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3,783,947 | Studying IR is good scholarship – remedies the split between the ivory tower and practical realities | Walt 11 | Walt 11 (Stephen, Prof Intl Affairs @ Harvard, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/) | social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving pressing global problems There is today no shortage of global problems that social scientists should study in depth: ethnic and religious conflict within and between states, the challenge of economic development, terrorism, the management of a fragile world economy, climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and impact of great power rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few one might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that helped them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say One might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in public debates about foreign policy Social scientists are far from omniscient, but the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of academia should give university-based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public discourse on world affairs academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency. The norms and procedures of the academic profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived political agendas. the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. the existence of these basic norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse about world affairs. Former policymakers complain that academic writing is “either irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion.” that policymakers’ eyes “would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.” Today’s political scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and past literature Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and ingrown.” how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters? . Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy debates may believe that they are “speaking truth to power but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and institutions that they initially hoped to sway scholars who embrace the role of a “public intellectual” may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise Instead of improving the quality of public discourse, such behavior may actually degrade it. by discussing the unique contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairs highlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative source of knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issue there is a growing gap between university-based scholars and both the policy world and the public sphere due largely to the professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs First most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs . Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement Within academia by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere | There is today no shortage of global problems ethnic and religious conflict economic development terrorism great power rivalries One might expect scholars to play a prominent the rigor of the scientific process give university-based scholars an especially valuable role The norms of the academic profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to political agendas policymakers complain that academic writing is irrelevant or inaccessible Today’s political scientists often address very narrow questions and are preoccupied with method Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world Inquiry is becoming obscurantist Instead of improving public discourse such behavior may actually degrade it. there is a growing gap between university-based scholars and the policy public sphere Academics can make contributions citizens rely upon the knowledge and insights of academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering world affairs through academic evaluation an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. alternative voices are needed scholars are protected by tenure and academic freedom they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales on policy issues unfettered debate helps expose errors fostering effective public policies a engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity it is desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues academic research can provide policymakers with frameworks theories that leaders can use to anticipate events and facilitate the formulation of policy academic scholars are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories when scholars have something useful to say, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere | Most social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving pressing global problems. Indeed, the United States and many other modern societies subsidize university-based research and teaching on the assumption that scholars will develop useful knowledge about today’s world, communicate that knowledge to their students and to the broader public, and, where appropriate, offer rigorous, well-informed advice to interested policymakers. There is today no shortage of global problems that social scientists should study in depth: ethnic and religious conflict within and between states, the challenge of economic development, terrorism, the management of a fragile world economy, climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and impact of great power rivalries, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few. In this complex and contentious world, one might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that helped them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say. One might also expect scholars of international relations to play a prominent role in public debates about foreign policy, along with government officials, business interests, representatives of special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. Social scientists are far from omniscient, but the rigor of the scientific process and the core values of academia should give university-based scholars an especially valuable role within the broader public discourse on world affairs. At its best, academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency. The norms and procedures of the academic profession make it less likely that scholarly work will be tailored to fit pre-conceived political agendas. When this does occur, the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed. Although we know that scholarly communities do not always live up to this ideal picture, the existence of these basic norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. Yet the precise role that academic scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to specify. Indeed, there appear to be two conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse about world affairs. Former policymakers complain that academic writing is “either irrelevant or inaccessible to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion.” This tendency helps explain Alexander George’s recollection that policymakers’ eyes “would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.”[1] As Lawrence Mead noted in 2010: “Today’s political scientists often address very narrow questions and they are often preoccupied with method and past literature. Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world. . . . Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting. Inquiry is becoming obscurantist and ingrown.”[2] Within the field of international affairs, this trend has led to repeated calls to “bridge the gap” between the ivory tower and the policy community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent scholars have recently organized workshops or research projects seeking to challenge this “cult of irrelevance” and deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar concern: how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters? On the other hand, closer engagement with the policy world and more explicit efforts at public outreach are not without their own pitfalls. Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy debates may believe that they are “speaking truth to power,” but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and institutions that they initially hoped to sway. Powerful interests are all-too-willing to use the prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and scholars are hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their objectivity. Furthermore, scholars who embrace the role of a “public intellectual” may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise. Instead of improving the quality of public discourse, such behavior may actually degrade it. The remainder of this essay explores these themes in greater detail. I begin by discussing the unique contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairs—at least in theory—highlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative source of knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issues (→Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why there is a growing gap between university-based scholars and both the policy world and the public sphere, and suggest that this trend is due largely to the professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas (→Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?). Next, I identify some of the pitfalls that scholars face when they become more active participants in the public sphere (→The Pitfalls of Engagement). I conclude by proposing several reforms that could help the social sciences make a more vital contribution to public understanding and policy formation in the broad domain of global affairs (→What Is To Be Done?). Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?
Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5]Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6]Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere. | 12,964 | <h4>Studying IR is good scholarship – remedies the split between the ivory tower and practical realities</h4><p><strong>Walt 11</strong> (Stephen, Prof Intl Affairs @ Harvard, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/)</p><p>Most <u>social scientists would like to believe that their profession contributes to solving pressing global problems</u>. Indeed, the United States and many other modern societies subsidize university-based research and teaching on the assumption that scholars will develop useful knowledge about today’s world, communicate that knowledge to their students and to the broader public, and, where appropriate, offer rigorous, well-informed advice to interested policymakers. <u><mark>There is today no shortage of global problems</mark> that social scientists should study in depth: <mark>ethnic and religious conflict</mark> within and between states, the challenge of <mark>economic development</mark>, <mark>terrorism</mark>, the management of a fragile world economy, climate change and other forms of environmental degradation, the origins and impact of <mark>great power rivalries</mark>, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, just to mention a few</u>. In this complex and contentious world, <u>one might think that academic expertise about global affairs would be a highly valued commodity. Scholars would strive to produce useful knowledge, students would flock to courses that helped them understand the world in which they will live and work, and policymakers and the broader public would be eager to hear what academic experts had to say</u>. <u><mark>One might</mark> also <mark>expect</mark> <mark>scholars</mark> of international relations <mark>to play a prominent</mark> role in public debates about foreign policy</u>, along with government officials, business interests, representatives of special interest groups, and other concerned citizens. <u>Social scientists are far from omniscient, but <mark>the <strong>rigor of the scientific process</strong></mark> and the core values of academia should <mark>give <strong>university-based scholars</strong></mark> <mark>an <strong>especially valuable role</strong></mark> within the broader public discourse on world affairs</u>. At its best, <u>academic scholarship privileges creativity, validity, accuracy, and rigor and places little explicit value on political expediency.</u> <u><mark>The norms</mark> and procedures <mark>of the academic</mark> <mark>profession</mark> <mark>make</mark> <mark>it less likely that scholarly</mark> <mark>work will be tailored</mark> <mark>to</mark> fit pre-conceived <mark>political</mark> <mark>agendas</mark>. </u>When this does occur, <u>the self-correcting nature of academic research makes it more likely that politically motivated biases or other sources of error will be exposed.</u> Although we know that scholarly communities do not always live up to this ideal picture, <u>the existence of these basic norms gives the academic world some important advantages over think tanks, media pundits, and other knowledge-producing institutions. </u>Yet the precise role that academic scholars of international affairs should play is not easy to specify. Indeed, there appear to be two conflicting ways of thinking about this matter. <u>On the one hand, there is a widespread sense that academic research on global affairs is of declining practical value, either as a guide to policymakers or as part of broader public discourse about world affairs. Former <mark>policymakers complain that academic writing is</mark> “either <mark>irrelevant or inaccessible</mark> to policy-makers. . . locked within the circle of esoteric scholarly discussion.”</u> This tendency helps explain Alexander George’s recollection <u><strong>that policymakers’ eyes “would glaze as soon as I used the word theory.”</u></strong>[1] As Lawrence Mead noted in 2010: “<u><mark>Today’s</mark> <mark>political scientists often address very narrow questions and</mark> they <mark>are</mark> <strong>often <mark>preoccupied</mark> <mark>with method</mark> </strong>and past literature</u>. <u><strong><mark>Scholars are focusing more on themselves, less on the real world</u></strong></mark>. . . . <u>Research questions are getting smaller and data-gathering is contracting</u>. <u><strong><mark>Inquiry is becoming</mark> <mark>obscurantist</mark> and ingrown.”</u></strong>[2] Within the field of international affairs, this trend has led to repeated calls to “bridge the gap” between the ivory tower and the policy community.[3] Consistent with that aim, a number of prominent scholars have recently organized workshops or research projects seeking to challenge this “cult of irrelevance” and deprogram its adherents, although it is not clear whether these efforts will succeed in reversing the current drift.[4] This online symposium reflects a similar concern: <u>how can the academic world contribute to a healthy public conversation about our collective fate, one that leads to more effective or just solutions to contemporary problems and helps humankind avoid major policy disasters?</u> On the other hand, closer engagement with the policy world and more explicit efforts at public outreach are not without their own pitfalls<u>. Scholars who enter government service or participate in policy debates may believe that they are “speaking truth to power</u>,” <u>but they run the risk of being corrupted or co-opted in subtle and not-so-subtle ways by the same individuals and institutions that they initially hoped to sway</u>. Powerful interests are all-too-willing to use the prestige associated with academic scholars to advance particular policy goals, and scholars are hardly immune to temptations that may cloud their judgment or compromise their objectivity. Furthermore, <u>scholars who embrace the role of a “public intellectual” may be tempted to sensationalize their findings to attract a larger audience or find themselves opining on topics on which they have no particular expertise</u>. <u><strong><mark>Instead of</mark> <mark>improving</mark> the quality of <mark>public discourse</mark>, <mark>such behavior may actually degrade it.</u></strong></mark> The remainder of this essay explores these themes in greater detail. I begin <u>by discussing the unique contributions that academic scholars could make to public discourse on world affairs</u>—at least in theory—<u>highlighting their capacity to serve as an authoritative source of knowledge about the world and as an independent voice in debates about contemporary issue</u>s (→Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?). I then consider why <u><mark>there is a growing gap between</mark> <mark>university-based scholars and</mark> both <mark>the</mark> <mark>policy</mark> world and the <mark>public sphere</u></mark>, and suggest that this trend is <u>due largely to the professionalization of academic disciplines and the concomitant rise of a quasi-academic community of think tanks with explicit political agendas</u> (→Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?). Next, I identify some of the pitfalls that scholars face when they become more active participants in the public sphere (→The Pitfalls of Engagement). I conclude by proposing several reforms that could help the social sciences make a more vital contribution to public understanding and policy formation in the broad domain of global affairs (→What Is To Be Done?). Why Is Academic Scholarship Valuable?
<u><mark>Academics can make</mark> at least three distinct <mark>contributions</mark> to public discourse on global affairs</u>. <u>First</u>, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, <u>most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean.</u> If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But <u>if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on</u>. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. <u>When <mark>citizens</mark> and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably <mark>rely upon the knowledge and insights of </mark>specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others</u>. <u><strong>And that means relying at least in part on <mark>academic scholars</mark> <mark>who have devoted their careers to mastering</mark> various aspects of <mark>world affairs</mark> and whose professional stature has been established <mark>through</mark> the usual procedures of <mark>academic evaluation</u></strong></mark> (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). Second, and more importantly, <u><mark>an independent academic community is an <strong>essential counterweight</strong> to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues</u>.</mark> <u>Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs</u>.[5]Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public<u>. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world,</u> but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6]Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, <u><mark>alternative voices are needed </mark>to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand.</u> <u>Because <mark>scholars are protected by tenure</mark> <mark>and</mark> cherish the principle of <mark>academic freedom</mark>, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods,</u> <u><strong><mark>they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales</mark> and to bring their knowledge and training to bear <mark>on</mark> vital <mark>policy issues</u></strong></mark>. If we believe that <u><strong><mark>unfettered debate</u></strong> <u>helps expose</mark> <mark>errors</mark> and correct missteps, thereby <mark>fostering</mark> more <mark>effective public policies</mark>, then <mark>a</mark> <strong>sophisticated, diverse and <mark>engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity</u></strong></mark>. Third, <u>the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement</u>. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. <u><strong>Within academia</u></strong>, <u>by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence.</u> Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. For all of these reasons, <u><mark>it is</mark> highly <mark>desirable for university-based scholars</mark> <mark>to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues</mark> and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate</u>. As I have argued elsewhere, <u><mark>academic research can provide policymakers with</mark> relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and <mark>frameworks</mark> that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test <mark>theories</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>leaders can use to</mark> choose among different policy instruments</u>. <u>Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers <mark>anticipate events</mark>, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, <mark>and</mark> when they <mark>facilitate</mark> <mark>the formulation of</mark> <mark>policy</mark> alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation.</u> <u>Because <mark>academic scholars</mark> are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they <mark>are in an ideal position to develop</mark> <mark>new concepts</mark> <mark>and theories</mark> to help us understand a complex and changing world</u>.[8] The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] <u>And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read.</u> <u>Even <mark>when scholars</mark> <mark>have something useful to say,</mark> in short, <mark>their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 80,966 | 195 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,948 | Aff flex – you limit all NoKo, SCS, and Japan affs which are core of the topic and key to aff ground – you functionally eliminate the diplomatic part of the resolution because no affs are diplomatic without requiring CBMs – incentivizes small one shot diplomacy affs like natural disaster resolution | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Aff flex – you limit all NoKo, SCS, and Japan affs which are core of the topic and key to aff ground – you functionally eliminate the diplomatic part of the resolution because no affs are diplomatic without requiring CBMs – incentivizes small one shot diplomacy affs like natural disaster resolution</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Topicality | Solvency | 1,561,033 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,949 | They’ve literally spent millions building spaces for military jets and sports spaces – they wouldn’t abandon that infrastructure | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They’ve literally spent millions building spaces for military jets and sports spaces – they wouldn’t abandon that infrastructure</h4> | 1NC/NC | Case | Solvency | 1,561,034 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,950 | Root cause explanations of international politics don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence. | Bleiker 14 | Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327) | the key challenge in IR is “unchecked reification” the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe The dangers are real because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can have far-reaching consequences
Levine detects self-reflective and critical moments in straightforward positivist positions
outlines why while explicitly post-positivist IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that reification is a consequence of all thinking
sustainable critique not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself”
He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship
Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand But each should recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when or, rather, precisely when they are deemed incompatible They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences
The benefit of such methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them reification may be “checked at the source” and a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” | the key challenge in is “unchecked reification” dangerous because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can have far-reaching consequences
Levine detects self-reflective moments in positivist positions
outlines why explicitly post-positivist IR often lacked critical self-awareness reification is a consequence of all thinking
Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of sustainable critique multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms trying to understand from multiple perspectives No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand But each should recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot In practical terms, this means combining methods precisely when they are deemed incompatible They can range from poststructual deconstruction to positivist social sciences
The benefit of methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives reification may be “checked at the source” | This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement.
For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated.
Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge.
The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68).
The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12).
The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth).
The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked.
Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.
The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail. | 5,989 | <h4><strong>Root cause explanations of international politics don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence.</h4><p>Bleiker 14</strong> – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)</p><p>This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement.</p><p>For Levine, <u><mark>the key challenge in</u></mark> international relations (<u><strong>IR</u></strong>) scholarship <u><mark>is</u></mark> what he calls <u><strong><mark>“unchecked reification”</u></strong></mark>: <u>the widespread and <mark>dangerous</mark> process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe</u> or to which they refer” (p. 15). <u>The dangers are real</u>, Levine stresses, <u><mark>because <strong>IR deals with</strong> some of the most difficult issues, from <strong>genocides to war</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can</u></mark> thus <u><mark>have <strong>far-reaching consequences</u></strong></mark>. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated.</p><p><u><mark>Levine</u></mark> proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he <u><mark>detects self-reflective</mark> and critical <mark>moments in</u></mark> scholars that are usually associated with <u>straightforward <mark>positivist positions</u></mark> (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge.</p><p>The second stage of Levine's inquiry <u><mark>outlines why</u></mark> IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, <u>while <mark>explicitly post-positivist</u></mark> and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing <u><mark>IR</u></mark> <u>scholarship, <mark>often lacked critical self-awareness</u></mark>. As a result, Levine believes that many of the <u>respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that</u> “<u><strong><mark>reification is a consequence of all thinking</u></strong></mark>—including itself” (p. 68).</p><p>The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “<u>sustainable critique</u>”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is <u>not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists</u>. <u>It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself”</u> (p. 12).</p><p>The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth).</p><p>The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. <u>He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship</u>. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of</mark> Levine's <mark>sustainable critique</u></strong></mark>. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates <u><strong><mark>multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena</u></strong></mark>. <u>He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing”</u> (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, <u><mark>a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms</u></mark>, <u><mark>trying to understand</mark> the event in question <mark>from multiple perspectives</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>But each should</u></mark>, in a way, <u><strong><mark>recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot</u></strong></mark> (p. 102). <u><mark>In practical terms, this means <strong>combining</mark> a range of <mark>methods</strong></mark> even when</u>—<u><strong>or, rather, <mark>precisely when</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>they are deemed incompatible</u></mark>. <u><mark>They can <strong>range from poststructual deconstruction</strong> to</mark> the tools pioneered and championed by</u> <u><strong><mark>positivist social sciences</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>The benefit of</mark> such</u> a <u><strong><mark>methodological polyphony</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives</u></mark>. <u>Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them</u>. For Levine, this is how <u><strong><mark>reification may be “checked at the source”</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> this is how <u>a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable”</u> (p. 103). It is in this sense that <u>Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but</u>, rather, <u>an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another”</u> (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.</p> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 10,116 | 1,568 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,951 | Neg Ground – Key to getting links to the appeasement DA – no military diplomacy affs means neg teams can never generate link uniqueness because affs are too small and aren’t politically contentious | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Neg Ground – Key to getting links to the appeasement DA – no military diplomacy affs means neg teams can never generate link uniqueness because affs are too small and aren’t politically contentious</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Topicality | Solvency | 1,561,035 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,952 | “Serial policy failure” args fortify dominant social understandings. When they do give rise to change – it’s Trump-style outcomes dipped in the illusion of transformation. | Bloom ‘8 | Bloom ‘8
Peter Bloom is currently a permanent lecturer in economics and politics at Swansea University. At the time of this writing, Peter has received his MA from the University of Essex and was instructing at that institution. Peter received a doctorate in politics and philosophy at the University of Essex and also has taught at Cambridge University, Swansea University, and for a year and Jiangsu University in China. “Capitalism's Cynical Leviathan: Cynicism, Totalitarianism, and Hobbes in Modern Capitalist Regulation” – From the Journal: IJZS; Vol 2.1 - #CutWithKirby - http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/viewFile/95/161 | cynicism empirically has not served as a flashpoint for more transformatory changes. cynical attitudes reinforce organizational obedience through displacing resistance away from actual practical change and towards complacency cynicism acts as a salve Consequently distancing works as a barrier to more effective campaigns of resistance. hegemony can ontologically seek to dominate a given space. However implicit in the account is the eternal availability of contestation to this hegemon It is at this juncture between hegemony that cynicism reveals its importance a dominant social understanding is sustained exactly through the perceived inability to change prevailing systems of power. | cynicism empirically has not served as a flashpoint for transformatory changes. cynical attitudes reinforce organizational obedience through displacing resistance away from practical change and towards complacency cynicism acts as a salve Consequently distancing works as a barrier to more effective campaigns of resistance. , a dominant social understanding is sustained exactly through the perceived inability to change prevailing systems of power. | Yet such cynicism empirically has not served as a flashpoint for more transformatory changes. Both Knights and McCabe as well as Wanous, Richter, and Austin note the ultimately non-revolutionary character of this cynicism. Fleming and Spicer (2003) have accordingly sought to theoretically explain this disjuncture between internal dissatisfaction and continued external compliance with organizational desires. Their essay "Working at a Cynical Distance" illuminates the relationship between cynicism and capitalist conformity. Drawing on the work of Lacan and Zizek they reveal how cynical attitudes reinforce organizational obedience through displacing resistance away from actual practical change and towards a complacency of internal disagreement. Here, cynicism acts as a salve for individuals who realize the futility of their working experience yet refuse or are unable to actualize this dissent. Consequently, the very presence of subjective distancing works as a barrier to more effective campaigns of resistance. How are we then to understand this seeming contradiction between the daily presence of individual subjective dis-identification and a continued compliance to capitalist organizational prerogatives? This cynical totalitarianism speaks theoretically to two competing elements integral to contemporary capitalist regulation-namely hegemony and the fetishist disavowal. Far from being separate both play into and enhance the overall strength of the other. Interrogating the dominant theorists of each perspective, Laclau and Zizek respectively, speaks to their ultimate compatibility. Laclau's notion of hegemony highlights how an organizational ideology can suture itself as an all-encompassing subjectivity due to the fact that discourses ontologically seek to dominate totally a given social space. However implicit in the Laclauian account is the eternal availability of contestation to this hegemonic discourse as no one subjectivity can completely monopolize a subject's understanding. It is at this juncture between complete interpellation and hegemony that cynicism reveals its importance for individual inscription, an idea expressed most clearly in the work of Zizek. The inherently incomplete nature of this hegemony provides the very terrain for a cynical obedience-as one can recognize the inadequacies of a hegemonic discourse without thinking beyond its ideological horizons. At stake thus is not internal coherence of a hegemonic discourse but the forms of enjoyment it provides to its inscribed subject. To this end an individual is able to participate within a hegemonic field of meaning without internally accepting its over-arching truth value. Put differently, a dominant social understanding is sustained exactly through the allowance of internal subjective disagreement premised on the perceived inability to change prevailing systems of power. | 2,886 | <h4><strong>“Serial policy failure” args fortify dominant social understandings. When they do give rise to change – it’s Trump-style outcomes dipped in the illusion of transformation.</h4><p>Bloom ‘8</p><p><u></strong>Peter Bloom is currently a permanent lecturer in economics and politics at Swansea University. At the time of this writing, Peter has received his MA from the University of Essex and was instructing at that institution. Peter received a doctorate in politics and philosophy at the University of Essex and also has taught at Cambridge University, Swansea University, and for a year and Jiangsu University in China. “Capitalism's Cynical Leviathan: Cynicism, Totalitarianism, and Hobbes in Modern Capitalist Regulation” – From the Journal: IJZS; Vol 2.1 - #CutWithKirby - http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/viewFile/95/161</p><p></u>Yet such <u><mark>cynicism <strong>empirically</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>has not served as a flashpoint for </mark>more <mark>transformatory changes.</u></mark> Both Knights and McCabe as well as Wanous, Richter, and Austin note the ultimately non-revolutionary character of this cynicism. Fleming and Spicer (2003) have accordingly sought to theoretically explain this disjuncture between internal dissatisfaction and continued external compliance with organizational desires. Their essay "Working at a Cynical Distance" illuminates the relationship between cynicism and capitalist conformity. Drawing on the work of Lacan and Zizek they reveal how <u><mark>cynical attitudes <strong>reinforce organizational obedience</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>through displacing resistance <strong>away from</mark> actual <mark>practical change</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>towards</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>complacency</u></strong></mark> of internal disagreement. Here, <u><mark>cynicism acts as a salve</u></mark> for individuals who realize the futility of their working experience yet refuse or are unable to actualize this dissent. <u><mark>Consequently</u></mark>, the very presence of subjective <u><mark>distancing works as a barrier <strong>to more effective campaigns of resistance.</strong></mark> </u>How are we then to understand this seeming contradiction between the daily presence of individual subjective dis-identification and a continued compliance to capitalist organizational prerogatives? This cynical totalitarianism speaks theoretically to two competing elements integral to contemporary capitalist regulation-namely hegemony and the fetishist disavowal. Far from being separate both play into and enhance the overall strength of the other. Interrogating the dominant theorists of each perspective, Laclau and Zizek respectively, speaks to their ultimate compatibility. Laclau's notion of <u>hegemony</u> highlights how an organizational ideology<u> can</u> suture itself as an all-encompassing subjectivity due to the fact that discourses <u>ontologically</u> <u>seek to dominate</u> totally <u>a given</u> social <u>space.</u> <u>However</u> <u>implicit in the</u> Laclauian <u>account is the <strong>eternal availability</u></strong> <u>of <strong>contestation to this hegemon</u></strong>ic discourse as no one subjectivity can completely monopolize a subject's understanding. <u>It is at this juncture between</u> complete interpellation and <u>hegemony that cynicism reveals its importance</u> for individual inscription, an idea expressed most clearly in the work of Zizek. The inherently incomplete nature of this hegemony provides the very terrain for a cynical obedience-as one can recognize the inadequacies of a hegemonic discourse without thinking beyond its ideological horizons. At stake thus is not internal coherence of a hegemonic discourse but the forms of enjoyment it provides to its inscribed subject. To this end an individual is able to participate within a hegemonic field of meaning without internally accepting its over-arching truth value. Put differently<mark>, <u>a dominant social understanding is sustained <strong>exactly through</u></strong></mark> the allowance of internal subjective disagreement premised on <u><mark>the <strong>perceived inability to change prevailing systems of power</strong>.</p></u></mark> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 443,681 | 32 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,953 | Sovereignty rights in the SCS are a key demand by the Chinese people – they’ll say no | SCMP 7/8 | SCMP 7/8 ("How we got to this stage in the South China Sea: understanding the source of tension," South China Morning Post, 7/8/2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1987046/how-we-got-stage-south-china-sea-understanding-source, IC) | China’s fundamental policy objective for the S C S is to protect the security of its sovereignty and maritime rights The Chinese people will not allow any further infringement of the country’s sovereignty and rights concerning land features in the S C S and hold high expectations towards the government to protect its national interests China will not give up its sovereignty stance | China’s fundamental policy objective for the South China Sea is to protect the security of its sovereignty The Chinese people will not allow any further infringement of the country’s sovereignty an and hold high expectations towards the government | First, China’s fundamental policy objective for the South China Sea is to protect the security of its sovereignty and maritime rights. Tactically, China has been coping with all motions by refraining from proactive motions, which means to act with restraint, and to take countermeasures when provoked. The Chinese people will not allow any further infringement of the country’s sovereignty and rights concerning land features in the South China Sea, and therefore hold high expectations towards the government to protect its national interests. As for the current status quo of some of the Nansha islands and reefs under other countries’ occupation, China will not give up its sovereignty stance. However, considering that China has significantly increased its capacity to control the situation and to prevent any further loss, it is highly advisable that as long as no new major threat looms large, China should continue to uphold the policy of “shelving the disputes and seeking joint development”, and to take in store the reality in the field. The outcome of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines should not shake China’s fundamental policy lines. | 1,158 | <h4>Sovereignty rights in the SCS are a <u>key demand</u> by the Chinese people – they’ll say no</h4><p><strong>SCMP 7/8</strong> ("How we got to this stage in the South China Sea: understanding the source of tension," South China Morning Post, 7/8/2016, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1987046/how-we-got-stage-south-china-sea-understanding-source, IC)</p><p>First, <u><strong><mark>China’s fundamental policy objective for the S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea <u><strong>is to protect the security of its sovereignty</mark> and maritime rights</u></strong>. Tactically, China has been coping with all motions by refraining from proactive motions, which means to act with restraint, and to take countermeasures when provoked. <u><strong><mark>The Chinese people will not allow any further infringement of the country’s sovereignty an</mark>d rights concerning land features in the S</u></strong>outh <u><strong>C</u></strong>hina <u><strong>S</u></strong>ea, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><strong><mark>hold high expectations towards the government</mark> to protect its national interests</u></strong>. As for the current status quo of some of the Nansha islands and reefs under other countries’ occupation, <u><strong>China will not give up its sovereignty stance</u></strong>. However, considering that China has significantly increased its capacity to control the situation and to prevent any further loss, it is highly advisable that as long as no new major threat looms large, China should continue to uphold the policy of “shelving the disputes and seeking joint development”, and to take in store the reality in the field. The outcome of the arbitration initiated by the Philippines should not shake China’s fundamental policy lines.</p> | 1NC/NC | Case | Solvency | 1,561,037 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
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- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,954 | Limits – affs are functionally limited by whether or not they have a solvency advocate specific to diplomatic channels or specific actors– all other affs lose to the mil-to-mil CP or T-substantial – other words the resolution check, and we still have the use the PROCESS of engagement | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Limits – affs are functionally limited by whether or not they have a solvency advocate specific to diplomatic channels or specific actors– all other affs lose to the mil-to-mil CP or T-substantial – other words the resolution check, and we still have the use the PROCESS of engagement</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Topicality | Solvency | 1,561,036 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
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- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,955 | Metatheory is NOT a structuring question. Those ontology quests create opportunity costs that violently hamper material conditions. | Graeber ‘13 | Graeber ‘13
David Graeber is an activist and Reader in Social Anthropology at The London School of Economics. David was an Associate Professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007 and specialized in theories of value and social theory. - “It is value that brings universes into being” – From the Journal of Ethnographic Theory - #2 (2013) – One portion of this card de-capitalized the word “It’s” and modified to “it’s” for the purposes of ease of reading. http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau3.2.012/758 | What I am suggesting is that ontological claims are not essential but a kind of political move that tend to be made in the context of competing claims of value. when universes collide we mediate between value spheres and reveal the ultimate stakes of politics Does this not require some system of metavalue criteria by which to prefer some structures of value over others? In fact, there is no reason to believe an explicit system of metavalues is necessary. Such arguments can be carried out tacitly and pragmatically in much the same way as any of us balance commitments to work, family, politics, religion, and so on without having an explicit code or criteria an “ontological gambit, might stake a claim for priority, but necessary prerequisites It’s (it’s) difficult to pursue truth if one does not have reliable access to food basic health or safety | What I am suggesting is that ontological claims are not essential but a kind of political move made in the context of competing claims of value. when universes collide we mediate between value spheres and reveal the ultimate stakes of politics Does this not require some metavalue by which to prefer some structures over others? there is no reason to believe an explicit system of metavalues is necessary. Such arguments can be carried out tacitly and pragmatically an “ontological gambit, might stake a claim for priority, but (it’s) difficult to pursue truth if one does not have reliable access to food basic health or safety | What I am suggesting then is that ontological claims are not essential to cosmologies, but themselves, a kind of political move—one possible political move—that will tend to be made in the context of competing claims of value. It’s only then, when universes collide, that it occurs to anyone to cement one universe’s status by insisting that it is somehow more real than any of the others, or that it has some special purchase on the nature of reality, as in the case of science or revealed religion. We might refer to this as “the ontological gambit.”11 If so, then the fascination with alterity, including the value of foreign exotica, on the power and value of anything that seems to come from outside the system entirely, so magnificently documented by Marshall Sahlins (part two of this issue), might be considered a kind of variant of this same move. After all, “reality,” if it is to mean anything, must always be that which lies beyond our imaginative constructions, or at the very least, which always contains some properties that extend beyond anything we can think or say about it. That is both undeniable, yet ultimately incomprehensible. As such they allow a similar Archimedian point, and identifying oneself with such ultimate realities, a way of claiming the authority to mediate between value spheres. It may even be that, just as scientific truth-claims arose as (and to some degree still maintain themselves as) a kind of counterdiscourse to those of revealed religion, revealed religions themselves arose as a way of playing this same game. Yet even in such complex circumstances, this is just one move among many. In most arenas, such truth claims, if they are made at all, retain that imaginative, as-if quality. 5) Metavalues and infravalues. If value systems create a potentially endless series of little worlds—“a thousand totalities”—and if the ultimate stakes of politics are negotiating how these come into relation with one another, then the obvious question is how? Does this not require some sort of system of metavalues, criteria by which to prefer some structures of value over others? In fact, there is no reason to believe an explicit system of metavalues is necessary. Such arguments can be conducted explicitly as, for instance, the case of the centuries-long conflict between Ecclesiastical and Temporal authority during the Middle Ages, or they can be carried out tacitly and pragmatically, in much the same way as any of us balance commitments to work, family, politics, religion, and so on without having an explicit code or criteria. Still, my proposal that religious, metaphysical, or scientific truth claims are themselves an “ontological gambit,” one way that those who identify themselves with a particular value arena might stake a claim for priority, suggests one way explicit criteria can be introduced. This is not even by taking one value and declaring its priority, that, in good Dumontian fashion, encompasses the rest but rather, by taking the tacit, interior values that inform how ones goes about pursuing value within certain fields (in the case of truth claims, logical consistency, verifiability, etc.) and reassembling them as an explicit value in themselves. We can refer to such tacit interior values as infravalues. Rather than being seen as ends in themselves, they are thought of as necessary prerequisites for, or means to, being able to pursue those forms of value that are socially realized in the kinds of arenas I have been describing. It’s easy enough to multiply examples. It’s (it’s) difficult to pursue truth or beauty if one does not have reliable access to food. Food security, like basic health or physical safety, might well be considered to fall into this category; but so would sociality, cooperation, technical efficiency, and so forth. Some of these might be rewarding in themselves (there are few things more pleasant than doing a job extremely well), but they are infravalues insofar as they are not seen as ends in themselves. Sometimes they might become so. But (and this is the main reason to draw attention to the phenomenon at all) it’s even more common for infravalues themselves to become metavalues. | 4,191 | <h4><strong>Metatheory is NOT a structuring question. Those ontology quests create opportunity costs that violently hamper material conditions. </h4><p>Graeber ‘13</p><p></strong>David Graeber is an activist and Reader in Social Anthropology at The London School of Economics. David was an Associate Professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007 and specialized in theories of value and social theory. - “It is value that brings universes into being” – From the Journal of Ethnographic Theory - #2 (2013) – One portion of this card de-capitalized the word “It’s” and modified to “it’s” for the purposes of ease of reading. <u><mark>http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau3.2.012/758</p><p><strong>What I am suggesting </u></strong></mark>then<u><strong><mark> is that ontological claims are not essential</u></strong></mark> to cosmologies, <u><strong><mark>but </u></strong></mark>themselves, <u><strong><mark>a kind of political move</u></strong></mark>—one possible political move—<u><strong>that </u></strong>will<u><strong> tend to be <mark>made in the context of competing claims of value.</u></strong></mark> It’s only then, <u><strong><mark>when universes collide</u></strong></mark>, that it occurs to anyone to cement one universe’s status by insisting that it is somehow more real than any of the others, or that it has some special purchase on the nature of reality, as in the case of science or revealed religion. We might refer to this as “the ontological gambit.”11 If so, then the fascination with alterity, including the value of foreign exotica, on the power and value of anything that seems to come from outside the system entirely, so magnificently documented by Marshall Sahlins (part two of this issue), might be considered a kind of variant of this same move. After all, “reality,” if it is to mean anything, must always be that which lies beyond our imaginative constructions, or at the very least, which always contains some properties that extend beyond anything <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> can think or say about it. That is both undeniable, yet ultimately incomprehensible. As such they allow a similar Archimedian point, and identifying oneself with such ultimate realities, a way of claiming the authority to<u><strong> <mark>mediate between value spheres</u></strong></mark>. It may even be that, just as scientific truth-claims arose as (<u><strong><mark>and</u></strong></mark> to some degree still maintain themselves as) a kind of counterdiscourse to those of <u><strong><mark>reveal</u></strong></mark>ed religion, revealed religions themselves arose as a way of playing this same game. Yet even in such complex circumstances, this is just one move among many. In most arenas, such truth claims, if they are made at all, retain that imaginative, as-if quality. 5) Metavalues and infravalues. If value systems create a potentially endless series of little worlds—“a thousand totalities”—and if <u><strong><mark>the ultimate stakes of politics</u></strong></mark> are negotiating how these come into relation with one another, then the obvious question is how? <u><mark>Does this not require</u></mark> <u><mark>some</mark> </u>sort of<u> system of</u> <u><mark>metavalue</u></mark>s, <u>criteria <mark>by which to prefer some structures</mark> of value <mark>over others?</u></mark> <u><strong>In fact, <mark>there is no reason to believe an explicit system of metavalues is necessary.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>Such arguments can be</u></mark> conducted explicitly as, for instance, the case of the centuries-long conflict between Ecclesiastical and Temporal authority during the Middle Ages, or they can be <u><strong><mark>carried out tacitly and pragmatically</u></strong></mark>, <u>in much the same way as any of us balance commitments to work, family, politics, religion, and so on without having an explicit code or criteria</u>. Still, my proposal that religious, metaphysical, or scientific truth claims are themselves <u><mark>an “ontological gambit,</u></mark>” one way that those who identify themselves with a particular value arena <u><mark>might stake a claim for priority,</mark> </u>suggests one way explicit criteria can be introduced. This is not even by taking one value and declaring its priority, that, in good Dumontian fashion, encompasses the rest<u> <strong><mark>but</u></strong></mark> rather, by taking the tacit, interior values that inform how ones goes about pursuing value within certain fields (in the case of truth claims, logical consistency, verifiability, etc.) and reassembling them as an explicit value in themselves. We can refer to such tacit interior values as infravalues. Rather than being seen as ends in themselves, they are thought of as <u><strong>necessary prerequisites</u></strong> for, or means to, being able to pursue those forms of value that are socially realized in the kinds of arenas I have been describing. It’s easy enough to multiply examples. <u>It’s <mark>(it’s) difficult to pursue truth</u></mark> or beauty <u><mark>if one does not have reliable access to food</u></mark>. Food security, like <u><mark>basic health or</u></mark> physical <u><mark>safety</u></mark>, might well be considered to fall into this category; but so would sociality, cooperation, technical efficiency, and so forth. Some of these might be rewarding in themselves (there are few things more pleasant than doing a job extremely well), but they are infravalues insofar as they are not seen as ends in themselves. Sometimes they might become so. But (and this is the main reason to draw attention to the phenomenon at all) it’s even more common for infravalues themselves to become metavalues.</p> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 799,209 | 28 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,956 | Glaser himself says that Chinese acceptance probability low | Glaser, IR Professor at George Washington University, 16 | Glaser, IR Professor at George Washington University, 16
(Easley, L. & Kim, P. & Glaser, C. L. Spring 2016 volume "Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan." <i>International Security</i> 40.4 (2016): 178-191. <i>Project MUSE</i>. Web. 6 Jul. 2016. <https://muse.jhu.edu/> D.O.A. 7/6/16 ) | Kim’s main argument is that China would not accept the kind of grand bargain proposed in my article Kim argues that if a weaker China was unwilling to negotiate over a less important issue, a “much more confident and ambitious” China is virtually certain to be unwilling to make the kind of maritime and territorial disputes concessions that I propose. The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low , there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions | Kim argues that if a weaker China was unwilling to negotiate over a less important issue The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions | Kim’s main argument is that China would not accept the kind of grand bargain proposed in my article. She explores a parallel historical period during which President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were negotiating the U.S. opening to China. At the time, Chinese leaders held that “they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces” from Taiwan, and they demonstrated no interest in a deal that have would involved ending China’s support for North Vietnam in return for U.S. concessions. Kim argues that if a weaker China was unwilling to negotiate over a less important issue, a “much more confident and ambitious” China is virtually certain to be unwilling to make the kind of maritime and territorial disputes concessions that I propose. The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. | 1,395 | <h4><strong>Glaser himself says that Chinese acceptance probability low</h4><p>Glaser, IR Professor at George Washington University, 16</p><p></strong>(Easley, L. & Kim, P. & Glaser, C. L. Spring 2016 volume "Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan." <i>International Security</i> 40.4 (2016): 178-191. <i>Project MUSE</i>. Web. 6 Jul. 2016. <https://muse.jhu.edu/> D.O.A. 7/6/16 )</p><p><u><strong>Kim’s main argument is that China would not accept the kind of grand bargain proposed in my article</u></strong>. She explores a parallel historical period during which President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were negotiating the U.S. opening to China. At the time, Chinese leaders held that “they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces” from Taiwan, and they demonstrated no interest in a deal that have would involved ending China’s support for North Vietnam in return for U.S. concessions. <u><strong><mark>Kim argues that if a weaker China was unwilling to negotiate over a less important issue</mark>, a “much more confident and ambitious” China is virtually certain to be unwilling to make the kind of maritime and territorial disputes concessions that I propose.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low</u></strong></mark>, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article<u><strong>, <mark>there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions</u></mark>: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises.</p></strong> | 1NC/NC | Case | Solvency | 176,679 | 166 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,957 | Those prior questions specifically ignore the violence caused by meta-theoretical quests. | Jones ‘99 | Jones ‘99
Richard Wyn Jones is at Cardiff University, where he is currently a Professor of Politics. Professor Wyn Jones is the former Director of the Institute of Welsh Politics and professor in critical security studies at Aberystwyth University. Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory – 1999. ISBN 1-55587-335-9 (hc. :alk. paper) ON-LINE ED.: Columbia International Affairs Online, Transcribed, proofread, and marked-up in HTML, September 1999. | These questions highlight an ethical lacuna the analysis generates a logic unable to differentiate meaningfully between different actions in the political realm. how are we to evaluate efforts at securing change in society? consider ending apartheid in South Africa. though citizens of that country cannot be judged to be free after apartheid surely they are freer Although liberal democracy offers no panacea it is a better system than the totalitarian one that it has replaced. as theoreticians they seem to be unable to provide us with any grounds for favoring one set of social institutions over another Here we have a bizarre inversion of relativism by arguing that everything is equally false, no judgment might prefer some practices over others The reductionism and the pessimism is so thorough that it becomes debilitating (stifling) Any attempt to challenge the status quo already stands condemned as futile The outcome of this attitude is resignation and that is ill suited to any theory that aspires to real–world relevance the position is an underestimation of the potential for progressive change that exists People acting , through state institutions can actually influence the world around them in a progressive direction pessimism is unwarranted. | the analysis generates logic unable to differentiate between actions though citizens cannot be judged free after apartheid surely they are freer. Here we have inversion of relativism by arguing everything equally false, no judgment might prefer some practices over others The reductionism and the pessimism is so thorough that it becomes stifling The outcome is resignation and that is ill suited to real–world relevance the position is an underestimation of potential for change institutions, can influence the world around them pessimism is unwarranted. | An even more troubling feature of Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis is the downplaying of individual responsibility that is implicit in their argument. If Auschwitz is the inevitable outcome of enlightenment, and if instrumental rationality is too powerful to resist, then can we expect an individual Nazi to act in a different fashion? In the hermetic society the individual is a mere cipher, and if this is the case, can any individual really be blamed for his or her behavior? These questions highlight an ethical lacuna at the heart of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Despite the obvious intentions of the authors, their analysis generates a logic that renders them unable to differentiate meaningfully between different actions in the political realm. If “nothing complicitous with this world can have any truth,” then surely everything that exists in the real world must be judged equally untrue or false. But if this is so, how are we to evaluate efforts at securing change in contemporary society? Let us consider the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Although the citizens of that country cannot be adjudged to be free after the overthrow of the apartheid system, surely they are freer. Although the establishment of liberal democracy there offers no panacea, it is a better system than the totalitarian one that it has replaced. But although Adorno and Horkheimer as individuals would almost certainly have rejoiced in the downfall of the apartheid system, as theoreticians they seem to be unable to provide us with any grounds for favoring one particular set of social institutions over another. Here we have a bizarre inversion of the relativism to which contemporary poststructuralist approaches are prone. By arguing that there are no grounds to choose between different accounts of reality, poststructuralists are inevitably forced to accept that all accounts of a given reality are true. They can make no judgment on these claims that is not arbitrary (Norris 1992; Hunter and Wyn Jones 1995). Similarly, by arguing that everything in the world is equally false, Adorno and Horkheimer can make no judgment as to why we might prefer some forms of behavior and some set of practices over others. Here the impasse into which the analysis of Dialectic of Enlightenment leads its authors stands in bold relief. The determinism and reductionism of their argument is ultimately paralyzing. It was, of course, Antonio Gramsci who popularized the injunction that all those intent on changing society should attempt to face the world with a combination of “pessimism of the intellect” and “optimism of the will.” This position has much to commend it given the propensity of radicals to view society with rose–tinted glasses. However, the limitations of this position are nowhere better illustrated than in Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which the pessimism is so thoroughgoing that it becomes absolutely debilitating (stifling). Any attempt to challenge the status quo already stands condemned as futile. The logical outcome of this attitude is resignation and passivity. Adorno attempted to make a virtue of the detached attitude that he and Horkheimer adopted toward the political struggles of their own age by claiming: “If one is concerned to achieve what might be possible with human beings, it is extremely difficult to remain friendly towards real people.” However, considering that it is only “real people” who can bring about a better society, Adorno’s “complex form of misanthropy” ultimately leads only to quiescence (Wiggershaus 1994: 268). Thus, despite the clear similarities in the influences and interests of the founding fathers of critical theory and Gramsci, the resignatory passivity of the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment led them to a position on political practice far more akin to that of Oswald Spengler or Arthur Schopenhauer than to that adopted by the Sardinian Marxist Gramsci, even as he languished in a fascist prison. In view of the traditional Marxist emphasis on the unity of theory and practice, it is hardly surprising that Adorno and Horkheimer’s rejection of any attempt to orient their work toward political activity led to bitter criticism from other radical intellectuals. Perhaps the most famous such condemnation was that of Lukács, who acidly commented that the members of the Frankfurt School had taken up residence in the “Grand Hotel Abyss.” The inhabitants of this institution enjoyed all the comforts of the bourgeois lifestyle while fatalistically surveying the wreckage of life beyond its doors. Whereas Lukács’s own apologias for Stalinism point to the dangers of subordinating theoretical activity to the exigencies of day–to–day practical politics, Adorno and Horkheimer sunder theory and political practice completely, impoverishing the theoretical activity itself. Their stance leads to an aridity and scholasticism ill suited to any social theory that aspires to real–world relevance. Furthermore, the critical theorist’s position on political practice is based on an underestimation of the potential for progressive change that exists even in the most administered societies. It is instructive to contrast the attitude of Adorno and Horkheimer with that of Raymond Williams, who delivers the following broadside against “high culture Marxists” such as the members of the Frankfurt School: When the Marxists say that we live in a dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant, I have to ask them... where on earth they have lived. A dying culture, and ignorant masses, are not what I have known and see. (R. Williams 1989: 8) As I will discuss in Chapter 6, the evidence suggests that Williams is closer to the truth. People acting both individually and collectively, through social movements and state institutions, can actually influence the world around them in a progressive direction. Adorno and Horkheimer’s pessimism is unwarranted. | 5,908 | <h4><strong>Those prior questions specifically ignore the violence caused by meta-theoretical quests.</h4><p>Jones ‘99</p><p></strong>Richard Wyn Jones is at Cardiff University, where he is currently a Professor of Politics. Professor Wyn Jones is the former Director of the Institute of Welsh Politics and professor in <u>critical security studies at Aberystwyth University. Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory – 1999. ISBN 1-55587-335-9 (hc. :alk. paper) ON-LINE ED.: Columbia International Affairs Online, Transcribed, proofread, and marked-up in HTML, September 1999.</p><p></u>An even more troubling feature of Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis is the downplaying of individual responsibility that is implicit in their argument. If Auschwitz is the inevitable outcome of enlightenment, and if instrumental rationality is too powerful to resist, then can we expect an individual Nazi to act in a different fashion? In the hermetic society the individual is a mere cipher, and if this is the case, can any individual really be blamed for his or her behavior? <u>These questions highlight an ethical lacuna</u> at the heart of Dialectic of Enlightenment. Despite the obvious intentions of the authors, <u><mark>the</u></mark>ir <u><mark>analysis generates </mark>a<mark> logic</u></mark> that renders them <u><mark>unable to differentiate </mark>meaningfully <mark>between </mark>different <mark>actions <strong></mark>in the political realm.</strong> </u>If “nothing complicitous with this world can have any truth,” then surely everything that exists in the real world must be judged equally untrue or false. But if this is so, <u>how are we to evaluate efforts at securing change in</u> contemporary <u>society?</u> Let us <u>consider </u>the <u>ending </u>of <u>apartheid in South Africa.</u> Al<u><mark>though</u></mark> the <u><mark>citizens </mark>of that country <mark>cannot be</u></mark> ad<u><mark>judged</u></mark> <u>to be <mark>free after </u></mark>the overthrow of the <u><mark>apartheid</u></mark> system, <u><mark>surely they are freer</u>.</mark> <u>Although </u>the establishment of<u> liberal democracy</u> there <u>offers no panacea</u>, <u><strong>it is a better system than the totalitarian one that it has replaced.</u></strong> But although Adorno and Horkheimer as individuals would almost certainly have rejoiced in the downfall of the apartheid system, <u>as theoreticians they seem to be unable to provide us with any grounds for favoring one</u> particular <u>set of social institutions over another</u>. <u><strong><mark>Here we have </mark>a bizarre <mark>inversion of</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>relativism</mark> </u></strong>to which contemporary poststructuralist approaches are prone. By arguing that there are no grounds to choose between different accounts of reality, poststructuralists are inevitably forced to accept that all accounts of a given reality are true. They can make no judgment on these claims that is not arbitrary (Norris 1992; Hunter and Wyn Jones 1995). Similarly, <u><mark>by arguing </mark>that <mark>everything</u></mark> in the world <u>is <mark>equally false, </u></mark>Adorno and Horkheimer can make<u><mark> no judgment</u></mark> as to why we<u><mark> might prefer some</u></mark> forms of behavior and some set of <u><mark>practices over others</u></mark>. Here the impasse into which the analysis of Dialectic of Enlightenment leads its authors stands in bold relief. <u><mark>The</mark> </u>determinism and <u><strong><mark>reductionism</u></strong></mark> of their argument is ultimately paralyzing. It was, of course, Antonio Gramsci who popularized the injunction that all those intent on changing society should attempt to face the world with a combination of “pessimism of the intellect”<u><strong> <mark>and</u></strong></mark> “optimism of the will.” This position has much to commend it given the propensity of radicals to view society with rose–tinted glasses. However, the limitations of this position are nowhere better illustrated than in Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which <u><mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>pessimism</strong> is so thorough</u></mark>going <u><mark>that it becomes</mark> </u>absolutely<u> debilitating (<mark>stifling</mark>)</u>. <u>Any</u> <u>attempt to</u> <u>challenge the status quo already stands condemned as futile</u>. <u><mark>The</u></mark> logical <u><mark>outcome </mark>of this attitude <mark>is resignation and</u></mark> passivity. Adorno attempted to make a virtue of the detached attitude <u><mark>that</mark> </u>he and Horkheimer adopted toward the political struggles of their own age by claiming: “If one is concerned to achieve what might be possible with human beings, it<u> <mark>is</u></mark> extremely difficult to remain friendly towards real people.” However, considering that it is only “real people” who can bring about a better society, Adorno’s “complex form of misanthropy” ultimately leads only to quiescence (Wiggershaus 1994: 268). Thus, despite the clear similarities in the influences and interests of the founding fathers of critical theory and Gramsci, the resignatory passivity of the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment led them to a position on political practice far more akin to that of Oswald Spengler or Arthur Schopenhauer than to that adopted by the Sardinian Marxist Gramsci, even as he languished in a fascist prison. In view of the traditional Marxist emphasis on the unity of theory and practice, it is hardly surprising that Adorno and Horkheimer’s rejection of any attempt to orient their work toward political activity led to bitter criticism from other radical intellectuals. Perhaps the most famous such condemnation was that of Lukács, who acidly commented that the members of the Frankfurt School had taken up residence in the “Grand Hotel Abyss.” The inhabitants of this institution enjoyed all the comforts of the bourgeois lifestyle while fatalistically surveying the wreckage of life beyond its doors. Whereas Lukács’s own apologias for Stalinism point to the dangers of subordinating theoretical activity to the exigencies of day–to–day practical politics, Adorno and Horkheimer sunder theory and political practice completely, impoverishing the theoretical activity itself. Their stance leads to an aridity and scholasticism <u><mark>ill suited to</mark> any </u>social <u>theory that aspires to <mark>real–world relevance</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>the</u></mark> critical theorist’s<u><mark> position </u></mark>on political practice<u><mark> is </u></mark>based on <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>underestimation</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>of </mark>the <mark>potential for </mark>progressive <mark>change </mark>that exists</u> even in the most administered societies. It is instructive to contrast the attitude of Adorno and Horkheimer with that of Raymond Williams, who delivers the following broadside against “high culture Marxists” such as the members of the Frankfurt School: When the Marxists say that we live in a dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant, I have to ask them... where on earth they have lived. A dying culture, and ignorant masses, are not what I have known and see. (R. Williams 1989: 8) As I will discuss in Chapter 6, the evidence suggests that Williams is closer to the truth. <u>People acting </u>both individually and collectively<u>, <strong>through</u></strong> social movements and <u><strong>state <mark>institutions</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>can</mark> actually <mark>influence the world around them</mark> in a progressive direction</u>. Adorno and Horkheimer’s <u><strong><mark>pessimism is unwarranted.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 112,532 | 48 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,958 | Default to Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze—the plan is diplomatic engagement because it promotes peaceful resolution of territorial disputes | Drifte 3 | Drifte 3 — Reinhard Drifte, Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673, p. 5-6) | The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult The crucial issue for a correct understanding of the engagement policy of any country is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used one needs to consider peaceful resolution of territorial disputes | misunderstanding of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion In order to propose remedies qualifying adjectives or coinage of new words have been proposed which make understanding engagement even more difficult The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult The crucial issue for a correct understanding is to clarify the goals as well as the mix of policy tools used one needs to consider peaceful resolution of territorial disputes | The complex nature of engagement policy The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations. The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9 The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective: 1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers; 2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy; 3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing; 4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11 When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12 | 4,234 | <h4><u><strong>Default to Reasonability</u> important when defining “engagement” — avoids an <u>impossible definitional maze</u>—the plan is diplomatic engagement because it promotes peaceful resolution of territorial disputes</h4><p>Drifte 3</strong> — Reinhard Drifte, Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673, p. 5-6)</p><p>The complex nature of engagement policy <u>The <mark>misunderstanding of</mark> the policy of <mark>engagement gives rise to <strong>considerable confusion</u></strong></mark> because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. <u><mark>In order to propose remedies</mark> to perceived deficiencies of engagement, <strong><mark>qualifying adjectives</strong></mark> to 'engagement', <mark>or</mark> even <strong>the <mark>coinage of new words</strong></mark>, <mark>have been proposed which make</mark> an appropriate <mark>understanding</mark> of <mark>engagement</mark> policy <strong><mark>even more difficult</strong></mark>. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment</u>.8 <u><mark>The resulting <strong>definatory maze</strong> cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement <strong>difficult</u></strong></mark> at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations. The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9 The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective: 1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers; 2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy; 3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing; 4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11 When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. <u><mark>The <strong>crucial issue</strong> for a correct understanding</mark> of</u> Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to <u>the engagement policy of any</u> other <u>country</u>) <u><mark>is to clarify the</mark> emphasis and the robustness with which <strong>some rather than other <mark>goals</strong></mark> associated with engagement are pursued, <mark>as well as <strong>the mix of policy tools used</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>one needs to consider</u></mark> issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, <u><strong><mark>peaceful resolution of territorial disputes</u></strong></mark>, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12</p> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Topicality | Solvency | 162,071 | 23 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,959 | The Grand Bargain will falter—China has distaste towards US hegemony. | Lingwall, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015. | Lingwall, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015.
(Noah, 8-14-2015, World Affairs Council of Western Michigan, “The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”, http://www.worldmichigan.org/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/, 7-9-2016, SL) | While a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility of the United States’ demands. First, a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China’s recent move toward a more “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the United States’ ambitions to retain its regional power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. Tensions between the United States and China over China’s artificial island construction in the South China Seaindicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference in the region. Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony | hile a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific China’s move toward “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the U St ambitions to retain its regional power. Tensions over China’s artificial island construction indicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference . U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony | While a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility of the United States’ demands. First, a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China’s recent move toward a more “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the United States’ ambitions to retain its regional power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. The proposal, presented to U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, represents China’s first major attempt to set the agenda in U.S.-China relations, reversing China’s historical trend of bowing to U.S. interests and marking a key shift in U.S.-China relations. Tensions between the United States and China over China’s artificial island construction in the South China Seaindicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference in the region. Throughout the past several months, U.S. surveillance planes and warships have patrolled the hotly contested South China Sea in an effort to protect freedom of navigation. Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony | 1,850 | <h4><strong>The Grand Bargain will falter—China has distaste towards US hegemony.</h4><p>Lingwall, Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015.</p><p></strong>(Noah, 8-14-2015, World Affairs Council of Western Michigan, “The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”, http://www.worldmichigan.org/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/, 7-9-2016, SL)</p><p><u><strong>W<mark>hile a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility</mark> of the United States’ demands. First, <mark>a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific</mark>. <mark>China’s</mark> recent <mark>move toward</mark> a more <mark>“assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates’ <mark>ambitions to retain its regional power.</mark> Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. </u></strong>The proposal, presented to U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, represents China’s first major attempt to set the agenda in U.S.-China relations, reversing China’s historical trend of bowing to U.S. interests and marking a key shift in U.S.-China relations. <u><strong><mark>Tensions</mark> between the United States and China <mark>over China’s artificial island construction</mark> in the South China Sea<mark>indicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference</mark> in the region. </u></strong>Throughout the past several months, U.S. surveillance planes and warships have patrolled the hotly contested South China Sea in an effort to protect freedom of navigation. <u><strong>Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames<mark>. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded</mark> <mark>to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.”</u></strong> <u><strong>Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by </mark>reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and <mark>condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.”</mark> Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. <mark>These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC/NC | Case | Solvency | 71,796 | 65 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,960 | The United States federal government should negotiate a phased grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end the commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan in exchange for a commitment by the People’s Republic of China to peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and to officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States federal government should negotiate a phased grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end the commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan in exchange for a commitment by the People’s Republic of China to peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and to officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. </h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Plan | 1,561,039 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,961 | The plan solves war and China relations—Eliminates the largest source of tension between the US and China—the Taiwan question—that’s Glaser | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>The plan solves war and China relations—Eliminates the largest source of tension between the US and China—the Taiwan question—that’s Glaser</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,038 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,962 | Endorsing a single reform is distinct from committing to reformism. | D’Amato ‘6 | D’Amato ‘6 | Paul D'Amato is managing editor of the International Socialist Review and author of The Meaning of Marxism, The Meaning of Marxism – p. 103
It is important to remember that rejecting reformism is not the same as rejecting reforms It is precisely struggles for immediate demands that develop consciousness of their own power as well as the confidence to move toward revolutionary action That is why the fight for reforms has the potential to go further because once in struggle horizons expand The possibility of another world looms more closely on the horizon. | It is important to remember that rejecting reformism is not the same as rejecting reforms It is precisely struggles for immediate demands that develop consciousness of their own power as well as the confidence to move toward revolutionary action That is why the fight for reforms has the potential to go further because once in struggle horizons expand The possibility of another world looms more closely on the horizon. | Paul D'Amato is managing editor of the International Socialist Review and author of The Meaning of Marxism, The Meaning of Marxism – p. 103
It is important to remember, however, that rejecting reformism is not the same as rejecting reforms, and in particular, the fight for reforms. It is precisely through struggles for immediate demands—over wages, working conditions, and for political and social improvements—that workers are able to develop consciousness of their own power, as well as the confidence born of collective action, to move toward revolutionary action. Struggle changes consciousness. That is why the fight for reforms has the potential to go further; because once in struggle, the horizons of workers expand beyond their immediate conditions. The possibility of another world looms more closely on the horizon. | 828 | <h4>Endorsing <u>a single reform</u> is distinct from committing to <strong>reformism.</h4><p>D’Amato ‘6</p><p><u>Paul D'Amato is managing editor of the International Socialist Review and author of The Meaning of Marxism, The Meaning of Marxism – p. 103</p><p></strong><mark>It is important to remember</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>that <strong>rejecting reformism</strong> is not the same as <strong>rejecting reforms</u></strong></mark>, and in particular, the fight for reforms. <u><mark>It is precisely </u></mark>through <u><strong><mark>struggles</strong> for immediate demands</u></mark>—over wages, working conditions, and for political and social improvements—<u><mark>that</mark> </u>workers are able to <u><mark>develop consciousness of their own power</u></mark>, <u><mark>as well as the confidence</u></mark> born of collective action, <u><mark>to move toward revolutionary action</u></mark>. Struggle changes consciousness. <u><mark>That is why the fight for reforms has the potential to go further</u></mark>; <u><mark>because once in struggle</u></mark>, the <u><mark>horizons</mark> </u>of workers <u><mark>expand</mark> </u>beyond their immediate conditions. <u><mark>The possibility of another world looms more closely on the horizon.</p></u></mark> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 94,118 | 49 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,963 | Interpretation – engagement is the offer of positive inducements in exchange for specific concessions | Hall ‘14 | Hall ‘14 - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4) | the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence behavior positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state. An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, in return for a specific concession aid and development assistance | growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence behavior positive inducements are offered to leverage" particular q p q s from the target state investment might be canvassed trade deal promised in return for a specific concession | This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific concession., business forums and research networks, aid and development assistance, and so on. | 809 | <h4>Interpretation – engagement is the offer of positive inducements <u>in exchange</u> for specific concessions </h4><p><strong>Hall ‘14</strong> - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, <u>The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses</u>, p. 3-4)</p><p>This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows <u><strong>the <mark>growing consensus</mark> <mark>in the literature that</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>behavior</u></strong></mark> of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, <u><strong><mark>positive inducements are offered to</mark> try to "<mark>leverage" particular q</mark>uid <mark>p</mark>ro <mark>q</mark>uo<mark>s</mark> <mark>from the target state</mark>.</u></strong>9 <u><strong>An <mark>investment might be canvassed</mark>, a <mark>trade deal promised</mark>,</u></strong> or a weapons system provided <u><strong><mark>in return for a specific concession</u></strong></mark>., business forums and research networks, <u><strong>aid and development assistance</u></strong>, and so on.</p> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | Solvency | 1,481,876 | 61 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,964 | Advantage 1 is Taiwan | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Advantage 1 is Taiwan</h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,561,040 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,965 | And, Taiwan is key: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>And, Taiwan is key:</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,041 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,966 | That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo | De LaHunt 6 | De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct) | Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior that puts coercion in its own box | Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward | Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.
Standards, only a few solvency advocates for qpq plans, it is easy to attack them.
This is just a waste of time, they lose no ground. The plan specifies that China is a threat | 754 | <h4>That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo</h4><p><strong>De LaHunt 6</strong> - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis</mark> – this for that. <mark>If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward</u></strong></mark>. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, <u><strong>I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior</u></strong>, so <u><strong>that</u></strong> pretty much <u><strong>puts coercion in its own box</u></strong>, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.</p><p>Standards, only a few solvency advocates for qpq plans, it is easy to attack them. </p><p>This is just a waste of time, they lose no ground. The plan specifies that China is a threat</p> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | Solvency | 168,886 | 58 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,967 | State vs. Non-State is a false binary. Both extremes fail to teach key lessons. Contingent State action can solve for green themes. | Harvey ’15 | Harvey ’15
(David Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York - interviewed by AK Malabocas, “Consolidating Power,” Roar, Issue #0, Fall 2015, https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power) | the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their refusal to see the state as a partner to radical transformation There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build infrastructures. There are wings of the state apparatus which are therefore terribly important the center of d sease control, for example How do we respond to global epidemics You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. the Montreal Protocol to phase out chlorofluorocarbon was successful enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis it is important for the left to act If the left doesn’t then the right-wing is the next option. the left has to be more pragmatic narrow demands open space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t possibility for revolution , we have to look for compromise solutions which open the space where new forms of organizing can take place | the problem with anarchists is denial of the significance of power and their refusal to see the state as a partner to radical transformation There is tendency to regard the state as the 100 percent enemy. the left is not good at answering how we build infrastructures. There are state apparatus which are important How do we respond to global epidemics You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY the Montreal Protocol to phase out c f c was successful but needed organization different to assembly-based politics. it is important for the left to act If the left doesn’t then the right-wing is the option. the left has to be more pragmatic narrow demands open space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t possibility for revolution we have to look for compromise which open space where new organizing can take place | So, looking at examples from southern Europe—solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey—these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach? I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the state as a possible partner to radical transformation. There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement—and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance. That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized? To begin with, the left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city—like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization. There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly important—the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization. There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone. One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the 1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based politics. From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making. Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’ So you believe this would require some form of authority? No, there will be authority structures anyway—there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here—but it’s covert.’ Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation? At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option. I think—and I hate to say this—but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right now. More pragmatic in what sense? Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me. It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very narrow demands open up space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place. | 5,254 | <h4>State vs. Non-State is a false binary. Both extremes fail to teach key lessons. Contingent State action <u>can</u> solve for green themes.</h4><p><strong>Harvey ’15</strong> </p><p>(David Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York - interviewed by AK Malabocas, “Consolidating Power,” Roar, Issue #0, Fall 2015, https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power)</p><p>So, looking at examples from southern Europe—solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey—these seem to be very crucial for building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach? I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that <u><mark>the problem with </mark>the <mark>anarchists is </mark>their <mark>denial of the significance of power and their</mark> </u>inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the <u><mark>refusal to see the state as a </u></mark>possible <u><mark>partner to <strong>radical transformation</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>There is</mark> a <mark>tendency to regard the state as </mark>being the enemy, <strong><mark>the 100 percent enemy.</u></strong></mark> And there are plenty of examples of repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement—and the state got reorganized and smashed the resistance. That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is left of the state to be conquered, to be seized? To begin with, <u><mark>the left is not</mark> very <mark>good at answering </mark>the question of<mark> how we build</u></mark> massive<u> <mark>infrastructures.</u></mark> How will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures for a whole city—like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization. <u><mark>There are </mark>wings of the <mark>state apparatus</u></mark>, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, <u><mark>which are</mark> therefore <strong>terribly <mark>important</u></strong></mark>—<u>the <strong>c</strong>enter of <strong>d</u></strong>i<u>sease <strong>c</strong>ontrol,</u> <u>for example</u>. <u><mark>How do we respond to global epidemics</mark> </u>such as Ebola and the like? <u><mark>You can’t do it in the anarchist way of</mark> <mark>DIY</mark>-organization</u>. <u><strong>There are many instances where you need some state-like forms of infrastructure. </u></strong>We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized forms of confrontations and activities alone. One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is <u><mark>the Montreal Protocol to phase out</u></mark> the use of <u><strong><mark>c</strong></mark>hloro<strong><mark>f</strong></mark>luoro<strong><mark>c</strong></mark>arbon</u> in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It <u><mark>was successful</u></mark>ly <u>enforced in the 1990s <mark>but</mark> it <mark>needed </mark>some kind of <mark>organization </mark>that is very <mark>different to </mark>the one coming out of <mark>assembly-based politics</u>.</mark> From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making. Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we listen to what they are saying?’ So you believe this would require some form of authority? No, there will be authority structures anyway—there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here—but it’s covert.’ Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards social transformation? At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? <u>In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis</u> of the last years, <u><mark>it is important for the left to <strong>act</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>If the left doesn’t </u></mark>make it,<u><mark> then <strong>the right-wing is the</mark> next <mark>option.</u></strong></mark> I think—and I hate to say this—but I think <u><mark>the left has to be</u> <u><strong>more pragmatic</u></strong></mark> in relation to the dynamics going on right now. More pragmatic in what sense? Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen and therefore it was a progressive move for me. It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very<u><mark> narrow demands</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>open</u></strong></mark> up<u><strong><mark> space</u></strong> <u>for</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>much more revolutionary outcomes,</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and even when there isn’t </u></mark>any <u><mark>possibility</mark> <mark>for </u></mark>any<u><mark> revolution</u></mark>ary outcomes<u>, <mark>we have to look for <strong>compromise </strong></mark>solutions <mark>which</u></mark> nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity nonsense and<u> <mark>open </mark>the<mark> space where new </mark>forms of <mark>organizing can take place</u></mark>.</p> | null | 1AC | The Advantage | 51,710 | 349 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,968 | Taiwan war is inevitable in the status quo: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Taiwan war is inevitable in the status quo:</h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,561,042 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,969 | 1. Nationalism in China makes it a critical issue | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>1. Nationalism in China makes it a critical issue</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,043 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
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3,783,970 | No one knows for sure what happens after we die, but science proves because memories and personality traits are stored in the neurons of brain when they die so does what we consider the “soul.” | null | Shermer 2008 | Skeptic Magazine Volume 13 Number 4 (2008): 52-57,80. //wyo-KB)
This is my position on the afterlife: I don’t know and you don’t either. . Because no one knows for sure what happens after we die, we deal with the topic in diverse ways through religion, literature, poetry, science, and even humor. What is it that supposedly survives the death of the physical body? The soul. The general belief is that the soul is a conscious ethereal substance that is the unique essence of a living being that survives its incarnation in flesh. In 1907 a Massachusetts physician named Duncan MacDougall tried to find out by weighing six dying patients before and after their death. He reported in the medical journal American Medicine that there was a 21-gram difference The implication is that the soul is a thing that can be weighed. Is it? In science we define our terms with semantic precision. I define the “soul” as the unique pattern of information that represents the essence of a person. By this definition, unless there is some medium to retain the pattern of our personal information after we die, our soul dies with us. Our bodies are made of proteins, coded by our DNA, so with the disintegration of DNA our protein patterns are lost forever. Our memories and personality are stored in the patterns of neurons firing in our brains, so when those neurons die it spells the death of our memories and personality, similar to the ravages of stroke and Alzheimer’s disease, only final. , the neural pattern of information that is our memories and personality — our “self” — is sensed as a soul. In this sense, the soul is an illusion. | on the afterlife: I don’t know and you don’t either Because no one knows for sure what happens after we die deal with the topic in diverse ways the soul is a thing that can be weighed. Is it? In science we define our terms with semantic precision. I define the “soul” as the unique pattern of information that represents the essence of a person Our bodies are made of proteins, coded by our DNA, so with the disintegration of DNA our protein patterns are lost forever. Our memories and personality are stored in the patterns of neurons firing in our brains, so when those neurons die it spells the death of our memories and personality, similar to the ravages of stroke and Alzheimer’s disease, only final. | (Michael Brant Shermer, PhD (Claremont Graduate University in history of science) is an American science writer, historian of science, founder of The Skeptics Society, and Editor in Chief of its magazine Skeptic, “Hope Springs Eternal: Science, the Afterlife & the Meaning of Life” Skeptic Magazine Volume 13 Number 4 (2008): 52-57,80. http://www.skeptic.com/reading_room/the-great-afterlife-debate/ //wyo-KB)
This is my position on the afterlife: I don’t know and you don’t either. If we knew for certain that there is an afterlife, we would not fear death as we do, we would not mourn quite so agonizingly the death of loved ones, and there would be no need to engage in debates on the subject. Because no one knows for sure what happens after we die, we deal with the topic in diverse ways through religion, literature, poetry, science, and even humor. The perpetually anxious Woody Allen has this workaround: “It’s not that I’m afraid to die. I just don’t want to be there when it happens.” Steven Wright thinks he’s figured out a solution: “I intend to live forever. So far, so good.” Humor aside, since I am a scientist and claims are made that there is scientific evidence for life after death, let us analyze the data for that doubtful future date, and consider what its possibility may mean for our present state. 21 Grams: The Nature of the Soul What is it that supposedly survives the death of the physical body? The soul. There are about as many different understandings of the nature of the soul as there are religions and spiritual movements. The general belief is that the soul is a conscious ethereal substance that is the unique essence of a living being that survives its incarnation in flesh. The ancient Hebrew word for soul is nephesh, or “life” or “vital breath”; the Greek word for soul is psyche, or “mind”; and the Roman Latin word for soul is anima, or “spirit” or “breath.” The soul is the essence that breathes life into flesh, animates us, gives us our vital spirit. Given the lack of knowledge about the natural world at the time these concepts were first formed, it is not surprising these ancient peoples reached for such ephemeral metaphors as mind, breath, and spirit. One moment a little dog is barking, prancing, and wagging its tail, and in the next moment it is a lump of inert flesh. What happened in that moment? In 1907 a Massachusetts physician named Duncan MacDougall tried to find out by weighing six dying patients before and after their death. He reported in the medical journal American Medicine that there was a 21-gram difference. Even though his measurements were crude and varying, and no one has been able to replicate his findings, it has nonetheless grown to urban legendary status as the weight of the soul. The implication is that the soul is a thing that can be weighed. Is it? In science we define our terms with semantic precision. I define the “soul” as the unique pattern of information that represents the essence of a person. By this definition, unless there is some medium to retain the pattern of our personal information after we die, our soul dies with us. Our bodies are made of proteins, coded by our DNA, so with the disintegration of DNA our protein patterns are lost forever. Our memories and personality are stored in the patterns of neurons firing in our brains, so when those neurons die it spells the death of our memories and personality, similar to the ravages of stroke and Alzheimer’s disease, only final. Because the brain does not perceive itself, it imputes mental activity to a separate source — hallucinations of preternatural entities such as ghosts, angels, and aliens are perceived as actual beings; out-of-body and near-death experiences are sensed as external events instead of internal states. Likewise, the neural pattern of information that is our memories and personality — our “self” — is sensed as a soul. In this sense, the soul is an illusion. | 3,941 | <h4>No one knows for sure what happens after we die, but science proves because memories and personality traits are stored in the neurons of brain when they die so does what we consider the “soul.<strong>”</h4><p></strong>Shermer 2008</p><p>(Michael Brant Shermer, PhD (Claremont Graduate University in history of science) is an American science writer, historian of science, founder of The Skeptics Society, and Editor in Chief of its magazine Skeptic, “Hope Springs Eternal: Science, the Afterlife & the Meaning of Life” <u>Skeptic Magazine Volume 13 Number 4 (2008): 52-57,80.</u> http://www.skeptic.com/reading_room/the-great-afterlife-debate/<u> //wyo-KB)</p><p>This is my position <mark>on the afterlife: I don’t know and you don’t either</mark>.</u> If we knew for certain that there is an afterlife, we would not fear death as we do, we would not mourn quite so agonizingly the death of loved ones, and there would be no need to engage in debates on the subject<u>. <mark>Because no one knows for sure what happens after we die</mark>, we <mark>deal with the topic in diverse ways</mark> through religion, literature, poetry, science, and even humor.</u> The perpetually anxious Woody Allen has this workaround: “It’s not that I’m afraid to die. I just don’t want to be there when it happens.” Steven Wright thinks he’s figured out a solution: “I intend to live forever. So far, so good.” Humor aside, since I am a scientist and claims are made that there is scientific evidence for life after death, let us analyze the data for that doubtful future date, and consider what its possibility may mean for our present state. 21 Grams: The Nature of the Soul <u>What is it that supposedly survives the death of the physical body? The soul. </u>There are about as many different understandings of the nature of the soul as there are religions and spiritual movements. <u>The general belief is that the soul is a conscious ethereal substance that is the unique essence of a living being that survives its incarnation in flesh.</u> The ancient Hebrew word for soul is nephesh, or “life” or “vital breath”; the Greek word for soul is psyche, or “mind”; and the Roman Latin word for soul is anima, or “spirit” or “breath.” The soul is the essence that breathes life into flesh, animates us, gives us our vital spirit. Given the lack of knowledge about the natural world at the time these concepts were first formed, it is not surprising these ancient peoples reached for such ephemeral metaphors as mind, breath, and spirit. One moment a little dog is barking, prancing, and wagging its tail, and in the next moment it is a lump of inert flesh. What happened in that moment? <u>In 1907 a Massachusetts physician named Duncan MacDougall tried to find out by weighing six dying patients before and after their death. He reported in the medical journal American Medicine that there was a 21-gram difference</u>. Even though his measurements were crude and varying, and no one has been able to replicate his findings, it has nonetheless grown to urban legendary status as the weight of the soul. <u>The implication is that <mark>the soul is a thing that can be weighed. Is it? In science we define our terms with semantic precision. I define the “soul” as the unique pattern of information that represents the essence of a person</mark>. By this definition, unless there is some medium to retain the pattern of our personal information after we die, our soul dies with us. <mark>Our bodies are made of proteins, coded by our DNA, so with the disintegration of DNA our protein patterns are lost forever. Our memories and personality are stored in the patterns of neurons firing in our brains, so when those neurons die it spells the death of our memories and personality, similar to the ravages of stroke and Alzheimer’s disease, only final.</u></mark> Because the brain does not perceive itself, it imputes mental activity to a separate source — hallucinations of preternatural entities such as ghosts, angels, and aliens are perceived as actual beings; out-of-body and near-death experiences are sensed as external events instead of internal states. Likewise<u>, the neural pattern of information that is our memories and personality — our “self” — is sensed as a soul. In this sense, the soul is an illusion.</p></u> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Death Bad | 478,365 | 7 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
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2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,971 | First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan.</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,044 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,972 | Despite the call, SCS and Taiwan war is inevitable in the status quo – Taiwan-China conflict will escalate | Düben 2-14-2017 National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-the-coming-taiwan-china-crisis-19443?page=show, Accessed: 2-16-2017, /Kent Denver-MB | Björn Alexander Düben is an assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University, and an associate of LSE ideas at the London School of Economics and Political Science. , Donald Trump and the Coming Taiwan-China Crisis,", 2-14-2017 National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-the-coming-taiwan-china-crisis-19443?page=show, Accessed: 2-16-2017, /Kent Denver-MB | AMONG THE four traditional geopolitical flash points in East Asia cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan have been the least likely to generate troubling headlines in recent years This changed in early December when President-elect Donald Trump made the controversial decision to take a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen In an interview shortly afterwards, Trump appeared to question Washington’s future commitment to the “one-China” policy that had guided the U.S. approach to cross-Strait relations for nearly four decades at the time of Trump’s intervention relations between Beijing and Taipei were already rapidly deteriorating, with the fragile status quo that hitherto sustained them now fraying The renewal of cross-Strait tensions was triggered by last year’s general election in Taiwan, which swept the Beijing-critical Democratic People’s Party (DPP) into power During the period of KMT preponderance relations between Taipei and Beijing had been tranquil The “new normalcy” in bilateral relations brought on by Ma’s course of rapprochement with Beijing mitigated cross-Strait tensions But even if the KMT had not suffered a historic defeat in the 2016 elections, the long-term viability of these policies would have been doubtful Opposition against Ma’s Beijing-friendly course had long been mounting in Taiwan. The policy of rapprochement masked the fact that both sides of the strait have been drifting further and further away from each other Around 60 percent of the people now regard themselves as “Taiwanese,” with only a third identifying as “both Chinese and Taiwanese.” This decisive shift in self-identification is a fairly new development Since Xi Jinping became China’s president in 2013, he has centralized power in a manner unseen for decades China’s neoauthoritarian policymaking streak has widened the political gulf between Taiwan and the mainland even further, and it makes it particularly difficult for Beijing to come to terms with the kinds of policies represented by the DPP. Public disenchantment in Taiwan has been strongly reinforced by Beijing’s erosion of civil and political rights in neighboring Hong Kong the primary source of discontent for Taiwanese voters has been the state of Taiwan’s ailing econom which entered a recession in the second half of 2015 and grew by little more than 1 percent in 2016 At the same time, however, cross-Strait economic relations have now lost much of their luster for the Taiwanese Not only have polls shown that a majority of Taiwanese are worried about the potential consequences of deepening economic dependence on Beijing. Taiwanese entrepreneurs are increasingly irked by China’s rising labor costs, the problems associated with environmental pollution, and the persistent bureaucratic hurdles erected by China’s central and regional governments many Chinese companies that used to form the supply lines of Taiwanese manufacturers have begun to engage in cut-throat competition with them. In light of the growing complications that Taiwanese businesses have been facing in China, they have begun to shift many of their production sites to South and Southeast Asia FOLLOWING TSAI’S inauguration as president of Taiwan, cross-Strait relations between Beijing and Taipei swiftly deteriorated Beijing proved unwilling to accept such an ambiguous stance. Xi Jinping put Tsai on the spot by explicitly demanding that she clarify her position on cross-Strait relations by declaring adherence to the so-called 1992 Consensus Tsai herself had on earlier occasions claimed that the 1992 Consensus “does not exist,” but during the election campaign and since she was elected president she has studiously avoided taking a clear stance on this subject Tsai has repeatedly refused to alter her stance on the issue. To date, all formal bilateral contacts between China and Taiwan remain suspended, with even Track II dialogue forums ruled out by Beijing Most analysts of cross-Strait relations have so far assumed that the Chinese leadership will refrain from making overly provocative and threatening moves absent a substantial policy change in Taipei in the direction of de jure Taiwanese independence There have been signs, however, that Xi Jinping and his government are no longer satisfied with simply maintaining the status quo of cross-Strait relations indefinitely These and other official proclamations indicate that Xi regards reunification not as an abstract, remote goal for the distant future, but a more proximate objective that cannot be postponed indefinitely. Xi’s apparent impatience on the issue of unification stands in stark contrast to the vocal resistance to this idea among the vast majority of Taiwa A nationwide opinion poll conducted in late May 2016 found that two-thirds of those polled in Taiwan—and more than 80 percent of respondents in the 20–29 age bracket—opposed the prospect of an eventual unification with China, while only 18.5 percent were in favor WITH THE prospects of improved cross-Strait ties appearing more distant than ever in the wake of the DPP’s electoral victory, Beijing began to tighten the screws on Taiwan and on Tsai Ing-wen’s administration long before Donald Trump picked up the phone in early December to embark on an apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy Ever since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in 1995–96, the balance of power between both sides of the strait has shifted dramatically in favor of Beijing Following Tsai’s election victory, it began to subtly undermine Taiwan in the international arena. By early 2016, the number of states that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan had gradually dwindled to a mere twenty-two As part of a tacit agreement with the Ma administration, Beijing had initially refused to establish formal ties of its own with the West African nation despite Gambia’s diplomatic overtures. But with Ma gone, the Chinese leadership no longer felt bound by the agreement. In late December, Beijing poached another one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, China has also used its influence to prevent Taiwan from being invited to important international gatherings particularly problematic scenario at a time when Taipei is keen to take part in regional integration projects and is trying to conclude free-trade agreements with a number of countries that do not formally recognize it Additional sovereignty concerns arose in Taiwan when Beijing pressured several countries, including Kenya, Malaysia, Cambodia and Armenia, to deport dozens of Taiwanese passport holders suspected of being members of telecoms fraud schemes to mainland China Beyond these diplomatic pressure points, China—which is Taiwan’s largest trading partner—can resort to a multitude of economic levers to apply further pressure on Taipei. The newly imposed restrictions, however, have caused the number of Taiwan-bound mainland Chinese tourists to drop by nearly 30 percent, and Beijing announced that their number would be further reduced to less than 2 million per year. The economic cost of a suspension of tourist visits from the mainland is a substantial but tolerable burden for Taiwan although it has already stirred up political resistance A much more potent weapon in Beijing’s arsenal would be to impose restrictions on Taiwanese business activity in China, considering that key sectors of Taiwanese manufacturing heavily reliant on the mainland. While China’s own economy would suffer from such measures—Taiwan is currently the mainland’s seventh-largest trading partner—Beijing would find it far easier than Taipei to stomach the cost of such a move. At present, Taiwan is already the most frequent target of Chinese cyberattacks, not least since it is considered a “test bed” for subsequent cyber campaigns against targets in the United States THE MOST drastic measure that Beijing could take against Taiwan if relations with the DPP-led government were to deteriorate beyond recovery is the employment of military force But it is not an altogether inconceivable step considering China’s conduct in previous crises in the Taiwan Strait and its increasing willingness to employ means of military coercion in disputes with other regional powers Following the Taiwan phone call and Trump’s potential willingness to abandon the one-China principle, the prospect of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait now appears less remote. China has substantially stepped up its military activities around Taiwan. Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly circled the international airspace surrounding Taiwan within visible range of the island, and a group of warships, including China’s sole aircraft carrier, passed some ninety nautical miles south of it. China’s armed forces are reportedly “considering strong measures” to deter the island from moving further out of Beijing’s grasp, and the Communist Party published an op-ed declaring that “the military status quo across the Taiwan Straits needs to be reshaped” and advising Beijing to get “ready to achieve reunification through the use of force The potential for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait depends in no small part on developments in other geopolitical hot spots in the region particularly the South China Sea. Beijing’s increasingly assertive moves and Washington’s intransigent response manifested in numerous close encounters between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft—risk sparking an open confrontation. Should tensions in the South China Sea escalate, the best option for Taipei would be to avoid any direct involvement More likely than not, however, it would be put under pressure by both China and the United States to take a stance, not least due to the fact that Taiwan is the site of strategically important military assets, More importantly, by virtue of controlling the island of Itu Aba (Taiping), the largest natural feature in the disputed Spratly Islands, Taiwan already has “boots on the ground” in the South China Sea and would thus find it hard to avoid involvement in any armed confrontation there In the event of an outbreak of open hostilities in the South or East China Sea, Taiwan’s ability to cooperate with any of the other actors in the region would be constrained by the fact that the Taiwanese government’s official position on the territorial disputes is largely identical to Beijing’s: Taipei has long claimed most of the contested islands and reefs as a part of the sovereign territory of “China.” It therefore finds itself in a particularly intricate situation: it has a number of natural allies in the region that share its aversion to the newfound assertiveness in the foreign policy pursued by China, yet it officially agrees with Beijing on the issue of China’s territorial claims vis-à-vis these states Taipei joined Beijing in roundly rejecting the ruling. President Tsai stated that the tribunal’s decision had “gravely harmed” Taiwan’s rights in the South China Sea, and in response Taipei dispatched a warship to patrol the contested region and reassert Taiwanese claims there SHOULD CHINA decide to employ military force in the Taiwan Strait—including any measure short of an outright invasion, such as a naval blockade the situation for Taiwan would be dire. The balance of military power, always highly unfavorable for Taipei, has never been as lopsided as it is today Taipei’s relative military disadvantage has been compounded by the fact that its principal ally, the United States, a have become very reluctant to supply state-of-the-art defense technology to the Taiwanese military out of concern about adversarial reactions from Beijing The plans for submarine development are part of the asymmetric defense strategy adopted by the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense in response to the continuous growth of China’s military power. Another central component of this strategy is the development of a fleet of state-of-the-art Tuo Chiang–class stealth corvettes, each equipped with sixteen potent Hsiung Feng antiship missiles The rationale for developing this type of warship is to employ it as a cheap and effective means of countering China’s massive naval development at a fraction of its cost By resorting to these and similar means of asymmetric defense, including a large network of “smart mines,” Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense currently estimates that the Taiwanese armed forces would be able to fend off a Chinese invasion for at least thirty days. Following the projected thirty-day period, Taiwan’s survival would depend on large-scale military support from the United States. The nature and degree of American involvement in a potential cross-Strait confrontation would be a crucial variable that critically affects the strategic calculations of the leaderships in Beijing and in Taipei. It is a commonly held belief among the Taiwanese public that, should there be a military conflict with Beijing, the United States would be bound to intervene in support of Taiwan Beijing’s last attempt to resort to military force in its relations with Taipei—th was met by a stern response from Washington, which dispatched two carrier battle groups to the region and warned Beijing that any further military aggression against Taiwan would bring “grave consequences” for China In view of the Trump administration’s determination to drive a harder bargain with China, Taipei might nonetheless receive further American assurances in the future. For Washington, a lack of support for Taiwan during a potential confrontation with Beijing could entail a serious loss of credibility with many of its key partners and allies in East and Southeast Asia, raising doubts about its wider defense commitments in this vitally important region AFTER A prolonged period of tranquility and rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei, cross-Strait relations are once again headed for troubled times The apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy is occurring at a time when Beijing, dissatisfied with the new leadership in Taipei and increasingly assertive towards the United States, has already enacted punitive measures against Taiwan, both diplomatic and economic Beijing is beginning to feel that it has exhausted all peaceful options of bringing Taiwan back into the fold, and Xi Jinping does not seem entirely averse to the prospect of using some form of military pressure to prevent Taipei from drifting further away from the mainland Ahead of a key leadership transition in China’s Communist Party in late 2017 , Xi does not want to appear weak on matters considered nonnegotiable core interests for the party—particularly Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, meanwhile, is keen to preserve the status quo of cross-Strait relations and has adopted a conciliatory tone towards Beijing, but she has been equally adamant in her affirmation of Taiwanese autonomy and her refusal to render explicit homage to the one-China principle. Tsai is under pressure domestically factions in her own party that helped propel her to power are now demanding that she take an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis Beijing Tsai’s domestic approval ratings have been sliding precipitously since she assumed office, but her defiant stance on cross-Strait relations and the 1992 Consensus is supported by a large majority of the population. | cross-Strait relations changed in December The renewal of cross-Strait tensions was triggered by last year’s election Opposition against Ma’s Beijing-friendly course had long been mounting in Taiwan both sides have been drifting further away Since Xi Jinping China’s policymaking has widened the political gulf between Taiwan and the mainland cross-Strait economic relations have now lost much of their luster for the Taiwanese Taiwanese are worried about deepening economic dependence on Beijing Tsai claimed the 1992 Consensus “does not exist,” Xi no longer satisfied with maintaining the status quo of cross-Strait relations Xi regards reunification as a objective that cannot be postponed China has used its influence to prevent Taiwan from being invited to international gatherings military force it is not inconceivable China’s armed are considering strong measures to deter the island to achieve reunification through force.” The potential for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait depends in no small part on developments in other geopolitical hot spots in the region Should tensions in the South China Sea escalate Taipei would be put under pressure In an outbreak of open hostilities Taiwan’s ability to cooperate would be constrained SHOULD CHINA decide to employ military force in the Taiwan Strait the situation would be dire the U S would be bound to intervene Trump might receive further American assurances lack of support could entail a serious loss of credibility with key allies Beijing feel that it has exhausted all peaceful options Xi does not want to appear weak Tsai has been adamant in her affirmation of Taiwanese autonom that she take an uncompromising stance | AMONG THE four traditional geopolitical flash points in East Asia—the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China Seas, and the Taiwan Strait—cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan have been the least likely to generate troubling headlines in recent years. This changed in early December, when President-elect Donald Trump made the controversial decision to take a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen—the first official interaction between a U.S. president or president-elect and Taiwan’s leader since the abrogation of formal ties between both countries in 1979. In an interview shortly afterwards, Trump appeared to question Washington’s future commitment to the “one-China” policy that had guided the U.S. approach to cross-Strait relations for nearly four decades. Trump’s actions sparked a furious reaction from Beijing and set in motion a string of provocative Chinese moves that thrust the frozen conflict over Taiwan back into the international limelight. But at the time of Trump’s intervention, relations between Beijing and Taipei were already rapidly deteriorating, with the fragile status quo that hitherto sustained them now fraying. The renewal of cross-Strait tensions was triggered by last year’s general election in Taiwan, which swept the Beijing-critical Democratic People’s Party (DPP) into power, whose leader Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as the island’s first female president in May. Tsai’s landslide defeat of the pro-Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT) marked the end of an era spanning nearly seven decades in which the KMT, with its coalition partners, had not once lost its majority in Taiwan’s parliament. During the period of KMT preponderance under Tsai’s predecessor, former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, relations between Taipei and Beijing had been tranquil. A champion of integration and eventual unification with the mainland, Ma initiated a policy of continuous improvement of relations with Beijing. During his eight-year tenure, the two sides signed twenty-three cooperation agreements on issues such as trade, transit, aviation, tourism, joint crime fighting and judicial assistance. Considering how limited the interaction between Beijing and Taipei had been in the past, their rapprochement during the Ma presidency proceeded at an astonishing pace. Few things illustrate this better than the upsurge in people-to-people exchanges: Whereas prior to 2008 there were no regular direct flights operating between China and Taiwan, their number rapidly soared to nearly nine hundred scheduled commercial flights a week. More than four million Chinese visited Taiwan in 2015 alone, while approximately one million Taiwanese are now living on the mainland. These unprecedented developments culminated in a historic meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and China’s President Xi Jinping in November 2015, the first ever personal encounter of the Chinese and Taiwanese leaders since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The “new normalcy” in bilateral relations brought on by Ma’s course of rapprochement with Beijing mitigated cross-Strait tensions and yielded a substantial “peace dividend” for businesses on both sides of the strait. But even if the KMT had not suffered a historic defeat in the 2016 elections, the long-term viability of these policies would have been doubtful. Opposition against Ma’s Beijing-friendly course had long been mounting in Taiwan. The policy of rapprochement masked the fact that both sides of the strait have been drifting further and further away from each other. Opinion polls have shown that the vast majority of Taiwanese support an improved dialogue with Beijing and the maintenance of the status quo in cross-Strait relations, but the proportion of those backing the idea of reunification with the mainland has long been dwindling. Around 60 percent of the people (and an even higher proportion among the younger generation) now regard themselves as “Taiwanese,” with only a third identifying as “both Chinese and Taiwanese.” In 1992, the number of those identifying themselves as Taiwanese had still been less than 18 percent. This decisive shift in self-identification is a fairly new development. It found a particularly stark expression in the Sunflower Movement, a student movement that was formed in March 2014 to protest against the planned ratification of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. This comprehensive association treaty with Beijing would have opened up sensitive industries such as banking, healthcare, or telecommunications to Chinese investment, leading to an unprecedented degree of economic integration with the mainland. The Ma government tried to pressure the parliament into ratifying the agreement, avoiding public debate and communication with the affected actors and industries. But the vehement student protest movement, which proceeded to occupy the chamber of the Taiwanese parliament for twenty-four days, succeeded in stalling the agreement indefinitely. The Sunflower Movement, which at one point saw as many as half a million people take to the street, petered out, having achieved most of its immediate goals. But the potential for further mass protests has remained strong, as was illustrated in July 2015, when hundreds of students stormed Taiwan’s Ministry of Education in response to a proposed revision of the national school curriculum, which they claimed was aimed at promoting a pro-Beijing stance and the one-China principle. Taiwan’s vibrant and assertive civil society stands in marked contrast to recent political developments in mainland China. Since Xi Jinping became China’s president in 2013, he has centralized power in a manner unseen for decades, including a distinct reideologization of Chinese politics and a tightening of repressive measures. China’s neoauthoritarian policymaking streak has widened the political gulf between Taiwan and the mainland even further, and it makes it particularly difficult for Beijing to come to terms with the kinds of policies represented by the DPP. Public disenchantment in Taiwan about a closer association with the mainland—especially among the younger generation—has been strongly reinforced by Beijing’s erosion of civil and political rights in neighboring Hong Kong. The Chinese leadership’s uncompromising reaction to the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (which maintained close contacts with Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement) and its recent ousting of elected parliamentarians from the city’s legislative council have magnified the political impasse that Hong Kong now finds itself in, demonstrating how little genuine progress there has been in implementing the principle of “one country, two systems” in practice. Considering that one country, two systems can be understood as Beijing’s proposed template for the (re)integration of Taiwan, the situation in Hong Kong has made the prospect of eventual unification with China even less palatable for large parts of the Taiwanese public. But the primary source of discontent for Taiwanese voters has been the state of Taiwan’s ailing economy, which entered a recession in the second half of 2015 and grew by little more than 1 percent in 2016. Exports have languished, wages have stagnated for years, real income has declined, and social inequality has deteriorated. Considering that the prospects of the economy are intimately tied up with the state of cross-Strait relations—China and Hong Kong account for roughly 30 percent of Taiwan’s trade, 38 percent of its exports, and more than two-thirds of its total foreign investments—most of the Taiwanese public would be unlikely to endorse a policy of increasing antagonism towards the mainland. At the same time, however, cross-Strait economic relations have now lost much of their luster for the Taiwanese. Not only have polls shown that a majority of Taiwanese are worried about the potential consequences of deepening economic dependence on Beijing. The business environment for Taiwanese investors and producers in the PRC—who are estimated to have invested between $60 and $200 billion in mainland China—has been deteriorating in recent years. Taiwanese entrepreneurs are increasingly irked by China’s rising labor costs, the problems associated with environmental pollution, and the persistent bureaucratic hurdles erected by China’s central and regional governments. In addition, due to the technological upgrading and growing sophistication of China’s own manufacturing sector, many Chinese companies that used to form the supply lines of Taiwanese manufacturers have begun to engage in cut-throat competition with them. In light of the growing complications that Taiwanese businesses have been facing in China, they have begun to shift many of their production sites to South and Southeast Asia. Between 2001 and 2015, Taiwan’s trade with Southeast Asia increased from around $30 billion to almost $80 billion, and Taiwanese companies’ foreign direct investment into the six largest Southeast Asian economies doubled in the past five years. The DPP has actively endorsed this strategy of diversifying trade and investment away from China, and has pushed for a “Go South” economic policy of bolstering alternative trade ties with South and Southeast Asian countries. One of Tsai’s first acts as president was to establish a designated office to coordinate this “New Southbound Policy,” and her government has begun to launch trade offices in the states of the region and to offer credit lines to businesses investing there. FOLLOWING TSAI’S inauguration as president of Taiwan, cross-Strait relations between Beijing and Taipei swiftly deteriorated. Although Tsai had previously served as a cabinet member during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), a fierce critic of Beijing, she was generally regarded as a highly pragmatic politician capable of doing business with the Chinese leadership. It was during her tenure as Minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council—the highest body coordinating relations with Beijing—that the “Little Three Links” were arranged in 2001 that provided the first trade, transportation and postal connections between Taiwan and the mainland. Throughout the election campaign and prior to her inauguration, Tsai had refrained from taking a clear position on the future of cross-Strait relations, but she had repeatedly expressed the desire to maintain the status quo. From the onset, however, Beijing proved unwilling to accept such an ambiguous stance. Xi Jinping put Tsai on the spot by explicitly demanding that she clarify her position on cross-Strait relations by declaring adherence to the so-called 1992 Consensus—an understanding reached between two agencies affiliated with the Chinese and Taiwanese governments in November 1992 that expressed a mutual commitment to the one-China principle. The 1992 Consensus has never been recognized as official policy by either government, and the DPP leadership has repeatedly contested its validity in the past. Tsai herself had on earlier occasions claimed that the 1992 Consensus “does not exist,” but during the election campaign and since she was elected president she has studiously avoided taking a clear stance on this subject. In her long-awaited inaugural address on May 20, 2016, Tsai merely stated that she “respects” the 1992 meetings as a “historical fact,” while continuously referring to Taiwan as a “country” (she has since, on another occasion, described Taiwan as “a sovereign, independent country”). Chinese officials and state media responded harshly to Tsai’s inauguration speech, referring to it as an “incomplete exam paper” and demanding that “Taiwan’s new leadership must complete their currently incomplete response” on the 1992 Consensus, but Tsai has repeatedly refused to alter her stance on the issue. Within a month of her inauguration, the Taiwan Affairs Bureau—Beijing’s primary authority devoted to relations with Taipei—announced that it had suspended the official cross-Strait communication mechanism that provided for regular contact between the two governments, due to Tsai’s refusal to recognize the one-China principle enshrined in the 1992 Consensus. To date, all formal bilateral contacts between China and Taiwan remain suspended, with even Track II dialogue forums ruled out by Beijing. Most analysts of cross-Strait relations have so far assumed that the Chinese leadership will refrain from making overly provocative and threatening moves absent a substantial policy change in Taipei in the direction of de jure Taiwanese independence. There have been signs, however, that Xi Jinping and his government are no longer satisfied with simply maintaining the status quo of cross-Strait relations indefinitely. Since he became China’s president in 2013, Xi has introduced various changes into cross-Strait policy, most notably pushing Taiwan to conclude the comprehensive trade agreements that triggered the public backlash of the Sunflower Movement. Xi appears to have become impatient about reintegrating Taiwan. In October 2013, he had already stated that the underlying cross-Strait political differences “cannot be passed down from generation to generation,” which was widely interpreted as an indication that he would want to pursue concrete steps towards unification during his tenure. China’s new military strategy, published in May 2015, addresses the Taiwan issue by declaring, “Reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation.” These and other official proclamations indicate that Xi regards reunification not as an abstract, remote goal for the distant future, but a more proximate objective that cannot be postponed indefinitely. Xi’s apparent impatience on the issue of unification stands in stark contrast to the vocal resistance to this idea among the vast majority of Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. A nationwide opinion poll conducted in late May 2016 found that two-thirds of those polled in Taiwan—and more than 80 percent of respondents in the 20–29 age bracket—opposed the prospect of an eventual unification with China, while only 18.5 percent were in favor. The Chinese government is clearly conscious of the need to sway the Taiwanese public in its favor, as evidenced by Xi’s willingness to organize the historic meeting with Ma in November of 2015. The summit meeting was meant to boost Ma’s flagging KMT in the polls, but it ended up drawing a very ambivalent reaction from the Taiwanese public. WITH THE prospects of improved cross-Strait ties appearing more distant than ever in the wake of the DPP’s electoral victory, Beijing began to tighten the screws on Taiwan and on Tsai Ing-wen’s administration long before Donald Trump picked up the phone in early December to embark on an apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy. Ever since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in 1995–96, the balance of power between both sides of the strait has shifted dramatically in favor of Beijing. Twenty years ago, the Chinese economy was three and a half times bigger than Taiwan’s—today, by contrast, Taiwan’s GDP is less than 5 percent the size of China’s. In terms of military strength, the balance sheet looks even bleaker for Taipei. Beijing now has a large and growing range of levers available to apply crippling pressure on Taipei. Following Tsai’s election victory, it began to subtly undermine Taiwan in the international arena. On the lowest rung in Beijing’s catalogue of punitive measures is the ability to create a more challenging diplomatic environment for Taipei and to further curtail its access to important international forums and agreements. By early 2016, the number of states that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan had gradually dwindled to a mere twenty-two—each of them small and susceptible to Beijing’s economic pressure. In March, China officially resumed diplomatic relations with Gambia, which had formally recognized Taiwan until 2013, when it chose to break off relations with Taipei. As part of a tacit agreement with the Ma administration, Beijing had initially refused to establish formal ties of its own with the West African nation despite Gambia’s diplomatic overtures. But with Ma gone, the Chinese leadership no longer felt bound by the agreement. In late December, Beijing poached another one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, as São Tomé and Príncipe chose to sever ties with Taipei. China’s attrition of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies is likely to continue, with several Central American countries and the Vatican seen as likely candidates for hostile takeovers in the near future. China has also used its influence to prevent Taiwan from being invited to important international gatherings—a particularly problematic scenario at a time when Taipei is keen to take part in regional integration projects and is trying to conclude free-trade agreements with a number of countries that do not formally recognize it (at present, Taiwan only has such agreements with Singapore and New Zealand). Beijing angered Taipei in early May, when a senior Chinese official cast doubt on Taiwan’s prospects of retaining its observer status at the World Health Organization if cross-Strait relations were to deteriorate further. Previously, in April, a Taiwanese delegation was forced to leave a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Steel Committee in Brussels following Chinese official complaints—the first such incident since Taiwan joined the committee as an observer in 2005. More recently, Chinese pressure prevented the International Civil Aviation Organization from inviting Taiwan to its annual assembly, which it had been able to attend in previous years, and Taiwan was also barred from sending an official delegation to the UN climate-change conference, as it had in 2015. Additional sovereignty concerns arose in Taiwan when Beijing pressured several countries, including Kenya, Malaysia, Cambodia and Armenia, to deport dozens of Taiwanese passport holders suspected of being members of telecoms fraud schemes to mainland China, ignoring Taipei’s efforts to have them repatriated to Taiwan. These moves were condemned by Taiwan’s parliament as having “seriously infringed upon . . . the nation’s sovereignty.” Beyond these diplomatic pressure points, China—which is Taiwan’s largest trading partner—can resort to a multitude of economic levers to apply further pressure on Taipei. One of the first steps Beijing took in reaction to Tsai’s election victory was to impose restrictions on the number of Chinese tourists allowed to travel to Taiwan—a measure of both symbolic and economic significance. Tourism accounts for approximately 4–5 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, and residents of mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau make up more than half of all visitors to the island. Prior to 2008, no more than three hundred thousand mainland Chinese visited Taiwan every year, but since then their number has rapidly surged to about four million per year, in addition to 1.5 million visitors from Hong Kong and Macau. The newly imposed restrictions, however, have caused the number of Taiwan-bound mainland Chinese tourists to drop by nearly 30 percent, and Beijing announced that their number would be further reduced to less than 2 million per year. The economic cost of a suspension of tourist visits from the mainland is a substantial but tolerable burden for Taiwan—although it has already stirred up political resistance, as thousands of workers in the island’s tourism industry took to the streets in September to protest against Tsai’s policies. A much more potent weapon in Beijing’s arsenal would be to impose restrictions on Taiwanese business activity in China, considering that key sectors of Taiwanese manufacturing (such as microchip production) are heavily reliant on the mainland. While China’s own economy would suffer from such measures—Taiwan is currently the mainland’s seventh-largest trading partner—Beijing would find it far easier than Taipei to stomach the cost of such a move. In the context of a potential heightening of China’s economic pressure on Taiwan, one of the DPP’s core election promises—energy reform, including a commitment to phase out nuclear power by 2025—raises questions about the future of the island’s strategic energy security. To date, the DPP has said relatively little about how it plans to replace the energy volumes lost when the nuclear power stations are decommissioned. The proposals made so far include a fivefold growth of renewables (with a focus on the large-scale development of offshore wind farms in the contested Taiwan Strait), a push to increase energy efficiency, a reduction of the power reserves ratio, and a focus on developing a smart grid, which is a prerequisite for the efficient use of renewable energy on a large scale. Besides the likelihood that a potential deficit in indigenous energy generation will have to be compensated by additional external energy supplies along vulnerable sea routes, the reliance on smart grids could also increase the exposure of Taiwan’s critical energy infrastructure to Chinese cyberattacks. At present, Taiwan is already the most frequent target of Chinese cyberattacks, not least since it is considered a “test bed” for subsequent cyber campaigns against targets in the United States. THE MOST drastic measure that Beijing could take against Taiwan if relations with the DPP-led government were to deteriorate beyond recovery is the employment of military force. For now, a military escalation is a remote scenario, and Beijing would doubtless ponder it only as an absolute last resort. But it is not an altogether inconceivable step, considering China’s conduct in previous crises in the Taiwan Strait (including its threat, during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96, to turn the strait into a “sea of fire”) and its increasing willingness to employ means of military coercion in disputes with other regional powers. Beijing’s overall posture vis-à-vis Taipei remained threatening even during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, as was underscored by reports in 2015 that a mock-up of the inner city of Taipei, including a replica of Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, was used as an urban warfare training ground for PLA soldiers on a Chinese military base. Beijing has solemnly declared that it would respond with military force to any official Taiwanese pronouncement of independence—which continues to be stipulated as an explicit long-term goal in the DPP’s charter. A few days after the DPP’s triumph in the 2016 elections, China’s state-owned television broadcast reports about Chinese live-fire military exercises and landing drills off the coast of Fujian province, directly across from Taiwan, which was interpreted as a clear warning for the DPP. Following the Taiwan phone call and Trump’s potential willingness to abandon the one-China principle, the prospect of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait now appears less remote. Since early December, China has substantially stepped up its military activities around Taiwan. Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly circled the international airspace surrounding Taiwan within visible range of the island, and a group of warships, including China’s sole aircraft carrier, passed some ninety nautical miles south of it. China’s armed forces are reportedly “considering strong measures” to deter the island from moving further out of Beijing’s grasp, and the Communist Party–owned daily Global Times published an op-ed declaring that “the military status quo across the Taiwan Straits needs to be reshaped” and advising Beijing to get “ready to achieve reunification through the use of force.” The potential for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait depends in no small part on developments in other geopolitical hot spots in the region, particularly the South China Sea. Beijing’s increasingly assertive moves and Washington’s intransigent response—manifested in numerous close encounters between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft—risk sparking an open confrontation. Should tensions in the South China Sea escalate, the best option for Taipei would be to avoid any direct involvement. More likely than not, however, it would be put under pressure by both China and the United States to take a stance, not least due to the fact that Taiwan is the site of strategically important military assets, such as a highly advanced PAVE PAWS long-range early-warning radar, one of very few such systems in the world. More importantly, by virtue of controlling the island of Itu Aba (Taiping), the largest natural feature in the disputed Spratly Islands, Taiwan already has “boots on the ground” in the South China Sea and would thus find it hard to avoid involvement in any armed confrontation there. Taiwan’s presence in the region was highlighted again when outgoing president Ma Ying-jeou chose to visit Itu Aba in January 2016, irritating not only Vietnam and the Philippines, but also the United States. In the event of an outbreak of open hostilities in the South or East China Sea, Taiwan’s ability to cooperate with any of the other actors in the region would be constrained by the fact that the Taiwanese government’s official position on the territorial disputes is largely identical to Beijing’s: Taipei has long claimed most of the contested islands and reefs as a part of the sovereign territory of “China.” It therefore finds itself in a particularly intricate situation: it has a number of natural allies in the region that share its aversion to the newfound assertiveness in the foreign policy pursued by China, yet it officially agrees with Beijing on the issue of China’s territorial claims vis-à-vis these states. Speculations that the DPP-led Taiwanese government, which emphasizes Taiwan’s autonomy and its historical distinctness from China, may choose to officially dissociate itself from these expansive territorial claims, have so far proven unfounded. When an international tribunal established by the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in July that many of China’s core claims in the South China Sea are groundless, Taipei joined Beijing in roundly rejecting the ruling. President Tsai stated that the tribunal’s decision (which included the ruling that Itu Aba should be classified as a rock and as such is not entitled to a two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone) had “gravely harmed” Taiwan’s rights in the South China Sea, and in response Taipei dispatched a warship to patrol the contested region and reassert Taiwanese claims there. Beijing and Taipei displayed a wholly uncharacteristic unity in their joint dismissal of the ruling, as the vice chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council stated that the tribunal’s rejection of the “nine-dash line” that marks China’s claims to 80 percent of the South China Sea, was unacceptable, while the Chinese government praised Taiwan’s efforts to “defend” Itu Aba. SHOULD CHINA decide to employ military force in the Taiwan Strait—including any measure short of an outright invasion, such as a naval blockade—the situation for Taiwan would be dire. The balance of military power, always highly unfavorable for Taipei, has never been as lopsided as it is today. According to estimates by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense (based in particular on an assessment of the development of missile systems, bombers and fourth-generation stealth fighter aircraft), China will have gained sufficient military capabilities to launch a large-scale invasion of Taiwan with good prospects of success by 2020. While Beijing has consistently boosted its armed forces, Taiwan’s military budget remains remarkably low, accounting for little more than 2 percent of its GDP, much to the chagrin of senior U.S. defense officials. Taipei’s relative military disadvantage has been compounded by the fact that its principal ally, the United States, as well as other Western governments, have become very reluctant to supply state-of-the-art defense technology to the Taiwanese military out of concern about adversarial reactions from Beijing. The resulting lack of access to critical new defense technology is affecting the entire range of relevant weapons systems. In mid-December 2015, the Obama administration finally cleared another major arms sale worth $1.83 billion to Taiwan, including two decommissioned guided-missile frigates, amphibious assault vehicles, and antitank and surface-to-air missiles. It was the first such sales clearance in more than four years, but it appears not to have included any critical cutting-edge military technology. One of the most pressing concerns for Taiwan’s military planners has been the development of an indigenous attack submarine, which is regarded as an essential missing link in the island’s defense structure. The project has proven very difficult to develop, as most countries with the requisite technological know-how have refused to cooperate with Taipei for fear of jeopardizing their ties with Beijing, although Washington now appears willing to provide at least a limited degree of assistance in the development process. The plans for submarine development are part of the asymmetric defense strategy adopted by the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense in response to the continuous growth of China’s military power. Another central component of this strategy is the development of a fleet of state-of-the-art Tuo Chiang–class stealth corvettes, each equipped with sixteen potent Hsiung Feng antiship missiles. The rationale for developing this type of warship is to employ it as a cheap and effective means of countering China’s massive naval development at a fraction of its cost (a flotilla of five Tuo Chiang–class corvettes costs about $350 million). By resorting to these and similar means of asymmetric defense, including a large network of “smart mines,” Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense currently estimates that the Taiwanese armed forces would be able to fend off a Chinese invasion for at least thirty days. Following the projected thirty-day period, Taiwan’s survival would depend on large-scale military support from the United States. The nature and degree of American involvement in a potential cross-Strait confrontation would be a crucial variable that critically affects the strategic calculations of the leaderships in Beijing and in Taipei. It is a commonly held belief among the Taiwanese public that, should there be a military conflict with Beijing, the United States would be bound to intervene in support of Taiwan. In practice, however, there is no alliance treaty between Washington and Taipei that explicitly specifies an American commitment to defend the island. The Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979—which, along with the “Six Assurances” given to Taiwan by Ronald Reagan in 1982, was reaffirmed by the House of Representatives as recently as May 2016—stipulates that the United States will do what is necessary to “enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” But this falls far short of an explicit defense commitment. Nor would such a commitment be backed by a majority of the American public: According to a recent poll, more than 70 percent of Americans would oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Beijing’s last attempt to resort to military force in its relations with Taipei—the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96—was met by a stern response from Washington, which dispatched two carrier battle groups to the region and warned Beijing that any further military aggression against Taiwan would bring “grave consequences” for China. Since then, however, U.S. military preponderance over China has dwindled. A 2015 assessment by the RAND Corporation projects that the U.S. military would now be facing major operational problems in prevailing in any conflict with Chinese forces over Taiwan. In view of the Trump administration’s determination to drive a harder bargain with China, Taipei might nonetheless receive further American assurances in the future. In December, the U.S. Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act, which provides for official reciprocal exchanges between U.S. and Taiwanese senior military officials for the first time since the 1970s. For Washington, a lack of support for Taiwan during a potential confrontation with Beijing could entail a serious loss of credibility with many of its key partners and allies in East and Southeast Asia, raising doubts about its wider defense commitments in this vitally important region. AFTER A prolonged period of tranquility and rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei, cross-Strait relations are once again headed for troubled times. The apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy is occurring at a time when Beijing, dissatisfied with the new leadership in Taipei and increasingly assertive towards the United States, has already enacted punitive measures against Taiwan, both diplomatic and economic. Beijing is beginning to feel that it has exhausted all peaceful options of bringing Taiwan back into the fold, and Xi Jinping does not seem entirely averse to the prospect of using some form of military pressure to prevent Taipei from drifting further away from the mainland. Ahead of a key leadership transition in China’s Communist Party in late 2017, and with nationalist sentiment rising in the mainland, Xi does not want to appear weak on matters considered nonnegotiable core interests for the party—particularly Taiwan. President Tsai Ing-wen, meanwhile, is keen to preserve the status quo of cross-Strait relations and has adopted a conciliatory tone towards Beijing, but she has been equally adamant in her affirmation of Taiwanese autonomy and her refusal to render explicit homage to the one-China principle. Tsai is under pressure domestically, as the same social activists and independence-minded “dark-Green” factions in her own party that helped propel her to power are now demanding that she take an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis Beijing. Tsai’s domestic approval ratings have been sliding precipitously since she assumed office, but her defiant stance on cross-Strait relations and the 1992 Consensus is supported by a large majority of the population. Many in Taiwan have been hopeful that Donald Trump’s statements on the one-China principle may signal positive change for the island’s status, but they remain wary of becoming a mere bargaining chip in a great-power game. Also, while the Trump administration has raised hopes in Taipei that U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations might be upgraded, Donald Trump’s economic isolationism and his decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are bad news for export-reliant Taiwan. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner (following China) and Taiwanese companies serve as major suppliers of U.S. tech giants like Apple, which have been pressured by Trump to relocate production to America, raising the prospect of trade disputes between Washington and Taipei. | 35,168 | <h4>Despite the call, SCS and Taiwan war is inevitable in the status quo – Taiwan-China conflict will escalate</h4><p>Björn Alexander <strong>Düben</strong> is an assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Jilin University, and an associate of LSE ideas at the London School of Economics and Political Science. , Donald Trump and the Coming Taiwan-China Crisis,", <strong>2-14<u>-2017 National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-the-coming-taiwan-china-crisis-19443?page=show, Accessed: 2-16-2017, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p></strong>AMONG THE four traditional geopolitical flash points in East Asia</u>—the Korean Peninsula, the South and East China Seas, and the Taiwan Strait—<u><mark>cross-Strait relations</mark> between China and Taiwan have been the least likely to generate troubling headlines in recent years</u>. <u><strong>This <mark>changed</mark> <mark>in</mark> early <mark>December</u></strong></mark>, <u>when President-elect Donald Trump made the controversial decision to take a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen</u>—the first official interaction between a U.S. president or president-elect and Taiwan’s leader since the abrogation of formal ties between both countries in 1979. <u>In an interview shortly afterwards, Trump appeared to question Washington’s future commitment to the “one-China” policy that had guided the U.S. approach to cross-Strait relations for nearly four decades</u>. Trump’s actions sparked a furious reaction from Beijing and set in motion a string of provocative Chinese moves that thrust the frozen conflict over Taiwan back into the international limelight. But <u>at the time of Trump’s intervention</u>, <u>relations between Beijing and Taipei were already rapidly deteriorating, with the fragile status quo that hitherto sustained them now fraying</u>. <u><strong><mark>The renewal of cross-Strait tensions</strong> was triggered by last year’s</mark> general <mark>election</mark> in Taiwan, which swept the Beijing-critical Democratic People’s Party (DPP) into power</u>, whose leader Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as the island’s first female president in May. Tsai’s landslide defeat of the pro-Chinese Nationalist Party Kuomintang (KMT) marked the end of an era spanning nearly seven decades in which the KMT, with its coalition partners, had not once lost its majority in Taiwan’s parliament. <u>During the period of KMT preponderance</u> under Tsai’s predecessor, former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, <u>relations between Taipei and Beijing had been tranquil</u>. A champion of integration and eventual unification with the mainland, Ma initiated a policy of continuous improvement of relations with Beijing. During his eight-year tenure, the two sides signed twenty-three cooperation agreements on issues such as trade, transit, aviation, tourism, joint crime fighting and judicial assistance. Considering how limited the interaction between Beijing and Taipei had been in the past, their rapprochement during the Ma presidency proceeded at an astonishing pace. Few things illustrate this better than the upsurge in people-to-people exchanges: Whereas prior to 2008 there were no regular direct flights operating between China and Taiwan, their number rapidly soared to nearly nine hundred scheduled commercial flights a week. More than four million Chinese visited Taiwan in 2015 alone, while approximately one million Taiwanese are now living on the mainland. These unprecedented developments culminated in a historic meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and China’s President Xi Jinping in November 2015, the first ever personal encounter of the Chinese and Taiwanese leaders since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. <u>The “new normalcy” in bilateral relations brought on by Ma’s course of rapprochement with Beijing mitigated cross-Strait tensions</u> and yielded a substantial “peace dividend” for businesses on both sides of the strait. <u>But even if the KMT had not suffered a historic defeat in the 2016 elections, <strong>the long-term viability of these policies would have been doubtful</u></strong>. <u><mark>Opposition against Ma’s Beijing-friendly course had long been mounting in Taiwan</mark>. The policy of rapprochement masked the fact that <strong><mark>both sides</mark> of the strait <mark>have been drifting</mark> further and <mark>further away</mark> from each other</u></strong>. Opinion polls have shown that the vast majority of Taiwanese support an improved dialogue with Beijing and the maintenance of the status quo in cross-Strait relations, but the proportion of those backing the idea of reunification with the mainland has long been dwindling. <u>Around 60 percent of the people</u> (and an even higher proportion among the younger generation) <u>now regard themselves as “Taiwanese,” with only a third identifying as “both Chinese and Taiwanese.”</u> In 1992, the number of those identifying themselves as Taiwanese had still been less than 18 percent. <u><strong>This decisive shift in self-identification is a fairly new development</u></strong>. It found a particularly stark expression in the Sunflower Movement, a student movement that was formed in March 2014 to protest against the planned ratification of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. This comprehensive association treaty with Beijing would have opened up sensitive industries such as banking, healthcare, or telecommunications to Chinese investment, leading to an unprecedented degree of economic integration with the mainland. The Ma government tried to pressure the parliament into ratifying the agreement, avoiding public debate and communication with the affected actors and industries. But the vehement student protest movement, which proceeded to occupy the chamber of the Taiwanese parliament for twenty-four days, succeeded in stalling the agreement indefinitely. The Sunflower Movement, which at one point saw as many as half a million people take to the street, petered out, having achieved most of its immediate goals. But the potential for further mass protests has remained strong, as was illustrated in July 2015, when hundreds of students stormed Taiwan’s Ministry of Education in response to a proposed revision of the national school curriculum, which they claimed was aimed at promoting a pro-Beijing stance and the one-China principle. Taiwan’s vibrant and assertive civil society stands in marked contrast to recent political developments in mainland China. <u><mark>Since Xi Jinping </mark>became China’s president in 2013, he has centralized power in a manner unseen for decades</u>, including a distinct reideologization of Chinese politics and a tightening of repressive measures. <u><mark>China’s</mark> neoauthoritarian <mark>policymaking</mark> streak <mark>has <strong>widened the political gulf between Taiwan and the mainland</strong></mark> even further, and it makes it particularly difficult for Beijing to come to terms with the kinds of policies represented by the DPP. Public disenchantment in Taiwan</u> about a closer association with the mainland—especially among the younger generation—<u>has been strongly reinforced by Beijing’s erosion of civil and political rights in neighboring Hong Kong</u>. The Chinese leadership’s uncompromising reaction to the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong (which maintained close contacts with Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement) and its recent ousting of elected parliamentarians from the city’s legislative council have magnified the political impasse that Hong Kong now finds itself in, demonstrating how little genuine progress there has been in implementing the principle of “one country, two systems” in practice. Considering that one country, two systems can be understood as Beijing’s proposed template for the (re)integration of Taiwan, the situation in Hong Kong has made the prospect of eventual unification with China even less palatable for large parts of the Taiwanese public. But <u>the primary source of discontent for Taiwanese voters has been the state of Taiwan’s ailing econom</u>y, <u>which entered a recession in the second half of 2015 and grew by little more than 1 percent in 2016</u>. Exports have languished, wages have stagnated for years, real income has declined, and social inequality has deteriorated. Considering that the prospects of the economy are intimately tied up with the state of cross-Strait relations—China and Hong Kong account for roughly 30 percent of Taiwan’s trade, 38 percent of its exports, and more than two-thirds of its total foreign investments—most of the Taiwanese public would be unlikely to endorse a policy of increasing antagonism towards the mainland. <u><strong>At the same time, however, <mark>cross-Strait economic relations have now lost much of their luster for the Taiwanese</u></strong></mark>. <u>Not only have polls shown that a majority of <mark>Taiwanese are worried about</mark> the potential consequences of <mark>deepening economic dependence on Beijing</mark>. </u>The business environment for Taiwanese investors and producers in the PRC—who are estimated to have invested between $60 and $200 billion in mainland China—has been deteriorating in recent years. <u>Taiwanese entrepreneurs are increasingly irked by China’s rising labor costs, the problems associated with environmental pollution, and the persistent bureaucratic hurdles erected by China’s central and regional governments</u>. In addition, due to the technological upgrading and growing sophistication of China’s own manufacturing sector, <u>many Chinese companies that used to form the supply lines of Taiwanese manufacturers have begun to engage in cut-throat competition with them.</u> <u><strong>In light of the growing complications that Taiwanese businesses have been facing in China, they have begun to shift many of their production sites to South and Southeast Asia</u></strong>. Between 2001 and 2015, Taiwan’s trade with Southeast Asia increased from around $30 billion to almost $80 billion, and Taiwanese companies’ foreign direct investment into the six largest Southeast Asian economies doubled in the past five years. The DPP has actively endorsed this strategy of diversifying trade and investment away from China, and has pushed for a “Go South” economic policy of bolstering alternative trade ties with South and Southeast Asian countries. One of Tsai’s first acts as president was to establish a designated office to coordinate this “New Southbound Policy,” and her government has begun to launch trade offices in the states of the region and to offer credit lines to businesses investing there. <u>FOLLOWING TSAI’S inauguration as president of Taiwan, cross-Strait relations between Beijing and Taipei swiftly deteriorated</u>. Although Tsai had previously served as a cabinet member during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), a fierce critic of Beijing, she was generally regarded as a highly pragmatic politician capable of doing business with the Chinese leadership. It was during her tenure as Minister of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council—the highest body coordinating relations with Beijing—that the “Little Three Links” were arranged in 2001 that provided the first trade, transportation and postal connections between Taiwan and the mainland. Throughout the election campaign and prior to her inauguration, Tsai had refrained from taking a clear position on the future of cross-Strait relations, but she had repeatedly expressed the desire to maintain the status quo. From the onset, however, <u>Beijing proved unwilling to accept such an ambiguous stance. Xi Jinping put Tsai on the spot by explicitly demanding that she clarify her position on cross-Strait relations by declaring adherence to the so-called 1992 Consensus</u>—an understanding reached between two agencies affiliated with the Chinese and Taiwanese governments in November 1992 that expressed a mutual commitment to the one-China principle. The 1992 Consensus has never been recognized as official policy by either government, and the DPP leadership has repeatedly contested its validity in the past. <u><mark>Tsai</mark> herself had on earlier occasions <mark>claimed </mark>that <mark>the 1992 Consensus “does not exist,”</mark> but during the election campaign and since she was elected president she has studiously avoided taking a clear stance on this subject</u>. In her long-awaited inaugural address on May 20, 2016, Tsai merely stated that she “respects” the 1992 meetings as a “historical fact,” while continuously referring to Taiwan as a “country” (she has since, on another occasion, described Taiwan as “a sovereign, independent country”). Chinese officials and state media responded harshly to Tsai’s inauguration speech, referring to it as an “incomplete exam paper” and demanding that “Taiwan’s new leadership must complete their currently incomplete response” on the 1992 Consensus, but <u>Tsai has repeatedly refused to alter her stance on the issue.</u> Within a month of her inauguration, the Taiwan Affairs Bureau—Beijing’s primary authority devoted to relations with Taipei—announced that it had suspended the official cross-Strait communication mechanism that provided for regular contact between the two governments, due to Tsai’s refusal to recognize the one-China principle enshrined in the 1992 Consensus. <u><strong>To date, all formal bilateral contacts between China and Taiwan remain suspended, with even Track II dialogue forums ruled out by Beijing</u></strong>. <u>Most analysts of cross-Strait relations have so far assumed that the Chinese leadership will refrain from making overly provocative and threatening moves absent a substantial policy change in Taipei in the direction of de jure Taiwanese independence</u>. <u><strong>There have been signs, however, that <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping and his government are <mark>no longer satisfied with</mark> simply <mark>maintaining the status quo of cross-Strait relations</mark> indefinitely</u></strong>. Since he became China’s president in 2013, Xi has introduced various changes into cross-Strait policy, most notably pushing Taiwan to conclude the comprehensive trade agreements that triggered the public backlash of the Sunflower Movement. Xi appears to have become impatient about reintegrating Taiwan. In October 2013, he had already stated that the underlying cross-Strait political differences “cannot be passed down from generation to generation,” which was widely interpreted as an indication that he would want to pursue concrete steps towards unification during his tenure. China’s new military strategy, published in May 2015, addresses the Taiwan issue by declaring, “Reunification is an inevitable trend in the course of national rejuvenation.” <u>These and other official proclamations indicate that <mark>Xi regards reunification</mark> not <mark>as</mark> an abstract, remote goal for the distant future, but <strong><mark>a</mark> more proximate <mark>objective that cannot be postponed</mark> indefinitely</strong>.</u> <u>Xi’s apparent impatience on the issue of unification stands in stark contrast to the vocal resistance to this idea among the vast majority of Taiwa</u>nese, particularly the younger generation. <u>A nationwide opinion poll conducted in late May 2016 found that two-thirds of those polled in Taiwan—and more than 80 percent of respondents in the 20–29 age bracket—opposed the prospect of an eventual unification with China, while only 18.5 percent were in favor</u>. The Chinese government is clearly conscious of the need to sway the Taiwanese public in its favor, as evidenced by Xi’s willingness to organize the historic meeting with Ma in November of 2015. The summit meeting was meant to boost Ma’s flagging KMT in the polls, but it ended up drawing a very ambivalent reaction from the Taiwanese public. <u>WITH THE prospects of improved cross-Strait ties appearing more distant than ever in the wake of the DPP’s electoral victory, <strong>Beijing began to tighten the screws on Taiwan and on Tsai Ing-wen’s administration long before Donald Trump picked up the phone</strong> in early December to embark on an apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy</u>. <u>Ever since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, in 1995–96, the balance of power between both sides of the strait has shifted dramatically in favor of Beijing</u>. Twenty years ago, the Chinese economy was three and a half times bigger than Taiwan’s—today, by contrast, Taiwan’s GDP is less than 5 percent the size of China’s. In terms of military strength, the balance sheet looks even bleaker for Taipei. Beijing now has a large and growing range of levers available to apply crippling pressure on Taipei. <u>Following Tsai’s election victory, it began to subtly undermine Taiwan in the international arena. </u>On the lowest rung in Beijing’s catalogue of punitive measures is the ability to create a more challenging diplomatic environment for Taipei and to further curtail its access to important international forums and agreements. <u>By early 2016, the number of states that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan had gradually dwindled to a mere twenty-two</u>—each of them small and susceptible to Beijing’s economic pressure. In March, China officially resumed diplomatic relations with Gambia, which had formally recognized Taiwan until 2013, when it chose to break off relations with Taipei. <u>As part of a tacit agreement with the Ma administration, Beijing had initially refused to establish formal ties of its own with the West African nation despite Gambia’s diplomatic overtures. But with Ma gone, the Chinese leadership no longer felt bound by the agreement. In late December, Beijing poached another one of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies,</u> as São Tomé and Príncipe chose to sever ties with Taipei. China’s attrition of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies is likely to continue, with several Central American countries and the Vatican seen as likely candidates for hostile takeovers in the near future. <u><strong><mark>China has</mark> also <mark>used its influence to</mark> <mark>prevent Taiwan from being invited to</mark> important <mark>international gatherings</u></strong></mark>—a <u>particularly problematic scenario at a time when Taipei is keen to take part in regional integration projects and is trying to conclude free-trade agreements with a number of countries that do not formally recognize it</u> (at present, Taiwan only has such agreements with Singapore and New Zealand). Beijing angered Taipei in early May, when a senior Chinese official cast doubt on Taiwan’s prospects of retaining its observer status at the World Health Organization if cross-Strait relations were to deteriorate further. Previously, in April, a Taiwanese delegation was forced to leave a meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Steel Committee in Brussels following Chinese official complaints—the first such incident since Taiwan joined the committee as an observer in 2005. More recently, Chinese pressure prevented the International Civil Aviation Organization from inviting Taiwan to its annual assembly, which it had been able to attend in previous years, and Taiwan was also barred from sending an official delegation to the UN climate-change conference, as it had in 2015. <u>Additional sovereignty concerns arose in Taiwan when Beijing</u> <u>pressured several countries, including Kenya, Malaysia, Cambodia and Armenia, to deport dozens of Taiwanese passport holders suspected of being members of telecoms fraud schemes to mainland China</u>, ignoring Taipei’s efforts to have them repatriated to Taiwan. These moves were condemned by Taiwan’s parliament as having “seriously infringed upon . . . the nation’s sovereignty.” <u>Beyond these diplomatic pressure points, China—which is Taiwan’s largest trading partner—can resort to a <strong>multitude of economic levers to apply further pressure on Taipei.</u></strong> One of the first steps Beijing took in reaction to Tsai’s election victory was to impose restrictions on the number of Chinese tourists allowed to travel to Taiwan—a measure of both symbolic and economic significance. Tourism accounts for approximately 4–5 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, and residents of mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau make up more than half of all visitors to the island. Prior to 2008, no more than three hundred thousand mainland Chinese visited Taiwan every year, but since then their number has rapidly surged to about four million per year, in addition to 1.5 million visitors from Hong Kong and Macau. <u>The newly imposed restrictions, however, have caused the number of Taiwan-bound mainland Chinese tourists to drop by nearly 30 percent, and Beijing announced that their number would be further reduced to less than 2 million per year. The economic cost of a suspension of tourist visits from the mainland is a substantial but tolerable burden for Taiwan</u>—<u><strong>although it has already stirred up political resistance</u></strong>, as thousands of workers in the island’s tourism industry took to the streets in September to protest against Tsai’s policies. <u>A much more potent weapon in Beijing’s arsenal would be to impose restrictions on Taiwanese business activity in China, considering that key sectors of Taiwanese manufacturing</u> (such as microchip production) are <u>heavily reliant on the mainland. While China’s own economy would suffer from such measures—Taiwan is currently the mainland’s seventh-largest trading partner—Beijing would find it far easier than Taipei to stomach the cost of such a move. </u>In the context of a potential heightening of China’s economic pressure on Taiwan, one of the DPP’s core election promises—energy reform, including a commitment to phase out nuclear power by 2025—raises questions about the future of the island’s strategic energy security. To date, the DPP has said relatively little about how it plans to replace the energy volumes lost when the nuclear power stations are decommissioned. The proposals made so far include a fivefold growth of renewables (with a focus on the large-scale development of offshore wind farms in the contested Taiwan Strait), a push to increase energy efficiency, a reduction of the power reserves ratio, and a focus on developing a smart grid, which is a prerequisite for the efficient use of renewable energy on a large scale. Besides the likelihood that a potential deficit in indigenous energy generation will have to be compensated by additional external energy supplies along vulnerable sea routes, the reliance on smart grids could also increase the exposure of Taiwan’s critical energy infrastructure to Chinese cyberattacks. <u>At present, Taiwan is already the most frequent target of Chinese cyberattacks, not least since it is considered a “test bed” for subsequent cyber campaigns against targets in the United States</u>. <u>THE MOST drastic measure that Beijing could take against Taiwan if relations with the DPP-led government were to deteriorate beyond recovery <strong>is the employment of <mark>military force</u></strong></mark>. For now, a military escalation is a remote scenario, and Beijing would doubtless ponder it only as an absolute last resort. <u><strong>But <mark>it is not</mark> an altogether <mark>inconceivable</mark> step</u></strong>, <u>considering China’s conduct in previous crises in the Taiwan Strait</u> (including its threat, during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96, to turn the strait into a “sea of fire”) <u><strong>and its increasing willingness to employ means of military coercion in disputes with other regional powers</u></strong>. Beijing’s overall posture vis-à-vis Taipei remained threatening even during the presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, as was underscored by reports in 2015 that a mock-up of the inner city of Taipei, including a replica of Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building, was used as an urban warfare training ground for PLA soldiers on a Chinese military base. Beijing has solemnly declared that it would respond with military force to any official Taiwanese pronouncement of independence—which continues to be stipulated as an explicit long-term goal in the DPP’s charter. A few days after the DPP’s triumph in the 2016 elections, China’s state-owned television broadcast reports about Chinese live-fire military exercises and landing drills off the coast of Fujian province, directly across from Taiwan, which was interpreted as a clear warning for the DPP. <u>Following the Taiwan phone call and Trump’s potential willingness to abandon the one-China principle, <strong>the prospect of a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait now appears less remote.</u></strong> Since early December, <u>China has substantially stepped up its military activities around Taiwan. Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly circled the international airspace surrounding Taiwan within visible range of the island, and a group of warships, including China’s sole aircraft carrier, passed some ninety nautical miles south of it. <mark>China’s armed</mark> forces <mark>are</mark> reportedly “<mark>considering strong measures</mark>” <mark>to deter the island </mark>from moving further out of Beijing’s grasp,</u> <u>and the Communist Party</u>–owned daily Global Times <u><strong>published an op-ed declaring that “the military status quo across the Taiwan Straits needs to be reshaped” and advising Beijing to get “ready <mark>to achieve reunification through</mark> the use of <mark>force</u></strong>.” <u><strong>The potential for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait depends in no small part on developments in other geopolitical hot spots in the region</u></strong></mark>, <u>particularly the South China Sea. Beijing’s increasingly assertive moves and Washington’s intransigent response</u>—<u>manifested in numerous close encounters between U.S. and Chinese ships and aircraft—risk sparking an open confrontation. <strong><mark>Should tensions in the South China Sea escalate</mark>, the best option for <mark>Taipei</mark> would be to avoid any direct involvement</u></strong>. <u>More likely than not, however, it <mark>would be put under pressure</mark> by both China and the United States to take a stance, not least due to the fact that Taiwan is the site of strategically important military assets,</u> such as a highly advanced PAVE PAWS long-range early-warning radar, one of very few such systems in the world. <u>More importantly, by virtue of controlling the island of Itu Aba (Taiping), the largest natural feature in the disputed Spratly Islands, Taiwan already has “boots on the ground” in the South China Sea and would thus find it hard to avoid involvement in any armed confrontation there</u>. Taiwan’s presence in the region was highlighted again when outgoing president Ma Ying-jeou chose to visit Itu Aba in January 2016, irritating not only Vietnam and the Philippines, but also the United States. <u><mark>In</mark> the event of <mark>an outbreak of open hostilities</mark> in the South or East China Sea, <mark>Taiwan’s ability to cooperate</mark> with any of the other actors in the region <mark>would be constrained</mark> by the fact that the Taiwanese government’s official position on the territorial disputes is largely identical to Beijing’s: Taipei has long claimed most of the contested islands and reefs as a part of the sovereign territory of “China.” It therefore finds itself in a particularly intricate situation: it has a number of natural allies in the region that share its aversion to the newfound assertiveness in the foreign policy pursued by China, yet it officially agrees with Beijing on the issue of China’s territorial claims vis-à-vis these states</u>. Speculations that the DPP-led Taiwanese government, which emphasizes Taiwan’s autonomy and its historical distinctness from China, may choose to officially dissociate itself from these expansive territorial claims, have so far proven unfounded. When an international tribunal established by the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in July that many of China’s core claims in the South China Sea are groundless, <u>Taipei joined Beijing in roundly rejecting the ruling. President Tsai stated that the tribunal’s decision </u>(which included the ruling that Itu Aba should be classified as a rock and as such is not entitled to a two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone) <u>had “gravely harmed” Taiwan’s rights in the South China Sea, and in response Taipei dispatched a warship to patrol the contested region and reassert Taiwanese claims there</u>. Beijing and Taipei displayed a wholly uncharacteristic unity in their joint dismissal of the ruling, as the vice chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council stated that the tribunal’s rejection of the “nine-dash line” that marks China’s claims to 80 percent of the South China Sea, was unacceptable, while the Chinese government praised Taiwan’s efforts to “defend” Itu Aba. <u><strong><mark>SHOULD CHINA decide to employ military force in the Taiwan Strait</mark>—including any measure short of an outright invasion, such as a naval blockade</u></strong>—<u><mark>the situation </mark>for Taiwan <mark>would be</mark> <mark>dire</mark>. The balance of military power, always highly unfavorable for Taipei, <strong>has never been as lopsided as it is toda</strong>y</u>. According to estimates by Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense (based in particular on an assessment of the development of missile systems, bombers and fourth-generation stealth fighter aircraft), China will have gained sufficient military capabilities to launch a large-scale invasion of Taiwan with good prospects of success by 2020. While Beijing has consistently boosted its armed forces, Taiwan’s military budget remains remarkably low, accounting for little more than 2 percent of its GDP, much to the chagrin of senior U.S. defense officials. <u>Taipei’s relative military disadvantage has been compounded by the fact that its principal ally, the United States, a</u>s well as other Western governments, <u>have become very reluctant to supply state-of-the-art defense technology to the Taiwanese military out of concern about adversarial reactions from Beijing</u>. The resulting lack of access to critical new defense technology is affecting the entire range of relevant weapons systems. In mid-December 2015, the Obama administration finally cleared another major arms sale worth $1.83 billion to Taiwan, including two decommissioned guided-missile frigates, amphibious assault vehicles, and antitank and surface-to-air missiles. It was the first such sales clearance in more than four years, but it appears not to have included any critical cutting-edge military technology. One of the most pressing concerns for Taiwan’s military planners has been the development of an indigenous attack submarine, which is regarded as an essential missing link in the island’s defense structure. The project has proven very difficult to develop, as most countries with the requisite technological know-how have refused to cooperate with Taipei for fear of jeopardizing their ties with Beijing, although Washington now appears willing to provide at least a limited degree of assistance in the development process. <u>The plans for submarine development are part of the asymmetric defense strategy adopted by the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense in response to the continuous growth of China’s military power. Another central component of this strategy is the development of a fleet of state-of-the-art Tuo Chiang–class stealth corvettes, each equipped with sixteen potent Hsiung Feng antiship missiles</u>. <u>The rationale for developing this type of warship is to employ it as a cheap and effective means of countering China’s massive naval development at a fraction of its cost </u>(a flotilla of five Tuo Chiang–class corvettes costs about $350 million). <u>By resorting to these and similar means of asymmetric defense, including a large network of “smart mines,” Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense currently estimates that the Taiwanese armed forces would be able to fend off a Chinese invasion for at least thirty days. <strong>Following the projected thirty-day period, Taiwan’s survival would depend on large-scale military support from the United States</strong>. The nature and degree of American involvement in a potential cross-Strait confrontation would be a crucial variable that critically affects the strategic calculations of the leaderships in Beijing and in Taipei.</u> <u><strong>It is a commonly held belief among the Taiwanese public that, should there be a military conflict with Beijing, <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>would be bound to intervene</mark> in support of Taiwan</u></strong>. In practice, however, there is no alliance treaty between Washington and Taipei that explicitly specifies an American commitment to defend the island. The Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979—which, along with the “Six Assurances” given to Taiwan by Ronald Reagan in 1982, was reaffirmed by the House of Representatives as recently as May 2016—stipulates that the United States will do what is necessary to “enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” But this falls far short of an explicit defense commitment. Nor would such a commitment be backed by a majority of the American public: According to a recent poll, more than 70 percent of Americans would oppose sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. <u>Beijing’s last attempt to resort to military force in its relations with Taipei—th</u>e Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–96—<u>was met by a stern response from Washington, which dispatched two carrier battle groups to the region and warned Beijing that any further military aggression against Taiwan would bring “grave consequences” for China</u>. Since then, however, U.S. military preponderance over China has dwindled. A 2015 assessment by the RAND Corporation projects that the U.S. military would now be facing major operational problems in prevailing in any conflict with Chinese forces over Taiwan. <u><strong>In view of the <mark>Trump</mark> administration’s determination to drive a harder bargain with China, Taipei <mark>might</mark> nonetheless <mark>receive further American assurances</mark> in the future.</u></strong> In December, the U.S. Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act, which provides for official reciprocal exchanges between U.S. and Taiwanese senior military officials for the first time since the 1970s. <u>For Washington, a <mark>lack of support</mark> for Taiwan during a potential confrontation with Beijing <mark>could entail a serious loss of credibility</mark> <mark>with</mark> many of its <mark>key</mark> partners and <mark>allies</mark> in East and Southeast Asia, raising doubts about its wider defense commitments in this vitally important region</u>. <u><strong>AFTER A prolonged period of tranquility and rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei, cross-Strait relations are once again headed for troubled times</u></strong>. <u>The apparent realignment of Washington’s Taiwan policy is occurring at a time when Beijing, dissatisfied with the new leadership in Taipei and increasingly assertive towards the United States, has already enacted punitive measures against Taiwan, both diplomatic and economic</u>. <u><strong><mark>Beijing</mark> is beginning to <mark>feel that it has exhausted all peaceful options</mark> of bringing Taiwan back into the fold, and Xi Jinping does not seem entirely averse to the prospect of using some form of military pressure to prevent Taipei from drifting further away from the mainland</u></strong>. <u>Ahead of a key leadership transition in China’s Communist Party in late 2017</u>, and with nationalist sentiment rising in the mainland<u><strong>, <mark>Xi does not want to appear weak</mark> on matters considered nonnegotiable core interests for the party—particularly Taiwan</u></strong>. <u>President <mark>Tsai</mark> Ing-wen, meanwhile, is keen to preserve the status quo of cross-Strait relations and has adopted a conciliatory tone towards Beijing, <strong>but she <mark>has been</mark> equally <mark>adamant in her affirmation of Taiwanese autonom</mark>y and her refusal to render explicit homage to the one-China principle. </strong>Tsai is under pressure domestically</u>, as the same social activists and independence-minded “dark-Green” <u>factions in her own party that helped propel her to power are now demanding <mark>that she take an uncompromising stance</mark> vis-à-vis Beijing</u>. <u>Tsai’s domestic approval ratings have been sliding precipitously since she assumed office, but <strong>her defiant stance on cross-Strait relations and the 1992 Consensus is supported by a large majority of the population.</strong> </u>Many in Taiwan have been hopeful that Donald Trump’s statements on the one-China principle may signal positive change for the island’s status, but they remain wary of becoming a mere bargaining chip in a great-power game. Also, while the Trump administration has raised hopes in Taipei that U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations might be upgraded, Donald Trump’s economic isolationism and his decision to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement are bad news for export-reliant Taiwan. The United States is Taiwan’s second-largest trading partner (following China) and Taiwanese companies serve as major suppliers of U.S. tech giants like Apple, which have been pressured by Trump to relocate production to America, raising the prospect of trade disputes between Washington and Taipei.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,481,834 | 28 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
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Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,973 | 2. Proximity and importance spurs military competition | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>2. Proximity and importance spurs military competition</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,045 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
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3,783,974 | Second, is reasons to prefer: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Second, is reasons to prefer:</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,046 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,975 | Trying to improve the lives of people while ignoring existential threats is like shuffling the deck-chairs on the titanic – extinction is bad and we should try stop it because it denies people the fundamental right to choose whether or not they live or die | Cerutti 14 | Cerutti 14 - Professor of Political Philosophy emeritus at the University of Florence and Adjunct Professor at the Scuola superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. In the last fifteen years, Cerutti has been aVisiting Professor at Harvard, the Universit´e de Paris 8, the Humboldt Universit ¨at zu Berlin, the London School of Economics and Political Science,(China Foreign Affairs University), Beijing, and Stanford University in Florence. Beyond the publications quoted in this article, Cerutti has written widely on the political identity of the Europeans and the legitimacy of the European Union (last publication: Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. with S. Lucarelli and V. Schmidt, Routledge: London 2011). Also, his MOOC ‘Political Philosophy: An Introduction’ is accessible on the platform <iversity.org>. | given the existence of global threats which endanger the life of humankind as a civ- ilized species right to survive should be asserted as its first fundamental right. this is not just philosophical but legal as well nobody seems to take note that the life of all present and future individuals could be annihilated It is like insisting on first debating the rights of a ship’s passengers instead of taking action in the light of the fact that the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak These dangers are philosophically significant because they tell something about human beings challenges like nuclear weapons and climate change can hit everybody on earth and they would destroy human civilization the shifting of Theory to pure normativity has favored an exclusive attention on intersubjectivity as if challenges to politics and civilization caused by systemic imperatives such as the nuclear threat and climate change) were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry the self- centered normative approach should be restructured to address the challenges for humankind’s survival critical theorists seem to be reluctant to address the philosophical issues raised by global challenges, not to mention their complete denial of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical Theory had accepted a tacit division of labor in which its competence is restricted to social justice and the “damaged” subjectivity starting from problems and threats that come up as physical events and are accounted for by hard science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without first engaging in a complicate and doubt- ful theorizing about how the world should be reshaped The literature on justice and climate change misses the point we have to motivate our interest in existence we should assume responsibility for future generations doing what we can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our individual life is meaningful because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity acknowledging this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible human rights can only apply to a living humankind, but not to a ”republic of insects and grass” The meta-right as a pre-condition has to be un- derstood in the moral sense: no foundation of morality makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental rights of those harmed by our acts and omissions global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the usual attitude in moral and political theory planetary lethal threats such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change have the potential strength to forge all relevant political actors into one community who received the push to unite from the threats to their life and limbs because they are all put in danger, and because they have to act jointly This is a possibility, not an inevitable process all this is enough to use ‘humankind’ in a political sense legal formulations cannot be ignored they create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring about a change, that is educational and political struggles, hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by philosophers Support from civil society would help | given the existence of global threats which endanger humankind right to survive should be asserted as its first fundamental right nobody seems to note that the life of all present and futur could be annihilated the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak challenges can hit everybody Theory has favored intersubjectivity the self- centered approach should be restructured to address survival critical theorists seem reluctant to address philosophical issues raised by global challenges starting from threats and are accounted for by science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without engaging in a complicate and theorizing about how the world should be reshaped lit misses the point we have to motivate our interest in existence we should assume responsibility for future gen s doing what we can for the survival can give reassurance that life is meaningful no morality makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental right planetary threats have the potential strength to forge all actors into one community to unite from the threats because they are all in danger legal formulations cannot be ignored Support from civil society would help | (Furio “Humankind’s First Fundamental Right: Survival,” Constellations)
This article’s main thesis1 is that, given the existence of at least two global threats, nuclear weapons and climate change, which endanger the life of humankind as a civ- ilized species, its right to survive should be asserted as its first human or rather fundamental right. The sense of this assertion is not just philosophical but legal as well.¶ To substantiate this thesis, I shall go through six argumentative steps:¶ 1. Why begin with global threats.¶ 2. Why survival is the leading category in this field, and¶ how it interplays with justice.¶ 3. What interest humankind has in its survival, and why¶ it should be protected as a right.¶ 4. Why regard “humankind” rather than “all indi-¶ viduals” as a possible actor.¶ 5. Why speak of a fundamental rather than human¶ right, and how to constitutionalize this right.¶ 6. How two developments in international law after 1945 can contribute to support the argument I have¶ been sketching.¶ **¶ 1. If philosophical thinking starts with being amazed at something in the world (Plato’s θαυμα ́ζειν), my in- terest in the present matter2 was first stimulated by the pre-philosophical amazement I always felt in seeing that in the now enormous human rights discourse (both in politics and academia) so much care is dedicated to the single individuals, and so wide-ranging designs of a cos- mopolis to come are based on their rights. Yet nobody seems to take note that the life of all present and future individuals could be annihilated by a nuclear war or up- set by catastrophic developments of climate change. It is like insisting on first debating the rights of a ship’s third- class passengers 3 instead of taking action in the light of the fact that the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak (climate change is already happening) and also risks to hit a mine that is floating around and would send it along with all passengers and crew straight to the ocean depths (by thinking and acting timely, leaks can be filled, mines detected and swept away, all ac- tions that would put the care for third-class passengers¶ on a firmer ground). These dangers are philosophically significant because they tell something about human beings, the only ones who have become able to destroy their own race, as well as about modernity: the possibil- ity of self-destruction sets an end to this era, opens a new one, which can only vaguely be termed post-modern,4 and requires an updated rewriting of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. It is also politically significant as it challenges present politics to restructure itself by ex- tending its attention to the far future, something which is not possible within the boundaries of modern politics because of its narrow time structure.5 In a more precise language, I term challenges like nuclear weapons (con- sidered in themselves, while nuclear proliferation is but a subphenomenon) and climate change global (in a very specific sense) because they are lethal and planet-wide, can hit approximately everybody on earth and can be reasonably addressed only by the near totality of coun- tries and peoples. They would not wipe out biologically humankind, although this cannot be excluded in case of an all-out nuclear war; but they would destroy human civilization:6 not a set of values, but the set of material and cultural tools (agriculture, communications, trans- portation and trade) that allow unspecialized animals like the humans to survive and to thrive.¶ It is clear that my thesis presupposes a revised scale of relevance among the issues requiring and stimulat- ing theoretical investigations: in my philosophical view global threats have a greater relevance and are intellec- tually more challenging than the issues suggested by the media’s headlines (present wars, terrorism, group and minority rights in the US, multiculturalism in Canada or Australia, immigrants in Europe, or, more recently, the crisis of the global economic system). As a reflection upon the deeper longue dure ́e determinants of human- ity’s fate, political philosophy should not necessarily espouse the agenda suggested by current politics and journalism and, instead, seek its own independent as- sessment of the state of the world as part of its business; this is a critical attitude that cannot be implemented without a philosophical view on history (not to be con- fused with a revival of the “grand narratives”). Besides, the shifting of most of Critical Theory to pure normativity has favored the emergence not just of worldviews based on the predominance of Sollen, but also of an exclusive attention on intersubjectivity and its troubles; as if challenges to politics and civilization caused by systemic imperatives (such as the nuclear threat and¶ climate change) were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry. What I am attempting in this article is to address an issue such as human rights that is typical of the self- centered normative approach mentioned and to show how it should be restructured to address the challenges for humankind’s survival.¶ In this attempt I am driven by the intent to debunk the layer of denial (or repression in pshychoanalyti- cal sense) that, more intensely after the end of the Cold War, has removed the nuclear threat from the philosoph- ical reflection on modernity and has later prevented cli- mate change from entering the main agenda of Critical Theory. There is also an epistemological aspect in this: a critical Zeitdiagnose, or an informed assessment of where history has taken us to in our post-modern times is not possible without first taking what hard science has to say about the threats for humankind very seriously.7 With rare exceptions, critical theorists seem to be reluctant to address the philosophical issues raised by global challenges, not to mention their complete denial beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno in the Fifties and Sixties (when Mutual Assured Destruction became a real possibility) of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical Theory, despite its claim to be a gen- eral assessment of our civilization, had accepted a tacit division of labor in which its competence is restricted to social justice (in continuation of its original being rooted in the Marxian critique of political economy) and the “damaged”8 subjectivity. The rest of the real world is left to a purely Hobbesian (and later Luhmannian) reading, or to the perception of side-figures such as Karl Jaspers or Gu ̈nther Anders.¶ A last epistemological remark: starting from problems and threats that, however socially generated, come up as physical events and are accounted for by hard science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without first engaging in a complicate and doubt- ful theorizing about how the world should be reshaped according to a general normative theory. This ad hoc theorizing shows the ability or inability of a philosoph- ical view to come to terms with problems that are of paramount importance to everybody, not just to the prac- titioners of Schulphilosophie.¶ 2. I have explained elsewhere9why survival rather than justice is the leading category of a philosophy of global threats. The now thriving literature on justice and climate change misses the point that before we look for ways to establish justice between generations, we have to motivate our interest in their existence and wellbeing, or rather in the existence and wellbeing of humankind.10 While survival of humankind is what best defines our problematic situation, when it comes to the normative aspect I believe that we should assume responsibility for future generations rather than do justice to them; talking responsibility I move from its most elementary¶ manifestation, the responsibility parents take on for their children. Justice as fairness comes in when we have to fight back “generational nepotism:” it is wrong for any generation to spoil the environment without regard to the consequences in the future, far that it may be, that is not just out of respect for those that may harm our children and children’s children. Out of elementary fairness, as expressed in the Golden Rule, we cannot deny parents of the, say, twenty-fifth century the chance to bear and educate their children in decent conditions.¶ Now, survival is a Hobbesian category, as such it sounds like an anathema to critical thinking, just as most categories stemming from the tradition of politi- cal realism do. Since under global threats present and future humankind is really endangered in its survival, it is however hard to see the rationale of denying the fact because the name comes from the enemy’s vocabu- lary. More importantly, there is an essential difference: Hobbes’ survival regards the individual and is there- fore self-centered and adversarial (in common parlance, mors tua vita mea), while humankind’s survival as a moral and political goal is by its own definition an uni- versalistic feature. More on this later.¶ A much talked-about issue in this context is the so- called identity problem, which I am however inclined to dismiss. If it means the doubtfulness of any engagement in favor of future generations because we do not know if they will exist (we could decide to stop procreating), the problem is surrounded by an air of futility: there is no imaginable decision process that could effectively lead to a total procreation stop. On the other hand, if only a few humans were alive in the far future, this would be enough of a reason for our engagement. Of course future humanity could never be born because meanwhile the planet may have been burnt out by an asteroid (natural precariousness of human life) or an all-out nuclear war (man-made precariousness). Neither type of precarious- ness can however be a reason not to endorse the interest of future generations in survival, because reducing that precariousness is exactly the engagement’s telos. The other aspect of the identity problem — the non-identity of posterity’s values and preferences with our own, or their indeterminacy — is not relevant to our case, be- cause the goal for whose attainment we are called to save or sacrifice something for their survival has to do with their sheer survival (in an indispensably civilized framework, as explained above) rather than with our own and the posterity’s moral configuration; in other words, there is no paternalistic attitude in it.¶ In a fairly different meaning, closer to social rather than moral (analytical) theory, identity comes up in an- other sense. Assuming responsibility for (or, for that matter, being fair to) future generations is not just an altruistic attitude. Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the¶ main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But doing what we can for the survival of humankind can give ourselves reassurance that our individual life (also seen in the context of our gen- eration’s) is meaningful beyond the limits of our own existence on earth, because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity.¶ 3. That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 More importantly, doubts may also arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right, that is to “juridify” it instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflict- ing parties. In general I share this preoccupation, and have misgivings at any inflationary expansion of the hu- man rights catalogue. On the other hand, moral rights that do not translate into legal rights12 are politically pointless or at least much less significant than the rights enshrined in a legal order. Also, our case is different, and the issues we are confronted with are more radi- cal than the worries with ‘juridification;’ this is all the truer, since the establishment of a right to survival for humankind would require a long and fierce political and intellectual battle in the first place.¶ First of all, does the right of humanity to survival qualify as a (basic or human) right? Before we proceed, let us note that humankind’s survival is not a good like civil liberties, which is completely at the disposal of human beings; instead, it can depend on the orbits of asteroids and other NEOs.13 The “right of humankind to survival” should therefore be read as a short for “the right of humankind, including future people, to have all previous generations doing their best to ensure their sur- vival and protect them from man-made threats.” In this version, we are clearly afar from the confusion between rights and goals criticized by Dworkin14 (§3.1 in the chapter on Difficult cases), the causation of the good at stake (survival) being elusive, or not completely nor (in the case of climate change) undoubtedly human; also¶ the content of the right is not a physical state, but rather the behavior influencing it. In a manifest way, this also identifies the right’s indispensable correlate, that is the duty of the relevant actors (individuals and institutions) to refrain from behaviors that are likely to cause harm to that good.¶ Whether or not this claim can translate into a right should be investigated from two points of view, those of its structure (a) and its bearer (b).¶ a. As for structure, three of Feinberg’s15 four crite- ria for being a right are already met (to have a content, a holder and an addressee). The fourth, the ‘source of validation,’ gradually emerges from the argument I am unfolding. Frydman and Haarscher also list four condi- tions, of which three are already present (titulaire, objet, opposabilite ́) – even if more remains to be said about the first one; while the fourth condition (sanction) shall be discussed below in the framework of the constitu- tionalization problem.16 Finally, let us look at the stan- dard distinction of negative and positive rights, which Shue rightly believes to be substantially untenable. This is also true in our case, because the ‘behavior’ of in- dividuals and institutions, which humanity is entitled to expect, according to the new right, can be imple- mented either by abstaining in single cases from using or possessing nuclear weapons and emitting excessive GHGs or by establishing new institutions (a global En- vironmental Protection Agency, say) and strategies (for example, technology transfer from advanced to develop- ing countries to help the latter rein in global warming). What would be acknowledged would be the right, not the policies that according to time and circumstances are devised for its realization.¶ Does this new right share with the other fundamental or human rights the need to be founded in a conception of the human, such as those focused by Donnelly on dignity, by Meyers on moral agency and by Frydman and Haarscher on autonomy?17 Not properly, or not di- rectly. Humanity’s right to survival is a meta-right rather than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for- mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human: acknowledging this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible. It is their Bedingung der Mo ̈glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that human rights can only apply to a living humankind, but not to a ”republic of insects and grass” (Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large nuclear war19). The meta-right as a pre-condition has rather to be un- derstood in the moral sense: no foundation of morality or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter) makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental rights of those (poor populations al- ready affected by global warming, future generations¶ as victims of nuclear war or extreme climate change) harmed by our acts and omissions. Here I mean moral- ity at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the business-as-usual attitude in moral and political theory; I mean the attitude to think of the foundations of moral- ity and polity as if the man-made (modern) world in which they operate had not been substantially altered by humankind’s newly achieved capability to destroy itself and/or the planet.¶ Let us make a further step on the road that leads to uncouple, as far as it goes, the foundation of a new right of paramount importance from a substantive conception of the human – an effort aimed at protecting it from the uncertain or frail fate of such conceptions. On the one hand, as a meta-right to individual-only human rights, the right to survival does not imply a choice among substantive values; this right does not refer to a partic- ular conception of what is good for future generations, as it only wants to ensure for them existential condi- tions that are an indispensable basis for their members to pursue whatever idea of the good, of liberty and self- realization they may choose. On the other hand, survival is indeed referred not to the mere biological fact, but to the survival of humankind in decent, civilized condi- tions, taking civilization in the meaning explained in §1. Alone, as I explained above, this qualification is not an added axiological component (civilization as a sys- tem of values), as it rather relies on the analytical view that some technical and cultural features of civilization are essential to the life of the human species.¶ There is a last aspect to be examined with regard to the structure or nature of this right: its emergence not from a shift in the doctrine of human rights, but as a response to a new situation in world history, in which survival goods (a livable atmosphere in the first place) that were so far tacitly taken for granted turn out to be no longer guaranteed, but more and more endangered. As such, this new right reconnects to what we know about individual human rights, that is that they come up as a response to “perceived threats” and build an “evolving whole”.20¶ b. Let us now come to the question of the right’s bearer. It is humankind, defined as the generality of the living individuals along with those who will be born. There are three possible objections to this proposition.¶ First, it seems to be self-evident that the notion of a human right for the so defined humankind cannot be subject to the classical liberal objection that bearers of such rights are individuals, not groups.21 Humankind is not an exclusive and self-contained group opposed to others (at least until we do not have our first contact with¶ dwellers of other regions of the universe), nor is it meant here to represent particular sets of values. Between the two meanings of “humanity” — as species (Artbegriff) and as regulative notion of a community cemented by shared values and goals (Zielbegriff)22 — I am referring to the first one; it is now becoming philosophically sig- nificant because not even its biological existence can be taken for granted under man-made threats. Humankind is not a hypostasis detached from the individuals, as in the case of ‘the community’ or ‘das Volk,’ as it rather means the totality of the living individuals of any given generation including (a) their potential to generate fur- ther human beings and generations and (b) their knowl- edge that the latter will exist and probably suffer. This reflexive notion of humankind raises a problem, but remains open to different ethical choices: indifference towards future generations, responsibility for them, and obligations assumed in their favor.¶ 4. A second question is: why should we speak of humankind instead of limiting ourselves to the more sober expression “all present and future individuals?” There is first a lexicological advantage, in as much as we thus use one word instead of connecting two by an “and.” This better conveys the sense that the bond of solidarity based on the responsibility for the elementary living conditions of posterity makes present and future individuals one community – in this sole, thin sense in- deed, which does not try to conceal the deep fractures existing between contemporaries within the present and the successive generations of this community. The very inclusion of future people into humankind is not an act of inclusive kindness towards them, but is rather made compelling by the lethal threats that past and present people have projected into the life of posterity, in an amount unprecedented in history. Lastly, introducing humankind as a bearer of rights highlights that the right of the individuals to be alive and free can be enjoyed only in the middle of a larger community, which makes the claim of human rights possible and helps to im- plement them. In times of economic globalization and global threats, we have come to know that this com- munity is the whole humankind, not just nations. All this however does not alter the truth that who is entitled to vindicate the right to survival is not humanity as a hypostasis, but every individual either living or not yet born – very much like what happens with individual human rights, whose constitutional formulation makes them enjoyable for every citizen who will in the future be born under the same Constitution.¶ Third comes the standard objection: it does not make sense to endorse obligation towards future people, since, if men and women agree to stop reproduction, those people might never be born. I have already dismissed this as a futile mental experiment. It could further be argued, though, that future generations might turn out¶ to have moral standards totally different from ours. Yet, the possibility that posterity will be not amenable to our moral world is not huge enough to release us from any responsibility towards them. We can still under- stand, and to an extent share, the moral problems raised by the Bible or the Greek classical tragedy of millen- nia ago and should not easily assume that our fellow humans of the year 3000, dwellers of a planet spoiled by global warming, will be morally so hugely different from us.¶ Finally, let me anticipate here one of the legal con- siderations that will be developed later on. Any right- establishing text (but I am now referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR 1948) works with the basic formula “everyone has the right to etc.”23 The validity of the claims is limited only by the spatial ex- tension of the law: a right established by the French Constitution may be thought to be valid universally, but is legally protected only on French territory, while the rights mentioned in the UDHR apply by definition to the entire world where humans live. This can be dubbed spa- tial universalism, while establishing a right of present and future humanity to survive is tantamount to adding a time universalism. In other words, this makes explicit that the right of everyone to a just international order (UDHR 1948, Art. 28; more below) also holds for the ‘everyones’ of the year 3000. This may have always been tacitly intended by the law, the only time limit ly- ing in the possibility that the law is at some point in the future dismissed by another law canceling or expand- ing those rights. In a present like ours, in which it has become known that the future is no longer guaranteed to be essentially homogeneous (with no radical change in the physical and anthropological life conditions) to the present and the past, it has become necessary to openly establish a linkage between our obligations and the rights of future generations, as far as existential issues are concerned; a link that will likewise apply to them as soon as they become the present generation.¶ So far, I have clarified the moral and, to a lesser extent, legal reasons for introducing the notion of hu- mankind as right bearer. I will now stress that the hu- mankind discourse in this article remains political rather than moral.¶ It is not necessary here to rerun the history of the humankind/humanity notion; it is enough to remember that its denial has been a stronghold in the battle of value nihilists (Nietzsche) and realist thinkers (Oswald Spen- gler, who dismissed it as a “zoological notion,” and more extensively Carl Schmitt in Schmitt 1976, particularly §6). As self-contained units (such as the Westphalian system states) were deemed to be the only sustainable and legitimate polities, any reference to humanity was seen as toothless or manipulative, as a noble universalis- tic alibi for particularistic interests.24 Setting aside this¶ sort of criticism, which mistakes the ideological use of the term for its very substance, we know that humanity, as a good-will aspiration of philosophers, poets and re- ligious men, could not be regarded as a political notion because only non-voluntaristic communities can be re- garded as political. They alone allow for binding and effective decisions, whereas any partner can at any time and according to its convenience withdraw from mem- bership in “humanity” or other large associations based on just good will.¶ This can now be expected to change, because planetary lethal threats such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change have the potential strength to forge all relevant political actors into one community, not unlike Hobbes’ individuals, who received the push to unite from the threats to their life and limbs: first because they are all put in danger, and second because they have to act jointly if they really want to fight back those dangers. This is a possibility, not an actual and inevitable process, as there are enough counter-forces that impede those ‘Hobbesian’ threats to fully make hu- mankind one political community: fear, the protecting passion, does no longer work as smoothly as in Hobbes’ model of Leviathan.25 Nor is the potential contained in global challenges supposed to generate a world state as its only outcome: practicing survival policies, who- ever the actors may be, is more important than a uni- fied state-like structure in charge of doing so. Nonethe- less all this is enough to use ‘humankind’ in a political sense, as something that is a potential constituency rather than a fragmented multiplicity of individuals and states.¶ 5. Why a fundamental rather than a human right? The distinction between human and fundamental is not univocally worked out in the literature.26 In the vocab- ulary I am using here, human rights are seen as a philo- sophical concept and a moral (deontological) precept, while fundamental rights are those positively acknowl- edged in a legal order, entrusted to political and institu- tional processes for their implementation, and claimable in courts – this last feature being more problematic. Putting on humankind’s survival the label of a funda- mental right avoids leaving it in a philosophical limbo as a regulative idea,27 and gives it a better defined political and legal nature; this is more adequate to the character- istic of survival as something endangered by political decisions (or the lack thereof) and requesting a political solution by a given deadline (the next few years if we want to try to keep the temperature increase expected by 2100 under two degrees).¶ If humankind’s survival is acknowledged as a funda- mental right, it follows that it should be constitutional- ized, that is inserted in new and old (and aptly modified) Constitutions as well as in a new version of the Univer- sal Declaration of Human Rights; as such, it could be referred to as highest guidance in international treaties aimed at implementing it – rather than being enshrined in a specific ‘survival’ treaty. In constitutional law, a development in this sense is already taking place, in as much as either the rights of future generations to a safe environment or our responsibility towards them in this regard or the imperative to preserve the environ- ment (without mention of the future generations, but implicitly to their benefit) have been affirmed in consti- tutional amendments of the last two decades in countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, but also Burkina Faso and Burundi. Having rights or being protected by the legally defined responsibility of the previous gener- ations is however not the same thing, and with regard to humankind’s survival I would point at its stronger formulation as a right: it is more binding, while the ob- jections against endowing future generations with rights can be easily argued against. Just because it is conceived in favor of those who cannot yet uphold their interest, this right should be protected against cancellation by a sort of Ewigkeitsklausel as in Art. 79.3 of the German Grundgesetz.28 A right to survival is more specific and more stringent than the right to a safe environment be- cause it derives from lethal and global challenges that affect the very core of the polity, protection, rather than from a generic care for a balanced relationship to na- ture or from a diffuse feeling of benevolence for the posterity.¶ In national or regional Constitutions, the acknowl- edgment of this right could be accompanied by the establishment of corresponding institutions, promoting the implementation of the new right; it could be for example an ombudsman29 for future generation as a (countermajoritarian)30 authority protecting their inter- ests against damages resulting from new legislation, and endowed with the power to send it back to the legislative rather than to veto it straight away.31 Not to be underes- timated are the difficulties that would arise in striking a very delicate balance on two levels: in general between the interests of present and future generations,32 but also between parliaments or executives, which act under the pressure of their constituencies, and the members of the ombudsman authority, who remain nonetheless contem- poraries of the former rather than being appointed by the latter – for all too natural reasons.¶ The same difficulty would affect the national courts in which the new fundamental right, as jus cogens principle, should be made claimable at the initiative of institutions such as the ombudsman or of advocacy groups representing a significative number of citizens in a referendum-like counting procedure. In international courts,33 the interest of future generations should be represented by an ombudsman to be established at the UN as well as at regional associations of states such as the EU or Mercosur. A point however that remains¶ open to further discussion has been raised in the de- bate on socio-economic or solidarity rights, which may have some affinity with the right to survival: theoreti- cally, Frank Michelman has made clear that the status of a norm as constitutional law ought not to be con- flated with the question of its availability for judicial enforcement.34 In practice, conflicts are easily possi- ble between the courts sentencing on the states’ failure to implement those rights and “the vain or overbearing nature of these sentences” on a matter that is political rather than judicial. 35 This is true in our case as well: the attainment of a new international order without national possession of nuclear arms or a carbon-free reordering of the world economy are goals for policy-making, not something that can be attained in courts. In this frame- work, however, courts are not jobless: sentencing the nuclear-armed states for their failure in implementing art.VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 or the US of the Bush years for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and failing to cut emissions is a typical judicial matter, as the two cases would regard the break of treaty obligations or the failure to cease doing some- thing harmful, not to bring about something good.37¶ Finally, two more fundamental objections could be raised against the idea of a legal protection of the inter- est of future generations. It could be argued that what would be represented (in a time-universalistic mode) is not the interest of future generations, but rather the interest of a particular fraction of the present ones, dis- guising itself as standard bearer of those people to come. On the one hand this should be taken into account as critical point of view in the public debate on those inter- ests. On the other hand, this criticism, strictly speaking, would also delegitimize such an ancient principle of Roman and Western law as the protection of the child. In morality it would affirm a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of slipping into another person’s clothes and acting from a non-egoistic stance. This can be obviously upheld, but at the price of the disappear- ance of morality as well as of the polity, which is – in any case and among other things – a solidaristic association.¶ A second problem, which is more difficult to deal with, is that we do not know as a general piece of knowl- edge what the interest of future generations is; whereas in the case of legal protection of the child we share a generally accepted knowledge of his or her future in- terest (to remain healthy, to get sufficient education, to be free to make the best of him/herself). What the real life conditions and the presumable vital interests of fu- ture generations will be can only be tentatively argued from what the several branches of natural and economic (e.g. demography) science are able to tell us about what is likely to remain constant in physical and cultural anthropology and what is likely to be most endangered.¶ As such, it is important that moral and political theory renew their relationship to the natural sciences after a time of reciprocal disdain between the two. While sci- ence cannot by itself draw an encompassing picture of future life under global threats, philosophy should learn from science what those future problems are likely to be and elaborate on them, instead of reflecting on the future of humanity by just moving from the doctrines of past philosophers or relying on the hearsay about it based on media reports or the philosopher’s personal divinations.¶ 6. My philosophical proposal to fill a hole in human rights discourse and legislation by introducing a first or meta-fundamental right of humankind to survival and positivizing it in national, international and world law38 resonates with two legal developments. The first related to ‘humanity’, the second to ‘human rights.’ The latter resonates with the novelties in constitutional law men- tioned in §5.¶ The first one began in 1970 as the UN General As- sembly adopted Resolution 2749, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, con- taining the notion of a “common heritage of mankind”; it was originally introduced to protect the seabed and ocean floor and later the “moon and other celestial bod- ies” from exploitation by powerful countries against the interest of the developing ones.39 In the 1990s, the competing and “thinner” concept of “common concern of mankind” emerged, as in the Convention on Bio- diversity of 1992; nonetheless it can be said that hu- mankind has become a notion contained in binding in- ternational law and referred to indivisible (climate) and divisible (seabed, ocean floor, moon) objects, and that this has happened as an answer to problems and chances generated by huge technological advancement.¶ In another corner of legal development, it could be argued that the logical structure, so to speak the norma- tive algorithm of the UDHR norms — the aforemen- tioned ‘everyone has the right . . . ’ — implies that hu- mankind, not just single individuals, is to be the bearer of those rights, even if the collective singular is not used. Turning to a more substantive level, we could go as far as to say that the legal protection of humankind’s survival was implicitly enshrined as early as 1948 in the UDHR and later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the In- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966. Art. 28 UDHR (“ev- eryone has the right to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla- ration can be fully realized”) could be rethought in the direction of institutions bound to implement for every- one, now and in the future, the right to life (Art.3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR), the right to an adequate standard of liv- ing incl. adequate food (Art.11 ICESRC)40 as well as¶ the right of the family to be protected (Art.10 ICESRC), a right that would be denied to families of the posterity bound to live under insufferable environmental condi- tions (cf. above the notion of a transgenerational chain of parents). While the different binding strength of the several legal formulations (treaty, covenant, convention, declaration) cannot be ignored, it remains clear that le- gal documents do not advance by themselves the cause of humankind’s survival, except if they can be effec- tively referred to in a court of justice; but they create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring about a change, that is educational and political struggles, the former aiming at a change in the political culture.¶ To sum up, (hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by philosophers and theologians, whose presence in international law was merely philo- sophical, if not rhetorical, as in the Preamble to the UN Charter of 1945. Though not explicitly endowed with rights in the documents quoted above, the humankind of the “common heritage” doctrine is an important prece- dent in the direction, suggested by this article, of in- troducing this new legal actor. When looking at the implementation of the rights that can be attributed to it, the other legal novelty of the “common but dif- ferentiated responsibility”41 of individual actors, such as countries, should also be brought to bear. This is important when it comes to distributing the burden of the duties corresponding to those rights – which is in- deed one of the major issues in the debate following the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change of 2009. In any case, the legal acknowledgment of a “common responsibility” for the global commons is a further step in designing humankind as a juridical notion.¶ This article is policy-oriented in the peculiar sense of a constitutional policy that will require decades, if ever, to become the subject of debate and even longer to be legally implemented. Impulses in this direction are cer- tainly not be expected from the world of politics, but rather from the scientific community (provided a now utopian sounding collaboration of physics, philosophy and legal theory materializes) or from scattered sen- tences of national and international courts, particularly in environmental matter.42 Support from civil society would help.¶ Finally, the author’s suggestion as to how to read this proposal: it has a clearly cosmopolitan (or better: cosmopolitical) character, not however in the sense of cosmopolitanism as a general doctrine of government/ governance. It is rather generated by tools coming from realist thought: new threats as source of new rights, and lethal and planetary threats to the survival of hu- mankind’s civilization as drivers towards a new level of legal protection. | 40,522 | <h4>Trying to improve the lives of people while <u>ignoring</u> existential threats is like shuffling the deck-chairs on the titanic – extinction is bad and we should try stop it because it denies people the fundamental right to choose whether or not they live or die</h4><p><strong>Cerutti 14</strong> - Professor of Political Philosophy emeritus at the University of Florence and Adjunct Professor at the Scuola superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa. In the last fifteen years, Cerutti has been aVisiting Professor at Harvard, the Universit´e de Paris 8, the Humboldt Universit ¨at zu Berlin, the London School of Economics and Political Science,(China Foreign Affairs University), Beijing, and Stanford University in Florence. Beyond the publications quoted in this article, Cerutti has written widely on the political identity of the Europeans and the legitimacy of the European Union (last publication: Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union, ed. with S. Lucarelli and V. Schmidt, Routledge: London 2011). Also, his MOOC ‘Political Philosophy: An Introduction’ is accessible on the platform <iversity.org>.</p><p>(Furio “Humankind’s First Fundamental Right: Survival,” Constellations)</p><p>This article’s main thesis1 is that, <u><mark>given the existence of</u></mark> at least two <u><mark>global threats</u></mark>, nuclear weapons and climate change, <u><mark>which endanger</mark> the life of <mark>humankind</mark> as a civ- ilized species</u>, its <u><mark>right to survive should be asserted as its <strong>first</u></strong></mark> human or rather <u><strong><mark>fundamental right</strong></mark>.</u> The sense of <u>this</u> assertion <u>is not just philosophical but legal as</u> <u>well</u>.¶ To substantiate this thesis, I shall go through six argumentative steps:¶ 1. Why begin with global threats.¶ 2. Why survival is the leading category in this field, and¶ how it interplays with justice.¶ 3. What interest humankind has in its survival, and why¶ it should be protected as a right.¶ 4. Why regard “humankind” rather than “all indi-¶ viduals” as a possible actor.¶ 5. Why speak of a fundamental rather than human¶ right, and how to constitutionalize this right.¶ 6. How two developments in international law after 1945 can contribute to support the argument I have¶ been sketching.¶ **¶ 1. If philosophical thinking starts with being amazed at something in the world (Plato’s θαυμα ́ζειν), my in- terest in the present matter2 was first stimulated by the pre-philosophical amazement I always felt in seeing that in the now enormous human rights discourse (both in politics and academia) so much care is dedicated to the single individuals, and so wide-ranging designs of a cos- mopolis to come are based on their rights. Yet <u><strong><mark>nobody seems to</mark> take <mark>note</strong> that the life of all present and futur</mark>e individuals <mark>could be annihilated</u></mark> by a nuclear war or up- set by catastrophic developments of climate change. <u>It is like insisting on first debating the rights of a ship’s</u> third- class <u>passengers</u> 3 <u>instead of taking action in the light of the fact that <mark>the ship is already taking in seawater from a leak</u></mark> (climate change is already happening) and also risks to hit a mine that is floating around and would send it along with all passengers and crew straight to the ocean depths (by thinking and acting timely, leaks can be filled, mines detected and swept away, all ac- tions that would put the care for third-class passengers¶ on a firmer ground). <u>These dangers are philosophically significant because they tell something about human beings</u>, the only ones who have become able to destroy their own race, as well as about modernity: the possibil- ity of self-destruction sets an end to this era, opens a new one, which can only vaguely be termed post-modern,4 and requires an updated rewriting of the Dialectics of the Enlightenment. It is also politically significant as it challenges present politics to restructure itself by ex- tending its attention to the far future, something which is not possible within the boundaries of modern politics because of its narrow time structure.5 In a more precise language, I term <u><mark>challenges</mark> like nuclear weapons</u> (con- sidered in themselves, while nuclear proliferation is but a subphenomenon) <u>and climate change</u> global (in a very specific sense) because they are lethal and planet-wide, <u><mark>can hit</u></mark> approximately <u><mark>everybody</mark> on earth and</u> can be reasonably addressed only by the near totality of coun- tries and peoples. They would not wipe out biologically humankind, although this cannot be excluded in case of an all-out nuclear war; but <u>they would destroy human civilization</u>:6 not a set of values, but the set of material and cultural tools (agriculture, communications, trans- portation and trade) that allow unspecialized animals like the humans to survive and to thrive.¶ It is clear that my thesis presupposes a revised scale of relevance among the issues requiring and stimulat- ing theoretical investigations: in my philosophical view global threats have a greater relevance and are intellec- tually more challenging than the issues suggested by the media’s headlines (present wars, terrorism, group and minority rights in the US, multiculturalism in Canada or Australia, immigrants in Europe, or, more recently, the crisis of the global economic system). As a reflection upon the deeper longue dure ́e determinants of human- ity’s fate, political philosophy should not necessarily espouse the agenda suggested by current politics and journalism and, instead, seek its own independent as- sessment of the state of the world as part of its business; this is a critical attitude that cannot be implemented without a philosophical view on history (not to be con- fused with a revival of the “grand narratives”). Besides, <u>the shifting of</u> most of Critical <u><mark>Theory</mark> to pure normativity <mark>has favored</u></mark> the emergence not just of worldviews based on the predominance of Sollen, but also of <u>an exclusive attention on <mark>intersubjectivity</u></mark> and its troubles; <u>as if challenges to politics and civilization caused by systemic imperatives</u> (<u>such as the nuclear threat and</u>¶ <u>climate change)</u> <u>were beyond the grasp of critical inquiry</u>. What I am attempting in this article is to address an issue such as human rights that is typical of <u><mark>the self- centered</mark> normative <mark>approach</u></mark> mentioned and to show how it <u><mark>should be restructured to address</mark> the challenges for humankind’s <mark>survival</u></mark>.¶ In this attempt I am driven by the intent to debunk the layer of denial (or repression in pshychoanalyti- cal sense) that, more intensely after the end of the Cold War, has removed the nuclear threat from the philosoph- ical reflection on modernity and has later prevented cli- mate change from entering the main agenda of Critical Theory. There is also an epistemological aspect in this: a critical Zeitdiagnose, or an informed assessment of where history has taken us to in our post-modern times is not possible without first taking what hard science has to say about the threats for humankind very seriously.7 With rare exceptions, <u><mark>critical theorists seem </mark>to be <mark>reluctant to address</mark> the <mark>philosophical issues raised by global challenges</mark>, not to mention their</u> <u>complete denial</u> beginning with Horkheimer and Adorno in the Fifties and Sixties (when Mutual Assured Destruction became a real possibility) <u>of the meaning of nuclear weapons. It is as if Critical Theory</u>, despite its claim to be a gen- eral assessment of our civilization, <u>had accepted a tacit division of labor in which its competence is restricted to social justice</u> (in continuation of its original being rooted in the Marxian critique of political economy) <u>and the “damaged”</u>8 <u>subjectivity</u>. The rest of the real world is left to a purely Hobbesian (and later Luhmannian) reading, or to the perception of side-figures such as Karl Jaspers or Gu ̈nther Anders.¶ A last epistemological remark: <u><mark>starting from </mark>problems and <mark>threats </mark>that</u>, however socially generated, <u>come up as physical events <mark>and are accounted for by </mark>hard <mark>science has the advantage that philosophy can work on them without </mark>first <mark>engaging in a complicate and </mark>doubt- ful <mark>theorizing about how the world should be reshaped</u> </mark>according to a general normative theory. This ad hoc theorizing shows the ability or inability of a philosoph- ical view to come to terms with problems that are of paramount importance to everybody, not just to the prac- titioners of Schulphilosophie.¶ 2. I have explained elsewhere9why survival rather than justice is the leading category of a philosophy of global threats. <u>The</u> now thriving <u><mark>lit</mark>erature on justice and climate change <mark>misses the point</u></mark> that before we look for ways to establish justice between generations, <u><mark>we have to motivate our interest in</u></mark> their <u><strong><mark>existence</u></strong></mark> and wellbeing, or rather in the existence and wellbeing of humankind.10 While survival of humankind is what best defines our problematic situation, when it comes to the normative aspect I believe that <u><mark>we should assume responsibility for future gen</mark>eration<mark>s</u></mark> rather than do justice to them; talking responsibility I move from its most elementary¶ manifestation, the responsibility parents take on for their children. Justice as fairness comes in when we have to fight back “generational nepotism:” it is wrong for any generation to spoil the environment without regard to the consequences in the future, far that it may be, that is not just out of respect for those that may harm our children and children’s children. Out of elementary fairness, as expressed in the Golden Rule, we cannot deny parents of the, say, twenty-fifth century the chance to bear and educate their children in decent conditions.¶ Now, survival is a Hobbesian category, as such it sounds like an anathema to critical thinking, just as most categories stemming from the tradition of politi- cal realism do. Since under global threats present and future humankind is really endangered in its survival, it is however hard to see the rationale of denying the fact because the name comes from the enemy’s vocabu- lary. More importantly, there is an essential difference: Hobbes’ survival regards the individual and is there- fore self-centered and adversarial (in common parlance, mors tua vita mea), while humankind’s survival as a moral and political goal is by its own definition an uni- versalistic feature. More on this later.¶ A much talked-about issue in this context is the so- called identity problem, which I am however inclined to dismiss. If it means the doubtfulness of any engagement in favor of future generations because we do not know if they will exist (we could decide to stop procreating), the problem is surrounded by an air of futility: there is no imaginable decision process that could effectively lead to a total procreation stop. On the other hand, if only a few humans were alive in the far future, this would be enough of a reason for our engagement. Of course future humanity could never be born because meanwhile the planet may have been burnt out by an asteroid (natural precariousness of human life) or an all-out nuclear war (man-made precariousness). Neither type of precarious- ness can however be a reason not to endorse the interest of future generations in survival, because reducing that precariousness is exactly the engagement’s telos. The other aspect of the identity problem — the non-identity of posterity’s values and preferences with our own, or their indeterminacy — is not relevant to our case, be- cause the goal for whose attainment we are called to save or sacrifice something for their survival has to do with their sheer survival (in an indispensably civilized framework, as explained above) rather than with our own and the posterity’s moral configuration; in other words, there is no paternalistic attitude in it.¶ In a fairly different meaning, closer to social rather than moral (analytical) theory, identity comes up in an- other sense. Assuming responsibility for (or, for that matter, being fair to) future generations is not just an altruistic attitude. Not in the sense that we can do as well do so by acting on egoistic grounds: were this the¶ main reason to take action, we were justified to limit our effort to the less costly adaptation policies instead of funding the restructuring of the economy necessary for mitigation, the only way-out from global warming for generations of the far future. To be true, addressing the limitation of global warming or the neutralization of nuclear weapons requires wide-ranging undertakings that can be justified only on grounds of a moral attitude towards future generations rather than of our enlight- ened self-interest. But <u><mark>doing what we can for the survival</mark> of humankind <mark>can give </mark>ourselves <mark>reassurance that</mark> our individual <mark>life</u></mark> (also seen in the context of our gen- eration’s) <u><mark>is meaningful</u></mark> beyond the limits of our own existence on earth, <u>because doing so helps us shed our isolation as single individuals or single generation and become partners in a wider transgenerational covenant of solidarity</u>.¶ 3. That the interest to live and to raise children in de- cent conditions we attribute to future generations ought to be translated into a right is not self-evident. It is not simply that we should abstain from transforming every reasonable claim into a right, and instead reserve this category for the essentials that make the associated life of individuals in the polity possible and acceptable ac- cording to each evolutionary stage.11 More importantly, doubts may also arise as to whether it is wise to translate any goal of social and political struggles into a right, that is to “juridify” it instead of focusing on the underlying conflict dynamics and the participation of the conflict- ing parties. In general I share this preoccupation, and have misgivings at any inflationary expansion of the hu- man rights catalogue. On the other hand, moral rights that do not translate into legal rights12 are politically pointless or at least much less significant than the rights enshrined in a legal order. Also, our case is different, and the issues we are confronted with are more radi- cal than the worries with ‘juridification;’ this is all the truer, since the establishment of a right to survival for humankind would require a long and fierce political and intellectual battle in the first place.¶ First of all, does the right of humanity to survival qualify as a (basic or human) right? Before we proceed, let us note that humankind’s survival is not a good like civil liberties, which is completely at the disposal of human beings; instead, it can depend on the orbits of asteroids and other NEOs.13 The “right of humankind to survival” should therefore be read as a short for “the right of humankind, including future people, to have all previous generations doing their best to ensure their sur- vival and protect them from man-made threats.” In this version, we are clearly afar from the confusion between rights and goals criticized by Dworkin14 (§3.1 in the chapter on Difficult cases), the causation of the good at stake (survival) being elusive, or not completely nor (in the case of climate change) undoubtedly human; also¶ the content of the right is not a physical state, but rather the behavior influencing it. In a manifest way, this also identifies the right’s indispensable correlate, that is the duty of the relevant actors (individuals and institutions) to refrain from behaviors that are likely to cause harm to that good.¶ Whether or not this claim can translate into a right should be investigated from two points of view, those of its structure (a) and its bearer (b).¶ a. As for structure, three of Feinberg’s15 four crite- ria for being a right are already met (to have a content, a holder and an addressee). The fourth, the ‘source of validation,’ gradually emerges from the argument I am unfolding. Frydman and Haarscher also list four condi- tions, of which three are already present (titulaire, objet, opposabilite ́) – even if more remains to be said about the first one; while the fourth condition (sanction) shall be discussed below in the framework of the constitu- tionalization problem.16 Finally, let us look at the stan- dard distinction of negative and positive rights, which Shue rightly believes to be substantially untenable. This is also true in our case, because the ‘behavior’ of in- dividuals and institutions, which humanity is entitled to expect, according to the new right, can be imple- mented either by abstaining in single cases from using or possessing nuclear weapons and emitting excessive GHGs or by establishing new institutions (a global En- vironmental Protection Agency, say) and strategies (for example, technology transfer from advanced to develop- ing countries to help the latter rein in global warming). What would be acknowledged would be the right, not the policies that according to time and circumstances are devised for its realization.¶ Does this new right share with the other fundamental or human rights the need to be founded in a conception of the human, such as those focused by Donnelly on dignity, by Meyers on moral agency and by Frydman and Haarscher on autonomy?17 Not properly, or not di- rectly. Humanity’s right to survival is a meta-right rather than being the first right and sharing the same founda- tion with the others.18 Therefore, its foundation is for- mal rather than rooted in a substantive view of what is human: <u>acknowledging this right is the pre-condition for making all other rights possible</u>. It is their Bedingung der Mo ̈glichkeit, to put it as Kant might have done. Not only in the trivial but sturdy physical sense that <u>human rights can only apply to a living humankind, but not to a ”republic of insects and grass”</u> (Jonathan Schell on the state of the earth after a large nuclear war19). <u>The meta-right as a pre-condition has</u> rather <u>to be un- derstood in the moral sense: <mark>no</mark> foundation of <mark>morality</u> </mark>or legality (except in a totally positivistic view of the latter) <u><mark>makes sense if it cannot rely on the respect of the fundamental right</mark>s of those</u> (poor populations al- ready affected by global warming, future generations¶ as victims of nuclear war or extreme climate change) <u>harmed by our acts and omissions</u>. Here I mean moral- ity at large, regardless of its being based on a conception of the right or the good. In other words, the two <u>global challenges, which have received so little attention in the mainstream philosophy of the last decades, have indeed philosophical implications capable of undermining the</u> business-as-<u>usual attitude in moral and political theory</u>; I mean the attitude to think of the foundations of moral- ity and polity as if the man-made (modern) world in which they operate had not been substantially altered by humankind’s newly achieved capability to destroy itself and/or the planet.¶ Let us make a further step on the road that leads to uncouple, as far as it goes, the foundation of a new right of paramount importance from a substantive conception of the human – an effort aimed at protecting it from the uncertain or frail fate of such conceptions. On the one hand, as a meta-right to individual-only human rights, the right to survival does not imply a choice among substantive values; this right does not refer to a partic- ular conception of what is good for future generations, as it only wants to ensure for them existential condi- tions that are an indispensable basis for their members to pursue whatever idea of the good, of liberty and self- realization they may choose. On the other hand, survival is indeed referred not to the mere biological fact, but to the survival of humankind in decent, civilized condi- tions, taking civilization in the meaning explained in §1. Alone, as I explained above, this qualification is not an added axiological component (civilization as a sys- tem of values), as it rather relies on the analytical view that some technical and cultural features of civilization are essential to the life of the human species.¶ There is a last aspect to be examined with regard to the structure or nature of this right: its emergence not from a shift in the doctrine of human rights, but as a response to a new situation in world history, in which survival goods (a livable atmosphere in the first place) that were so far tacitly taken for granted turn out to be no longer guaranteed, but more and more endangered. As such, this new right reconnects to what we know about individual human rights, that is that they come up as a response to “perceived threats” and build an “evolving whole”.20¶ b. Let us now come to the question of the right’s bearer. It is humankind, defined as the generality of the living individuals along with those who will be born. There are three possible objections to this proposition.¶ First, it seems to be self-evident that the notion of a human right for the so defined humankind cannot be subject to the classical liberal objection that bearers of such rights are individuals, not groups.21 Humankind is not an exclusive and self-contained group opposed to others (at least until we do not have our first contact with¶ dwellers of other regions of the universe), nor is it meant here to represent particular sets of values. Between the two meanings of “humanity” — as species (Artbegriff) and as regulative notion of a community cemented by shared values and goals (Zielbegriff)22 — I am referring to the first one; it is now becoming philosophically sig- nificant because not even its biological existence can be taken for granted under man-made threats. Humankind is not a hypostasis detached from the individuals, as in the case of ‘the community’ or ‘das Volk,’ as it rather means the totality of the living individuals of any given generation including (a) their potential to generate fur- ther human beings and generations and (b) their knowl- edge that the latter will exist and probably suffer. This reflexive notion of humankind raises a problem, but remains open to different ethical choices: indifference towards future generations, responsibility for them, and obligations assumed in their favor.¶ 4. A second question is: why should we speak of humankind instead of limiting ourselves to the more sober expression “all present and future individuals?” There is first a lexicological advantage, in as much as we thus use one word instead of connecting two by an “and.” This better conveys the sense that the bond of solidarity based on the responsibility for the elementary living conditions of posterity makes present and future individuals one community – in this sole, thin sense in- deed, which does not try to conceal the deep fractures existing between contemporaries within the present and the successive generations of this community. The very inclusion of future people into humankind is not an act of inclusive kindness towards them, but is rather made compelling by the lethal threats that past and present people have projected into the life of posterity, in an amount unprecedented in history. Lastly, introducing humankind as a bearer of rights highlights that the right of the individuals to be alive and free can be enjoyed only in the middle of a larger community, which makes the claim of human rights possible and helps to im- plement them. In times of economic globalization and global threats, we have come to know that this com- munity is the whole humankind, not just nations. All this however does not alter the truth that who is entitled to vindicate the right to survival is not humanity as a hypostasis, but every individual either living or not yet born – very much like what happens with individual human rights, whose constitutional formulation makes them enjoyable for every citizen who will in the future be born under the same Constitution.¶ Third comes the standard objection: it does not make sense to endorse obligation towards future people, since, if men and women agree to stop reproduction, those people might never be born. I have already dismissed this as a futile mental experiment. It could further be argued, though, that future generations might turn out¶ to have moral standards totally different from ours. Yet, the possibility that posterity will be not amenable to our moral world is not huge enough to release us from any responsibility towards them. We can still under- stand, and to an extent share, the moral problems raised by the Bible or the Greek classical tragedy of millen- nia ago and should not easily assume that our fellow humans of the year 3000, dwellers of a planet spoiled by global warming, will be morally so hugely different from us.¶ Finally, let me anticipate here one of the legal con- siderations that will be developed later on. Any right- establishing text (but I am now referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR 1948) works with the basic formula “everyone has the right to etc.”23 The validity of the claims is limited only by the spatial ex- tension of the law: a right established by the French Constitution may be thought to be valid universally, but is legally protected only on French territory, while the rights mentioned in the UDHR apply by definition to the entire world where humans live. This can be dubbed spa- tial universalism, while establishing a right of present and future humanity to survive is tantamount to adding a time universalism. In other words, this makes explicit that the right of everyone to a just international order (UDHR 1948, Art. 28; more below) also holds for the ‘everyones’ of the year 3000. This may have always been tacitly intended by the law, the only time limit ly- ing in the possibility that the law is at some point in the future dismissed by another law canceling or expand- ing those rights. In a present like ours, in which it has become known that the future is no longer guaranteed to be essentially homogeneous (with no radical change in the physical and anthropological life conditions) to the present and the past, it has become necessary to openly establish a linkage between our obligations and the rights of future generations, as far as existential issues are concerned; a link that will likewise apply to them as soon as they become the present generation.¶ So far, I have clarified the moral and, to a lesser extent, legal reasons for introducing the notion of hu- mankind as right bearer. I will now stress that the hu- mankind discourse in this article remains political rather than moral.¶ It is not necessary here to rerun the history of the humankind/humanity notion; it is enough to remember that its denial has been a stronghold in the battle of value nihilists (Nietzsche) and realist thinkers (Oswald Spen- gler, who dismissed it as a “zoological notion,” and more extensively Carl Schmitt in Schmitt 1976, particularly §6). As self-contained units (such as the Westphalian system states) were deemed to be the only sustainable and legitimate polities, any reference to humanity was seen as toothless or manipulative, as a noble universalis- tic alibi for particularistic interests.24 Setting aside this¶ sort of criticism, which mistakes the ideological use of the term for its very substance, we know that humanity, as a good-will aspiration of philosophers, poets and re- ligious men, could not be regarded as a political notion because only non-voluntaristic communities can be re- garded as political. They alone allow for binding and effective decisions, whereas any partner can at any time and according to its convenience withdraw from mem- bership in “humanity” or other large associations based on just good will.¶ This can now be expected to change, because <u><mark>planetary</mark> lethal <mark>threats</mark> such as nuclear war or disastrous climate change <mark>have the potential strength to forge all </mark>relevant political <mark>actors into one community</u></mark>, not unlike Hobbes’ individuals, <u>who received the push <mark>to unite from the threats</mark> to their life and limbs</u>: first <u><mark>because they are all</mark> put <mark>in danger</mark>, and</u> second <u>because they have to act jointly</u> if they really want to fight back those dangers. <u>This is a possibility, not an</u> actual and <u>inevitable process</u>, as there are enough counter-forces that impede those ‘Hobbesian’ threats to fully make hu- mankind one political community: fear, the protecting passion, does no longer work as smoothly as in Hobbes’ model of Leviathan.25 Nor is the potential contained in global challenges supposed to generate a world state as its only outcome: practicing survival policies, who- ever the actors may be, is more important than a uni- fied state-like structure in charge of doing so. Nonethe- less <u>all this is enough to use ‘humankind’ in a political sense</u>, as something that is a potential constituency rather than a fragmented multiplicity of individuals and states.¶ 5. Why a fundamental rather than a human right? The distinction between human and fundamental is not univocally worked out in the literature.26 In the vocab- ulary I am using here, human rights are seen as a philo- sophical concept and a moral (deontological) precept, while fundamental rights are those positively acknowl- edged in a legal order, entrusted to political and institu- tional processes for their implementation, and claimable in courts – this last feature being more problematic. Putting on humankind’s survival the label of a funda- mental right avoids leaving it in a philosophical limbo as a regulative idea,27 and gives it a better defined political and legal nature; this is more adequate to the character- istic of survival as something endangered by political decisions (or the lack thereof) and requesting a political solution by a given deadline (the next few years if we want to try to keep the temperature increase expected by 2100 under two degrees).¶ If humankind’s survival is acknowledged as a funda- mental right, it follows that it should be constitutional- ized, that is inserted in new and old (and aptly modified) Constitutions as well as in a new version of the Univer- sal Declaration of Human Rights; as such, it could be referred to as highest guidance in international treaties aimed at implementing it – rather than being enshrined in a specific ‘survival’ treaty. In constitutional law, a development in this sense is already taking place, in as much as either the rights of future generations to a safe environment or our responsibility towards them in this regard or the imperative to preserve the environ- ment (without mention of the future generations, but implicitly to their benefit) have been affirmed in consti- tutional amendments of the last two decades in countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland, but also Burkina Faso and Burundi. Having rights or being protected by the legally defined responsibility of the previous gener- ations is however not the same thing, and with regard to humankind’s survival I would point at its stronger formulation as a right: it is more binding, while the ob- jections against endowing future generations with rights can be easily argued against. Just because it is conceived in favor of those who cannot yet uphold their interest, this right should be protected against cancellation by a sort of Ewigkeitsklausel as in Art. 79.3 of the German Grundgesetz.28 A right to survival is more specific and more stringent than the right to a safe environment be- cause it derives from lethal and global challenges that affect the very core of the polity, protection, rather than from a generic care for a balanced relationship to na- ture or from a diffuse feeling of benevolence for the posterity.¶ In national or regional Constitutions, the acknowl- edgment of this right could be accompanied by the establishment of corresponding institutions, promoting the implementation of the new right; it could be for example an ombudsman29 for future generation as a (countermajoritarian)30 authority protecting their inter- ests against damages resulting from new legislation, and endowed with the power to send it back to the legislative rather than to veto it straight away.31 Not to be underes- timated are the difficulties that would arise in striking a very delicate balance on two levels: in general between the interests of present and future generations,32 but also between parliaments or executives, which act under the pressure of their constituencies, and the members of the ombudsman authority, who remain nonetheless contem- poraries of the former rather than being appointed by the latter – for all too natural reasons.¶ The same difficulty would affect the national courts in which the new fundamental right, as jus cogens principle, should be made claimable at the initiative of institutions such as the ombudsman or of advocacy groups representing a significative number of citizens in a referendum-like counting procedure. In international courts,33 the interest of future generations should be represented by an ombudsman to be established at the UN as well as at regional associations of states such as the EU or Mercosur. A point however that remains¶ open to further discussion has been raised in the de- bate on socio-economic or solidarity rights, which may have some affinity with the right to survival: theoreti- cally, Frank Michelman has made clear that the status of a norm as constitutional law ought not to be con- flated with the question of its availability for judicial enforcement.34 In practice, conflicts are easily possi- ble between the courts sentencing on the states’ failure to implement those rights and “the vain or overbearing nature of these sentences” on a matter that is political rather than judicial. 35 This is true in our case as well: the attainment of a new international order without national possession of nuclear arms or a carbon-free reordering of the world economy are goals for policy-making, not something that can be attained in courts. In this frame- work, however, courts are not jobless: sentencing the nuclear-armed states for their failure in implementing art.VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 or the US of the Bush years for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and failing to cut emissions is a typical judicial matter, as the two cases would regard the break of treaty obligations or the failure to cease doing some- thing harmful, not to bring about something good.37¶ Finally, two more fundamental objections could be raised against the idea of a legal protection of the inter- est of future generations. It could be argued that what would be represented (in a time-universalistic mode) is not the interest of future generations, but rather the interest of a particular fraction of the present ones, dis- guising itself as standard bearer of those people to come. On the one hand this should be taken into account as critical point of view in the public debate on those inter- ests. On the other hand, this criticism, strictly speaking, would also delegitimize such an ancient principle of Roman and Western law as the protection of the child. In morality it would affirm a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of slipping into another person’s clothes and acting from a non-egoistic stance. This can be obviously upheld, but at the price of the disappear- ance of morality as well as of the polity, which is – in any case and among other things – a solidaristic association.¶ A second problem, which is more difficult to deal with, is that we do not know as a general piece of knowl- edge what the interest of future generations is; whereas in the case of legal protection of the child we share a generally accepted knowledge of his or her future in- terest (to remain healthy, to get sufficient education, to be free to make the best of him/herself). What the real life conditions and the presumable vital interests of fu- ture generations will be can only be tentatively argued from what the several branches of natural and economic (e.g. demography) science are able to tell us about what is likely to remain constant in physical and cultural anthropology and what is likely to be most endangered.¶ As such, it is important that moral and political theory renew their relationship to the natural sciences after a time of reciprocal disdain between the two. While sci- ence cannot by itself draw an encompassing picture of future life under global threats, philosophy should learn from science what those future problems are likely to be and elaborate on them, instead of reflecting on the future of humanity by just moving from the doctrines of past philosophers or relying on the hearsay about it based on media reports or the philosopher’s personal divinations.¶ 6. My philosophical proposal to fill a hole in human rights discourse and legislation by introducing a first or meta-fundamental right of humankind to survival and positivizing it in national, international and world law38 resonates with two legal developments. The first related to ‘humanity’, the second to ‘human rights.’ The latter resonates with the novelties in constitutional law men- tioned in §5.¶ The first one began in 1970 as the UN General As- sembly adopted Resolution 2749, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, con- taining the notion of a “common heritage of mankind”; it was originally introduced to protect the seabed and ocean floor and later the “moon and other celestial bod- ies” from exploitation by powerful countries against the interest of the developing ones.39 In the 1990s, the competing and “thinner” concept of “common concern of mankind” emerged, as in the Convention on Bio- diversity of 1992; nonetheless it can be said that hu- mankind has become a notion contained in binding in- ternational law and referred to indivisible (climate) and divisible (seabed, ocean floor, moon) objects, and that this has happened as an answer to problems and chances generated by huge technological advancement.¶ In another corner of legal development, it could be argued that the logical structure, so to speak the norma- tive algorithm of the UDHR norms — the aforemen- tioned ‘everyone has the right . . . ’ — implies that hu- mankind, not just single individuals, is to be the bearer of those rights, even if the collective singular is not used. Turning to a more substantive level, we could go as far as to say that the legal protection of humankind’s survival was implicitly enshrined as early as 1948 in the UDHR and later in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the In- ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 1966. Art. 28 UDHR (“ev- eryone has the right to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla- ration can be fully realized”) could be rethought in the direction of institutions bound to implement for every- one, now and in the future, the right to life (Art.3 UDHR, Art. 6 ICCPR), the right to an adequate standard of liv- ing incl. adequate food (Art.11 ICESRC)40 as well as¶ the right of the family to be protected (Art.10 ICESRC), a right that would be denied to families of the posterity bound to live under insufferable environmental condi- tions (cf. above the notion of a transgenerational chain of parents). While the different binding strength of the several <u><mark>legal formulations</u></mark> (treaty, covenant, convention, declaration) <u><mark>cannot be ignored</u></mark>, it remains clear that le- gal documents do not advance by themselves the cause of humankind’s survival, except if they can be effec- tively referred to in a court of justice; but <u>they create an appropriate and stable environment for what can really bring about a change, that is educational and political struggles,</u> the former aiming at a change in the political culture.¶ To sum up, (<u>hu)mankind has thus ceased to be just a concept used by philosophers</u> and theologians, whose presence in international law was merely philo- sophical, if not rhetorical, as in the Preamble to the UN Charter of 1945. Though not explicitly endowed with rights in the documents quoted above, the humankind of the “common heritage” doctrine is an important prece- dent in the direction, suggested by this article, of in- troducing this new legal actor. When looking at the implementation of the rights that can be attributed to it, the other legal novelty of the “common but dif- ferentiated responsibility”41 of individual actors, such as countries, should also be brought to bear. This is important when it comes to distributing the burden of the duties corresponding to those rights – which is in- deed one of the major issues in the debate following the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change of 2009. In any case, the legal acknowledgment of a “common responsibility” for the global commons is a further step in designing humankind as a juridical notion.¶ This article is policy-oriented in the peculiar sense of a constitutional policy that will require decades, if ever, to become the subject of debate and even longer to be legally implemented. Impulses in this direction are cer- tainly not be expected from the world of politics, but rather from the scientific community (provided a now utopian sounding collaboration of physics, philosophy and legal theory materializes) or from scattered sen- tences of national and international courts, particularly in environmental matter.42 <u><mark>Support from civil society would help</u></mark>.¶ Finally, the author’s suggestion as to how to read this proposal: it has a clearly cosmopolitan (or better: cosmopolitical) character, not however in the sense of cosmopolitanism as a general doctrine of government/ governance. It is rather generated by tools coming from realist thought: new threats as source of new rights, and lethal and planetary threats to the survival of hu- mankind’s civilization as drivers towards a new level of legal protection.</p> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Death Bad | 42,538 | 633 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
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3,783,976 | A – Interpretation: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>A – Interpretation:</h4> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,561,047 | 1 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
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3,783,977 | Hawks will make great power conflict inevitable | Marston 2017 | Hunter Marston is a political analyst in Washington, DC 2017, Foreign Policy, 1-23-2017, Trump has nothing to offer Asia except threats," chicagotribune, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-asia-analysis-c787a67c-e1a0-11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63-20170123-story.html, Accessed: 2-12-2017, /Kent Denver-MB | the "peace through strength" vision offered by Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, two of Trump's Asia advisers, on Foreign Policy The Asia hawks on Team Trump seem to think that a show of force is necessary to persuade Beijing to relent in its quest for regional domination. , rather than stabilizing the region such a strategy will increase the likelihood of a great power conflict between the United States and China. China is likely to believe the United States is trying to contain its rise a Trump strategy of peace through strength will only empower Chinese hard-liners and increase the chances of a superpower conflict | The Asia hawks on Team Trump seem to think that a show of force is necessary rather than stabilizing the region, such a strategy will increase the likelihood of a great power conflict between the United States and China a Trump strategy will empower Chinese hard-liners and increase the chances of a superpower conflict | Or consider the "peace through strength" vision offered by Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, two of Trump's Asia advisers, on Foreign Policy. They say the president will strengthen U.S. military might in the Pacific by expanding its presence of navy ships. The Asia hawks on Team Trump seem to think that a show of force is necessary to persuade Beijing to relent in its quest for regional domination. However, rather than stabilizing the region, such a strategy will increase the likelihood of a great power conflict between the United States and China. China is likely to believe the United States is trying to contain its rise, a position already popular among the leadership in Beijing. Bereft of trade incentives and heavy on military posturing, a Trump strategy of peace through strength will only empower Chinese hard-liners and increase the chances of a superpower conflict. | 882 | <h4>Hawks will make great power conflict inevitable</h4><p>Hunter <strong>Marston</strong> is a political analyst in Washington, DC <strong>2017</strong>, Foreign Policy, 1-23-2017, Trump has nothing to offer Asia except threats," chicagotribune, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-asia-analysis-c787a67c-e1a0-11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63-20170123-story.html, Accessed: 2-12-2017, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>Or consider <u>the "peace through strength" vision offered by Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, two of Trump's Asia advisers, on Foreign Policy</u>. They say the president will strengthen U.S. military might in the Pacific by expanding its presence of navy ships. <u><mark>The Asia hawks on Team</mark> <mark>Trump seem to think that a show of force is necessary</mark> to persuade Beijing to relent in its quest for regional domination.</u> However<u>, <mark>rather than stabilizing the region</u>, <u>such a strategy will increase the likelihood of a <strong>great power conflict between the United States and China</mark>. </strong>China is likely to believe the United States is trying to contain its rise</u>, a position already popular among the leadership in Beijing. Bereft of trade incentives and heavy on military posturing, <u><mark>a Trump</mark> <mark>strategy</mark> of peace through strength <mark>will</mark> only <mark>empower Chinese hard-liners and increase the</mark> <mark>chances of a superpower</mark> <mark>conflict</u></mark>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,561,017 | 9 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
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3,783,978 | 3. Fuels competition over the SLOC’s | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>3. Fuels competition over the SLOC’s </h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,048 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
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- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,979 | Fifth, trying to stop suffering is good – it affirms life and allows people the choice of how they want to find meaning in life | Smolkin 89 | Smolkin 89
(Mitchell Smolkin. Understanding Pain, 1989 p75-79) | Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and find meaning in living. Despite these needs, [humanity] is surrounded by destructiveness, and the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. [Humanity] hears “nights and days filled with the eternal cry of pain.” how does one avoid “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy? Camus criticizes “Nietzsche in his theory of super-humanity, [who] replace The Beyond by the Later On.” He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder Revolution consists in loving[those] who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] who do Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] need to exert all effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers Killing for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to work for justice and a decrease in suffering. one should take the victim’s side and “share with fellow citizens the onlycertitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.” What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,” in that suffering will always conquer He realizes that after [humanity] has mastered everything in creation children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. [One] who dedicates [oneself] to the dignity of [hu]mankind, reaps from it the harvest that sows its seedand sustains the world again and again. Those whose Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.” “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] The rebel must share in the struggles and destiny of all Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague that “never disappears | Once suffering denounced, [people need to exert all effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers , one should take the victim’s side and “share with fellow citizens the onlycertitude they have in common love, exile, suffering One] who dedicates [oneself to the dignity of [hu]mankind Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the freedom to search for meaning Future utopias must be renounced, history can no longer be presented as an object of worship The rebel must share in the struggles and destiny of all | For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and to find meaning in living. They desire to feel at home in the universe. Despite these natural needs, [humanity] man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He is surrounded by irrational destructiveness, and by the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits. Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He [Humanity] hears his “nights and days filled always, everywhere with the eternal cry of human pain.”56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and how does one avoid merely “beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. Camus criticizes “Nietzsche, at least in his theory of super-humanity, and Marx before him, with his classless society, [who] both replace The Beyond by the Later On.”62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder in the name of vague future goals. “Revolution consists in loving[those] a man who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those] men who doexist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering.Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people] man needs to exert all his effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers in the world. Killing existing men for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with the sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by stoical acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to renounce murder completely and work for justice and for a decrease in suffering. Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, one should take the victim’s side and “share with his fellow citizens the onlycertitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”68 What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus’ goals are modest. He realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”69 in that death, finitude and suffering will always conquer him. He realizes that after [humanity] man has mastered everything in creation that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. He [One] who dedicates [oneself] himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, to the dignity of [hu]mankind, dedicates himself the earth and reaps from it the harvest that sows its seedand sustains the world again and again. Those whosedesires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to pursue his own search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”74 “It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people] men. The rebel must “reject divinity in order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men.”75 Redemption is impossible. Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague bacillus that “never dies or disappears for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76 | 7,314 | <h4>Fifth, <strong>trying to stop suffering is good – it affirms life and allows people the choice of how they want to find meaning in life</h4><p>Smolkin 89</p><p></strong>(Mitchell Smolkin. Understanding Pain, 1989 p75-79)</p><p>For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. <u>Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and</u> to <u>find meaning in living.</u> They desire to feel at home in the universe. <u>Despite these</u> natural <u>needs, [humanity]</u> man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He <u>is surrounded by</u> irrational <u>destructiveness, and</u> by <u>the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void capriciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits.</u> Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He <u>[Humanity] hears</u> his <u>“nights and days filled</u> always, everywhere <u>with the eternal cry of</u> human <u>pain.”</u>56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and <u>how does one avoid</u> merely <u>“beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?</u>With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. <u>Camus criticizes “Nietzsche</u>, at least <u>in his theory of super-humanity,</u> and Marx before him, with his classless society, <u>[who]</u> both <u>replace The Beyond by the Later On.”</u>62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 <u>He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder</u> in the name of vague future goals. “<u>Revolution consists in loving[those]</u> a man <u>who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those]</u> men <u>who do</u>exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering.<u><mark>Once</mark> injustice and <mark>suffering</mark> are <mark>denounced, [people</mark>]</u> man <u><mark>need</u></mark>s <u><mark>to exert all</u></mark> his <u><mark>effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers</u></mark> in the world. <u>Killing</u> existing men <u>for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with</u> the <u>sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by</u> stoical <u>acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to</u> renounce murder completely and <u>work for justice and</u> for <u>a decrease in suffering.</u> Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague<mark>, <u>one should take the victim’s side and “share with</u></mark> his <u><mark>fellow citizens the onlycertitude they have in common</mark>—<mark>love, exile, suffering</mark>.”</u>68 <u>What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus</u>’ goals are modest. He <u>realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”</u>69 <u>in that</u> death, finitude and <u>suffering will always conquer</u> him. <u>He realizes that after [humanity]</u> man <u>has mastered everything in creation</u> that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, <u>children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.</u>Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° <u>However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel. </u>He <u>[<mark>One] who dedicates [oneself</mark>]</u> himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, <u><mark>to the dignity of [hu]mankind</mark>,</u> dedicates himself the earth and <u>reaps from it the harvest that sows its seedand sustains the world again and again. Those whose</u>desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. <u><mark>Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the</mark> leisure and <mark>freedom to</u></mark> pursue his own <u><mark>search for meaning</mark>. <mark>Future utopias must be renounced,</mark> and “<mark>history can no longer be presented as an object of worship</mark>.”</u>74 <u>“It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people]</u> men. <u><mark>The rebel must</u></mark> “reject divinity in order to <u><mark>share in the struggles and destiny of all</u></mark> men.”75 Redemption is impossible. <u>Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague</u> bacillus <u>that “never</u> dies or <u>disappears</u> for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76</p> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Death Bad | 96,588 | 10 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,980 | (___) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>(___) A. Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 9 minutes of the 1ac</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,049 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,981 | War is inevitable – Taiwan and the SCS will escalate and draw in the United States | Liu 1/18 | Liu 1/18 (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | means Xi—to stay popular at home simply cannot afford to appear weak next to Trump unpredictable tit-for-tat reactions will result if Trump trespasses on core Chinese interests. The chance of an irreversible Sino-U.S. blow-up over Taiwan diminished briefly in early January when Trump and his transition team kept their distance as Tsai travelled to Central America, with a “transit stopover” in Houston. But Beijing objected to the Taiwanese leader’s meeting with prominent Republicans such as Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, and Chinese media editorials warned Trump that China would exact “revenge” if he reneged on longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan Already, Chinese hardliners are calling for PLA fighter jets to buzz Taipei to compel Tsai to support a “one China” principle. If she does not, military conflicts could occur between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan by 2020. It is quite possible that the mainland will take the island in one stroke A risk of miscalculation exists on the high seas, where diplomats and military personnel from both China and the United States are vying for influence, testing each other and at times colliding in testosterone contests Especially while Trump and Xi are still strangers, each with hawks back home lobbying in favor of more aggressive action, close encounters between aircraft or marine vessels could risk “the two giants sleepwalking into a war,” This wouldn’t be the first time Beijing tested the resolve of a newly minted U.S. president ten weeks after George W. Bush was inaugurated, a Chinese navy vessel nearly rammed the U.S. oceanographic vessel USNS Bowditch in the Yellow Sea. Beijing tested Obama a couple months after his inauguration, too What’s different today, as Trump prepares to take office, is that Beijing’s technological expertise, its military capabilities and the expectations of its people have all grown steadily over the years . And their nationalistic voices, demanding muscular action in the face of minor incursions or diplomatic gaffes, might prod Xi to respond more assertively than his consensus-minded predecessors would have | Xi—to stay popular cannot afford to appear weak tit-for-tat reactions will result The chance of an irreversible blow-up over Taiwan and Chinese media warned Trump China would exact “revenge Chinese hardliners are calling to compel Tsai to support a “one China military conflicts could occur between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan by 2020. risk of miscalculation exists on the high seas while Trump and Xi are still strangers, each with hawks back home lobbying in favor of more aggressive action, c could risk sleepwalking into a war What’s different today is Beijing’s technological expertise And nationalistic voices, demanding muscular action might prod Xi to respond more assertively | It also means Xi—to stay popular at home—simply cannot afford to appear weak next to Trump. On the trade front, Beijing is ready in case the new administration follows through on Trump’s threats. While Capitol Hill will not likely accept 45 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, even without congressional approval Trump has discretion to levy up to 15 percent tariffs for months, enough time for Beijing to feel the pinch and respond in kind. Chinese officials would likely restrict U.S. agricultural imports, and turn to Airbus instead of Boeing when shopping for new aircraft. (The economies of China and America are so intertwined that both sides will suffer; in September, China became the world’s first trillion-dollar aviation market, with plans to buy 6,810 aircraft over the next 20 years, and Boeing expects to provide a lot of them.) American firms operating in China could also experience deeper regulatory scrutiny, more inspections and other bureaucratic hassles that are legal but irritating nonetheless. More unpredictable tit-for-tat reactions will result if Trump trespasses on core Chinese interests. The chance of an irreversible Sino-U.S. blow-up over Taiwan diminished briefly in early January when Trump and his transition team kept their distance as Tsai travelled to Central America, with a “transit stopover” in Houston. But Beijing objected to the Taiwanese leader’s meeting with prominent Republicans such as Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, and Chinese media editorials warned Trump that China would exact “revenge” if he reneged on longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Already, Chinese hardliners are calling for PLA fighter jets to buzz Taipei to compel Tsai to support a “one China” principle. If she does not, Wang Hongguang, former deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, told a conference in early December that “military conflicts could occur between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan by 2020. It is quite possible that the mainland will take the island in one stroke.” Meanwhile, mainland China has already embarked on a diplomatic offensive to try to woo away from Taiwan some smaller countries – mostly in Central America and Africa – that still have diplomatic ties with Taipei instead of Beijing. Taiwan and the mainland had observed an eight-year “diplomatic truce” in this contest. But now Xi has decided the gloves are off. The latest to defect by de-recognizing Taipei is the flyspeck African nation of Sao Tome and Principe (population 200,000), which established diplomatic ties with Beijing on Dec. 26. Nicaragua and the Vatican could be next, if Beijing’s campaign succeeds. A risk of miscalculation exists on the high seas, where diplomats and military personnel from both China and the United States are vying for influence, testing each other and at times colliding in testosterone contests. Especially while Trump and Xi are still strangers, each with hawks back home lobbying in favor of more aggressive action, close encounters between aircraft or marine vessels could risk “the two giants sleepwalking into a war,” as Zhou Bo of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences put it in an op-ed in the state-run China Daily. This wouldn’t be the first time Beijing tested the resolve of a newly minted U.S. president. In 2001, ten weeks after George W. Bush was inaugurated, a Chinese navy vessel nearly rammed the U.S. oceanographic vessel USNS Bowditch in the Yellow Sea. One week later, a Chinese jet fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane not far from China’s southern Hainan Island. China’s aircraft crashed, killing the pilot. The EP-3 was forced to land on Hainan. Eleven days of negotiations later, China released the 24-member American crew. The plane was eventually returned, in pieces. Beijing tested Obama a couple months after his inauguration, too. In March 2009, the American USNS Impeccable was towing a low-frequency sonar system to monitor submarine activity in the South China Sea, where several countries have conflicting claims – China among them. Near Hainan, the U.S. ship was shadowed by five PLA vessels; Chinese sailors waved national flags and ordered the Americans to leave. A maritime melee erupted. The U.S. side opened up with water cannon. Chinese sailors stripped down to their underwear. Ships from both sides veered within 25 yards of each other. Finally, Impeccable signaled its intent to depart. But Chinese vessels didn’t allow it to leave until the crew aboard one of them tried to use a grappling hook to snag the American ship’s towed sonar array. What’s different today, as Trump prepares to take office, is that Beijing’s technological expertise, its military capabilities and the expectations of its people have all grown steadily over the years. A decade ago, Chinese had no idea who was spying on whom hundreds of miles out to sea. Today, even some Chinese teenagers can rattle off the names of American spy planes that are closely observing the PLA navy’s sole aircraft carrier Liaoning on its maneuvers, or a Chinese diesel submarine’s port call in Borneo. Ordinary Chinese know the United States is using naval drones to gathering data on everything from water salinity to the activities of Beijing’s nuclear submarine fleet. Many aren’t pleased. And their nationalistic voices, demanding muscular action in the face of minor incursions or diplomatic gaffes, might prod Xi to respond more assertively than his consensus-minded predecessors would have. | 5,491 | <h4>War is inevitable – Taiwan and the SCS will escalate and draw in the United States</h4><p><strong>Liu 1/18</strong> (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>It also <u>means <mark>Xi—to stay popular</mark> at home</u>—<u>simply <strong><mark>cannot afford to appear weak</strong></mark> next to Trump</u>. On the trade front, Beijing is ready in case the new administration follows through on Trump’s threats. While Capitol Hill will not likely accept 45 percent tariffs on Chinese imports, even without congressional approval Trump has discretion to levy up to 15 percent tariffs for months, enough time for Beijing to feel the pinch and respond in kind. Chinese officials would likely restrict U.S. agricultural imports, and turn to Airbus instead of Boeing when shopping for new aircraft. (The economies of China and America are so intertwined that both sides will suffer; in September, China became the world’s first trillion-dollar aviation market, with plans to buy 6,810 aircraft over the next 20 years, and Boeing expects to provide a lot of them.) American firms operating in China could also experience deeper regulatory scrutiny, more inspections and other bureaucratic hassles that are legal but irritating nonetheless. More <u>unpredictable <mark>tit-for-tat reactions</mark> <mark>will result</mark> if Trump trespasses on core Chinese interests.</u> <u><mark>The chance of an irreversible</mark> Sino-U.S. <mark>blow-up over Taiwan </mark>diminished briefly in early January when Trump and his transition team kept their distance as Tsai travelled to Central America, with a “transit stopover” in Houston. But Beijing objected to the Taiwanese leader’s meeting with prominent Republicans such as Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, <mark>and Chinese</mark> <mark>media</mark> editorials <strong><mark>warned Trump</mark> that <mark>China</mark> <mark>would exact “revenge</mark>” if he reneged on longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan</u></strong>. <u>Already, <mark>Chinese hardliners are calling</mark> for PLA fighter jets to buzz Taipei <mark>to compel Tsai to support a “one China</mark>” principle. If she does not, </u>Wang Hongguang, former deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, told a conference in early December that “<u><strong><mark>military conflicts could occur between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan by 2020.</u></strong></mark> <u>It is quite possible that the mainland will take the island in one stroke</u>.” Meanwhile, mainland China has already embarked on a diplomatic offensive to try to woo away from Taiwan some smaller countries – mostly in Central America and Africa – that still have diplomatic ties with Taipei instead of Beijing. Taiwan and the mainland had observed an eight-year “diplomatic truce” in this contest. But now Xi has decided the gloves are off. The latest to defect by de-recognizing Taipei is the flyspeck African nation of Sao Tome and Principe (population 200,000), which established diplomatic ties with Beijing on Dec. 26. Nicaragua and the Vatican could be next, if Beijing’s campaign succeeds. <u>A <mark>risk of miscalculation exists on the high seas</mark>, where diplomats and military personnel from both China and the United States are vying for influence, testing each other and at times colliding in testosterone contests</u>. <u><strong>Especially <mark>while Trump and Xi are still strangers, each with hawks back home lobbying in favor of more aggressive action,</u></strong> <u>c</mark>lose encounters between aircraft or marine vessels <mark>could risk</mark> “the two giants <strong><mark>sleepwalking into a war</mark>,”</u></strong> as Zhou Bo of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences put it in an op-ed in the state-run China Daily. <u>This wouldn’t be the first time Beijing tested the resolve of a newly minted U.S. president</u>. In 2001, <u>ten weeks after George W. Bush was inaugurated, a Chinese navy vessel nearly rammed the U.S. oceanographic vessel USNS Bowditch in the Yellow Sea. </u>One week later, a Chinese jet fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane not far from China’s southern Hainan Island. China’s aircraft crashed, killing the pilot. The EP-3 was forced to land on Hainan. Eleven days of negotiations later, China released the 24-member American crew. The plane was eventually returned, in pieces. <u>Beijing tested Obama a couple months after his inauguration, too</u>. In March 2009, the American USNS Impeccable was towing a low-frequency sonar system to monitor submarine activity in the South China Sea, where several countries have conflicting claims – China among them. Near Hainan, the U.S. ship was shadowed by five PLA vessels; Chinese sailors waved national flags and ordered the Americans to leave. A maritime melee erupted. The U.S. side opened up with water cannon. Chinese sailors stripped down to their underwear. Ships from both sides veered within 25 yards of each other. Finally, Impeccable signaled its intent to depart. But Chinese vessels didn’t allow it to leave until the crew aboard one of them tried to use a grappling hook to snag the American ship’s towed sonar array. <u><mark>What’s different today</mark>, as Trump prepares to take office, <mark>is</mark> that <mark>Beijing’s</mark> <mark>technological expertise</mark>, its military capabilities and the expectations of its people have all grown steadily over the years</u>. A decade ago, Chinese had no idea who was spying on whom hundreds of miles out to sea. Today, even some Chinese teenagers can rattle off the names of American spy planes that are closely observing the PLA navy’s sole aircraft carrier Liaoning on its maneuvers, or a Chinese diesel submarine’s port call in Borneo. Ordinary Chinese know the United States is using naval drones to gathering data on everything from water salinity to the activities of Beijing’s nuclear submarine fleet. Many aren’t pleased<u><strong>. <mark>And</mark> their <mark>nationalistic voices, demanding muscular action</mark> in the face of minor incursions or diplomatic gaffes, <mark>might prod Xi to respond more assertively</mark> than his consensus-minded predecessors would have</u></strong>.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 1,561,050 | 4 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,982 | The purpose of the debate is to answer the question: should the United States federal government increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China? | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The purpose of the debate is to answer the question: should the United States federal government increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China?</h4> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,561,051 | 1 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,983 | Strategic ambiguity creates a commitment trap which causes miscalculation and draw-in | Colby and Slocombe 5/23 | Colby and Slocombe 5/23 (Elbridge Colby and Walter Slocombe, Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001, 5-23-2016, "U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837 /Kent Denver-NK) | the U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity It’s time for that to change. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant. Beijing meanwhile appeared content to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification. Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before he situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy to attack Taiwan to one in which it may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may even deem it necessary to keep alive its ambition of uniting the island with the mainland China may decide that Taiwan is very unlikely to simply fall into its lap—and will be increasingly tempted to turn to coercion This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers, Thus Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense. Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan It might well assess U.S. ambiguity as indicating that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, the U.S. would decide not to go to war or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals This perilous situation will only grow worse as China gets stronger. F | the U.S. maintains strategic ambiguity Beijing appeared to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding to attack Taiwan may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may deem it necessary to keep alive ambition of uniting China may decide that Taiwan is unlikely to fall into its lap will be tempted to turn to coercion Sung invaded So Ko believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense. Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan It might assess ambiguity as indicating the U.S would not to go to war This situation will only grow worse as China gets stronger | If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense? It is hard to know because the U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” concerning how it would respond. It’s time for that to change. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island. This is a much less firm commitment than the U.S. offers in NATO and to allies Japan and South Korea. But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant. The benefits of this approach long outweighed its risks. It preserved flexibility, was less offensive to Beijing and signaled to Taipei the need to tread gingerly on sovereignty issues. Beijing meanwhile appeared content to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification. Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. The U.S. was so dominant militarily that Beijing’s only plausible course was to tolerate the status quo. But this calculus no longer obtains. The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before. This means that the situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy to attack Taiwan to one in which it may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may even deem it necessary to keep alive its ambition of uniting the island with the mainland. Polls show that Taiwan’s residents overwhelmingly prefer the status quo or independence, and fewer identify as Chinese as time goes on. Given that there are already substantial economic links with the mainland, why should Beijing expect support for unification to grow suddenly, particularly in light of China’s turn away from liberalization under Xi Jinping and the discouraging example of Hong Kong? Thus, sooner or later, China may decide that Taiwan is very unlikely to simply fall into its lap—and will be increasingly tempted to turn to coercion. This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced. History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers, based on the belief that their strength or resolve over some issue was greater than that of their foes, and that their opponents wouldn’t fight at all or hard enough. Thus Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense. Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan. It might well assess U.S. ambiguity as indicating that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, the U.S. would decide not to go to war or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals. This perilous situation will only grow worse as China gets stronger. For the sake of deterrence and stability, it is essential that Beijing understand that using force would mean a stout U.S. intervention. | 3,411 | <h4>Strategic ambiguity creates a <u>commitment trap</u> which causes miscalculation and draw-in</h4><p><strong>Colby and Slocombe 5/23</strong> (Elbridge Colby and Walter Slocombe, Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001, 5-23-2016, "U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837 /Kent Denver-NK)</p><p>If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense? It is hard to know because <u><mark>the U.S. maintains</mark> a policy of “<strong><mark>strategic ambiguity</u></strong></mark>” concerning how it would respond. <u>It’s time for that to change. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island</u>. This is a much less firm commitment than the U.S. offers in NATO and to allies Japan and South Korea. <u>But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant. </u>The benefits of this approach long outweighed its risks. It preserved flexibility, was less offensive to Beijing and signaled to Taipei the need to tread gingerly on sovereignty issues. <u><mark>Beijing</mark> meanwhile <mark>appeared</mark> content <mark>to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification</mark>. Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. </u>The U.S. was so dominant militarily that Beijing’s only plausible course was to tolerate the status quo. But this calculus no longer obtains. <u><mark>The military balance is <strong>shifting in Beijing’s favor</strong></mark>. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any <strong><mark>U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding</strong></mark>. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before</u>. This means that t<u>he situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy <mark>to attack Taiwan</mark> to one in which it <mark>may seem <strong>an increasingly viable option</strong>. Beijing may</mark> even <mark>deem it necessary to keep alive</mark> its <mark>ambition of uniting</mark> the island with the mainland</u>. Polls show that Taiwan’s residents overwhelmingly prefer the status quo or independence, and fewer identify as Chinese as time goes on. Given that there are already substantial economic links with the mainland, why should Beijing expect support for unification to grow suddenly, particularly in light of China’s turn away from liberalization under Xi Jinping and the discouraging example of Hong Kong? Thus, sooner or later, <u><mark>China may decide that Taiwan is</mark> very <mark>unlikely to</mark> simply <mark>fall into its lap</mark>—and <mark>will be</mark> increasingly <strong><mark>tempted to turn to coercion</u></strong></mark>. <u>This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced</u>. <u>History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers,</u> based on the belief that their strength or resolve over some issue was greater than that of their foes, and that their opponents wouldn’t fight at all or hard enough. <u>Thus Kim Il <mark>Sung invaded So</mark>uth <mark>Ko</mark>rea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, <mark>believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense. <strong>Beijing could make a similar miscalculation</strong></mark> <mark>about U.S. resolve over Taiwan</u></mark>. <u><mark>It might</mark> well <mark>assess</mark> U.S. <mark>ambiguity as indicating</mark> that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, <mark>the U.S</mark>. <mark>would</mark> decide <mark>not to go to war</mark> or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals</u>. <u><mark>This</mark> perilous <mark>situation will only grow</mark> <mark>worse as China gets stronger</mark>. F</u>or the sake of deterrence and stability, it is essential that Beijing understand that using force would mean a stout U.S. intervention.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 66,256 | 96 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,984 | All of these fuel war and elimination of US security commitment decreases pressure—That’s Glaser | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>All of these fuel war and elimination of US security commitment decreases pressure—That’s Glaser</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,052 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,985 | Scenario planning is good. In a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future. | Kurasawa, 2004 | Kurasawa, 2004 | ]
room for maneuver and the chances of success no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides procrastination exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway Preventive foresight is grounded in the logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent farsighted cosmopolitanism is not idealistic “[g]lobal justice seems to be increasing, as evidenced by greater sensitivity to future dangers Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now. | no generation is immune from catastrophe crises are becoming globalized the impact environmental degradation epidemics inequalities wars and genocides procrastination exponentially raises the costs of future action Preventive foresight is grounded in the logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today enhances sensitivity to future dangers | [Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention
and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]
Independently of this room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.
undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come. | 3,012 | <h4>Scenario planning is good. I<strong>n a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.</h4><p>Kurasawa, 2004</p><p></strong>[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention </p><p>and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4<u>]</p><p></u>Independently of this <u>room for maneuver and the chances of success</u>. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that <u><mark>no</mark> <mark>generation</mark>, and no part of the world, <mark>is immune from catastrophe</u></mark>. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, <u>all but the smallest and most isolated of <mark>crises are</mark> rapidly <mark>becoming globalized</u></mark> due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. <u>Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to <mark>the</mark> <mark>impact</mark> of <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>degradation</mark>, the spread of <mark>epidemics</mark>, gross North-South socioeconomic <mark>inequalities</mark>, refugee flows, civil <mark>wars</mark>, <mark>and</mark> <mark>genocides</u></mark>. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, <u><mark>procrastination</u></mark> makes little sense for three principal reasons: it <u><mark>exponentially</mark> <mark>raises the costs of </mark>eventual <mark>future action</mark>; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness.</u> With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how <u>it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway</u>. <u><mark>Preventive</mark> <mark>foresight</mark> <mark>is</mark> <mark>grounded</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>the</u></mark> opposite <u><mark>logic, whereby</u> <u>the</mark> <mark>decision to work through perils</mark> <mark>today</u></mark> <u>greatly <mark>enhances</mark> both the subsequent </u>Moreover, I would contend that <u>farsighted cosmopolitanism</u> <u>is not</u> as remote or <u>idealistic</u> a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, <u>“[g]lobal justice</u> between temporal communities, however, actually <u>seems to be increasing, as</u> <u>evidenced</u> <u>by</u> various expressions of <u>greater <mark>sensitivity</mark> <mark>to</u></mark> past injustices and <u><mark>future dangers</u></mark>.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. <u>Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.</p><p></u><strong>undoubtedly necessary, it suggests one potential direction for the years to come.</p></strong> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Scenario Planning Good | 635,040 | 29 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,986 | (___) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>(___) B. It is predictable, the resolution demands USFG action</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,053 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,987 | B – Definitions | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>B – Definitions</h4> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,561,054 | 1 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,988 | The impact outweighs: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The impact outweighs:</h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,561,055 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,989 | Nationalists make war likely | Liu 1/18 | Liu 1/18 (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | the weeks since the election have given Chinese leaders reason to rethink that optimism Trump has infuriated Beijing by suggesting Washington’s longstanding acknowledgement of a “one China principle” might be up for negotation in trade talks He named Peter Navarro, one of America’s most vocal China hawks, to join his White House team. His secretary of state nominee, Rex Tillerson, vowed to deny China access to islands in the South China Sea—a move some in Beijing would see as an act of war The president-elect also has blamed Chinese leaders for doing “nothing” to stop their bellicose neighbor, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, And, of course, he shared a phone call with the leader of Taiwan, breaking with 37 years of diplomatic protocol China needs to face up to the reality “that the Trump team maintains a hard-line attitude.” Says Paul Haenle It’s increasingly apparent to China that the Trump administration’s vision for the Asia-Pacific will likely mean more strategic pressure, not less.” It all comes at the worst possible time for Chinese President Xi Jinping The last thing he wants is to be distracted by a White House that intends to challenge nearly every aspect of the Sino-U.S. relationship or to appear weak in its face , leading Chinese hawks are spewing nationalistic rhetoric, putting pressure on Xi and raising the odds of a dangerous clash with an unpredictable American president China barely understands Dai Xu warned: “If the U.S. chooses military confrontations against China in this region, the U.S. side will lose the battle for sure.” China is a dragon. America is an eagle. Britain is a lion. When the dragon wakes up, the others are all snacks.” | the weeks since the election have given Chinese leaders reason to rethink optimism Trump named Navarro one of America’s most vocal China hawks to join his White House team Tillerson vowed to deny China the South China Sea And, he shared a phone call wit Taiwan the Trump team maintains a hard-line attitude Trump will likely mean more pressure, not less.” It comes at the worst possible time for Chinese Xi Chinese hawks are spewing nationalistic rhetoric raising the odds of a dangerous clash Dai Xu warned , the U.S. side will lose the battle for sure | But the weeks since the election have given Chinese leaders reason to rethink that optimism. Trump has infuriated Beijing by suggesting Washington’s longstanding acknowledgement of a “one China principle” might be up for negotation in trade talks. He tweeted that China had “stolen” a U.S. underwater drone, which Beijing’s navy had seized, then returned after a few days. He named Peter Navarro, one of America’s most vocal China hawks, to join his White House team. His secretary of state nominee, Rex Tillerson, vowed to deny China access to islands in the South China Sea—a move some in Beijing would see as an act of war. The president-elect also has blamed Chinese leaders for doing “nothing” to stop their bellicose neighbor, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, from developing nukes—an accusation that will not wear well in Beijing. And, of course, he shared a phone call with the leader of Taiwan, breaking with 37 years of diplomatic protocol. Beijing, in short, appears to have completely misread Trump’s intentions—and many there know it now. “China needs to face up to the reality,” concluded a recent editorial in the Global Times, a hawkish state-backed tabloid, “that the Trump team maintains a hard-line attitude.” Says Paul Haenle, founding director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing, who served in the White House for five years under Bush and Obama: “It’s increasingly apparent to China that the Trump administration’s vision for the Asia-Pacific will likely mean more strategic pressure, not less.” It all comes at the worst possible time for Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is looking ahead to a politically tricky Party Congress in late 2017, when key policies will be debated and a large number of top decision-making posts will turn over. The last thing he wants is to be distracted by a White House that intends to challenge nearly every aspect of the Sino-U.S. relationship—or to appear weak in its face. Already, leading Chinese hawks are spewing nationalistic rhetoric, putting pressure on Xi and raising the odds of a dangerous clash with an unpredictable American president China barely understands. In December, at a Beijing seminar organized by the Global Times, Dai Xu—a People’s Liberation Army senior colonel and commentator known for his hawkish views— warned: “If the U.S. chooses military confrontations against China in this region, the U.S. side will lose the battle for sure.” Added professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University, “China is a dragon. America is an eagle. Britain is a lion. When the dragon wakes up, the others are all snacks.” | 2,584 | <h4>Nationalists make war likely</h4><p><strong>Liu 1/18<u></strong> (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p></u>But <u><strong><mark>the weeks since the election</mark> <mark>have given Chinese leaders</mark> <mark>reason to rethink</mark> that <mark>optimism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Trump</mark> has infuriated Beijing by suggesting Washington’s longstanding acknowledgement of a “one China principle” might be up for negotation in trade talks</u>. He tweeted that China had “stolen” a U.S. underwater drone, which Beijing’s navy had seized, then returned after a few days. <u>He <mark>named</mark> Peter <mark>Navarro</mark>, <mark>one of America’s most vocal China hawks</mark>, <mark>to join his White House team</mark>. His secretary of state nominee, Rex <mark>Tillerson</mark>, <mark>vowed to deny China</mark> access to islands in <mark>the South China Sea</mark>—a move some in Beijing would see as an act of war</u>. <u>The president-elect also has blamed Chinese leaders for doing “nothing” to stop their bellicose neighbor, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un,</u> from developing nukes—an accusation that will not wear well in Beijing. <u><mark>And,</mark> of course, <mark>he shared a phone call wit</mark>h the leader of <mark>Taiwan</mark>, breaking with 37 years of diplomatic protocol</u>. Beijing, in short, appears to have completely misread Trump’s intentions—and many there know it now. “<u>China needs to face up to the reality</u>,” concluded a recent editorial in the Global Times, a hawkish state-backed tabloid, <u><strong>“that <mark>the Trump team</mark> <mark>maintains a hard-line attitude</mark>.” </strong>Says Paul Haenle</u>, founding director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center in Beijing, who served in the White House for five years under Bush and Obama: “<u>It’s increasingly apparent to China that the <mark>Trump </mark>administration’s vision for the Asia-Pacific <mark>will likely mean more</mark> strategic <mark>pressure, not less.”</mark> <mark>It</mark> all <mark>comes at the <strong>worst possible time</strong></mark> <mark>for Chinese</mark> President <mark>Xi</mark> Jinping</u>, who is looking ahead to a politically tricky Party Congress in late 2017, when key policies will be debated and a large number of top decision-making posts will turn over. <u>The last thing he wants is to be distracted by a White House that intends to challenge nearly every aspect of the Sino-U.S. relationship</u>—<u>or to appear weak in its face</u>. Already<u>, leading <mark>Chinese</mark> <mark>hawks</mark> <mark>are <strong>spewing nationalistic</mark> <mark>rhetoric</strong></mark>, putting pressure on Xi and <mark>raising the odds of a dangerous clash</mark> with an unpredictable American president China barely understands</u>. In December, at a Beijing seminar organized by the Global Times, <u><mark>Dai Xu</u></mark>—a People’s Liberation Army senior colonel and commentator known for his hawkish views— <u><mark>warned</mark>: “If the U.S. chooses military confrontations against China in this region<mark>, the U.S. side <strong>will lose the battle for sure</strong></mark>.”</u> Added professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University, “<u>China is a dragon. America is an eagle. Britain is a lion. When the dragon wakes up, the others are all snacks.”</p></u> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 1,561,057 | 6 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,990 | Finally, a grand bargain is key—forcing China to make concessions decreases military aggression, communicates information about intentions and calms and assures allies because it demonstrates US resolve—also Glaser | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>Finally, a grand bargain is key—forcing China to make concessions decreases military aggression, communicates information about intentions and calms and assures allies because it demonstrates US resolve—also Glaser</h4></u></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,056 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,991 | Scenario planning about nuclear warfare is critical to IR pedagogy and improves international relations theory | Mahnken and Junio 13 | Mahnken and Junio 13 – (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395, September 2013) | scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future,as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited force; the importance of private information audience costs the relationship between military expediency and political objectives and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, such stories improve the study of IR | future scenarios contribute to theory building and development analyzing research topics articulating world views,” setting new agendas and teaching Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymaker scenarios assist scholars developing testable hypotheses gathering data and are an effective way to apply theory to policy narratives about the future look like high-consequence, low-probability events the best example is nuclear warfare such stories improve the study of IR | This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future,as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline. | 6,001 | <h4><strong>Scenario planning about nuclear warfare is critical to IR pedagogy and improves international relations theory</h4><p>Mahnken and Junio 13</strong> – (2013, Thomas, PhD, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and Timothy, Predoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, PhD in Political Science expected 2013, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” International Studies Review Volume 15, Issue 3, pages 374–395, September 2013)</p><p>This article introduces political scientists to <u>scenarios—<mark>future</mark> counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that <mark>scenarios</mark> <mark>contribute to theory building and development</mark>, identifying new hypotheses, <mark>analyzing</mark> data-poor <mark>research topics</mark>, <mark>articulating</mark> “<mark>world views,”</mark> <mark>setting new</mark> research <mark>agendas</mark>, avoiding cognitive biases, <mark>and teaching</mark>. </u>The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario analysis, The Art of the Long View, Peter Schwartz commented that “social scientists often have a hard time [building scenarios]; they have been trained to stay away from ‘what if?’ questions and concentrate on ‘what was?’” (Schwartz 1996:31). While Schwartz's comments were impressionistic based on his years of conducting and teaching scenario analysis, his claim withstands empirical scrutiny. <u>Scenarios—counterfactual narratives about the future—are woefully underutilized among political scientists. The method is almost never taught </u>on graduate student syllabi, and a survey of leading international relations (IR) journals indicates that scenarios were used in only 302 of 18,764 sampled articles. The low rate at which political scientists use scenarios—less than 2% of the time—is surprising; the method is popular in fields as disparate as business, demographics, ecology, pharmacology, public health, economics, and epidemiology (Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). <u><strong><mark>Scenarios also are a common tool</strong></mark> <strong><mark>employed by the policymaker</strong></mark>s whom political scientists study. </u>This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for <u>theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future,as critics might suggest, <mark>scenarios assist scholars</mark> with <mark>developing</mark> <mark>testable</mark> <mark>hypotheses</mark>, <mark>gathering data</mark>, <mark>and</mark> identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios <strong><mark>are an effective way to</strong></mark> teach students to <strong><mark>apply theory to policy</strong></mark>.</u> In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline <u>What do counterfactual <mark>narratives</mark> <mark>about the future look like</mark>? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which <strong><mark>high-consequence, low-probability events</strong></mark> may occur. Perhaps <strong><mark>the best example</strong></mark> of this <strong><mark>is nuclear warfare</u></strong></mark>, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. <u>This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many dimensions of political science theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited</u>,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of <u>force; the importance of private information </u>about capabilities and commitment; <u>audience costs </u>in international politics; <u>the relationship between military expediency and political objectives </u>during war; <u>and the role of compressed timelines for decision making,</u> among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how <u><strong><mark>such stories</u></strong></mark>, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may <u><strong><mark>improve the study of IR</u></strong></mark>. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.</p> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Scenario Planning Good | 2,268 | 567 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,992 | (___) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>(___) C. It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,058 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,993 | SCS conflict goes nuclear | Slater 2017 | Slater 2017 (Jerome Slater, Professor Emeritus of political science, SUNY Buffalo, 1-4-2017, A Coming War With China?," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-slater/a-coming-war-with-china_b_13949580.html, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | two recent developments expanding U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea and the growing assertion by China of what it considers to be its national rights in the region there have been an increasing number of alarming incidents between the military forces of the two countries It would seem to be only a matter of time before shots are fired And outright military clashes no matter how limited they initially may seem to be, contain the wholly unacceptable risk of escalating into a major war—and even a nuclear war | recent developments expanding U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea and the growing assertion by China would seem to be only a matter of time before shots are fired military clashes no matter how limited risk of escalating into a major nuclear war. | Not surprisingly, China sees itself as a defensive state and, alarmed by these U.S. actions, has taken a series of steps, including what we see as military “provocations,” but which China—and not only China—considers a response to provocative U.S. actions. Because of these two recent developments—the expanding U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea and the growing assertion by China of what it considers to be its national rights in the region—there have been an increasing number of alarming incidents between the military forces of the two countries. It would seem to be only a matter of time before shots are fired. And outright military clashes, no matter how limited they initially may seem to be, contain the wholly unacceptable risk of escalating into a major war—and even a nuclear war. | 801 | <h4>SCS conflict goes nuclear </h4><p><strong>Slater 2017</strong> (Jerome Slater, Professor Emeritus of political science, SUNY Buffalo, 1-4-2017, A Coming War With China?," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerome-slater/a-coming-war-with-china_b_13949580.html, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>Not surprisingly, China sees itself as a defensive state and, alarmed by these U.S. actions, has taken a series of steps, including what we see as military “provocations,” but which China—and not only China—considers a response to provocative U.S. actions. Because of these <u>two <mark>recent developments</u></mark>—the <u><strong><mark>expanding U.S. naval presence in the South China</mark> <mark>Sea</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and the growing assertion by China</mark> of what it considers to be its national rights in the region</u>—<u>there have been an increasing number of alarming incidents between the military forces of the two countries</u>. <u><strong>It <mark>would seem to be only a matter of time</mark> <mark>before shots are fired</u></strong></mark>. <u>And outright <mark>military clashes</u></mark>, <u><mark>no matter how limited</mark> they initially may seem to be, contain the wholly unacceptable <mark>risk of escalating into a major </mark>war—and even a <mark>nuclear</u> <u>war</u>.</p></mark> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 1,561,018 | 20 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,994 | 1. Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan | American Heritage Dictionary 2000 | American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com) | The will to do something | null | should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it. | 96 | <h4>1. Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan</h4><p><strong>American Heritage Dictionary 2000</strong> (Dictionary.com)</p><p>should. <u>The will to do something</u> or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it. </p> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,185 | 389 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,995 | Probability—Taiwan is comparatively the most probable cause of nuclear escalation – military tensions and US foreign-policy stance make deterrence and traditional checks irrelevant. | Littlefield and Lowther 15 | Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016) | While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U S and China is , some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its A2/AD strategy If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the U S may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks on China will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon as a means of forcing de-escalation In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U S an outside aggressor, not China nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U S China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U S – far more is at stake for China than it is for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck Given that MAD is not part of China’s strategic thinking the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U S China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U S It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate | conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and U.S. would come to blows. China will turn to A2/AD) strategy the U S may attack mainland China Given the regime’s weakness the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon such a strike would not be a violation of no-first-use Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as aggression far more is at stake for China than for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one Taiwan acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests and the lengths to which China will ultimately go to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate or capitulate | Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. | 5,723 | <h4>Probability—Taiwan is comparatively the <u>most probable cause of nuclear escalation</u> – military tensions and US foreign-policy stance make deterrence and traditional checks irrelevant. </h4><p><strong>Littlefield and Lowther 15</strong> — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Possible Scenario <u>While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is </u><strong>possible<u></strong>, some analysts believe that a <mark>conflict over Taiwan remains <strong>the most likely place</strong> where the PRC and</mark> the <mark>U.S. would come to blows. </mark>Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, <mark>China will</mark> certainly <mark>turn to</mark> its</u> anti-access/area-denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u>) <u>strategy</u></mark>, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. <u>If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may</mark> be tempted to resort to stronger measures and <strong><mark>attack mainland China</u></strong></mark>. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. <u><mark>Given the regime’s</mark> relative <mark>weakness </mark>and the probability that American attacks</u> (cyber and conventional) <u>on China will include strikes against PLA command and control</u> (C2) <u>nodes</u>, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, <u><mark>the Chinese may <strong>escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon</u></strong></mark> (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) <u>as a means of forcing de-escalation</u>. <u>In the view of China, <mark>such</mark> <mark>a strike would not be a violation of </mark>its <mark>no-first-use </mark>policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since <mark>Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as</mark> an act of <mark>aggression</mark>. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>an outside aggressor, not China</u>. It is also important to remember that <u>nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>– <strong><mark>far more is at stake for China than</mark> it is <mark>for the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates. In essence, <u><mark>the <strong>only</strong> effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one</u></mark>. Without making too crude a point, <u>the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck</u>, or yuan. <u>Given that</u> mutually assured destruction (<u>MAD</u>) <u>is not part of China’s strategic thinking</u> – in fact it is explicitly rejected – <u>the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as <mark>Taiwan</mark> maintains its de facto independence of China it <mark>acts as <strong>a literal and symbolic barrier</strong> to China’s power projection</mark> beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood</u>. <u>China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. <mark>With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is <strong>greatly diminished</u></strong></mark>. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. <u><mark>Central to China’s ability to <strong>guarantee</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>prosperity</strong> is the return of Taiwan</mark>, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies</u>. Unfortunately, <u>too many <mark>Americans <strong>underestimate the importance of these core interests</mark> to China</strong> <mark>and the lengths to which China will ultimately go</mark> in order <mark>to guarantee them – <strong>even the use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. <u><mark>China</mark> sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it <mark>is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely <strong>instigate, control, and conclude</strong> in the Taiwan Straits</mark>. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits</u> in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, <u>ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis</u>. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, <u>China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan</u>. <u>China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ <mark>nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is <strong>caught off-guard</strong>, <strong>overwhelmed</strong>, and forced to <strong>either escalate</mark> a crisis <mark>or capitulate</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 8,673 | 565 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,996 | China would say yes – 3 reasons: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>China would say yes – 3 reasons:</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 1,561,059 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,997 | Their [method/ontology/epistemology] first arguments are bad scholarship- you have to engage the case | Wight 7 | Wight 7 | Journal of International Relations and Development
he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological. But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological As it has developed in IR, this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones In either debate, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made. We can certainly ask any theorist how they know (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance But their epistemological response is not the same as the claim itself, but rather defends the claim on one or other basis Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be scientists cannot afford to be epistemological dogmatists, pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast. Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists using a wide range of supports and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging knowledge claims I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible. I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can, stop an object from existing | in IR, . , no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made We can ask any theorist how they know But their response is not the same as the claim itself, but defends the claim on one or other basis scientists cannot be epistemological dogmatists, . I reject that we need to commit to any particular epistemological position in advance But this does not mean we are unable to make informed judgements It may be philosophically naıve to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, the easiest way is to look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible the claim can justifiably be supported on various grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate | [Colin, Department of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Exeter, Journal of International Relations and Development, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]
Kratochwil’s attempt to push beyond the epistemological wars by remaining inside the epistemological cave is not as puzzling as it might seem given that he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological. Thus, for example, he argues that he aims to ‘review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed’(Kr atochwil 2007: 2). Likewise, he suggests that issues such as incommensurability, reductionism and materialism vs idealism are arcane epistemological concerns (Kratochwil 2007: 2). But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological? As it has developed in IR, this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones.8 A related debate within philosophy attempts to grasp whether being or ideas ultimately matter. In either debate, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made.9 We can certainly ask any theorist who takes a position of either side of this debate how they know (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance. But their epistemological response to this question is not the same as the claim itself, but rather defends the claim on one or other basis. And we assess these claims on a number of grounds. Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be, then it also follows that scientists cannot afford to be epistemological dogmatists, pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast. Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance over another— empiricism vs rationalism, for example—after all it is their job, but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists (Einstein 1949) using a wide range of epistemological supports and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made. In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as I reject outright that we need to commit ourselves to any particular epistemological position in advance of making or judging particular knowledge claims. I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege. But I can also answer no because this position does not mean that we are unable to make informed judgements on the basis of the evidence for the claim. The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations for one or other epistemological stance does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between. It may be philosophically naıve of me to claim that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive, then the easiest way is to probably go and look. But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible. Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, I could still be wrong but the point is that the claim about the existence of a certain number of cars can justifiably be supported on various epistemological grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate. Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can, in all cases, stop an object from existing. | 4,712 | <h4>Their [method/ontology/epistemology] <strong>first arguments are bad scholarship- you have to engage the case</h4><p>Wight 7</p><p></strong>[Colin, Department of Politics, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of Exeter, <u>Journal of International Relations and Development</u>, “Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off”, p. asp//wyo-tjc]</p><p>Kratochwil’s attempt to push beyond the epistemological wars by remaining inside the epistemological cave is not as puzzling as it might seem given that <u>he assumes all meta-theoretical debate to be epistemological.</u> Thus, for example, he argues that he aims to ‘review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed’(Kr atochwil 2007: 2). Likewise, he suggests that issues such as incommensurability, reductionism and materialism vs idealism are arcane epistemological concerns (Kratochwil 2007: 2). <u>But in what sense, for example, is the materialism vs idealism question epistemological</u>? <u>As it has developed <mark>in IR,</mark> this is a debate about whether social outcomes are best explained in terms of material factors or ideational ones</u>.8 A related debate within philosophy attempts to grasp whether being or ideas ultimately matter<mark>. <u></mark>In either debate<mark>, no epistemological issues are involved until a specific claim is made</mark>.</u>9 <u><mark>We can</mark> certainly <mark>ask any theorist</u></mark> who takes a position of either side of this debate <u><mark>how they know</mark> (the epistemological question) their chosen factor is determinate in the last instance</u>. <u><mark>But their</mark> epistemological <mark>response</u></mark> to this question <u><mark>is not the same as the claim itself, but</mark> rather <mark>defends the claim on one or other basis</u></mark>. And we assess these claims on a number of grounds. <u>Given that we do not know in advance what the epistemological support for any given claim may be</u>, then it also follows that <u><mark>scientists cannot</mark> afford to <mark>be epistemological dogmatists, </mark>pinning their colours to only one epistemological mast<mark>.</u></mark> <u>Philosophers can trouble themselves with convoluted debates about the relative merits of one particular epistemological stance </u>over another— empiricism vs rationalism, for example—after all it is their job, <u>but scientists need to be epistemological opportunists</u> (Einstein 1949) <u>using a wide range of</u> epistemological <u>supports</u> <u>and never knowing in advance which one, or which mix of them, is relevant until a specific claim is made</u>. In some respects, this might seem to place me close to the position that Kratochwil suggests is absurd. For <u>is not my position a form of ‘anything goes’? </u>Well, again agreeing with Kratochwil that we should reject traditional logic and its associated yes or no answers, I will reply both yes and no.10 <u>Yes, it is an ‘anything goes’ position insofar as <mark>I reject </mark>outright <mark>that we need to commit </mark>ourselves <mark>to any particular epistemological position <strong>in advance</strong> </mark>of making or judging</u> particular <u>knowledge claims</u>. <u>I can see no good reason for giving any specific epistemological standpoint a position of a priori privilege</u>. <u><mark>But</mark> I can also answer no because <mark>this</mark> position <strong><mark>does not mean</mark> that <mark>we are unable to make informed judgements</strong></mark> on the basis of the evidence for the claim</u>. <u>The fact that philosophers have been unable to provide secure foundations </u>for one or other epistemological stance <u>does not alter the fact that we continue to use these positions to get along in the world</u>. In this respect, I agree completely with Kratochwil’s claim (2007: 11) that <u>both absolute certainty and absolute doubt are impossible positions to hold, and that we ‘go on’in a situation located somewhere in between</u>. <u><mark>It may be philosophically naıve</mark> of me <mark>to claim</mark> <mark>that if I wish to know how many cars are parked in my drive,</mark> then <mark>the easiest way is to</mark> probably go and <mark>look.</mark> <mark>But I can do this without needing philosophy to prove empiricism infallible</mark>.</u> Equally, in certain circumstances I might be able to ascertain how many cars are in my drive without looking; if, for example, I know that at time T1 that there were three cars and that one went away at time T2, then, if asked at time T3 (assuming these events are sequential), I have a legitimate case to say ‘two’. Of course, in either case, <u>I could still be wrong but the point is that <mark>the claim</u></mark> about the existence of a certain number of cars <u><mark>can justifiably be supported on various</mark> epistemological <mark>grounds and we do not know in advance which will be the most appropriate</u></mark>. <u>Hence the context in which the claim emerges is also an important aspect of its validity</u>. In both cases, there is no doubt that observation or the process of rational deduction is theoretically laden, but <u>to say that our concepts help carve up the world in certain ways is not to accept that they either determine the physicality of what exists or can,</u> in all cases, <u>stop an object from existing</u>.</p> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Epistemology Justified | 176,504 | 37 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,998 | Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Framework Long | 1,561,060 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,783,999 | 2. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum | Army Officer School ‘04 | Army Officer School ‘04 | The colon introduces . A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: That this council petition the mayor | The colon introduces . A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: That this council petition the mayor | (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)
The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor. | 1,317 | <h4>2. “Resolved” before a colon reflects <strong>a legislative forum</h4><p>Army Officer School ‘04</p><p></strong>(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><u><strong><mark>The colon introduces</u></strong></mark> the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g<u><strong><mark>. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved:</u></strong></mark> (colon) <u><strong><mark>That this council petition the mayor</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,131 | 1,242 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,000 | Taiwan goes nuclear – comparatively the most probable cause of nuclear escalation – military tensions and US foreign-policy stance make deterrence and traditional checks irrelevant. | Littlefield and Lowther 15 | Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016) | While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U S and China is , some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U S To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its A2/AD strategy If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the U S may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks on China will include strikes against PLA command and control nodes the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon as a means of forcing de-escalation In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U S an outside aggressor, not China nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U S China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U S – far more is at stake for China than it is for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck Given that MAD is not part of China’s strategic thinking the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U S China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U S It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate | conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and U.S. would come to blows. China will turn to A2/AD) strategy the U S may attack mainland China Given the regime’s weakness the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon such a strike would not be a violation of no-first-use Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as aggression far more is at stake for China than for the U S the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one Taiwan acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished Central to China’s ability to guarantee prosperity is the return of Taiwan Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests and the lengths to which China will ultimately go to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons China is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate or capitulate | Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. | 5,723 | <h4>Taiwan goes nuclear – comparatively the <u>most probable cause of nuclear escalation</u> – military tensions and US foreign-policy stance make deterrence and traditional checks irrelevant. </h4><p><strong>Littlefield and Lowther 15</strong> — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” The Diplomat, August 11th, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/, Accessed 06-25-2016)</p><p>Possible Scenario <u>While there are several scenarios where conflict between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is </u><strong>possible<u></strong>, some analysts believe that a <mark>conflict over Taiwan remains <strong>the most likely place</strong> where the PRC and</mark> the <mark>U.S. would come to blows. </mark>Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, <mark>China will</mark> certainly <mark>turn to</mark> its</u> anti-access/area-denial (<u><mark>A2/AD</u>) <u>strategy</u></mark>, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. <u>If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, <mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>may</mark> be tempted to resort to stronger measures and <strong><mark>attack mainland China</u></strong></mark>. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. <u><mark>Given the regime’s</mark> relative <mark>weakness </mark>and the probability that American attacks</u> (cyber and conventional) <u>on China will include strikes against PLA command and control</u> (C2) <u>nodes</u>, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, <u><mark>the Chinese may <strong>escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon</u></strong></mark> (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) <u>as a means of forcing de-escalation</u>. <u>In the view of China, <mark>such</mark> <mark>a strike would not be a violation of </mark>its <mark>no-first-use </mark>policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. <mark>Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as</mark> an act of <mark>aggression</mark>. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>an outside aggressor, not China</u>. It is also important to remember that <u>nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>– <strong><mark>far more is at stake for China than</mark> it is <mark>for the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates. In essence, <u><mark>the <strong>only</strong> effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one</u></mark>. Without making too crude a point, <u>the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck</u>, or yuan. <u>Given that</u> mutually assured destruction (<u>MAD</u>) <u>is not part of China’s strategic thinking</u> – in fact it is explicitly rejected – <u>the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. <u>It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as <mark>Taiwan</mark> maintains its de facto independence of China it <mark>acts as <strong>a literal and symbolic barrier</strong> to China’s power projection</mark> beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood</u>. <u>China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. <mark>With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is <strong>greatly diminished</u></strong></mark>. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. <u><mark>Central to China’s ability to <strong>guarantee</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>prosperity</strong> is the return of Taiwan</mark>, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies</u>. Unfortunately, <u>too many <mark>Americans <strong>underestimate the importance of these core interests</mark> to China</strong> <mark>and the lengths to which China will ultimately go</mark> in order <mark>to guarantee them – <strong>even the use of nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. <u><mark>China</mark> sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it <mark>is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely <strong>instigate, control, and conclude</strong> in the Taiwan Straits</mark>. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits</u> in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, <u>ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis</u>. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, <u>China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan</u>. <u>China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ <mark>nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is <strong>caught off-guard</strong>, <strong>overwhelmed</strong>, and forced to <strong>either escalate</mark> a crisis <mark>or capitulate</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 8,673 | 565 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,001 | Magnitude—nuclear war with China causes extinction and immediately kills billions | Wittner 11 | Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013) | While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon The gathering tension between the U S and China is clear need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could both the U S and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations But the Kargil War of 1999 between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons The second is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies | A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher Both nations would be smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris would blot out the sun and bring nuclear winter destroying agriculture, creating famine and destruction To avert the disaster actions improve U.S.-China relations are ensuring survival of the world, | While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies. | 5,056 | <h4><u>Magnitude—</u>nuclear war with China causes extinction and immediately kills billions</h4><p><strong>Wittner 11</strong> — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)</p><p><u>While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that <strong>they will be used</u></strong>. After all, <u>for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing <strong>their deadliest weapons</strong>. The current deterioration of <strong>U.S. relations with China</strong> might end up providing us with <strong>yet another example</strong> of this phenomenon</u>. <u>The gathering tension between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is <strong>clear</u></strong> enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But <u>need this lead to nuclear war? </u>Not necessarily. And yet, <u>there are signs that <strong>it could</u></strong>. After all, <u>both the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China possess <strong>large numbers</strong> of nuclear weapons</u>. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. <u>Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations</u>; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. <u>But the <strong>Kargil War</strong> of 1999</u>, <u>between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan</u>, <u>should convince us that such wars <strong>can</strong> occur</u>. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? <u><mark>A nuclear attack by China would <strong>immediately slaughter</strong> at least 10 million Americans</mark> in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. <mark>The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be <strong>far higher</strong></mark>. <mark>Both nations would be</mark> reduced to <strong><mark>smoldering, radioactive wastelands</u></strong></mark>. Also, <u><mark>radioactive debris</mark> sent aloft by the nuclear explosions <mark>would <strong>blot out the sun</strong> and</mark> <mark>bring</mark> on a “<strong><mark>nuclear winter</strong></mark>” around the globe—<strong><mark>destroying agriculture</strong>, <strong>creating</mark> worldwide <mark>famine</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> <strong>generating chaos and <mark>destruction</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. <u><mark>To avert the</mark> enormous <mark>disaster</mark> of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are</u> two <u><strong>obvious <mark>actions</strong></mark> that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons</u>, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. <u>The second</u>, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, <u>is to <strong><mark>improve U.S.-China relations</strong></mark>. If the American and Chinese people <mark>are</mark> interested in <strong><mark>ensuring </mark>their <mark>survival</mark> and that <mark>of the world</strong>,</mark> they should be working to <strong>encourage these policies</u></strong>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 9,638 | 1,488 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,002 | Empirical validity is sufficient justification for action | Owen 2 nnium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7 | David Owen 2, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7 | ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” signals this philosophical turn such a turn is not without its dangers it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter were merely a simple function of the former. the explanatory and interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. It may be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. since there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on action, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’ this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. the preceding combine to encourage the formation of a Highlander view’ an image of warring theoretical approaches the prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. | this philosophical turn’ has a tendency to prioritise ontology and epistemology over explanatory power rational choice theory may provide the best account available because prioritisation promotes theory-construction it cultivates a theory-driven approach to IR this slips into the pursuit of generality over empirical validity prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right This image feeds back into IR exacerbating dangers, and a vicious circle arises | Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises. | 4,827 | <h4>Empirical validity is sufficient justification for action</h4><p>David <strong>Owen 2</strong>, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Mille<u><strong>nnium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7</p><p></u></strong>Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that <u>‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology”</u> often <u>signals <mark>this philosophical turn</u>’</mark>, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, <u>such a </u>philosophical<u> turn is not without its dangers </u>and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that <u>it <mark>has a</mark>n inbuilt <mark>tendency to<strong> prioritise </strong></mark>issues of <mark>ontology and epistemology over explanatory</mark> and/or interpretive <mark>power</mark> as if the latter</u> two <u>were merely a <strong>simple function</strong> of the former. </u>But while <u>the explanatory and</u>/or <u>interpretive power of a theoretical account is not </u>wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, <u>wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments.</u> Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded.<u> It may</u>, of course, <u>be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful </u>in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, i<u>f this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this <strong>does not undermine</strong> the point that, for a certain class of problems, <mark>rational choice theory may <strong>provide the best account available</mark> to us.</u></strong> In other words, <u>while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the <strong>most important </strong>kind</u>. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that <u><mark>because prioritisation</mark> of ontology and epistemology <mark>promotes theory-construction</u></mark> from philosophical first principles,<u><strong> <mark>it cultivates a theory-driven</mark> rather than problem-driven <mark>approach to IR</mark>.</u></strong> Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this:<u> since</u> it is the case that <u>there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions </u>of a given action, event or phenomenon,<u> the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous <strong>grip on</u></strong> the <u><strong>action,</u></strong> event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, <u>‘theory-driven work is part of a <strong>reductionist program’</strong> in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the <strong>preferred model </strong>or theory’.5 The justification</u> offered for this strategy <u>rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. </u>However, as Shapiro points out,<u><strong> this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science</strong> since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, <strong>not to be prejudged </strong>before conducting that inquiry’</u>.6 Moreover, <u><mark>this</mark> strategy easily <mark>slips</mark> <mark>into</mark> the promotion of <mark>the pursuit of <strong>generality over</strong> </mark>that of <strong><mark>empirical validity</mark>.</u></strong> The third danger is that <u>the preceding</u> two <u>combine to encourage the formation of a</u> particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the <u>Highlander view’</u>—namely, <u>an image of warring theoretical approaches</u> with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because <u>the</u> turn to, and <u><strong><mark>prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right</u></strong></mark>, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. <u><mark>This image feeds back into IR exacerbating</mark> the first and second <mark>dangers, and</mark> so <mark>a</mark> potentially <strong><mark>vicious circle arises</mark>.</p></u></strong> | null | 2AC | 2AC – Owen | 1,128 | 393 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
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2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,003 | A. Government can claim a big policy win | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>A. Government can claim a big policy win</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 1,561,061 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
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3,784,004 | Evaluate consequences for your decision—any other framing opens up the possibility for worse forms of violence | Isaac 2002 | Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring 2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2 | unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, but It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil : it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important , to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic ways. Moral absolutism it undermines political effectiveness | unyielding moral goodness undercuts political responsibility purity does not ensure the achievement of what one intends in a world of real violence and injustice moral purity is often a form of complicity in injustice politics is about consequences it is the effects of action that is most significant often pursuit of "good" generates evil it is important to ask about the effects of pursuing goals and to judge these | As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. | 1,802 | <h4><u>Evaluate consequences</u> for your decision—any other framing opens up the possibility for worse forms of violence </h4><p>Jeffrey C. <strong>Isaac</strong>, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring <strong>2002</strong>, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2</p><p>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u><strong><mark>unyielding</mark> concern with <mark>moral</mark> <mark>goodness undercuts</mark> <mark>political responsibility</mark>. The concern may be morally laudable,</u></strong> reflecting a kind of personal integrity, <u>but</u> it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) <u><strong>It fails to see that the <mark>purity</mark> of one's intention <mark>does not ensure the</mark> <mark>achievement of what one intends</u></strong></mark>. Abjuring violence or <u><strong>refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good</u></strong> beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that <u><strong><mark>in a world of real violence and injustice</mark>, <mark>moral purity is</mark> not simply a form of powerlessness; it is <mark>often a form of complicity in injustice</u></strong></mark>. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that <u><strong><mark>politics</mark> <mark>is</mark> as much <mark>about</mark> unintended <mark>consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; <mark>it is the effects of action</mark>, rather than the motives of action, <mark>that is most significant</u></strong></mark>. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, <u><strong>it is <mark>often</mark> the <mark>pursuit of "good"</mark> that <mark>generates evil</u></strong></mark>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century<u><strong>: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is</mark> equally <mark>important</u></strong></mark>, always<u><strong>, <mark>to ask about the effects of pursuing</mark> these <mark>goals</mark> <mark>and to judge</mark> <mark>these</mark> effects in pragmatic</u></strong> and historically contextualized <u><strong>ways. Moral absolutism</u></strong> inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And <u><strong>it undermines political effectiveness</u></strong>.</p> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Weigh Consequences | 26,721 | 1,533 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,005 | 3. Resolved implies a policy | Louisiana House 2005 | Louisiana House 3-8-2005, http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm | Resolution A legislative instrument used for stating policies . A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved | Resolution A legislative instrument used for stating policies a resolution uses the term "resolved". | Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4) | 409 | <h4>3. Resolved implies a policy </h4><p><strong>Louisiana House</strong> 3-8-<strong>2005</strong>, http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm</p><p><u><strong><mark>Resolution A legislative instrument</u></strong></mark> that generally is <u><strong><mark>used for</u></strong></mark> making declarations, <u><strong><mark>stating policies</u></strong></mark>, and making decisions where some other form is not required<u><strong>. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; <mark>a resolution uses the term "resolved</u></strong>".</mark> Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4) </p> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,126 | 1,429 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
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2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,006 | Magnitude—nuclear war with China causes extinction and immediately kills billions | Wittner 11 | Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013) | While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon The gathering tension between the U S and China is clear need this lead to nuclear war? there are signs that it could both the U S and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations But the Kargil War of 1999 between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan should convince us that such wars can occur A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons The second is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies | A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher Both nations would be smoldering, radioactive wastelands radioactive debris would blot out the sun and bring nuclear winter destroying agriculture creating famine and destruction To avert the disaster actions improve U.S.-China relations are ensuring survival of the world, | While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies. | 5,056 | <h4><u>Magnitude—</u>nuclear war with China causes extinction and immediately kills billions</h4><p><strong>Wittner 11</strong> — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” Huntington News, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)</p><p><u>While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that <strong>they will be used</u></strong>. After all, <u>for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing <strong>their deadliest weapons</strong>. The current deterioration of <strong>U.S. relations with China</strong> might end up providing us with <strong>yet another example</strong> of this phenomenon</u>. <u>The gathering tension between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China is <strong>clear</u></strong> enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But <u>need this lead to nuclear war? </u>Not necessarily. And yet, <u>there are signs that <strong>it could</u></strong>. After all, <u>both the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and China possess <strong>large numbers</strong> of nuclear weapons</u>. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. <u>Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations</u>; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. <u>But the <strong>Kargil War</strong> of 1999</u>, <u>between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan</u>, <u>should convince us that such wars <strong>can</strong> occur</u>. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? <u><mark>A nuclear attack by China</mark> <mark>would <strong>immediately slaughter</strong> at least 10 million Americans</mark> in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. <mark>The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be <strong>far higher</strong></mark>. <mark>Both nations would be</mark> reduced to <strong><mark>smoldering, radioactive wastelands</u></strong></mark>. Also, <u><mark>radioactive debris</mark> sent aloft by the nuclear explosions <mark>would <strong>blot out the sun</strong> and</mark> <mark>bring</mark> on a “<strong><mark>nuclear winter</strong></mark>” around the globe—<strong><mark>destroying</mark> <mark>agriculture</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>creating</mark> worldwide <mark>famine</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> <strong>generating chaos and <mark>destruction</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. <u><mark>To avert the</mark> enormous <mark>disaster</mark> of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are</u> two <u><strong>obvious <mark>actions</strong></mark> that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons</u>, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. <u>The second</u>, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, <u>is to <strong><mark>improve U.S.-China relations</strong></mark>. If the American and Chinese people <mark>are</mark> interested in <strong><mark>ensuring </mark>their <mark>survival</mark> and that <mark>of the world</strong>,</mark> they should be working to <strong>encourage these policies</u></strong>.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 9,638 | 1,488 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,007 | The plan resolves the Taiwan issue: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The plan resolves the Taiwan issue:</h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,561,062 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,008 | B. Taiwan is comparatively of larger importance than islands | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>B. Taiwan is comparatively of larger importance than islands</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 1,561,063 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,009 | Skepticism of all knowledge claims undermines all political struggle—we can still make decisions about the good and bad even if knowledge is structured by relations of power | Grossburg 1992 | Lawrence Grossburg, University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Outta This Place, 1992, p. 362-364 | too many intellectuals have renounced the value of intellectual and political authority. intellectual suspicion it goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are unjustified and unjustifiable, leaving the critic to celebrate difference and a radical and pluralist relativism. The fact that specific discourses are articulated into relations of power does not mean that these relations are necessary or guaranteed, nor that all knowledges are equally bad there as no reason to assume that all structures of power are equally bad. This “intellectual’s crisis” of representation becomes particularly dangerous when it is projected on everyday life and political struggle, . Left intellectuals have constructed their own irrelevance, through their refusal to find appropriate forms and sites of authority. Authority it need not claim the privilege of an autonomous, sovereign and unified speaking subject. In the face of real historical relations of domination intervention seems to demand, as part of the political responsibility that they speak to—and sometimes for—others. And sometimes that speech must address questions about the relative importance of different struggles and the relative value, of, different structures. | intellectual suspicion goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are unjustified leaving the critic to celebrate difference and pluralist relativism The fact that specific discourses are articulated into relations of power does not mean all knowledges are equally bad This “intellectual’s crisis becomes particularly dangerous when it is projected on political struggle Left intellectuals have constructed their own irrelevance intervention seems to demand political responsibility that speech must address questions about different struggles and structures | In their desire to renounce vanguardism, hierarchy and authoritarianism, too many intellectuals have also renounced the value of intellectual and political authority. This renunciation of authority is predicated on a theoretical crisis of representation in which the authority of any knowledge is suspect, since all knowledge is historically determined and implicated in hierarchical relations of power. The political reflection of this suspicion is that structures and hierarchy are equated with domination. Intellectuals cannot claim to speak the “truth” of the world, and they cannot speak for or in the name of other people. There are only two strategies available to the critic. First, the ability to describe the reality of people’s experience or position in the world can be given over entirely to the people who are the subjects of the analysis. They are “allowed” to speak for themselves within the intellectual’s discourse. The critic merely inscribes the other’s own sense of their place within and relationship to specific experiences and practices.” Second, the critic analyzes his or her own position self-reflexivly, and its consequences for his or her study (i.e., my history and position have determined the inevitable failure of my authority) but without privileging that position. In either case, there is little room for the critic’s own authority. While such a moment of intellectual suspicion is necessary, it goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are unjustified and unjustifiable, leaving the critic to celebrate difference and a radical and pluralist relativism. The fact of contextual determination does not by itself mean that all knowledge claims are false, nor does it mean that all such claims are equally invalid or useless responses to a particular context. It need not entail relativism. The fact that specific discourses are articulated into relations of power does not mean that these relations are necessary or guaranteed, nor that all knowledges are equally bad—and to be opposed—for even if they are implicated with particular structures of power, there as no reason to assume that all structures of power are equally bad. Such an assumption would entail the futility of political struggle and the end of history. This is the conundrum of the intellectual Left, for you can’t have knowledge without standards and authority. Similarly, although all structures of commonality, norrnality and the sacred may be suspect, social existence itself is impossible without at least the imagination of such possibilities. This “intellectual’s crisis” of representation becomes particularly dangerous when it is projected on everyday life and political struggle, when it is mistakenly identified with a very different crisis of authority. In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-Three Mile Island, post-Challenger, post-Jimmy Bakker world, many if not all of the traditional sources of moral, political and even intellectual authority (including those empowered by the postwar consensus) have collapsed or at least lost a good deal of their aura. There is a deep seated public anxiety that America’s power (moral, political, economic, etc.) is on the wane and that none of the traditional authorities is capable of protecting Americans from the many forces—natural and social—that threaten them. Here we must assent to part of the new conservative argument: Structures of ironic cynicism have become increasingly powerful and do represent a real cultural and political problem. Both ‘crises” involve a struggle to redefine cultural authority. For the former it is a struggle to reestablish the political possibility of theory. For the latter it involves the need to construct politically effective authorities, and to relocate the right of intellectuals to claim such authority without reproducing authoritarian relations. The intellectuals’ crisis is a reflexive and rather self-indulgent struggle against a pessimism which they have largely created for themselves. The conflation of the two glosses over the increasing presence (even as popular figures) of new conservative intellectuals, and the threatening implications of the power of a popular new conservatism. The new conservative alliance has quite intentionally addressed the crisis of authority, often blaming it on the Left’s intellectual crisis of representation (e.g., the attacks on ‘political correctness”), as the occasion for their own efforts to set new authorities in place new positions, new criteria and new statements. Left intellectuals have constructed their own irrelevance, not through their “elitist” language, but through their refusal to find appropriate forms and sites of authority. Authority is not necessarily authoritarian; it need not claim the privilege of an autonomous, sovereign and unified speaking subject. In the face of real historical relations of domination and subordination, political intervention seems to demand, as part of the political responsibility of those empowered to speak, that they speak to—and sometimes for—others. And sometimes that speech must address questions about the relative importance of different struggles and the relative value, even the enabling possibilities of, different structures. | 5,255 | <h4>Skepticism of all knowledge claims undermines all political struggle—we can still make decisions about the good and bad even if knowledge is structured by relations of power</h4><p>Lawrence <strong>Grossburg</strong>, University of Illinois, We Gotta Get Outta This Place, <strong>1992<u></strong>, p. 362-364</p><p></u>In their desire to renounce vanguardism, hierarchy and authoritarianism,<u> too many intellectuals have </u>also<u> renounced the value of intellectual and political authority. </u>This renunciation of authority is predicated on a theoretical crisis of representation in which the authority of any knowledge is suspect, since all knowledge is historically determined and implicated in hierarchical relations of power. The political reflection of this suspicion is that structures and hierarchy are equated with domination. Intellectuals cannot claim to speak the “truth” of the world, and they cannot speak for or in the name of other people. There are only two strategies available to the critic. First, the ability to describe the reality of people’s experience or position in the world can be given over entirely to the people who are the subjects of the analysis. They are “allowed” to speak for themselves within the intellectual’s discourse. The critic merely inscribes the other’s own sense of their place within and relationship to specific experiences and practices.” Second, the critic analyzes his or her own position self-reflexivly, and its consequences for his or her study (i.e., my history and position have determined the inevitable failure of my authority) but without privileging that position. In either case, there is little room for the critic’s own authority. While such a moment of <u><mark>intellectual suspicion</u></mark> is necessary,<u> it <mark>goes too far when it assumes that all knowledge claims are unjustified</mark> and unjustifiable, <mark>leaving the critic to celebrate difference</mark> <mark>and</mark> a radical and <mark>pluralist relativism</mark>.</u> The fact of contextual determination does not by itself mean that all knowledge claims are false, nor does it mean that all such claims are equally invalid or useless responses to a particular context. It need not entail relativism. <u><mark>The fact that specific</mark> <mark>discourses</mark> <mark>are</mark> <mark>articulated into relations of power</mark> <mark>does not mean</mark> that these relations are necessary or guaranteed, nor that <mark>all knowledges are equally bad</u></mark>—and to be opposed—for even if they are implicated with particular structures of power,<u> there as no reason to assume that all structures of power are equally bad. </u>Such an assumption would entail the futility of political struggle and the end of history. This is the conundrum of the intellectual Left, for you can’t have knowledge without standards and authority. Similarly, although all structures of commonality, norrnality and the sacred may be suspect, social existence itself is impossible without at least the imagination of such possibilities. <u><mark>This “intellectual’s crisis</mark>” of representation <mark>becomes particularly dangerous when it is</mark> <mark>projected on </mark>everyday life and <mark>political</mark> <mark>struggle</mark>,</u> when it is mistakenly identified with a very different crisis of authority. In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-Three Mile Island, post-Challenger, post-Jimmy Bakker world, many if not all of the traditional sources of moral, political and even intellectual authority (including those empowered by the postwar consensus) have collapsed or at least lost a good deal of their aura. There is a deep seated public anxiety that America’s power (moral, political, economic, etc.) is on the wane and that none of the traditional authorities is capable of protecting Americans from the many forces—natural and social—that threaten them. Here we must assent to part of the new conservative argument: Structures of ironic cynicism have become increasingly powerful and do represent a real cultural and political problem. Both ‘crises” involve a struggle to redefine cultural authority. For the former it is a struggle to reestablish the political possibility of theory. For the latter it involves the need to construct politically effective authorities, and to relocate the right of intellectuals to claim such authority without reproducing authoritarian relations. The intellectuals’ crisis is a reflexive and rather self-indulgent struggle against a pessimism which they have largely created for themselves. The conflation of the two glosses over the increasing presence (even as popular figures) of new conservative intellectuals, and the threatening implications of the power of a popular new conservatism. The new conservative alliance has quite intentionally addressed the crisis of authority, often blaming it on the Left’s intellectual crisis of representation (e.g., the attacks on ‘political correctness”), as the occasion for their own efforts to set new authorities in place new positions, new criteria and new statements<u>. <mark>Left intellectuals have constructed their</mark> <mark>own irrelevance</mark>,</u> not through their “elitist” language, but<u> through their refusal to find appropriate forms and sites of authority. Authority </u>is not necessarily authoritarian; <u>it need not claim the privilege of an autonomous, sovereign and unified speaking subject. In the face of real historical relations of domination </u>and subordination, political<u> <mark>intervention</mark> <mark>seems to demand</mark>, as part of the <mark>political responsibility</mark> </u>of those empowered to speak, <u>that they speak to—and sometimes for—others. And sometimes <mark>that speech must address</mark> <mark>questions</mark> <mark>about</mark> the relative importance of <mark>different struggles and</mark> the relative value,</u> even the enabling possibilities<u> of, different <mark>structures</mark>.</p></u> | null | 2AC | 2AC – We Can Know Things | 220,085 | 8 | 126,158 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | 660,658 | A | Berkeley | Octas | Denverlake Independent RL | Jim Schultz, Brock Hanson, Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan Method (Unilateral)
1NC - Bundle of Ks
2NR - Smaller Bundle of Ks | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Berkeley-Octas.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,010 | Death is the only impact you can’t recover from—all other impacts can be reversed or improved overtime. You must be alive to have value to life. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Death is the only impact you can’t recover from—all other impacts can be reversed or improved overtime. You must be alive to have value to life.</h4> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Extinction First | 1,561,064 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,011 | Ending commitment to Taiwan results in elimination of the security dilemma between the United States and China—solves war | Glaser, 2015 | Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB | ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is adding to strains in their relationship. the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced. U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma | ending commitment to Taiwan could greatly moderate military competition a security dilemma adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship There is no military solution because two countries cannot control the same space A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma eliminating the scenario most likely to bring the United States and China into war U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals are limited which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship further reduce the severity of the security dilemma | Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly, the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid.73 The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma in two important ways. By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma.76 | 2,007 | <h4>Ending commitment to Taiwan results in <u>elimination of the security dilemma</u> between the United States and China—solves war</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>Second, <u><mark>ending</mark> the U.S. <mark>commitment to</mark> defend <mark>Taiwan could <strong>greatly</mark> <mark>moderate</mark> the intensifying <mark>military competition</mark> between the United States and China</strong>, which is adding to strains in their relationship.</u>72 Most directly, <u>the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid</u>.73 <u><strong>The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further.</u></strong> <u>China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs</u>. <u><strong>This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74</u></strong> <u>The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. <strong>The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates <mark>a security dilemma</mark>, which <mark>adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship</mark>.</u></strong> <u><mark>There is no military</mark>-technical <mark>solution </mark>to this security dilemma, however, <mark>because two countries</mark> <mark>cannot control the same space</mark>.75 <strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma</u></strong></mark> in two important ways. <u>By <mark>eliminating the scenario</mark> <strong>that is <mark>most likely </strong>to bring the United States and China into</mark> a large <mark>war</mark>, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs</u>. <u><strong>Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced.</u></strong> In addition, as explained above, <u><strong><mark>U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals</mark> in the region <mark>are limited</mark>, <mark>which should</mark> <mark>contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship</mark> by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn <mark>further reduce the</mark> <mark>severity of the security dilemma</u></strong></mark>.76</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 1 is Flashpoints | 1,651,053 | 456 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,012 | 4. The “United States federal government” is the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branch—this excludes actions by smaller political units—like the people | Hogan, 2010 | Hogan, 2010 | The United States federal government ¶ is one of strong, but limited, powers. specified in the ¶ ¶ Constitution All other powers are reserved to the states and the people The Constitution established three separate branches of government Legislative Executive and Judicial The three branches of the federal government | federal government is of strong powers other powers are reserved to people The Constitution established three branches of government Legislative Executive and Judicial The three branches of the federal government | [Thomas, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/English.pdf] /Bingham-MB
The United States Constitution and the Federal Government The United States Constitution, adopted in ¶ 1789 and amended only rarely since then, is the ¶ ¶ supreme law of the United States. It established ¶ ¶ a republic under which the individual states ¶ ¶ retain considerable sovereignty and authority. ¶ ¶ Each state, for example, has its own elected ¶ ¶ executive (governor), legislature, and court ¶ ¶ system. The federal, or national, government ¶ ¶ is one of strong, but limited, powers. It may ¶ ¶ exercise only the powers specified in the ¶ ¶ Constitution itself. All other powers are reserved ¶ ¶ by the Constitution to the states and the people. ¶ ¶ This system of divided powers between the ¶ ¶ national and state governments is known as ¶ ¶ “federalism.” ¶ ¶ The Bill of Rights is set forth as the first ten ¶ ¶ amendments to the Constitution. It guarantees ¶ ¶ fundamental rights to the people and protects ¶ ¶ them against improper acts by the government. ¶ ¶ The rights protected include such matters as free ¶ ¶ speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to seek ¶ ¶ redress of grievances, freedom from unreasonable ¶ ¶ searches and seizures, due process of law, ¶ ¶ protection against compelled self-incrimination, ¶ ¶ protection against seizure of property without ¶ ¶ just compensation, a speedy and public trial in ¶ ¶ criminal cases, trial by jury in both criminal and ¶ ¶ civil cases, and assistance of counsel in criminal ¶ ¶ prosecutions. ¶ ¶ The Constitution established three separate ¶ ¶ branches of government—Legislative (Article I), ¶ ¶ Executive (Article II), and Judicial (Article III). ¶ ¶ The three branches of the federal government ¶ ¶ operate within a constitutional system known as ¶ ¶ “checks and balances.” Each branch is formally ¶ ¶ separate from the other two, and each has certain ¶ ¶ constitutional authority to check the actions of ¶ ¶ the others. | 2,086 | <h4>4. The “United States federal government” is the <u>Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branch</u><strong>—this excludes actions by smaller political units—like the people</h4><p>Hogan, 2010</p><p></strong>[Thomas, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/English.pdf] /Bingham-MB</p><p>The United States Constitution and the Federal Government <u><strong>The United States</u></strong> Constitution, adopted in ¶ 1789 and amended only rarely since then, is the ¶ ¶ supreme law of the United States. It established ¶ ¶ a republic under which the individual states ¶ ¶ retain considerable sovereignty and authority. ¶ ¶ Each state, for example, has its own elected ¶ ¶ executive (governor), legislature, and court ¶ ¶ system. The<u><strong> <mark>federal</u></strong></mark>, or national, <u><strong><mark>government</u></strong></mark> ¶ <u><strong>¶ <mark>is</mark> one <mark>of</mark> <mark>strong</mark>, but limited, <mark>powers</mark>.</u></strong> It may ¶ ¶ exercise only the powers <u><strong>specified in the ¶ ¶ Constitution</u></strong> itself. <u><strong>All <mark>other powers are reserved</u></strong></mark> ¶ ¶ by the Constitution <u><strong><mark>to</mark> the states and the <mark>people</u></strong></mark>. ¶ ¶ This system of divided powers between the ¶ ¶ national and state governments is known as ¶ ¶ “federalism.” ¶ ¶ The Bill of Rights is set forth as the first ten ¶ ¶ amendments to the Constitution. It guarantees ¶ ¶ fundamental rights to the people and protects ¶ ¶ them against improper acts by the government. ¶ ¶ The rights protected include such matters as free ¶ ¶ speech, freedom of assembly, freedom to seek ¶ ¶ redress of grievances, freedom from unreasonable ¶ ¶ searches and seizures, due process of law, ¶ ¶ protection against compelled self-incrimination, ¶ ¶ protection against seizure of property without ¶ ¶ just compensation, a speedy and public trial in ¶ ¶ criminal cases, trial by jury in both criminal and ¶ ¶ civil cases, and assistance of counsel in criminal ¶ ¶ prosecutions. ¶ ¶ <u><strong><mark>The Constitution established</mark> <mark>three</mark> separate</u></strong> ¶ ¶ <u><strong><mark>branches of government</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>Legislative</u></strong></mark> (Article I), ¶ ¶ <u><strong><mark>Executive</u></strong></mark> (Article II), <u><strong><mark>and Judicial</u></strong></mark> (Article III). ¶ ¶ <u><strong><mark>The three branches of the federal government</u></strong></mark> ¶ ¶ operate within a constitutional system known as ¶ ¶ “checks and balances.” Each branch is formally ¶ ¶ separate from the other two, and each has certain ¶ ¶ constitutional authority to check the actions of ¶ ¶ the others.</p> | null | null | 1NC – T | 477,437 | 78 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,013 | Ending commitment to Taiwan results in elimination of the security dilemma between the United States and China—solves war | Glaser, 2015 | Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB | ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is adding to strains in their relationship. the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced. U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma | ending the commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate military competition China worries the United States will interrupt SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to coercion during wars The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. because two countries cannot control the same space A decision to end commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma most likely to bring war, accommodation should significantly reduce the China places on SLOCs the military threat posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced accommodation could signal that U.S. goals are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship which would reduce the the security dilemma | Second, ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan could greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China, which is adding to strains in their relationship.72 Most directly, the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid.73 The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further. China worries that in a conflict over Taiwan the United States will interrupt its SLOCs. This vulnerability would leave China open to U.S. coercion during severe crises and conventional wars.74 The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs during a crisis or war creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship. There is no military-technical solution to this security dilemma, however, because two countries cannot control the same space.75 A decision by the United States to end its commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma in two important ways. By eliminating the scenario that is most likely to bring the United States and China into a large war, accommodation should significantly reduce the importance that China places on controlling its SLOCs. Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, the military threat the United States posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced. In addition, as explained above, U.S. accommodation could signal that U.S. goals in the region are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, which would in turn further reduce the severity of the security dilemma.76 | 2,007 | <h4>Ending commitment to Taiwan results in <u>elimination of the security dilemma</u> between the United States and China—solves war</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>Second, <u><mark>ending the</mark> U.S. <mark>commitment to defend Taiwan could <strong>greatly moderate</mark> the intensifying <mark>military competition</mark> </strong>between the United States and China, which is adding to strains in their relationship.</u>72 Most directly, <u>the United States is developing its AirSea Battle concept to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, which are intended primarily to undermine the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid</u>.73 <u>The impact of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan on China’s military requirements and capabilities, however, arguably reaches much further.</u> <u><mark>China</mark> <mark>worries</mark> that in a conflict over Taiwan <mark>the United States will interrupt</mark> its <mark>SLOCs</u>. <u><strong>This vulnerability would leave</mark> <mark>China open to</mark> U.S. <mark>coercion</mark> <mark>during</mark> severe crises and conventional <mark>wars</mark>.74</u></strong> <u>The United States dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca and still enjoys significant military advantages in the South China and East China Seas. <strong><mark>The requirement for both China and the United States to control these SLOCs</mark> during a crisis or war <mark>creates a security dilemma, which adds to strains in the U.S.-China relationship.</u></strong></mark> <u>There is no military-technical solution to this security dilemma, however, <mark>because two countries cannot control the same space</mark>.75 <strong><mark>A</mark> <mark>decision</mark> by the United States <mark>to end</mark> its <mark>commitment to Taiwan could moderate this security dilemma</u></strong></mark> in two important ways. <u>By eliminating the scenario <strong>that is <mark>most likely</mark> </strong><mark>to bring</mark> the United States and China into a large <mark>war, accommodation should</mark> <mark>significantly reduce the</mark> importance that <mark>China places on</mark> controlling its <mark>SLOCs</u></mark>. <u><strong>Although China would likely still find U.S. control undesirable, <mark>the military threat</mark> the United States <mark>posed to China’s security would be greatly reduced</mark>.</u></strong> In addition, as explained above, <u><strong>U.S. <mark>accommodation could signal that U.S. goals</mark> in the region <mark>are limited, which should contribute to improving the U.S.-China relationship</mark> by increasing China’s assessment that U.S. motives are benign, <mark>which</mark> <mark>would</mark> in turn further <mark>reduce the</mark> severity of <mark>the security dilemma</u></strong></mark>.76</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 1 | 1,651,053 | 456 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
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3,784,014 | C. The deal would reduce the security threat the US poses to Taiwan | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>C. The deal would reduce the security threat the US poses to Taiwan</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 1,561,065 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
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- Discussion Counter Plan
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3,784,015 | Extinction comes before all other impacts—it is a moral imperative | Bostrom, 3-6-2012 ] /Bingham-MB | Bostrom, 3-6-2012 [Nick, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, Interview in The Atlantic with Ross Andersen, We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/] /Bingham-MB | humanity could someday be wiped from the face of the Earth. human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards. | human extinction risks are poorly understood existential risk mitigation may be a dominant moral priority a moral view counts future people as being worth as much as present people future generations matter then existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else so many people could come into existence there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently Therefore even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits | Unthinkable as it may be, humanity, every last person, could someday be wiped from the face of the Earth. We have learned to worry about asteroids and supervolcanoes, but the more-likely scenario, according to Nick Bostrom, a professor of philosophy at Oxford, is that we humans will destroy ourselves.¶ Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards. | 3,249 | <h4><u><strong>Extinction comes before all other impacts—it is a moral imperative</h4><p></u>Bostrom, 3-6-2012 </strong>[Nick, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, Interview in The Atlantic with Ross Andersen, We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/<u><strong>] /Bingham-MB</p><p></u></strong>Unthinkable as it may be, <u><strong>humanity</u></strong>, every last person, <u><strong>could someday be wiped from the face of the Earth. </u></strong>We have learned to worry about asteroids and supervolcanoes, but the more-likely scenario, according to Nick Bostrom, a professor of philosophy at Oxford, is that we humans will destroy ourselves.¶ Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that <u><strong><mark>human extinction risks are poorly understood</mark> and, worse still, severely underestimated by society.</u></strong> Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be <u><strong>directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable</u></strong>. <u><strong>You have responded by suggesting that <mark>existential risk mitigation may</mark> in fact <mark>be a dominant moral priority</mark> over the alleviation of present suffering</u></strong>. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: <u><strong>Well suppose you have <mark>a moral view</mark> that <mark>counts</mark> <mark>future people as being worth as much as present people</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time</u></strong>, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. <u><strong>A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that <mark>future generations matter</mark> in proportion to their population numbers, <mark>then</mark> you get this very stark implication that <mark>existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else</mark> that you could do.</u></strong> <u><strong>There are <mark>so many people</mark> that <mark>could come into</mark> <mark>existence</mark> in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and <mark>there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently</mark>. <mark>Therefore</mark>, <mark>even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits</mark> like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.</p></u></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Extinction First | 1,240,482 | 818 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,016 | C. the violation: the affirmative claims to win the debate for something other than topical action | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>C. the violation: the affirmative claims to win the debate for something other than topical action</h4> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,561,066 | 1 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
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3,784,017 | Advantage 2 is relations | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Advantage 2 is relations</h4> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 2 | 1,561,067 | 1 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
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3,784,018 | The liberal international order faces massive threats to its sustainability now | Nye 2017 | Nye 2017 (Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University,won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.January 2017, Will the Liberal Order Survive?," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive, Accessed: 1-11-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | the desirability and sustainability of the order have been called into question as never before Some critics, such as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, have argued that the costs of maintaining the order outweigh its benefits and that Washington would be better off handling its interactions with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis, Others claim that the foundations of the order are eroding because of a long-term global power transition involving the dramatic rise of Asian economies such as China and India And still others see it as threatened by a broader diffusion of power from governments to nonstate actors thanks to ongoing changes in politics, society, and technology The order is facing its greatest challenges in generations. Can it survive, and will it? | the desirability and sustainability of the order have been called into question critics have argued the costs of maintaining the order outweigh its benefits Others claim the foundations are eroding because of a power transition And nonstate actors The order is facing its greatest challenges in generations | Until now, that is—for recently, the desirability and sustainability of the order have been called into question as never before. Some critics, such as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, have argued that the costs of maintaining the order outweigh its benefits and that Washington would be better off handling its interactions with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis, making sure it “wins” rather than “loses” on each deal or commitment. Others claim that the foundations of the order are eroding because of a long-term global power transition involving the dramatic rise of Asian economies such as China and India. And still others see it as threatened by a broader diffusion of power from governments to nonstate actors thanks to ongoing changes in politics, society, and technology. The order, in short, is facing its greatest challenges in generations. Can it survive, and will it? | 904 | <h4>The liberal international order faces massive threats to its sustainability now</h4><p><strong>Nye 2017</strong> (Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University,won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.January 2017, Will the Liberal Order Survive?," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive, Accessed: 1-11-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>Until now, that is—for recently, <u><mark>the desirability and sustainability of the order</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>have</mark> <mark>been called into question</mark> as never before</u></strong>. <u>Some <mark>critics</mark>, such as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, <mark>have argued</mark> that <mark>the costs of maintaining the order</mark> <mark>outweigh</mark> <mark>its</mark> <mark>benefits</mark> and that Washington would be better off handling its interactions with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis,</u> making sure it “wins” rather than “loses” on each deal or commitment. <u><mark>Others claim</mark> that <mark>the foundations</mark> of the order <mark>are eroding</mark> <mark>because of a</mark> long-term global <mark>power transition</mark> involving the dramatic rise of Asian economies such as China and India</u>. <u><mark>And</mark> still others see it as threatened by a broader diffusion of power from governments to <mark>nonstate actors</mark> thanks to ongoing changes in politics, society, and technology</u>. <u><mark>The order</u></mark>, in short, <u><mark>is facing its greatest challenges</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>generations</mark>. Can it survive, and will it?</u> </p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order | 1,561,069 | 2 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,019 | All 3 calculations allows party leaders to spin a big win and pacify nationalism—that’s Glaser 16 | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>All 3 calculations allows party leaders to spin a big win and pacify nationalism—that’s Glaser 16</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 1,561,068 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,020 | Debate over a point of controversy is key to argumentative stasis—while many debates foster education and skills—focused debate on a LIMITED point of contestation BEST fosters FAIRNESS and CLASH. Those are best for advocacy skills. A model of debate that moves away from specific policy proposals results in competing truth claims that destroys the benefits of specific forms of advocacy | Steinberg and Freely 08 | Steinberg and Freely 08 | (David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument What sort of writing are we concerned What does "effectiveness" mean in this context What kind of physical force is being compared Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference | there must a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. would be pointless to debate two plus two equals four because there is no controversy Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument is not likely to be productive controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions specific ways of dealing with problems aid discussants in identifying points of differenc To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined the statement That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference | (David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion. | 6,602 | <h4>Debate over a point of controversy is <u>key to argumentative stasis</u>—while many debates foster education and skills—<u>focused debate on a LIMITED point of contestation BEST fosters FAIRNESS and CLASH</u>. Those are best for advocacy skills. A<strong> model of debate that moves away from specific policy proposals results in competing truth claims that destroys the benefits of specific forms of advocacy</h4><p>Steinberg and Freely 08 </p><p><u>(David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)</p><p>Debate is a means of settling differences, so <mark>there must</mark> be <mark>a</mark> difference of opinion or a <mark>conflict of interest before there can be a debate. </mark>If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, it <u><strong><mark>would be pointless to</mark> attempt to <mark>debate</mark> "Resolved: That <mark>two plus two equals</mark> <mark>four</mark>," <mark>because there is</mark> simply <mark>no controversy</mark> about this statement</u></strong>. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. <u><strong><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered</mark>.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong><mark>general argument</mark> may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. <u><strong>Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is not likely to be productive</mark> or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <mark>controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions</mark>, frustration, and emotional distress</u></strong>, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><strong>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step</u></strong>. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify <u><strong><mark>specific ways of dealing with</mark> educational <mark>problems</mark> in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and <mark>aid discussants in identifying points of differenc</mark>e.¶ <mark>To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined</mark>. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the statement</mark> "Resolved: <mark>That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable</mark>, <mark>yet</mark> <mark>fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation</mark>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. <mark>It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>What sort of writing are we concerned</u></strong> with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u><strong>What does "effectiveness" mean in this context</u></strong>? <u><strong>What kind of physical force is being compared</u></strong>—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "<u><strong>Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <mark>This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</mark> of the controversy by advocates, <mark>or that good debates cannot occur</mark> over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. <mark>The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference</u></mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Extinction First | 51,689 | 1,023 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,021 | Xi economic reforms have momentum and are being implemented now | Xiangwei 1/22 | Xiangwei 1/22 (South China Morning Post WANG XIANGWEI, 1/22/2017, China may have the reins of globalisation, but it faces problems at home," http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2064006/china-may-have-reins-globalisation-it-faces-problems-home, Accessed: 1-23-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | the same day the Chinese government announced more measures to attract foreign investment, Xinhua reported that the government would ease restrictions on foreign banks, brokerages, insurers, futures companies and other industries seeking to do business in China clearly aimed at reinforcing Xi’s message that China wants to be more open to foreign direct investment and trade. as China tries to seize the role of leader on free trade and investment, it still has its own uphill battle to make investors, foreign or domestic, feel more welcome domestically Back in November 2013, the mainland leadership approved an ambitious blueprint for reform measures, and promised to let market forces play a “decisive” role in the economy. More than three years have passed but progress has been limited, to say the least. . As China basks in the glory of seizing a world-leading role in charting the course of economic globalisation, hopefully that seizure will put more pressure on the central government to match words with concrete actions to bring the country’s opening up and reforms to a new level | Xinhua reported the government would ease restrictions on industries seeking to do business in China aimed at reinforcing Xi’s message that China wants to be more open China still has its own uphill battle leadership approved reform measures progress has been limited China will put more pressure on the central government to bring opening up and reforms to a new level | And it was no mere coincidence that on the same day the Chinese government announced more measures to attract foreign investment, promising easier access and a better environment. Xinhua reported that the government would ease restrictions on foreign banks, brokerages, insurers, futures companies and other industries seeking to do business in China. Details were vague, but the announcement was clearly aimed at reinforcing Xi’s message that China wants to be more open to foreign direct investment and trade. While that announcement is encouraging, it is also a reminder that, as China tries to seize the role of leader on free trade and investment, it still has its own uphill battle to make investors, foreign or domestic, feel more welcome domestically. Indeed, investors’ confidence in the Chinese economy has taken a hit in the past few years because of the frequent heavy-handed government interventions in the stock markets, limited access and unclear regulations. Back in November 2013, the mainland leadership approved an ambitious blueprint for reform measures, and promised to let market forces play a “decisive” role in the economy. More than three years have passed but progress has been limited, to say the least. Foreign investors have made louder complaints about rising protectionism, while private Chinese businessmen have made little headway in gaining entry into lucrative industries dominated by the state-owned enterprises. The latest survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, released last week, confirmed the trend. According to the survey, a majority of the respondents said they “feel foreign companies are less welcome in China than in the past” and more than 60 per cent said they had no confidence in China’s promises of opening its market further. Meanwhile, falling private investment has become another source of concern about the health of the Chinese economy, as the private sector contributes to more than 60 per cent of China’s gross domestic product and provides more than 80 per cent of jobs. Just as Xi said in his Davos speech, China once had doubts about economic globalisation and was not sure if it should join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). But joining the WTO has proved to be the treasure cave found by Ali Baba in Arabian Nights, prompting China to push radical economic reforms, and propelling it to its place as the world’s second-largest economy. As China basks in the glory of seizing a world-leading role in charting the course of economic globalisation, hopefully that seizure will put more pressure on the central government to match words with concrete actions to bring the country’s opening up and reforms to a new level. | 2,696 | <h4>Xi economic reforms have momentum and are being implemented now</h4><p><strong>Xiangwei 1/22</strong> (South China Morning Post WANG XIANGWEI, 1/22/2017, China may have the reins of globalisation, but it faces problems at home," http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2064006/china-may-have-reins-globalisation-it-faces-problems-home, Accessed: 1-23-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>And it was no mere coincidence that on <u><strong>the same day the Chinese government announced more measures to attract foreign investment,</u></strong> promising easier access and a better environment. <u><strong><mark>Xinhua</mark> <mark>reported</mark> that <mark>the government would ease restrictions</mark> <mark>on</mark> foreign banks, brokerages, insurers, futures companies and other <mark>industries seeking to do business in China</u></strong></mark>. Details were vague, but the announcement was <u><strong>clearly <mark>aimed at reinforcing Xi’s message</mark> <mark>that China wants to be more open</mark> to foreign direct investment and trade.</u></strong> While that announcement is encouraging, it is also a reminder that, <u><strong>as <mark>China</mark> tries to seize the role of leader on free trade and investment, it <mark>still has its own uphill</mark> <mark>battle</mark> to make investors, foreign or domestic, feel more welcome domestically</u></strong>. Indeed, investors’ confidence in the Chinese economy has taken a hit in the past few years because of the frequent heavy-handed government interventions in the stock markets, limited access and unclear regulations. <u><strong>Back in November 2013, the mainland <mark>leadership approved</mark> an ambitious blueprint for <mark>reform measures</mark>, and promised to let market forces play a “decisive” role in the economy. More than three years have passed but <mark>progress has been limited</mark>, to say the least.</u></strong> Foreign investors have made louder complaints about rising protectionism, while private Chinese businessmen have made little headway in gaining entry into lucrative industries dominated by the state-owned enterprises. The latest survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, released last week, confirmed the trend. According to the survey, a majority of the respondents said they “feel foreign companies are less welcome in China than in the past” and more than 60 per cent said they had no confidence in China’s promises of opening its market further. Meanwhile, falling private investment has become another source of concern about the health of the Chinese economy, as the private sector contributes to more than 60 per cent of China’s gross domestic product and provides more than 80 per cent of jobs. Just as Xi said in his Davos speech, China once had doubts about economic globalisation and was not sure if it should join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). But joining the WTO has proved to be the treasure cave found by Ali Baba in Arabian Nights, prompting China to push radical economic reforms, and propelling it to its place as the world’s second-largest economy<u><strong>. As <mark>China</mark> basks in the glory of seizing a world-leading role in charting the course of economic globalisation, hopefully that seizure <mark>will put more pressure on the central government to</mark> match words with concrete actions to <mark>bring</mark> the country’s <mark>opening up and reforms to a</mark> <mark>new level</u></strong></mark>.</p> | 1NC | DA | 1NC Xi Politics | 1,561,071 | 6 | 126,162 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | 660,692 | N | Golden Desert | 6 | Damien MP | Joel Lemuel | 1AC - AIIB
1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case
2NC - T QPQ Politics DA
1NR - Commission CP
2NR Commission CP Politics DA | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,022 | D. Vote negative | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>D. Vote negative</h4> | null | null | 1NC – T | 1,561,070 | 1 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,023 | Plan is the most important action that could boost US-China cooperation – further enmeshes China into the liberal order by resolving distrust in the relationship | Glaser, 2015 | Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB | focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important the most important policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.” The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations. U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to- military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people. ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict | Taiwan is the most important sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions a key source of “strategic distrust authorities on relations concludes that Beijing views Taiwan as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s affairs and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests most Chinese see strategic motives at American behavior. The position the U.S. takes on Taiwan determines strategy toward China, and determines the quality of U.S.-China relations U.S. policies are the cause of anti-American sentiment among a posture change will remove the major obstacle for our relations and strengthen cooperation by winning hearts and minds ending commitment has the potential to improve U.S.-China relations which could increase cooperation on other issues | More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to- military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict. | 2,286 | <h4>Plan is the most important action that could boost US-China cooperation – further enmeshes China into the liberal order by resolving distrust in the relationship</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>More important, however, is that <u>focusing on the quality of current cross-strait</u> <u>relations overlooks</u> two other less direct, but potentially more <u>significant,</u> <u>benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan</u>. First, <u>U.S. support for <mark>Taiwan is</mark> one of the most important</u>, possibly <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>most important</u></strong></mark>, <u>policy-driven <mark>sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions</u></mark>. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, <u>China considers U.S. support of Taiwan <strong><mark>a key source of “strategic distrust</u></strong></mark>.” <u>A recent study by two leading <mark>authorities on </mark>U.S.-China <mark>relations</mark> <mark>concludes</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>Beijing views </mark>U.S. arms sales to <mark>Taiwan</mark> “<mark>as confirming</mark> <mark>American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s</mark> domestic <mark>affairs</mark> and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.”</u> In a similar vein, their report argues that “<u>continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes <mark>and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests</mark> and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s</u>.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “<u><strong><mark>most Chinese see strategic motives at </mark>the root of <mark>American behavior</u></strong>.</mark> <u>They believe that <strong>keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”</u></strong>69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “<u><strong><mark>The position the U.S. takes on </mark>the <mark>Taiwan </mark>issue <mark>determines </mark>the essence of American <mark>strategy toward China,</mark> <mark>and </mark>thus <mark>determines the quality</mark> and status <mark>of U.S.-China relations</mark>.</u></strong>”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “<u><mark>U.S. policies </mark>toward Taiwan have been and <mark>are the </mark>fundamental <mark>cause of </mark>some <mark>anti-American sentiment among</mark> the Chinese public.</u> . . . <u><strong>I assure you that <mark>a posture change </mark>of the U.S. policy on Taiwan <mark>will remove the major obstacle for our</mark> military-to- military <mark>relations and </mark>also <mark>strengthen </mark>Sino-American <mark>cooperation by winning </mark>the <mark>hearts</mark> <mark>and minds </mark>of 1.3 billion Chinese people.</u></strong>”71 In short, <u><mark>ending </mark>the U.S. <mark>commitment </mark>to Taiwan <mark>has the potential to <strong></mark>dramatically <mark>improve U.S.-China relations</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>which</mark> in turn <mark>could increase </mark>the possibility of <mark>cooperation on other issues </mark>and reduce the probability of competition and conflict</u>.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order | 1,651,053 | 456 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,024 | Plan is the most important action that could boost US-China relations—all other alt causes would be resolved—it radically changes the nature of US-China cooperation and spills over to other issues | Glaser, 2015 | Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB | focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important the most important policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.” The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations. U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to- military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people. ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict | Taiwan is the most important sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions a key source of “strategic distrust Beijing views Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s affairs and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests most Chinese see strategic motives at American behavior. The position the U.S. takes on Taiwan determines strategy toward China, and determines the quality of U.S.-China relations U.S. policies are the cause of anti-American sentiment among a posture change will remove the major obstacle for our relations and strengthen cooperation by winning hearts and minds ending commitment has the potential to improve U.S.-China relations, which could increase cooperation on other issues | More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. . . . I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to- military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict. | 2,286 | <h4>Plan is the most important action that could boost US-China relations—all other alt causes would be resolved—it radically changes the nature of US-China cooperation and spills over to other issues</h4><p>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>More important, however, is that <u>focusing on the quality of current cross-strait</u> <u>relations overlooks</u> two other less direct, but potentially more <u>significant,</u> <u>benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan</u>. First, <u>U.S. support for <mark>Taiwan is</mark> one of the most important</u>, possibly <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>most important</u></strong></mark>, <u>policy-driven <mark>sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions</u></mark>. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, <u>China considers U.S. support of Taiwan <strong><mark>a key source of “strategic distrust</u></strong></mark>.” <u>A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that <mark>Beijing views </mark>U.S. arms sales to <mark>Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s</mark> domestic <mark>affairs</mark> and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.”</u> In a similar vein, their report argues that “<u>continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons . . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes <mark>and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests</mark> and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s</u>.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “<u><strong><mark>most Chinese see strategic motives at </mark>the root of <mark>American behavior</u></strong>.</mark> <u>They believe that <strong>keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”</u></strong>69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “<u><strong><mark>The position the U.S. takes on </mark>the <mark>Taiwan </mark>issue <mark>determines </mark>the essence of American <mark>strategy toward China, and </mark>thus <mark>determines the quality</mark> and status <mark>of U.S.-China relations</mark>.</u></strong>”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “<u><mark>U.S. policies </mark>toward Taiwan have been and <mark>are the </mark>fundamental <mark>cause of </mark>some <mark>anti-American sentiment among</mark> the Chinese public.</u> . . . <u><strong>I assure you that <mark>a posture change </mark>of the U.S. policy on Taiwan <mark>will remove the major obstacle for our</mark> military-to- military <mark>relations and </mark>also <mark>strengthen </mark>Sino-American <mark>cooperation by winning </mark>the <mark>hearts and minds </mark>of 1.3 billion Chinese people.</u></strong>”71 In short, <u><mark>ending </mark>the U.S. <mark>commitment </mark>to Taiwan <mark>has the potential to <strong></mark>dramatically <mark>improve U.S.-China relations</u></strong>, <u>which</mark> in turn <mark>could increase </mark>the possibility of <mark>cooperation on other issues </mark>and reduce the probability of competition and conflict</u>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 2 | 1,651,053 | 456 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,025 | China will get more benefits than the US—increases incentives to say yes—deal favors China | Glaser, 2015 | Charles L Glaser, 2015, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB | a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States | states trade issues but not necessarily equally A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, because the agreement favors China because China’s interests are greater | Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. | 700 | <h4><strong>China will get more benefits than the US—increases incentives to say yes—deal favors China</h4><p></strong>Charles L <strong>Glaser, 2015</strong>, is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p>Likely the most common way to envision <u>a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue</u> to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the <u><mark>states</mark> <mark>trade</mark> across multiple <mark>issues</mark>, making both states better off, <mark>but not necessarily equally<strong></mark>. <mark>A grand bargain</mark> <mark>in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form</u></strong>,</mark> <u>partly <mark>because</mark> <mark>the</mark> <mark>agreement</mark> would be in response to a power shift that <mark>favors China</mark> and partly <mark>because China’s interests</mark> in the region <mark>are greater</mark> than those of the United States</u><strong>.</p></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 69,187 | 345 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
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- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,026 | Failure to provide predictable and stable clash is an independent reason to reject their claims because we haven’t had the opportunity to subject them to rigorous scrutiny—it independently takes out their argument because mindsets are changed in the process of researching an issue—not in the debate itself—because cognitive shortcuts are employed during debate when your opponents are surprised and there is limited time to refute your arguments | Goodin and Niemeyer 2003 | Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, | time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes The key is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue. we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’ when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. that the earliest steps in the process he sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue in mass politics (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features. | the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel myths and symbolic posturing and liberate people to act upon their attitudes that happened in the earlier stages before the formal discussions engaging with the issue is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process well in advance of discussion Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought In such cases positions may be arrived at via shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions not deliberation in the reflective sense Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies or incomplete information Research stresses the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot When we come across something ‘new’, we update our running’ beliefs accordingly But having updated, we drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’ we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That fully reasoned assessment internal-reflective deliberation requires us to call up reasons rather than consulting our summary judgments’ prompts that shift to deeply reflective deliberation the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes focusing attention on a topic providing information and inviting people to think hard is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation altering the way people process that information and what they think the anticipation of participating) in formally organized discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. micro-deliberative processes might be different from mass politics, A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue agreed by all stakeholders In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion knowing we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively | When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf
What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from on-line to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features. | 11,066 | <h4>Failure to provide predictable and stable clash is an independent <u>reason to reject their claims </u>because we haven’t had the opportunity to subject them to rigorous scrutiny—it independently takes out their argument because <u>mindsets are changed</u> <u>in the process of researching</u> an issue—not in the debate itself—because cognitive shortcuts are employed during debate when your opponents are surprised and there is limited time to refute your arguments </h4><p>Robert E. <strong>Goodin and</strong> Simon J. <strong>Niemeyer</strong>- Australian National University- <strong>2003</strong>, </p><p>When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf</p><p>What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long <u><strong>time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them</u></strong>. In this circumstance, <u><strong><mark>the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel</mark> the <mark>myths and symbolic posturing</mark> on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, <mark>and liberate people to act upon their attitudes</u></strong></mark> toward the protection of rainforest itself. <u><strong>The key</u></strong> point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, <u><strong>is that <mark>that happened in the earlier stages</mark> of deliberation – <mark>before the formal discussions</mark> </u></strong>(‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. <u><strong>Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people's<mark> engaging with the</mark> <mark>issue</mark> – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that <mark>is likely to</mark> <mark>occur</mark> <mark>earlier rather than later</mark> <mark>in the deliberative process</mark>. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, <mark>well in advance of</mark> any formal, organized group <mark>discussion</u></strong></mark>. There is much in the large literature on <u><strong>attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. <mark>Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought</mark> or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 <mark>In such cases</mark>, <mark>positions may be arrived at via</mark> peripheral routes, taking cognitive <mark>shortcuts</mark> <mark>or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions</mark> or even simply following the lead of others</u></strong> believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). <u><strong>These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’</u></strong> (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – <u><strong><mark>not deliberation</mark> <mark>in the</mark> internal-<mark>reflective sense</mark> we have described. <mark>Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies</mark> in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information <mark>or incomplete information</mark> processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal</u></strong>. Importantly for our thesis, <u><strong>there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. <mark>Research</mark> in this area <mark>stresses</mark> instead <mark>the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation</mark>, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.</u></strong>33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that <u><strong><mark>we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot</mark>, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. <mark>When we come across something ‘new’, we update our</mark> routines – our ‘<mark>running’ beliefs</mark> and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – <mark>accordingly</mark>. <mark>But having updated, we</mark> then <mark>drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’</u></strong></mark>. A consequence of this procedure is that, <u><strong>when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ </u></strong>or<u><strong> </u></strong>‘what attitude we take’ toward something, <u><strong><mark>we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>That</mark> more <mark>fully reasoned assessment</mark> – the sort of thing we have been calling <mark>internal-reflective deliberation</mark> – <mark>requires us to call up reasons</mark> from stored memory <mark>rather than</mark> just <mark>consulting our</mark> running on-line ‘<mark>summary judgments’</mark>. </u></strong>Crucially for our present discussion, once again, <u><strong>what <mark>prompts that shift </mark>from on-line <mark>to</mark> more <mark>deeply reflective deliberation</mark> is not necessarily interpersonal discussion</u></strong>. <u><strong>The impetus for fixing one's attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources:</u></strong> group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘on-line’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All <u><strong>this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of <mark>the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people's attitudes</u></strong></mark> in a citizens’ jury-style process. <u><strong>The initial processes of <mark>focusing attention on a topic</mark>, <mark>providing information</mark> about it <mark>and inviting people to think hard</mark> about it <mark>is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation</mark>, <mark>altering</mark> not just the information people have about the issue but also <mark>the way people process that information and</mark> hence (perhaps) <mark>what they think</mark> about the issue.</u></strong> What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely <u><strong>that the earliest steps in</u></strong> <u><strong>the</u></strong> jury <u><strong>process</u></strong> – t<u><strong>he sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts</u></strong> – <u><strong>will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe</u></strong>. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the <u><strong>pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue</u></strong>. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, <u><strong>in mass politics</u></strong>. In citizens’ juries the need to participate <u><strong>(or <mark>the anticipation of participating) in formally organized</mark> group <mark>discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes</u></strong>.</mark> But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate <u><strong><mark>micro-deliberative processes</mark>)37 <mark>might be different from mass politics,</mark> and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics:</u></strong> • <u><strong><mark>A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue</u></strong></mark>. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • <u><strong>A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been <mark>agreed by all stakeholders</mark> (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). <mark>In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted</u></strong></mark>.<u> </u>• A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). <u><strong>• In a citizens’ jury, <mark>we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion</mark> phase, <mark>knowing</mark> that <mark>we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively</mark>.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well.</strong> <strong>There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.</p></u></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Case | 2AC Extinction First | 54,860 | 423 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
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o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,027 | The plan tanks Xi’s agenda, pulls him away from spending capital on it | Liu 1/18 | Liu 1/18 (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | on Xi and his team at a particularly delicate political moment Long before Trump’s election upset, Xi began preparing for the 19th Communist Party Congress, scheduled for late 2017 The Congress will almost certainly grant Xi a second five-year term as party head. But that’s not what worries Xi. At the Congress, he’s expected to try to alter the age and term limits observed by senior communist officials, and perhaps timeworn succession procedures as well. Such changes won’t be universally popular in a bureaucracy already rattled by Xi’s draconian anti-corruption campaign
That means over the next months, Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions. Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability. Intense political jockeying is already underway in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to divert considerable time and attention | Xi at a delicate political moment he’s expected to try to alter the age and term limits and succession procedures
over the next months Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship that require him to divert time and attention | Trump’s moves—and the response from Chinese hawks—are putting enormous pressure on Xi and his team at a particularly delicate political moment. Long before Trump’s election upset, Xi began preparing for the 19th Communist Party Congress, scheduled for late 2017 (the exact date remains secret). The Congress will almost certainly grant Xi a second five-year term as party head. But that’s not what worries Xi. At the Congress, he’s expected to try to alter the age and term limits observed by senior communist officials, and perhaps timeworn succession procedures as well. Such changes won’t be universally popular in a bureaucracy already rattled by Xi’s draconian anti-corruption campaign.
That means over the next months, Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home, without overseas distractions. “Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability. Intense political jockeying is already underway in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges,” says Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center. “The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship or on the Taiwan issue that require him to have to divert considerable time and attention.” | 1,243 | <h4>The plan tanks Xi’s agenda, pulls him away from spending capital on it</h4><p><strong>Liu 1/18</strong> (Melinda Liu, 1-18-2017, Donald Trump and China’s Year of the Hawk," POLITICO Magazine, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/donald-trump-and-chinas-year-of-the-hawk-214656, Accessed: 1-22-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>Trump’s moves—and the response from Chinese hawks—are putting enormous pressure <u><strong>on <mark>Xi</mark> and his team <mark>at a</mark> particularly <mark>delicate political</mark> <mark>moment</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Long before Trump’s election upset, Xi began preparing for the 19th Communist Party Congress, scheduled for late 2017 </u></strong>(the exact date remains secret). <u><strong>The Congress will almost certainly grant Xi a second five-year term as party head. But that’s not what worries Xi. At the Congress, <mark>he’s expected to try to alter the age and term limits</mark> observed by senior communist officials, <mark>and</mark> perhaps timeworn <mark>succession procedures</mark> as well. Such changes won’t be universally popular in a bureaucracy already rattled by Xi’s draconian anti-corruption campaign</u></strong>. </p><p><u><strong>That means <mark>over the next months</mark>, <mark>Xi needs to immerse himself in consensus-building and political horse-trading back home,</mark> <mark>without overseas distractions</mark>.</u></strong> “<u><strong>Beijing has placed an enormous premium on stability.</u></strong> <u><strong>Intense political jockeying is already underway in China, and the economy faces increasingly serious and difficult challenges</u></strong>,” says Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center. “<u><strong><mark>The last thing Xi Jinping wants is big problems in the U.S.-China relationship</mark> or on the Taiwan issue <mark>that require him to</mark> have to <mark>divert</mark> considerable <mark>time and attention</u></strong></mark>.”</p> | 1NC | DA | 1NC Xi Politics | 1,118,831 | 11 | 126,162 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | 660,692 | N | Golden Desert | 6 | Damien MP | Joel Lemuel | 1AC - AIIB
1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case
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2NR Commission CP Politics DA | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,028 | Engagement with China solves – the plan’s quid pro quo is key | Ikenberry 2015 (G. JOHN IKENBERRY is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia, Political Science Quarterly 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/between_the_eagle_and_the_dragon.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB) | Ikenberry 2015 (G. JOHN IKENBERRY is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia, Political Science Quarterly 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/between_the_eagle_and_the_dragon.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB) | Regional order in East Asia is in transition, away from a U.S.-led hegemonic order to something more complex. It will not be a simple transition from American hegemony to Chinese hegemony The dual hierarchy that today increasingly marks the region has the potential to be quite durable. No one hegemonic state will be able to dominate the region With the rise of China and the ongoing economic integration of the region, the United States cannot play its old hegemonic role And if China tries to “push” itself into a position of leading regional military power, the weaker and secondary countries will try to “pull” the United States ever more tightly into the region. The region will continue to bear the markings of both hegemony and the balance of power. Middle states also face a collective action problem when they think about pursuing an outright counterbalancing policy toward China. If other states do not follow their lead, they will be punished by China. So no state has an incentive to “go all in” unless a large group of states also go all in. And no state wants to go all in if there is still an opportunity for a more cooperative outcome major factors that mute or restrain a region-wide movement to full-scale balance of power rivalr middle states in the region find themselves tied to both the United States and China They rely on the United States for security and providing a general counterweight to China, and they are increasingly tied to China for trade and investment They gain from both relationships. This places constraints on the United States. The United States will not find its regional allies wanting to pursue a full-scale balancing strategy against China They do not want to be placed in a situation in which they need to choose between the Eagle and the Dragon So the United States will have an incentive to pursue a “not too hot and not too cold” strategy toward China. It will want to show that it takes the security of middle states seriously. It will want to show that it “has their back.” But—absent aggressive and confrontational moves by China—it will not want to be too aggressive or confrontational toward China They will want steady and credible American security commitments These considerations suggest that the United States will not want to organize its presence in Asia simply around “balancing” China. It will need a more complex strategy of engagement, restraint, commitment, and the building of counterweights to China. | dual hierarchy has the potential to be durable The region to bear balance of power middle states in the region find themselves tied to both the United States and China for security and for trade They do not want to be placed in a situation in which they need to choose the United will have an incentive to pursue a strategy to show middle states that it “has their back But— not too aggressive toward China the United States will not want to organize its presence in Asia around “balancing” China It will need a more complex strategy of engagement | Regional order in East Asia is in transition, away from a U.S.-led hegemonic order to something more complex. It will not be a simple transition from American hegemony to Chinese hegemony. The dual hierarchy that today increasingly marks the region has the potential to be quite durable. No one hegemonic state will be able to dominate the region. With the rise of China and the ongoing economic integration of the region, the United States cannot play its old hegemonic role. And if China tries to “push” itself into a position of leading regional military power, the weaker and secondary countries will try to “pull” the United States ever more tightly into the region. The region will continue to bear the markings of both hegemony and the balance of power. The United States and China will each offer the region “services” that states want. But they will also act as counterweights to each other. The complexity of regional order is reflected in the strategies that states are pursuing. The United States, China, and the middle states are all pursuing mixed strategies of engagement and hedging. The United States is leading the region in building a counterweight response to the rise of China. But it is also engaging China and seeking to draw China into greater regional cooperation. China is seeking to expand its regional influence and leadership. But it is also engaging weaker and secondary states bilaterally and within regional institutions. The middle states are also pursuing a mix of strategies across a spectrum between balancing and bandwagoning. In a transforming region marked by uncertainty, these mixed strategies make sense. Each state wants to guard against its own version of a “worst-case” outcome, one in which great power rivalry and security competition fragment the region and trigger escalating conflict. States in the region have incentives to hedge against this outcome. But states also know that they make this outcome more likely if they go ahead and pursue hardline balancing strategies, particularly toward China. Middle states also face a collective action problem when they think about pursuing an outright counterbalancing policy toward China. If other states do not follow their lead, they will be punished by China. So no state has an incentive to “go all in” unless a large group of states also go all in. And no state wants to go all in if there is still an opportunity for a more cooperative outcome. Hence, there is an incentive for mixed strategies and quiet hedging. Taken together, there are three major factors that mute or restrain a region-wide movement to full-scale balance of power rivalry. First, as this article notes, middle states in the region find themselves tied to both the United States and China. They rely on the United States for security and providing a general counterweight to China, and they are increasingly tied to China for trade and investment. They gain from both relationships. This places constraints on the United States. The United States will not find its regional allies wanting to pursue a full-scale balancing strategy against China. They do not want to be placed in a situation in which they need to choose between the Eagle and the Dragon. So the United States will have an incentive to pursue a “not too hot and not too cold” strategy toward China. It will want to show that it takes the security of middle states seriously. It will want to show that it “has their back.” But—absent aggressive and confrontational moves by China—it will not want to be too aggressive or confrontational toward China. Countries in the region will not want to join a crusade. They will want steady and credible American security commitments. These considerations suggest that the United States will not want to organize its presence in Asia simply around “balancing” China. It will need a more complex strategy of engagement, restraint, commitment, and the building of counterweights to China. | 3,960 | <h4>Engagement with China solves – the plan’s quid pro quo is key</h4><p><strong>Ikenberry 2015<u> (G. JOHN IKENBERRY is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies. Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia, Political Science Quarterly 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/between_the_eagle_and_the_dragon.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p></strong>Regional order in East Asia is in transition, away from a U.S.-led hegemonic order to something more complex.</u> <u><strong>It will not be a simple transition from American hegemony to Chinese hegemony</u></strong>. <u>The <mark>dual hierarchy</mark> that today increasingly marks the region <mark>has the potential to be</mark> quite <mark>durable</mark>. No one hegemonic state will be able to dominate the region</u>. <u>With the rise of China and the ongoing economic integration of the region, the United States cannot play its old hegemonic role</u>. <u>And if China tries to “push” itself into a position of leading regional military power, the weaker and secondary countries will try to “pull” the United States ever more tightly into the region.</u> <u><mark>The region</mark> will continue <mark>to bear</mark> the markings of both hegemony and the <mark>balance of power</mark>. </u>The United States and China will each offer the region “services” that states want. But they will also act as counterweights to each other. The complexity of regional order is reflected in the strategies that states are pursuing. The United States, China, and the middle states are all pursuing mixed strategies of engagement and hedging. The United States is leading the region in building a counterweight response to the rise of China. But it is also engaging China and seeking to draw China into greater regional cooperation. China is seeking to expand its regional influence and leadership. But it is also engaging weaker and secondary states bilaterally and within regional institutions. The middle states are also pursuing a mix of strategies across a spectrum between balancing and bandwagoning. In a transforming region marked by uncertainty, these mixed strategies make sense. Each state wants to guard against its own version of a “worst-case” outcome, one in which great power rivalry and security competition fragment the region and trigger escalating conflict. States in the region have incentives to hedge against this outcome. But states also know that they make this outcome more likely if they go ahead and pursue hardline balancing strategies, particularly toward China. <u>Middle states also face a collective action problem when they think about pursuing an outright counterbalancing policy toward China. If other states do not follow their lead, they will be punished by China. So no state has an incentive to “go all in” unless a large group of states also go all in. And no state wants to go all in if there is still an opportunity for a more cooperative outcome</u>. Hence, there is an incentive for mixed strategies and quiet hedging. Taken together, there are three <u>major factors that mute or restrain a region-wide movement to full-scale balance of power rivalr</u>y. First, as this article notes, <u><strong><mark>middle states in the region find themselves tied to both the United States and China</u></strong></mark>. <u>They rely on the United States <mark>for security</mark> and providing a general counterweight to China, <mark>and</mark> they are increasingly tied to China <mark>for trade</mark> and investment</u>. <u>They gain from both relationships. This places constraints on the United States. The United States will not find its regional allies wanting to pursue a full-scale balancing strategy against China</u>. <u><strong><mark>They do not want to be placed in a situation in which they need to choose</mark> between the Eagle and the Dragon</u></strong>. <u>So <mark>the United</mark> States <mark>will have an incentive to pursue a</mark> “not too hot and not too cold” <mark>strategy</mark> toward China. It will want <mark>to show</mark> that it takes the security of <mark>middle states</mark> seriously. It will want to show <mark>that it “has their back</mark>.” <mark>But—</mark>absent aggressive and confrontational moves by China—it will <mark>not</mark> want to be <mark>too aggressive</mark> or confrontational <mark>toward China</u></mark>. Countries in the region will not want to join a crusade. <u><strong>They will want steady and credible American security commitments</u></strong>. <u><strong>These considerations suggest that <mark>the United States will not</mark> <mark>want to organize its presence in Asia</mark> simply <mark>around “balancing” China</mark>. <mark>It will need a more complex strategy of engagement</mark>, restraint, commitment, and the building of counterweights to China.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AC | Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order | 1,561,073 | 2 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,029 | Debate over a point of controversy is key to argumentative stasis—while many debates foster education and skills—focused debate on a LIMITED point of contestation BEST fosters FAIRNESS and CLASH. Those are best for advocacy skills. A model of debate that moves away from specific policy proposals results in competing truth claims that destroys the benefits of specific forms of advocacy | Steinberg and Freely 08 | Steinberg and Freely 08 | (David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument What sort of writing are we concerned What does "effectiveness" mean in this context What kind of physical force is being compared Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
Limits are key to education
Limits
limited topic allows for depth
Clash
Focusing on a specific topic allows the two teams examine their arguments critically | there must a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. would be pointless to debate two plus two equals four because there is no controversy Where there is no clash there is no debate debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered general argument is not likely to be productive controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions specific ways of dealing with problems aid discussants in identifying points of differenc To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined the statement That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation or that good debates cannot occur The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference | (David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.
Limits are key to education
Limits
limited topic allows for depth
Clash
Focusing on a specific topic allows the two teams examine their arguments critically | 6,759 | <h4>Debate over a point of controversy is <u>key to argumentative stasis</u>—while many debates foster education and skills—<u>focused debate on a LIMITED point of contestation BEST fosters FAIRNESS and CLASH</u>. Those are best for advocacy skills. A<strong> model of debate that moves away from specific policy proposals results in competing truth claims that destroys the benefits of specific forms of advocacy</h4><p>Steinberg and Freely 08 </p><p><u>(David L., lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Austin J. Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making” p. 45//wyoccd)</p><p>Debate is a means of settling differences, so <mark>there must</mark> be <mark>a</mark> difference of opinion or a <mark>conflict of interest before there can be a debate. </mark>If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent</u></strong>. Thus, for example, it <u><strong><mark>would be pointless to</mark> attempt to <mark>debate</mark> "Resolved: That <mark>two plus two equals</mark> <mark>four</mark>," <mark>because there is</mark> simply <mark>no controversy</mark> about this statement</u></strong>. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. <u><strong><mark>Where there is no clash</mark> of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, <mark>there is no debate</u></strong></mark>. In addition, <u><strong><mark>debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered</mark>.</u></strong> For example, <u><strong><mark>general argument</mark> may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration</u></strong>. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. <u><strong>Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it <mark>is not likely to be productive</mark> or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, <mark>controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions</mark>, frustration, and emotional distress</u></strong>, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." <u><strong>Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step</u></strong>. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify <u><strong><mark>specific ways of dealing with</mark> educational <mark>problems</mark> in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and <mark>aid discussants in identifying points of differenc</mark>e.¶ <mark>To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined</mark>. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument</u></strong>. For example, <u><strong><mark>the statement</mark> "Resolved: <mark>That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable</mark>, <mark>yet</mark> <mark>fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation</mark>. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. <mark>It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>What sort of writing are we concerned</u></strong> with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? <u><strong>What does "effectiveness" mean in this context</u></strong>? <u><strong>What kind of physical force is being compared</u></strong>—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "<u><strong>Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. <mark>This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation</mark> of the controversy by advocates, <mark>or that good debates cannot occur</mark> over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. <mark>The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference</mark>, which will be outlined in the following discussion.</p><p>Limits are key to education</p><p>Limits</p><p>limited topic allows for depth</p><p>Clash</p><p>Focusing on a specific topic allows the two teams examine their arguments critically</p></u></strong> | null | null | 1NC Limits | 51,689 | 1,023 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,030 | And, a tipping point is coming, relations aren’t resilient without the plan. | Lampton 15 | Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016) | For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments that we had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After 9/11 China was seen as non-threatening In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which negative narratives have grown Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the U S should not be dirty words Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side | since 2010. The tipping point is near We are witnessing erosion of critical supports for positive U.S.-China ties the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, seas, Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and confusion about where China is headed If developments continue probabilities of confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation and, economic welfare will be diminished The words “accommodation” or “compromise” should not be dirty words Balance and stability should be our objective, not primacy | For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains. Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” as one respected Chinese professor put it, and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.” In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization. We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1] Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans. What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done? Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side. | 4,761 | <h4>And, a tipping point is coming, relations <u>aren’t</u> resilient <u>without the plan</u>. </h4><p><strong>Lampton 15</strong> — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” U.S.-China Perception Monitor, May 11th, Available Online at http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/, Accessed 06-29-2016)</p><p><u>For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity</u>—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. <u>This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But</u>, <u>none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments</u> in both our nations <u>that we</u> each <u>had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains</u>. <u>Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives</u> in either society <u>to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,”</u> as one respected Chinese professor put it, <u>and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After</u> the <u>9/11</u> attacks on America, <u>China was seen as non-threatening</u>, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.” <u>In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests</u> that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. <u>The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. <strong>Things unfortunately have changed dramatically <mark>since</mark> about <mark>2010</strong>. The <strong>tipping point</strong> is near</mark>. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization</u>. <u><mark>We are witnessing </mark>the <mark>erosion of</mark> some <strong><mark>critical </mark>underlying <mark>supports</strong> for</mark> predominantly <mark>positive</mark> <mark>U.S.-China</mark> <mark>ties</mark>. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability</u>. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1] <u>Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which</u> these <u>negative narratives have grown</u> in each of our societies. <u>Among them are: <mark>the <strong>2008 financial crisis</strong>, incidents in <strong>Hong Kong</strong>, </mark>developments in <strong>the south and east China <mark>seas</strong>, </mark>U.S. inability to quickly exit <strong><mark>Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires</strong>, and</mark> the <mark>confusion</mark> in America and elsewhere <mark>about <strong>where China is headed</mark> internally and in terms of its foreign policy</u></strong>. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans. What is happening? <u><mark>If developments continue </mark>along the current trajectory, both countries will have <strong>progressively less security</strong>, at higher cost; the <mark>probabilities of <strong></mark>intentional</strong>, <strong>accidental</strong>, or <strong>catalytic violent <mark>confrontations</strong> will increase; the world will enjoy <strong>less cooperation </mark>on transnational issues</strong> requiring joint Sino-American efforts; <mark>and, <strong>economic welfare</strong></mark> in both societies <mark>will be diminished</u></mark>. What can be done? Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. <u><mark>The words “accommodation” or “compromise”</mark> in either China or the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><strong><mark>should not be dirty words</u></strong></mark>. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. <u><strong><mark>Balance</strong> and <strong>stability</strong></mark> in Asia <mark>should be our objective, not</mark> the <mark>primacy</mark> of either side</u>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 2 | 169,101 | 86 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,031 | The role of the ballot this round it to vote for the side that fights violence the best. That means that you vote for us because we’re the only side that is actually fighting violence. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The role of the ballot this round it to vote for the side that fights violence the best. That means that you vote for us because we’re the only side that is actually fighting violence. </h4> | 2NC/NR | 1 K | Framework | 1,561,074 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,032 | China will say yes—US-China relations are comparatively more important, and the plan raises the stakes in the South China Sea | Fuchs 2016 | Michael Fuchs, senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. foreign policy priorities and U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific, 3-2-2016, Safe Harbor," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-02/safe-harbor, Accessed: 6-1-2016, /Kent Denver-MB | The United States and China must meet at the negotiating table to hammer out a security arrangement for the South China Sea that can allow both sides to maintain their interests while also de-escalating tensions. Washington must change its approach it must do more than operate on the periphery in order to shape the region. It must reframe the South China Sea issue as a conflict that directly involves the United States and requires Beijing to act as such Making this a bilateral U.S.–China issue would lead Beijing to question its strategy, because China’s relationship with the United States and its role in the Asia-Pacific is the biggest regional factor affecting Beijing’s foreign security policy | for the South China Sea Washington must change its approach to reframe the issue as a conflict that directly involves the United States and requires Beijing to act as such Making this a bilateral U.S.–China issue would lead Beijing to question its strategy because China’s relationship with the United States is the biggest regional factor affecting Beijing’s security policy | The United States and China must meet at the negotiating table to hammer out a security arrangement for the South China Sea that can allow both sides to maintain their interests while also de-escalating tensions. To meet with China at the bargaining table, Washington must change its approach. Namely, it must do more than operate on the periphery in order to shape the region. It must reframe the South China Sea issue as a conflict that directly involves the United States and requires Beijing to act as such. Making this a bilateral U.S.–China issue would lead Beijing to question its strategy, because China’s relationship with the United States and its role in the Asia-Pacific is the biggest regional factor affecting Beijing’s foreign security policy. | 758 | <h4><strong>China will say yes—US-China relations are comparatively more important, and the plan raises the stakes in the South China Sea</h4><p></strong>Michael <strong>Fuchs</strong>, senior Fellow at American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. foreign policy priorities and U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific, 3-2-<strong>2016</strong>, Safe Harbor," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-02/safe-harbor, Accessed: 6-1-2016, /Kent Denver-MB</p><p><u>The United States and China must meet at the negotiating table to hammer out a security arrangement <mark>for the South China Sea</mark> that can allow both sides to maintain their interests while also de-escalating tensions.</u> To meet with China at the bargaining table, <u><strong><mark>Washington must change its approach</u></strong></mark>. Namely, <u>it must do more than operate on the periphery in order <mark>to</mark> shape the region. It must <mark>reframe the</mark> South China Sea <mark>issue</mark> <mark>as a conflict that directly</mark> <mark>involves</mark> <mark>the United</mark> <mark>States</mark> <mark>and requires Beijing to act as such</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Making this a bilateral U.S.–China issue would lead Beijing to question its strategy</mark>,</u></strong> <u><mark>because</mark> <mark>China’s relationship with the United States</mark> and its role in the Asia-Pacific <mark>is the biggest regional factor affecting Beijing’s</mark> foreign <mark>security policy</u></mark>.</p> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Solvency | 2AC AT: Say No | 178,756 | 7 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,033 | China economic collapse undermines the ccp | Fallows 12/1 | Fallows 12/1 (James Fallows is based in Washington as a national correspondent for The Atlantic. He has worked for the magazine for nearly 35 years and in that time has also lived in Seattle, Berkeley, Austin, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Sydney, Shanghai, and Beijing. He was raised in Redlands, California, received his undergraduate degree in American history and literature from Harvard, and received a graduate degree in economics from Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. In addition to working for The Atlantic, he has spent two years as chief White House speechwriter for Jimmy Carter, two years as the editor of US News & World Report, and six months as a program designer at Microsoft. He is an instrument-rated private pilot, December 1, 2016, China's Great Leap Backward," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/, Accessed: 12-2-2016, /Kent Denver-MB) | for China the short-term stability and long-term improvement of jobs, wages, and living standards are fundamental to the government’s survival sustained economic failure would naturally raise questions about the system as a whole, as it did in the Soviet Union | for China short-term stability and long-term improvement of jobs, wages, and living standards are fundamental to the government’s survival sustained economic failure would naturally raise questions about the system as a whole, as it did in the Soviet Union | Nor is the question mainly about economics, although for China the short-term stability and long-term improvement of jobs, wages, and living standards are fundamental to the government’s survival. Under China’s single-party Communist arrangement, sustained economic failure would naturally raise questions about the system as a whole, as it did in the Soviet Union. True, modern China’s economic performance even during its slowdowns is like the Soviet Union’s during its booms. But the absence of a political outlet for dissatisfaction is similar. | 548 | <h4>China economic collapse undermines the ccp</h4><p><strong>Fallows 12/1</strong> (James Fallows is based in Washington as a national correspondent for The Atlantic. He has worked for the magazine for nearly 35 years and in that time has also lived in Seattle, Berkeley, Austin, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Sydney, Shanghai, and Beijing. He was raised in Redlands, California, received his undergraduate degree in American history and literature from Harvard, and received a graduate degree in economics from Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. In addition to working for The Atlantic, he has spent two years as chief White House speechwriter for Jimmy Carter, two years as the editor of US News & World Report, and six months as a program designer at Microsoft. He is an instrument-rated private pilot, December 1, 2016, China's Great Leap Backward," Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/, Accessed: 12-2-2016, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p>Nor is the question mainly about economics, although <u><strong><mark>for China</mark> the <mark>short-term stability and long-term</mark> <mark>improvement of jobs, wages, and living standards are fundamental to the government’s survival</u></strong></mark>. Under China’s single-party Communist arrangement, <u><strong><mark>sustained economic failure</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>would naturally raise questions about the system as a whole, as it did in the Soviet Union</u></strong></mark>. True, modern China’s economic performance even during its slowdowns is like the Soviet Union’s during its booms. But the absence of a political outlet for dissatisfaction is similar.</p> | 1NC | DA | 1NC Xi Politics | 1,560,759 | 11 | 126,162 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | 660,692 | N | Golden Desert | 6 | Damien MP | Joel Lemuel | 1AC - AIIB
1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case
2NC - T QPQ Politics DA
1NR - Commission CP
2NR Commission CP Politics DA | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,034 | Liberal international order solves multiple existential threats – it is try or die | Nye 2017 | Nye 2017 (Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University,won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.January 2017, Will the Liberal Order Survive?," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive, Accessed: 1-11-2017, /Kent Denver-MB) | The order will inevitably look somewhat different as China will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will drop But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the United States from its dominant position the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number of transnational issues, such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cybersecurity, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond Complexity is growing, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments. Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the action. Even if the United States remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve many of its international goals acting alone international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure it Global climate change and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves And in a world where borders are becoming more porous, letting in everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must use soft power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself On the new transnational issues however, success will require the cooperation of others and thus empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals power becomes a positive-sum game: one needs to think of not just the United States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can acquire by working with others. In such a world, the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power, and here, too, the United States leads the pack | the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power putting a number of transnational issues such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cybersecurity on the global agenda Complexity is growing the United States will not be able to achieve its goals alone financial stability needs the cooperation of others Global climate change Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves. And in a world becoming more porous from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must use soft power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges On transnational issues success will require cooperation empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals power becomes a positive-sum game the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power | The order will inevitably look somewhat different as the twenty-first century progresses. China, India, and other economies will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will drop. But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the United States from its dominant position. Even so, the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number of transnational issues, such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and cybersecurity, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond. Complexity is growing, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments. Individuals and private organizations—from corporations and nongovernmental organizations to terrorists and social movements—are being empowered, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly on power of traditional bureaucracies. Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the action. Even if the United States remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve many of its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure it. Global climate change and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves. And in a world where borders are becoming more porous, letting in everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must use soft power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges. Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself. The U.S. Navy is crucial when it comes to policing the law of the seas and defending freedom of navigation, and the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds international financial stability by serving as a lender of last resort. On the new transnational issues, however, success will require the cooperation of others—and thus empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals. In this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game: one needs to think of not just the United States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can acquire by working with others. In such a world, the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power, and here, too, the United States leads the pack. The United States comes first in the Lowy Institute’s ranking of nations by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and The Economist estimates that nearly 100 of the 150 largest countries lean toward it, while only 21 lean against it. | 2,946 | <h4>Liberal international order solves multiple existential threats – it is try or die</h4><p><strong>Nye 2017</strong> (Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor, and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University,won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University, and earned a PhD in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.January 2017, Will the Liberal Order Survive?," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive, Accessed: 1-11-2017, /Kent Denver-MB)</p><p><u>The order will inevitably look somewhat different as</u> the twenty-first century progresses. <u>China</u>, India, and other economies <u>will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will drop</u>. <u><strong>But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the United States from its dominant position</u></strong>. Even so, <u><mark>the order</mark> <mark>may</mark> <mark>still be threatened by a general diffusion of power</mark> away from governments toward nonstate actors.</u> <u>The information revolution is <mark>putting a number of transnational issues</mark>, <mark>such as <strong>financial stability</strong>, <strong>climate change</strong>, <strong>terrorism</strong>, <strong>pandemics</strong>, and <strong>cybersecurity</strong></mark>, <mark>on the global agenda</mark> at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all governments to respond</u>. <u><mark>Complexity is growing</mark>, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments.</u> Individuals and private organizations—from corporations and nongovernmental organizations to terrorists and social movements—are being empowered, and informal networks will undercut the monopoly on power of traditional bureaucracies. <u>Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the action.</u> <u>Even if <mark>the United States </mark>remains the largest power, accordingly, it <mark>will <strong>not be able to achieve </mark>many of <mark>its</mark> international <mark>goals</mark> acting <mark>alone</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u>international <mark>financial stability</mark> is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but the United <strong>States <mark>needs the cooperation of others</mark> to ensure it</u></strong>. <u><mark>Global climate change</mark> and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but <mark>Americans cannot manage these problems by themselves</u>.</mark> <u><mark>And</mark> <mark>in a world</mark> where borders are <mark>becoming more porous</mark>, letting in everything <mark>from</mark> <mark>drugs to infectious diseases</mark> <mark>to terrorism, <strong>nations must use soft power to develop networks and build</mark> <mark>institutions to address shared threats and challenges</u></strong></mark>. <u>Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself</u>. The U.S. Navy is crucial when it comes to policing the law of the seas and defending freedom of navigation, and the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds international financial stability by serving as a lender of last resort. <u><strong><mark>On</mark> the new <mark>transnational</mark> <mark>issues</u></strong></mark>, <u>however, <mark>success will require</mark> the <mark>cooperation</mark> of others</u>—<u>and thus <mark>empowering</mark> <mark>others</mark> <mark>can help the United States accomplish its own goals</u></mark>. In this sense, <u><strong><mark>power becomes a positive-sum game</mark>: </strong>one needs to think of not just the United States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can acquire by working with others.</u> <u>In such a world, <mark>the ability to connect with others becomes a major source of power</mark>, and here, too, the United States leads the pack</u>. The United States comes first in the Lowy Institute’s ranking of nations by number of embassies, consulates, and missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and The Economist estimates that nearly 100 of the 150 largest countries lean toward it, while only 21 lean against it.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order | 6,372 | 100 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,035 | U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global challenges including warming | Cohen et al. 9 | Cohen et al. 9 — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1) | Sino-U.S. relations has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship the most influential in the world the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation | Sino-U.S. relations have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other arrangement the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address financial stability, energy security climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation | The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. | 963 | <h4>U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address <u>all global challenges</u> including warming </h4><p><strong>Cohen et al. 9</strong> — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)</p><p>The evolution of <u><mark>Sino-U.S. relations</u></mark> over the next months, years, and decades <u>has the potential to <mark>have a <strong>greater impact on global security and prosperity</strong> than any other</u></mark> bilateral or multilateral <u><mark>arrangement</u></mark>. In this sense, <u>many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship</u> to be <u>the most influential in the world</u>. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, <u><mark>the <strong>trajectory of U.S.-China relations</strong> will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address <strong></mark>the toughest global challenges</strong>: <strong>global <mark>financial stability</strong>, <strong>energy security</strong> </mark>and <strong><mark>climate change</strong>, <strong>nonproliferation</strong>, and <strong>terrorism</strong></mark>, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a <strong>priority</strong> for Washington and Beijing. <strong>Virtually <mark>no major global challenge</strong> can be met without U.S.-China cooperation</u></mark>.</p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 2 | 1,562,854 | 69 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,036 | The aff’s opposition to reformism dooms them to irrelevance. Affirmation produces catharsis, but cements inequality. | Smulewicz-Zucker 15 | Smulewicz-Zucker 15 – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY | Radical politics in contemporary western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting radical theory has blossomed Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to machinations of real politics and the broader culture leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether left critique possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum, they are generally focused on questions of culture, and are generally obsessed with questions of identity divorced from questions of political power which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and anarchic democracy economic inequality has ballooned working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force This has been the result of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory this is the result of a transformation of the left a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other intellectual fads This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose we should seek not the utopian post-statist” politics, but to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and democratize society and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends Once grounded in the impulse for equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade these concerns Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments or respond to their critics. Their purported radicalism becomes all the more opaque when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated subjectivity, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” all serve to deplete the radical tradition of its potency Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve to splinter forms of political resistance, consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence and political irrelevance the disintegration of the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the labor movement to the Civil Rights movement – has detached philosophical thinking from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly. The result has been the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy the survival of the tradition of rational, radical political and social criticism pivots on a confrontation with these new academic trends and fads | Radical politics finds itself in a state of crisis theory has blossomed there is a profound lack in substantive political criticism that once made left discourse relevant leftist theory has fallen so far from actual issues the question can be whether left possess a critical mass to sustain struggles movements have lost momentum they are obsessed with questions of identity divorced from political power This result of a lack of concern with real politics in radical theory. discourse has become dominated by intellectual fads so irrelevant it ends up serving as a cathartic space further stabilizing systemic power rather than disrupting it we should seek not post-statist” politics, but orient powers toward common ends Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments purported radicalism becomes more opaque when coherence is called into question exaggerated subjectivity serve to deplete radical tradition of its potency Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies to splinter resistance consigning radicalism to incoherence and irrelevance disintegration of labor to Civil Rights has the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy the survival of the rational, radical criticism pivots on confrontation with these new fads | (Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)
Radical politics in contemporary western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and sub-fields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political, social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture. Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity – from the workers movement to the Civil Rights movement – possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles. Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum, they are generally focused on questions of culture, shallow discussions of class, and are generally obsessed with questions of identity divorced from the questions of material forms of oppression rather than on the great “social question” of unequal distributions of economic and political power which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force. This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades – a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. At a time when the left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism,further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose. The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics, but rather to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and class, democratize all aspects of society and economy, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and re-thinking the ends of the labor movement – connecting the struggles labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture and the nature of the social order more broadly – can we envision a revitalization of a worker’s movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.[1] But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. Once grounded in the Enlightenment impulse for progress, equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade the concrete nature of these concerns. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments or respond to their critics. Their purported radicalism becomes all the more opaque when the coherence of their claims is called into question. A concern for an exaggerated subjectivity, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” – all serve to deplete the radical tradition of its potency. Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies, invent new forms of “subjectivity,” and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve to splinter forms of political resistance, consigning radicalism to the depths of incoherence and (academic success notwithstanding) political irrelevance. Indeed, the disintegration of the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the labor movement to the Civil Rights movement – has detached philosophical thinking from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly. The result has been – despite the ironic new turn toward “anti-philosophy” – the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy. Abstraction has been the result, as well as a panoply of shibboleths that have only served to sever “radical” thought from its relevance to contemporary politics and society. It seems to us that the survival of the tradition of rational, radical political and social criticism pivots on a confrontation with these new academic trends and fads. | 7,373 | <h4>The aff’s <u>opposition</u> to reformism <u>dooms</u> them to irrelevance. Affirmation produces <u>catharsis</u>, but <u>cements</u> inequality.</h4><p><strong>Smulewicz-Zucker 15</strong> – Professor of Philosophy @ Baruch College CUNY</p><p>(Gregory, “The Treason of Intellectual Radicalism and the Collapse of Leftist Politics,” LOGOS, Winter edition)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Radical politics</mark> in contemporary western democracies <mark>finds itself in a state of crisis</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting</u></strong>. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, <u><strong>radical <mark>theory has</mark> <mark>blossomed</u></strong></mark>. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and sub-fields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. <u><strong>Despite this, <mark>there is a profound lack in substantive</mark>, meaningful <mark>political</u></strong></mark>, social, and cultural <u><strong><mark>criticism</mark> of the kind <mark>that</mark> <mark>once made</mark> progressive and rational <mark>left</mark> political <mark>discourse relevant</mark> to</u></strong> the <u><strong>machinations of real politics and the broader culture</u></strong>. Today, <u><strong><mark>leftist</mark> political <mark>theory</mark> in the academy <mark>has fallen</mark> under the spell of ideas <mark>so far</mark> removed <mark>from actual</mark> political <mark>issues</mark> that <mark>the question can be</mark> posed <mark>whether</u></strong></mark> the traditions of <u><strong><mark>left</mark> critique</u></strong> that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity – from the workers movement to the Civil Rights movement – <u><strong><mark>possess a critical mass to sustain</mark> future <mark>struggles</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Quite to the contrary, social <mark>movements have lost</mark> political <mark>momentum</mark>, <mark>they are</mark> generally focused on questions of culture,</u></strong> shallow discussions of class, <u><strong>and are generally <mark>obsessed with questions of identity divorced from</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong>questions of</u></strong> material forms of oppression rather than on the great “social question” of unequal distributions of economic and <u><strong><mark>political power</mark> which once served as the driving impulse for political, social and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and</u></strong> illusory visions of <u><strong>anarchic democracy</u></strong>, <u><strong>economic inequality has ballooned</u></strong> into oligarchic proportions, <u><strong>working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups are turned into a modern “coolie” labor force</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>This</mark> has been the <mark>result</u></strong></mark>, we contend, <u><strong><mark>of a lack of concern with real politics in</mark> contemporary <mark>radical theory</u></strong>.</mark> Further, we believe that <u><strong>this is the result of a transformation of</u></strong> ideas, that contemporary political theory on <u><strong>the left</u></strong> has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades – <u><strong>a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age</u></strong>. At a time when the left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, <u><strong>political <mark>discourse has become</mark> increasingly <mark>dominated by</mark> the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, post-colonialism, and other <mark>intellectual</mark> <mark>fads</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This new radicalism has made itself <mark>so irrelevant</mark> with respect to real politics that <mark>it ends up serving as a</mark> kind of <mark>cathartic space </mark>for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism</u></strong>,<u><strong><mark>further stabilizing</mark> its <mark>systemic</mark> and integrative <mark>power rather than disrupting it</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose</u></strong>. The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to post-industrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what <u><strong><mark>we</u></strong></mark> would call a rational radical politics <u><strong><mark>should seek not</mark> the utopian </u></strong>end of a “<u><strong><mark>post-statist” politics, but</u></strong></mark> rather <u><strong>to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and</u></strong> class, <u><strong>democratize</u></strong> all aspects of <u><strong>society</u></strong> and economy, <u><strong>and seek to <mark>orient</mark> the <mark>powers</mark> of individuals and the community <mark>toward common ends</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and re-thinking the ends of the labor movement – connecting the struggles labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture and the nature of the social order more broadly – can we envision a revitalization of a worker’s movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.[1] But this is merely one fringe expression of what we see as a corrupted, simplified and de-politicized “new” radicalism. <u><strong>Once grounded in the</u></strong> Enlightenment <u><strong>impulse for</u></strong> progress, <u><strong>equality, rationalism, and the critical confrontation with asymmetrical power relations, the dominant trends of radical political thought now evade</u></strong> the concrete nature of <u><strong>these concerns</u></strong>. The battles that raged in the 1980s and 1990s between postmodernists and defenders of modernity – while serving as a harbinger of the contemporary split between the radical theorists divorced from reality and those who seek to establish anti-foundationalist conceptions of democratic discourse – were attached to a strong sense that the future of rationalism and radical politics hung in the balance. <u><strong><mark>Today’s radical intellectuals do not feel compelled to defend their arguments</mark> or respond to their critics. Their <mark>purported radicalism becomes</mark> all the <mark>more opaque when</mark> the <mark>coherence</mark> of their claims <mark>is called into question</mark>. A concern for an <mark>exaggerated subjectivity</mark>, identity politics, anti-empirical theories of power, an obsession with “difference” </u></strong>– <u><strong>all <mark>serve to deplete</mark> the <mark>radical tradition of its potency</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Radical intellectuals now formulate new vocabularies</u></strong></mark>, invent new forms of “subjectivity,” <u><strong>and concoct new languages of discourse that only serve <mark>to splinter</mark> forms of political <mark>resistance</mark>, <mark>consigning</mark> <mark>radicalism to</mark> the depths of <mark>incoherence and</u></strong></mark> (academic success notwithstanding) <u><strong>political <mark>irrelevance</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, <u><strong>the <mark>disintegration of</mark> the great radical movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – from the <mark>labor</mark> movement <mark>to</mark> the <mark>Civil Rights</mark> movement – has detached philosophical thinking from the mechanisms of power and political reality more broadly. The result <mark>has</mark> been</u></strong> – despite the ironic new turn toward “anti-philosophy” – <u><strong><mark>the conquest of politics by poorly constructed philosophy</u></strong></mark>. Abstraction has been the result, as well as a panoply of shibboleths that have only served to sever “radical” thought from its relevance to contemporary politics and society. It seems to us that <u><strong><mark>the survival of the</mark> tradition of <mark>rational, radical</mark> political and social <mark>criticism pivots on</mark> a <mark>confrontation with these new</mark> academic trends and <mark>fads</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | K – Legal Reformism | 1NC | 53,905 | 243 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,037 | The plan solves Taiwan war, that’s Glaser 11 and 15, multiple warrants: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>The plan solves Taiwan war, that’s Glaser 11 and 15, multiple warrants:</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Flashpoints/Taiwan | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,075 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,038 | Reasons to prefer | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Reasons to prefer</h4> | 2NC/NR | 1 K | Framework | 1,561,076 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,039 | Impact is nuclear war | Yee and Storey 02 bjs | Yee and Storey 02 [Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality”, Taylor and Francis Group, pdf] bjs | The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords From this perspective a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world. | the fear of economic collapse in the PRC resulting in territorial fragmentation civil war and waves of refugees have a negative impact on stability Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems problems are putting a strain on the government’s ability to govern effectively Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result A fragmented China could result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible warlords disintegrating would pose a threat to the world | The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.12 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world. | 1,254 | <h4>Impact is nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Yee and Storey 02 </strong>[Herbert - Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University. Ian - Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality”, Taylor and Francis Group, pdf] <u><strong>bjs</p><p>The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is <mark>the fear of</mark> political and <mark>economic collapse in the PRC</mark>, <mark>resulting in territorial fragmentation</mark>, <mark>civil war and</mark> <mark>waves of refugees</mark> pouring into neighbouring countries</u></strong>. Naturally, <u><strong>any or all of these scenarios would <mark>have a</mark> profoundly <mark>negative impact on</mark> regional <mark>stability</mark>. <mark>Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems</mark>, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation </u></strong>and pollution. <u><strong>These <mark>problems are putting a strain on</mark> <mark>the</mark> central <mark>government’s ability to govern</mark> <mark>effectively</mark>. <mark>Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might</mark> <mark>result</mark> in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. <mark>A fragmented China could</mark> </u></strong>also <u><strong><mark>result in</mark> another nightmare scenario—<mark>nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible</mark> local provincial leaders or <mark>warlords</u></strong></mark>.12 <u><strong>From this perspective</u></strong>, <u><strong>a <mark>disintegrating</mark> China <mark>would</mark> also <mark>pose a threat to</mark> its neighbours and <mark>the world</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | DA | 1NC Xi Politics | 24,663 | 266 | 126,162 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | 660,692 | N | Golden Desert | 6 | Damien MP | Joel Lemuel | 1AC - AIIB
1NC - Xi Politics DA Agenda Politics DA Commission CP T QPQ Dollar Heg Turn On Case Appeasement Turn On Case
2NC - T QPQ Politics DA
1NR - Commission CP
2NR Commission CP Politics DA | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Neg-Golden%20Desert-Round6.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,040 | Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China | Ayson 10 | Ayson 10
Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld) | major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. if the act came as a surprise American suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors consisting of North Korea, Iran Pakistan Russia and China , if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, The reverse might well apply too should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack Washington’s response raise the possibility of nuclear confrontation with Russia and/or China. in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against the temptations to preempt such actions might grow | nuclear terrorism, could precipitate exchange of nuclear weapons between states suspicion would shift to state possessors should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China Moscow and Beijing might consider the United States a perpetrator noise and confusion might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions and the temptations to preempt such actions might grow | A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. | 5,686 | <h4><strong>Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China</h4><p>Ayson 10</p><p></strong>Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)</p><p>A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the <u>major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal</u>, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But <u>these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack</u>, and especially an act of <u><mark>nuclear terrorism, could precipitate</mark> a chain of events leading to a massive <mark>exchange of nuclear weapons</mark> <mark>between</mark> two or more of the <mark>states</mark> that possess them. </u>In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, <u>if the act</u> of nuclear terrorism <u>came as a</u> complete <u>surprise</u>, and <u>American</u> officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) <u><mark>suspicion would shift</mark> immediately <mark>to state possessors</u></mark>. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list <u>consisting of North Korea,</u> perhaps <u>Iran</u> if its program continues, and possibly <u>Pakistan</u>. But at what stage would <u>Russia and China</u> be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular<u>, if the act of</u> <u>nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst</u>? Of course, the chances of <u>this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war,</u> as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. <u>The reverse might well apply too</u>: <u><mark>should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China</u></mark> during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, <u>could <mark>Moscow and Beijing</mark> resist the pressures that <mark>might</mark> rise domestically to <mark>consider the United States</mark> as <mark>a</mark> possible <mark>perpetrator</mark> or encourager of the attack</u>? <u>Washington’s</u> early <u>response</u> to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also <u>raise the possibility of</u> an unwanted (and <u>nuclear</u> aided) <u>confrontation with Russia and/or China.</u> For example, <u>in the <mark>noise and confusion</mark> during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack</u>, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, <u>it is just possible that Moscow and/or China <mark>might mistakenly read this as a sign</mark> <mark>of U.S. intentions</mark> to use force (<mark>and</mark> possibly nuclear force) against</u> them. In that situation, <u><mark>the temptations to preempt such actions might grow</u></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.</p> | null | 1AC | Advantage 2 is the Liberal Order | 5,359 | 656 | 126,164 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | 660,652 | A | Golden Desert | 4 | Notre Dame MP | Jack Lassiter | 1AC - Taiwan (Sorta New You Should Check it Out)
1NC - Security K T-Reznick
2NR - K | hspolicy16/KentDenver/KrKi/Kent%20Denver-Krauss-Kim-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round4.docx | null | 56,019 | KrKi | Kent Denver KrKi | null | Ni..... | Kr..... | Ja..... | Ki..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,041 | Warming causes extinction | Mccoy 14 | Mccoy 14 (Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510) | the IPCC’s new report should leave no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the climate system and it is “extremely likely that more than half of the increase in temperature is anthropogenic Its report outlines the threats of warming: increased scarcity of food and water; extreme weather rise in sea level loss of biodiversity areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass migration, conflict and violence. the well being of all nations [is] at risk climate change is “the greatest threat to human health Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations The IPCC warns of “tipping points which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts | increase in temperature is anthropogenic the threats of warming scarcity of food and water rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity and mass migration, conflict and violence climate change could lead to a catastrophic collapse of systems | The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human survival, health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6] | 2,661 | <h4>Warming causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Mccoy 14 </strong>(Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510)</p><p>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], <u>the IPCC’s new report should leave</u> the world in <u><strong>no doubt</strong> about the <strong>scale</strong> and <strong>immediacy</strong> of the threat to <strong>human survival</strong>,</u> health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that <u>it is “<strong>virtually certain</strong> that human influence has warmed the</u> global <u>climate system</u>” <u>and</u> that <u>it is “<strong>extremely likely</strong> that more than half of the</u> observed <u><mark>increase in</u> </mark>global average surface <u><mark>temperature</u></mark> from 1951 to 2010” <u><mark>is anthropogenic</u></mark> [1]. <u>Its</u> new <u>report outlines <mark>the</u></mark> future <u><mark>threats</mark> <mark>of</mark> </u>further global <u><mark>warming</mark>: increased <mark>scarcity of food and</mark> </u>fresh <u><mark>water</mark>; extreme weather</u> events; <u><mark>rise in sea level</u>; <u>loss of biodiversity</u></mark>; <u>areas becoming <strong>uninhabitable;</strong> <mark>and mass</u></mark> human <u><mark>migration, conflict and violence</mark>.</u> Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “<u>the well being of</u> people of <u>all nations [is] at risk</u>.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that <u><mark>climate change</mark> is “the <strong>greatest threat</strong> to human health</u> of the 21st century.” [3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. <u>Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet</u>. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years. [4] “<u><strong>Business as usual</strong>” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations</u> from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. <u>The IPCC warns of “<strong>tipping points</u></strong>” in the Earth’s system, <u>which, if crossed, <mark>could lead to a <strong>catastrophic collapse</strong> of</mark> interlinked human and natural <mark>systems</u></mark>. The AAAS concludes that <u>there is now a “real chance of <strong>abrupt,</strong> <strong>unpredictable</strong> and potentially <strong>irreversible</strong> changes with <strong>highly damaging</strong> impacts</u> on people around the globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6] </p> | 1AC | 1AC | Advantage 2 | 47,595 | 469 | 126,106 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | 660,755 | A | Berkeley | 2 | Classical TS | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC-Taiwan
Adv 1-Taiwan
Adv 2-Relations
Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HsTa/Kent%20Denver-Hsia-Tamkin-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx | null | 56,025 | HsTa | Kent Denver HsTa | null | Al..... | Hs..... | Da..... | Ta..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,042 | Political progress happens. Recognizing that doesn’t produce complacency, and building politics is far more valuable than theorizing about anti-institutional black agency | Reed 15 | Reed 15 – professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania | What approach to political action can follow from the contention that the Thirteenth Amendment was empty window dressing The perspective that shrivels the scope of black political concern to expressing racial “agency” diminishes the significance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the US Supreme Court’s Smith v. Allwright decision that outlawed the infamous “white primary” (and exponentially increased black voting in the South), the 1954 Brown decision, 1964 Civil Rights law, and 1965 Voting Rights Act as if all were in some twisted way racially inauthentic because acknowledging their significance as moments in the struggle for social justice detracts from Black Liberation The psychobabbling bromides that elevate recognition and celebration of black agency rest on an ideological perspective that in practical terms rejects effective black political action in favor of expressive display. It is the worldview of an element of the contemporary black professional stratum anchored in the academy whose standing in public life is bound up with establishing a professional authority in speaking for the race. This is the occupational niche of the so-called black public intellectuals faddish chattering-class blather and debate illustrates the utter fatuity of this domain, as if there were any reason to care about a squabble between two with no constituency or links to institutions the newly confected category of the Black Public Intellectual were not organically rooted in any dynamic political activity and emerged only after opportunities for real connection to political movements had disappeared Rather, their status was no more than a posture and a brand. By the early 2000s, it was possible to see young people entering doctoral programs with their sights on the academy as a venue for racial commentariat But the politics enacted in those venues is by and large an ersatz politics, and the controversies that sustain them are by and large ephemeral, vacant bullshit the “feud” between Iggy Azalea and Azealia Banks, whether black people were dissed because Selma wasn’t nominated In the context of this sort of non-stop idiotic bread and circuses it is good to reflect on one of the crucial moments in American history when the linking of social and political forces presented a clear choice between egalitarian and inegalitarian interests, and masses of black people joined with others to strike a consequential blow for social justice and to wipe the scourge of slavery from the United States No, it wasn’t a final victory over inequality it didn’t usher in a utopian order, and the greatest promises were unfulfilled But it was one of the most important victories that egalitarian forces have won, along with those of the twentieth-century labor, civil rights, and women’s movements, and it is worth reflecting on it and the ways it changed the country for the better the path to winning the kind of just world to which a left should aspire requires building a politics that seeks to unite the many to defeat the few. Any other focus is either unserious or retrograde | The perspective that shrivels the scope of black political concern to expressing racial “agency diminishes the significance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the decision that outlawed the white primary” Voting Rights Act as if all were in some twisted way racially inauthentic because acknowledging their significance as moments in the struggle for social justice detracts from Black Liberation in practical terms rejects effective black political action in favor of expressive display. the newly confected category of the Black Public Intellectual were not organically rooted in any dynamic political activity and merged only after opportunities for real connection to political movements had disappeared Rather, their status was no more than a posture and a brand the controversies that sustain them are by and large ephemeral, vacant bullshit it is good to reflect on one of the crucial moment to wipe the scourge of slavery from the United States.∂ No, it wasn’t a final victory over inequality it didn’t usher in a utopian order, and the greatest promises were unfulfilled But it was one of the most important victories that egalitarian forces have won, along with those of the twentieth-century labor, civil rights, and women’s movements, and it is worth reflecting on it and the ways it changed the country for the better the path to winning the kind of just world to which a left should aspire requires building a politics that seeks to unite the many to defeat the few. Any other focus is either unserious or retrograde | (Adolph, “The James Brown Theory of Black Liberation,” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/adolph-reed-black-liberation-django-lincoln-selma-glory/)
What approach to political action can follow from the contention that the Thirteenth Amendment was empty window dressing and that black slaves’ emancipation was like James Brown’s backward, Nixonian ideal of self-help?∂ The perspective that shrivels the scope of black political concern to expressing racial “agency” similarly diminishes the significance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the US Supreme Court’s 1944 Smith v. Allwright decision that outlawed the infamous “white primary” (and exponentially increased black voting in the South), the 1954 Brown decision, 1964 Civil Rights law, and 1965 Voting Rights Act as if all were in some twisted way racially inauthentic because acknowledging their significance as moments in the struggle for social justice detracts from the James Brown Theory of Black Liberation.∂ That ideological commitment is what impelled Ava DuVernay to make the seemingly gratuitous move of falsifying Martin Luther King Jr’s relationship with the Johnson administration around the Selma campaign: “I wasn’t interested in making a white savior movie,” she replied to critics, “I was interested in making a movie centered on the people of Selma.”∂ Of course, she doesn’t do the latter either, but her commitment to not “making a white savior movie” also led her to misconstrue the tension between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Selma, which stemmed precisely from the SNCC activists’ objection that King and his organization maintained secret, backdoor dealings with the Johnson administration.∂ The psychobabbling bromides that elevate recognition and celebration of black agency rest on an ideological perspective that in practical terms rejects effective black political action in favor of expressive display. It is the worldview of an element of the contemporary black professional stratum anchored in the academy, blogosphere, and the world of mass media chat whose standing in public life is bound up with establishing a professional authority in speaking for the race. This is the occupational niche of the so-called black public intellectuals.∂ The torrent of faddish chattering-class blather and trivial debate sparked by Michael Eric Dyson’s recent attack on Cornel West in the New Republic illustrates the utter fatuity of this domain, as if there were any reason to care about a squabble between two freelance Racial Voices with no constituency or links to radical institutions between them.∂ In an illustration of what this game is all about, the Nation, sensing space for competing brands, projected some Alternative Black Voices into this circus of spurious racial representation in a piece entitled “6 Scholars Who Are ‘Reimagining Black Politics.’ ”∂ Twenty years practically to the week before publication of Dyson’s essay, I took stock of what was then the newly confected category of the Black Public Intellectual and noted that the notion’s definitive irony was that its avatars were quite specifically not organically rooted in any dynamic political activity and in fact emerged only after opportunities for real connection to political movements had disappeared. Nor were the “public intellectuals” connected to any particular strain of scholarship or criticism.∂ Rather, their status was no more than a posture and a brand. By the early 2000s, it was possible to see young people entering doctoral programs with their sights on the academy as a venue for pursuing careers as public intellectuals — i.e. among the free-floating racial commentariat. And that was before the explosion of the blogosphere and Twitterverse, which have exponentially increased both avenues for realizing such aspirations and the numbers of people pursuing them.∂ But the politics enacted in those venues is by and large an ersatz politics, and the controversies that sustain them are by and large ephemeral, vacant bullshit — the “feud” between Iggy Azalea and Azealia Banks, whether black people were dissed because Selma wasn’t nominated for/didn’t win enough Oscars, and so on.∂ In the context of this sort of non-stop idiotic bread and circuses — and this may be an apt moment to remind that the blogosphere is open to any fool with a computer and Internet access — it is good to reflect on one of the crucial moments in American history when the linking of social and political forces presented a clear choice between egalitarian and inegalitarian interests, and masses of black people joined with others to strike a consequential blow for social justice and to wipe the scourge of slavery from the United States.∂ No, it wasn’t a final victory over inequality — it didn’t usher in a utopian order, and the greatest promises opened by the triumph were unfulfilled or largely undone. But it was one of the most important victories that egalitarian forces have won, along with those of the twentieth-century labor, civil rights, and women’s movements, and it is worth reflecting on it and the ways it changed the country for the better.∂ That struggle against the slaveholders’ insurrection, along with those latter movements, also underscores the fact that the path to winning the kind of just world to which a left should aspire requires building a politics that seeks, as the old saying goes, to unite the many to defeat the few. Any other focus is either unserious or retrograde. | 5,541 | <h4>Political progress happens. Recognizing that doesn’t produce complacency, and building politics is far more valuable than theorizing about anti-institutional black agency</h4><p><strong>Reed 15</strong> – professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania</p><p>(Adolph, “The James Brown Theory of Black Liberation,” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/adolph-reed-black-liberation-django-lincoln-selma-glory/)</p><p><u><strong>What approach to political action can follow from the contention that the Thirteenth Amendment was empty window dressing</u></strong> and that black slaves’ emancipation was like James Brown’s backward, Nixonian ideal of self-help?∂ <u><strong><mark>The perspective that shrivels the scope of black political concern to expressing racial “agency</mark>”</u></strong> similarly <u><strong><mark>diminishes the significance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,</mark> <mark>the</mark> US Supreme Court’s</u></strong> 1944 <u><strong>Smith v. Allwright <mark>decision that outlawed the</mark> infamous “<mark>white primary”</mark> (and exponentially increased black voting in the South), the 1954 Brown decision, 1964 Civil Rights law, and 1965 <mark>Voting Rights Act as if all were in some twisted way racially inauthentic because acknowledging their significance as moments in the struggle for social justice detracts from</u></strong></mark> the James Brown Theory of <u><strong><mark>Black Liberation</u></strong></mark>.∂ That ideological commitment is what impelled Ava DuVernay to make the seemingly gratuitous move of falsifying Martin Luther King Jr’s relationship with the Johnson administration around the Selma campaign: “I wasn’t interested in making a white savior movie,” she replied to critics, “I was interested in making a movie centered on the people of Selma.”∂ Of course, she doesn’t do the latter either, but her commitment to not “making a white savior movie” also led her to misconstrue the tension between the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in Selma, which stemmed precisely from the SNCC activists’ objection that King and his organization maintained secret, backdoor dealings with the Johnson administration.∂ <u><strong>The psychobabbling bromides that elevate recognition and celebration of black agency rest on an ideological perspective that <mark>in practical terms rejects effective black political action in favor of expressive display.</mark> It is the worldview of an element of the contemporary black professional stratum anchored in the academy</u></strong>, blogosphere, and the world of mass media chat <u><strong>whose standing in public life is bound up with establishing a professional authority in speaking for the race. This is the occupational niche of the so-called black public intellectuals</u></strong>.∂ The torrent of <u><strong>faddish chattering-class blather and</u></strong> trivial <u><strong>debate</u></strong> sparked by Michael Eric Dyson’s recent attack on Cornel West in the New Republic <u><strong>illustrates the utter fatuity of this domain, as if there were any reason to care about a squabble between two</u></strong> freelance Racial Voices <u><strong>with no constituency or links to </u></strong>radical <u><strong>institutions</u></strong> between them.∂ In an illustration of what this game is all about, the Nation, sensing space for competing brands, projected some Alternative Black Voices into this circus of spurious racial representation in a piece entitled “6 Scholars Who Are ‘Reimagining Black Politics.’ ”∂ Twenty years practically to the week before publication of Dyson’s essay, I took stock of what was then <u><strong><mark>the newly confected category of the Black Public Intellectual</u></strong></mark> and noted that the notion’s definitive irony was that its avatars <u><strong><mark>were</u></strong></mark> quite specifically <u><strong><mark>not organically rooted in any dynamic political activity and</u></strong></mark> in fact <u><strong>e<mark>merged only after opportunities for real connection to political movements had disappeared</u></strong></mark>. Nor were the “public intellectuals” connected to any particular strain of scholarship or criticism.∂ <u><strong><mark>Rather, their status was no more than a posture and a brand</mark>. By the early 2000s, it was possible to see young people entering doctoral programs with their sights on the academy as a venue for </u></strong>pursuing careers as public intellectuals — i.e. among the free-floating <u><strong>racial commentariat</u></strong>. And that was before the explosion of the blogosphere and Twitterverse, which have exponentially increased both avenues for realizing such aspirations and the numbers of people pursuing them.∂ <u><strong>But the politics enacted in those venues is by and large an ersatz politics, and <mark>the controversies that sustain them are by and large ephemeral, vacant bullshit</u></strong></mark> — <u><strong>the “feud” between Iggy Azalea and Azealia Banks, whether black people were dissed because Selma wasn’t nominated</u></strong> for/didn’t win enough Oscars, and so on.∂ <u><strong>In the context of this sort of non-stop idiotic bread and circuses</u></strong> — and this may be an apt moment to remind that the blogosphere is open to any fool with a computer and Internet access —<u><strong> <mark>it is good to reflect on one of the crucial moment</mark>s in American history when the linking of social and political forces presented a clear choice between egalitarian and inegalitarian interests, and masses of black people joined with others to strike a consequential blow for social justice and <mark>to wipe the scourge of slavery from the United States</u></strong>.∂</mark> <u><strong><mark>No, it wasn’t a final victory over inequality</u></strong></mark> — <u><strong><mark>it didn’t usher in a utopian order, and the greatest promises</u></strong></mark> opened by the triumph <u><strong><mark>were unfulfilled</u></strong></mark> or largely undone. <u><strong><mark>But it was one of the most important victories that egalitarian forces have won, along with those of the twentieth-century labor, civil rights, and women’s movements, and it is worth reflecting on it and the ways it changed the country for the better</u></strong></mark>.∂ That struggle against the slaveholders’ insurrection, along with those latter movements, also underscores the fact that <u><strong><mark>the path to winning the kind of just world to which a left should aspire requires building a politics that seeks</u></strong></mark>, as the old saying goes, <u><strong><mark>to unite the many to defeat the few. Any other focus is either unserious or retrograde</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | K – Legal Reformism | 1NC | 40,061 | 35 | 126,168 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | 660,775 | N | Berkeley | 5 | McDonogh JN | Anastasia Kazteridis | 1AC - Fugitivity
1NC - Framework Legalism K
2NC - Framework
1NR - Legalism
2NR - Framework K but kicked the alt | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HaRo/Kent%20Denver-Hamilton-Rolls-Neg-Berkeley-Round5.docx | null | 56,031 | HaRo | Kent Denver HaRo | null | Tu..... | Ha..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,043 | 1. It ends the root cause of military competition, fight over SLOC’s, modernization, and increasing nationals are all traced back to the importance of Taiwan | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>1. It ends the root cause of military competition, fight over SLOC’s, modernization, and increasing nationals are all traced back to the importance of Taiwan</h4></strong> | 2AC/1AR (LD) | Flashpoints/Taiwan | 2AC Solvency | 1,561,077 | 1 | 126,088 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | 660,779 | A | UC Berkeley Invitational | 5 | Davis WK | Hanna Wilson | 1AC
- FlashpointsTaiwan
- Relations
- Grand Bargain Solvency
1NC
- Topicality (Military)
- Discussion Counter Plan
- Japan DA
- Taiwan
- Relations | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoWo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Woodard-Aff-UC%20Berkeley%20Invitational-Round5.docx | null | 56,032 | HoWo | Kent Denver HoWo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ai..... | Wo..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
3,784,044 | Western epistemology endorses male domination by regarding it as a universal standard – that slows progression in philosophy and sciences – feminist epistemology solves by revealing its’ androcentricity
Jiang 5 (Xinyan Jiang, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Redlands, 2005, “Feminist Epistemology: An Introduction” http://csasc.org/2005/journal/ae13.pdf) | Jiang 5 Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Redlands, 2005, “Feminist Epistemology: An Introduction” http://csasc.org/2005/journal/ae13.pdf) | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Western epistemology endorses male domination by regarding it as a universal standard – that slows progression in philosophy and sciences – feminist epistemology solves by revealing its’ androcentricity</h4><p><strong>Jiang 5</strong> (Xinyan Jiang, <u><strong>Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Redlands, 2005, “Feminist Epistemology: An Introduction” http://csasc.org/2005/journal/ae13.pdf)</p></u></strong> | 2NC/NR | 1 K | Framework | 1,561,078 | 1 | 126,103 | ./documents/hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | 660,743 | A | Mile High Classic | 6 | Reyna Esquibel and Owen Schalk | John Mckiernan | Taiwan Aff
- Taiwan
- Relations
- Solvency
1NC
- T
- Fem K
- Solvency (On Case)
2NC
- K
- FWK
- Perm
1NR
- Solvency
2NR Choice
- Weigh K and case using Framework
o Solvency | hspolicy16/KentDenver/HoRo/Kent%20Denver-Ho-Rolls-Aff-Mile%20High%20Classic-Round6.docx | null | 56,024 | HoRo | Kent Denver HoRo | null | Gr..... | Ho..... | Ia..... | Ro..... | 20,163 | KentDenver | Kent Denver | null | null | 1,015 | hspolicy16 | HS Policy 2016-17 | 2,016 | cx | hs | 2 |
Subsets and Splits