiencing wild swings from day to day. ”
Already, natural gas spot prices are so high that the world’ s top buyers in North Asia are choosing not to refill inventories with additional overseas purchases. They’ re instead gambling that this summer will be mild, or a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine will result in a price drop, said traders, who requested anonymity to discuss private details.
LNG importers in China and India have drastically cut back spot purchases, and are instead maximizing domestic supply and consuming gas in storage, traders said. This strategy will help to save money, but comes with an enormous risk that allows little room for surprises -- a bet that hasn’ t paid off recently.
If there is a sudden spike in demand for gas, or if a contracted shipment isn’ t able to be delivered due to a production issue, some of Asia’ s top consumers may be short of gas this summer or next winter. They will be forced to go back into the spot market and buy very expensive shipments of the fuel, or curtail gas deliveries to customers at home.
Europeans will also be counting on a mild summer in Asia because of the need to pull spot LNG and fill their storage mandates. The European Union is pursuing a target of an 80% storage fill level by November, compared to roughly 26% now. That’ s achievable if Russian pipeline gas flows are steady and European prices beat Asian rates to lure available LNG, according to BloombergNEF.
Right now, Russia is continuing to supply the market and Europe has avoided sanctions on that gas. However, a sudden drop in Russian exports -- either through sanctions or a unilateral action by Moscow -- would wreak havoc, with demand destruction the only option to keep the market balanced.
Russian gas is so important to Germany that immediately halting imports would trigger a recession, according to Deutsche Bank AG CEO Christian Sewing. That would intensify the global dash for spare gas, sending prices to new heights and leaving many countries without enough fuel to power their economies.
For cash-strapped emerging nations across South Asia and South America, the situation is dire, as governments may be forced to curb electricity or heating fuels to households. Argentina forked out roughly $ 750 million for eight LNG shipments for May to June delivery in a tender last month. That’ s about 20 times higher than the price they paid for similar shipments in 2020, and threatens to send electricity bills surging.
Pakistan is also in harrowing position, as the government can no longer afford to buy overseas shipments of the fuel and is struggling to find alternatives. Power plants in Pakistan are running out of fuel, and are pleading with the government to make more supply available, according to local reports. As prices remain elevated, fuel shortages are at risk of spreading to Bangladesh, India and Thailand.
“ Energy poverty in parts of Asia could result as Europe sucks LNG cargoes away from their originally intended destinations, ” said Saul Kavonic, an energy analyst at Credit Suisse Group AG. | general |
FDA pulls COVID antibody therapy as BA.2 variant becomes dominant in US | New modeling from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( CDC) estimates the BA.2 Omicron variant is now dominant in the United States. In related news, the Food and Drug Administration ( FDA) has withdrawn its emergency use authorization for the COVID-19 antibody treatment sotrovimab as research has found it ineffective against the BA.2 variant.
Since the pandemic began, the CDC has been tracking the prevalence of different SARS-CoV-2 viral strains in the country through its National SARS-CoV-2 Strain Surveillance program. The program analyzes viral samples from all over the country to estimate the predominance of emerging variants.
As the genetic surveillance work takes a couple of weeks to formally collect, the CDC also has a model called Nowcast that estimates current variant proportions. As of the start of April, the CDC’ s Nowcast modeling estimates the BA.2 Omicron variant accounts for 72.2 percent of all COVID-19 infections in the United States.
The last recorded real variant prevalence rate cited by the CDC was for the week ending March 19, estimating BA.2 accounting for 42.4 percent of all infections in the country. The spread of BA.2 has been dramatically rapid, with the CDC estimating at the end of January the variant only accounted for 1 percent of all infections in the country.
In a recent White House press briefing CDC Director Rochelle Walensky said there is no evidence so far to indicate BA.2 leads to more severe disease than other forms of Omicron that have been circulating. However, she also said BA.2 “ does appear to be more transmissible. ”
BA.2 initially emerged back in November 2021. It was one of three distinct SARS-CoV-2 variants that the World Health Organization ultimately incorporated under the one Omicron moniker. It has been estimated to be around 10 to 15 percent more transmissible than the initial iteration of Omicron.
In response to the increasing prevalence of BA.2 in the country, the FDA has revoked its emergency use authorization for sotrovimab, a once-promising monoclonal antibody treatment for COVID-19 that has recently proven ineffective against this variant. This decision comes just weeks after the FDA halted use of two other monoclonal antibody treatments. An antibody cocktail from pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly ( bamlanivimab and etesevimab) and Regeneron’ s infamous antibody cocktail were both found to be ineffective at treating COVID-19 cases with the BA.1 type of the Omicron variant.
This leaves doctors in the country with fewer treatment choices for severe COVID-19 cases. The only monoclonal antibody so far proven to work against BA.2 is a new treatment called bebtelovimab, which was authorized by the FDA two months ago.
Alongside this monoclonal antibody, the FDA recommends three currently available antiviral treatments that are expected to still work effectively against BA.2. These include the two SARS-CoV-2 specific antivirals – Paxlovid and Lagevrio – and the intravenously administered remdesivir.
According to Walensky, the United States is currently experiencing a quiet lull in the pandemic. Weekly average case loads are down and COVID-19 hospitalizations are at one of their lowest points since the pandemic began in 2020.
The big question is whether the rapidly emerging BA.2 variant will trigger a new wave in the pandemic. The variant has caused significant spikes in cases and hospitalizations across Europe in recent months. The United Kingdom, for example, currently has more people in hospital with COVID-19 than it has seen in over 12 months.
Walensky is optimistic the United States should be somewhat protected from a severe BA.2 wave, but she does urge everyone in the country to make sure they have had their vaccine booster shots.
“ The high level of immunity in the population from vaccines, boosters, and previous infection will provide some level of protection against BA.2, ” Walensky said. “ However, we strongly encourage everyone to be up to date on their COVID-19 vaccines. ”
Source: CDC, FDA, White House | science |
Jaime Jones, Brenna Jenny, Paul Kalb, Raj Pai and Matt Bergs, Author at Corporate Compliance Insights | Jaime L.M. Jones is global co-leader of the Healthcare practice at Sidley Austin LLP and serves on the firm’ s Global Life Sciences Leadership Council. She represents leading healthcare and life sciences companies in civil and criminal government enforcement matters, False Claims Act litigation, and initiatives to build and improve compliance programs.
Brenna E. Jenny is a partner in the Healthcare practice at Sidley Austin LLP and previously served as Principal Deputy General Counsel of HHS and the Chief Legal Officer of CMS. She represents clients in the healthcare industry in government enforcement actions, internal investigations, and compliance reviews.
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Estimating the cost of achieving basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste management services in public health-care facilities in the 46 UN designated least-developed countries: a modelling study - The Lancet Global Health | BackgroundAn alarming number of public health-care facilities in low-income and middle-income countries lack basic water, sanitation, hygiene ( WASH), and waste management services. This study estimates the costs of achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in existing public health facilities in the 46 UN designated least-developed countries ( LDCs).MethodsIn this modelling study, in-need facilities were quantified by combining published counts of public facilities with estimated basic WASH and waste service coverage. Country-specific per-facility capital and recurrent costs to deliver basic services were collected via survey of country WASH experts and officials between Sept 24 and Dec 24, 2020. Baseline cost estimates were modelled and discounted by 5% per year. Key assumptions were adjusted to produce lower and upper estimates, including adjusting the discount rate to 8% and 3% per year, respectively.FindingsAn estimated US $ 6·5 billion to $ 9·6 billion from 2021 to 2030 is needed to achieve full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in public health facilities in LDCs. Capital costs are $ 2·9 billion to $ 4·8 billion and recurrent costs are $ 3·6 billion to $ 4·8 billion over this time period. A mean of $ 0·24–0·40 per capita in capital investment is needed each year, and annual operations and maintenance costs are expected to increase from $ 0·10 in 2021 to $ 0·39–0·60 in 2030. Waste management accounts for the greatest share of costs, requiring $ 3·7 billion ( 46·6% of the total) in the baseline estimates, followed by $ 1·8 billion ( 23·1%) for sanitation, $ 1·5 billion ( 19·5%) for water, and $ 845 million ( 10·7%) for hygiene. Needs are greatest for non-hospital facilities ( $ 7·4 billion [ 94% ] of $ 7·9 billion) and for facilities in rural areas ( $ 5·3 billion [ 68% ]).InterpretationInvestment will need to increase to reach full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in public health facilities. Financial needs are modest compared with current overall health and WASH spending, and better service coverage will yield substantial health benefits. To sustain services and prevent degradation and early replacement, countries will need to routinely budget for operations and maintenance of WASH and waste management assets.FundingWHO ( including underlying grants from the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK), World Bank ( including an underlying grant from the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership), and UNICEF.TranslationsFor the Arabic, French and Portuguese translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.
An alarming number of public health-care facilities in low-income and middle-income countries lack basic water, sanitation, hygiene ( WASH), and waste management services. This study estimates the costs of achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in existing public health facilities in the 46 UN designated least-developed countries ( LDCs).
In this modelling study, in-need facilities were quantified by combining published counts of public facilities with estimated basic WASH and waste service coverage. Country-specific per-facility capital and recurrent costs to deliver basic services were collected via survey of country WASH experts and officials between Sept 24 and Dec 24, 2020. Baseline cost estimates were modelled and discounted by 5% per year. Key assumptions were adjusted to produce lower and upper estimates, including adjusting the discount rate to 8% and 3% per year, respectively.
An estimated US $ 6·5 billion to $ 9·6 billion from 2021 to 2030 is needed to achieve full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in public health facilities in LDCs. Capital costs are $ 2·9 billion to $ 4·8 billion and recurrent costs are $ 3·6 billion to $ 4·8 billion over this time period. A mean of $ 0·24–0·40 per capita in capital investment is needed each year, and annual operations and maintenance costs are expected to increase from $ 0·10 in 2021 to $ 0·39–0·60 in 2030. Waste management accounts for the greatest share of costs, requiring $ 3·7 billion ( 46·6% of the total) in the baseline estimates, followed by $ 1·8 billion ( 23·1%) for sanitation, $ 1·5 billion ( 19·5%) for water, and $ 845 million ( 10·7%) for hygiene. Needs are greatest for non-hospital facilities ( $ 7·4 billion [ 94% ] of $ 7·9 billion) and for facilities in rural areas ( $ 5·3 billion [ 68% ]).
Investment will need to increase to reach full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in public health facilities. Financial needs are modest compared with current overall health and WASH spending, and better service coverage will yield substantial health benefits. To sustain services and prevent degradation and early replacement, countries will need to routinely budget for operations and maintenance of WASH and waste management assets.
WHO ( including underlying grants from the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK), World Bank ( including an underlying grant from the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership), and UNICEF.
For the Arabic, French and Portuguese translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.
At the 2019 World Health Assembly, all 194 WHO member states resolved to ensure that every health-care facility in the world has adequate water, sanitation, and hygiene ( WASH) services, waste management, and environmental cleaning practices.1WHOWater, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: World Health Assembly Resolution 72.7. World Health Organization, Geneva2019Google Scholar Ministries of Health committed to set, implement, and regularly monitor standards, as well as to empower the health workforce to improve WASH and waste management practices. These commitments echoed the UN Secretary-General's 2018 call to action2UN Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General's remarks at launch of International Decade for Action ‘ Water for Sustainable Development’ 2018-2028 [ as delivered ].https: //www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-03-22/secretary-generals-remarks-launch-international-decade-action-waterDate: 2018Date accessed: February 7, 2021Google Scholar and the growing global collaboration on WASH in health-care facilities co-led by WHO and UNICEF.3WHOUNICEFWater, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: practical steps to achieve universal access.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311618/9789241515511-eng.pdfDate: 2019Date accessed: February 17, 2021Google Scholar Member states recognised that the lack of WASH and waste services and behaviours forestall progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs), especially the attainment of healthy lives and wellbeing ( goal 3) and water and sanitation for all ( goal 6). This collective action came amidst intensifying efforts to track access to WASH and waste services in health-care settings, aided by global indicators and service levels defined by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme ( JMP) for Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene,4WHOUNICEFCore questions and indicators for monitoring WASH in health care facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals.https: //washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-04/JMP-2018-core-questions-for-monitoring-WinHCF.pdfDate: 2018Date accessed: February 2, 2021Google Scholar setting of a global target for all health-care facilities to have basic WASH and waste services by 2030 as input to the SDGs agenda,3WHOUNICEFWater, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: practical steps to achieve universal access.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311618/9789241515511-eng.pdfDate: 2019Date accessed: February 17, 2021Google Scholar and publication of global coverage estimates for the first time.5WHOUNICEFWASH in health care facilities: Global Baseline Report 2019.https: //www.who.int/water sanitation health/publications/wash-in-health-care-facilities-global-report/en/Date: 2019Date accessed: February 1, 2021Google Scholar Despite progress, in 2019 an estimated quarter of health facilities still did not have basic water services, a tenth had no sanitation services, over one third did not have hand hygiene at points of care, and three out of ten failed to safely segregate waste.6WHOUNICEFGlobal progress report on water, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: fundamentals first.https: //www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240017542Date: 2020Date accessed: February 1, 2021Google Scholar
Research in contextEvidence before this studyWe consulted widely within WHO ( including with staff in regional and country offices and headquarters teams focused on health financing, health workforce, health systems, and health emergencies), with representatives of relevant partner agencies ( including World Bank; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; Water Aid; and World Vision), and with other experts working on water, sanitation, hygiene ( WASH) and waste management in health-care facilities globally. All indicated that no comprehensive costing for WASH and waste services in health-care facilities had been previously conducted for the UN designated least-developed countries ( LDCs). We also searched PubMed, Jisc Library Hub Discover, and Google Scholar using the terms “ water ”, “ sanitation ”, “ hygiene ”, “ health care waste ”, “ costs ”, and “ costing ” for articles published in English until Aug 31, 2020, and did not find any global or LDC-focused studies. Related resource needs have previously been estimated for achieving the health-related and WASH-related Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs). In 2016, the World Bank estimated that $ 28 billion ( US $ 2015) was needed annually between 2015 and 2030 to provide universal access to basic WASH services ( SDG 6: safe water and sanitation for all) in 140 low-income and middle-income countries ( LMICs). These estimates, and the update for sanitation published by UNICEF in 2020, addressed the needs of households but not institutions such as schools or health-care facilities. In 2017, WHO estimated that an additional $ 274 billion ( US $ 2014) per year, between 2016 and 2030, would allow 67 LMICs to achieve SDG 3 ( healthy lives and wellbeing). This estimate only partially accounted for WASH and waste management needs in health-care facilities, for which WHO did not report specific findings. A 2021 systematic review by Anderson and colleagues found only 36 studies on environmental health service costs in health-care facilities in LMICs; of these, only three studies were conducted during the SDGs era in one of the currently UN designated LDCs ( Rwanda, Malawi, and Zambia), and none presented national resource needs estimates. At the end of 2020, a provisional cost estimate for achieving full coverage of WASH and waste services in facilities in the LDCs was included in WHO and UNICEF's global progress report on WASH in health-care facilities but without a discussion of methodological details. This study updates and substantiates that estimate.Added value of this studyTo our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the costs of achieving global targets specifically for WASH and waste services in health-care settings. Given the poor state of WASH and waste services in LDCs, substantial investment will be needed to achieve coverage in all existing public health-care facilities by 2030. We estimated the total capital and recurrent costs necessary to provide basic WASH and waste management services. Our analysis benefited from a new set of per-facility cost data rapidly collected by UNICEF in late 2020 via a survey of WASH experts and government officials working in nearly 60 LMICs.Implications of all the available evidenceWe found that achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in the LDCs ' existing public health-care facilities will require substantial investment, although the needs are modest when compared with prevailing government and donor resource flows for health and WASH. Waste management accounts for nearly half the resource needs, with lesser shares for sanitation, water, and hygiene. Most additional spending is required in non-hospital facilities and in facilities in rural areas, meaning efforts to meet WASH and waste needs in public health-care facilities will contribute to the equity-centred and primary care-centred principles of the post-2015 development agenda. Our estimates can inform resource mobilisation, planning, and prioritisation efforts within global and national public health and WASH communities. The estimates can also help to stimulate policy dialogue regarding the distribution of financial and operational responsibilities for environmental health services across sectors, administrative levels of government, and the private sector.
We consulted widely within WHO ( including with staff in regional and country offices and headquarters teams focused on health financing, health workforce, health systems, and health emergencies), with representatives of relevant partner agencies ( including World Bank; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; Water Aid; and World Vision), and with other experts working on water, sanitation, hygiene ( WASH) and waste management in health-care facilities globally. All indicated that no comprehensive costing for WASH and waste services in health-care facilities had been previously conducted for the UN designated least-developed countries ( LDCs). We also searched PubMed, Jisc Library Hub Discover, and Google Scholar using the terms “ water ”, “ sanitation ”, “ hygiene ”, “ health care waste ”, “ costs ”, and “ costing ” for articles published in English until Aug 31, 2020, and did not find any global or LDC-focused studies. Related resource needs have previously been estimated for achieving the health-related and WASH-related Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs). In 2016, the World Bank estimated that $ 28 billion ( US $ 2015) was needed annually between 2015 and 2030 to provide universal access to basic WASH services ( SDG 6: safe water and sanitation for all) in 140 low-income and middle-income countries ( LMICs). These estimates, and the update for sanitation published by UNICEF in 2020, addressed the needs of households but not institutions such as schools or health-care facilities. In 2017, WHO estimated that an additional $ 274 billion ( US $ 2014) per year, between 2016 and 2030, would allow 67 LMICs to achieve SDG 3 ( healthy lives and wellbeing). This estimate only partially accounted for WASH and waste management needs in health-care facilities, for which WHO did not report specific findings. A 2021 systematic review by Anderson and colleagues found only 36 studies on environmental health service costs in health-care facilities in LMICs; of these, only three studies were conducted during the SDGs era in one of the currently UN designated LDCs ( Rwanda, Malawi, and Zambia), and none presented national resource needs estimates. At the end of 2020, a provisional cost estimate for achieving full coverage of WASH and waste services in facilities in the LDCs was included in WHO and UNICEF's global progress report on WASH in health-care facilities but without a discussion of methodological details. This study updates and substantiates that estimate.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the costs of achieving global targets specifically for WASH and waste services in health-care settings. Given the poor state of WASH and waste services in LDCs, substantial investment will be needed to achieve coverage in all existing public health-care facilities by 2030. We estimated the total capital and recurrent costs necessary to provide basic WASH and waste management services. Our analysis benefited from a new set of per-facility cost data rapidly collected by UNICEF in late 2020 via a survey of WASH experts and government officials working in nearly 60 LMICs.
We found that achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in the LDCs ' existing public health-care facilities will require substantial investment, although the needs are modest when compared with prevailing government and donor resource flows for health and WASH. Waste management accounts for nearly half the resource needs, with lesser shares for sanitation, water, and hygiene. Most additional spending is required in non-hospital facilities and in facilities in rural areas, meaning efforts to meet WASH and waste needs in public health-care facilities will contribute to the equity-centred and primary care-centred principles of the post-2015 development agenda. Our estimates can inform resource mobilisation, planning, and prioritisation efforts within global and national public health and WASH communities. The estimates can also help to stimulate policy dialogue regarding the distribution of financial and operational responsibilities for environmental health services across sectors, administrative levels of government, and the private sector.
These deficits contribute to the health and economic harms wrought by poor-quality health care. In low-income and middle-income countries, more deaths occur due to low service quality than from lack of access to care,7Kruk ME Gage AD Arsenault C et al.High-quality health systems in the Sustainable Development Goals era: time for a revolution.Lancet Glob Health. 2018; 6: e1196-e1252Google Scholar and lost productivity from poor-quality care costs an estimated US $ 1·4 trillion to $ 1·6 trillion each year.8National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and MedicineCrossing the global quality chasm: improving health care worldwide. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC2018Google Scholar Inadequate WASH and waste management in health-care facilities increases the likelihood of health care–associated infections9WHOHealth care without avoidable infections: the critical role of infection prevention and control.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/246235/WHO-HIS-SDS-2016.10-eng.pdfDate: 2016Date accessed: February 7, 2021Google Scholar and contributes to antimicrobial resistance.10The Food and Agriculture Organization of the UNOIEWHOTechnical brief on water, sanitation, hygiene and wastewater management to prevent infections and reduce the spread of antimicrobial resistance.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/332243/9789240006416-eng.pdfDate: 2020Date accessed: February 7, 2021Google Scholar The global spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, draws further attention to these risks given the importance of WASH and waste services for effective infection prevention and control, health worker safety, and the continuity of essential services.11WHOCOVID-19 strategic preparedness and response plan: 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2022.https: //cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/3rd-edl-submissions/who sprp-2021final18022021.pdf? sfvrsn=ce5092f9 1 & download=trueDate: 2021Date accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar
Achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in health facilities by 2030 will require considerable efforts to build, rehabilitate, operate, and maintain infrastructure, but the costs of doing so have not been estimated. Existing global resource-needs estimates for reaching the SDG targets for WASH focus on household access, not health facilities or other institutional settings.12Hutton G Varughese M The costs of meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal targets on drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene. the World Bank, Washington, DC2016Google Scholar, 13Hutton G Varughese M Global and regional costs of achieving universal access to sanitation to meet SDG target 6.2.https: //www.unicef.org/media/85111/file/Wash-Reports-CostOfSanitation.pdfDate: 2020Date accessed: November 6, 2020Google Scholar Global price tags for the health SDG targets14Stenberg K Hanssen O Edejer TT-T et al.Financing transformative health systems towards achievement of the health Sustainable Development Goals: a model for projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries.Lancet Glob Health. 2017; 5: e875-e887Google Scholar and primary health care15Stenberg K Hanssen O Bertram M et al.Guide posts for investment in primary health care and projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.Lancet Glob Health. 2019; 7: e1500-e1510Google Scholar only partially account for health facilities ' WASH and waste management needs, and they do not include the facilities on which the poorest often rely, such as clinics and health posts. Global cost projections for effective national COVID-19 responses16Tan-Torres Edejer T Hanssen O Mirelman A et al.Projected health-care resource needs for an effective response to COVID-19 in 73 low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.Lancet Glob Health. 2020; 8: e1372-e1379Google Scholar and vaccine roll-outs17Griffiths U Adjagba A Attaran M et al.Costs of delivering COVID-19 vaccine in 92 AMC countries: updated estimates from COVAX Working Group on delivery costs.https: //www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/act-accelerator/covax/costs-of-covid-19-vaccine-delivery-in-92amc 08.02.21.pdfDate: 2021Date accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar incorporate some considerations of water, hygiene, and waste management in health facilities, but they are based on emergency response strategies rather than sustainable, long-term solutions, and they do not include sanitation. Few studies have estimated high-quality facility-level or national-level costs on which global estimates could be based.18Anderson DM Cronk R Fejfar D Pak E Cawley M Bartram J Safe healthcare facilities: a systematic review on the costs of establishing and maintaining environmental health in facilities in low- and middle-income countries.Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2021; 18: 817Google Scholar
To inform global resource mobilisation efforts for critical health infrastructure needs, this study estimates the cost of achieving full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in existing public health-care facilities in the UN designated least developed countries ( LDCs) by 2030. This study updates and substantiates a preliminary estimate of $ 3·4 billion that WHO and UNICEF published in late 2020 within a broader global progress report ( appendix 4 p 3).6WHOUNICEFGlobal progress report on water, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: fundamentals first.https: //www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240017542Date: 2020Date accessed: February 1, 2021Google Scholar
In this modelling study, we estimate the financial costs of achieving full coverage by 2030 of basic WASH and waste management services in existing public health-care facilities in the 46 LDCs, home to 1·1 billion people ( appendix 4 p 4). The focus on LDCs reflects both a scarcity of coverage data in middle-income and high-income countries and a desire to prioritise attention and investment to the countries with the greatest needs. In LDCs, half of all facilities did not have basic water services, nearly two-thirds did not have basic sanitation, a quarter were without basic hygiene at points of care, and 70% did not adequately manage waste in 2019.6WHOUNICEFGlobal progress report on water, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: fundamentals first.https: //www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240017542Date: 2020Date accessed: February 1, 2021Google Scholar
Costs are estimated from the provider perspective, namely the public sector organisations responsible for health and infrastructure. The analysis does not distinguish among current financing sources, which can include government, the private sector, donors, and others. The estimated costs are additional to what is already being spent; the analysis therefore assumes that countries will sustain service coverage where it already exists. The definitions used for global monitoring of basic service levels for WASH in health-care facilities ( developed by the JMP-convened Global Task Team for Monitoring WASH in Health Care Facilities) 4WHOUNICEFCore questions and indicators for monitoring WASH in health care facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals.https: //washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-04/JMP-2018-core-questions-for-monitoring-WinHCF.pdfDate: 2018Date accessed: February 2, 2021Google Scholar are shown in the panel.PanelDefinitions of basic service levels in health-care facilities * The global monitoring definitions were developed by the Global Task Team for Monitoring WASH in Health Care Facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals Era, convened by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene under the auspices of the Global Action Plan on WASH in Health Care Facilities. More information can be found from WHO and UNICEF.4WHOUNICEFCore questions and indicators for monitoring WASH in health care facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals.https: //washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-04/JMP-2018-core-questions-for-monitoring-WinHCF.pdfDate: 2018Date accessed: February 2, 2021Google Scholar * The global monitoring definitions were developed by the Global Task Team for Monitoring WASH in Health Care Facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals Era, convened by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene under the auspices of the Global Action Plan on WASH in Health Care Facilities. More information can be found from WHO and UNICEF.4WHOUNICEFCore questions and indicators for monitoring WASH in health care facilities in the Sustainable Development Goals.https: //washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-04/JMP-2018-core-questions-for-monitoring-WinHCF.pdfDate: 2018Date accessed: February 2, 2021Google ScholarWaterWater is available from an improved source on the premises.SanitationImproved sanitation facilities are usable, with at least one toilet dedicated for staff, at least one sex-separated toilet with menstrual hygiene facilities, and at least one toilet accessible for people with limited mobility.HygieneFunctional hand hygiene facilities ( with water and soap or alcohol-based hand rub, or both) are available at points of care and within 5 m of toilets.Waste managementWaste is safely segregated into at least three bins, and sharps and infectious waste are treated and disposed of safely.Environmental cleaning †Environmental cleaning was excluded from the cost analysis due to insufficient data on existing levels of coverage. †Environmental cleaning was excluded from the cost analysis due to insufficient data on existing levels of coverage.Basic protocols for cleaning are available, and staff with cleaning responsibilities have all received training.WASH=water, sanitation, and hygiene.
Water is available from an improved source on the premises.
Improved sanitation facilities are usable, with at least one toilet dedicated for staff, at least one sex-separated toilet with menstrual hygiene facilities, and at least one toilet accessible for people with limited mobility.
Functional hand hygiene facilities ( with water and soap or alcohol-based hand rub, or both) are available at points of care and within 5 m of toilets.
Waste is safely segregated into at least three bins, and sharps and infectious waste are treated and disposed of safely.
Environmental cleaning †Environmental cleaning was excluded from the cost analysis due to insufficient data on existing levels of coverage. †Environmental cleaning was excluded from the cost analysis due to insufficient data on existing levels of coverage.
Basic protocols for cleaning are available, and staff with cleaning responsibilities have all received training.
WASH=water, sanitation, and hygiene.
Estimation of per-facility costs relied on unpublished data collected between Sept 24 and Dec 24, 2020 ( appendix 4 pp 5–12). Experts in UNICEF's country offices were surveyed for information regarding the average costs per facility of improving from an absence of WASH and waste services to meeting the JMP's monitoring definitions for basic services. Data on upfront investments ( capital costs) and annual operations and maintenance ( recurrent costs) were collected for WASH and waste management services across different facility types ( hospitals and non-hospitals) and settings ( urban and rural). No additional guidance was given to respondents regarding facility size; rather, it was assumed they accounted for variation in their submissions. In most countries, UNICEF personnel consulted with health ministries to complete the survey. Respondents were instructed to provide average costs, expressed in 2020 US $, based on standard technologies available in their countries. By Dec 31, 2020, a database constructed from their responses contained at least some cost information for 40 of the 46 LDCs ( home to 95% of the LDC population). Regional and all-LDC median costs were used when values were missing ( appendix 4 pp 5–12).
Extensive internet searches yielded primary and secondary data on public sector facility counts from national governments and international agencies ( appendix 4 pp 13–19). Public primary, secondary, tertiary, and more advanced or specialised facilities were identified, with private facilities excluded unless managed as part of the public system. In line with how the per-facility cost survey differentiated facilities based on type and setting, the identified facilities were sorted into four profiles: urban hospitals, urban non-hospitals, rural hospitals, and rural non-hospitals ( appendix 4 pp 13–19). Hospitals included all tertiary and more advanced or specialised facilities, while non-hospitals were defined broadly to include most fixed-location establishments not classified as hospitals. The inclusion of all permanent primary facilities contrasts with other global price tags for health, which include health centres but exclude lower-level clinics and health posts.14Stenberg K Hanssen O Edejer TT-T et al.Financing transformative health systems towards achievement of the health Sustainable Development Goals: a model for projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries.Lancet Glob Health. 2017; 5: e875-e887Google Scholar, 15Stenberg K Hanssen O Bertram M et al.Guide posts for investment in primary health care and projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.Lancet Glob Health. 2019; 7: e1500-e1510Google Scholar, 16Tan-Torres Edejer T Hanssen O Mirelman A et al.Projected health-care resource needs for an effective response to COVID-19 in 73 low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.Lancet Glob Health. 2020; 8: e1372-e1379Google Scholar
For each service, a facility in need was defined as one that did not already meet or exceed the basic service level. Coverage data were retrieved from the JMP database for 2019, the most recent year available. Each country's own estimates were applied whenever possible; otherwise, the JMP's all-LDC estimates were applied. Rules were developed to match stratified coverage estimates to the four facility profiles, based either on facility attributes ( type and location) or, when there were no country estimates for the preferred strata, on correlation analyses used to rank the alternatives ( appendix 4 pp 20–23). Given variation among sub-standard facilities ( ranging from a complete absence of services to requiring only minor improvements), more detailed needs categories were defined for each service, leveraging JMP data for indicators such as the share of facilities that had an improved, on-premises water source but still fell short of the basic service level ( all needs categories are summarised in appendix 4 [ pp 20–23 ] with corresponding indicators and cost assumptions).
In-need facilities were assigned a water or sanitation technology to align with the per-facility cost data. For water, per-facility costs were available for connecting to piped networks or exploiting on-premises water sources, such as boreholes or rainwater collection systems. For sanitation, per-facility costs were available for sanitation facilities connected either to a sewer or to a septic tank. By contrast, only one service option each was reflected in the per-facility cost data for hygiene and waste management.
Data on the availability of networked water and sanitation services ( ie, piped water and sewerage-based sanitation) came from the comments section of the per-facility cost survey and the JMP country files, which consolidate findings from nationally representative health facility assessments. A technology was considered unavailable in a country if so indicated by the survey response, except in rare instances when the JMP data indicated coverage of at least 10%, in which case the JMP estimate was used. Where data for health-care facilities were not available, household data from the JMP were used as proxies. Similar to the method for quantifying needs, rules were developed to match stratified service availability estimates to the four facility profiles ( appendix 4 pp 24–25). For each country, these data determined what share of in-need facilities were assigned a networked service, with the remainder assigned to on-premises water sources and sanitation systems.
Data were combined in an Excel-based model that computed the aggregate capital and recurrent costs required to progress from current to full coverage of basic WASH and waste services in all LDCs by 2030, the year by which all facilities are meant to have basic services.3WHOUNICEFWater, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: practical steps to achieve universal access.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311618/9789241515511-eng.pdfDate: 2019Date accessed: February 17, 2021Google Scholar The model assumed a linear scale-up of investment, such that capital costs were spread evenly across the ten-year period ending in 2030, with corresponding increases to annual recurrent costs. Per-capita estimates were based on country populations from the UN's medium variant population projections for 2021 to 2030.19UN Department of Economic and Social AffairsPopulation division. World population prospects 2019.https: //population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/Date: 2019Date accessed: February 19, 2021Google Scholar Replacement costs were incorporated for services whose assets were expected to expire before 2030, including hygiene in facilities with non-piped water sources and incinerators in non-hospitals. Replacement costs were incurred entirely within the year following asset expiration ( appendix 4 pp 26–27).
Future costs were discounted to present value terms at a 5% annual rate, which was the most commonly applied rate found in a 2018 review of national practices,20Attema AE Brouwer WBF Claxton K Discounting in economic evaluations.PharmacoEconomics. 2018; 36: 745-758Google Scholar and which falls within the range of prominent methodological guidance ( appendix 4 pp 28–29). The model's estimates for all LDCs were computed by aggregating country-level costs; however, data confidentiality agreements prevent the presentation of country-specific findings.
To address the uncertainty in identifying country-specific coverage levels and per-facility costs, and in recognition that investment decisions are made in diverse and evolving contexts, lower and upper estimates were also generated by varying key model assumptions. While facilities requiring partial investment for water and sanitation were assumed to need 50% of the full per-facility capital costs in the baseline estimates, they were assigned 15% of those costs for the lower estimate and 85% of those costs for the upper estimates. Additionally, the discount rate was varied between 3% and 8% per year ( appendix 4 pp 28–29). Finally, the lifespans of on-premises water and sanitation technologies were shortened from more than ten years to seven for the upper estimates to reflect the climate-related risks of increased droughts and floods that could undermine those assets.21WHOWHO Guidance for Climate Resilient and Environmentally Sustainable Health Care Facilities.https: //www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240012226Date: 2020Date accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar
To gauge financial feasibility, the estimated costs were compared to four relevant expenditure benchmarks: capital expenditure in health by governments and donors, current health expenditure by governments, WASH expenditure by governments, and aid disbursements for WASH. Country-level per-capita estimates from secondary sources22WHOGlobal health expenditure database.https: //apps.who.int/nha/databaseDate: 2021Date accessed: February 17, 2021Google Scholar, 23UN Water, WHONational systems to support drinking-water, sanitation and hygiene: global status report 2019.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/326444/9789241516297-eng.pdf? ua=1Date: 2019Date accessed: November 18, 2020Google Scholar, 24Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentCreditor reporting system ( CRS).https: //stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode=crs1Date: 2021Date accessed: February 18, 2021Google Scholar were used to compute population-adjusted LDC means ( appendix 4 pp 30–31).
The funders of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report.
Estimated financial costs to achieve full coverage of WASH and waste services in the 46 UN designated LDCs ' public health-care facilities are summarised in table 1. The incremental cost beyond current spending levels is $ 6·5 billion to $ 9·6 billion from 2021 to 2030. The capital cost is $ 2·9 billion to $ 4·8 billion, or a mean of $ 0·24–0·40 per capita, per year. The recurrent cost over ten years is $ 3·6 billion to $ 4·8 billion, increasing from $ 0·10 per capita in 2021 to $ 0·39–0·60 ( baseline $ 0·51) per capita in 2030. The undiscounted ( fiscal) costs are $ 9·8 billion to $ 11·2 billion.Table 1Incremental cost to reach full water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste service coverage in the least-developed countries ' public health-care facilities ( 2020 US $), 2021–30Total cost ( US $ billions) Capital cost ( US $ billions) Recurrent cost ( US $ billions) Average annual capital cost per capita ( US $) Annual recurrent cost per capita in 2021 ( US $) Annual recurrent cost per capita in 2030 ( US $) Baseline7·93·64·30·300·100·51Lower estimate6·52·93·60·240·100·39Upper estimate9·64·84·80·400·100·60 Open table in a new tab
The distribution of the baseline estimates over the four services, facility settings, and facility types are shown in table 2. Waste management costs are greatest at $ 3·7 billion ( 46·6% of the total), followed by $ 1·8 billion ( 23·1%) for sanitation, $ 1·5 billion ( 19·5%) for water, and $ 845 million ( 10·7%) for hygiene. Waste management's predominance reflects its high per-facility costs ( table 3) and low baseline coverage in the LDCs. This service ranking is maintained across most facility settings and types. However, hospitals require considerably more investment in hygiene than in water or sanitation.Table 2Incremental cost to reach full coverage of water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste services in the least-developed countries ' public health-care facilities by service, geography, and facility type ( baseline estimates), 2021–30All facilitiesUrban facilitiesRural facilitiesHospitalsNon-hospitalsNumber of facilitiesShare of facilitiesCost ( US $ billions) Share of total costCost ( US $ billions) Share of total costCost ( US $ billions) Share of total costCost ( US $ billions) Share of total costCost ( US $ billions) Share of total costTotal cost7·9100·0% 2·532·3% 5·367·7% 0·56·3% 7·493·7%.... ServiceWater1·519·5% 0·44·8% 1·214·7% 0·10·7% 1·518·9%.... Sanitation1·823·1% 0·56·3% 1·316·8% 0·11·0% 1·722·1%.... Hygiene0·810·7% 0·33·5% 0·67·3% 0·11·5% 0·79·2%.... Waste management3·746·6% 1·417·7% 2·328·9% 0·23·1% 3·443·5%.... GeographyUrban2·532·3%........ 0·23·1% 2·329·2% 48 10533·1% Rural5·367·7%........ 0·33·2% 5·164·5% 97 26066·9% Facility typeHospital0·56·3% 0·23·1% 0·33·2%........ 55833·8% Non-hospital7·493·7% 2·329·2% 5·164·5%........ 139 78296·2% Open table in a new tab Table 3Summary of per-facility capital costs and recurrent costs to meet basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste service standards in the least-developed countries ( 2020 US $) Capital costsRecurrent costsWaterNon-hospital, rural, piped5757 ( 2125–23 750); 382000 ( 500–5289); 35Non-hospital, rural, on premises15 601 ( 6875–28 726); 381700 ( 500–4500); 35Non-hospital, urban, piped5000 ( 2000–9000); 371500 ( 500–3030); 33Non-hospital, urban, on premises17 500 ( 5000–28 330); 331425 ( 500–3450); 30Hospital, piped4500 ( 2000–20 000); 342000 ( 1200–5000); 25SanitationNon-hospital, septic12 000 ( 6000–17 376); 40855 ( 350–2000); 30Non-hospital, sewerage8700 ( 5000–13 500); 25300 ( 150–600); 21Hospital, septic18 000 ( 10 000–30 000); 342050 ( 808–3500); 28Hospital, sewerage10 000 ( 7000–24 000); 251000 ( 600–2006); 20HygieneNon-hospital1200 ( 463–3500); 38330 ( 200–950); 34Hospital2500 ( 1107–6690); 341500 ( 403–3000); 29Waste managementNon-hospital10 159 ( 3000–15 000); 381750 ( 500–3918); 30Hospital21 000 ( 15 000–50 000); 344250 ( 1500–10 500); 28Data are median ( IQR); n. n is the number of least-developed countries for which cost data were reported on the per-facility cost survey. Open table in a new tab
Data are median ( IQR); n. n is the number of least-developed countries for which cost data were reported on the per-facility cost survey.
Sanitation is the most capital-intensive service and the only one for which the majority of costs is for capital investment ( figure 1A). For all four services costs are concentrated in rural facilities ( figure 1B) and non-hospital facilities ( figure 1C). Despite differences in coverage, the distributions of costs across contexts and facility types are driven almost entirely by how facilities were sorted into the four modelled profiles ( appendix 4 pp 13–19). 97 260 ( 67%) of the 145 365 facilities in rural areas account for $ 5·3 billion ( 68%) of the $ 7·9 billion of costs, and the 139 782 ( 96%) facilities classified as non-hospitals account for $ 7·4 billion ( 94%) of costs. Even in urban areas, hospitals only account for $ 247 million ( 10%) of $ 2·5 billion of costs.Figure 1Total costs of meeting basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste service levels in the least-developed countries ' public health facilities, by serviceShow full caption ( A) Service costs by capital and recurrent portions. ( B) Service costs between rural and urban facilities. ( C) Service costs between non-hospital facilities and hospitals.View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
( A) Service costs by capital and recurrent portions. ( B) Service costs between rural and urban facilities. ( C) Service costs between non-hospital facilities and hospitals.
Annual recurrent costs grow steadily, from $ 103 million in 2021 to $ 516 million to $ 791 million in 2030, depending on the discount rate applied. Meanwhile, yearly capital costs initially decrease over time and then spike when assets start requiring replacement ( figure 2A). As recurrent costs mount, capital's share of annual costs decreases substantially, at times attenuated or reversed by the advent of asset replacement ( figure 2B).Figure 2Annual costs ( baseline, lower, and upper estimate) of meeting basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste service levels in the least-developed countries ' public health facilities, 2021–30Show full caption ( A) Annual capital and recurrent costs. ( B) Capital and recurrent shares of annual costs.View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
( A) Annual capital and recurrent costs. ( B) Capital and recurrent shares of annual costs.
Of the parameters varied in the sensitivity analysis ( appendix 4 pp 28–29), the discount rate accounted for the greatest deviations from the baseline estimates, followed by the share of per-facility costs assigned to sub-standard facilities and asset lifespan. All three parameters have similar effects on capital costs. On their own, the range of discount rates applied changes total costs by more than 10% in each direction, whereas the other parameters ' individual impacts amount to less than 5% of the baseline estimates. Only the discount rate affects recurrent costs. Asset lifespans were varied based on one-tail risks associated with climate change, whose impacts on their own are estimated to increase total costs by nearly $ 330 million.
The estimated costs are small or moderate compared to expenditure benchmarks ( appendix 4 pp 30–31). The mean annual additional capital cost per capita is estimated at $ 0·30, equal to nearly 20% of the $ 1·56 per capita invested in 2018 in health capital by 23 LDC governments ( $ 0·80) and their development partners ( $ 0·76). Meanwhile, current health expenditure by 44 LDC governments was $ 10·17 per capita in 2018 ( US $ 2018), meaning limited fiscal space will be needed to cover the estimated additional recurrent costs of $ 0·10 to $ 0·51 per capita per year, between 2021 and 2030. Compared with existing expenditure on WASH, the mean annual cost of $ 0·65 per capita ( capital and recurrent) would represent about a one-fifth increase on the $ 3·09 per capita 22 LDC governments already spend on WASH, or a similar increment on the $ 3·01 per capita all 46 LDCs received in aggregate as aid for WASH in 2019.24Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentCreditor reporting system ( CRS).https: //stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? DataSetCode=crs1Date: 2021Date accessed: February 18, 2021Google Scholar
The cost of reaching full coverage of basic WASH and waste management in existing public health-care facilities in LDCs is estimated to be $ 6·5 billion to $ 9·6 billion from 2021 to 2030. To our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the costs of achieving global targets for WASH and waste services in health facilities for a large group of priority countries. Relative to investment needs to reach the health SDGs, which amount to $ 58 per capita by 2030 ( US $ 2014),14Stenberg K Hanssen O Edejer TT-T et al.Financing transformative health systems towards achievement of the health Sustainable Development Goals: a model for projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries.Lancet Glob Health. 2017; 5: e875-e887Google Scholar the less than $ 1 per capita required annually to meet basic levels of WASH and waste services in health facilities is minimal. Meeting these basic levels would also require only modest increases to existing health and WASH spending in LDCs.
These findings add to the available evidence on resource needs for achieving global goals for health ( SDG 3) and WASH ( SDG 6). The resources are needed even if the estimated $ 193 billion ( US $ 2015) required from 2015 to 2030 to achieve the basic WASH service level for households in the LDCs are fully realised ( Hutton G, unpublished). The investments needed for households to have basic services would probably not diminish the expected costs for health-care facilities or other institutions because the household-cost estimates did not include any shared costs such as the expansion of piped water or sewerage networks.12Hutton G Varughese M The costs of meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goal targets on drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene. the World Bank, Washington, DC2016Google Scholar
This study also helps to unpack health infrastructure's share of the substantial resource requirements for achieving SDG 3, as well as highlights the need to improve existing health infrastructure, which previous analyses minimally address.14Stenberg K Hanssen O Edejer TT-T et al.Financing transformative health systems towards achievement of the health Sustainable Development Goals: a model for projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries.Lancet Glob Health. 2017; 5: e875-e887Google Scholar, 15Stenberg K Hanssen O Bertram M et al.Guide posts for investment in primary health care and projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries: a modelling study.Lancet Glob Health. 2019; 7: e1500-e1510Google Scholar Given the concentration of additional needs in rural and non-hospital facilities, scaling up investment for WASH and waste services in public health facilities furthers the equity-centred and primary health care-centred post-2015 development agenda for health.25WHOUNICEFDeclaration of Astana. Global conference on primary health care.https: //www.who.int/docs/default-source/primary-health/declaration/gcphc-declaration.pdfDate accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar
The costs presented here are based on imperfect data sources and thus do not have a high degree of precision. The lower and upper estimates were designed, in part, to account for uncertainty in the underlying coverage data and in the magnitude of investment needs to improve sub-standard facilities that had some existing services. This uncertainty is inherent in the per-facility cost data, which were collected through country consultations and thus were for some countries based on real project costs or on opinions of country experts ( or both). Although respondents were instructed to report average costs that accounted for within-country variability, it was not feasible to assess how rigorously they did so. However, the potential bias is partially mitigated by the fixed nature of many of the capital needs ( eg, even the smallest facilities require at least two toilets and a reliable, safe source of water to meet basic service-level guidelines) and the fact that facility size might not always correlate with utilisation and, therefore, recurrent costs.
In general, the analysis probably underestimates the global costs for WASH and waste services in public health-care facilities. First, the estimates do not include capital maintenance, which is often included in lifecycle cost analysis for WASH services. Capital maintenance was excluded because the modelling covered a ten-year period rather than the full lifecycles of all assets, and there is minimal evidence on the magnitude and frequency of capital maintenance needs. Second, the scope of the analysis was limited by data availability and, consequently, excludes environmental cleaning and cross-cutting activities such as training, supervision, mentoring, and monitoring and evaluation. Furthermore, costs were only estimated for LDCs due to sparse coverage data for other countries. Although the LDCs have the lowest service coverage, the magnitude of needs elsewhere is probably greater given the large populations and numbers of health facilities in middle-income countries such as China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Findings from a 2020 study in India support this hypothesis.26Tseng KK Joshi J Shrivastava S Klein E Estimating the cost of interventions to improve water, sanitation and hygiene in healthcare facilities across India.BMJ Glob Health. 2020; 5e003045Google Scholar Moreover, only existing facilities were included in the analysis, whereas countries are expected to build many more facilities to achieve SDG 3,14Stenberg K Hanssen O Edejer TT-T et al.Financing transformative health systems towards achievement of the health Sustainable Development Goals: a model for projected resource needs in 67 low-income and middle-income countries.Lancet Glob Health. 2017; 5: e875-e887Google Scholar all of which will entail WASH-related and waste-related investments. The costs of improving hygiene behaviours, most notably through the proven multi-modal implementation strategy for hand hygiene,27WHOWHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care. First global patient safety challenge: clean care is safer care.https: //www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241597906Date: 2009Date accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar were also excluded due to the scarcity of data. Additionally, fulfilling the spirit of the World Health Assembly resolution might require exceeding the basic service levels to ensure, for example, the universal safe management of water and sanitation systems and fully meet infection prevention and control and quality of care needs. Future studies that incorporate all WASH and waste services, more countries, and higher service levels will undoubtedly estimate greater total costs. A comprehensive cost estimate for universal access to WASH ought to account for these considerations and resource needs in other institutional settings, such as schools.
Understanding resource needs for WASH and waste services in health facilities is only one step towards implementation. Only 25% of national budgets have line items for WASH and waste management in health facilities,23UN Water, WHONational systems to support drinking-water, sanitation and hygiene: global status report 2019.https: //apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/326444/9789241516297-eng.pdf? ua=1Date: 2019Date accessed: November 18, 2020Google Scholar and there is little published evidence on how it is otherwise financed. To build and sustain services in perpetuity, countries will need to plan and allocate resources within their annual budget cycle, regularly monitor WASH and waste services and spending, and strengthen the enabling environment for the private sector to finance and deliver these services, where appropriate. This analysis assumed that countries will sustain existing services, but in practice spending might not be sufficient to maintain coverage or underlying assets. Because half or more of the costs of increasing coverage will arise from regular operating and maintenance activities, governments, donors, and facilities should collaborate to ensure all new capital investments are accompanied by commitments and processes to ensure funding for recurrent needs. Failure to do so could lead to a flurry of upfront investment followed by rapid service degradation, which would in turn require even greater future investment to replace or rehabilitate neglected assets.
The countries classified as LDCs are diverse. Although some LDCs might be able to increase or reallocate domestic financing to address these needs, those that are affected by conflict, fragility, or limited fiscal capacity will require substantial efforts to prioritise funding for such investments. External funding will remain critical in these contexts, and there are many opportunities to channel humanitarian assistance to more durable health and WASH infrastructure rather than temporary emergency services.
Currently, the lack of basic WASH and waste services in the LDCs causes numerous harms, including hampering an effective response to COVID-19, compromising service quality, and contributing to antimicrobial resistance. These service gaps also undermine fundamental human rights enshrined in various UN and member state documents.28UNThe human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation: resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council ( A/HRC/RES/45/8).https: //digitallibrary.un.org/record/3888410/files/A HRC RES 45 8-EN.pdfDate: 2020Date accessed: March 12, 2021Google Scholar As cross-cutting functions that involve multiple ministries and generate many positive externalities, WASH and waste services in health facilities are often chronically underfunded without explicit prioritisation by governments and partners, as with other common goods for health.29Sparkes SP Kutzin J Earle AJ Financing common goods for health: a country agenda.Health Syst Reform. 2019; 5: 322-333Google Scholar, 30WHOFinancing common goods for health.https: //apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/345090Date: 2021Date accessed: September 23, 2021Google Scholar Within the health sector, resources need to be prioritised as part of overall investments in universal health coverage and health security-oriented reforms.
There also need to be mechanisms for health officials to coordinate ( and even jointly budget) with counterparts in other relevant sectors. For example, the needs and preferences of community members, health-care workers, and educators could collectively inform decisions about where to prioritise new investments in water and sanitation infrastructure and guide technology choices, thereby increasing the likelihood that institutions benefit alongside households from new or improved systems. Prioritisation is also important within health facilities given that some rooms or wards, such as for maternity, can have poorer WASH and waste services, but greater needs and infection risks, than others.31Gon G Restrepo-Méndez MC Campbell OMR et al.Who delivers without water? a multi country analysis of water and sanitation in the childbirth environment.PLoS One. 2016; 11e0160572Google Scholar Finally, roles, responsibilities, and lines of accountability for the financing, operations, and maintenance of WASH and waste services in health facilities need to be clearly articulated and commonly understood across levels of government.
Despite their shortcomings, the cost estimates for WASH and waste services in public health-care facilities provide an evidence-based starting point for determining the resources needed to address a harmful health system deficit in the world's poorest countries, as well as indicate that the additional financing needs are modest relative to existing levels of spending on health and WASH. The findings can inform ongoing efforts for smart investments in the COVID-19 response and recovery, as well as encourage greater attention to basic infrastructure in the long run as countries seek to invest in greener and more resilient health systems. To further advance dialogue, governments and their partners should undertake tailored national and local cost analyses to inform routine planning and budgeting, as well as systematise practices for sound asset management.
For more on household data see washdata.org/data/householdFor more on health-care facilities coverage data see washdata.org/data/healthcare
For more on household data see washdata.org/data/household
For more on health-care facilities coverage data see washdata.org/data/healthcare
MC, SG, GH, and MM conceptualised the study. MC, SM, CC, SG, ONH, GH, RJ, TS, and MM contributed to methodology design. SM, JA-ST, and IA curated the data. MC and SM conducted the formal analysis. MC wrote the first draft of the manuscript with inputs from SM, JA-ST, IA, SG, CC, and MM. MC, SM, and ONH revised the manuscript based on feedback from all other coauthors. All authors had access to all underlying data, which were verified by MC and SM. All authors reviewed and approved the manuscript for submission. All authors had the final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Due to confidentiality agreements with respondents to UNICEF's survey, the per-facility capital and recurrent costs data can not be made publicly available. A description of the database and survey are provided in appendix 4 ( pp 5–12), and those seeking additional information or access should contact Jorge Alvarez-Sala Torreano ( [ email protected ]). UNICEF will evaluate any requests for access on a case-by-case basis. All other data used in this study were from publicly available sources or are catalogued in appendix 4 ( pp 19, 21–22, 25–28).
MC reports personal fees from WHO during the conduct of the study and from Results for Development, ThinkWell, and the World Bank outside the submitted work. SM reports personal fees from WHO during the conduct of the study and from Evidence Action and Vysnova Partners outside the submitted work. ONH reports personal fees from WHO during the conduct of the study. RJ reports grants from Agence Française de Développement, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Government of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN-Water Inter-Agency Trust Fund, United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, both during the conduct of the study and outside the submitted work. All other authors declare no competing interests.
WHO ( including underlying grants from the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK), the World Bank ( including an underlying grant from the Global Water Security and Sanitation Partnership), and UNICEF funded this study. We acknowledge a steering group that provided guidance on study design and interpretation of findings: Kelly Ann Naylor ( UNICEF); Bruce Gordon ( WHO); Lindsay Denny, Hank Habicht, and Hayley Schram ( Global Water 2020); and John Garrett, Ellen Greggio, Alison Macintyre, and Kyla Smith ( Water Aid). We also acknowledge Andrew Mirelman ( WHO), Ute Pieper ( independent consultant, Germany), Ian Ross ( London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), Susan Sparkes ( WHO), and Karin Stenberg ( WHO) for advice and inputs on model design, parameters, analysis, and presentation of findings; and Mark Hoeke ( independent consultant, USA) and Sofia Murad ( WHO) for assistance with aid disbursement data. Finally, we acknowledge the many individuals who provided data and insights related to costs and facility counts. They include Faustin Urbain Padonou, Ministry of Health, and Mariam Traore, UNICEF ( Benin); Christiane Nzeyimana, Ministry of Public Health and the Fight against AIDS, Jean Baptiste Nizonkiza, Ministry of Public Health and the Fight against AIDS, Kakou Arsene Batcho, UNICEF, and Yves Shaka, UNICEF ( Burundi); Bassina Ouattara, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Baki Traore, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Julienne Tiendrebeogo, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Yasseya Ganame, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Constant Dahourou, Ministry of Health, Yagouba Diallo, UNICEF, Joanna N'Tsoukpoe, UNICEF, Yemdame Bangagne, UNICEF, Noufou Giure, Croix Rouge, Ousmane Konate, ACF, and Juliana Gnamon, ThinkWell ( Burkina Faso); Michel Ange Lebaramo, UNICEF, Vincent Andjodoulou, Ministry of Energy Development and Hydraulic Resources ( Central African Republic); Noe Reouebmel, UNICEF, Brehima Camara, UNICEF, Ronelgar Allaramadjibaye, UNICEF; Guiradoumadji Nguétora, Ministry of Public Health, and Salomon Frissala, Ministry of Public Health ( Chad); Jean Marie Sangria, UNICEF, Florien Bisimwa, UNICEF, and Peter Maes, UNICEF ( Democratic Republic of Congo); Kitka Goyol, UNICEF, Jane Bevan, UNICEF, and Getachew Hailemichael, UNICEF ( Ethiopia); Fredrik Asplund, UNICEF ( Guinea-Bissau); Lenay Alexandra Blason, UNICEF, and Reginald Claveus, UNICEF ( Haiti); Jefferson Dahnlo, National Public Health Institute of Liberia, Morris Gono, National Public Health Institute of Liberia, Lekiley Tehmeh, Ministry of Health, Baldwin Davies, Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation, Eugene Caine, National WASH Commission, Quincy Trisoh D'Goll, WHO, and Edwin Rogers, UNICEF ( Liberia); Michele Paba, UNICEF, Blessius Tauzie, UNICEF, Jackson Ndayizeye, UNICEF, and Holystone Kafanikale, Ministry of Health ( Malawi); Moustapha Harouna, UNICEF, Abddayem Maaouya, UNICEF, Doulo Traore, UNICEF, Mohamed Yahya Bah, UNICEF, Ahmed Weddady, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Ahmed Lekiel, Ministry of Water and Sanitation, Maurice Taisa, ADRA Mauritanie, and Hbib Sidi Aly, ONG SERV'EAU ( Mauritania); Sai Han Lynn Aung, UNICEF Hakha, Kyaw Thet, UNICEF Lashio, Khin Mar Win, UNICEF Taungyi, Ye Min Aung, UNICEF Hpa-an, Sanda Lwin, UNICEF Myitkyina, Kap Zo Lian, UNICEF Sittwe, Than Kyaw Soe, UNICEF Naypyidaw, and A Mar Zaw, UNICEF Naypyidaw ( Myanmar); Alphonsine Mukamumana, Ministry of Health, Innocent Habimana, WHO, Cindy Kushner, UNICEF, Albertine Uwimana, UNICEF, Jean Marie Vianney Rutaganda, UNICEF, and Gedeon Musabyimana, UNICEF ( Rwanda); Piter Visser, Ministry of Health & Medical Services, Abigail Tevera, UNICEF, Zelalem Taffesse, UNICEF, Chander Badloe, UNICEF, Seraphina Elisha, Ministry Of Health & Medical Services, Baakai Kamoriki, Ministry Of Health & Medical Services, and Peter Wopereis, Ministry Of Health & Medical Services ( Solomon Islands); Amgad Farah ( Sudan); Amour Seleman, Ministry of Health, John Mfungo, UNICEF, and Frank Odhiambo, UNICEF ( Tanzania); Asmaa Al Wajeeh, UNICEF ( Yemen); and Cheleka Kaziya, Ministry of Health, Innocent Hamuganyu, Ministry of Health, Joseph Ng'ambi, UNICEF, Murtaza Malik, UNICEF, Douglas Abuuru, UNICEF, and Gloria Nyam Gyang, UNICEF ( Zambia).
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Health system performance in Iran: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019 | BackgroundBetter evaluation of existing health programmes, appropriate policy making against emerging health threats, and reducing inequalities in Iran rely on a comprehensive national and subnational breakdown of the burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.MethodsIn this systematic analysis, we present the national and subnational estimates of the burden of disease in Iran using the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019. We report trends in demographics, all-cause and cause-specific mortality, as well as years of life lost ( YLLs), years lived with disability ( YLDs), and disability-adjusted life-years ( DALYs) caused by major diseases and risk factors. A multi-intervention segmented-regression model was used to explore the overall impact of health sector changes and sanctions. For this analysis, we used a variety of sources and reports, including vital registration, census, and survey data to provide estimates of mortality and morbidity at the national and subnational level in Iran.FindingsIran, which had 84·3 million inhabitants in 2019, had a life expectancy of 79·6 years ( 95% uncertainty interval 79·2–79·9) in female individuals and 76·1 ( 75·6–76·5) in male individuals, an increase compared with 1990. The number of DALYs remained stable and reached 19·8 million ( 17·3–22·6) in 2019, of which 78·1% were caused by non-communicable diseases ( NCDs) compared with 43·0% in 1990. During the study period, age-standardised DALY rates and YLL rates decreased considerably; however, YLDs remained nearly constant. The share of age-standardised YLDs contributing to the DALY rate steadily increased to 44·5% by 2019. With regard to the DALY rates of different provinces, inequalities were decreasing. From 1990 to 2019, although the number of DALYs attributed to all risk factors decreased by 16·8%, deaths attributable to all risk factors substantially grew by 43·8%. The regression results revealed a significant negative association between sanctions and health status.InterpretationThe Iranian health-care system is encountering NCDs as its new challenge, which necessitates a coordinated multisectoral approach. Although the Iranian health-care system has been successful to some extent in controlling mortality, it has overlooked the burden of morbidity and need for rehabilitation. We did not capture alleviation of the burden of diseases in Iran following the 2004 and 2014 health sector reforms; however, the sanctions were associated with deaths of Iranians caused by NCDs.FundingBill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Better evaluation of existing health programmes, appropriate policy making against emerging health threats, and reducing inequalities in Iran rely on a comprehensive national and subnational breakdown of the burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.
In this systematic analysis, we present the national and subnational estimates of the burden of disease in Iran using the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019. We report trends in demographics, all-cause and cause-specific mortality, as well as years of life lost ( YLLs), years lived with disability ( YLDs), and disability-adjusted life-years ( DALYs) caused by major diseases and risk factors. A multi-intervention segmented-regression model was used to explore the overall impact of health sector changes and sanctions. For this analysis, we used a variety of sources and reports, including vital registration, census, and survey data to provide estimates of mortality and morbidity at the national and subnational level in Iran.
Iran, which had 84·3 million inhabitants in 2019, had a life expectancy of 79·6 years ( 95% uncertainty interval 79·2–79·9) in female individuals and 76·1 ( 75·6–76·5) in male individuals, an increase compared with 1990. The number of DALYs remained stable and reached 19·8 million ( 17·3–22·6) in 2019, of which 78·1% were caused by non-communicable diseases ( NCDs) compared with 43·0% in 1990. During the study period, age-standardised DALY rates and YLL rates decreased considerably; however, YLDs remained nearly constant. The share of age-standardised YLDs contributing to the DALY rate steadily increased to 44·5% by 2019. With regard to the DALY rates of different provinces, inequalities were decreasing. From 1990 to 2019, although the number of DALYs attributed to all risk factors decreased by 16·8%, deaths attributable to all risk factors substantially grew by 43·8%. The regression results revealed a significant negative association between sanctions and health status.
The Iranian health-care system is encountering NCDs as its new challenge, which necessitates a coordinated multisectoral approach. Although the Iranian health-care system has been successful to some extent in controlling mortality, it has overlooked the burden of morbidity and need for rehabilitation. We did not capture alleviation of the burden of diseases in Iran following the 2004 and 2014 health sector reforms; however, the sanctions were associated with deaths of Iranians caused by NCDs.
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
During the past four decades, Iran has experienced substantial turmoil in its economy and international policy. After the 1979 revolution, Iran was afflicted with the longest war in the 20th century with its neighbour Iraq.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar After the end of the war in 1988, Iran entered an era of massive construction and investment in its health and non-health infrastructures, with an increase in gross domestic product ( GDP) per person.2The World BankGDP per capita ( current US $) —Iran, Islamic Rep.https: //data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD? end=2018 & locations=IR & start=1960Date: 2021Date accessed: May 25, 2021Google Scholar The economic and social development included, but was not limited to, improvement in literacy, urbanisation, and investments in the transport and food industries. In the health sector, policies were designed and implemented in the four main domains of primary care, secondary and tertiary care, training health-care professionals, and research to reach universal health coverage ( UHC); 3Sajadi HS Ehsani-Chimeh E Majdzadeh R Universal health coverage in Iran: where we stand and how we can move forward.Med J Islamic Rep Iran. 2019; 33: 9Google Scholar nevertheless, international sanctions against Iran in 2011 imposed some restrictions on these efforts.4Kokabisaghi F Assessment of the effects of economic sanctions on Iranians ' right to health by using human rights impact assessment tool: a systematic review.Int J Health Policy Manag. 2018; 7: 374-393Google Scholar On the path towards UHC, Iran has undergone several major transformations, including expanding the primary health-care ( PHC) system5Nasseri K Sadrizadeh B Malek-Afzali H et al.Primary health care and immunisation in Iran.Pub Health. 1991; 105: 229-238Google Scholar and integrating the Ministry of Health with Medical Education in the 1980s,1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar the 2004 Universal Rural Health Insurance,1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 6Takian A Doshmangir L Rashidian A Implementing family physician programme in rural Iran: exploring the role of an existing primary health care network.Fam Pract. 2013; 30: 551-559Google Scholar, 7Doshmangir L Bazyar M Rashidian A Gordeev VS Iran health insurance system in transition: equity concerns and steps to achieve universal health coverage.Int J Equit Health. 2021; 20: 1-14Google Scholar and the 2014 Health Transformation Plan; 1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar however, existing evidence indicates unequal improvements in the distribution of specific health indicators across 31 provinces ( appendix p 2).8Fattahi N Azadnajafabad S Mohammadi E et al.Geographical, gender and age inequalities in non-communicable diseases both at national and provincial levels in Iran.J Diabetes Metab Disord. 2021; ( published online Feb 2.) https: //doi.org/10.1007/s40200-020-00713-yGoogle Scholar, 9Djalalinia S Modirian M Sheidaei A et al.Protocol design for large-scale cross-sectional studies of surveillance of risk factors of non-communicable diseases in Iran: STEPs 2016.Arch Iran Med. 2017; 20: 608-616Google Scholar
Assessment of the performance of the health-care system is necessary for evaluating the success or failure of previous policies, assessing needs, setting priorities, and directing future evidence-based policies; nonetheless, this initiative requires a comprehensive national and subnational breakdown of the burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors.10GBD 2019 Diseases and Injuries CollaboratorsGlobal burden of 369 diseases and injuries in 204 countries and territories, 1990–2019: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1204-1222Google Scholar, 11Aminorroaya A Fattahi N Azadnajafabad S et al.Burden of non-communicable diseases in Iran: past, present, and future.J Diabetes Metab Disord. 2020; ( published online Oct 27.) https: //doi.org/10.1007/s40200-020-00669-zGoogle Scholar, 12GBD 2019 Demographics CollaboratorsGlobal age-sex-specific fertility, mortality, healthy life expectancy ( HALE), and population estimates in 204 countries and territories, 1950–2019: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1160-1203Google Scholar, 13Azadnajafabad S Mohammadi E Aminorroaya A et al.Non-communicable diseases ' risk factors in Iran; a review of the present status and action plans.J Diabetes Metab Disord. 2021; 2019: 1-9Google Scholar In this study, we aimed to provide this breakdown in Iran, using the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study ( GBD) 2019. This report is the first on the burden of diseases and risk factors that encompasses 30-year trends in all subnational records, to the best of our knowledge.
Research in contextEvidence before this studyWe searched online databases including PubMed and Google Scholar for Farsi and English language articles using keywords including “ Iran ”, “ burden of disease ”, “ subnational level ”, “ epidemiological trends ”, “ mortality ”, “ morbidity ”, “ health system performance ”, and “ sanction ”. In 2019, a review paper was published in The Lancet entitled Iran in Transition, which reported a comprehensive history of Iran and its health-care system and presented the main turning points in the health-care system and infrastructure in Iran. The paper discussed the current health status and future directions on the basis of results and information from various sources. Additionally, several national and subnational studies on the burden of certain diseases and risk factors have been done and reported in Iran at certain points during the past three decades.Added value of this studyTo the best of our knowledge, the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2019 is the most comprehensive, systematic, and concerted effort so far that reports life expectancy, mortality, and disability from 369 causes, and the burden attributable to 87 risk factors at the national and subnational level in Iran from 1990 to 2019. This study includes special consideration of the Iranian health-care system's performance and action plans.Implications of all the available evidenceThis study shows a demographic transition leading to population growth and ageing, and an increase in life expectancy, along with an epidemiological transition. Evidence shows that the expanded health-care system has been quite successful in halting communicable, maternal, and neonatal diseases. Economic and social development in Iran is linked to the decreased burden of certain conditions, such as injuries and certain environmental risk factors; however, policies to control non-communicable diseases, such as substance-use disorders and mental disorders, and certain risk factors, including metabolic risk factors, have not been successful. Given the future burden of COVID-19 in the coming years, and the probable continuation of sanctions and their impact on Iran's economy and the function of the health-care system, policies should focus on maintaining the infrastructure and the financing of the health-care system, human resources, and equality and quality of health-care services, and setting priorities favouring fatal causes in vulnerable populations with restricted access to health care.
We searched online databases including PubMed and Google Scholar for Farsi and English language articles using keywords including “ Iran ”, “ burden of disease ”, “ subnational level ”, “ epidemiological trends ”, “ mortality ”, “ morbidity ”, “ health system performance ”, and “ sanction ”. In 2019, a review paper was published in The Lancet entitled Iran in Transition, which reported a comprehensive history of Iran and its health-care system and presented the main turning points in the health-care system and infrastructure in Iran. The paper discussed the current health status and future directions on the basis of results and information from various sources. Additionally, several national and subnational studies on the burden of certain diseases and risk factors have been done and reported in Iran at certain points during the past three decades.
To the best of our knowledge, the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2019 is the most comprehensive, systematic, and concerted effort so far that reports life expectancy, mortality, and disability from 369 causes, and the burden attributable to 87 risk factors at the national and subnational level in Iran from 1990 to 2019. This study includes special consideration of the Iranian health-care system's performance and action plans.
This study shows a demographic transition leading to population growth and ageing, and an increase in life expectancy, along with an epidemiological transition. Evidence shows that the expanded health-care system has been quite successful in halting communicable, maternal, and neonatal diseases. Economic and social development in Iran is linked to the decreased burden of certain conditions, such as injuries and certain environmental risk factors; however, policies to control non-communicable diseases, such as substance-use disorders and mental disorders, and certain risk factors, including metabolic risk factors, have not been successful. Given the future burden of COVID-19 in the coming years, and the probable continuation of sanctions and their impact on Iran's economy and the function of the health-care system, policies should focus on maintaining the infrastructure and the financing of the health-care system, human resources, and equality and quality of health-care services, and setting priorities favouring fatal causes in vulnerable populations with restricted access to health care.
GBD 2019 provided estimates of the burden of 369 diseases and injuries and 87 risk factors for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019, with subnational estimates for 21 countries, including Iran. The detailed estimation framework of GBD 2019 has been discussed previously.10GBD 2019 Diseases and Injuries CollaboratorsGlobal burden of 369 diseases and injuries in 204 countries and territories, 1990–2019: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1204-1222Google Scholar, 12GBD 2019 Demographics CollaboratorsGlobal age-sex-specific fertility, mortality, healthy life expectancy ( HALE), and population estimates in 204 countries and territories, 1950–2019: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1160-1203Google Scholar, 14GBD 2019 Risk Factors CollaboratorsGlobal burden of 87 risk factors in 204 countries and territories, 1990–2019: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1223-1249Google Scholar, 15GBD 2019 Viewpoint CollaboratorsFive insights from the global burden of disease study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1135-1159Google Scholar All measures are reported in age-standardised rates derived from the GBD standard population structure that were developed as part of the GBD framework. Our article complies with the Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting ( GATHER). Our full GATHER checklist is available in the appendix ( p 25). All data sources used in this analysis and related code can be found on the Global Health Data Exchange.16Global Health Data ExchangeGlobal Burden of Disease Study 2019 ( GBD 2019) data input sources tool.https: //ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-2019/data-input-sourcesDate accessed: April 4, 2022Google Scholar, 17Global Health Data ExchangeGlobal Burden of Disease Study 2019 ( GBD 2019) code.https: //ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-2019/codeDate accessed: April 4, 2022Google Scholar Additional results from GBD 2019 can be viewed with our data visualisation tools.
We investigated subnational inequalities through comparing age-standardised rates. GBD 2019 used several databases from Iran, which have been summarised ( appendix section 2). The data for national and subnational estimates of health in Iran were retrieved from various sources, including censuses and vital registration. A decomposition analysis was used to identify the cause-specific contributions to changes in life expectancy.18Andreev EM Shkolnikov VM Begun AZ Algorithm for decomposition of differences between aggregate demographic measures and its application to life expectancies, healthy life expectancies, parity-progression ratios and total fertility rates.Demographic Res. 2002; 7: 499-522Google Scholar Detailed steps to achieve the decomposition analysis are included in the appendix ( p 21). There were sharp declines in life expectancy because of earthquakes in 1990 ( Gilan, Iran, and Zanjan, Iran) and 2003 ( Kerman, Iran). Therefore, 1991 was chosen as the reference year for life expectancy and all-cause estimates. We reported 95% uncertainty intervals ( UIs) for each measure that were generated using the 25th and 975th ordered 1000 draws of the posterior distribution.10GBD 2019 Diseases and Injuries CollaboratorsGlobal burden of 369 diseases and injuries in 204 countries and territories, 1990–2019: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.Lancet. 2020; 396: 1204-1222Google Scholar To investigate the impact of different health sector reforms ( details on the history of major health policies in Iran are provided in the appendix, section 1) and the economic crisis caused by sanctions on the Iranian health-care system, we utilised two methods, the annual percentage change in age-standardised deaths and a multi-intervention segmented regression model to explore the changes in non-communicable diseases ( NCDs) and under-5 mortality rate ( U5MR).19Wagner AK Soumerai SB Zhang F Ross-Degnan D Segmented regression analysis of interrupted time series studies in medication use research.J Clin Pharm Therap. 2002; 27: 299-309Google Scholar The U5MR incorporated death rates as the dependent variable and the two major changes ( health sector changes and the economic crisis caused by sanctions) as independent variables adjusted to 2021 health expenditure per person ( extracted from The World Bank).20The World BankCurrent health expenditure per capita, PPP ( current international $) —Iran, Islamic Rep.https: //data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PP.CD? locations=IRDate: 2021Date accessed: February 18, 2021Google Scholar The segmented regression model is a method for statistically modelling interrupted time-series data, and to draw more formal inferences regarding the effect of an intervention or event on the response variable. Therefore, by using a multi-intervention segmented regression model, we can specify more than one change point. In the multi-intervention segmented regression model, level ( which is the value of the series at the beginning of a given time interval) and trend ( which is the rate of change of a measure) in the preintervention segment and changes in level and trend after the interventions were estimated. Additional details on the methods are presented ( appendix section 2).
The funder of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report.
Iran is having a late demographic transition.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar Iran's total population increased from 58·5 million ( 95% UI 53·3–63·5) in 1990 to 84·3 million ( 77·3–91·9) in 2019 because of high fertility rates in the early 1990s ( appendix pp 33, 56). From the late 1990s to 2019, the total fertility rate decreased steadily from 4·2 ( 95% UI 3·7–4·6) to 1·8 ( 1·4–2·4), which resulted in an apparent ageing of the population in this period ( appendix pp 34, 62). In 2019, life expectancy for female individuals in Iran was 79·6 years ( 95% UI 79·2–79·9) and 76·1 years ( 75·6–76·5) for male individuals. From 1991 to 2019, life expectancy at birth increased from 68·9 ( 95% UI 68·2–69·6) to 77·8 ( 77·5–78·0), with diverse provincial patterns by sex ( figure 1; appendix pp 36, 58). The absolute difference between the highest and the lowest life expectancy across provinces was 12·5 years in 1991, which declined to 8·2 years in 2019, indicating a convergence ( appendix p 37). The ratio of the highest-to-lowest age-standardised death rates in provinces remained almost constant from 1991 to 2019 ( 2·0 vs 1·9; appendix p 41). More information about the results can be found in the appendix ( sections 3, 4).Figure 1Life expectancy at birth ( years) among provinces of Iran in male and female individuals, 2019View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
All provinces observed increases in life expectancy ( appendix p 37). The decline in age-standardised death rates of almost all causes improved life expectancy during the study period. The causes whose reductions made the largest contributions to improvement in life expectancy were cardiovascular diseases ( 2·9 years), unintentional injuries ( 2·6 years), maternal and neonatal diseases ( 1·8 years), and transport injuries ( 0·9 years). The alleviation of most infectious diseases substantially contributed to the improvement in life expectancy. Conversely, very few conditions quite minimally counteracted the progress in life expectancy, including diabetes and kidney diseases, HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections, substance-use disorders, musculoskeletal disorders, and mental disorders. Improvement in substance-use disorders led to increased life expectancy in six provinces, and neoplasms were associated with life expectancy decrease in five provinces ( figure 2; appendix p 63).Figure 2Breakdown of life expectancy in Iran and provinces between 1990 and 2019, for both sexesView Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT) Figure 2Breakdown of life expectancy in Iran and provinces between 1990 and 2019, for both sexesView Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT) Figure 2Breakdown of life expectancy in Iran and provinces between 1990 and 2019, for both sexesView Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
In addition to the demographic transition, an epidemiological transition is ongoing, with a shift in burden from injuries and communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional diseases ( CMNNDs) towards NCDs. In 2019, the total number of DALYs reached 19·8 million ( 95% UI 17·3–22·6; appendix p 125). In 2019, 78·1% of disability-adjusted life years ( DALYs) were caused by non-communicable diseases compared with 43·0% in 1990. The epidemiological transition level, defined as the ratio of the all-age DALY rate caused by CMNNDs to the DALY rate caused by NCDs and injuries together, ranged between 8·0% and 103·2% in 1990, and from 5·1% to 23·6% in 2019 among provinces ( appendix p 38). Over the period studied, the number of DALYs attributed to all risk factors showed a decline of 16·8%, although deaths attributable to risk factors increased substantially by 43·8%. From 1991 to 2019, all-age numbers and age-standardised rates of DALYs and years of life lost ( YLLs) due to all causes considerably decreased by more than 35%; however, estimates of years lived with disability ( YLDs) were constant, underscoring the crucial role of infrastructure for managing morbidity ( appendix p 40). In 2019, the share of age-standardised YLDs contributing to DALYs steadily increased to 44·5%.
During the study period, reductions in major infectious diseases including malaria, measles, and diphtheria were among the major drivers of the nearly 95% of the decrease in the burden of communicable diseases based on the percentage change in the number of all-age DALYs. Within almost every subcategory of communicable diseases, a remarkable decrease in the DALY rate ( range 93·4–59·0%) was detected, except for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases, which had a substantial 197·6% increase. Among CMNNDs, the HIV/AIDS DALY rate increased by almost 13 times and climbed to the 6th rank ( appendix pp 51, 52). Although the burden of tuberculosis had a decreasing pattern ( −64·0% in the number of DALYs), this halted in the mid-2000s with the large surge of HIV/AIDS in Iran. The burden of tuberculosis almost reached a steady state in the past two decades, highlighting the importance of the re-emerging condition of tuberculosis as the major comorbidity of HIV/AIDS.
Considering the emergence of HIV/AIDS in Iran, the age-standardised DALY rate of this disease increased in most provinces from 1990 to 2019; however, this rise was more pronounced in Sistan and Baluchistan ( 23-fold increase), Lorestan ( 20-fold increase), and Hormozgan ( 18-fold increase). The highest DALY rates were noted in Kermanshah ( 299·4 per 100 000 people, 95% UI 229·9–388·8) and the lowest DALY rates were recorded in Semnan ( 3·5 per 100 000, 2·5–4·8) in 2019. The increasing difference between HIV/AIDS rates of DALYs among provinces in the past three decades was remarkable, with the highest-to-lowest ratio being 17·3 in 1990 compared with 85·8 in 2019 ( appendix p 152).
Given the high social stigma of HIV/AIDs in Iran,21Pourmarzi D Khoramirad A Gaeeni M Perceived stigma in people living with HIV in Qom.J Family Reprod Health. 2017; 11: 202-210Google Scholar its burden has been substantially underestimated and control measures have been neglected, and there is also a pattern of behaviours associated with a higher risk of HIV acquisition coupled with a lower perception of individual risk in the Iranian population.22Baghi HB Aghazadeh M Rashedi J Poor BM HIV/AIDS in Iran.Clin Infect Dis. 2017; 64: 820-821Google Scholar Injection-drug use and substantially increasing sexual transmission of HIV since the early 1990s are the main drivers of the increasing burden of HIV/AIDS.23VizHubGBD compare.https: //vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare/ # Date accessed: April 4, 2022Google Scholar, 24Joulaei H Motazedian N Primary health care strategic key to control HIV/AIDS in Iran.Iran J Public Health. 2013; 42: 540-541Google Scholar, 25Heidary M Nasiri MJ Why has HIV/AIDS prevalence increased in Iran?.Clin Infect Dis. 2016; 63: 846Google Scholar Iran started triangular clinic services in the late 1990s to address the growing epidemic of HIV/AIDS. These clinics provided services for people at high risk of HIV infection and those who were infected in three domains of HIV units, addiction units, and sexually-transmitted-disease units. In the early 2000s, the health-care system integrated these clinics with the PHC system to effectively address the epidemic.26Talbot JR Bohrer M Rhatigan J Iran's triangular clinic. Harvard Business Publishing, Cambridge, MA2011Google Scholar However, shortages in several aspects of this policy resulted in the country's surge in HIV/AIDs cases.27Khodayari-Zarnaq R Mosaddeghrad AM Nadrian H Kabiri N Ravaghi H Comprehensive analysis of the HIV/AIDS policy-making process in Iran.Health Res Pol Syst. 2019; 17: 69Google Scholar
Improved sanitation and nutrition preceded profound improvements in the reduction of communicable diseases in Iran.28Shadpour K Primary health care networks in the Islamic Republic of Iran.East Mediterr Health J. 2000; 6: 822-825Google Scholar Vaccination programmes have been largely successful in reducing the burden of bacterial and viral infections. Hepatitis B vaccination was launched in 1993 in Iran, requiring that all children born after this time receive vaccination for hepatitis B. Increasing vaccination coverage was followed by a sharp decline in cirrhosis caused by chronic hepatitis B since 2001.29Moghadami M Dadashpour N Mokhtari AM Ebrahimi M Mirahmadizadeh A The effectiveness of the national hepatitis B vaccination program 25 years after its introduction in Iran: a historical cohort study.Braz J Infect Dis. 2019; 23: 419-426Google Scholar Another example is the success of the mumps-measles-rubella mass vaccination that reached more than 96·4% in 2008.30Majdzadeh R Moradi A Zeraati H Sepanlou SG Zamani G Zonobi V Evaluation of the measles-rubella mass vaccination campaign in the population covered by Tehran University of Medical Sciences.East Mediterr Health J. 2008; 14: 810-817Google Scholar Certain diseases have been systematically controlled with concerted efforts; for example, malaria ( p vivax) has been largely controlled, with Iran in the WHO pre-elimination phase, with a directly observed therapy method in the PHC network.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar
One of the main drivers of the remarkable reduction in the burden of CMNNDs was improvements in the care of neonatal disorders, the leading cause of DALYs in 1990. By 2019, neonatal disorders had descended to the fourth rank among all causes of DALYs in Iran, decreasing by 81·5%. Furthermore, DALYs caused by maternal disorders substantially decreased by 68·0%. The top cause of DALYs among neonatal disorders was neonatal preterm birth in both 1990 and 2019. Among maternal disorders, the leading causes of DALYs were maternal hypertensive disorders in 1990 and indirect maternal deaths in 2019 ( appendix p 130).
The distribution of the burden of maternal and neonatal disorders varied at the subnational level. The decreasing trend of age-standardised deaths caused by neonatal disorders had a converging pattern among provinces in the past three decades, indicating reduced differences between provinces, with the highest age-standardised deaths in Sistan and Baluchistan ( 19·3, 95% UI 15·6–23·7) and the lowest in Gilan ( 5·5, 4·1–7·2) in 2019. The decreasing trend in age-standardised death rates caused by maternal disorders had a converging pattern, with the highest rates in female individuals in Sistan and Baluchistan ( 1·9, 1·4–2·4) and the lowest in Tehran ( 0·2, 0·1–0·3) in 2019 ( appendix pp 818, 871).
Nutritional deficiencies, another major contributor to CMNNDs, showed a 59·4% decrease in the all-age number of DALYs in the study period reaching 123 514 ( 95% UI 81 350–174 299 ] in 2019. Dietary iron deficiency and protein-energy malnutrition were the top two causes of nutritional deficiencies in both 1990 and 2019; nevertheless, the DALYs associated with both these nutritional deficiencies declined in their number by 46·7% for dietary iron deficiency and 77·9% for protein-energy malnutrition. Comparing the age-standardised DALY rates at the subnational level showed that provinces had a converging declining pattern, because the highest-to-lowest ratio of age-standardised DALY rates was 3·6 in 1990 against 1·8 in 2019. The Sistan and Baluchistan province had the highest rates of nutritional deficiencies in both 1990 and 2019 ( appendix p 152).
The remarkable improvement in maternal, child, and nutritional health status occurred mainly because of improved health literacy, especially among women, urbanisation, and advances in the economic status of the country during specific periods.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar Iran implemented many strategies to advance maternal and child health. One of the earliest was the PHC system implemented in the 1980s, which provided health-care services, child nutritional support, better access to clean water and sanitation, and national vaccination programmes in deprived areas of the country.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 31Azizi MH Bahadori M A brief history of tuberculosis in Iran during the 19th and 20th centuries.Arch Iran Med. 2011; 14: 215-219Google Scholar, 32Malekafzali H Primary health care in the rural area of the Islamic Republic of Iran.Iran J Public Health. 2009; 38: 69-70Google Scholar, 33Mehrdad R Health system in Iran.JMAJ. 2009; 52: 69-73Google Scholar, 34Moshiri E Rashidian A Arab M Khosravi A Using an analytical framework to explain the formation of primary health care in rural Iran in the 1980s.Arch Iran Med. 2016; 19: 16-22Google Scholar Furthermore, the Ministry of Health took responsibility for educating health-care personnel in 1986, which resulted in a considerable increase in the number of medical students and universities, and the number and density of hospitals, outpatient clinics, and health-care personnel.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 35Bastani P Vatankhah S Salehi M Performance ratio analysis: a national study on Iranian hospitals affiliated to Ministry of Health and Medical Education.Iran J Public Health. 2013; 42: 876Google Scholar
Ambient particulate matter pollution, unsafe water, and unsafe sanitation were among the major environmental risk factors with strong impacts on health status. In 2019, ambient particulate matter pollution was the fifth leading contributor to DALYs ( 137 832, 95% UI 113 167–163 498) and deaths ( 4913, 3967–5931) in Tehran province, which has a large population. Ambient particulate matter showed a 46·7% increase in attributable DALYs and a 109·6% increase in deaths in this province ( appendix p 971). In Tehran province, air pollution is estimated to have contributed to deaths from cardiovascular diseases ( 6·2%), diabetes and kidney diseases ( 2·1%), and chronic respiratory diseases ( 0·6%). The substantial adverse effect of air pollution on health and economics36Brajer V Hall J Rahmatian M Air pollution, its mortality risk, and economic impacts in Tehran, Iran.Iran J Public Health. 1970; 41: 31-38Google Scholar, 37Naddafi K Hassanvand MS Yunesian M et al.Health impact assessment of air pollution in megacity of Tehran, Iran.Iran J Environ Health Sci Eng. 2012; 9: 28Google Scholar necessitates more rigorous legislative measures, as well as applying novel approaches, such as spatiotemporal screening tools, for the collection and analysis of environmental data.38Shamsipour M Farzadfar F Gohari K et al.A framework for exploration and cleaning of environmental data: Tehran air quality data experience.Arch Iran Med. 2014; 17: 821-829Google Scholar
The number of all-age all-cause DALYs attributable to unsafe water sources declined to 99 237 ( 95% UI 51 328–151 535) in 2019; the corresponding number for unsafe sanitation was 27 018 ( 15 392–43 370). With a converging pattern at the subnational level, the highest age-standardised DALY rates attributable to unsafe water sources occurred in Sistan and Baluchistan ( 208·6, 113·8–305·3) and the lowest in Tehran ( 94·4, 43·8–152·5) in 2019. The highest DALY rates attributable to unsafe sanitation were seen in Sistan and Baluchistan ( 89·5, 48·7–140·1) and the lowest in Tehran ( 15·0, 6·4–29·6) in 2019, with a converging decreasing pattern among all provinces, showing the lessening of inequalities between provinces ( Table 1, Table 2; appendix p 971).Table 1All-age DALYs and deaths attributable to risk factors for all causes, and age-standardised rates ( per 100 000 people) in 1990 and 2019, by sex19902019DALYsDeathsDALYsDeathsNumberRateNumberRateNumberRateNumberRateAll risk factorsBoth sexes9 243 048 ( 8 190 548 to 10 576 260) 19 189·8 ( 17 788·5 to 20 901·8) 169 011 ( 156 653 to 184 419) 610·3 ( 574·5 to 644·2) 7 686 074 ( 7 031 340 to 8 350 066) 10 286·0 ( 9481·9 to 11 112·5) 243 052 ( 231 290 to 254 791) 378·8 ( 359·0 to 397·0) Female3 840 371 ( 3 369 936 to 4 422 415) 16 154·7 ( 14 864·1 to 17 724·0) 69 264 ( 63 613 to 76 225) 529·9 ( 493·8 to 567·4) 3 139 891 ( 2 835 769 to 3 450 775) 8730·3 ( 7945·0 to 9542·4) 104 477 ( 97 544 to 110 417) 344·1 ( 320·5 to 363·9) Male5 402 677 ( 4 787 352 to 6 184 535) 21 986·2 ( 20 298·9 to 24 063·5) 99 747 ( 92 022 to 109 374) 684·2 ( 641·8 to 728·4) 4 546 183 ( 4 169 464 to 4 933 000) 11 839·9 ( 10 930·0 to 12 807·4) 138 575 ( 131 522 to 146 256) 414·9 ( 393·0 to 438·0) Environmental and occupational risksOverallBoth sexes2 456 746 ( 2 149 920 to 2 863 083) 5803·2 ( 5262·2 to 6431·0) 51 471 ( 46 733 to 57 175) 200·2 ( 180·4 to 221·9) 2 228 640 ( 1 996 190 to 2 470 780) 2943·2 ( 2652·5 to 3249·9) 75 484 ( 68 142 to 82 329) 116·6 ( 104·6 to 128·0) Female941 039 ( 802 887 to 1 106 149) 4484·1 ( 4025·4 to 5009·9) 20 072 ( 17 989 to 22 517) 168·2 ( 149·9 to 187·8) 812 357 ( 722 472 to 907 316) 2276·5 ( 2029·0 to 2527·3) 31 179 ( 27 624 to 34 423) 102·2 ( 90·0 to 113·4) Male1 515 707 ( 1 332 710 to 1 768 490) 7024·7 ( 6341·4 to 7865·0) 31 399 ( 28 434 to 35 302) 229·8 ( 206·2 to 256·6) 1 416 282 ( 1 269 888 to 1 576 426) 3606·9 ( 3254·8 to 3992·0) 44 304 ( 40 099 to 48 555) 131·4 ( 117·5 to 144·3) Unsafe water, sanitation, and handwashingBoth sexes471 647 ( 345 822 to 645 280) 618·5 ( 460·3 to 830·8) 5164 ( 3648 to 7147) 9·4 ( 6·7 to 12·7) 127 854 ( 82 215 to 179 366) 169·1 ( 109·4 to 235·3) 1040 ( 655 to 1485) 1·7 ( 1·0 to 2·4) Female222 041 ( 154 394 to 309 403) 595·1 ( 421·0 to 809·1) 2434 ( 1614 to 3427) 9·3 ( 5·7 to 14·5) 60 569 ( 38 195 to 85 854) 163·4 ( 104·1 to 229·0) 470 ( 267 to 762) 1·6 ( 0·9 to 2·6) Male249 606 ( 181 133 to 352 778) 639·6 ( 475·2 to 874·1) 2730 ( 1912 to 3923) 9·4 ( 6·7 to 12·8) 67 285 ( 44 040 to 94 129) 174·7 ( 114·9 to 242·7) 569 ( 363 to 838) 1·7 ( 1·1 to 2·6) Air pollutionBoth sexes1 323 247 ( 1 143 429 to 1 563 808) 3198·7 ( 2826·7 to 3625·6) 30 463 ( 26 960 to 34 732) 116·4 ( 102·5 to 131·3) 1 190 330 ( 1 042 443 to 1 349 001) 1603·0 ( 1404·7 to 1813·8) 43 203 ( 37 478 to 48 717) 65·5 ( 56·5 to 74·0) Female540 695 ( 459 745 to 643 633) 2686·9 ( 2370·6 to 3058·1) 12 304 ( 10 831 to 14 017) 100·4 ( 86·7 to 114·6) 489 525 ( 425 747 to 556 544) 1364·8 ( 1186·0 to 1549·4) 18 483 ( 15 972 to 20 998) 58·7 ( 50·6 to 67·0) Male782 552 ( 666 167 to 932 336) 3664·0 ( 3208·5 to 4195·8) 18 159 ( 15 903 to 20 825) 130·9 ( 114·4 to 148·3) 700 805 ( 610 488 to 789 456) 1841·6 ( 1607·2 to 2070·8) 24 720 ( 21 429 to 27 990) 72·4 ( 62·5 to 82·0) Non-optimal temperatureBoth sexes301 596 ( 231 651 to 397 680) 931·8 ( 784·4 to 1104·7) 9641 ( 8119 to 11 428) 48·3 ( 40·2 to 56·9) 348 406 ( 300 862 to 398 741) 510·2 ( 443·1 to 581·6) 19 997 ( 17 225 to 22 753) 32·5 ( 28·0 to 37·0) Female147 601 ( 116 551 to 190 597) 877·7 ( 749·9 to 1021·6) 4481 ( 3833 to 5230) 45·4 ( 38·1 to 53·4) 159 324 ( 139 092 to 181 434) 479·7 ( 417·9 to 546·7) 9445 ( 8153 to 10 812) 31·9 ( 27·4 to 36·6) Male153 995 ( 112 461 to 210 598) 975·4 ( 800·4 to 1186·5) 5159 ( 4248 to 6264) 50·7 ( 41·9 to 59·8) 189 082 ( 160 424 to 221 661) 543·0 ( 463·4 to 631·0) 10 553 ( 9035 to 12 063) 33·2 ( 28·5 to 37·9) Other environmental risksBoth sexes266 794 ( 199 508 to 337 867) 903·5 ( 665·9 to 1159·9) 8319 ( 6007 to 10 930) 39·3 ( 27·7 to 52·6) 331 163 ( 236 863 to 430 616) 468·5 ( 334·1 to 610·3) 15 318 ( 10 786 to 20 591) 24·6 ( 17·2 to 33·3) Female85 838 ( 59 562 to 113 860) 626·8 ( 430·2 to 838·7) 2744 ( 1818 to 3791) 29·4 ( 19·2 to 41·5) 114 358 ( 76 637 to 157 236) 338·1 ( 229·0 to 462·3) 5697 ( 3731 to 8098) 19·4 ( 12·8 to 27·7) Male180 956 ( 137 123 to 226 850) 1158·0 ( 870·0 to 1464·9) 5575 ( 4134 to 7195) 48·6 ( 35·1 to 64) 216 805 ( 158 961 to 279 515) 599·9 ( 444·3 to 768·4) 9620 ( 7000 to 12 666) 29·8 ( 21·7 to 39·2) Occupational risksBoth sexes288 541 ( 234 081 to 349 374) 695·1 ( 565·1 to 838·1) 3378 ( 2760 to 4089) 9·4 ( 7·7 to 11·2) 412 274 ( 327 667 to 496 133) 442·7 ( 353·2 to 530·6) 4398 ( 3786 to 5106) 5·5 ( 4·7 to 6·4) Female19 391 ( 13 902 to 26 020) 105·0 ( 76·2 to 142·6) 113 ( 88 to 144) 0·9 ( 0·7 to 1·3) 50 459 ( 36 995 to 65 779) 108·3 ( 80·5 to 139·7) 251 ( 202 to 313) 0·7 ( 0·6 to 0·9) Male269 150 ( 217 370 to 326 600) 1257·9 ( 1023·7 to 1510·8) 3264 ( 2652 to 3972) 17·6 ( 14·5 to 21·2) 361 815 ( 290 663 to 434 273) 770·7 ( 621·0 to 918·6) 4147 ( 3540 to 4871) 10·1 ( 8·6 to 11·9) Behavioural risksOverallBoth sexes7 544 925 ( 6 544 210 to 8 830 843) 13 448·6 ( 12 215·6 to 14 960·7) 121 737 ( 110 103 to 135 956) 360·2 ( 332·8 to 387·5) 4 418 672 ( 4 016 468 to 4 823 401) 5822·1 ( 5310·2 to 6336·0) 125 194 ( 114 285 to 135 637) 189·5 ( 172·2 to 205·9) Female3 108 223 ( 2 655 801 to 3 665 420) 10 746·2 ( 9598·4 to 12 131·3) 46 731 ( 41 505 to 52 618) 276·3 ( 248·1 to 302·8) 1 604 156 ( 1 412 276 to 1 799 568) 4369·7 ( 3889·5 to 4862·5) 44 848 ( 39 353 to 49 440) 144·3 ( 125·9 to 160·0) Male4 436 702 ( 3 842 634 to 5 182 530) 15 972·9 ( 14 507·1 to 17 811·2) 75 006 ( 67 712 to 84 089) 441·6 ( 408·2 to 479·6) 2 814 515 ( 2 581 287 to 3 063 686) 7269·7 ( 6664·8 to 7909·3) 80 346 ( 74 301 to 86 800) 235·0 ( 216·5 to 254·5) Child and maternal malnutritionBoth sexes5 497 708 ( 4 494 154 to 6 691 000) 6473·8 ( 5314·1 to 7849·0) 59 628 ( 48 241 to 72 978) 69·9 ( 56·8 to 85·3) 852 138 ( 712 936 to 1 011 606) 1237·9 ( 1030·3 to 1478·3) 7199 ( 5817 to 8869) 11·1 ( 8·9 to 13·6) Female2 433 922 ( 1 986 834 to 2 961 190) 5903·1 ( 4836·5 to 7176·3) 26 223 ( 21 235 to 32 090) 63 ( 51·2 to 76·7) 390 403 ( 327 344 to 461 032) 1151·1 ( 964·2 to 1362·8) 3124 ( 2519 to 3817) 9·9 ( 8·0 to 12·0) Male3 063 786 ( 2 473 525 to 3 781 655) 7013·7 ( 5678·2 to 8651·2) 33 405 ( 26 659 to 41 349) 76·4 ( 61·1 to 94·4) 461 736 ( 379 751 to 556 357) 1319·1 ( 1078·5 to 1594·2) 4075 ( 3218 to 5054) 12·2 ( 9·6 to 15·1) Tobacco useBoth sexes1 052 471 ( 944 533 to 1 167 768) 3314·5 ( 3033·5 to 3599·9) 30 711 ( 27 976 to 33 274) 120·3 ( 110·8 to 130·1) 1 481 171 ( 1 360 879 to 1 619 268) 1914·4 ( 1766·8 to 2083·2) 48 564 ( 45 319 to 52 061) 70·4 ( 65·6 to 75·8) Female249 542 ( 201 341 to 300 925) 1474·0 ( 1230·1 to 1728·7) 6511 ( 5432 to 7629) 51·4 ( 43·2 to 60·2) 323 767 ( 275 393 to 376 425) 847·4 ( 718·5 to 980·3) 10 319 ( 8909 to 11 711) 30·5 ( 26·2 to 34·7) Male802 928 ( 723 767 to 882 646) 5044·3 ( 4601·4 to 5478·1) 24 201 ( 22 108 to 26 394) 188·9 ( 173·6 to 205·0) 1 157 404 ( 1 067 589 to 1 259 569) 2983·7 ( 2757·0 to 3239·4) 38 245 ( 35 862 to 41 046) 110·1 ( 102·9 to 118·3) Alcohol useBoth sexes50 140 ( 38 540 to 64 703) 125·1 ( 96·7 to 159·7) 837 ( 627 to 1138) 2·8 ( 2·1 to 3·7) 139 833 ( 109 766 to 175 225) 158·9 ( 124·4 to 200·3) 2976 ( 2244 to 3996) 3·8 ( 2·9 to 5·2) Female10 373 ( 8118 to 12 941) 53·3 ( 42·8 to 65·6) 154 ( 121 to 193) 1·2 ( 0·9 to 1·6) 22 610 ( 17 489 to 28 833) 52·9 ( 41·0 to 67·9) 416 ( 302 to 585) 1·2 ( 0·8 to 1·7) Male39 767 ( 29 902 to 52 702) 193 ( 146·1 to 254·5) 683 ( 492 to 964) 4·3 ( 3·2 to 5·9) 117 223 ( 91 263 to 148 028) 263·3 ( 204·7 to 334·1) 2560 ( 1922 to 3433) 6·5 ( 4·8 to 8·8) Drug useBoth sexes171 635 ( 141 604 to 206 825) 370·7 ( 312·8 to 438·1) 1962 ( 1707 to 2243) 5·5 ( 4·7 to 6·4) 444 340 ( 376 720 to 521 935) 475·2 ( 404·5 to 557·0) 5980 ( 5470 to 6569) 7·0 ( 6·4 to 7·8) Female49 753 ( 39 195 to 62 668) 209·4 ( 167·9 to 258·3) 434 ( 371 to 513) 2·4 ( 2·0 to 2·9) 103 135 ( 83 667 to 126 514) 224·3 ( 183·1 to 274·3) 1080 ( 906 to 1306) 2·6 ( 2·1 to 3·1) Male121 882 ( 101 042 to 145 354) 523·3 ( 441·0 to 611·6) 1528 ( 1307 to 1768) 8·4 ( 7·1 to 9·9) 341 205 ( 291 777 to 396 501) 720·1 ( 617·1 to 832·9) 4900 ( 4485 to 5358) 11·5 ( 10·4 to 12·6) Dietary risksBoth sexes1 004 233 ( 840 580 to 1 166 327) 3788·0 ( 3155·0 to 4390·3) 37 273 ( 30 928 to 43 438) 182·8 ( 151·6 to 212·7) 1 473 685 ( 1 208 551 to 1 739 207) 1986·8 ( 1627·6 to 2346·4) 64 424 ( 52 234 to 76 488) 100·0 ( 80·6 to 118·5) Female361 178 ( 302 769 to 415 925) 2987·3 ( 2507·6 to 3434·1) 14 351 ( 11 947 to 16 553) 155·5 ( 128·1 to 180·1) 573 055 ( 473 687 to 663 363) 1624·1 ( 1333·1 to 1884·7) 27 392 ( 22 210 to 32 074) 90·5 ( 73·3 to 106·1) Male643 055 ( 533 177 to 760 324) 4513·9 ( 3749·6 to 5353·1) 22 922 ( 18 893 to 27 346) 207·6 ( 172·1 to 247·8) 900 631 ( 728 882 to 1 092 221) 2352·3 ( 1899·7 to 2848·0) 37 032 ( 29 787 to 44 723) 110·0 ( 88·6 to 133·0) Intimate partner violenceFemale59 495 ( 13 668 to 110 038) 261·8 ( 57·3 to 493·7) 152 ( 99 to 207) 0·7 ( 0·4 to 0·9) 126 718 ( 30 299 to 237 808) 276·0 ( 66·6 to 515·7) 342 ( 241 to 437) 0·8 ( 0·6 to 1·0) Childhood sexual abuse and bullyingBoth sexes66 060 ( 26 079 to 125 638) 104·8 ( 42·7 to 197·9) 17 ( 2 to 39) 0 ( 0 to 0·1) 103 460 ( 40 147 to 202 055) 124·5 ( 49·6 to 238·7) 27 ( 4 to 63) 0 ( 0 to 0·1) Female21 225 ( 8009 to 43 058) 68·2 ( 27·8 to 135·7) 2 ( 0 to 4) 034 360 ( 13 058 to 71 940) 84·6 ( 32·2 to 174·2) 2 ( 0 to 4) 0Male44 836 ( 17 800 to 83 645) 140·0 ( 57·2 to 258·0) 16 ( 2 to 36) 0·1 ( 0 to 0·2) 69 100 ( 27 055 to 130 477) 162·9 ( 66·3 to 300·0) 26 ( 3 to 59) 0·1 ( 0 to 0·1) Unsafe sexBoth sexes19 940 ( 14 986 to 24 076) 57·4 ( 43·3 to 68·7) 435 ( 317 to 524) 1·7 ( 1·2 to 2·1) 50 884 ( 40 983 to 63 816) 56·2 ( 45·7 to 69·4) 1154 ( 914 to 1422) 1·5 ( 1·1 to 1·8) Female17 693 ( 13 007 to 21 037) 108·1 ( 80·1 to 129·3) 425 ( 304 to 513) 3·3 ( 2·4 to 4·2) 38 152 ( 31 239 to 46 660) 87·2 ( 71·7 to 104·7) 959 ( 755 to 1127) 2·5 ( 2·0 to 2·9) Male2247 ( 1506 to 3270) 9·4 ( 6·3 to 13·8) 10 ( 5 to 15) 0·1 ( 0 to 0·1) 12 732 ( 8309 to 18 379) 25·3 ( 17·0 to 36·4) 195 ( 111 to 304) 0·4 ( 0·2 to 0·6) Low physical activityBoth sexes128 650 ( 59 165 to 242 900) 585·5 ( 286·3 to 1031·7) 5490 ( 2548 to 10 053) 34·4 ( 17·3 to 58) 298 331 ( 164 409 to 506 086) 433·3 ( 243·2 to 722·0) 14 446 ( 7800 to 23 762) 24·0 ( 13·1 to 38·6) Female55 765 ( 28 698 to 97 035) 542·6 ( 283·1 to 909·9) 2543 ( 1288 to 4314) 33·2 ( 17·6 to 54·1) 147 116 ( 85 245 to 233 837) 436·8 ( 258·7 to 688·1) 7252 ( 4150 to 11 381) 25·1 ( 14·4 to 39·2) Male72 884 ( 29 488 to 149 871) 621·7 ( 275·5 to 1177·9) 2947 ( 1214 to 5808) 35·3 ( 16·3 to 62·0) 151 215 ( 75 241 to 271 785) 431·4 ( 221·8 to 748·3) 7194 ( 3601 to 12 516) 23·0 ( 11·6 to 39·3) Metabolic risksOverallBoth sexes2 264 132 ( 2 065 676 to 2 470 091) 8570·8 ( 7795·7 to 9358·4) 79 124 ( 72 173 to 86 453) 402·9 ( 364·8 to 442·6) 4 490 268 ( 4 092 380 to 4 912 190) 6175·4 ( 5643·6 to 6733·7) 179 522 ( 165 891 to 193 135) 283·5 ( 260·8 to 305·9) Female937 318 ( 853 989 to 1 031 052) 7632·3 ( 6916·2 to 8393·5) 34 069 ( 30 915 to 37 400) 375·8 ( 338·2 to 414·2) 2 013 201 ( 1 820 664 to 2 216 579) 5727·1 ( 5202·3 to 6270·4) 84 222 ( 76 996 to 91 071) 279·6 ( 254·2 to 302·9) Male1 326 814 ( 1 198 540 to 1 465 361) 9378·1 ( 8473·9 to 10 381·0) 45 055 ( 40 579 to 49 971) 423·6 ( 377·6 to 469·3) 2 477 067 ( 2 255 742 to 2 712 522) 6634·7 ( 6049·3 to 7274·8) 95 300 ( 87 591 to 103 591) 289·2 ( 265·0 to 314·5) High fasting plasma glucoseBoth sexes492 031 ( 400 079 to 607 114) 1988·1 ( 1601·4 to 2516·0) 16 744 ( 13 015 to 21 907) 91·4 ( 68·4 to 127·3) 1 777 998 ( 1 449 520 to 2 170 035) 2511·2 ( 2017·4 to 3108·7) 68 121 ( 51 370 to 91 493) 109·5 ( 80·8 to 150·7) Female209 639 ( 171 279 to 258 101) 1808·2 ( 1450·0 to 2314·3) 7355 ( 5718 to 9850) 85·4 ( 63·0 to 120·9) 861 064 ( 695 980 to 1 052 758) 2472·5 ( 1979·6 to 3062·7) 33 687 ( 25 173 to 45 261) 112·2 ( 81·5 to 156·1) Male282 391 ( 224 565 to 353 197) 2144·1 ( 1708·5 to 2720·0) 9390 ( 7209 to 12 169) 96·2 ( 71·4 to 133·2) 916 934 ( 738 525 to 1 128 130) 2555·6 ( 2028·4 to 3194·5) 34 434 ( 25 937 to 47 345) 107·6 ( 79·8 to 148·9) High LDLcholesterolBoth sexes848 799 ( 712 609 to 999 261) 3106·6 ( 2528·4 to 3789·1) 30 291 ( 24 441 to 37 076) 145·5 ( 109·3 to 188·8) 1 203 791 ( 998 464 to 1 437 959) 1574·5 ( 1268·6 to 1922·4) 52 530 ( 40 050 to 66 947) 79·9 ( 58·2 to 105·1) Female314 726 ( 263 599 to 373 702) 2528·9 ( 2017·7 to 3120·2) 12 126 ( 9527 to 15 127) 129·2 ( 94·5 to 172·3) 460 884 ( 369 788 to 568 383) 1287·6 ( 996·7 to 1626·7) 22 882 ( 16 693 to 30 058) 75·1 ( 52·4 to 101·7) Male534 072 ( 445 485 to 635 284) 3620·9 ( 2960·9 to 4398·9) 18 165 ( 14 777 to 22 205) 159·2 ( 120·9 to 202·5) 742 907 ( 624 494 to 874 498) 1862·3 ( 1523·2 to 2233·1) 29 648 ( 23 001 to 36 975) 85·2 ( 63·9 to 109·5) High systolic blood pressureBoth sexes1 205 800 ( 1 054 681 to 1 364 300) 4800·2 ( 4200·5 to 5423·5) 47 648 ( 41 787 to 53 977) 244·8 ( 209·5 to 279·6) 2 127 266 ( 1 913 281 to 2 347 736) 2973·4 ( 2652·2 to 3280·2) 99 939 ( 86 758 to 112 458) 157·8 ( 135·3 to 179·1) Female487 121 ( 429 441 to 557 118) 4266·4 ( 3714·5 to 4858·0) 20 663 ( 17 866 to 23 588) 231·5 ( 197·1 to 265·8) 908 895 ( 806 424 to 1 012 537) 2657·4 ( 2331·5 to 2961·1) 46 448 ( 39 687 to 52 480) 154·5 ( 130·2 to 176·0) Male718 679 ( 621 097 to 826 401) 5247·5 ( 4540·8 to 6009·4) 26 986 ( 23 379 to 30 992) 253·4 ( 214·8 to 291·8) 1 218 371 ( 1 091 596 to 1 348 440) 3295·7 ( 2949·8 to 3650·7) 53 491 ( 46 734 to 60 346) 162·1 ( 140·5 to 183·4) High body-mass indexBoth sexes710 771 ( 443 039 to 990 856) 2419·6 ( 1497·6 to 3414·7) 21 127 ( 12 854 to 30 040) 89·2 ( 52·9 to 131·7) 1 989 457 ( 1 441 100 to 2 561 406) 2580·9 ( 1845·1 to 3337·3) 61 415 ( 43 342 to 81 358) 91·7 ( 63·9 to 122·1) Female357 549 ( 236 964 to 480 587) 2589·6 ( 1695·4 to 3516·8) 10 693 ( 6968 to 14 654) 96·7 ( 60·6 to 137·2) 952 359 ( 710 774 to 1 205 407) 2545·9 ( 1886·3 to 3238·4) 30 603 ( 22 263 to 39 710) 96·1 ( 68·5 to 125·6) Male353 223 ( 200 530 to 523 534) 2248·7 ( 1265·1 to 3376·4) 10 433 ( 5811 to 15 739) 80·7 ( 43·5 to 125·8) 1 037 098 ( 712 749 to 1 364 782) 2617·7 ( 1778·2 to 3468·9) 30 812 ( 20 622 to 42 064) 88·1 ( 57·9 to 121·5) Low bone mineral densityBoth sexes71 668 ( 57 602 to 82 246) 261·0 ( 211·0 to 300·6) 1828 ( 1428 to 2073) 7·8 ( 6·3 to 8·9) 117 725 ( 96 750 to 137 753) 154·0 ( 126·9 to 180·5) 3048 ( 2586 to 3396) 4·4 ( 3·8 to 5) Female21 117 ( 17 352 to 24 514) 173·4 ( 142·0 to 202·0) 506 ( 413 to 584) 5·1 ( 4·1 to 6·2) 41 294 ( 33 393 to 49 855) 114·7 ( 92·9 to 138·5) 1018 ( 848 to 1144) 3·2 ( 2·7 to 3·7) Male50 550 ( 39 161 to 58 053) 341·3 ( 265·0 to 391·0) 1322 ( 967 to 1515) 10·3 ( 7·9 to 11·7) 76 431 ( 63 055 to 88 118) 193·0 ( 159·3 to 224·0) 2030 ( 1715 to 2333) 5·6 ( 4·7 to 6·5) Kidney dysfunctionBoth sexes445 178 ( 387 847 to 502 678) 1596·7 ( 1377·8 to 1837·6) 15 111 ( 12 902 to 17 507) 78·4 ( 65 to 93·1) 790 836 ( 692 731 to 897 947) 1127·2 ( 981·1 to 1282·7) 35 987 ( 30 559 to 41 889) 58·2 ( 48·8 to 68·1) Female200 663 ( 176 741 to 226 572) 1502·4 ( 1297·0 to 1733·1) 6868 ( 5843 to 7973) 75·1 ( 61·5 to 89·7) 368 995 ( 321 289 to 415 886) 1077·5 ( 933·4 to 1226·1) 17 356 ( 14 522 to 20 245) 58·2 ( 48 to 68·7) Male244 514 ( 208 327 to 281 379) 1673·4 ( 1419·8 to 1941·1) 8242 ( 6922 to 9598) 80·8 ( 66·8 to 96·5) 421 841 ( 367 827 to 483 023) 1179·4 ( 1023·7 to 1351·6) 18 631 ( 15 793 to 21 799) 58·4 ( 49·0 to 68·8) Data in parentheses are 95% CIs. DALYs=disability-adjusted life-years. Open table in a new tab Table 2All-age percentage change between 1990 and 2019, by sexDALYsDeathNumberRateNumberRateAll risk factorsBoth sexes−16·8% ( −28·0 to −5·2) −46·4% ( −51·2 to −42·0) 43·8% ( 29·8 to 56·4) −37·9% ( −42·0 to −34·8) Female−18·2% ( −30·5 to −5·5) −46·0% ( −51·6 to −41·0) 50·8% ( 33·2 to 65·3) −35·1% ( −39·8 to −30·9) Male−15·9% ( −27·1 to −4·3) −46·1% ( −51·2 to −41·2) 38·9% ( 25·2 to 52·5) −39·4% ( −43·6 to −35·1) Environmental and occupational risksOverallBoth sexes−9·3% ( −22·9 to 3·5) −49·3% ( −54·4 to −45·3) 46·7% ( 29·8 to 59·5) −41·8% ( −46·1 to −38·1) Female−13·7% ( −28·2 to 1·0) −49·2% ( −54·8 to −44·3) 55·3% ( 36·8 to 70·9) −39·2% ( −44·3 to −34·0) Male−6·6% ( −19·8 to 5·9) −48·7% ( −54·4 to − 43·6) 41·1% ( 23·5 to 55·2) −42·8% ( −48·1 to −38·1) Unsafe water, sanitation, and handwashingBoth sexes−72·9% ( −82·4 to −60·4) −72·7% ( −81·7 to − 61·1) −79·9% ( −86·9 to − 70·6) −82·5% ( −87·3 to − 76·9) Female−72·7% ( −83·0 to −58·9) −72·5% ( −82·1 to − 59·3) −80·7% ( −88·3 to − 69·5) −83·1% ( −88·4 to − 75·1) Male−73·0% ( −82·8 to −59·9) −72·7% ( −82·1 to −60·8) −79·1% ( −86·5 to −67·8) −81·5% ( −86·9 to −75·4) Air pollutionBoth sexes−10·0% ( −24·1 to 3·6) −49·9% ( −55·0 to −45·3) 41·8% ( 26·6 to 54·2) −43·7% ( −48·2 to −39·6) Female−9·5% ( −24·5 to 6·5) −49·2% ( −54·8 to −44·0) 50·2% ( 33·9 to 65·6) −41·5% ( −46·9 to −35·1) Male−10·4% ( −24·8 to 3·9) −49·7% ( −55·9 to −44·3) 36·1% ( 19·3 to 50·9) −44·7% ( −50·4 to −39·6) Non-optimal temperatureBoth sexes15·5% ( −13·5 to 44·0) −45·2% ( −52·7 to −39·9) 107·4% ( 78·4 to 129·2) −32·7% ( −38·6 to −27·3) Female7·9% ( −18·4 to 34·3) −45·3% ( −52·9 to −39·6) 110·8% ( 82·0 to 133·9) −29·7% ( −35·8 to −22·8) Male22·8% ( −10·8 to 57·9) −44·3% ( −53·0 to −37·5) 104·5% ( 73·4 to 133·2) −34·5% ( −41·4 to −28·3) Other environmental risksBoth sexes24·1% ( 9·7 to 38·4) −48·2% ( −53·7 to −43·4) 84·1% ( 57·8 to 108·1) −37·3% ( −44·4 to −30·6) Female33·2% ( 13·0 to 52·1) −46·1% ( −53·3 to − 39·4) 107·6% ( 72·1 to 140·8) −33·9% ( −44·2 to − 24·2) Male19·8% ( 5·9 to 34·2) −48·2% ( −53·9 to − 42·5) 72·5% ( 48·0 to 96·5) −38·7% ( −45·5 to − 31·4) Occupational risksBoth sexes42·9% ( 21·6 to 68·7) −36·3% ( −44·8 to − 26·0) 30·2% ( 4·6 to 65·2) −41·6% ( −51·9 to − 28·5) Female160·2% ( 108·8 to 227·7) 3·2% ( −17·0 to 28·0) 121·7% ( 73·6 to 199·6) −20·3% ( −37·7 to 11·3) Male34·4% ( 13·4 to 60·7) −38·7% ( −47·4 to −28·0) 27·0% ( 1·5 to 62·3) −42·8% ( −53·0 to −29·3) Behavioural risksOverallBoth sexes−41·4% ( −50·2 to −31·0) −56·7% ( −61·6 to −51·8) 2·8% ( −9·4 to 15·6) −47·4% ( −51·0 to −43·9) Female−48·4% ( −57·4 to −38·2) −59·3% ( −64·9 to −53·9) −4·0% ( −17·4 to 9·7) −47·8% ( −52·0 to −43·3) Male−36·6% ( −46·2 to −25·7) −54·5% ( −59·7 to −49·3) 7·1% ( −5·8 to 19·9) −46·8% ( −51·2 to −42·5) Child and maternal malnutritionBoth sexes−84·5% ( −88·4 to −80·0) −80·9% ( −85·6 to −75·3) −87·9% ( −91·4 to −83·7) −84·2% ( −88·7 to −78·8) Female−84·0% ( −87·9 to −79·1) −80·5% ( −85·3 to −74·7) −88·1% ( −91·5 to −83·9) −84·4% ( −88·7 to −78·9) Male−84·9% ( −89·0 to −80·2) −81·2% ( −86·3 to −75·5) −87·8% ( −91·5 to −83·5) −84% ( −88·9 to −78·5) Tobacco useBoth sexes40·7% ( 27·0 to 55·5) −42·2% ( −46·9 to − 37·1) 58·1% ( 45·4 to 73·4) −41·4% ( −46·1 to − 36·2) Female29·7% ( 7·0 to 57·9) −42·5% ( −51·7 to − 31·9) 58·5% ( 32·4 to 89·8) −40·6% ( −50·3 to − 29·0) Male44·1% ( 30·8 to 59·9) −40·9% ( −45·6 to − 35·1) 58·0% ( 43·4 to 75·5) −41·7% ( −46·9 to − 35·6) Alcohol useBoth sexes178·9% ( 128·1 to 251·6) 27·0% ( 3·6 to 59·5) 255·5% ( 167·7 to 389·3) 36·7% ( 2·7 to 89·6) Female118·0% ( 86·3 to 165·4) −0·7% ( −17·9 to 22·6) 169·6% ( 92·1 to 294·2) −2·8% ( −34·7 to 49·7) Male194·8% ( 134·7 to 281·1) 36·4% ( 8·1 to 76·0) 275·0% ( 176 to 427·9) 49·5% ( 10·9 to 106·7) Drug useBoth sexes158·9% ( 139·6 to 182·4) 28·2% ( 18·8 to 39·4) 204·8% ( 166·4 to 255·2) 28·3% ( 10·7 to 50·1) Female107·3% ( 87·8 to 131·2) 7·1% ( −2·2 to 17·3) 149·1% ( 107·3 to 204·5) 6·5% ( −11·5 to 29·1) Male179·9% ( 155·3 to 211·3) 37·6% ( 25·6 to 52·9) 220·7% ( 175·8 to 282·2) 36·9% ( 16·5 to 62·7) Dietary risksBoth sexes46·7% ( 32·3 to 59·2) −47·5% ( −52·3 to −43·3) 72·8% ( 56·9 to 87·6) −45·3% ( −49·8 to −40·7) Female58·7% ( 41·9 to 76·6) −45·6% ( −51·1 to −39·6) 90·9% ( 71·0 to 114·1) −41·8% ( −47·7 to −33·9) Male40·1% ( 25·1 to 55·1) −47·9% ( −53·4 to − 42·6) 61·6% ( 43·3 to 78·1) −47·0% ( −52·6 to −41·8) Intimate partner violenceFemale113·0% ( 90·3 to 135·0) 5·4% ( 1·6 to 15·6) 125·4% ( 84·9 to 186·9) 19·2% ( −1·4 to 45·1) Childhood sexual abuse and bullyingBoth sexes56·6% ( 35·1 to 80·5) 18·8% ( 8·8 to 27·9) 57·4% ( 28·4 to 127·1) −40·0% ( −50·9 to −13·5) Female61·9% ( 38·5 to 88·1) 24·1% ( 10·7 to 38·8) 4·4% ( −11·5 to 22·2) −51·8% ( −58·4 to −43·9) Male54·1% ( 31·4 to 82·0) 16·3% ( 5·9 to 28·1) 62·5% ( 30·2 to 141·8) −38·0% ( −49·9 to −8·8) Unsafe sexBoth sexes155·2% ( 112·8 to 220·2) −2·0% ( −18·4 to 23·5) 165·5% ( 111·6 to 256·5) −12·3% ( −33·3 to 13·8) Female115·6% ( 82·5 to 173·1) −19·4% ( −32·4 to 2·5) 125·9% ( 81·5 to 197·2) −23·5% ( −41·5 to −1·2) Male466·7% ( 273·0 to 759·9) 168·9% ( 84·3 to 298·8) 1849·5% ( 1034·1 to 3769·0) 569·4% ( 323·1 to 1055·1) Low physical activityBoth sexes131·9% ( 93·3 to 216·6) −26·0% ( −35·4 to −6·4) 163·1% ( 122·5 to 232·5) −30·4% ( −36·7 to −19·9) Female163·8% ( 118·9 to 244·9) −19·5% ( −30·8 to 1·1) 185·2% ( 141·1 to 252·1) −24·2% ( −32·9 to −9·9) Male107·5% ( 73·3 to 190·1) −30·6% ( −39·7 to −10·9) 144·1% ( 103·2 to 232·1) −34·8% ( −41·5 to −24·0) Metabolic risksBoth sexes98·3% ( 84·1 to 112·1) −27·9% ( −33·3 to − 23·3) 126·9% ( 108·2 to 142·4) −29·6% ( −34·6 to − 25·2) Female114·8% ( 96·6 to 132·6) −25·0% ( −31·4 to − 19·1) 147·2% ( 123·5 to 166·8) −25·6% ( −31·9 to − 19·6) Male86·7% ( 70·4 to 102·6) −29·3% ( −35·2 to − 23·6) 111·5% ( 93·1 to 129·7) −31·7% ( −37·2 to − 26·3) High fasting plasma glucoseBoth sexes261·4% ( 225·3 to 304·3) 26·3% ( 14·9 to 39·2) 306·8% ( 248·4 to 385·9) 19·9% ( 7·9 to 35·2) Female310·7% ( 264·6 to 359·7) 36·7% ( 22·5 to 53·4) 358·0% ( 289·0 to 439·8) 31·3% ( 14·8 to 52·5) Male224·7% ( 186·8 to 273·0) 19·2% ( 7·5 to 33·8) 266·7% ( 208·5 to 350·9) 11·9% ( −1·4 to 28·5) High LDL cholesterolBoth sexes41·8% ( 24·0 to 56·8) −49·3% ( −54·7 to −45·1) 73·4% ( 47·0 to 99·3) −45·1% ( −50·7 to −40·3) Female46·4% ( 24·8 to 66·2) −49·1% ( −55·1 to −43·1) 88·7% ( 59·0 to 121·1) −41·9% ( −48·6 to −34) Male39·1% ( 22·0 to 55·0) −48·6% ( −54·3 to −43·5) 63·2% ( 38·3 to 89·5) −46·5% ( −53 to −41·2) High systolic blood pressureBoth sexes76·4% ( 58·3 to 90·0) −38·1% ( −43·8 to −33·8) 109·7% ( 85·0 to 127·1) −35·6% ( −42·3 to −31·3) Female86·6% ( 61·2 to 105·8) −37·7% ( −45·8 to −32·0) 124·8% ( 90·5 to 148·5) −33·3% ( −43·2 to −26·6) Male69·5% ( 52·9 to 86) −37·2% ( −42·4 to − 31·8) 98·2% ( 77·6 to 119·5) −36% ( −41·2 to −30·6) High body-mass indexBoth sexes179·9% ( 136·4 to 256·3) 6·7% ( −9·5 to 35·6) 190·7% ( 148·0 to 270·2) 2·8% ( −13·1 to 32·6) Female166·4% ( 127·7 to 229·1) −1·7% ( −15·3 to 22·5) 186·2% ( 141·0 to 261·6) −0·7% ( −16·6 to 28·3) Male193·6% ( 137·6 to 323·4) 16·4% ( −4·9 to 68·8) 195·3% ( 141·1 to 315·7) 9·1% ( −10·8 to 57·2) Low bone mineral densityBoth sexes64·3% ( 50·6 to 89·1) −41·0% ( −45·7 to −33·2) 66·8% ( 49·7 to 102·0) −43·3% ( −48·9 to −32·5) Female95·5% ( 79·3 to 120·0) −33·8% ( −39·7 to −24·3) 101·2% ( 73·0 to 162·8) −37·1% ( −47·5 to −14·1) Male51·2% ( 36·3 to 85·8) −43·4% ( −48·7 to −32·1) 53·6% ( 35·0 to 101·3) −45·2% ( −51·3 to −31·8) Kidney dysfunctionBoth sexes77·6% ( 64·2 to 91·3) −29·4% ( −33·9 to −24·7) 138·2% ( 116·9 to 159·1) −25·8% ( −31·7 to −20·5) Female83·9% ( 69·6 to 100·3) −28·3% ( −33·9 to −22) 152·7% ( 126·4 to 180·9) −22·4% ( −30·6 to −12·9) Male72·5% ( 57·0 to 90·0) −29·5% ( −35·0 to −24·0) 126·0% ( 103·9 to 148·1) −27·8% ( −33·7 to −22) Data in parentheses are 95% CIs. DALYs=disability-adjusted life-years. Open table in a new tab
Data in parentheses are 95% CIs. DALYs=disability-adjusted life-years.
Data in parentheses are 95% CIs. DALYs=disability-adjusted life-years.
These patterns showed that environmental risk factors are primarily dependent on socioeconomic development. An example is unsafe water and sanitation, with the highest burden in a deprived province—Sistan and Baluchistan—and the lowest burden in the capital, Tehran. Results show a slight peak in the burden attributable to unsafe water and sanitation and mortality caused by enteric infections in 1990, followed by a sharp decline until 2019, which coincides with the expansion of the piped water and sewerage network.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar Another example is the Iran Gas Trunk line associated with decreased household air pollution caused by using solid fuels for cooking and heating.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar Therefore, supporting development in deprived regions could prevent exposure to harmful environmental risks.
The emergence of NCDs is a new challenge to Iranian health care.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar In 2019, 15·5 million ( 95% UI 13·2–18·1) DALYs were caused by NCDs, 44·2% more than in 1990, whereas the age-standardised DALY rate of NCDs substantially decreased by 25·9% ( appendix p 125). Ischaemic heart disease was the leading cause of age-standardised DALY rates in 1990 and 2019 ( figure 3; appendix p 45). The next leading causes were stroke, diabetes, lower back pain, and depressive disorders at the national level and in most provinces in 2019, with the largest 30-year change observed for diabetes, a nearly two-fold increase. Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ( age-standardised DALY rate 517·2 per 100 000 people, 471·0–560·8) and asthma ( 232·3 per 100 000, 185·0–299·3), are main WHO targets for Sustainable Development Goals ( SDGs; target 3.4), with percentage changes of −7·0% and −56·1% from 1990 to 2019, respectively. The age-standardised death rate of most neoplasms showed a mixed pattern, with stomach ( 16·2, 95% UI 14·9–17·4), tracheal, bronchus, and lung ( 12·9, 11·9–13·9), colorectal ( 9·3, 8·5–10·1), and prostate ( 6·5, 4·9–7·4) cancers occupying the leading ranks in 2019 ( appendix p 125).Figure 3Ranking of age-standardised rates of disability-adjusted life-years caused by level 3 non-communicable diseases at national and subnational levels, 2019View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
The pattern of all-cause health burden attributable to risk factors changed in favour of metabolic risk factors from 1990 to 2019 ( appendix p 53–55). We estimate that 31·7% of total DALYs caused by NCDs ( 6·3 million, 95% UI 5·7–6·9) were attributable to at least one risk factor in 2019, including 22·0% attributable to metabolic ( 4·4 million, 4·0–4·8), 17·1% to behavioural ( 3·4 million, 3·0–3·7), and 9·3% to environmental and occupational ( 1·9 million, 1·7–2·1) risks. Implementation of the PHC system, Health Transformation Plan, and ease of access to screening programmes for cancer and metabolic disorders are believed to be the lower-stream sources of the changing trend of NCDs at the health-provider level,39Mohammadi E Aminorroaya A Fattahi N et al.Epidemiologic pattern of cancers in Iran; current knowledge and future perspective.J Diabet Metab Disord. 2021; 20: 825-829Google Scholar which is in line with the upper-stream developments in the economy, literacy, and infrastructure, among other areas. Variability at the subnational level of modified diet, urbanisation, sedentary lifestyle, and ageing of the population can be regarded as the cause of geographical disparities in NCDs.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 40UNWorld urbanization prospects: the 2014 revision, highlights. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division UN, 2014https: //www.un.org/en/development/desa/publications/2014-revision-world-urbanization-prospects.html #: ~: text=The% 202014% 20revision% 20of% 20the, population% 20between% 202014% 20and% 202050Date accessed: May 25, 2021Google Scholar
In 2019, 326 508 Iranians ( 95% UI 318 268–335 734) died from NCDs, 88·0% more than in 1990 ( appendix p 125). The age-standardised YLL rate of NCDs significantly declined by 41·3%, whereas the age-standardised YLD rate remained statistically stable with a 1·4% increase. This observation implies that the share of DALYs consisting of YLDs increased compared with the share of YLLs in the past three decades. The number of premature ( 30–70 years of age) deaths caused by four main NCDs ( neoplasms, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, and diabetes) was 66 818 ( 52·7% of all-age mortality caused by NCDs) in 1990 and reached 100 893 ( 37·1%) in 2019. According to SDGs target 3.4, the share of premature deaths should reach 11·6% in 2025 in Iran, which might not be attainable with the current trend. As the top-ranked NCD, cardiovascular diseases caused about 54·6% of premature deaths in 2019. The unconditional probability of death ( UPoD) has been estimated to be constantly decreasing in the past three decades and reached 14·6% in 2019 for both sexes ( figure 4). Additionally, UPoD was estimated to be 1·5 times higher among male individuals, but both sexes showed a similar decreasing trend. The highest UPoD was estimated in the Golestan province with 21·6% probability, compared with 9·1% in Tehran ( the lowest UPoD).Figure 4Time trend of the unconditional probability of death at national and subnational levels, 1990–2019View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
Primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention should be adopted to tackle the challenge of NCDs in Iran. Health policy makers should implement multisectoral approaches to address the high prevalence of modifiable cardiovascular risk factors, including obesity and overweight ( 60%),41Mahdavi M Parsaeian M Mohajer B et al.Insight into blood pressure targets for universal coverage of hypertension services in Iran: the 2017 ACC/AHA versus JNC 8 hypertension guidelines.BMC Public Health. 2020; 20: 1-9Google Scholar dyslipidaemia ( 80%),42Aryan Z Mahmoudi N Sheidaei A et al.The prevalence, awareness, and treatment of lipid abnormalities in Iranian adults: surveillance of risk factors of noncommunicable diseases in Iran 2016.J Clin Lipid. 2018; 12: 1471-1481Google Scholar and hypertension ( 53%) 37Naddafi K Hassanvand MS Yunesian M et al.Health impact assessment of air pollution in megacity of Tehran, Iran.Iran J Environ Health Sci Eng. 2012; 9: 28Google Scholar in Iranian adults. Since the early 2000s, lifesaving treatments for NCDs, such as primary percutaneous coronary intervention, fibrinolytic therapy, and emergency surgeries, became more extensively available with increasing hospital bed density and adoption of modern facilities.43Abdi S Haji Aghajani M Janbabaei G et al.24/7 primary percutaneous coronary intervention as a national program.Crit Pathw Cardiol. 2021; 20: 81-87Google Scholar, 44Rezaei S Bazyar M Fallah R Chavehpour Y Homaie Rad E Assessment of need and access to physician and hospital beds: a cross sectional province based study in Iran.Shiraz E-Med J. 2015; 16e26351Google Scholar Although the prevention of deaths is an important target, averting deaths can lead to higher rates of chronic conditions compared with previous time periods because of an ageing population, such as heart failure after an acute coronary syndrome, which cause disability and necessitate appropriate rehabilitation centres.
Although the Iranian health-care system appears to be alleviating the risks of NCDs, this does not downgrade the importance of control measures for NCDs.45Rahbar M Ahmadi M Lessons learnt from the model of instructional system for training community health workers in rural health houses of iran.Iran Red Cres Med J. 2015; 17e2145Google Scholar Subnational geographical dissimilarity indicates uneven distribution of health system goods and urgent need for action. The PHC network, the 2004 Universal Rural Health Insurance, and the 2014 Health Transformation Plan partially contributed to resolving these disparities by easing accessibility and affordability of health-care services in underserved locations.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 46Farzadfar F Murray CJL Gakidou E et al.Effectiveness of diabetes and hypertension management by rural primary health-care workers ( Behvarz workers) in Iran: a nationally representative observational study.Lancet. 2012; 379: 47-54Google Scholar The estimated epidemiological measures indicate that health policies have been effective in modifying the burden of NCDs, but improvements have remained trivial in many sectors and geographical areas.
Mental disorders accounted for 2295·8 ( 95% UI 1702·2–3033·6) of age-standardised DALYs per 100 000 people and substance-use disorders accounted for 399·9 ( 324·3–481·3) age-standardised DALYs per 100 000 in 2019, with 1·8% and 20·1% increases, respectively, compared with 1990 ( appendix pp 46, 125). These disorders are responsible for an increasing percentage of total DALYs, up from 0·7% in 1990 to 1·9% in 2019 ( a 193·6% increase). Depressive disorders ( 890·3, 605·8–1247·8), anxiety disorders ( 695·8, 483·3–954·7), and bipolar disorder ( 175·8, 107·9–270·0) were the mental conditions that most contributed to the age-standardised DALY rate in 2019. Depressive disorders had a particularly notable change with a 104·4% increase in burden. At the subnational level, the Fars province always had the greatest age-standardised DALY rate of mental disorders, whereas east Azarbayejan had the lowest rate during most of the study period ( appendix p 152). Opioid use was the top cause of substance -use disorders, with an estimated 269 294 DALYs [ 212 575–333 596 ] in 2019 and a 146·4% increase. The trend of substance use is increasing all around the country, with no convergence or divergence. Hamadan, Tehran, and Sistan and Baluchistan were found to be the leading provinces by age-standardised DALYs rate; however, Kermanshah recorded an increasing trend from 1990 and reached a peak in 2007, followed by a decrease.
Access to mental health services did not grow sufficiently in response to the growing burden of mental and substance-use disorders. Concerns about psychological issues were highlighted after the end of the Iraq–Iran war as the Iranian Mental Health Survey demonstrated that the prevalence of psychiatric disorders in Iran is relatively high.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 47Sharifi V Amin-Esmaeili M Hajebi A et al.Twelve-month prevalence and correlates of psychiatric disorders in Iran: the Iranian Mental Health Survey, 2011.Arch Iran Med. 2015; 18: 76-84Google Scholar In addition, mental health awareness and services remain inadequate with two-thirds of Iranians diagnosed with a mental health disorder not receiving any care and treatment options for substance-use disorders.48Amin-Esmaeili M Rahimi-Movaghar A Sharifi V et al.Epidemiology of illicit drug use disorders in Iran: prevalence, correlates, comorbidity and service utilization results from the Iranian Mental Health Survey.Addiction. 2016; 111: 1836-1847Google Scholar, 49Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar Integration of mental health services into the PHC system by training Behvarzes ( community health workers in Iran) from 1990 resulted in modest improvement of attitudes, knowledge, and satisfaction of these practitioners and the general population towards mental health and psychological conditions.50Shariat SV Mansouri N Gharraee B Bolhari J Yousefi Nourai R Rahimi Movaghar A Attitude, knowledge, and satisfaction of health personnel and general population about the program of integration of mental health in PHC in Iran: systematic review.Iran J Psych Clin Psych. 2011; 17: 85-98Google Scholar These integrated services were not systematically evaluated for their effectiveness or revisited considering they were made mainstream within community health services since the start of our study period and because of the multifactorial dynamic of mental disorders. Furthermore, actions and efforts should be revisited continuously and weighted on the basis of the burden of mental disorders at national and subnational levels.
Road injuries climbed to the second rank by DALY rates from 1990 to 2019 ( 1302·1 per 100 000, 95% UI 1147·4–1488·3) and caused 21 122 deaths ( 95% UI 18 110–24 648) in 2019. DALY and death age-standardised rates substantially decreased by around 60% in this period, with a slightly steeper decline between 2002 and 2015. The reduction in the DALY rate might be associated with increased GDP per person, given the reverse-U-shaped association between this index and the burden of transport injuries.51Kopits E Cropper M Traffic fatalities and economic growth.Acc Anal Prev. 2005; 37: 169-178Google Scholar, 52Iwata K The relationship between traffic accidents and economic growth in China.Econ Bull. 2010; 30: 3306-3314Google Scholar Therefore, the minimal reduction in DALYs from road injuries might be related to the impact of sanctions on GDP.20The World BankCurrent health expenditure per capita, PPP ( current international $) —Iran, Islamic Rep.https: //data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.PP.CD? locations=IRDate: 2021Date accessed: February 18, 2021Google Scholar It is noteworthy that, although Iran managed road injury mortality and decreased DALYs, the age-standardised rate of YLDs reduced by 41·0%, and the share of YLDs out of DALYs increased ( appendix p 47).
The highest number of new cases of road injuries, 77 143 ( 95% UI 63 939–91 908), occurred in Tehran province in 2019. Tehran had the lowest ( 303·8, 95% UI 216·9–667·2) age-standardised DALY rates and Sistan and Baluchistan provinces the highest ( 2286·8, 1978·1–2627·9) age-standardised DALY rates in 2019. All of the subnational DALY rates converged in this period. Qom, Khorasan-e-Razavi, and Zanjan recorded the greatest declines in age-standardised DALY rates, by 70%, and Tehran had one of the lowest percentage changes in this regard ( appendix p 152).
Policies to control road traffic injuries showed many shortcomings in Iran, pointing to the need for more effective measures.53Azmin M Jafari A Rezaei N et al.An approach towards reducing road traffic injuries and improving public health through big data telematics: a randomised controlled trial protocol.Arch Iran Med. 2018; 21: 495-501Google Scholar The low prevalence of seatbelt ( about 75%) and helmet use ( about 14%) in the Iranian population is a major contributor to road traffic injuries.54Fathollahi S Saeedi Moghaddam S Rezaei N et al.Prevalence of behavioural risk factors for road-traffic injuries among the Iranian population: findings from STEPs 2016.Int J Epidemiol. 2019; 48: 1187-1196Google Scholar Despite improvement in road infrastructure, low-quality domestic vehicles along with poor driving behaviours still contribute to this burden.55Mohajer B Azmin M Mohebi F Ahmadi N Farzadfar F Low-quality domestic automobiles continue to threaten lives in Iran: economic instability as the potential contributor.Arch Iran Med. 2020; 23: 764-765Google Scholar Although control measures by the traffic police contributed to this,56Soori H Royanian M Zali AR Movahedinejad A Road traffic injuries in Iran: the role of interventions implemented by traffic police.Traffic Inj Prev. 2009; 10: 375-378Google Scholar limitations in the widespread implementation of these measures highlight the importance of novel approaches such as telematics.53Azmin M Jafari A Rezaei N et al.An approach towards reducing road traffic injuries and improving public health through big data telematics: a randomised controlled trial protocol.Arch Iran Med. 2018; 21: 495-501Google Scholar Towards this objective, the national action plan for NCD Prevention and Control provided by the Iranian Non-Communicable Diseases Committee ( INCDC) was developed in 2015, with a specific target of a 20% relative reduction in the mortality rate caused by traffic injuries by 2025, which needs a multisectoral approach.57Peykari N Hashemi H Dinarvand R et al.National action plan for non-communicable diseases prevention and control in Iran; a response to emerging epidemic.J Diabet Metab Dis. 2017; 16: 1-7Google Scholar
Exploring the impacts of the 2011 sanctions and two major health sector reforms in 2004 ( the Universal Rural Health Insurance) and 2014 ( the Health Transformation Plan) revealed that NCD deaths had a smaller decreasing slope during the 5 years after the beginning of sanctions in 2011 compared with the previous and following periods. Among NCDs, neoplasms showed the most substantial change in this investigation ( appendix p 1176). Concerning NCD deaths, the regression model showed that deaths from NCDs had a significant decreasing effect on temporal changes after 2004 ( coefficient −10·58, SE 0·97; p < 0·0001) and a significant increasing effect on temporal changes after 2011 ( coefficient 11·21, SE 2·25; p=0·0001; appendix p 1177). In the case of U5MR, the model showed a mild increase in mortality after the 2004 health-care transformation ( coefficient 0·64, SE 0·21; p=0·013), and the effects of other changes were not statistically significant ( appendix p 1178). Overall, among these major changes, the 2011 sanctions had the most remarkable and detrimental impact on the health of Iranians, especially regarding deaths caused by NCDs ( figure 5).Figure 5Timeline of major events in Iranian history from 1990 to 2019Show full captionDALY=disability-adjusted life-years. PHC=primary health care.View Large Image Figure ViewerDownload Hi-res image Download ( PPT)
DALY=disability-adjusted life-years. PHC=primary health care.
The neutral effect of the 2004 reform might be attributed to the fact that this strategy was not planned to address NCDs. Although there were some guidelines for managing NCDs and their risk factors, integrating multifactorial approaches to control NCDs was not done until the 2014 reform. Notably, the 2004 reform aimed to improve children's health; nevertheless, with Behvarzes in health houses, improved vaccination coverage and nutrition messaging had already achieved great strides in improving children's health. Therefore, the 2004 reform was not able to further decrease U5MR. The 2011 sanctions might have affected deaths of Iranians caused by NCDs, especially neoplasms, through decreasing timely diagnosis and reducing accessibility of modern pharmacological interventions.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar, 11Aminorroaya A Fattahi N Azadnajafabad S et al.Burden of non-communicable diseases in Iran: past, present, and future.J Diabetes Metab Disord. 2020; ( published online Oct 27.) https: //doi.org/10.1007/s40200-020-00669-zGoogle Scholar The wide-ranging impacts of sanctions constrained drug supplies and non-pharmaceutical resources necessary for health-care services.58Baradaran-Seyed Z Majdzadeh R Economic sanctions strangle Iranians ' health, not just drug supply.Lancet. 2013; 3811626Google Scholar, 59Danaei G Harirchi I Sajadi HS Yahyaei F Majdzadeh R The harsh effects of sanctions on Iranian health.Lancet. 2019; 394: 468-469Google Scholar The national pursuit of UHC coverage was dampened by the sanctions, leaving some health policy reforms underfunded or ineffective.60Doshmangir L Bazyar M Majdzadeh R Takian A So near, so far: four decades of health policy reforms in Iran, achievements and challenges.Arch Iran Med. 2019; 22: 592-605Google Scholar We did not capture alleviation in the burden of disease following the 2014 reform, given that it aimed to enhance health infrastructure and improve health-care density, which needs more time to affect the health-care system. It should be noted that the transformation plan expanded hospital and intensive care unit beds, which helped the Iranian health-care system better cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition to other capacities of the health system.61Azadnajafabad S Saeedi Moghaddam S Rezaei N et al.A report on statistics of an online self-screening platform for COVID-19 and its effectiveness in Iran.Int J Health Policy Manag. 2021; ( published online Jan 16.) DOI:10.34172/ijhpm.2020.252Google Scholar This expansion of health-care-system infrastructures should also be used for prevention. Although the 2014 reform might be a step towards UHC, the absence of a clear and sufficient budget line is an important drawback.1Danaei G Farzadfar F Kelishadi R et al.Iran in transition.Lancet. 2019; 393: 1984-2005Google Scholar
Altogether, the results of this study should be translated into practical actions and strategies. National and international agencies and policy makers should be prompted and informed that sanctions indirectly had major adverse effects on the health of Iranians by diminishing access to quality care. Delayed or inaccessible treatment exacerbated health burdens, especially in those with cancers. Although sanctions do not include health and medical issues, their effects on financial transactions, such as those required for the importation of medicines, have had unfavourable consequences, as represented in this study.
Future policies in the health sector should be prioritised to integrate health-care services to address NCDs, especially cardiovascular diseases, and modifiable risk factors, into the existing health-care infrastructure, such as the Iranian Package of Essential NCD Interventions for primary health care. Because the PHC system is unable to manage NCDs alone, this issue needs an integrated intersectoral collaboration such as the INCDC. Examples in this regard are dietary improvements that require an alliance between the health sector and the food industry, and improvements in ambient air pollution in major cities that require cooperation to shift from using fossil fuels to cleaner sources of energy. Further, strategies should focus on providing integrated care to those with mental health and substance use disorders to combat their increasing and unmet burden. The concurrent HIV/AIDS epidemic and re-emergence of tuberculosis in Iran require continued prevention efforts such as the directly-observed therapy short course.
Regarding the existing health disparities among provinces, closing the health equity gaps in Iran needs a two-part approach of health sector policies and cross-government actions to effectively use all resources to address this concern.62WHOClosing the health equity gap: policy options and opportunities for action. World Health Organization, Geneva2013Google Scholar One of the major steps in resolving health disparities is monitoring health inequalities; that includes practical and continuous measurement and reporting of disparities, which is an essential step in low-income and middle-income countries that do not have adequate data sources.62WHOClosing the health equity gap: policy options and opportunities for action. World Health Organization, Geneva2013Google Scholar These disparities should encourage multisectoral policy making, collaboration, and resource allocation on the basis of affirmative action to resolve disparities through equal distribution of education, sanitation, nutrition, road infrastructure, and PHC across the country.63Di Cesare M Khang Y-H Asaria P et al.Inequalities in non-communicable diseases and effective responses.Lancet. 2013; 381: 585-597Google Scholar
Ultimately, the emergence of COVID-19 and its confluence with socioeconomic gaps, economic recession, and the heavy burden of NCDs in Iran could have direct and indirect effects on the care provided for major diseases and expand inequalities in the care provided.64Maani N Abdalla SM Galea S Avoiding a legacy of unequal non-communicable disease burden after the COVID-19 pandemic.Lancet Diabetes Endocrinol. 2021; 9: 133-135Google Scholar Therefore, careful evidence-based policies should be made to prevent the further adverse effects of COVID-19, which requires integrated collaboration and effort. Limitations of this study are presented in the appendix ( section 6).
A remarkable improvement in life expectancy has happened in the past three decades in Iran. The Iranian health-care system has successfully managed CMNNDs; however, it is encountering NCDs and injuries as its new challenges. In the study period, the Iranian health-care system has been more effective at averting deaths than managing morbidity and mental disorders, indicating an unmet need for rehabilitation centres and integration of mental health services into PHC. Environmental changes as developing risks threaten the population. Besides addressing the current challenges and subnational disparities, the Iranian health-care system must be more prepared for emerging diseases, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Farshad Farzadfar *, Mohsen Naghavi *, Sadaf G Sepanlou, Sahar Saeedi Moghaddam, William James Dangel, Nicole Davis Weaver, Arya Aminorroaya, Sina Azadnajafabad, Sogol Koolaji, Esmaeil Mohammadi, Negar Rezaei, Jaffar Abbas, Behzad Abbasi, Mitra Abbasifard, Mohsen Abbasi-Kangevari, Zeinab Abbasi-Kangevari, Hedayat Abbastabar, Amir Abdoli, Mohammad Abdollahi, Sina Abdollahzade, Hassan Abolhassani, Zahra Abrehdari-Tafreshi, Soodabeh Aghababaei, Bahman Ahadinezhad, Ali Ahmadi, Sepideh Ahmadi, Hamid Ahmadieh, Mohammad Esmaeil Akbari, Yousef Alimohamadi, Vahid Alipour, Hesam Alizade, Saba Alvand, Saeed Amini, Sohrab Amiri, Ali Arash Anoushirvani, Fereshteh Ansari, Jalal Arabloo, Morteza Arab-Zozani, Zahra Aryan, Armin Aryannejad, Mehran Asadi-Aliabadi, Ali A Asadi-Pooya, Zatollah Asemi, Samaneh Asgari, Saeed Asgary, Babak Asghari, Mohammad Asghari Jafarabadi, Elham Ashrafi, Zahra Atafar, Seyyed Shamsadin Athari, Abolfazl Avan, Abbas Azadmehr, Hiva Azami, Mohammadreza Azangou-Khyavy, Samad Azari, Amirhossein Azari Jafari, Ghasem Azarian, Alireza Badirzadeh, Elham Bahrami, Mohammad Amin Bahrami, Nastaran Barati, Mohsen Bayati, Gholamreza Bazmandegan, Masoud Behzadifar, Ali Bijani, Somayeh Bohlouli, Shiva Borzouei, Parnaz Daneshpajouhnejad, Abdollah Dargahi, Ahmad Daryani, Jalal Davoodi Lahijan, Mojtaba Didehdar, Shirin Djalalinia, Saeid Doaei, Fariba Dorostkar, Leila Doshmangir, Mohammadreza Edraki, Amir Emami, Babak Eshrati, Sharareh Eskandarieh, Firooz Esmaeilzadeh, Shahriar Faghani, Mahdi Fakhar, Hamid Reza Farpour, Hossein Farrokhpour, Majid Fasihi Harandi, Mohammad Fereidouni, Masoud Foroutan, Mansour Ghafourifard, Azin Ghamari, Seyyed-Hadi Ghamari, Ahmad Ghashghaee, Fariba Ghassemi, Ali Gholami, Asadollah Gholamian, Abdolmajid Gholizadeh, Salime Goharinezhad, Pouya Goleij, Mostafa Hadei, Nima Hafezi-Nejad, Sanam Hariri, Edris Hasanpoor, Hossein Hassanian-Moghaddam, Soheil Hassanipour, Hadi Hassankhani, Mohammad Heidari, Reza Heidari-Soureshjani, Mohammad Hoseini, Mohammad-Salar Hosseini, Mostafa Hosseini, Seyed Kianoosh Hosseini, Ali Hosseinzadeh, Mehdi Hosseinzadeh, Soodabeh Hoveidamanesh, Pooya Iranpour, Seyed Sina Naghibi Irvani, Jalil Jaafari, Roxana Jabbarinejad, Morteza Jafarinia, Hamed Jafari-Vayghan, Mohammad Ali Jahani, Nader Jahanmehr, Mahsa Jalili, Roksana Janghorban, Fatemeh Javanmardi, Farahnaz Joukar, Ali Kabir, Leila R Kalankesh, Rohollah Kalhor, Zahra Kamiab, Naser Kamyari, Behzad Karami Matin, Amirali Karimi, Salah Eddin Karimi, Ali Kazemi Karyani, Leila Keikavoosi-Arani, Maryam Keramati, Pedram Keshavarz, Mohammad Keykhaei, Ali Khaleghi, Mohammad Khammarnia, Javad Khanali, Maryam Khayamzadeh, Sajad Khosravi, Mina Khosravifar, Omid Khosravizadeh, Neda Kianipour, Ali-Asghar Kolahi, Amirhosein Maali, Mokhtar Mahdavi, Afshin Maleki, Mohammad-Reza Malekpour, Kamyar Mansori, Borhan Mansouri, Mohammad Ali Mansournia, Mohammad Reza Maracy, Abdoljalal Marjani, Sahar Masoudi, Seyedeh Zahra Masoumi, Hossein Masoumi-Asl, Mahsa Mayeli, Entezar Mehrabi Nasab, Fereshteh Mehri, Mohammad Miri, Seyyedmohammadsadeq Mirmoeeni, Hamed Mirzaei, Maryam Mirzaei, Roya Mirzaei, Ashraf Mohamadkhani, Heidar Mohammadi, Seyyede Momeneh Mohammadi, Shadieh Mohammadi, Abdollah Mohammadian-Hafshejani, Noushin Mohammadifard, Reza Mohammadpourhodki, Mohammad Mohseni, Amin Mokari, Sara Momtazmanesh, Abdolvahab Moradi, Masoud Moradi, Yousef Moradi, Mohammad Moradi-Joo, Farhad Moradpour, Maliheh Moradzadeh, Rahmatollah Moradzadeh, Abbas Mosapour, Shandiz Moslehi, Simin Mouodi, Mehdi Naderi, Homa Naderifar, Zhila Najafpour, Javad Nazari, Seyed Aria Nejadghaderi, Leila Nemati-Anaraki, Amin Reza Nikpoor, Marzieh Nojomi, Maryam Noori, Hasti Nouraei, Ali Nowroozi, Morteza Oladnabi, Fatemeh Pashazadeh Kan, Majid Pirestani, Meghdad Pirsaheb, Mohammadreza Pourahmadi, Hadis Pourchamani, Hadi Pourjafar, Akram Pourshams, Mohammad Rabiee, Navid Rabiee, Alireza Rafiei, Sima Rafiei, Fakher Rahim, Amir Masoud Rahmani, Sina Rashedi, Vahid Rashedi, Amirfarzan Rashidi, Mahsa Rashidi, Mohammad-Mahdi Rashidi, Ramin Ravangard, Reza Rawassizadeh, Iman Razeghian-Jahromi, Mohammad Sadegh Razeghinia, Sofia B Redford, Maryam Rezaei, Nazila Rezaei, Nima Rezaei, Saeid Rezaei, Hossein Rezaei Aliabadi, Mohsen Rezaeian, Mohammad Sadegh Rezai, Aziz Rezapour, Hossein Rezazadeh, Sahba Rezazadeh-Khadem, Morteza Rostamian, Ehsan Sadeghi, Erfan Sadeghi, Masoumeh Sadeghi, Reihaneh Sadeghian, Saeid Sadeghian, Hamid Safarpour, Mahdi Safdarian, Sare Safi, Maryam Sahebazzamani, Amirhossein Sahebkar, Mohammad Ali Sahraian, Sarvenaz Salahi, Payman Salamati, Hossein Samadi Kafil, Yaser Sarikhani, Maryam Sarkhosh, Arash Sarveazad, Maryam Seyed-Nezhad, Omid Shafaat, Zahra Shaghaghi, Saeed Shahabi, Sarvenaz Shahin, Elaheh Shaker, Saeed Shakiba, MohammadBagher Shamsi, Erfan Shamsoddin, Kiomars Sharafi, Sakineh Sharifian, Maryam Shaygan, Abbas Sheikhtaheri, Amir Shiani, Kiarash Shirbandi, Reza Shirkoohi, Parnian Shobeiri, Azad Shokri, Soraya Siabani, Ali Reza Sima, Ahmad Sofi-Mahmudi, Amin Soheili, Shahin Soltani, Mohammad Sadegh Soltani-Zangbar, Moslem Soofi, Seidamir Pasha Tabaeian, Mohammadreza Tabary, Alireza Tahamtan, Majid Taheri, Amir Taherkhani, Masih Tajdini, Hamed Tavolinejad, Arash Tehrani-Banihashemi, Amir Tiyuri, Seyed Abolfazl Tohidast, Alireza Vakilian, Sahel Valadan Tahbaz, Bay Vo, Seyed Hossein Yahyazadeh Jabbari, Vahid Yazdi-Feyzabadi, Zabihollah Yousefi, Taraneh Yousefinezhadi, Mazyar Zahir, Telma Zahirian Moghadam, Maryam Zamanian, Hamed Zandian, Alireza Zangeneh, Hadi Zarafshan, Fariba Zare, Ali Zare Dehnavi, Kourosh Zarea, Ahmad Zarei, Zahra Zareshahrabadi, Arash Ziapour, Sina Zoghi, Nizal Sarrafzadegan, Vafa Rahimi-Movaghar, Hamid Reza Jamshidi, Ali H Mokdad, Simon I Hay, Christopher J L Murray, Ardeshir Khosravi, Maziar Moradi-Lakeh, Mohsen Asadi-Lari, Reza Malekzadeh†, Bagher Larijani†.
Affiliations are listed in the appendix ( pp 1189–94).
For more detailed information about individual author contributions to the research, divided into the following categories, please see the appendix ( pp 1185–88): managing the estimation or publication process; writing the first draft of the manuscript; primary responsibility for applying analytical methods to produce estimates; primary responsibility for seeking, cataloguing, extracting, or cleaning data; designing or coding figures and tables; providing data or critical feedback on data sources; developing methods or computational machinery; providing critical feedback on methods or results; drafting the manuscript or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and managing the overall research enterprise.
This study follows the Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting. All data sources used in this analysis are found on the Global Health Data Exchange ( http: //ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-2019/data-input-sources), and related code is available at http: //ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-2019/code. Additional results from this study and the larger GBD 2019 analysis can be explored using our data visualisation tools at https: //vizhub.healthdata.org/gbd-compare.
MA-L reports leadership or fiduciary roles in a board, society, committee, or advocacy groups, paid or unpaid with International Affairs in the Ministry of Health, Iran as Director General, all outside the submitted work. SBor reports support for the present manuscript from medical writing. All other authors declare no competing interests.
ZAr would like to thank One Brave Idea, an initiative of the American Heart Association, AstraZeneca, and Verily, and would like to thank National Elites Foundation, Iran. HM-A would like to acknowledge the kind collaboration of provincial and district health centres and laboratory technicians in different provinces for their data collection.
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Understanding the changing health of the Iranian peopleThe Iranian people have suffered much. At the end of the 1980s, Iran emerged from a decade-long war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, experiencing the loss of at least 200 000 lives and massive economic damage.1 In 2006, international sanctions, imposed in response to Iran's nuclear programme, had inevitable consequences for health.2 Yet, despite these challenges, successive Iranian governments have undertaken two major health-system reforms. A new analysis in The Lancet by the Global Burden of Disease ( GBD) 2019 Iran Collaborators3 based on data from 1990 to 2019 from the GBD project investigated health trends during these complex times. Full-Text PDF | tech |
Holly Energy Partners, L.P. Announces Pricing of $ 400 Million of Senior Notes Due 2027 | DALLAS -- ( BUSINESS WIRE) -- Holly Energy Partners, L.P. ( NYSE: HEP) ( the “ Partnership ” or “ HEP ”) announced today that it and its wholly owned subsidiary, Holly Energy Finance Corp. ( together with the Partnership, the “ Issuers ”), have finalized the terms of their previously announced offering of $ 400 million in aggregate principal amount of 6.375% senior notes due 2027 ( the “ Notes ”) in a private placement under Rule 144A and Regulation S of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ( the “ Securities Act ”) to eligible purchasers ( the “ Offering ”). The Notes will be issued at a price equal to 100% of the principal amount thereof.
The Notes will initially be fully and unconditionally guaranteed on a senior unsecured basis by the Partnership’ s existing wholly owned subsidiaries ( other than Holly Energy Finance Corp., UNEV Pipeline, LLC and certain immaterial subsidiaries). The Partnership intends to use the net proceeds from the Offering to partially repay outstanding borrowings under its revolving credit agreement. The Offering is expected to close on April 8, 2022, subject to customary closing conditions.
The Notes and the related guarantees have not been registered under the Securities Act, or any state securities laws, and unless so registered, may not be offered or sold in the United States except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act and applicable state securities laws. The Notes are being sold only to persons reasonably believed to be qualified institutional buyers pursuant to Rule 144A under the Securities Act and to non-U.S. persons outside the United States pursuant to Regulation S under the Securities Act.
This press release is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy the securities described herein, nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such an offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction.
About Holly Energy Partners, L.P.
Holly Energy Partners, L.P., headquartered in Dallas, Texas, provides petroleum product and crude oil transportation, terminalling, storage and throughput services to the petroleum industry, including subsidiaries of HF Sinclair Corporation ( “ HF Sinclair ”). The Partnership, through its subsidiaries and joint ventures, owns and/or operates petroleum product and crude pipelines, tankage and terminals in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wyoming, as well as refinery processing units in Kansas and Utah.
Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains various “ forward-looking statements ” within the meaning of the federal securities laws. These forward-looking statements are identified as any statement that does not relate strictly to historical or current facts. When used in this press release, words such as “ anticipate, ” “ project, ” “ expect, ” “ will, ” “ plan, ” “ goal, ” “ forecast, ” “ strategy, ” “ intend, ” “ should, ” “ would, ” “ could, ” “ believe, ” “ may ” and similar expressions and statements regarding our plans and objectives for future operations are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are based on our beliefs and assumptions and those of our general partner, using currently available information and expectations as of the date hereof, are not guarantees of future performance and involve certain risks and uncertainties. Although we and our general partner believe that such expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, neither we nor our general partner can give assurance that our expectations will prove to be correct. All statements concerning our expectations for future results of operations are based on forecasts for our existing operations and do not include the potential impact of any future acquisitions. Our forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks, uncertainties and assumptions. If one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or if underlying assumptions prove incorrect, our actual results may vary materially from those anticipated, estimated, projected or expected. Certain factors could cause actual results to differ materially from results anticipated in the forward-looking statements. These factors include, but are not limited to: ( i) HF Sinclair’ s and our ability to successfully integrate the Sinclair Oil Corporation and Sinclair Transportation Company businesses acquired from REH Company ( formerly known as The Sinclair Companies, referred to herein as “ Sinclair ”) ( collectively, the “ Sinclair Transactions ”) with their existing operations and fully realize the expected synergies of the Sinclair Transactions or on the expected timeline; ( ii) risks relating to the value of our limited partner common units issued at the closing of the Sinclair Transactions from sales by the Sinclair holders following the closing of the Sinclair Transactions; ( iii) the demand for and supply of crude oil and refined products, including uncertainty regarding the effects of the continuing COVID-19 pandemic on future demand and increasing societal expectations that companies address climate change; ( iv) risks and uncertainties with respect to the actual quantities of petroleum products and crude oil shipped on our pipelines and/or terminalled, stored or throughput in our terminals and refinery processing units; ( v) the economic viability of HF Sinclair, our other customers and our joint ventures’ other customers, including any refusal or inability of our or our joint ventures’ customers or counterparties to perform their obligations under their contracts; ( vi) the demand for refined petroleum products in the markets we serve; ( vii) our ability to purchase and integrate future acquired operations; ( viii) our ability to complete previously announced or contemplated acquisitions; ( ix) the availability and cost of additional debt and equity financing; ( x) the possibility of temporary or permanent reductions in production or shutdowns at refineries utilizing our pipelines, terminal facilities and refinery processing units, due to reasons such as infection in the workforce, in response to reductions in demand or lower gross margins due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and any potential asset impairments resulting from such actions; ( xi) the effects of current and future government regulations and policies, including the effects of current and future restrictions on various commercial and economic activities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; ( xii) delay by government authorities in issuing permits necessary for our business or our capital projects; ( xiii) our and our joint venture partners’ ability to complete and maintain operational efficiency in carrying out routine operations and capital construction projects; ( xiv) the possibility of terrorist or cyberattacks and the consequences of any such attacks; ( xv) uncertainty regarding the effects and duration of global hostilities and any associated military campaigns which may disrupt crude oil supplies and markets for refined products and create instability in the financial markets that could restrict our ability to raise capital; ( xvi) general economic conditions, including uncertainty regarding the timing, pace and extent of an economic recovery in the United States; ( xvii) the impact of recent or proposed changes in the tax laws and regulations that affect master limited partnerships; and ( xviii) other financial, operational and legal risks and uncertainties detailed from time to time in our filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
All forward-looking statements included in this press release and all subsequent written or oral forward-looking statements attributable to us or persons acting on our behalf are expressly qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Other factors described herein, or factors that are unknown or unpredictable, could also have a material adverse effect on future results. You should not put undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. When considering forward-looking statements, you should keep in mind the risk factors and other cautionary statements set forth in the “ Risk Factors ” section in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2021. The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date made and, other than as required by law, we undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
Craig Biery Vice President, Investor Relations
or | general |
4Sight achieves ISO 27001 certification | 4Sight Holdings has achieved ISO 27001:2013 certification for Information Security Management Systems ( ISMS), demonstrating our commitment to the highest level of internal compliance and security.
Information security extends beyond IT and software and includes any shape or form of information of value to the business or any internal or external stakeholder. The goal of information security is to ensure the right person has the right information at the right time every time, to guarantee confidentiality, integrity as well as availability.
Tracy Short, Chief Operating Officer of 4Sight, says: “ We handle significant amounts of customer and partner information; our priority is to ensure data protection and data privacy through implemented controls and tools focused on identifying information security risks, dramatically reducing the risk of data breaches. The ISMS is now a core component of our day-to-day business processes. ”
Achieving ISO 27001 certification for the 4Sight Group was a rigorous external audit process. 4Sight is proud to have been awarded this certification, for what has become a global benchmark for the effective management of information assets. We have invested in the necessary people, processes and technology to protect our data. With this in place, we have the benefit of increased reliability and security of information.
With an approach to accelerating our customers’ digital transformation journeys, 4Sight is continually empowering them with foresight data to make better, more informed decisions and the ability to predict using insight data. As the IT and operational technologies converge, the free flow of data is enabled into the business environment, where it can be safely stored and processed using artificial intelligence, machine learning and analytics. And with security of this data core to the success of our customers’ businesses, it is clearly advantageous to be partnering with an organisation that takes information security and corporate governance seriously.
Short adds: “ Achieving the ISO 27001 certification signifies that 4Sight can be trusted with critical information assets and that security is paramount to the way we operate. ”
Tertius Zitzke, CEO of 4Sight Holdings, concludes: “ In the fourth industrial revolution, over the past four decades, we have seen the mainframe computer in the 80s, connectivity and networks in the 90s, the internet explosion in the 2000s and mobility in the 2010s. Automation got turned into the automation of data around processes with people, where COVID-19 made people our most valuable asset to manage and the way people manage their customer data. We as 4Sight walk this path with our partners, both customer and vendors, into the principles of ISO 27001. ” | general |
Surging Treasury Yields Leave Thai Bonds Most at Risk in Asia | The information you requested is not available at this time, please check back again soon.
Shoppers walk through Sampeang Market in Bangkok, Thailand, on Friday, May 14, 2021. Thailand plans to inoculate the majority of the adult population in Bangkok in the coming months to quell a flareup in virus infections that's made the capital city the epicenter of the nations biggest Covid-19 outbreak. Photographer: Nicholas Axelrod/Bloomberg, Bloomberg
( Bloomberg) -- Thai bonds look vulnerable to further losses as the volatility in U.S. Treasuries is far from over.
The securities are the most susceptible among Asian emerging markets to a further surge in Treasury yields, according to a Bloomberg analysis of seven countries. Total returns on baht-denominated sovereign bonds are down 6.1% since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, the biggest laggard, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
The pressure doesn’ t look likely to ease any time soon with Treasury yields primed to march higher. Ten-year yields surged this week to as high as 2.66% after the Federal Reserve laid out a plan to shrink its balance sheet, and Governor Lael Brainard said reductions would start as soon as May. That’ s after March saw the biggest monthly increase in yields in more than five years.
Thai debt has the tightest real yield buffer in emerging Asia -- a measure of sensitivity -- the analysis showed, leaving them most exposed to moves in Treasuries. Economists at Deutsche Bank AG see 10-year U.S. yields climbing to 3.3% this year.
“ Thai 10-year yields have been vulnerable to the surge in Treasury yields amid expectations for aggressive rate hikes from the Fed, as well as foreign investors reducing emerging-market bond exposure ” due to the war in Ukraine and quickening inflation, said Poon Panichpibool, a strategist at Krung Thai Bank Pcl in Bangkok.
The federal government is planning to unveil a significant crackdown on foreign homebuyers as part of Thursday’ s federal budget, CTV National News Ottawa Bureau Chief Joyce Napier reported Wednesday afternoon.
Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland may effectively tell the Bank of Canada it’ s on its own in tackling inflation when she introduces a budget Thursday that’ s expected to be full of new spending initiatives.
The U.S. Fed signaled it will reduce its massive bond holdings at a maximum pace of US $ 95 billion a month, further tightening credit across the economy as the central bank raises interest rates to cool inflation
Bay Street could be about to learn its fate in Canada’ s halls of power. | general |
Empty leg flights and the role played by technology in reducing them | Global commercial travel has declined 52% since the start of the pandemic. However, the number of private jet flights has increased by 16% compared to pre-pandemic levels.
By Jasleen Mann
The aviation industry, including the private jet sector, have been dealing with the issue of empty legs and repositioning flights. Private jet hailing app TailHail aims to utilise technology to provide passengers with access to empty legs, limiting resource wastage.
Regulations requiring UK airlines to use their airport slots for a minimum of 80% of the time were suspended during the Covid-19 pandemic to preserve some competition amidst restrictions. However, TailHail suggests that data has shown nearly 14,500 empty/near empty flights went ahead between 2020 and 2021.
James Moon, founder and CEO of TailHail, says: “ With all the technology we have been creating, it has been addressing the pain points that currently exist in the sector from an operators point of view and user point of view.
“ It is clear that there are a lot of inefficiencies that exist, such as aircraft flying empty, which is not ideal given the current climate, and that is what we have been focusing on. ”
Related
TailHail’ s new website will launch this month and the app will follow in early May, with the aim of overcoming issues associated with booking flights within the private aviation sector.
“ At the moment the industry is narrow in terms of what is available. What we are trying to bring to market is a variety of options. Choice is a core principle that we are working on, ” says Moon.
TailHail aims to have bookings of private jets completed quickly, within seconds or minutes, to make the process less time consuming. The platform would handle the bookings digitally. The current process is a manual one which entails submitting a flight request and waiting for someone to respond. It also involves scrolling through PDFs to find a flight.
With TailHail, once a flight request is submitted the user will be matched to an approved aircraft. The platform offers users the opportunity to view more aircraft than they would if they were using a broker.
TailHail also expects that by filling seats on empty leg flights rather than by a direct charter, the carbon footprint of each flight will be minimised.
“ What we are doing is putting it in the digital world, making it easier to understand and making it transparent, ” says Moon.
With a geolocating feature, in future TailHail expects to provide users with private flight sharing opportunities near their location. The app will help operators push surplus capacity while dealing with on demand charter flight requests.
Moon says: “ Our sector has been left behind and we are bringing new technology to market which will be a constantly evolving process. There are a lot of companies who claim to be the Uber of aviation but they do not have the technology to back it up. ”
Due to concerns surrounding hygiene, raised during the pandemic, there has been in an increase in first time private aviation users. This includes families, individuals and businesses who have realised the benefits of flying privately.
The private aviation sector can benefit from the fact that while confidence in travel is growing, people remain cautious and prefer to avoid crowds.
Moon says: “ Through our platform and unique algorithm users will be able to see a wide range of aircraft that match their profile. One of our key findings is that users think they have to fly from one of the big airports that are nearby, but private aviation offers the chance to fly from a different airport which may be closer to their departure point.
“ In the US, commercial airlines serve 500 airports but private aviation can reach 5,000. In the UK, private aviation is seen as luxury but elsewhere it is seen as a necessity. ”
TailHail expects to release a flight sharing functionality soon, this could lower prices of flying privately and also has the benefit of building a community within the sector.
With regards to the private aviation sector, in the US there were around 300,000 flights just in the last month compared to 8,000 in the UK. | general |
AFRICA: China thrives in oil services but slumps in exploration and production | The Russian pipeline company ChelPipe ( TMK) had been well placed in the race for the Uganda-Tanzania pipeline contract, but the current geopolitical situation has completely thrown its situation into doubt. [... ]
China is revving up the bulldozers on its huge Agadem oil pipeline project now that it has lifted its Covid-19 ban. This massive undertaking will stretch 2,000km from south-east Niger to Benin. [... ]
The relationship between the two oil companies has deteriorated to the point of them almost coming to blows during a stakeholder meeting. [... ]
Already once postponed from April to June, the delivery of the first LNG cargo imported by Shell to supply the Tema LNG terminal will not take place before the end of July as rescheuled. [... ]
The Addax Petroleum dispute is the perfect illustration of how the NNPC has been able to drive home its dominence over the country's petroleum regulator. [... ]
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A pioneer on the web since 1996, Africa Intelligence is the leading news site on Africa for professionals. | general |
Calif. Naturopathic Doctor Cops To Peddling Fake Vax Cards | A California-licensed naturopathic doctor pled guilty on Wednesday to charges stemming from an alleged scheme to sell forged COVID-19 vaccination cards and fake immunization `` pellets '' she claimed granted `` lifelong protection '' from the virus in what was the first federal prosecution related to fake immunizations and fraudulent vaccination cards.As part of a plea agreement, Juli Mazi pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of making false statements related to health care, the U.S. Department of Justice said in a statement. Mazi changed her plea at a hearing in California federal court Wednesday, according to the case docket.... | general |
Matthew Broderick tests positive for Covid-19 |
Matthew Broderick will sit out
Broadway's
`` Plaza Suite '' after testing positive for Covid-19.
The
actor
tested positive on Tuesday, `` despite strict adherence to COVID safety protocols, '' the production announced.
Broderick stars in the Neil Simon play alongside his wife Sarah Jessica Parker, who has tested negative and will continue performing.
The show marks the first time Parker and Broderick have shared the stage since 1996's `` How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying. '' The two play three different couples at the famous Plaza Hotel.
According to
Playbill
, Broderick's standby Michael McGrath will stand in for him while he recovers.
Read More
The play also stars Danny Bolero, Molly Ranson and Eric Wiegand
Plaza Suite opened on March 28 at the Hudson Theatre. John Benjamin Hickey directs. The show had been postponed for a long time due to the coronavirus pandemic. | general |
Building a virtual ICU depends on politicking and persuasion | `` Those of you who think that I 'm going to give you a technology talk, you might as well leave now, '' said Roberta Schwartz, chief innovation officer at Houston Methodist at HIMSS22 this past month.
While technology is key to delivering virtual care at scale, the story of the sprawling Texas health system's tele-ICU system, the tale of `` getting from ground zero to where we are today, '' is really `` a story of change management, '' said Schwartz.
Earlier this year we offered a sneak peek at how Houston Methodist went live with its virtual ICU in February 2020, just as the pandemic proved the value of having such a thing.
At HIMSS22, Schwartz gave an in-depth look at some of the challenging human factors that figured into such a momentous achievement – the cajoling and convincing and arguing and arm-twisting that it took to get the complex, paradigm-shifting telehealth program up and running.
Like most health systems, Houston Methodist was dealing with staff shortages and needed to provide support to its community hospitals, which didn’ t always have round-the-clock intensivist coverage.
The decision to deploy a technology-enabled virtual care approach took place after years of deliberative discussion and preparation. The virtual ICU pilot launched in early 2020, just as COVID-19 shone its harsh spotlight on the need for critical care beds and staffing, and the need to minimize risk to providers.
It was a validation of lots of hard work – and more than a little disagreement – among C-suite, operations, IT and clinicians over the previous years. But it ultimately proved an adage from Seneca favored by Houston CIO Ken Letkeman, said Schwartz: `` Luck happens when preparation meets opportunity. ''
Houston Methodist is big. ( `` Our institution alone has done over 1.1 million vaccines – that's more than many states have done, '' said Schwartz.) And several years ago, she made the case for some big changes.
`` I believe that the hospital needed to completely disrupt ourselves from the inside, '' she said. `` Disrupt or be disrupted. ''
To help drive that change, the health system's Center for Innovation convened a subcommittee called DIOP: Digital Innovation Obsessed People.
`` We are 50% operators – from the physician organization, from the hospital, from our global operations, from our HR – and 50% IT, '' Schwartz explained. `` We sit at the table together, so when operations is ready, IT is telling us whether or not they can handle it. We go back and forth and choose things that can work in our organization. ''
The goal, she said, is to foster a culture of innovation: `` We believe that we have 28,000 innovators across the organization who need to continually help us change. ''
That's key. While much of the deliberation and decision about innovation will start with those innovative thinkers, `` most of our work will never live in our Center for Innovation, '' said Schwartz.
`` It will live in the center for a year, and then it's not ours anymore. I feel a little bit strange even standing up and talking about the Virtual ICU. It's no longer in the center for Innovation. It's a full-on graduate. It works. It's out there. It has its own business unit with its own people. ''
The path to getting there was not always an easy one.
`` Virtual ICU was probably envisioned five to seven years before we went live with a virtual ICU, '' said Schwartz. `` We kind of played around with it. We weren't really an outsourcing kind of shop, and it was just too expensive to jump into the world of virtual ICU. So we played around the fringes and never jumped. ''
Earlier, more manageable successes occurred in areas such as virtual urgent care and tele-psychiatry, she said. Tele-stroke was another field where some substantial, if cautious, innovation took place. ( `` We had some very anxious physicians, and we helped spur them along. '')
Add in a tele-sitter program at Houston Methodist's main hospital and a tele-rounding initiative that was `` sped up for COVID-19 because of the great needs, '' and the health system was already well-positioned in several diverse virtual care use cases.
But virtual ICU was a much bigger project, and one that took years of planning and prodding and pushback.
`` We started this seven years before [ because ] you could already see that there was going to be an intensivist shortage, '' said Schwartz.
`` We actually had full intensivists, 24/7, in five separate ICUs. But I could see that they were constantly struggling to keep the talent. ''
The value of tele-ICU is enormous, when it's done right.
`` You can vastly improve quality, '' said Schwartz. `` But it can be a very expensive endeavor if you already have intensivists. There is work to be done. You want to improve your ICU throughput. Reduce physicians ' burnout. ''
The potential benefits are significant for quality and cost-effectiveness: improved severity-adjusted outcomes, reduced length of stay in the ICU, decreased hospital acquired conditions. The kind of goals all health systems are after in the era of accountable care.
`` Everyone agreed on the outcome of what we wanted to achieve, '' said Schwartz. `` And then I will tell you, after that, there was almost no agreement on how to get there. ''
According to many physicians, the `` how to get there, '' was to raise salaries and hire more intensivists, she said. Very few were onboard, at first, with launching a virtual ICU initiative – despite the fact that some were moonlighting with virtual ICU companies for extra cash.
It took a lot of political capital, plenty of cashed-in chips and, from time to time, some strategically-tightened purse strings to gain buy-in and build momentum on the project.
`` They can tell you about some fine meetings where it was pretty dueling, '' said Schwartz. `` I can tell you, if you're going to go down this road in an organization that's not always ready for it, figure out who your person is with an iron stomach, who is willing to be a brick wall and take huge amounts of arrows, and sustain them. That support is what you need to go down this road and implement it in full. ''
One fundamental fight will probably be over staffing, she warned.
`` Our doctors, all they wanted to do was quote the statistics: ' I can take care of 14 patients. ' ' I can only take care of 14 patients. ' 'We can only take care of 14 patients, day and night. ' The fights oftentimes come down to what is going to be left at coverage at the end of the day. They're not going to be about the technology; they're going to be very much about this implementation. ''
The doctors, she said, `` were absolutely convinced about this. And I was like, 'If we fail, we fail. But it's not going to be because we didn't try. ' ''
Once the battle of hearts and minds was won, there was still plenty of other preparation and groundwork to lay, of course – both technologically and procedurally.
`` The change management began years and years before the first camera was hung, and began with the fact of trying to get the staffing correct, trying to improve the operations, trying to improve the quality. ''
Fast forward a few years. The virtual ICU pilot launched about 26 months ago.
`` We put our last camera in the main hospital in February of 2020. COVID-19 came in March, '' said Schwartz.
`` I suddenly looked pretty smart. But luck happens when preparation meets opportunity. ''
Twitter: @ MikeMiliardHITN Email the writer: mike.miliard @ himssmedia.comHealthcare IT News is a HIMSS publication. | tech |
Ukraine invasion's impacts on the world of science: Live updates | Live Science is supported by its audience. When you purchase through links on our site, we may earn an affiliate commission. Learn more
By Nicoletta Lanese, Brandon Specktor, Ben Turner, Jeanna Bryner published 6 April 22
Russia launched a war against Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, targeting more than a dozen cities and the Chernobyl nuclear site within the first day of the invasion.
The ongoing war not only threatens Ukraine's continued existence as an independent country, but the conflict will likely have wide-reaching ramifications for science-related industries and organizations the world over. In addition, the potential for nuclear war and damage to Ukraine's various nuclear sites pose a threat to public health and the environment, on a global scale.
As the war continues, Live Science will be sharing live updates on how the conflict is impacting various scientific fields, the energy sector and the space industry. We 'll also be covering developments related to nuclear weapons and power plants, as well as relevant health news, such as the state of medical supply chains in Ukraine and updates on how the COVID-19 pandemic is unfolding in the region.
Russia could end its cooperation on the International Space Station in as little as two years, using the sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine as an excuse, according to space experts.
Most commentators characterize the threats by the director general of Russia’ s Roscosmos space agency to end its involvement with the orbital outpost as mere political bluster. But the threat to sever such relations could come to fruition, as some experts Live Science spoke to noted that Russia has only committed to the ISS project until 2024, rather than “ after 2030 ” as had been proposed by NASA and other partners.
And Russia’ s withdrawal from the project could mean it will be mainly up to NASA to keep the ISS physically in orbit for almost another 10 years – something that Russia has been responsible for up until now. Even further, the threats signal just how badly Russia's actions in Ukraine have damaged ties in the scientific community between the country and the rest of the world, meaning that any science-related cooperation with Russia may be difficult, experts said.
Read the full story on Live Science.
Satellite images have revealed what appears to be a mass grave and the bodies of civilians scattered in the streets of the Ukrainian town of Bucha. The images implicate Russian troops in a massacre.
Many of the images were taken during the Russian occupation of Bucha by Maxar Technologies ' WorldView-3 satellite. They show that the bodies — some of which were discovered by eyewitnesses with their hands bound and with gunshot wounds to the head — could have been in the streets for as long as three weeks.
Another, taken on March 31, shows what is likely a mass grave on the grounds of a church, which includes a trench that is roughly 45 feet ( 14 meters) long, according to Maxar ( opens in new tab), a satellite company that produces `` 90% of the foundational geospatial intelligence used by the U.S. Government for national security and keeping troops safe on the ground, '' as well as the imagery for companies such as Google Earth and Google Maps. A previous Maxar satellite image, taken on March 10, shows what looks like the initial excavations of the grave.
Read the full story on Live Science.
🛑 WARNING ❗In Rubizhne, # Luhansk region, Russian troops hit a tank with nitric acid! Nitric acid is very dangerous if inhaled, swallowed or if it is in contact with skin.The consequences of this incident are similar to usage of chemical or biological weapons! 1/2 pic.twitter.com/o5kPccPg6uApril 5, 2022
A large tank of nitric acid was struck during a Russian air strike on the city of Rubizhne in eastern Ukraine, causing the ruptured tank to let loose a plume of yellow-brown smoke, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab) Tuesday ( March 5).
The colorless liquid turns brown upon exposure to water or oxygen, producing yellow or red fumes with an acrid odor, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ( opens in new tab) ( CDC). Exposure to nitric acid can irritate the eyes, skin and mucous membranes and can also cause a condition known as `` wet lung, '' or pulmonary edema, where excess fluid accumulates in the organ. Exposure to the chemical can also irritate and inflame the lung tissue; cause bronchitis; and drive dental erosion.
The `` highly corrosive '' acid is typically used in the manufacture of fertilizers, dyes and polymers, according to the CDC.
After the Russian strike burst the nitric acid tank in Rubizhne, the governor, Serhiy Haidai, advised residents to stay indoors, close their doors and windows and wear masks to avoid inhaling the fumes, according to the Times.
`` This is a rather toxic substance, '' Haidai said in a video posted on his Facebook page. `` We don't know where this toxic cloud will go. ''
The United States will allocate $ 250,000 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( OPCW), an intergovernmental organization, The Associated Press reported ( opens in new tab) Tuesday ( March 5).
In a statement, Marc Shaw, deputy assistant secretary at the State Department’ s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, said that he hopes that the money will enable the OPCW to `` quickly assist Ukraine as it seeks protection against chemical threats from the Russian government. ''
Russia threatened to pull out of the International Space Station ( ISS) program until sanctions from the West are lifted, according to news reports. This isn't the first time the Russian space agency, Roscosmos, has aired such threats.
Head of Roscosmos Dmitry Rogozin said that Moscow would restore cooperation with ISS partners only after sanctions were lifted. ( Other ISS partners include the United States, Japan, Canada and the European Union.)
`` The purpose of the sanctions is to kill the Russian economy, plunge our people into despair and hunger and bring our country to its knees, '' Rogozin wrote on Twitter on Saturday ( opens in new tab) ( April 2), as translated from Russian using Google Translate.
This and other similar tweets from Rogozin do not mean Russia will necessarily walk out on the ISS. The Russian space chief is known for his hyperbolic statements, according to Live Science sister site Space.com ( opens in new tab). Despite these past threats, the ISS has been operating normally, with NASA astronaut Mark Vande Hei returning to Earth in a Russian Soyuz spacecraft on March 30.
The International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA), the United Nations ' nuclear watchdog, has been informed that the Russian forces occupying the Chernobyl nuclear power plant have `` in writing, transferred control '' of the defunct facility to Ukrainian personnel, The Associated Press reported ( opens in new tab). Three convoys of Russian forces have left the site and the rest seem to be preparing to leave, the IAEA reported Thursday ( March 31).
These reports came from Energoatom, Ukraine's nuclear power operator. In a Telegram post ( opens in new tab), Energoatom said that the Russian troops were leaving the Chernobyl power plant and surrounding exclusion zone and heading towards Belarus, according to a translation by Axios ( opens in new tab). Russian forces were also preparing to leave the nearby city of Slavutych, where many of the Ukrainian workers that monitor and maintain the plant live, the post said.
In a later Telegram post ( opens in new tab), Energoatom said that the Russian troops signed a document officially confirming the plant's handover back to Ukrainian control.
There have been reports of Russian soldiers being exposed to high doses of radiation while at the plant and in surrounding exclusion zone, but the IAEA has not yet been able to confirm those reports, according to the AP. The agency continues to investigate.
President Joe Biden has announced a plan to increase the U.S. oil supply, with the aim of driving down gas prices that have skyrocketed since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, according to a White House statement ( opens in new tab) released March 31.
Biden has called on Congress to institute fees for oil companies that have leased public lands and drilled wells for oil production but aren't actively utilizing those leased acres. In addition, `` the President will announce the largest release of oil reserves in history, putting one million additional barrels on the market per day on average — every day — for the next six months, '' the White House statement reads.
The release will likely lower the price of oil in the short term, but it may not completely make up for the loss of Russian resources should the situation worsen, experts told The New York Times ( opens in new tab).
Biden's two-part plan aims to increase oil supply, in the short term, and reduce the country's dependence on oil, in the long term, the White House statement notes. To achieve the latter goal, Biden's administration is pursuing various initiatives to increase the country's use of and investment in alternative energy sources.
Sometime during Russia's invasion of Chernobyl in Ukraine, looters stole radioactive material from a radiation monitoring laboratory near the defunct nuclear power plant. There seems to be a low risk that this material would be used in so-called dirty bombs, an expert told Live Science.
Read the full story on Live Science.
Ukrtelecom, the biggest internet provider in Ukraine in terms of geographical coverage, was the target of a major cyberattack, the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine reported on Monday ( March 28), according to The New York Times ( opens in new tab). During the attack, which the agency says was perpetrated by Russian forces, Ukrtelecom limited its service to private users and business clients in order to maintain coverage for the military, technical security and intelligence service of Ukraine. The company was able to restore connectivity to all users after several hours.
Rafael Mariano Grossi, the chief of the United Nations ' nuclear watchdog, is currently in Ukraine to speak with senior government officials about maintaining the integrity of the country's nuclear facilities, CNN reported ( opens in new tab) on Tuesday ( March 29). The International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) has stated that it will offer `` urgent technical assistance to ensure the safety and security of the country's nuclear facilities and help avert the risk of an accident that could endanger people and the environment. ''
`` The IAEA's presence, where needed to ensure safety and security, is of paramount importance. We are ready to provide the necessary support now, '' Grossi said in an IAEA statement, according to CNN. Ukraine's nuclear sites include the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and 15 additional nuclear power reactors at four other plants.
Russian citizens are panic-buying medicines such as sleeping pills, contraceptives, cancer drugs, heart drugs, hormones and antidepressants following a further increase of Western sanctions and boycotts, Reuters has reported.
Information from the Russian data analytics company DSM Group has shown that, in the two weeks between Feb. 28 and March 13, Russians bought one month's worth of pharmaceutical items. The 270.5 million items amount to a value of around $ 104 billion.
Sergei Shulyak, general director of DSM Group, told Reuters that the surge was due to fear. `` The first fear was that everything could get more expensive and the second fear was that medicines they need won't be available in some time. Those fears moved people. They stood in lines at pharmacies and bought everything, '' he said.
Shuylak explained that he expects the surge to stabilize over time, as many Russian manufacturers are still capable of producing generic drugs and foreign producers are still able to supply them, albeit at higher prices. He did raise concerns, however, that worsening relations with the West could leave Russian drug manufacturers unable to source some of the ingredients needed to make drug products.
The Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich and Ukrainian negotiators experienced symptoms of poisoning after a meeting to discuss peace with Russia in Kyiv earler this month, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Abramovich and two members of the Ukrainian team reportedly suffered from red eyes, painful tears and peeling skin around their faces and hands after attending the meeting on the night of March 3-4, according to the investigative journalism group Bellingcat.
The symptoms, which lasted until the morning, have been blamed on a likely biological or chemical weapons attack, with Bellingcat citing that the three affected men only consumed water and chocolate in the hours leading up to the onset of the symptoms. A fourth member of the team who also consumed the same chocolate and water did not suffer from symptoms.
Bellingcat reports that, according to two chemical weapons experts and a doctor, the symptoms most closely matched those associated with porphyrin, organophosphates, or bicyclic substances, although a lack of specialized lab equipment near the victims made it impossible to know for sure. The experts believe that the dosage was low, indicating that the poisoner may have intended to scare the victims rather than kill them.
It is unclear who was responsible for the alleged attack, but the Ukrainian negotiating team suspect it may have been committed by Russian hard-liners who hoped to disrupt peace talks between the two warring nations.
Poisonings have an infamous place in modern Russian history and have occurred multiple times since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’ s rule. These include the 2004 dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko ( who ran against a Kremlin-favored candidate for Ukraine's presidency and was left disfigured); the 2004 poisoning of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya; the 2006 polonium-210 poisoning of former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko and the 2018 Novichok poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal.
On Friday ( March 25), U.S. President Joe Biden and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the establishment of a joint task force to help reduce European dependence on Russian fossil fuels, according to a White House statement ( opens in new tab). The Task Force for Energy Security will be chaired by a representative from the White House and a representative of the President of the European Commission.
Through this partnership, the U.S. will work with international partners to increase exports of liquified natural gas ( LNG) to Europe; the plan does not specify how much of this LNG will be supplied by the U.S., specifically, according to Reuters ( opens in new tab). In the short-term, for the U.S. to increase its LNG exports to Europe, the nation would likely need to compensate by exporting less LNG to other places, analysts told Reuters.
In addition to diversifying Europe's LNG supply, the task force will work to `` reduce overall gas demand by accelerating market deployment of clean energy measures, '' the White House statement reads.
Speaking in Brussels after the deal was agreed on Friday, Biden said that launching the task force was not `` only the right thing to do from a moral standpoint '' but `` it's going to put us on a stronger strategic footing, '' The Guardian reported ( opens in new tab).
Russian forces have destroyed a laboratory located in Chernobyl's exclusion zone where radioactive samples were being stored, according to news outlets.
The laboratory, which cost about 6 million euros to build, opened in 2015 and was aimed at improving the management of radioactive waste at the plant, among other objectives. The State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management reported on social media that the Russian military has now destroyed the facility and that radioactive material is in the `` hands of the enemy '' rather than the hands of a `` civilized world, '' The Hill reported ( opens in new tab).
At the start of the invasion, Russian forces seized control of the power plant, holding hostage more than 60 workers who continued to try to maintain safety at the plant until volunteers could replace them, The Hill said.
In addition, the automated radiation monitoring system in the exclusion zone has stopped working, according to National Nuclear Energy Generating Company of Ukraine ( also called Energoatom), as reported by The Hill.
Russian forces took control of Chernobyl early in the invasion on Feb. 24. After the defunct nuclear plant was seized, more than 60 workers continued to work for about 600 hours to maintain the facility until volunteers were able to replace them.
Chernobyl is the site of the 1986 nuclear reactor meltdown, considered the world's worst nuclear disaster. The defunct plant and the contaminated zone surrounding the disaster, continue to be a a safety risk as Russian forces shell and bomb the area.
Mykhailo Fedorov, the deputy prime minister and head of the Digital Transformation Ministry in Ukraine, has confirmed that Ukraine is using facial recognition technology to identify deceased Russian soldiers, Forbes reported ( opens in new tab). Specifically, they're using software provided by Clearview AI, the New York-based facial recognition provider, which has offered the service without charge, Fedorov's department told Forbes.
Ukraine's aim in identifying Russian soldiers is to inform their loved ones of the deaths, and in doing so, `` dispel the myth of a'special operation ' in which there are 'no conscripts ' and 'no one dies, ' '' Fedorov wrote in a Telegram post, according to Forbes. In other words, the effort is intended to counter Russian propaganda and help reveal exactly how many Russian soldiers are dying in the ongoing war.
Albert Fox Cahn, founder of the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project, told Forbes that using facial recognition technology of this kind in a war could be a `` human rights catastrophe in the making. '' The technology is fallible, so it's possible that the deceased could sometimes be misidentified and the wrong loved ones informed of the death, he noted. He also expressed concern that the technology may eventually be used to screen refugees at checkpoints, where misidentification could have fatal consequences.
Read more about the facial recognition technology in Forbes ( opens in new tab).
An international organization that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy is `` gravely concerned '' about Ukraine's nuclear reactors, which are at high risk of a severe accident due to the Russian invasion of the country, the related intense fighting and Russia's seizure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
`` Over the past few weeks, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been actively working to ensure the safety and security of all nuclear installations in Ukraine during these dramatic and unique circumstances where major nuclear facilities are operating in an armed conflict zone, '' Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA director-general, said in a video statement ( opens in new tab) Wednesday ( March 23). `` I remain gravely concerned about the safety and security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. ''
Several of Ukraine's 15 working nuclear reactors are currently under Russian control; Chernobyl has been occupied by the Russians since the start of the invasion on Feb. 24, according to The Guardian.
`` The IAEA is ready and is able to deploy immediately and provide indispensable assistance for ensuring nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, '' Grossi said in the statement.
In addition to the bombs and missiles that could endanger these facilities, fires have broken out in Chernobyl, officials have said.
Firefighters are currently trying to extinguish wildfires near the Chernobyl Nuclear power Plant, the IAEA said in a statement ( opens in new tab) Wednesday ( March 23). `` The fire brigade from the town of Chornobyl [ Chernobyl ] has extinguished four fires, but there are still ongoing fires. The local fire station does not currently have access to the electricity grid, '' the regulator said, as reported by the IAEA. The nuclear power plant continues to rely on offsite power, the IAEA said.
`` The distressing situation continues and the need to prevent a nuclear accident becomes more pressing with each day that passes, '' Grossi said, emphasizing the importance of allowing in IAEA experts to ensure nuclear reactor safety.
`` This assistance is essential to help avert the real risk of a severe nuclear accident that could threaten public health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond, '' Grossi said.
—Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri S. Peskov said that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons if the country comes under `` existential threat, '' CNN reported ( opens in new tab). Peskov said this in an interview with CNN’ s Christiane Amanpour, after he repeatedly characterized Russia's invasion as a defensive move to protect Russia from Ukraine, which he said was `` formed by the Western countries, anti-Russia, '' according to The New York Times ( opens in new tab).
— On Wednesday ( March 23), the European Commission presented European Union ( EU) leaders with options to handle soaring energy prices and impending fuel shortages largely driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab). Some options include establishing price caps and subsidies, to lower energy prices for both consumers and businesses. Additional proposals suggest that, in advance of next winter, member states should jointly buy and store fuel so that resources can be rapidly stockpiled and then shared across the bloc.
Having recently launched its hypersonic missiles against Ukraine, Russia may soon resort to using more severe tactics, including biological and chemical weapons, President Joe Biden said in an address at the Business Roundtable’ s CEO Quarterly Meeting ( opens in new tab) on March 21.
`` Now, Putin’ s back is against the wall, '' Biden said. `` And the more his back is against the wall, the greater the severity of the tactics he may employ. ''
Russia has asserted — without evidence — that the U.S. and Ukraine have biological and chemical weapons, Biden noted. `` That’ s a clear sign he [ Putin ] is considering using both of those. He’ s already used chemical weapons in the past, and we should be careful … of what’ s about to come. ''
In addition, Russia may soon execute cyberattacks against critical U.S. infrastructure, Biden said. `` The magnitude of Russia’ s cyber capacity is fairly consequential, and it’ s coming, '' he said. `` The federal government is doing its part to get ready. ''
The trees around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant still hold loads of radiation absorbed during the 1986 nuclear meltdown, considered one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.
Since Feb. 25, Russian forces have occupied the power plant and the surrounding exclusion zone, taking plant employees hostage. This seizure and related fighting put the forest at an increased risk of catching fire, according to William Keeton, a forest ecosystem scientist at the University of Vermont. Such a fire would release potentially dangerous radiation into the atmosphere.
When the nuclear reactor `` melted down '' on April 26, 1986, it launched radionuclides across an area of about 58,000 square miles, according to Smithsonian Magazine. Some of that radiation washed down to the ground in rain, only to be taken up by growing trees. Those trees now store all of those radionuclides.
`` These forests absorbed tremendous amounts of radiation during the 1986 disaster, and the trees and soils still contain significant radiation — in the form of large amounts of radioactive elements called radionuclides, '' Keeton said in a statement. If a forest fire happens — from a bomb, explosion or fire — this radiation could be released into the atmosphere.
The forest there is mostly coniferous, which includes relatively fire-prone types of trees, Keeton said. Because of that risk, the U.S. Forest Service and Ukrainian experts have worked together to manage the fire risk. With Russian occupation, that capacity has dwindled. In addition, the forests are near the warzone, meaning risks from gunfire, explosions and even power line damage, Keeton explained.
Forest fires in the exclusion zone are not unheard of. In April of 2020, about 50 acres ( 20 hectares) of forest caught fire near the abandoned village of Vladimirovka in Ukraine's exclusion zone, Live Science previously reported. Water drops from aircraft and a 124-person strong firefighting force were needed to put out that blaze.
The Park XII Months zoo, located about 15.5 miles ( 25 kilometers) north of Kyiv in Ukraine, has requested that a humanitarian corridor be established to allow some of its animals to be evacuated, The Independent reported ( opens in new tab). For large animals that are difficult to transport, such as the rhinos and giraffes, the zoo staff hope that such corridors could serve as transport routes for food and fuel to heat the animals ' enclosures.
`` We need green corridors to bring in diesel, heat, and feed them. We can’ t take out rhinos and giraffes, big animals, we don’ t even have medicine to put them to sleep. We need to negotiate green corridors, '' Mykhailo Pinchuk, the zoo's owner, said in a recent Facebook video, according to The Independent.
Since the start of the war, various humanitarian corridors have been established to allow tens of thousands of people to evacuate Ukraine, The Washington Post reported ( opens in new tab). However, these corridors have often been made impassable by ongoing Russian attacks, Ukrainian officials have said.
In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, countries must not only decrease their reliance on Russian oil and gas but also heavily invest in renewable energy sources, António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations ( UN), said in an address on Monday ( March 21), The Guardian reported ( opens in new tab).
It would be folly to invest in new fossil fuel infrastructure to make up for the loss of Russian resources, as doing so `` might create long-term fossil fuel dependence and close the window to 1.5C, '' the goal set forth at the Cop26 UN climate summit last year, he said. `` Countries could become so consumed by the immediate fossil fuel supply gap that they neglect or knee-cap policies to cut fossil fuel use. ''
Average global temperatures have already increased more than 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit ( 1 degree Celsius) since the pre-industrial era, The Washington Post reported ( opens in new tab). Estimates suggest that the world could pass the 2.7 F ( 1.5 C) cutoff by the 2030s, if critical action is not taken now.
`` If we continue with more of the same, we can kiss 1.5 goodbye. Even 2 degrees may be out of reach, '' Guterres said Monday, according to the Post.
An ammonia leak at a chemical factory near the northern Ukrainian town of Novoselytsya has led officials to urge residents to take shelter, all amidst the intense fighting with Russian armed forces in the area, according to news reports.
The ammonia leak came from the Sumykhimprom fertilizer plant, the Sumy regional governor Dmytro Zhyvytsky said, as reported by Al Jazeera ( opens in new tab). Shelling from Russian forces caused the leak, he added, and wounded an employee at the plant.
The Russian army has said otherwise, calling the ammonia leak a `` chemical false flag. '' Russian army spokesperson Igor Konashenkov said, “ The Russian army has not planned or delivered any strikes against Ukrainian facilities that manufacture or keep in store poisonous chemicals, '' Al Jazeera quoted him.
Ammonia is a highly toxic gas made of nitrogen and hydrogen that produces a noxious odor. To produce the compound, plants utilize a chemical reaction of both elements at high temperature and pressure, according to the American Chemical Society ( opens in new tab). About 85% of the world's ammonia production is used directly or indirectly in agriculture, according to the ACS. The most common household use of the chemical is in glass cleaners. According to the ACS, exposure to the gas can cause severe skin burns and eye damage; it is toxic if inhaled and under pressure the gas can explode when heated.
The bright-yellow and blue flight suits donned by a trio of Russian cosmonauts as they boarded the International Space Station on Friday ( March 18) appeared to be a sign of their support for Ukraine, whose flag is the same colors, some outsiders had said. Now, Russia has scoffed at that interpretation.
The three cosmonauts, Oleg Artemyev, Denis Matveev and Sergey Korsakov, joined seven crewmates already onboard the ISS. On Saturday ( March 19), the Russian space agency released a statement quoting Artemyev: `` There is no need to look for any hidden signs or symbols in our uniform. A colour is simply a colour. It is not in any way connected to Ukraine. Otherwise, we would have to recognise its rights to the yellow sun in the blue sky, '' Artemyev said, as reported by The Guardian ( opens in new tab). `` These days, even though we are in space, we are together with our president and our people! ''
Even so, on Friday, Artemyev had explained the color choice with a different rationale, saying the team chose the bright yellow because there was so much of that material in storage, explaining `` that’ s why we had to wear yellow, '' The Guardian reported.
Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed the country has deployed its newest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles for the first time in Ukraine on Friday ( March 18) in an effort to destroy a weapons storage facility,
This is the first time that Russia has claimed to use such high-precision weapons in combat, according to the South China Morning Post.
`` The Kinzhal aviation missile system with hypersonic aeroballistic missiles destroyed a large underground warehouse containing missiles and aviation ammunition in the village of Deliatyn in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, '' the Russian defence ministry said Saturday ( March 19), as reported by Al Jazeera ( opens in new tab).
The Kinzhal weapon, which was unveiled and tested in March 2018, reportedly travels at 10 times the speed of sound. At the time, Putin, speaking on Russian television ( opens in new tab), indicated that this new hypersonic missile and cruise missile had `` unlimited range '' and could avoid adversaries ' detection technologies.
Read more about the hypersonic missiles on Live Science.
Three Russian cosmonauts who arrived at the International Space Station on Friday ( March 18) wore yellow and blue flight suits — the same colors as the Ukraine flag — when they entered the orbiting lab, according to The Associated Press ( opens in new tab).
The three cosmonauts, Oleg Artemyev, Denis Matveev and Sergey Korsakov, joined seven crewmates already onboard the ISS.
Whether their `` fashion choice '' was a sign of their support for Ukraine during the Russian invasion is unknown.
When the trio were able to speak with family on Earth, Artemyev was asked about the color choice. He responded: “ It became our turn to pick a color. But in fact, we had accumulated a lot of yellow material so we needed to use it. So that’ s why we had to wear yellow, ” he said, as reported by the AP.
Regardless, former NASA astronauts who were watching the docking with the ISS noticed. In a tweet on Friday ( opens in new tab), former NASA astronaut Scott Kelly said, `` Three Russian cosmonauts who just docked with the ISS arrive in Ukrainian yellow! '' Kelly was onboard the space station with cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko from March 2015 to March 2016.
The International Energy Agency, an autonomous intergovernmental organization, warned that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is likely to create a global energy crisis, the likes of which we 've never seen before, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab). The agency, which was established after the 1973 oil crisis to help stabilize the global energy market, issued several recommendations to help nations reduce their dependence on oil.
`` Reducing demand is a way of addressing the situation without just pumping more oil, '' said Fatih Birol, the agency’ s executive director, according to the Times.
The agency's recommendations include reducing speed limits; reducing fares on public transportation; promoting the use of trains over airplanes, when possible; encouraging carpooling; instituting car-free days in cities; and cutting down on commuting by having people work from home three days a week. The agency also put forth several recommendations to be implemented in the long-term, such as establishing the necessary infrastructure to prioritize electric vehicles.
—The World Food Programme ( WFP) is urgently trying to deliver emergency food supplies to hardhit Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv, Kharkiv and Dnipro, The Guardian reported. These cities, the WFP said, are at risk of `` medieval tactics of besiegement. ''
“ We are concentrating right now on stocking up the cities that are in danger of being encircled. That’ s the rush against time for us, ” said Jakob Kern, emergency coordinator for WFP, as reported by The Guardian. The agency will try to get food into the porty city of Mariupol, where bombings have destroyed a hospital complex and more, as well as the encircled city of Sumy; aid workers plan to take advantage of any ceasefires for humanitarian aid, The Guardian said.
—The European Space Agency unanimously voted to suspend a joint Mars mission with Russia. The Council of the ESA said on Thursday ( March 17) that due to the the tragedy that is unfolding in the Ukraine since the Russian invasion, the agency could no longer carry out `` ongoing cooperation with Roscosmos on the ExoMars rover mission with a launch in 2022, '' referring to the Russian Space Agency and its role in the second part of the ExoMars program that involves sending a rover and a Russian surface platform to the Red Planet. Read more about the ExoMars delay at Live Science.
The European Space Agency ( ESA) will suspend its partnership with Russian space agency Roscosmos on a number of projects, including the ExoMars rover mission, which is scheduled to launch later this year, the ESA said in a statement.
ESA officials will implement a fast-track study to `` define the available options for a way forward to implement the ExoMars rover mission, '' the agency said. The ExoMars mission will hunt for evidence of potential past life on Mars. The mission was previously pushed back in 2020, due to pandemic-related issues.
U.S. astronaut Mark Vande Hei will return to Earth from the International Space Station ( ISS) aboard a Russian space capsule alongside two Russian cosmonauts, despite earlier fears that he might get left behind amid tensions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine, BBC reported.
`` I can tell you for sure Mark is coming home... We are in communication with our Russian colleagues. There's no fuzz on that, '' Joel Montalbano, NASA's International ISS program manager said.
Vande Hei, 55, has been in space for 355 days, setting a new U.S. record for most time spent in space. He and the two cosmonauts are expected to land in Kazakhstan on March 30.
Earlier this month, Dmitry Rogozin, chief of the Russian Space Agency Roscosmos, announced on state TV that Russia would halt rocket sales to the U.S. in response to sanctions against Russia.
Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to President Joe Biden, spoke with General Nikolay Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, on Wednesday ( March 16), according to a White House statement ( opens in new tab). During the call, Sullivan `` warned General Patrushev about the consequences and implications of any possible Russian decision to use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine, '' the statement reads.
U.S. officials have not said exactly why they think Russia might deploy chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab). But that said, Russia recently accused the U.S. of operating a biowarfare lab out of Ukraine, and `` Russia has a track record of accusing the West of the very crimes that Russia itself is perpetrating, '' U.S. Department of State spokesperson Ned Price said in a recent statement ( opens in new tab). `` These tactics are an obvious ploy by Russia to try to justify further premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified attacks on Ukraine. ''
New images captured by the U.S. private satellite company Maxar reveal horrific scenes of destruction in Mariupol, the southern port city in Ukraine where Russian forces have dropped about 100 bombs in the last 10 days. In a statement released March 13, the Mariupol local council said that 2,187 civilians have been killed in the bombings, although Oleksiy Arestovych, an advisor to the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said that the number now exceeds 2,500.
Read the full story on Live Science.
The defunct Chernobyl nuclear power plant has lost power again, less than 24 hours after the plant's electricity was restored on March 13. Ukrenergo, Ukraine's electrical grid operator, has demanded safe entry to the site for a repair crew to inspect and fix the high-voltage power lines that supply the plant's electricity.
Approximately 20,000 spent nuclear fuel units sit in the plant's cooling tanks, and without reliable power, the likelihood of the evaporation and discharge of nuclear material at the site may increase, Ukrainian officials have warned. But nuclear experts, including the United Nations ' International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA), have downplayed these concerns, saying that cutting off power to the Chernobyl power plant will not have a drastic impact on the facility's safety.
Read the full story on Live Science.
A pregnant woman who was pulled out of the rubble of the bombed Ukrainian maternity hospital in Mariupol on March 9 has reportedly died; her baby also died, The Associated Press reported ( opens in new tab). AP photos of the woman on a stretcher stroking her bloodied belly and her face in shock was one of the `` most brutal moments '' in the now 19-day invasion of Ukraine, the AP reported.
When the woman was rushed to a nearby hospital, she reportedly realized her baby was dying and yelled out to the medics `` Kill me now! '' the AP said. The surgeon who treated her told the AP that her pelvis had been crushed and hip was detached from the attack. The baby was delivered via C-section, though it showed no signs of life.
Read more at The Associated Press ( opens in new tab).
Bayer, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, is halting business in Russia.
`` As a response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Bayer stopped all spending in Russia and Belarus that is not related to supplying essential products in health and agriculture, '' Bayer said in a statement ( opens in new tab) today ( March 14). The ban includes halting both advertising and promotional activities in Russia as well as any capital investment projects.
However, Bayer did not suspend delivery of their products to Russia, as some people had reportedly wanted: `` Our position is that this senseless war has already taken many lives. As a Life Science company, we have an ethical obligation — in every country we operate in. Withholding essential health and agriculture products from the civilian populations — like cancer or cardiovascular treatments, health products for pregnant women and children as well as seeds to grow food — would only multiply the war's ongoing toll on human life, '' Bayer said.
Energy prices skyrocket in the European Union, on the heels of sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, according to news reports.
Nikolai Kobrinets, a Russian foreign ministry officer, said that the EU would pay at least three times more for their oil, gas and electricity, Reuters reported ( opens in new tab). `` I believe the European Union would not benefit from this — we have more durable supplies and stronger nerves, '' Kobrinets told Interfax, a Russian news agency, as reported by Reuters.
In fact, Russia is currently urging India to invest even more into the country's oil and gas sector. `` Russia's economy faces its deepest crisis since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, as the West imposes severe sanctions over Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, '' Reuters reported ( opens in new tab).
Russia is one of the world's largest oil producers. This month, the International Energy Agency ( IEA) put together a 10-point plan to help reduce the European Union’ s reliance on Russia’ s natural gas.
The U.N. Security Council convened on Friday ( March 11) to discuss Russia's unsupported claims that the United States has been running a biological weapons program out of Ukraine.
The U.S. again denied the claims, instead accusing Russia of using the council meeting for `` lying and spreading disinformation, '' the Associated Press reported.
U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield suggested that Russia had fabricated these claims to `` justify its own violent attacks against the Ukrainian people, '' and that Russia was likely to `` use chemical or biological agents for assassinations, as part of a staged or false-flag incident, or to support tactical military operations. ''
U.N. disarmament chief Izumi Nakamitsu agreed that there was no evidence of `` any biological weapons programs '' in Ukraine.
With its claims still being boosted by Chinese media as well as right-wing pundits in the U.S, Russia continued to push the story on Friday, adding the bizarre detail that the U.S. had trained an army of migratory birds to carry Ukrainian bioweapons across the border to drop on Russian targets, Vice reported.
The World Health Organization ( WHO) recommended that Ukrainian public health labs that handle infectious agents destroy any `` high-threat pathogens '' to prevent potential spills during the ongoing Russian invasion, the agency told Reuters ( opens in new tab) on Thursday ( March 10).
The WHO previously worked with Ukrainian public health labs to establish security protocols aimed at preventing the `` accidental or deliberate '' release of such pathogens, the agency told Reuters in an email. `` As part of this work, the WHO has strongly recommended to the Ministry of Health in Ukraine and other responsible bodies to destroy high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills, '' the email read.
The agency also advised all affected parties `` to reach out for technical assistance as needed, '' regarding the safe and secure disposal of any pathogens.
Read the full story on Live Science.
China has joined Russia in spreading unsupported claims that the United States has been funding biological weapons’ labs in Ukraine.
The U.S. denies the claims, and the UN says it has not received any information to back them up. Even so, both China and Russia insist that the rumors are true, and that the U.S. may be gearing up to use them on Ukrainian citizens, the Associated Press reports ( opens in new tab).
`` This Russian military operation has uncovered the secret of the U.S. labs in Ukraine, and this is not something that can be dealt with in a perfunctory manner, '' Zhao Lijian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign ministry, said Thursday ( March 10). `` It is not something they can muddle through by saying that China's statement and Russia's finding are disinformation, and are absurd and ridiculous. ''
The claims have since been picked up by far-right groups and media in the U.S., but U.S. state department officials say the allegations are a disinformation operation.
`` The Russian accusations are absurd. They're laughable. And you know, in the words of my Irish Catholic grandfather, a bunch of malarkey. There's nothing to it. It's classic Russian propaganda, '' John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, said in a news briefing ( opens in new tab) on Wednesday ( March 9).
`` Unlike Russia, which does have chemical weapons and has used them, and does do biological weapons research and has for years, Ukraine has neither, '' Burns, the director of the CIA and a former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, said in a senate hearing on Thursday. `` And when you couple that with their demonstrated willingness to create false flag operations and try to create the impression that somehow Ukrainians are responsible for this, that should give us all pretty serious reason for concern about their propaganda. ''
The U.N. Security Council is set to discuss Moscow’ s claim at a meeting today ( March 11).
At least three people, including a 6-year-old child, were killed in a Russian airstrike on a hospital complex in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol yesterday, city officials said on Thursday ( March 10). At least 17 other civilians were wounded in the attack, which destroyed the hospital's maternity and children's wards, deputy mayor Sergiy Orlov told reporters.
Russian forces continue to bomb the city for the eighth day in a row, the New York Times reported. The city is home to some 430,000 people.
Read the full story on Live Science.
The UN's atomic watchdog has said that the cutting off of power to the Chernobyl power plant will not have a drastic impact on the facility's safety.
The Chernobyl nuclear facility was taken on the first day of the invasion ( Feb. 24). After heavy fighting, Russian forces captured the defunct plant and took its roughly 210 staff hostage. An announcement made yesterday ( March 9) by Ukraine's state energy company said that the plant has been disconnected from the electrical grid, leaving its roughly 20,000 spent nuclear fuel units held in cooling tanks without active cooling, Live Science previously reported.
This led to concerns that the defunct Chernobyl reactor's spent fuel would overheat and leak from containment. But the IAEA said in a tweet ( opens in new tab) that while the development `` violates ( a) key safety pillar, '' in this case it saw `` no critical impact on safety. ''
The UN agency said that `` the heat load of spent fuel storage pool and volume of cooling water at # Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant '' were `` sufficient for effective heat removal without need for electrical supply. ''
The seven pillars of nuclear safety are seven important regulatory conditions set out by the IAEA for nuclear facilities. Among them are the requirements to maintain the physical integrity of nuclear facilities; ensure that staff are not under coercion or duress; and guarantee a constant supply of electricity to facilities.
Ukraine's state energy company has announced that `` there is no possibility to restore the lines '' at Chernobyl and that the site's security systems had also lost power.
Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, a key Russian ally, has instructed Belarusian specialists to restore the Chernobyl plant's power supply, according to the state-owned Belarusian news agency BelTA.
The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine was overtaken by Russian forces last week, and now, the plant's communication lines have been cut, the United Nations ' ( UN) atomic watchdog has announced.
That means that the International Atomic Energy Agency ( IAEA) is no longer receiving data transmissions from the Zaporizhzhia plant or the defunct Chernobyl power plant, whose communication lines had already been severed. Without a way to monitor how nuclear material is being handled at these sites, the IAEA can not check that key safety regulations are being upheld or that material isn't being moved from its current location.
`` The remote transmission of data from IAEA safeguards equipment located at nuclear sites around the world is an important component of our safeguards implementation, in Ukraine and globally, '' IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in a statement ( opens in new tab). `` Such systems... enable us to monitor nuclear material and activities at these sites when our inspectors are not present. ''
Read the full story on Live Science.
Images being released from Ukraine continue to look bleak. Much of Mariupol’ s population of 400,000 is without power, heat and water, as well as no phone signal, for over a week, a situation that the country’ s foreign minister Dmitryo Kuleba said is akin to Russia `` holding 400,000 people hostage, '' The Guardian reported ( opens in new tab).
The city is being bombarded by continuous shelling, resulting in the deaths of at least 1,170 Mariupol’ s residents ( 47 of these individual were buried March 9 in a mass grave), the city’ s deputy mayor Sergei Orlov said, as reported by The Guardian. Orlov called the acts `` medieval '' and `` pure genocide. '' He reportedly added, `` The attack isn’ t simply treacherous. It’ s a war crime. They are attacking us with aviation, shells, multiple rocket launchers. ”
Meanwhile, the Red Cross has described conditions in Mariupol `` apocalyptic. '' And `` catastrophic '' is the term the deputy prime minister Iryna Vereshchuk used to describe what is happening in the port city, according to The Guardian. Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskiy also denounced the brutal attack in Mariupol, saying it is an `` atrocity '' and comparing it to the devastation unleashed by the Nazis, The Guardian said.
The Russian forces have used thermobaric weapons — which pull in oxygen to generate a super-hot explosion — in Ukraine, according to the U.K. Ministry of Defence.
`` The Russian MoD has confirmed the use of the TOS-1A weapon system in Ukraine. The TOS-1A uses thermobaric rockets, creating incendiary and blast effects, '' the U.K. Ministry of Defence tweeted ( opens in new tab). The MoD also included a video showing the Russian TOS-1 rocket launchers, which can spit out up to 30 thermobaric warheads atop rockets in quick succession, according to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Along with fuel air explosives, thermobaric warheads are a type of volumetric weapon that consists of a fuel container and two explosive charges, the Arms Control center explained. Once the weapon gets launched, the first explosive charge detonates and broadcasts fuel particles. Then, the second charge ignites those particles and oxygen in the surrounding air. The result? A high-pressure, high-temperature blast that can reverberate and can even generate a partial vacuum when released inside buildings and other enclosed spaces, the Arms Control center said.
Though international law allows for the use of thermobaric weapons against military targets, they are banned if they could harm civilians, The Hill reported. U.S. officials have said that Russia is escalating its tactics, killing hundreds of civilians ( including kids), The Hill reported ( opens in new tab).
The Russian MoD has confirmed the use of the TOS-1A weapon system in Ukraine. The TOS-1A uses thermobaric rockets, creating incendiary and blast effects.Watch the video below for more information about this weapon and its devastating impact. 🇺🇦 # StandWithUkraine🇺🇦 pic.twitter.com/d8PLQ0PhQDMarch 9, 2022
A hospital complex that includes a children’ s ward and maternity hospital in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol has been destroyed by Russian forces dropping bombs on the facility, CNN reports ( opens in new tab). Video of the building after being bombed shared by the city council of Mariupol shows a hospital in tatters, with scraps from walls and beds and equipment strewn or in piles across the floors.
`` A maternity hospital in the city center, a children’ s ward and department of internal medicine... all these were destroyed during the Russian air strike on Mariupol. Just now, '' said Pavlo Kyrylenko, head of the Donetsk regional administration.
In terms of casualties, the police said that information “ is being clarified, ” CNN reported. Even so, preliminary information indicates that at least 17 people were injured in the Russian attack, according to CNN. Among those injured are staff and patients in the maternity ward, The New York Times said ( opens in new tab).
Though Russia and Ukraine had agreed on a cease-fire on Saturday ( March 5), hours later fighting had resumed. Videos of the current strike also show sprays of shrapnel bursting through hospital windows. One of the resulting craters, this one in a courtyard between buildings, looked to be about 10 feet ( 3 meters) deep, according to the Times.
Read the full story on Live Science.
Dr. Hans Henri P. Kluge, the World Health Organization ( WHO) Regional Director for Europe, issued a statement ( opens in new tab) on March 8 addressing health care provisions for civilians within and refugees beyond Ukraine.
Kluge notes that he's been working with Amin Awad, Assistant Secretary-General and United Nations Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine, to establish a system to safely convey humanitarian health supplies into Ukraine.
`` So far, 2 shipments totalling 76 tonnes ( 36 + 40 tonnes) of trauma and emergency health supplies, as well as freezers, refrigerators, ice packs and cool boxes are in transit in Ukraine, '' the statement reads. `` We have further shipments of 500 oxygen concentrators and more supplies are on their way. '' WHO teams have also been deployed to Hungary, Poland, the Republic of Moldova and Romania to assess the needs of incoming refugees and to help build up the capacity of local health care systems.
As the Russian invasion continues in Ukraine, so too does the COVID-19 pandemic. `` Remarkably, Ukraine has maintained its COVID-19 surveillance and response system, '' the WHO statement reads. The country reported 731 COVID-19 deaths to the WHO last week, `` and sadly this number will increase as oxygen shortages continue. ''
In addition to addressing the health status of Ukrainians, the WHO condemned Russian attacks on health care facilities and workers in the country.
`` It should not need saying that health workers, hospitals and other medical facilities must never be a target at any time, including during crises and conflicts. To date, we have 16 confirmed reports of attacks on health in Ukraine, and more are being verified. WHO strongly condemns these attacks on health-care services. ''
Read the full WHO statement ( opens in new tab).
As Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, Svitlana Krakovska, a senior scientist at the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute, and a delegation of other Ukrainian scientists continued to attend UN-run virtual meetings to finalize the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC) report. Krakovska, who headed the Ukrainian delegation, told the IPCC chair that the group would `` continue to work if we have an internet connection and no missiles over our heads, '' Bloomberg Green reported ( opens in new tab) on Feb. 28.
Soon, however, members of the delegation had to abandon the enterprise to seek safety in air raid shelters, or to flee Ukraine altogether, The Guardian reported ( opens in new tab) on Wednesday ( March 9). Krakovska sheltered in her home in Kyiv with her family as missiles struck nearby buildings.
At this time, `` I started to think about the parallels between climate change and this war and it’ s clear that the roots of both these threats to humanity are found in fossil fuels, '' Krakovska told The Guardian.
`` Burning oil, gas and coal is causing warming and impacts we need to adapt to. And Russia sells these resources and uses the money to buy weapons, '' she said. `` Other countries are dependent upon these fossil fuels, they don’ t make themselves free of them. This is a fossil fuel war. It’ s clear we can not continue to live this way, it will destroy our civilization. ''
This statement follows an executive order from President Joe Biden banning the importation of Russian oil, gas and coal into the U.S., as well as an announcement from the European Union that its member states will be drastically reducing their dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
Read more about the role of fossil fuels in the war in The Guardian ( opens in new tab) and Bloomberg Green ( opens in new tab).
The site of the worst nuclear disaster in history, Chernobyl’ s nuclear power plant has gone dark, as Russian forces occupy the defunct plant in Ukraine. The plant along with the facilities in the Chernobyl exclusion zone have no electricity, Ukraine’ s state energy company announced ( opens in new tab).
With now power, the planet’ s estimated 20,000 spent nuclear fuel units, which are stored in cooling tanks, will no longer receive cooling. The fear is that the spent nuclear fuel could discharge a dangerous dose of radioactivity to the plant’ s personnel, Ukrainian officials warned. Even so, nuclear energy experts caution that because the fuel rods are 22 years old, they are not as hot as they were initially and so this discharge is unlikely.
Facility staff are responsible for decommissioning the site and ensuring the safe disposal of the radioactive material inside the plant’ s defunct reactors. However, since Russian forces seized Chernobyl, that work has been on hold.
`` I 'm deeply concerned about the difficult and stressful situation facing staff at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the potential risks this entails for nuclear safety, '' IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi said in the statement. `` I call on the forces in effective control of the site to urgently facilitate the safe rotation of personnel there. ''
Read the full story on Live Science.
NATO member Poland said Tuesday ( March 8) that the country was ready to deliver Mikoyan MiG-29 fighter jets designed in the Soviet Union to Ramstein Air Base for use by the U.S. The Defense Department, however, turned down the offer.
The move is thought to be a way for Poland to avoid any retaliation for directly helping Ukraine fight against Russian invaders. However, the Pentagon responded that the delivering the Soviet-era warplanes from the Air Base in southwestern Germany into risky airspace is just not a `` tenable '' proposal. According to The Guardian ( opens in new tab), Poland is thought to have around 28 of these fighter aircraft.
`` The prospect of fighter jets 'at the disposal of the Government of the United States of America ' departing from a U.S./NATO base in Germany to fly into airspace that is contested with Russia over Ukraine raises serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance, '' John F. Kirby, Pentagon press secretary, said in a statement today ( opens in new tab). `` It is simply not clear to us that there is a substantive rationale for it. We will continue to consult with Poland and our other NATO allies about this issue and the difficult logistical challenges it presents, but we do not believe Poland's proposal is a tenable one. ''
The proposal from Poland comes after news that although Russian forces are seeing great losses — and not the easy win the Kremlin had anticipated — the country under Vladimir Putin will push on, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab). According to the Times, top intelligence officials said that Putin was `` surprised and unsettled by the problems that have hampered his military in Ukraine. ''
Even so, the Ukraine forces can't hold onto Kyiv forever. `` With supplies being cut off, it will become somewhat desperate in, I would say, 10 days to two weeks, '' Lt. Gen. Scott D. Berrier, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Times.
U.S. sanctions on Russia, including severe limits on the country's central bank, could deliver a crushing blow to the Kremlin and its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, according to news reports. And now, in order to prevent Russia from skirting these restrictions with cryptocurrency, U.S. President Joe Biden is expected to sign an executive order this week to regulate the digital currency.
According to Reuters, Biden could sign the order on Wednesday ( March 9) for `` a wide-ranging oversight of the cryptocurrency market. '' The executive order is also a response to moves by China and others to create their own cryptocurrencies, Reuters reported ( opens in new tab).
`` Although we have not seen widespread evasion of our sanctions using methods such as cryptocurrency, prompt reporting of suspicious activity contributes to our national security and our efforts to support Ukraine and its people, '' acting Director Him Das said, as reported by The Hill ( opens in new tab).
Though Bitcoin is the most well-known cryptocurrency, thousands of these digital currencies exist and as of June 2021, about 220 million Americans used this completely virtual `` cash, '' according to Crypto.com ( opens in new tab).
Those familiar with Biden's intentions say the executive order will task the State Department with ensuring that U.S. crypto laws align with those of allies, while mandating the the Financial Stability Oversight Council to investigate any related financial concerns and the Justice Department to look into the need for a new law to create a new currency, The Hill reported.
On Tuesday ( March 8), President Joe Biden announced that the U.S. is banning the importation of Russian oil, gas and coal and prohibiting any new U.S. investment in Russia's energy sector or in foreign companies that invest in the country's energy production. The U.S. receives less than 10% of its energy resources from Russia, but the ban is still expected to impact the price of gas and other petroleum products in the States, The New York Times reported ( opens in new tab). | general |
Sonrai Named a Representative CNAPP Vendor by Gartner | Cloud-native applications and cloud native application protection platforms ( CNAPP) offer the potential for stronger security than traditional, monolithic architectures. However, making the leap to cloud-native also requires a fundamental shift in security strategy.
First off, what is a CNAPP? Gartner defines it as an integrated set of security and compliance capabilities designed to help secure and protect cloud-native applications across development and production. Furthermore, Gartner explains in its recent “ Innovation Insight for Cloud-Native Application Protection Platforms ” report, that optimal cloud-native security requires an integrated approach that begins in development and extends to workload management.
The thought process around CNAPP is relatively simple – use tools and security practices that were made for native cloud use. Read on to learn some of the key insights from Gartner’ s report, including important security recommendations for security and risk management ( SRM) leaders.
COVID-19 is accelerating digital business initiatives and pushing companies to cloud-native application development. More and more companies are combining microservices-based architectures with DevOps-style pipelines, multi cloud infrastructure, and ephemeral cloud resources.
But this shift, Gartner says, is creating significant security challenges as traditional security practices can not keep up with the speed and scale of the cloud.
It’ s therefore important to “ shift left ” and embrace DevSecOps and seamlessly integrate security when developing and deploying cloud-native applications. In fact, Gartner says that 44% of organizations are now using a DevSecOps pipeline to secure cloud-native apps, with most occurring in limited deployment.
According to Gartner, understanding the real risk of cloud-native applications requires advanced analytics with visibility into different areas — including open source components, applications, cloud infrastructure, and workloads.
The report also mentions that businesses need to secure cloud-native applications using a complex set of interconnected tools spanning production and development. Here are some solutions included in a CNAPP that Gartner recommends.
CIEM manages cloud identities and their extensive entitlements, or, effective permissions. The main purpose of a CIEM platform is to manage identities and their effective permissions. CIEM solutions will reveal the entitlements these identities, person and non-person, hold. This allows your business to strip excessive permissions and reach least privilege. CIEM solutions will keep you at least privilege with continuous monitoring to notify you of any out of policy changes.
CSPM helps companies discover misconfigurations, potential risks, cloud drift or lack of compliance. CSPM will ensure your cloud has all the necessary basic controls in place to secure its foundation. This could mean ensuring databases are not publicly accessible or that you have logging enabled. Once you have a secure environment, a baseline is locked in which allows a CSPM tool to monitor against and detect deviations.
CWPPs monitor workloads in the cloud, scan for vulnerabilities and provide information regarding those vulnerabilities. CWPP, Gartner says, can help gain control and visibility into virtual and physical infrastructure, serverless workloads, and containers.
Gartner recommends taking specific actions to safeguard your cloud-native applications.
Security teams should strive to automate security testing as code. This can reduce the friction of adoption and make it easier to secure your applications.
Gartner recommends combining scanning with runtime visibility and configuration awareness. This can help to prioritize risk remediation.
When designing applications, it’ s best to avoid striving for perfection. Instead, security teams should focus on the highest severity, confidence, and risk vulnerabilities to avoid wasting time.
Gartner’ s report encourages businesses to take an integrated platform approach when implementing cloud-native application security by using either a CNAPP or a cloud-native security platform.
Per Gartner, CNAPP integrates security and compliance capabilities to enhance cloud-native application security during development and production. CNAPPs combine a variety of capabilities including top solutions like CIEM, CSPM and CWPP.
With the help of a CNAPP, you can cover multiple security needs in one central platform. As a result, you can tighten control and gain deeper visibility for comprehensive threat detection and management.
Selecting a CNAPP, or cloud-native application protection platform, can be an overwhelming challenge. To help narrow down picking a CNAPP, Gartner provides a list of example vendors that offer a combination of workload security, CIEM, CSPM, data protection and overall visibility.
Sonrai is one of the key representative providers in Gartner’ s report. Sonrai Dig, a leading cloud security platform that provides true end-to-end visibility and control over your environment. Dig combines cross-platform security with exceptional CIEM capabilities for inventorying identities, tracking and managing permissions, and enforcing a state of least privilege, with intelligent CSPM and workload security. Additionally, Dig offers intelligent workflows and automation meaning alerts make their way to the right time and action can be taken immediately.
If your business is experimenting with cloud-native development, Sonrai Dig can help you iterate safely and efficiently. Dig lets you go beyond standard IAM and achieve complete real-time visibility into all of your data and identities.
The end result? A much more secure cloud environment — and much greater peace of mind.
To try Sonrai Dig, request a free demo today.
The post Sonrai Named a Representative CNAPP Vendor by Gartner appeared first on Sonrai Security.
* * * This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Blog - Sonrai Security authored by Eric Kedrosky. Read the original post at: https: //sonraisecurity.com/blog/cnapp-vendor-gartner/ | general |
Little Uptick in New COVID Cases in Santa Barbara County - The Santa Barbara Independent | CDC Recommends Second Booster Shots for Some
As word spreads internationally of yet another more contagious mutation of the COVID-19 virus, the Centers for Disease Control recently advised that immunocompromised people and adults 50 and older take another booster shot. In Santa Barbara County, the vaccine is still free and available at medical offices and pharmacies.
The county’ s health officer, Dr. Henning Ansorg, said “ almost no COVID cases ” were being found among county clinic patients currently, and according to the county dashboard, the daily case count is in the high twenties, down from the hundreds during the Omicron surge in January and February of this year. California cases statewide have been slowly growing from a low of 1,959 last Wednesday to 2,078 today, but Ansorg stated such small fluctuations, whether upward or downward, were not unusual and could be due to reporting delays.
The new mutation is an Omicron variant called XE and was first identified in Great Britain, where researchers had sequenced only 630 cases as of last weekend. The XE variant has been found in New England, but on the West Coast, the majority of virus sequences are still the two Omicron variants — the BA.1 and newer BA.2 — that are “ parents ” to XE, which has bits and pieces of both. All the variants — from Alpha through to Omicron — have each been more contagious than the last, but the Omicrons have so far not proved to be more dangerous. The vaccine and boosters work against Omicron, but an early study from Israel indicates a fourth shot of Pfizer confers increased immunity for about four weeks.
Vaccination in Santa Barbara County has hit 80 percent of eligible residents — those 5 years old and older — and 72 percent of eligible residents are fully vaccinated with single or two-dose shots. Among the roughly 400,000 eligible residents, 160,243 have had booster doses. Hospitalizations for COVID are down to eight patients as of Monday, with one person on a ventilator in an intensive care unit. COVID-19 remains a serious disease; though newer mutations seem to be less deadly, 675 people have died in S.B. County since the pandemic first hit in March 2020, and 10 died this March.
Eligibility for the second booster depend on age and level of immune-system compromise, said Public Health spokesperson Jackie Ruiz, and people should wait until four months after their last vaccine. Children 12 and older who’ ve had an organ transplant or are immunocompromised by health conditions may get a second booster of the Pfizer vaccine. People 18 and older with similarly compromised health are eligible for a Pfizer or Moderna booster. And people 50 and older may generally get the booster of their choice.
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Santa Barbara MTD Announces Cutbacks on Most Major Bus Routes - The Santa Barbara Independent | Staff Shortage Forces MTD to Alter Schedules Temporarily Starting April 25
Starting April 25, MTD will be making temporary service reductions to improve system reliability, due to a shortage of bus operators. Despite efforts to recruit bus operators, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused MTD to experience ongoing workforce shortages, causing occasional bus trip cancellations that create uncertainty for passengers.
This temporary reduction of service is a necessary step to ensure schedule reliability, according to MTD General Manager Jerry Estrada. Estrada said he hopes this change will allow time for MTD to increase staff and return to higher levels of service later in the year.
Changes will adjust service to a level that can be more reliably covered by the current MTD bus operators, and these reductions are intended to last for the spring and summer period. MTD will notify the public with any future service adjustments.
Passengers are encouraged to review the schedule of the bus lines they ride in advance of April 25, as changes will be different for every line. Hard copies of temporary schedule guides will be available at the Transit Center and on buses by next week.
In the meantime, the new schedule guide can be found online here and further details here.
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Supply chain agility and stability: Three ways CMOs ease international expansion | Ralph Tricomi, director, market development, Web Industries, shares three ways a contract manufacturing organisation ( CMO) can help medical device businesses expand internationally despite supply chain challenges.
From Brexit to Omicron, medical device original equipment manufacturers ( OEM) are always adapting to uncertainty. Who would have thought that first quarter 2022 would bring blockages at the Canadian border, continued ports congestion, truck driver shortages and escalating container costs? For U.K.- and Ireland-based OEMs, these are just a few challenges associated with entering the North American market.
But the potential spoils make it worth the effort to consider international American expansion. The U.S. medical device market alone is the world’ s largest, with 40% of global market share, according to SelectUSA, and it’ s projected to grow to $ 208 billion by 2023.
The opportunity to expand across the Atlantic is sizeable. Some OEMs choose to engage CMOs to expedite and ease the entry process. A Grand View Research study found that “ the U.S. medical device outsourcing market size was valued at $ 21.8 billion in 2020 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate ( CAGR) of 10.3% from 2021 to 2028. ” Contract manufacturing made up 55.5% of overall outsourcing in 2020. This data suggests many device OEMs are prioritising outsourced manufacturing. Here are three answers why.
Medical device OEMs benefit when they can focus on core competencies and outsource other processes to contract manufacturing partners. It’ s increasingly common for brand owners to devote attention to design, development and marketing while delegating other processes to third parties, trends, and product innovation.
When they use CMOs, medical device makers can direct their resources to product design, development, patient care, healthcare provider expectations and demand trends while assigning manufacturing details to a CMO partner.
OEM-CMO collaboration is made seamless these days by enhanced business-to-business digital communication. Companies can establish secure virtual connectivity for sharing and collaborating on designs, project plans and production forecasts. In-person visits and on-site inspections still are important but boots on the ground are not necessary to keep information flowing and projects moving forward around-the-clock.
2. Supply security and predictability
Since the pandemic’ s onset, one of the greatest issues facing OEMs has been supply chain uncertainty. Partnering with a nearshore or onshore CMO close to the target market eases materials inventory management, supply chain predictability and securitisation.
Stretched global supply chains are vulnerable to delays, capacity constraints, ports congestion and supply shortages. In 2021, approximately 8,000 to 12,000 containers of medical supplies were delayed an average of 37 days by U.S. transportation congestion at ports, on railroads and with trucking, according to research by the Health Industry Distributors Association.
By outsourcing to a North America-based CMO, OEMs simplify raw materials and components sourcing. They rely on their contract manufacturing partner’ s supply chain knowledge and relationships. The CMO connects the dots to match vetted suppliers with the bill of materials and can manage raw materials inventory.
In addition, OEMs who outsource to an established CMO partner will have a skilled workforce, already in position. This factor is important amid a competitive labour market.
Speed to market matters. The ability to manufacture and distribute — at mass scale — within the target launch window plays a significant role in whether a device is a commercial success. Unfortunately, there have been COVID-19 diagnostic tests and other solutions that never made it to market because of supply chain challenges or regulatory issues. While these risks can impede any organisation, they are intensified for international OEMs trying to expand in the U.S. market. Hurdles might have been avoided or overcome if they had the right partners to help them build their North American business.
For U.K.- and Ireland-based OEMs looking to expand internationally, a CMO partnership offers a rapid means of accessing new geographic markets without extensive capital expenditure and time to stand up new factories or convert facilities into medical-grade operations.
With strong medical device industry growth, it’ s an ideal time to consider international expansion, particularly in the United States. There are headwinds, including global supply chain shortages and delays. With the right CMO relationship close to market, device OEMs will have a trusted partner to help surmount the difficulties, seize on new opportunities, and share their innovations with more customers. | tech |
Tenant Relief Bill Passes, Protecting Qualifying Santa Barbara Households from Eviction - The Santa Barbara Independent | Applications for Rent Relief Must Have Been Submitted on or by March 31 for Protections
California Assembly Bill 2179 was signed into law on March 31, which will extend some of the tenant protections put in place by the original COVID-19 Tenant Relief eviction moratorium, but only for tenants that have submitted rental relief requests on or before March 31. The bill will also prevent any local governing body from enacting its own COVID-19 rent moratorium until at least June 30.
The bill passed the state senate with a 36-1 vote, and both State Senator Monique Limón and Assemblymember Steve Bennett voted in favor of the bill. Under AB 2179, tenants who applied for rental relief on or by March 31 and are awaiting approval or payment are protected from eviction until June 30, 2022. Due to the extensive backlog of applications for assistance, this bill was created to allow more time for funds to be distributed. Any tenant or household that has not applied for this assistance is subject to the eviction laws created prior to the pandemic and moratorium.
Limón emphasized that AB 2179 is a very narrowly focused bill and was not meant to be an extension of the eviction moratorium but an extension of rental relief. Limón told the Independent the bill would only impact about 160,000-190,000 households in California that have applied for rental relief.
“ [ The bill ] does more than the alternative, which would have been everybody running out of protections, ” she said. There is a larger conversation to be had about tenant protections, Limón said, but this bill was created to target those who have yet to receive aid and are counting on receiving it. “ I don’ t think the bill solves all the issues we have, ” she said.
Since 2021, attorneys at Santa Barbara Legal Aid have seen a steady uptick in tenants reaching out for assistance and in landlords and property owners filing for eviction or unlawful detainer through the court. Jennifer Smith, executive director of the Legal Aid Foundation of Santa Barbara County, said in recent months, Legal Aid has also seen an increase in eviction notice activity, or landlords and property owners serving tenants with eviction notices. Tenant laws have become very complex in the last two years, Smith said, even before the COVID-19 pandemic began. The California Tenant Protection Act of 2019 went into effect in January 2020, just before the pandemic began, and included requiring landlords to have “ just cause ” when serving evictions and limiting annual rent increases.
Groups like the Santa Barbara Tenants Union have been at the forefront of tenants issues and have brought attention to issues like “ soft evictions, ” or those are carried out through threats and intimidation tactics rather than the court.
“ Unfortunately, what we see because of added complexity, there may be landlords who threaten things or deliver notices that are not lawful, ” Smith said. “ Nobody can be lawfully evicted without an order from a judge, ” she said.
Smith encouraged both tenants and landlords to seek legal representation, to inform both parties of their rights and responsibilities. “ It’ s important for folks to reach out and understand their rights, ” she said.
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How to reduce loneliness: Meaningful activities can improve health, well-being -- ScienceDaily | An international team of researchers including John Dattilo -- professor of recreation, park, and tourism management at Penn State -- has been studying how to increase leisure and reduce loneliness during the pandemic among both international college students and older adults.
Across two different studies, the researchers found that people who had meaningful, challenging experiences were less lonely -- even when higher levels of social contact and support were not available.
`` There is a well-known saying: 'Time flies when you are having fun, ' '' said Dattilo. `` The unspoken corollary is that time drags when you are bored. Our research shows that both of these ideas are true. By engaging in meaningful activities during free time that demand focus, people can reduce loneliness and increase momentary happiness. ''
Loneliness and the pandemic
Despite -- or perhaps in part because of -- technology that can connect people anywhere at any time, previous research has shown that loneliness has increased over recent decades.
Loneliness touches people of all ages, from children to young adults to older adults. The COVID-19 pandemic, which caused many people to alter their social behavior to prevent the spread of disease, exacerbated the problem of loneliness around the world.
`` Loneliness is very connected to our health, '' Dattilo explained. `` Psychological, emotional, and cognitive health are all challenged when people are lonely. Loneliness is associated with depression and other mental health challenges. ''
`` Troublingly, '' continued Dattilo, `` there is a loneliness epidemic. And while the COVID-19 pandemic has increased loneliness for many people, the silver lining is that the pandemic has also exposed the scope of the loneliness problem. Anything we can do as a society to reduce loneliness should improve health and happiness for people everywhere. ''
In a new article that appears in Leisure Sciences, the researchers explored loneliness among international university students in Taiwan. The same research team also published an article about reducing loneliness among nursing home residents late in 2021.
Prior research has shown that loneliness among international university students is common around the world. International students are removed from their social networks and live in a different culture, often one that speaks a different language. Typically, international students can prevent loneliness by participating in social activities to receive'social support, ' the sense that they are cared for by the people with whom they socialize. During the pandemic, however, many group-based activities and social gatherings have been cancelled or prohibited.
Additionally, the researchers identified that the online social opportunities that became available in the pandemic may be less accessible to international students because of language and cultural differences.
Flow reduces loneliness
According to the researchers, reduced loneliness is associated with engaging in enjoyable activities that require both concentration and skill.
`` When people become engrossed in what they are doing, they enter a state that is called 'flow, ' '' Dattilo explained. `` Flow can be achieved by engaging in mental or physical activities that we value and that require us to concentrate fully to use our skills. ''
For people to achieve a state of flow, an activity must require a good deal of their skill but not be so difficult that it seems impossible. Additionally, it must demand concentration to execute and be meaningful to the participant. Artistic endeavors like playing the piano or painting can induce flow. So can physical activities like skiing or chopping wood, along with mental tasks like writing or storytelling. What induces flow differs from person to person based on individual skills and values.
`` When we enter a state of flow, we become absorbed and focused, and we experience momentary enjoyment, '' Dattilo continued. `` When we leave a state of flow, we are often surprised by how much time has passed. ''
People with extensive free time -- like college students who are locked down during a pandemic, or people who live in a nursing home -- can achieve flow when they engage in activities they find to be meaningful. In this way, time passes quickly for them, their life has meaning, and their experience of loneliness is reduced, according to the researchers.
Social support from friends and acquaintances is a primary way that people reduce loneliness. For many people, however, obtaining adequate social support can be challenging. Though the researchers found that students with high levels of social support were less lonely, they found that flow was even more important to reducing loneliness. Helping people achieve flow can reduce loneliness in situations where social support is insufficient. More importantly, it can reduce loneliness for people in any situation.
Encouraging flow for everyone
Some activities never induce flow, while other activities may or may not, depending on the individual. According to Dattilo, there is nothing wrong with watching television, but, typically, it does not help people enter a state of flow because they are unlikely to experience any challenges. Additionally, different people find different activities meaningful and enjoyable. Nursing home residents are unlikely to enjoy playing bingo if they did not enjoy similar games when they were younger, said Dattilo.
`` Learning which activities might enable someone to enter a state of flow requires asking questions and listening, '' said Dattilo. `` People tend to thrive on healthy engagement and challenge. My collaborators and I hope that this research will help people live fuller, happier, healthier lives. ''
This research was funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology in Taiwan. Liang-Chih Chang of National Open University in New Taipei City, Taiwan was the lead author of this research. Pei-Chun Hseih of Brock University in Ontario, Canada and Fei-Hsin Huang of Lungwha University of Science and Technology in Taoyuan City, Taiwan also contributed to this research. | science |
Wastewater provides a planet-wide laboratory for the study of human health -- ScienceDaily | The research highlights a technique known as Wastewater-based Epidemiology ( WBE), in which samples of municipal wastewater can be used as a diagnostic tool to explore a surprisingly broad range of community-wide health indices.
In research published in the peer-reviewed, high-impact journal Environment International, Rolf Halden and Sangeet Adhikari, describe how WBE can be used to help achieve a number of ambitious objectives outlined in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
The study, the largest and most comprehensive assessment of wastewater infrastructure around the world to date, examines wastewater treatment facilities in 129 countries, serving over a third of the world's population. It is also the first study to propose and evaluate the feasibility of using WBE to measure progress toward achieving several UN sustainability objectives.
The WBE technique can be used to assess factors influencing community-wide health, from the consumption of local diets, alcohol, illicit drugs and tobacco to exposure to hazardous chemicals, pharmaceuticals, personal care products, viruses, and antibiotic-resistant microbes.
In addition to infectious disease monitoring, new disease biomarkers detectable in wastewater are being developed, enabling researchers to mine samples for evidence of afflictions including diabetes, heart disease and cancer. The study emphasizes the dire need for the expansion of wastewater services to large swaths of the globe where such resources are still lacking.
As recently as 2019, the use of wastewater monitoring to assess and optimize global health was a utopian dream, envisioned and pursued by few, as detailed in Halden's 2020 book, Environment. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, changed all of this, with the method put to immediate, practical use for tracking the devastating course of SARS CoV-2.
`` Whereas most of these efforts today are still focused on containing the pandemic locally, it is time to take stock of what else can be accomplished using WBE to advance the human condition and sustainability globally, '' Halden says. `` The first inventory of global wastewater infrastructure presented in our paper represents an initial and important step toward creating a healthier and more equitable future for human populations around the world. ''
Professor Halden is the director of the Biodesign Center for Environmental Engineering at Arizona State University, where he works with Sangeet Adhikari, who wrote the study as part of his recently completed doctoral thesis. Halden is also professor in ASU's School of Sustainable Engineering and the Built Environment, a member of the university's Global Futures Laboratory and professor in the School of Life Sciences.
A drop of water, a wealth of data
The effluent from human waste may seem far removed from a sterile clinical laboratory where diagnostic tests are performed. Yet both diagnostic approaches rely on the rich storehouse of information contained in bodily fluids and excretions.
Today, more than 55 countries are actively using WBE to evaluate community health. The method provides a comprehensive, inexpensive and rapid means of monitoring population-wide health. The initial burst in activity, due to the SARS CoV-2 crisis, enabled public health officials to evaluate local, regional and national disease trends even as pandemic surges posed severe challenges to conventional diagnostic testing.
A further benefit of WBE is that it can deliver population-level data reflecting the burden of undiagnosed COVID-19 cases, including asymptomatic infections that are unlikely to be detected through standard clinical surveillance. Such information is particularly valuable for epidemiologists hoping to refine estimates of case-fatality rates. It has been successfully applied by national and state governments, nongovernmental organizations, universities, and commercial ventures.
Monitoring health and sustainability
Halden and his ASU colleagues had long recognized the power of WBE to provide vital clues about the prevalence and transmission rates of pathogens and the novel coronavirus quickly turned into a showcase on how to apply wastewater monitoring to inform public health decision-making in real time. After creating the world's first wastewater-informed, open-access electronic dashboards for opioids in 2018/19 and for COVID-19 in 2020, in collaboration with the City of Tempe, AZ, the current study seeks to radically expand the scope of wastewater monitoring to benefit human populations around the world and particularly in developing countries.
By unanimous decision, 17 specific goals were announced by the UN to meet social, economic, and environmental development milestones. The UN agenda represents the determination of member countries to address global challenges posed by climate change, rapid urbanization, and other factors. The new study demonstrates that WBE could be used to effectively track the progress made toward achieving over half of these goals, set for 2030.
These include:
A range of health outcomes could also be dramatically improved simply through expansion of wastewater treatment technologies to the areas of greatest global need.
Earth inventory
The researchers began by conducting an in-depth literature survey of existing sewerage infrastructure, population demographics of the regions served and a range of health-related biomarkers available in wastewater that could be informative for furthering the UN goals.
The study identified some 109,000 municipal wastewater treatment plants in 129 countries, serving 2.7 billion people worldwide. This is equivalent to around 35% of the global population. Although some 80% of the population is served by municipal waste treatment systems in high-income countries, around 60 countries were identified in which less than 40% of the population is served. The grave disparities between rich and poor nations in terms of these facilities is partially responsible for their divergent health statistics.
Indeed, the study notes that areas lacking centralized sewerage infrastructure, particularly in low-income countries, are at a double disadvantage. Without such facilities, community hygiene is compromised; and affected populations are further deprived of the benefits of ongoing health monitoring provided by WBE. This fact is reflected in the observed data that showed a reduction in disease burden associated with centralized wastewater infrastructure.
Multi-purpose diagnostics
Providing access to sanitation infrastructure helps limit fecal contamination and the spread of waterborne diseases. Extending sewerage collection and treatment to areas lacking in this technology could provide a cost-effective strategy for health assessment through WBE under conditions where traditional healthcare is financially out of reach for most local people.
In addition to the detection of infectious disease, WBE can also assist in the management of chemical risks to the population, including microplastics, endocrine disrupting agents and a broad range of contaminants. The study also identifies 25 different classes of biomarkers that can provide valuable health statistics on community levels of hunger, stress, cardiovascular disease, pulmonary afflictions, and cancer.
The enhanced power of WBE for comprehensive health monitoring has significantly strengthened the case for extending sanitation infrastructure across the globe to safeguard human health as well as critical ecosystems. The new study also demonstrates the usefulness of the technique for helping society meet many of the United Nation's goals toward a healthier and more sustainable world. | science |
First large-scale study of COVID-era birth data finds significant drop in cesarian, induced deliveries -- ScienceDaily | Published April 6 in the journal Pediatrics, the study is the first to examine pandemic-era birth data at scale. The research raises questions about medical interventions in pregnancy and whether some decisions by doctors may result in unnecessary preterm deliveries, according to Assistant Professor Daniel Dench, the paper's lead author.
`` While much more research needs to be done, including understanding how these changes affected fetal deaths and how doctors triaged patient care by risk category during the pandemic, these are significant findings that should spark discussion in the medical community, '' Dench said.
Notable Findings
In effect, the study begins to answer a question that never could have been resolved in a traditional experiment: What would happen to the rate of premature C-sections and induced deliveries if women didn't see doctors as often, especially in person, during pregnancy?
Such an experiment would be unethical, of course. But stay-at-home orders had a side effect of reducing prenatal care visits by more than a third, according to one analysis. That gave Dench and his colleagues -- Theodore Joyce at Baruch College and Dr. Howard Minkoff at Maimonides Medical Center -- an opportunity to evaluate the impacts, after all.
The researchers examined records of nearly 39 million U.S. births from 2010 to 2020. They used the data from the National Center for Health Statistics to forecast expected premature births -- defined as babies born before 37 weeks of pregnancy -- from March to December 2020. Then they compared the predictions to the actual numbers.
Dench and his co-authors found that in March 2020 -- when the World Health Organization declared Covid-19 a pandemic, sparking business closures and stay-at-home orders around the country -- preterm births from C-sections or induced deliveries immediately fell from the forecasted number by 0.4 percentage points. From March 2020 to December 2020, the number remained on average 0.35 percentage points below the predicted values. That translates to 350 fewer preterm C-sections and induced deliveries per 100,000 live births, or 10,000 fewer overall.
Before the pandemic, the number of preterm C-sections and induced deliveries had been rising. Spontaneous preterm births -- those that were not induced or cesarean -- also fell by a small percentage in the first months of the pandemic, but much less than births involving those two factors. The number of full-term cesarean and induced deliveries increased.
The Bigger Picture
Dench and his co-authors were the first researchers to look at this data on a large scale.
`` If you look at 1,000 births in a single hospital, or even at 30,000 births across a hospital system, you wouldn't be able to see the drop as clearly, '' said Dench. `` The drop we detected is a huge change, but you might miss it in a small sample. ''
The researchers also corrected for seasonality -- for example, preterm births are higher on average in February than in March -- which helped them get a clearer picture of the data.
The research comes with caveats. Up to half of all preterm C-sections and induced deliveries are due to a ruptured membrane, which is a spontaneous cause. But in the data Dench and his team used, it's impossible to distinguish these C-sections from the ones caused by doctors ' interventions. So, Dench and co-authors are seeking more detailed data to get a clearer picture of preterm deliveries.
Still, these findings are significant because the causes for preterm births are not always known.
`` However, we know for certain that doctors ' interventions cause preterm delivery, and for good reason most of the time, '' Dench said. `` So, when I saw the change in preterm births, I thought, if anything changed preterm delivery, it probably had to be some change in how doctors were treating patients. ''
What's Next?
The researchers ' findings raise a critical question: Was the pre-pandemic level of doctor intervention necessary?
`` It's really about, how does this affect fetal health? '' said Dench. `` Did doctors miss some false positives -- did they just not deliver the babies that would have survived anyway? Or did they miss some babies that would die in the womb without intervention? ''
Dench plans to use fetal death records from March 2020 to December 2020 to answer this question. If he finds no change in fetal deaths at the same time as the drop in preterm births, that could point to `` false positives '' in doctor intervention that can be avoided in the future. Learning which pregnancies required care during the pandemic and which ones didn't could help doctors avoid unnecessary interventions in the future.
`` This is just the start of what I think will be an important line of research, '' Dench said.
The article, `` U.S. Preterm Birth Rate and Covid-19, '' was published online in Pediatrics on April 6, 2022. | science |
Lessons from the global South on how to counter harmful information | The large-scale contamination of the public sphere by rumours, hate speech, dangerous conspiracy theories and orchestrated deception campaigns is causing widespread concern around the world. These ills are collectively referred to as “ information disorder ”.
The disorder results from a range of factors. They include a rapidly changing media ecology and an increasingly fractious, populist and polarised political environment. The surge in misleading and false information about the Covid-19 pandemic has increased these concerns.
Despite being a widespread problem in the Global South, the study of information disorder is dominated by examples, case studies and models from the Global North. This applies to the available knowledge about the range of responses and counter-interventions that have been put in place.
Our new study, aims to fill this gap. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive overview of the organisations, activists and movements working across the Global South to counter information disorder. The term Global South refers to the regions outside Europe and North America, mostly low-income and often politically or culturally marginalised.
The study was a collaborative effort by research teams from four regions: sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia as well as the Middle East and North Africa ( MENA) region.
It explored the methods people use to meet the challenge of disinformation. Special attention was given to how the Covid-19 pandemic has made the problem worse.
We found that a range of actors are working to fight the problem of information disorder. These include teams of independent fact checkers, policymakers as well as media educators. Organisations and movements in lower and middle-income countries are also rising to combat the problem of “ fake news ”.
This study provides useful reference points on how civil society organisations in the Global South are countering information disorder. This includes a focus on what’ s being done to support reliable and trustworthy information.
The information disorder is being generated by the increasing prevalence of misinformation, disinformation and malinformation in public and on social media.
Misinformation is false information that is shared, but with no harm intended.
Disinformation is false information that is knowingly shared to mislead or cause harm.
Malinformation ( malicious information) is when information, factual or false, is shared to cause harm. This is often done by publishing information meant to stay private.
Meeting the challenges of information disorder is particularly important in fledgling democracies or where democratic rights are in decline or under pressure. Access to quality information is vital to enabling citizens to participate in democratic processes.
Read more: Punitive laws are failing to curb misinformation in Africa. Time for a rethink
Many democracies in the global South are fragile and need deepening. In addition, access to digital resources is unevenly distributed and independent media are often under pressure. In these environments, information disorder can further undermine democratic governance and civic agency.
The study found various types of responses – similar to those identified elsewhere – to information disorder across regions. These included:
production and distribution responses. These included algorithmic and technical processes to root out disinformation online, and
responses aimed at targets of disinformation – literacy campaigns, for example.
The work done by organisations in the region often shows a multilayered response to the problem. By linking different issues together, organisations show the importance of approaching information disorder as a complex problem requiring various responses.
Combining fact-checking with media literacy initiatives. This is done by, for instance, Dubawa and Africa Check in sub-Saharan Africa. This empowers citizens to establish the veracity of information they come across. They can then become more critical and discerning consumers of media.
Linking quality of information with right of access to information and digital technologies, policy interventions on cyber-security, surveillance and data protection. This is done by, among others, the AlSur consortium in Latin America.
Read more: Journalism has changed. Education must reflect the reality
The assumption here is that citizens are unable to empower themselves with quality information unless they have better access to digital resources. Similarly, the integrity of the public sphere is compromised if peoples’ data isn’ t protected, or if governments use digital platforms as surveillance tools against citizens.
Linking anti-information disorder work with media freedom and right to protest. An example is Artigo 19 in Latin America. An example of combating hate speech is by Kashif in Palestine. The linking of these issues is based on the understanding that a democratic public sphere is as much about rooting out bad information as it is about allowing good information to flourish.
Linking electoral information disorder and internet rights. This was done by, for instance, Derechos Digitales in Latin America. It uses advocacy campaigns to engage politicians and digital platforms. Linking these issues makes clear that citizens have to be able to take part in online spaces, where political agendas are set and discussed for democratic political processes like elections to succeed.
Several organisations in the region complement fact checking with their own investigative journalism. Examples include Chequeado in Argentina and Verificado in Mexico. Some also conduct workshops on media ethics, such as Falso in Libya. And, journalism training, as Desinfox Africa is doing in Western Africa.
Combining verification skills with journalistic training, and inculcating ethical values recognises that encouraging good, ethical conduct is essential to eliminating false information and harmful from journalism.
Our research shows why there’ s a need to take a comprehensive approach to combating information disorder in the Global South. Effective solutions have to extend beyond addressing only digital content, to seeing the problem as a social and political one as well.
However, the global South should not be treated as a monolith. Important differences and variations exist between countries within regions and between different groups within countries. They’ re also found between different geographical, economic or social contexts. Future research should, therefore, maintain regional diversity even as it aims to connect the dots across the South. | business |
MTD to Make Temporary Service Reductions as of Monday, April 25 - The Santa Barbara Independent |
Press releases are posted on Independent.com as a free community service.
SANTA BARBARA—Effective Monday, April 25, 2022, Santa Barbara MTD will be temporarily lowering service levels in order to improve system reliability. During the COVID-19 pandemic, transit operators nationwide and many other industries have experienced workforce shortages, and MTD is no different. While MTD continues to recruit aggressively for bus operators, the agency has experienced a confluence of retirements and normal attrition causing a drop in the number of available bus operators. This drop coupled with the Omicron surge has meant that various bus trips are occasionally cancelled, causing uncertainty for passengers.
In order to adjust service to a level that the MTD workforce can reliably cover on a daily basis, MTD staff have made surgical changes to service levels that will go into effect as of Monday, April 25, 2022. While these reductions are designed to last for the spring and summer period, MTD will notify the public about any future service adjustments.
“ The reliability of our schedules is crucial and due to the current labor shortage the temporary reduction of service is a necessary step, ” said MTD General Manager Jerry Estrada. “ We hope that these temporary reductions will allow us the time to staff up appropriately and return to higher levels of service later this year. ”
The changes are different for each bus line, so passengers are encouraged to review the schedules of the lines they ride in advance of April 25, 2022. Temporary schedule guides are being printed and hard copies will be available at the Transit Center and on-board buses by next week. In the meantime, a pdf of the new schedule guide is available at this link and the public can get further details at sbmtd.gov/reduced. The table on page 2 of this press release describes changes for each bus line. | general |
CONTAINER QUARTERLY: Shippers look to USEC gateways amid USWC congestion, uncertainty | In this episode of the Oil Markets Podcast, S & P Global Commodity Insights editors Paul Hickin, Emma...
After settling at its highest price in over a decade on April 7, the NYMEX Henry Hub prompt-month...
The legal gridlock that has affected Mexico's power market the past few years will likely continue...
Shippers importing goods into the United States from Asia have been allotting more cargos to the US East and Gulf coasts in an effort to avoid congestion and diversify their risk ahead of potential industrial action at USWC ports, sources said.
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The shift comes as many North American ports continue to grapple with vessel lineups and congested terminals, unable to efficiently move containers due to inland logistical constraints.
Vessel queues outside of the Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach peaked in January at 109, and have since fallen to just 33 vessels on April 4. Vessel wait times remain unpredictable, sliding from 10 to 40 days depending on terminal availability.
`` We're seeing things improve in SoCal, but we 've also seen business efforts made to dampen Southern California volumes, '' a US-based carrier source said. `` We wouldn't be surprised if it's a lull, and that congestion seems to be coming back. ''
The diversion of disports from the USWC has increased congestion at USEC and USGC ports, as increased vessel traffic has pressured operations at container gateways and inland infrastructure.
The Port of Charleston had 14 vessels at anchor or adrift waiting for a berth on April 6, Platts cFlow trade-flow analytics software showed, down from a high of nearly 30 vessels in mid March. Vessel waiting times at the port remained between 10 and 16 days.
The port of Virginia in Norfolk similarly had 13 ships waiting for berth, while the Houston backlog tallied 12.
Global congestion levels did ease during the first quarter of the year, according to an April 5 report by maritime researcher Sea-Intelligence, which indicated global capacity taken off-market by congestion fell 2.1 percentage points to 11.6% in February.
`` The terminal congestion index saw a gradual improvement over the past two months in North America, but the index is still at an elevated level, '' said Sea-Intelligence CEO Alan Murphy. `` We see the same trend for the intermodal congestion. ''
Much of the improvement at Southern California ports has been chalked up to seasonal demand declines, compounded by factory shutdowns brought on by fresh coronavirus lockdowns in many North Asian origin cities.
The demand for Asian cargoes is likely to rebound as and when the market turns towards the peak season, which historically begins in July. Some sources report that order projections are already well above past years, while carrier sources note strong volume projections for May onwards. This means that an early start to the peak import rush in the US could be on the way.
`` [ We're going to ] pivot to peak season early, '' said one US freight forwarder. `` Summer and back-to-school supplies are already here. That to me is an indicator of what's going to happen with bookings. ''
Shippers have shuffled volumes away from the congested US West Coast to the US Gulf and East Coast ports on both spot and long-term bases, as upcoming International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union contract negotiations are expected to be tempestuous.
Contract discussions are scheduled to begin on May 12, while the current contract is set to expire on July 1.
`` The potential is high for a work stoppage, '' said Julie Gerdeman, CEO of Everstream Analytics. `` Shippers can divert to USEC, divert to smaller ports, and other modalities. ''
Three of the last four negotiations between the union and its employers resulted in temporary work stoppage before a deal could be struck.
`` People that didn't have USEC distribution center presence are now asking for USEC rates, '' said another carrier source. `` Easy to hide behind congestion on USWC, but in reality, it's hedging on what could happen on ILWU discussions. ''
Container rates into the US East Coast and West Coast have further decoupled in early April as divergent market forces keep the spot market on edge.
Platts Container Rate 5 -- North Asia-to-East Coast North America -- was assessed at $ 12,000/FEU April 5, after gaining $ 1,000/FEU against the month, supported in large part by growing demand for all-water USEC services and port congestion at key gateways such as Charleston, Norfolk, and on the Gulf Coast, Houston.
At the same time, PCR13 -- North Asia-to-West Coast North America -- lost $ 1,300/FEU on the month as demand had yet to return to pre-Lunar New Year heights, while sentiment remained poor that Asian output would improve materially in the first weeks of Q2.
The spread between PCR5 and PCR13 reached $ 4,000/FEU in early April, an all-time high for the assessments launched in July 2017.
Since its launch, the differential has averaged $ 1,077/FEU, but it began to widen during the fourth quarter of 2021 and has grown for four consecutive months, increasing by $ 2,600/FEU since the start of 2022.
The Platts Container Index -- a weighted average of Platts ' key container rate assessments -- has trended largely downwards since the beginning of the first quarter, brought on by significant rate erosion in the Asia-Europe market.
The index was down 12% from the start of the year at $ 6,293.56/FEU on April 5 but showed significant growth against the same day in 2021, when it was assessed at $ 4,487.41/FEU.
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It’ s free and easy to do. Please use the button below and we will bring you back here when complete. | business |
Sarah Palin's House candidacy causes GOP rift and reopens old wounds |
Despite her 13 years out of office, Sarah Palin immediately won an
endorsement
from former President Donald Trump in her campaign to
represent Alaska in the US House
.
GOP hard-liners already plan to invite her to join their congressional caucus. And House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy said Wednesday he's a `` big fan '' of hers.
But some Republicans in Alaska are scoffing.
`` We 've got 50 names that Alaskans will have the opportunity to choose from, '' Sen. Lisa Murkowski, the state's senior senator, who has long had a frosty relationship with Palin, told CNN in Washington. `` A lot of really good qualified individuals that nobody else is talking about back here. Back home, they are. So this is your own kind of bubble. I 'm just telling you: You are not in Alaska's bubble, because Alaskans are talking about the others. ''
When was the last time Murkowski saw Palin in Alaska?
Read More
`` That is a really hard question, '' Murkowski said. `` Because it's been years. ''
Palin's decision to jump into the race to replace
the late Don Young
-- who represented the state for nearly 50 years -- adds a nationally prominent candidate to a nearly 50-person field. And it reopens old wounds with some Republican critics, who were eager to see the mercurial politician stay away for good after she abruptly resigned as Alaska's governor in 2009.
Some of her opponents are trying to capitalize on the rift she left behind.
`` Many of the people that I know were very surprised because we didn't realize that she was still a resident of the state, '' said Nick Begich III, a Republican rival for the seat and grandson of the late Rep. Nick Begich and nephew of former Democratic Sen. Mark Begich. `` Most people haven't seen her around. I 've been to hundreds of events over the last several years and have seen her maybe once. And that's been true of nearly everyone I 've talked to. ''
Palin still has a home in Wasilla, Alaska -- the small town where she was first elected to the city council 30 years ago before serving as mayor. She then defeated Murkowski's father, Frank, in the 2006 governor's race. After catapulting onto the national stage as GOP presidential nominee Sen. John McCain's 2008 running mate, she resigned from office three years into her four-year term.
In announcing her resignation, Palin compared herself to a point guard who would selflessly `` pass the ball for victory, '' and save the state taxpayer money by leaving office early, as a
number of ethics complaints
were filed against her.
`` Many just accept that lame-duck status, hit the road, draw the paycheck and milk it. I 'm not putting Alaska through that -- I promised efficiencies and effectiveness, '' she
said
at the time.
A Palin campaign adviser touted the former vice presidential candidate's long ties to the state.
`` Sarah Palin would be honored to serve the men and women of Alaska in Washington and continue the legacy of Don Young, '' the adviser said. `` She's a lifelong Alaskan since the age of three months old whose youngest son is still a middle schooler in Wasilla. ''
But Palin's Alaska Republican critics say that she hasn't been involved in the state's politics for years, as she spent some of her time living elsewhere and traveling the country promoting her conservative causes.
Since leaving office, Palin has bought and sold homes in Arizona. She released a
New York Times bestselling memoir
, `` Going Rogue, '' filmed the TLC reality TV series `` Sarah Palin's Alaska '' and the Sportsman Channel's `` Amazing America with Sarah Palin, '' launched and dropped the online Sarah Palin Channel, and gave political commentary on Fox before her contract w
as not renewed
in 2015.
She also
entertained
questions about running for various offices, including against Murkowski in the senator's 2022 reelection bid, and taped a video calling out Murkowski as the senator weighed whether to back Amy Coney Barrett's nomination to the Supreme Court in 2020. ( Murkowski
ended up voting for Barrett
.)
Lately, Palin has been bashing the effectiveness of the coronavirus vaccines, telling a conference sponsored by Turning Point USA in Phoenix, `` It 'll be over my dead body that I 'll have to get a shot. ''
`` I will not do that, '' said Palin, who tested positive for Covid-19 in 2021 and 2022. `` I won't do it, and they better not touch my kids either. ''
In an interview this week, Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan, a Republican who served as attorney general while Palin was governor, said he was not endorsing in the race at this point.
`` We got a lot of good candidates in the race, 50. She's one of them, '' Sullivan said. `` And what I 'm looking for right now is someone who can fit the seat of Don Young as a fighter. ''
Asked if Palin would be a good partner on Capitol Hill, Sullivan said: `` There's a lot who would be good partners, and she's one of them. ''
Murkowski had a different response to that question.
`` I 'm not kind of giving an analysis of her at this point, '' Murkowski said. `` I 'm talking about all these other campaigns. ''
Palin irked Murkowski in 2008 when she continually touted her effort to break up the `` old boys ' network, '' a reference to the senator's father, and even flirted with challenging the senator in 2010.
Murkowski warned her at the time not to challenge her.
`` I can guarantee it would be a very tough election, ''
Murkowski said in 2008
. Palin never ran against Murkowski.
Asked about that episode and her relationship with Palin, Murkowski said Wednesday, `` I 'm not going to talk about Sarah Palin. ''
A tricky path for victory
The 2022 election could also be dicey.
The top four candidates of the special primary election on June 11 will run in the special general election on August 16. The winner will serve in Congress until January.
On August 16, Alaskans will also vote in the regular primary election, and the top four candidates will face each other on November 8. The winner of that House race will earn a full, two-year term.
Alaska's elections are now ranked-choice voting, where voters can rank up to five candidates.
Now, Palin faces nearly 50 opponents in her bid for Congress, including Begich. Other Republican candidates include state Sen. Josh Revak, former head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney and former state Sen. John Coghill. Independent Al Gross, who ran and lost the 2020 Alaska US Senate race as the Democratic nominee, and Democratic Assemblyman Chris Constant are also running.
Young's imprints are all over the race for his successor; Revak and Sweeney were the statewide co-chairs of Young's 2022 campaign, and Begich co-chaired his 2020 campaign before announcing his 2022 bid against the congressman.
In interviews, Revak, an Army veteran, and Begich sought to distinguish themselves from Palin.
`` I 'm not going to Congress to be incendiary, '' Revak said. `` I 'm going there to represent Alaskans. ''
Begich added: `` I think a lot of Alaskans recognize that a lightning-rod style is going to do very little to nothing to actually advance the case for Alaska at a national level. ''
Conservative House Republicans embrace Palin
In the House, Palin's congressional bid was more warmly received by her potential GOP colleagues.
Members of the hardline House Freedom Caucus -- an invite-only group that has morphed into a Trump loyalty club over the years -- said Palin would likely find a welcome home in their conservative crew.
`` I 'm glad to hear it, '' freshman Rep. Matt Rosendale of Montana, a Freedom Caucus member, said of Palin's announcement. `` And I would expect that if she comes to Congress that she would be a member of the Freedom Caucus. ''
In an interview with Fox this week, Palin singled out the Freedom Caucus as a group she would be interested in joining and praised its rabble-rousing brand of politics.
`` I 've always been a big fan of the Freedom Caucus, '' Palin said. `` I 've always felt for them. Because they 've been criticized, and beat up, and misunderstood. But they 've got the right priorities. ''
But it's not just the far-right group: the highest-ranking House Republican also heaped praise on Palin.
`` I 'm a big fan of Sarah Palin, '' said McCarthy, a close Trump ally. `` I was impressed by her. I 've talked to her before. ''
Republicans think Trump's endorsement could certainly give Palin a leg up in the packed primary, but they also noted she is already a national figure in conservative politics with high name recognition.
`` We can't ignore that she's made a name for herself in her own right, '' Rosendale said.
Even though members of the Freedom Caucus were mostly thrilled by the prospect of Palin joining their ranks, some of them couldn't help but poke fun at the gaffes that often defined her political brand.
`` I know she could see Russia from her back porch, '' joked Tennessee Rep. Scott DesJarlais, when asked about Palin's politics, referring to Tina Fey's `` Saturday Night Live '' impression of Palin. `` But no, she is very conservative.... I look forward to working with her. ''
This story has been updated with a response from Sarah Palin's campaign.
CNN's Ted Barrett and Morgan Rimmer contributed to this report. | general |
As the world reacts in horror to Bucha, China's state media strikes a different tone | A version of this story appeared in CNN's Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country's rise and how it impacts the world.
Sign up here.
Hong Kong ( CNN)
Shocking images showing the
bodies of civilians scattered across the streets
of Bucha, a suburb of the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, have sparked global horror in recent days and raised the urgency of ongoing investigations into alleged Russian war crimes. But a starkly different narrative is playing out on China's state-run media.
There, domestic media reports on the
civilian casualties in Bucha
have been quick to emphasize the Russian rebuttal, with two prominent televised reports from national broadcaster CCTV this week highlighting unsubstantiated claims from Moscow that the situation was staged after Russian forces withdrew from the area.
In one report, a caption citing Russia with the words `` Ukrainians directed a good show, '' flashes over heavily blurred footage from the Ukrainian town.
There is no evidence to suggest this is the case. Satellite images suggest some bodies had been there since at least March 18, while eyewitnesses have said the
carnage began weeks ago
.
Ukraine's Zelensky questions UN Security Council's mandate in speech on alleged Russian atrocities
Separately, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Tuesday said the shocking images from Bucha showed `` all the signs '' that civilians were `` directly targeted and directly killed. '' On Tuesday, UN chief António Guterres added to growing international calls for a war crimes investigation into the killing of civilians in the town.
Read More
The allegations of war crimes raise the stakes for China's position. Beijing's apparent boosting of Russian propaganda is consistent with its stance
since the beginning of the invasion,
as it refuses to condemn Russia
-- at home or in its diplomacy -- even as the civilian death toll grows.
Instead, Beijing has sought to portray itself as a neutral actor, calling for peace while
blaming the situation on the United States
.
This was on show in an editorial published in the nationalist tabloid the Global Times on Wednesday, which appeared to question the veracity of what it called, in quotes, the `` Bucha incident '' and absolve Russia of responsibility.
`` It is regrettable that after the exposure of the 'Bucha incident, ' the US, the initiator of the Ukraine crisis, has not shown any signs of urging peace and promoting talks, but is ready to exacerbate the Russia-Ukraine tensions, '' the editorial said.
`` No matter how the 'Bucha incident ' took place, no one can deny at least one thing: War itself is the main culprit of the humanitarian disaster, '' it added.
A common foe
Rising tensions with the US have driven Moscow and Beijing closer in recent years, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping declaring their countries ' partnership had `` no limits '' just weeks before Russia's invasion.
Since Russia's invasion, Beijing has
come under considerable pressure
to decry Russia's actions and join countries around the world in imposing sanctions. Chinese officials have instead refused to use the term invasion to describe Russia's actions, and have repeatedly said they will cut their own path when it comes to their response.
China's promotion of Russian disinformation indicates where its loyalties lie
At a UN Security Council special session on Tuesday, Chinese Ambassador Zhang Jun acknowledged that the images of civilian deaths in Bucha were `` deeply disturbing, '' but when it came to attributing blame for the situation he urged `` all sides '' to `` exercise restraint and avoid unfounded accusations. ''
`` The relevant circumstances and specific causes of the incident should be verified and established. Any accusations should be based on facts, '' Zhang said.
Similar comments were made at a regular briefing on Wednesday by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin, who said `` humanitarian issues should not be politicized. ''
`` All parties should exercise restraint and avoid groundless accusations '' before fact-finding was concluded, Wang said, adding that China `` is willing to continue to work together with the international community to avoid any harm coming to civilians. ''
But at home, China has been broadcasting a more pointed message, one that ties into a longer history of Russian and Chinese state media reinforcing each other's narratives -- on issues such as the treatment of Russian dissidents, Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, and the origins of Covid-19 -- as they seek to refute the characterizations of Western officials and media.
In an example of such overlap on Tuesday, state agency China News Service ran a post on the popular Twitter-like social media platform Weibo with the hashtag, `` Russia shows the video to prove that the Bucha incident is staged '' referencing a report from a Russian state news agency.
But as China amplifies Russian rhetoric in its reporting at home, some public shows of skepticism can be seen, even in China's highly moderated social media platforms.
In a recent example, a widely followed military blogger wrote on Sunday that Ukrainians were responsible for a `` massacre '' of civilians -- but multiple users in the comments below suggested the details of the post were wrong. | general |
Shanghai’ s daily covid cases have surpassed the peak in Wuhan — Quartz | It has been over two years since the covid-19 pandemic first broke out in the central Chinese city of Wuhan. But China’ s latest outbreak is causing a surge in new daily infections, and raising fresh doubts about its zero-covid strategy.
On Tuesday ( April 5), Shanghai, the country’ s financial capital and its current epicenter of the pandemic, recorded 17,077 new local infections, surpassing the highest daily record of 13,436 cases that Wuhan reported on Feb. 12, 2020, according to Chinese health authorities and news outlet Caixin.
Overall, the country reported 20,472 new locally transmitted cases yesterday, with the rest of the infections mainly recorded in northeastern Jilin province. The new cases nationwide yesterday represent China’ s highest ever new daily infections.
But with China’ s nearly 90% ( link in Chinese) primary vaccination rate for the 1.4 billion population, most of the current cases in China and Shanghai are mild. Of yesterday’ s national infections, around 19,000 were asymptomatic.
Still, the rising infections in China have brought the effectiveness of its zero-covid approach, which entails mass covid testing and centralized quarantine for even mild cases, into question.
Shanghai has imposed partial lockdowns since early March, as have most cities in Jilin. But the measure hasn’ t brought down the city’ s cases which have continued to soar since the the city entered a two-stage lockdown on March 28, that was indefinitely extended yesterday. Meanwhile, videos of angry citizens protesting against lockdown and posts complaining about a shortage of food have been trending on Chinese social media, leading many to express their shock at the level of disorganization being seen in China’ s wealthiest city. But so far, the government has maintained it needs to stick to so-called “ dynamic clearance ” approach.
Though the numbers are startling to many in China, where covid outbreaks were quickly eliminated until the emergence of the new more contagious variants last year. The numbers are still small compared to other countries. In the UK, the seven-day average was above 60,000 as of Tuesday, according to the British government. | tech |
Priorities for Strengthening Key Revenue Sources in Asia | This paper discusses the evolution of key taxes in the past 20 years in developing Asia and fiscal challenges that these countries face in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. It presents estimates of tax capacity and tax potential and discusses the productivity of key taxes in the region. The paper finds that developing Asia has potential to raise more revenues—of up to 4 percent of GDP on average. While corporate income tax productivity is high vis-à-vis other regions, the same does not apply to personal income tax or the value added tax. There is potential to raise more revenues by improving the compliance and design of the value added tax. It is important to ensure that the tax systems in developing Asia become more progressive with expansion of personal income and property taxes. Increased allocations and better targeting of social spending would help offset some of the regressivity stemming from indirect taxes. An important source of revenue leakage is tax expenditures granted by countries in the region.
You may use and disseminate CGD’ s publications under these conditions. | general |
Maritime VSAT Terminal Market 2022-2028 | Pune, April 06, 2022 ( GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Maritime VSAT Terminal Market report is expert study that can deliver you with an elaborate analysis of the Maritime VSAT Terminal. The report covers information about top players, projected size of the market, data and figures to update about where opportunities are in the market, competitor analysis and vendor information. Also, it offers a complete analysis of the key market dynamics, with growth drivers, challenges, restraints, opportunities and trends. Furthermore, receive exact details and statistics associated to Maritime VSAT Terminal market and its key factors such as revenue, growth, compound annual growth, year-over-year developments, consumption, and production.
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VSAT literally translates as `` very small aperture terminal '', a satellite communication system developed in the mid-1980s. VSAT is also called satellite small data station or personal earth station because it originates from traditional satellite communication system. The “ small ” here refers to the small antenna of small station equipment in VSAT system, which is usually 0.3m~1.4m, equipment structure. Compact, solid, intelligent, inexpensive, easy to install, less demanding on the environment, and not limited by terrestrial networks, flexible networking.
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Maritime VSAT Terminal market report delivers study of the key trends in each sub-segment of the worldwide Maritime VSAT Terminal report, with estimates for development at the global, regional and country level and categorized the market based on product type, applications, regions.
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Absolute Reports is an upscale platform to help key personnel in the business world in strategizing and taking visionary decisions based on facts and figures derived from in depth market research. We are one of the top report resellers in the market, dedicated towards bringing you an ingenious concoction of data parameters. | general |
Philippines Used Car Market -- More Organized Players Plan | Increasing Used Car Sales due to Covid-19: The pandemic made owning a car an inevitable aspect of an individual's life as travelling via public transport can be hazardous during the times when strict social distancing protocols must be followed. People who preferred public transport during the pre-Covid times are now the potential customers of the used cars market. Since, the pandemic does not seem to completely subside anytime soon, the demand for used cars will keep increasing until majority of the potential customers, who initially travelled via public transport, own a car. Since most of these people could not afford a car in the first place, they would prefer the most optimal solution available, that is, purchasing a pre-owned car.
Expansion of OEM Dealers: The pandemic showed that while the new cars market is becoming vulnerable, the pre-owned cars market is becoming more resilient. In order to take advantage of the growing used cars space in Philippines, some of the popular OEM brands are expanding their presence in the pre-owned certified cars segment.
Rising popularity of Online platforms: The online space in the used cars market has been gaining traction over time on account of increasing internet penetration and Covid-19 protocols that forced several dealers to introduce the concept of virtual showrooms to promote minimum contact and social distancing between buyers and sellers. Increased usage of Facebook and other social networking sites too will contribute to the increased role of online platforms in promoting the used cars industry.
Increased focus on value-added services: Since the number of organized players in the used cars segment is gradually increasing, more dealers have shifted their focus on providing value-added services to survive the increasing competition. While it is quite common for the DDSAs ( Direct Dealership Sales Agents) to provide such services, several multi-brand dealers too have started providing additional services such as extended warranty, insurance, after sales services, etc., to become a 'one-stop ' destination for used car buyers.
Unorganised Segment's Share to Decline: Small independent dealers with fewer inventories along with individual sellers constitute the unorganized sector. Unorganized segment contributes to majority of the market share in the used cars space basis the number of small dealers spread across the country. However, the share of unorganized dealers is expected to decline in the future as more and more organized players enter the market. Moreover, buying used cars from organized players has an added advantage of the value-added services which are not provided by the unorganized players.
Analysts at Ken Research in their latest publication '' Philippines Used Car Market Outlook To 2025 ( Second Edition): The Pandemic Incited Increased Demand for Used Cars coupled with Increased Internet Penetration provides for Resilience in the Used Cars Market during the Economic Crisis '' observed that Philippines is in a growth phase in the used car market in South East Asia and is gradually recovering from the economic crisis after the pandemic. The increasing credit appetite of banks fueled by competition from foreign financing companies is giving a boost to this industry. Going forward, the industry is expected to demonstrate a moderated growth in the short-medium term fueled by growth of online used car platforms that provide convenience to both buyers and sellers.
The Used Car industry in Indonesia has grown at a CAGR of 4.5% on the basis of gross transaction value over the period 2014-2019 and at a CAGR of 2.0% on the basis of sales volume. The overall economic slowdown, as well as the slowdown of the automotive industry due to a reduction in purchasing power of consumers, contributed to the decline in sales during 2016-2017. The entry of various financing companies in the used car industry, as well as the launch of OEM-certified used car programs, has been the major growth drivers of the industry. The boom in the number of online auto-classified platforms and the traction of the consumers towards online platforms is contributing to the inclining used car sales in the country.
The used car industry in Saudi Arabia has grown at a CAGR of 0.8% on the basis of gross transaction value over the period 2014-2019 and declined at a CAGR of -2.4% on the basis of sales volume. The departure of expats from the country and the economic instability contributed to the decline in sales during 2016-2017. The addition of women drivers and the high levels of disposable income in the country are one of the major growth drivers of the industry. Boom in the number of online auto-classified platforms and the traction of the consumers towards online platforms is contributing to the inclining used car sales in the country.
UAE is one of the biggest automobile markets in the industry. The market of used cars has grown at very fast pace in the last few years. The market size by value has registered a five-year CAGR of xx% ( 2015-2020) as the total value of sales increased from AED xx Billion in 2015 to AED xx Billion in 2020. The market size by volume increased from xx cars in 2015 to xx cars in 2020 while registering a five-year CAGR of xx% in the period. The market had initially slowed down in between 2015 and 2017 due to fall in export value of crude oil in 2015 oil which adversely impacted the purchasing power of consumers. However, since 2017 the market had witnessed tremendous growth. There are a number of growth drivers which has resulted in expansion of the market; these include improving quality of used cars and large number of expatriates among other determinants. There have been a number of regulatory changes that have impacted the market such as the imposition of VAT of 5% for sales of used as well as new cars in 2018. There are a number of challenges that exist for the market such as price discrepancies, lack of standardization and others. Customers of the used cars can be divided according to their needs. The passion for cars in the country is one of the biggest reasons that more and more players are entering the market. Further, the used car market can be segmented on the basis of import, export and re-export of used car sales based on brands and countries. In recent times manufactured certified cars are gaining foothold in the market as they provide reliable quality of cars.
Malaysia's Used Car sector is in the late growth phase, having grown at a CAGR of ~1% during 2015-2020. Increasing demand for private vehicles, increasing purchasing power, easy availability of finance, increased govt. incentives to ensure the sale of new cars are the main reasons behind positive growth in used car revenue. Other major drivers include drop-in use of public transport due to the pandemic and emergence of online players which have made the overall process of selling and buying used cars smoothly, thus boosting sales.
More Used Car Research Reports: - https: //www.kenresearch.com/productsearch.php? searchKey=Used+Car
Contact Us: -Ken ResearchAnkur Gupta, Head Marketing & CommunicationsSupport @ kenresearch.com+91-9015378249 | general |
Algeria Fitness Services Market -- Growth in Organized Gym | Gurugram, India, April 06, 2022 ( GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- - The entry of low budget international fitness chains and attractive offers offered by the fitness centers are expected to encourage the offline membership participation rate in fitness clubs.
- Growing trend of one-on-one personal training and small group trainings along with opening of budget gyms and advancement of technologies adopted by majority of the fitness center will intensify the number of subscribers.
- Digital Fitness and At- Home workouts will gain traction in the near future as majority of the population intend to make virtual classes a regular part of their routine post pandemic.
Growing Demand for Certified Personal Trainers: Growing trend of one-on-one personal training and small group trainings along with opening of budget gyms and advancement of technologies adopted by majority of the fitness centre will intensify the number of subscribers.
Growth in Number of Hotel based Fitness Establishments: Development of the hospitality sector as a part of the Algerian government's National Tourism Development plan along with the entry of International hotel chains providing a range of amenities will result into the growth of hotel-based fitness centres.
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Impact of COVID 19: The pandemic is expected to accelerate the transformation from offline-only to online-offline integration in leading operators. Enhancing fitness awareness and popularization of the fitness apps due to penetration of internet and increase in mobile phone users is expected to drive the market growth. The industry is experimenting with `` digital fitness '' by offering online classes and incorporating fitness-based apps for at-home exercise.
The report titled '' Algeria Fitness Services Market Outlook to 2025F – Driven by technological innovations and inventive training approaches along with adoption of hybrid model by fitness centers '' by Ken Research suggested that the fitness market is further expected to grow in the near future owing to growing awareness of health benefits, increasing disposable income, rising awareness regarding obesity and to overcome health issues such as cardiovascular diseases along with growth of female only fitness centers has been the major key factors which drives the demand for fitness services centers in Algeria. The market is expected to register a positive five-year CAGR of 19.4% in terms of revenue during the forecast period 2020-2025F.
The Philippines Market Device Industry was valued at PHP ~ million in 2015 and registered a positive growth during the review period of 2015-2020 reaching to a value of PHP ~ in 2020. The market is currently in Growth Stage, with an increase in number of hospitals, high prevalence of chronic diseases, rising instances of heart and kidney failures, expanding elderly population, awareness towards health checkups, incoming of medical tourism and onset of COVID-19 pandemic as some of the key drivers for the market. Medical Device Industry in the Philippines is currently import oriented, especially for highly technological machineries such as Diagnostic Imaging, Cardiac Devices, Respiratory products and others. Current demand reflects healthcare requirements for growing incidence of hypertension, diabetes/kidney diseases, TB/respiratory ailments, cancer, and some incidence of HIV/AIDS.
Indonesia Health Tech market grew at a very high growth rate over the review period 2017-2020 and was further supported by an increase in health awareness among the younger population, the advancement of technology in the market, introduction of new platforms in the market. The entry of domestic players with international investments has also contributed to the same. Strong growth was observed in Indonesia's health tech industry majorly due to high-end user demand.
The India Consumer Wearable industry has grown at a CAGR of 32.0% on the basis of revenue over the period 2015-2020. The young demographics and high disposable income in the country is one of the largest growth drivers of the industry. Continuous investment in research & development and marketing activities by the wearables manufacturers is positively impacting the industry's growth.
Israel is a leading fitness and wellness destination with abundance of wellness retreats, spa breaks, and boot camps offering in a fitness center with state-of-the-art equipment. Growing awareness regarding balanced lifestyle, access to low-cost budget fitness centers and growth of well equipped gyms with state-of the art equipment are fueling the market growth. Opening up of ladies dedicated gyms such as Fitwell Ladies Fitness Centers with female professional trainers to guide woman's pursuing exercises has created new segment and increased the female memberships in the country.
Ken ResearchAnkur Gupta, Head Marketing & Communicationssupport @ kenresearch.com +91-9015378249 | general |
Surging interest rates push mortgage demand down more than 40% from a year ago | Rising interest rates are crushing the mortgage market, as precious few homeowners can now benefit from a refinance and more potential homebuyers become priced out.
Total mortgage application volume fell another 6% last week compared with the previous week, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association's seasonally adjusted index. Volume was down 41% from the same week one year ago.
The average contract interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with conforming loan balances ( $ 647,200 or less) increased to 4.90% from 4.80%, with points decreasing to 0.53 from 0.56 ( including the origination fee) for loans with a 20% down payment. That rate was just 3.36% one year ago. That is the fourth consecutive week of increases.
Applications to refinance a home loan, which have been falling steadily for months, dropped another 10% week to week. Refinance demand was 62% lower than the same week one year ago.
`` Mortgage application volume continues to decline due to rapidly rising mortgage rates, as financial markets expect significantly tighter monetary policy in the coming months, '' said Joel Kan, an MBA economist. `` As higher rates reduce the incentive to refinance, application volume dropped to its lowest level since the spring of 2019. ''
The refinance share of all applications fell to 38.8% from 51% a year ago.
Mortgage applications to purchase a home declined 3% for the week and were 9% lower than the same week one year ago. A strong employment market with continuing wage growth is keeping housing demand hot, but the supply of existing homes for sale is still extremely lean. Bidding wars tend to be the rule, rather than the exception. Affordability is falling fast, and entry-level buyers are being sidelined.
`` The elevated average purchase loan size, and steeper 8% drop in FHA purchase applications, are both indicative of first-time buyers being disproportionately impacted by supply and affordability challenges, '' added Kan.
The drop in mortgage business is causing layoffs at companies like Movement Mortgage and Better.com. Mortgage companies had been on massive hiring sprees in the first year of the Covid pandemic, as interest rates set more than a dozen record lows and both refinance and purchase demand surged. | business |
Teens spend on Nike and Lululemon despite concerns about U.S. economy | In this article
Teens are spending more and shifting their shopping habits, even as they worry about growing economic uncertainty, according to a new survey.
Athletic apparel brands such as Lululemon and Nike that combine comfort and fashion are winning out over traditional clothing labels, Piper Sandler's biannual `` Taking Stock With Teens '' report released on Wednesday revealed.
Many teens say they're either unsure of or uninterested in the so-called metaverse — the idea of buying goods through a virtual reality experience. Retailers including Nike, PacSun, Forever 21 and Ralph Lauren have all been dipping their toes in the budding technology.
A growing number of teenagers also say they're much more familiar with NFTs, or non-fungible tokens, than they were last fall, while only a small percentage have actually purchased one.
But they're also increasingly concerned about the Russian war in Ukraine, the survey revealed, and are less preoccupied with the Covid-19 pandemic.
The results of the biannual survey have implications for the businesses vying to win over this generation's dollars. That's particularly true now with the economic environment riddled with uncertainty.
Teens plan to spend about $ 2,367 this year on everything from fast food meals and video games to handbags and sneakers, Piper Sandler found, or an estimated overall total of roughly $ 66 billion. That's up 9% from reported spending levels in the spring 2021 report, and up 4% from Piper Sandler's fall survey. Reported annual spending by teens peaked at about $ 3,023, in the spring of 2006.
Piper Sandler surveyed 7,100 teens from Feb. 16 to March 22. The average age of those surveyed was 16.2 and the average household income was $ 69,298. Thirty-nine percent of the teens surveyed were employed part-time, up from 38% last fall and 33% last spring.
Though teen-spending levels have improved steadily since a trough in the fall of 2020, businesses still grapple with the question of what could derail growth and whether consumers will pull back in their spending.
A whopping 71% teens reported to Piper Sandler that they believe the U.S. economy is getting worse, up from 56% who felt that way last fall, and 46% last spring.
When asked which political or social issues mattered the most to them, teens ' top response was Russia's invasion of Ukraine, at 13%. That was followed by the environment, at 11%; racial equality, at 10%; gas prices, at 10%; and inflation, at 4%.
Coronavirus notably fell off the list of teens ' top 10 concerns, after ranking fourth in Piper Sandler's survey last fall as well as last spring.
Piper Sandler consumer analyst Matt Egger noted that the continued concern among Generation Z consumers on the environment bodes well for rental platforms such as Rent the Runway and resale businesses like ThredUp and The RealReal.
Meanwhile, Nike remained the No. 1 favored clothing brand among teens, a spot it has held for an impressive 11 consecutive years. It also widened its margin as the preferred footwear brand among Gen Z shoppers, the survey said, ahead of Converse, Adidas, Vans, New Balance and Crocs, in that order.
American Eagle kept its spot as teens ' second-favorite apparel brand, followed by Lululemon, which moved up one position on the list from the prior year. Fast-fashion retailer H & M rose to fourth from ninth a year earlier. Adidas remained in fifth place.
Overall, the athletic brands mentioned in the survey released Wednesday accounted for 44% of teens ' favorite clothing labels, the highest levels that Piper Sandler has seen for the category. That aligns with a broader shift among consumers during the pandemic, toward stretchy and more loose-fitting clothing to be worn around the house. And many teens are still incorporating athletic brands into their wardrobes even as they head back to schools and offices.
Shein, a Chinese e-commerce fashion behemoth that is reportedly weighing a funding round at a valuation of about $ 100 billion, ranked seventh for teens ' favorite place to buy clothes, down from sixth in the fall of 2021 but up from eighth last spring.
Females continue to widely outspend males on clothing, according to the Piper Sandler survey, while males spend, on average, about $ 51 more that females on shoes each year.
Amazon remained by far the favorite website to shop overall, taking a 53% share, up from 52% last fall. Shein remained in second place, but its share of teens ' preference fell to 8% from 9%. Other retailers on the list were Nike, PacSun, Lululemon and Princess Polly, in that order.
When it comes to the metaverse and platforms such as Roblox or Decentraland, 26% of teens reported they own some sort of virtual reality device, with just 5% using it daily. Forty-eight percent said they are either unsure of or not interested in the metaverse. | business |
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