instruction
stringclasses
1 value
output
stringlengths
64
69.4k
input
stringlengths
205
32.4k
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void recalculatePermissions() { clearPermissions(); Set<Permission> defaults = Bukkit.getServer().getPluginManager().getDefaultPermissions(isOp()); Bukkit.getServer().getPluginManager().subscribeToDefaultPerms(isOp(), parent); for (Permission perm : defaults) { String name = perm.getName().toLowerCase(); permissions.put(name, new PermissionAttachmentInfo(parent, name, null, true)); Bukkit.getServer().getPluginManager().subscribeToPermission(name, parent); calculateChildPermissions(perm.getChildren(), false, null); } for (PermissionAttachment attachment : attachments) { calculateChildPermissions(attachment.getPermissions(), false, attachment); } }
#vulnerable code public void recalculatePermissions() { dirtyPermissions = true; } #location 2 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void test() { JedisPoolConfig config = new JedisPoolConfig(); // 设置空间连接 config.setMaxIdle(20); config.setMaxWaitMillis(1000); // JedisPool pool = new JedisPool(config, "27.126.180.210", 6379); // System.out.println(pool.getResource()); // Jedis jedis = pool.getResource(); // jedis.set("name", "陈杰"); // System.out.println(jedis.get("name")); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void test() { JedisPoolConfig config = new JedisPoolConfig(); // 设置空间连接 config.setMaxIdle(20); config.setMaxWaitMillis(1000); JedisPool pool = new JedisPool(config, "27.126.180.210", 6379); System.out.println(pool.getResource()); Jedis jedis = pool.getResource(); jedis.set("name", "陈杰"); System.out.println(jedis.get("name")); } #location 12 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public File saveAs(String path) throws IOException, InterruptedException { byte[] pdf = this.getPDF(); File file = new File(path); BufferedOutputStream bufferedOutputStream = new BufferedOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(file)); bufferedOutputStream.write(pdf); bufferedOutputStream.flush(); bufferedOutputStream.close(); return file; }
#vulnerable code public File saveAs(String path) throws IOException, InterruptedException { Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); String command = this.commandWithParameters() + Symbol.separator + path; Process proc = rt.exec(command); if(htmlFromString) { OutputStream stdin = proc.getOutputStream(); stdin.write(htmlInput.getBytes()); stdin.close(); } proc.waitFor(); if(proc.exitValue() != 0) { throw new RuntimeException("Process (" + command + ") exited with status code " + proc.exitValue()); } return new File(path); } #location 16 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public byte[] getPDF() throws IOException, InterruptedException { return getPDF(STDOUT); }
#vulnerable code public byte[] getPDF() throws IOException, InterruptedException { Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); if(htmlFromString && !this.params.contains(new Param("-"))) { this.addParam(new Param("-")); } String command = this.commandWithParameters() + Symbol.separator + "-"; Process process = runtime.exec(command); if(htmlFromString) { OutputStream stdInStream = process.getOutputStream(); stdInStream.write(htmlInput.getBytes()); stdInStream.close(); } InputStream stdOutStream = process.getInputStream(); InputStream stdErrStream = process.getErrorStream(); process.waitFor(); ByteArrayOutputStream stdOut = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); ByteArrayOutputStream stdErr = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); for(int i = 0; i < stdOutStream.available(); i++) { stdOut.write((char) stdOutStream.read()); } stdOutStream.close(); for(int i = 0; i < stdErrStream.available(); i++) { stdErr.write((char) stdErrStream.read()); } stdErrStream.close(); if(process.exitValue() != 0) { throw new RuntimeException("Process (" + command + ") exited with status code " + process.exitValue() + ":\n"+new String(stdErr.toByteArray())); } return stdOut.toByteArray(); } #location 33 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public File saveAs(String path) throws IOException, InterruptedException { byte[] pdf = this.getPDF(); File file = new File(path); BufferedOutputStream bufferedOutputStream = new BufferedOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(file)); bufferedOutputStream.write(pdf); bufferedOutputStream.flush(); bufferedOutputStream.close(); return file; }
#vulnerable code public File saveAs(String path) throws IOException, InterruptedException { Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime(); String command = this.commandWithParameters() + Symbol.separator + path; Process proc = rt.exec(command); if(htmlFromString) { OutputStream stdin = proc.getOutputStream(); stdin.write(htmlInput.getBytes()); stdin.close(); } proc.waitFor(); if(proc.exitValue() != 0) { throw new RuntimeException("Process (" + command + ") exited with status code " + proc.exitValue()); } return new File(path); } #location 13 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public byte[] getPDF() throws IOException, InterruptedException { return getPDF(STDOUT); }
#vulnerable code public byte[] getPDF() throws IOException, InterruptedException { Runtime runtime = Runtime.getRuntime(); if(htmlFromString && !this.params.contains(new Param("-"))) { this.addParam(new Param("-")); } String command = this.commandWithParameters() + Symbol.separator + "-"; Process process = runtime.exec(command); if(htmlFromString) { OutputStream stdInStream = process.getOutputStream(); stdInStream.write(htmlInput.getBytes()); stdInStream.close(); } InputStream stdOutStream = process.getInputStream(); InputStream stdErrStream = process.getErrorStream(); process.waitFor(); ByteArrayOutputStream stdOut = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); ByteArrayOutputStream stdErr = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); for(int i = 0; i < stdOutStream.available(); i++) { stdOut.write((char) stdOutStream.read()); } stdOutStream.close(); for(int i = 0; i < stdErrStream.available(); i++) { stdErr.write((char) stdErrStream.read()); } stdErrStream.close(); if(process.exitValue() != 0) { throw new RuntimeException("Process (" + command + ") exited with status code " + process.exitValue() + ":\n"+new String(stdErr.toByteArray())); } return stdOut.toByteArray(); } #location 30 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testComplexCoreFields() { User carter = DataGenerator.carter(); carter.getFavoriteArtists().add( DataGenerator.neutralMilkHotel() ); carter.getFavoriteArtists().add( DataGenerator.arcadeFire() ); ResultTraverser traverser = new ResultTraverser(); traverser.getFieldPopulatorRegistry().register( new UserFieldPopulatorWithArtistCoreField() ); Map<String, Object> objectTree = doTraverse( carter, ":", traverser, _simpleContext ); Assert.assertEquals( 3, objectTree.size() ); Assert.assertEquals( carter.getId(), objectTree.get( "id" ) ); Assert.assertEquals( carter.getName(), objectTree.get( "name" ) ); List<Map<String, Object>> favoriteArtists = getList( objectTree, "favoriteArtists" ); Assert.assertNotNull( favoriteArtists ); Assert.assertEquals( 2, favoriteArtists.size() ); Map<String, Object> neutralMap = findItem( favoriteArtists, "name", "Neutral Milk Hotel" ); Assert.assertEquals( DataGenerator.neutralMilkHotel().getId(), neutralMap.get( "id" ) ); Map<String, Object> arcadeMap = findItem( favoriteArtists, "name", "Arcade Fire" ); Assert.assertEquals( DataGenerator.arcadeFire().getId(), arcadeMap.get( "id" ) ); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testComplexCoreFields() { User carter = DataGenerator.carter(); carter.getFavoriteArtists().add( DataGenerator.neutralMilkHotel() ); carter.getFavoriteArtists().add( DataGenerator.arcadeFire() ); ResultTraverser traverser = new ResultTraverser(); MapSelector selector = new MapSelector(); selector.register( User.class, "id", "favoriteArtists" ); Map<String, Object> objectTree = doTraverse( carter, traverser, _simpleContext, new CompositeSelector( selector, new CoreSelector() ) ); Assert.assertTrue( objectTree.size() >= 2 ); Assert.assertEquals( carter.getId(), objectTree.get( "id" ) ); Assert.assertEquals( carter.getName(), objectTree.get( "name" ) ); List<Map<String, Object>> favoriteArtists = getList( objectTree, "favoriteArtists" ); Assert.assertNotNull( favoriteArtists ); Assert.assertEquals( 2, favoriteArtists.size() ); Map<String, Object> neutralMap = findItem( favoriteArtists, "name", "Neutral Milk Hotel" ); Assert.assertEquals( DataGenerator.neutralMilkHotel().getId(), neutralMap.get( "id" ) ); Map<String, Object> arcadeMap = findItem( favoriteArtists, "name", "Arcade Fire" ); Assert.assertEquals( DataGenerator.arcadeFire().getId(), arcadeMap.get( "id" ) ); } #location 20 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void init() { try { init( Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResourceAsStream( "sampledb.sql" ) ); } catch ( Exception e ) { throw new RuntimeException( e ); } // this doesn't seem to work yet. It reads a partial line and throws up // try // { // init( new GZIPInputStream( new URL( remoteData ).openStream() ) ); // } // catch ( Exception e ) // { // e.printStackTrace(); // } }
#vulnerable code public void init() throws IOException { InputStream is = Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader().getResourceAsStream( "sampledb.sql" ); BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader( is ) ); String line = null; while ( ( line = reader.readLine() ) != null ) { String type = line.replaceFirst( "INSERT INTO ([^(]+).*", "$1" ); String[] values = line.replaceFirst( ".*VALUES\\((.*)\\)", "$1" ).split( ", " ); if ("User".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newUser( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toStr( values[ 1 ] ) ); } else if ("Friend".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newFriend( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toLong( values[ 1 ] ) ); } else if ("Artist".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newArtist( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toStr( values[ 1 ] ) ); } else if ("Fan".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newFan( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toLong( values[ 1 ] ) ); } else if ("Album".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newAlbum( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toStr( values[ 1 ] ), toLong( values[ 2 ] ), new Integer( values[ 3 ].trim() ) ); } else if ("Song".equalsIgnoreCase( type )) { newSong( toLong( values[ 0 ] ), toStr( values[ 1 ] ), toLong( values[ 2 ] ), toLong( values[ 3 ] ) ); } } is.close(); } #location 13 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testView() throws IOException { UserDefinedFileAttributeView view = provider.getView(attributeStoreSupplier()); assertNotNull(view); ASSERT.that(view.name()).is("user"); ASSERT.that(view.list()).isEmpty(); byte[] b1 = {0, 1, 2}; byte[] b2 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}; view.write("b1", ByteBuffer.wrap(b1)); view.write("b2", ByteBuffer.wrap(b2)); ASSERT.that(view.list()).has().allOf("b1", "b2"); ASSERT.that(store.getAttributeKeys()).has().exactly("user:b1", "user:b2"); ASSERT.that(view.size("b1")).is(3); ASSERT.that(view.size("b2")).is(5); ByteBuffer buf1 = ByteBuffer.allocate(view.size("b1")); ByteBuffer buf2 = ByteBuffer.allocate(view.size("b2")); view.read("b1", buf1); view.read("b2", buf2); ASSERT.that(Arrays.equals(b1, buf1.array())).isTrue(); ASSERT.that(Arrays.equals(b2, buf2.array())).isTrue(); view.delete("b2"); ASSERT.that(view.list()).has().exactly("b1"); ASSERT.that(store.getAttributeKeys()).has().exactly("user:b1"); try { view.size("b2"); fail(); } catch (IllegalArgumentException expected) { ASSERT.that(expected.getMessage()).contains("not set"); } try { view.read("b2", ByteBuffer.allocate(10)); fail(); } catch (IllegalArgumentException expected) { ASSERT.that(expected.getMessage()).contains("not set"); } view.write("b1", ByteBuffer.wrap(b2)); ASSERT.that(view.size("b1")).is(5); view.delete("b2"); // succeeds }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testView() throws IOException { UserDefinedFileAttributeView view = service.getFileAttributeView(fileSupplier(), UserDefinedFileAttributeView.class); assertNotNull(view); ASSERT.that(view.name()).is("user"); ASSERT.that(view.list()).isEmpty(); byte[] b1 = {0, 1, 2}; byte[] b2 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}; view.write("b1", ByteBuffer.wrap(b1)); view.write("b2", ByteBuffer.wrap(b2)); ASSERT.that(view.list()).has().allOf("b1", "b2"); ASSERT.that(service.readAttributes(file, "user:*").keySet()) .has().allOf("b1", "b2"); ASSERT.that(view.size("b1")).is(3); ASSERT.that(view.size("b2")).is(5); ByteBuffer buf1 = ByteBuffer.allocate(view.size("b1")); ByteBuffer buf2 = ByteBuffer.allocate(view.size("b2")); view.read("b1", buf1); view.read("b2", buf2); ASSERT.that(Arrays.equals(b1, buf1.array())).isTrue(); ASSERT.that(Arrays.equals(b2, buf2.array())).isTrue(); view.delete("b2"); ASSERT.that(view.list()).has().exactly("b1"); ASSERT.that(service.readAttributes(file, "user:*").keySet()) .has().exactly("b1"); try { view.size("b2"); fail(); } catch (IllegalArgumentException expected) { ASSERT.that(expected.getMessage()).contains("not set"); } try { view.read("b2", ByteBuffer.allocate(10)); fail(); } catch (IllegalArgumentException expected) { ASSERT.that(expected.getMessage()).contains("not set"); } view.write("b1", ByteBuffer.wrap(b2)); ASSERT.that(view.size("b1")).is(5); view.delete("b2"); // succeeds } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testAsynchronousClose() throws Exception { RegularFile file = regularFile(10); final FileChannel channel = channel(file, READ, WRITE); file.writeLock().lock(); // ensure all operations on the channel will block ExecutorService executor = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(BLOCKING_OP_COUNT); List<Future<?>> futures = queueAllBlockingOperations(channel, executor, latch); // wait for all the threads to have started running latch.await(); // then ensure time for operations to start blocking Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(20, MILLISECONDS); // close channel on this thread channel.close(); // the blocking operations are running on different threads, so they all get // AsynchronousCloseException for (Future<?> future : futures) { try { future.get(); fail(); } catch (ExecutionException expected) { assertThat(expected.getCause()).named("blocking thread exception") .isA(AsynchronousCloseException.class); } } }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testAsynchronousClose() throws IOException, InterruptedException { RegularFile file = regularFile(10); final FileChannel channel = channel(file, READ, WRITE); file.writeLock().lock(); // ensure all operations on the channel will block ExecutorService executor = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); List<Future<?>> futures = queueAllBlockingOperations(channel, executor); // ensure time for operations to start blocking Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(10, MILLISECONDS); channel.close(); for (Future<?> future : futures) { try { future.get(); fail(); } catch (ExecutionException expected) { assertTrue(expected.getCause() instanceof AsynchronousCloseException); } } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public WatchService newWatchService() throws IOException { return watchServiceConfig.newWatchService(defaultView, pathService); }
#vulnerable code @Override public WatchService newWatchService() throws IOException { return new PollingWatchService(defaultView, pathService, fileStore.state()); } #location 3 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testCloseByInterrupt() throws Exception { RegularFile file = regularFile(10); final FileChannel channel = channel(file, READ, WRITE); file.writeLock().lock(); // ensure all operations on the channel will block ExecutorService executor = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); final CountDownLatch threadStartLatch = new CountDownLatch(1); final SettableFuture<Throwable> interruptException = SettableFuture.create(); // This thread, being the first to run, will be blocking on the interruptible lock (the byte // file's write lock) and as such will be interrupted properly... the other threads will be // blocked on the lock that guards the position field and the specification that only one method // on the channel will be in progress at a time. That lock is not interruptible, so we must // interrupt this thread. Thread thread = new Thread(new Runnable() { @Override public void run() { threadStartLatch.countDown(); try { channel.write(ByteBuffer.allocate(20)); interruptException.set(null); } catch (Throwable e) { interruptException.set(e); } } }); thread.start(); // let the thread start running threadStartLatch.await(); // then ensure time for thread to start blocking on the write lock Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(10, MILLISECONDS); CountDownLatch blockingStartLatch = new CountDownLatch(BLOCKING_OP_COUNT); List<Future<?>> futures = queueAllBlockingOperations(channel, executor, blockingStartLatch); // wait for all blocking threads to start blockingStartLatch.await(); // then ensure time for the operations to start blocking Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(20, MILLISECONDS); // interrupting this blocking thread closes the channel and makes all the other threads // throw AsynchronousCloseException... the operation on this thread should throw // ClosedByInterruptException thread.interrupt(); // get the exception that caused the interrupted operation to terminate assertThat(interruptException.get(200, MILLISECONDS)) .named("interrupted thread exception") .isA(ClosedByInterruptException.class); // check that each other thread got AsynchronousCloseException (since the interrupt, on a // different thread, closed the channel) for (Future<?> future : futures) { try { future.get(); fail(); } catch (ExecutionException expected) { assertThat(expected.getCause()).named("blocking thread exception") .isA(AsynchronousCloseException.class); } } }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testCloseByInterrupt() throws IOException, InterruptedException { RegularFile file = regularFile(10); final FileChannel channel = channel(file, READ, WRITE); file.writeLock().lock(); // ensure all operations on the channel will block ExecutorService executor = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); final CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1); final AtomicReference<Throwable> interruptException = new AtomicReference<>(); // This thread, being the first to run, will be blocking on the interruptible lock (the byte // file's write lock) and as such will be interrupted properly... the other threads will be // blocked on the lock that guards the position field and the specification that only one method // on the channel will be in progress at a time. That lock is not interruptible, so we must // interrupt this thread. Thread thread = new Thread(new Runnable() { @Override public void run() { try { channel.write(ByteBuffer.allocate(20)); latch.countDown(); } catch (Throwable e) { interruptException.set(e); latch.countDown(); } } }); thread.start(); // ensure time for thread to start blocking on the write lock Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(5, MILLISECONDS); List<Future<?>> futures = queueAllBlockingOperations(channel, executor); // ensure time for operations to start blocking Uninterruptibles.sleepUninterruptibly(10, MILLISECONDS); // interrupting this blocking thread closes the channel and makes all the other threads // throw AsynchronousCloseException... the operation on this thread should throw // ClosedByInterruptException thread.interrupt(); latch.await(); assertTrue(interruptException.get() instanceof ClosedByInterruptException); for (Future<?> future : futures) { try { future.get(); fail(); } catch (ExecutionException expected) { assertTrue(expected.getCause() instanceof AsynchronousCloseException); } } } #location 3 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) { loadProperties(); int concurrents = Integer.parseInt(properties.getProperty("concurrents")); int runtime = Integer.parseInt(properties.getProperty("runtime")); String classname = properties.getProperty("classname"); String params = properties.getProperty("params"); isMultiClient = Boolean.parseBoolean(properties.getProperty("isMultiClient")); if (args.length == 5) { concurrents = Integer.parseInt(args[0]); runtime = Integer.parseInt(args[1]); classname = args[2]; params = args[3]; isMultiClient = Boolean.parseBoolean(args[4]); } ApplicationContext applicationContext = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext( new String[]{"classpath*:motan-benchmark-client.xml"}); benchmarkService = (BenchmarkService) applicationContext.getBean("motanBenchmarkReferer"); new MotanBenchmarkClient().start(concurrents, runtime, classname, params); }
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) { int concurrents = Integer.parseInt(properties.getProperty("concurrents")); int runtime = Integer.parseInt(properties.getProperty("runtime")); String classname = properties.getProperty("classname"); String params = properties.getProperty("params"); isMultiClient = Boolean.parseBoolean(properties.getProperty("isMultiClient")); if (args.length == 5) { concurrents = Integer.parseInt(args[0]); runtime = Integer.parseInt(args[1]); classname = args[2]; params = args[3]; isMultiClient = Boolean.parseBoolean(args[4]); } ApplicationContext applicationContext = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext(new String[]{"classpath*:motan-benchmark-client.xml"}); benchmarkService = (BenchmarkService) applicationContext.getBean("motanBenchmarkReferer"); new MotanBenchmarkClient().start(concurrents, runtime, classname, params); } #location 16 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Before public void setup() throws DBException { orientDBClient = new OrientDBClient(); Properties p = new Properties(); // TODO: Extract the property names into final variables in OrientDBClient p.setProperty("orientdb.url", TEST_DB_URL); orientDBClient.setProperties(p); orientDBClient.init(); }
#vulnerable code @Before public void setup() throws DBException { orientDBClient = new OrientDBClient(); Properties p = new Properties(); // TODO: Extract the property names into final variables in OrientDBClient p.setProperty("orientdb.url", TEST_DB_URL); orientDBClient.setProperties(p); orientDBClient.init(); orientDBDictionary = orientDBClient.getDB().getDictionary(); } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void cleanup() throws DBException { // Get the measurements instance as this is the only client that should // count clean up time like an update since autoflush is off. Measurements _measurements = Measurements.getMeasurements(); try { long st=System.nanoTime(); if (_hTable != null) { _hTable.flushCommits(); } synchronized(THREAD_COUNT) { int threadCount = THREAD_COUNT.decrementAndGet(); if (threadCount <= 0 && _hConn != null) { _hConn.close(); } } long en=System.nanoTime(); _measurements.measure("UPDATE", (int)((en-st)/1000)); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } }
#vulnerable code public void cleanup() throws DBException { // Get the measurements instance as this is the only client that should // count clean up time like an update since autoflush is off. Measurements _measurements = Measurements.getMeasurements(); try { long st=System.nanoTime(); if (_hTable != null) { _hTable.flushCommits(); } if (_hConn != null) { _hConn.close(); } long en=System.nanoTime(); _measurements.measure("UPDATE", (int)((en-st)/1000)); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } #location 9 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public int read(String table, String key, Set<String> fields, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> result) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document query = new Document("_id", key); FindIterable<Document> findIterable = collection.find(query); Document queryResult = null; if (fields != null) { Document projection = new Document(); for (String field : fields) { projection.put(field, INCLUDE); } findIterable.projection(projection); } queryResult = findIterable.first(); if (queryResult != null) { fillMap(result, queryResult); } return queryResult != null ? 0 : 1; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public int read(String table, String key, Set<String> fields, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> result) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document query = new Document("_id", key); FindIterable<Document> findIterable = collection .withReadPreference(readPreference) .find(query); Document queryResult = null; if (fields != null) { Document projection = new Document(); for (String field : fields) { projection.put(field, INCLUDE); } findIterable.projection(projection); } queryResult = findIterable.first(); if (queryResult != null) { fillMap(result, queryResult); } return queryResult != null ? 0 : 1; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } } #location 10 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public int update(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document query = new Document("_id", key); Document fieldsToSet = new Document(); for (Map.Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { fieldsToSet.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().toArray()); } Document update = new Document("$set", fieldsToSet); UpdateResult result = collection.updateOne(query, update); if (result.wasAcknowledged() && result.getMatchedCount() == 0) { System.err.println("Nothing updated for key " + key); return 1; } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public int update(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document query = new Document("_id", key); Document fieldsToSet = new Document(); for (Map.Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { fieldsToSet.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().toArray()); } Document update = new Document("$set", fieldsToSet); UpdateResult result = collection.withWriteConcern(writeConcern) .updateOne(query, update); if (result.wasAcknowledged() && result.getMatchedCount() == 0) { System.err.println("Nothing updated for key " + key); return 1; } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } } #location 15 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Status scan(String table, String startkey, int recordcount, Set<String> fields, Vector<HashMap<String, ByteIterator>> result) { try { PreparedStatement stmt = (fields == null) ? scanAllStmt.get() : scanStmts.get(fields); // Prepare statement on demand if (stmt == null) { Select.Builder selectBuilder; if (fields == null) { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select().all(); } else { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select(); for (String col : fields) { ((Select.Selection) selectBuilder).column(col); } } Select selectStmt = selectBuilder.from(table); // The statement builder is not setup right for tokens. // So, we need to build it manually. String initialStmt = selectStmt.toString(); StringBuilder scanStmt = new StringBuilder(); scanStmt.append(initialStmt.substring(0, initialStmt.length() - 1)); scanStmt.append(" WHERE "); scanStmt.append(QueryBuilder.token(YCSB_KEY)); scanStmt.append(" >= "); scanStmt.append("token("); scanStmt.append(QueryBuilder.bindMarker()); scanStmt.append(")"); scanStmt.append(" LIMIT "); scanStmt.append(QueryBuilder.bindMarker()); stmt = session.prepare(scanStmt.toString()); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(readConsistencyLevel); if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } PreparedStatement prevStmt = (fields == null) ? scanAllStmt.getAndSet(stmt) : scanStmts.putIfAbsent(new HashSet(fields), stmt); if (prevStmt != null) { stmt = prevStmt; } } logger.debug(stmt.getQueryString()); logger.debug("startKey = {}, recordcount = {}", startkey, recordcount); ResultSet rs = session.execute(stmt.bind(startkey, Integer.valueOf(recordcount))); HashMap<String, ByteIterator> tuple; while (!rs.isExhausted()) { Row row = rs.one(); tuple = new HashMap<String, ByteIterator>(); ColumnDefinitions cd = row.getColumnDefinitions(); for (ColumnDefinitions.Definition def : cd) { ByteBuffer val = row.getBytesUnsafe(def.getName()); if (val != null) { tuple.put(def.getName(), new ByteArrayByteIterator(val.array())); } else { tuple.put(def.getName(), null); } } result.add(tuple); } return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { logger.error( MessageFormatter.format("Error scanning with startkey: {}", startkey).getMessage(), e); return Status.ERROR; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public Status scan(String table, String startkey, int recordcount, Set<String> fields, Vector<HashMap<String, ByteIterator>> result) { try { Statement stmt; Select.Builder selectBuilder; if (fields == null) { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select().all(); } else { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select(); for (String col : fields) { ((Select.Selection) selectBuilder).column(col); } } stmt = selectBuilder.from(table); // The statement builder is not setup right for tokens. // So, we need to build it manually. String initialStmt = stmt.toString(); StringBuilder scanStmt = new StringBuilder(); scanStmt.append(initialStmt.substring(0, initialStmt.length() - 1)); scanStmt.append(" WHERE "); scanStmt.append(QueryBuilder.token(YCSB_KEY)); scanStmt.append(" >= "); scanStmt.append("token('"); scanStmt.append(startkey); scanStmt.append("')"); scanStmt.append(" LIMIT "); scanStmt.append(recordcount); stmt = new SimpleStatement(scanStmt.toString()); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(readConsistencyLevel); if (debug) { System.out.println(stmt.toString()); } if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } ResultSet rs = session.execute(stmt); HashMap<String, ByteIterator> tuple; while (!rs.isExhausted()) { Row row = rs.one(); tuple = new HashMap<String, ByteIterator>(); ColumnDefinitions cd = row.getColumnDefinitions(); for (ColumnDefinitions.Definition def : cd) { ByteBuffer val = row.getBytesUnsafe(def.getName()); if (val != null) { tuple.put(def.getName(), new ByteArrayByteIterator(val.array())); } else { tuple.put(def.getName(), null); } } result.add(tuple); } return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); System.out.println("Error scanning with startkey: " + startkey); return Status.ERROR; } } #location 37 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Status read(String table, String key, Set<String> fields, Map<String, ByteIterator> result) { try { PreparedStatement stmt = (fields == null) ? readAllStmt.get() : readStmts.get(fields); // Prepare statement on demand if (stmt == null) { Select.Builder selectBuilder; if (fields == null) { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select().all(); } else { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select(); for (String col : fields) { ((Select.Selection) selectBuilder).column(col); } } stmt = session.prepare(selectBuilder.from(table) .where(QueryBuilder.eq(YCSB_KEY, QueryBuilder.bindMarker())) .limit(1)); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(readConsistencyLevel); if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } PreparedStatement prevStmt = (fields == null) ? readAllStmt.getAndSet(stmt) : readStmts.putIfAbsent(new HashSet(fields), stmt); if (prevStmt != null) { stmt = prevStmt; } } logger.debug(stmt.getQueryString()); logger.debug("key = {}", key); ResultSet rs = session.execute(stmt.bind(key)); if (rs.isExhausted()) { return Status.NOT_FOUND; } // Should be only 1 row Row row = rs.one(); ColumnDefinitions cd = row.getColumnDefinitions(); for (ColumnDefinitions.Definition def : cd) { ByteBuffer val = row.getBytesUnsafe(def.getName()); if (val != null) { result.put(def.getName(), new ByteArrayByteIterator(val.array())); } else { result.put(def.getName(), null); } } return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { logger.error(MessageFormatter.format("Error reading key: {}", key).getMessage(), e); return Status.ERROR; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public Status read(String table, String key, Set<String> fields, Map<String, ByteIterator> result) { try { Statement stmt; Select.Builder selectBuilder; if (fields == null) { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select().all(); } else { selectBuilder = QueryBuilder.select(); for (String col : fields) { ((Select.Selection) selectBuilder).column(col); } } stmt = selectBuilder.from(table).where(QueryBuilder.eq(YCSB_KEY, key)) .limit(1); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(readConsistencyLevel); if (debug) { System.out.println(stmt.toString()); } if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } ResultSet rs = session.execute(stmt); if (rs.isExhausted()) { return Status.NOT_FOUND; } // Should be only 1 row Row row = rs.one(); ColumnDefinitions cd = row.getColumnDefinitions(); for (ColumnDefinitions.Definition def : cd) { ByteBuffer val = row.getBytesUnsafe(def.getName()); if (val != null) { result.put(def.getName(), new ByteArrayByteIterator(val.array())); } else { result.put(def.getName(), null); } } return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); System.out.println("Error reading key: " + key); return Status.ERROR; } } #location 21 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public int scan(String table, String startkey, int recordcount, Set<String> fields, Vector<HashMap<String, ByteIterator>> result) { MongoCursor<Document> cursor = null; try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document scanRange = new Document("$gte", startkey); Document query = new Document("_id", scanRange); Document sort = new Document("_id", INCLUDE); Document projection = null; if (fields != null) { projection = new Document(); for (String fieldName : fields) { projection.put(fieldName, INCLUDE); } } cursor = collection.find(query) .projection(projection).sort(sort).limit(recordcount).iterator(); if (!cursor.hasNext()) { System.err.println("Nothing found in scan for key " + startkey); return 1; } while (cursor.hasNext()) { HashMap<String, ByteIterator> resultMap = new HashMap<String, ByteIterator>(); Document obj = cursor.next(); fillMap(resultMap, obj); result.add(resultMap); } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } finally { if (cursor != null) { cursor.close(); } } }
#vulnerable code @Override public int scan(String table, String startkey, int recordcount, Set<String> fields, Vector<HashMap<String, ByteIterator>> result) { MongoCursor<Document> cursor = null; try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document scanRange = new Document("$gte", startkey); Document query = new Document("_id", scanRange); Document sort = new Document("_id", INCLUDE); Document projection = null; if (fields != null) { projection = new Document(); for (String fieldName : fields) { projection.put(fieldName, INCLUDE); } } cursor = collection.withReadPreference(readPreference).find(query) .projection(projection).sort(sort).limit(recordcount).iterator(); if (!cursor.hasNext()) { System.err.println("Nothing found in scan for key " + startkey); return 1; } while (cursor.hasNext()) { HashMap<String, ByteIterator> resultMap = new HashMap<String, ByteIterator>(); Document obj = cursor.next(); fillMap(resultMap, obj); result.add(resultMap); } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println(e.toString()); return 1; } finally { if (cursor != null) { cursor.close(); } } } #location 20 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void init() throws DBException { Properties props = getProperties(); String url = props.getProperty(URL_PROPERTY); String user = props.getProperty(USER_PROPERTY, USER_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); String password = props.getProperty(PASSWORD_PROPERTY, PASSWORD_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); Boolean newdb = Boolean.parseBoolean(props.getProperty(NEWDB_PROPERTY, NEWDB_PROPERTY_DEFAULT)); String remoteStorageType = props.getProperty(STORAGE_TYPE_PROPERTY); String intent = props.getProperty(INTENT_PROPERTY, INTENT_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); Boolean dotransactions = Boolean.parseBoolean( props.getProperty(DO_TRANSACTIONS_PROPERTY, DO_TRANSACTIONS_PROPERTY_DEFAULT)); if (url == null) { throw new DBException(String.format("Required property \"%s\" missing for OrientDBClient", URL_PROPERTY)); } log.info("OrientDB loading database url = " + url); // If using a remote database, use the OServerAdmin interface to connect if (url.startsWith(OEngineRemote.NAME)) { isRemote = true; if (remoteStorageType == null) { throw new DBException("When connecting to a remote OrientDB instance, " + "specify a database storage type (plocal or memory) with " + STORAGE_TYPE_PROPERTY); } try { OServerAdmin server = new OServerAdmin(url).connect(user, password); if (server.existsDatabase()) { if (newdb && !dotransactions) { log.info("OrientDB dropping and recreating fresh db on remote server."); server.dropDatabase(remoteStorageType); server.createDatabase(server.getURL(), ORIENTDB_DOCUMENT_TYPE, remoteStorageType); } } else { log.info("OrientDB database not found, creating fresh db"); server.createDatabase(server.getURL(), ORIENTDB_DOCUMENT_TYPE, remoteStorageType); } server.close(); db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url).open(user, password); } catch (IOException | OException e) { throw new DBException(String.format("Error interfacing with %s", url), e); } } else { try { db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url); if (db.exists()) { db.open(user, password); if (newdb && !dotransactions) { log.info("OrientDB dropping and recreating fresh db."); db.drop(); db.create(); } } else { log.info("OrientDB database not found, creating fresh db"); db.create(); } } catch (ODatabaseException e) { throw new DBException(String.format("Error interfacing with %s", url), e); } } log.info("OrientDB connection created with " + url); dictionary = db.getMetadata().getIndexManager().getDictionary(); if (!db.getMetadata().getSchema().existsClass(CLASS)) { db.getMetadata().getSchema().createClass(CLASS); } if (intent.equals(ORIENTDB_MASSIVEINSERT)) { log.info("Declaring intent of MassiveInsert."); db.declareIntent(new OIntentMassiveInsert()); } else if (intent.equals(ORIENTDB_MASSIVEREAD)) { log.info("Declaring intent of MassiveRead."); db.declareIntent(new OIntentMassiveRead()); } else if (intent.equals(ORIENTDB_NOCACHE)) { log.info("Declaring intent of NoCache."); db.declareIntent(new OIntentNoCache()); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void init() throws DBException { Properties props = getProperties(); String url = props.getProperty(URL_PROPERTY); String user = props.getProperty(USER_PROPERTY, USER_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); String password = props.getProperty(PASSWORD_PROPERTY, PASSWORD_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); Boolean newdb = Boolean.parseBoolean(props.getProperty(NEWDB_PROPERTY, NEWDB_PROPERTY_DEFAULT)); String remoteStorageType = props.getProperty(STORAGE_TYPE_PROPERTY); Boolean dotransactions = Boolean.parseBoolean( props.getProperty(DO_TRANSACTIONS_PROPERTY, DO_TRANSACTIONS_PROPERTY_DEFAULT)); if (url == null) { throw new DBException(String.format("Required property \"%s\" missing for OrientDBClient", URL_PROPERTY)); } log.info("OrientDB loading database url = " + url); // If using a remote database, use the OServerAdmin interface to connect if (url.startsWith(OEngineRemote.NAME)) { isRemote = true; if (remoteStorageType == null) { throw new DBException("When connecting to a remote OrientDB instance, " + "specify a database storage type (plocal or memory) with " + STORAGE_TYPE_PROPERTY); } try { OServerAdmin server = new OServerAdmin(url).connect(user, password); if (server.existsDatabase()) { if (newdb && !dotransactions) { log.info("OrientDB dropping and recreating fresh db on remote server."); server.dropDatabase(remoteStorageType); server.createDatabase(server.getURL(), ORIENTDB_DOCUMENT_TYPE, remoteStorageType); } } else { log.info("OrientDB database not found, creating fresh db"); server.createDatabase(server.getURL(), ORIENTDB_DOCUMENT_TYPE, remoteStorageType); } server.close(); db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url).open(user, password); } catch (IOException | OException e) { throw new DBException(String.format("Error interfacing with %s", url), e); } } else { try { db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url); if (db.exists()) { db.open(user, password); if (newdb && !dotransactions) { log.info("OrientDB dropping and recreating fresh db."); db.drop(); db.create(); } } else { log.info("OrientDB database not found, creating fresh db"); db.create(); } } catch (ODatabaseException e) { throw new DBException(String.format("Error interfacing with %s", url), e); } } log.info("OrientDB connection created with " + url); dictionary = db.getMetadata().getIndexManager().getDictionary(); if (!db.getMetadata().getSchema().existsClass(CLASS)) { db.getMetadata().getSchema().createClass(CLASS); } db.declareIntent(new OIntentMassiveInsert()); } #location 42 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Status delete(String table, String key) { try { PreparedStatement stmt = deleteStmt.get(); // Prepare statement on demand if (stmt == null) { stmt = session.prepare(QueryBuilder.delete().from(table) .where(QueryBuilder.eq(YCSB_KEY, QueryBuilder.bindMarker()))); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(writeConsistencyLevel); if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } PreparedStatement prevStmt = deleteStmt.getAndSet(stmt); if (prevStmt != null) { stmt = prevStmt; } } logger.debug(stmt.getQueryString()); logger.debug("key = {}", key); session.execute(stmt.bind(key)); return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { logger.error(MessageFormatter.format("Error deleting key: {}", key).getMessage(), e); } return Status.ERROR; }
#vulnerable code @Override public Status delete(String table, String key) { try { Statement stmt; stmt = QueryBuilder.delete().from(table) .where(QueryBuilder.eq(YCSB_KEY, key)); stmt.setConsistencyLevel(writeConsistencyLevel); if (debug) { System.out.println(stmt.toString()); } if (trace) { stmt.enableTracing(); } session.execute(stmt); return Status.OK; } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); System.out.println("Error deleting key: " + key); } return Status.ERROR; } #location 11 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { session = cassandraUnit.getSession(); Properties p = new Properties(); p.setProperty("hosts", HOST); p.setProperty("port", Integer.toString(PORT)); p.setProperty("table", TABLE); Measurements.setProperties(p); final CoreWorkload workload = new CoreWorkload(); workload.init(p); client = new CassandraCQLClient(); client.setProperties(p); client.init(); }
#vulnerable code @Before public void setUp() throws Exception { // check that this is Java 8+ int javaVersion = Integer.parseInt(System.getProperty("java.version").split("\\.")[1]); Assume.assumeTrue(javaVersion >= 8); session = cassandraUnit.getSession(); Properties p = new Properties(); p.setProperty("hosts", HOST); p.setProperty("port", Integer.toString(PORT)); p.setProperty("table", TABLE); Measurements.setProperties(p); final CoreWorkload workload = new CoreWorkload(); workload.init(p); client = new CassandraCQLClient(); client.setProperties(p); client.init(); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void cleanup() throws DBException { // Get the measurements instance as this is the only client that should // count clean up time like an update if client-side buffering is // enabled. Measurements measurements = Measurements.getMeasurements(); try { long st = System.nanoTime(); if (bufferedMutator != null) { bufferedMutator.close(); } if (currentTable != null) { currentTable.close(); } long en = System.nanoTime(); final String type = clientSideBuffering ? "UPDATE" : "CLEANUP"; measurements.measure(type, (int) ((en - st) / 1000)); threadCount.decrementAndGet(); if (threadCount.get() <= 0) { // Means we are done so ok to shut down the Connection. synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { if (connection != null) { connection.close(); connection = null; } } } } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void cleanup() throws DBException { // Get the measurements instance as this is the only client that should // count clean up time like an update if client-side buffering is // enabled. Measurements measurements = Measurements.getMeasurements(); try { long st = System.nanoTime(); if (bufferedMutator != null) { bufferedMutator.close(); } if (currentTable != null) { currentTable.close(); } long en = System.nanoTime(); final String type = clientSideBuffering ? "UPDATE" : "CLEANUP"; measurements.measure(type, (int) ((en - st) / 1000)); synchronized(threadCount) { --threadCount; if (threadCount <= 0 && connection != null) { connection.close(); connection = null; } } } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } #location 18 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private Map<String, byte[]> convertToBytearrayMap(Map<String,ByteIterator> values) { Map<String, byte[]> retVal = new HashMap<String, byte[]>(); for (Map.Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { retVal.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().toArray()); } return retVal; }
#vulnerable code private Map<String, byte[]> convertToBytearrayMap(Map<String,ByteIterator> values) { Map<String, byte[]> retVal = new HashMap<String, byte[]>(); for (String key : values.keySet()) { retVal.put(key, values.get(key).toArray()); } return retVal; } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void cleanup() throws DBException { if (asyncExecutor != null) { try { asyncExecutor.flush(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } synchronized (CONFIG) { --threadCount; if (threadCount <= 0) { try { session.close(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void cleanup() throws DBException { if (asyncExecutor != null) { try { asyncExecutor.flush(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } synchronized (threadCount) { --threadCount; if (threadCount <= 0) { try { session.close(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } } } #location 10 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void init() throws DBException { if ("true" .equals(getProperties().getProperty("clientbuffering", "false"))) { this.clientSideBuffering = true; } if (getProperties().containsKey("writebuffersize")) { writeBufferSize = Long.parseLong(getProperties().getProperty("writebuffersize")); } if (getProperties().getProperty("durability") != null) { this.durability = Durability.valueOf(getProperties().getProperty("durability")); } if ("kerberos".equalsIgnoreCase(config.get("hbase.security.authentication"))) { config.set("hadoop.security.authentication", "Kerberos"); UserGroupInformation.setConfiguration(config); } if ((getProperties().getProperty("principal")!=null) && (getProperties().getProperty("keytab")!=null)) { try { UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytab(getProperties().getProperty("principal"), getProperties().getProperty("keytab")); } catch (IOException e) { System.err.println("Keytab file is not readable or not found"); throw new DBException(e); } } try { threadCount.getAndIncrement(); synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { if (connection == null) { // Initialize if not set up already. connection = ConnectionFactory.createConnection(config); } } } catch (java.io.IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } if ((getProperties().getProperty("debug") != null) && (getProperties().getProperty("debug").compareTo("true") == 0)) { debug = true; } if ("false" .equals(getProperties().getProperty("hbase.usepagefilter", "true"))) { usePageFilter = false; } columnFamily = getProperties().getProperty("columnfamily"); if (columnFamily == null) { System.err.println("Error, must specify a columnfamily for HBase table"); throw new DBException("No columnfamily specified"); } columnFamilyBytes = Bytes.toBytes(columnFamily); // Terminate right now if table does not exist, since the client // will not propagate this error upstream once the workload // starts. String table = com.yahoo.ycsb.workloads.CoreWorkload.table; try { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { connection.getTable(tName).getTableDescriptor(); } } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void init() throws DBException { if ("true" .equals(getProperties().getProperty("clientbuffering", "false"))) { this.clientSideBuffering = true; } if (getProperties().containsKey("writebuffersize")) { writeBufferSize = Long.parseLong(getProperties().getProperty("writebuffersize")); } if (getProperties().getProperty("durability") != null) { this.durability = Durability.valueOf(getProperties().getProperty("durability")); } if ("kerberos".equalsIgnoreCase(config.get("hbase.security.authentication"))) { config.set("hadoop.security.authentication", "Kerberos"); UserGroupInformation.setConfiguration(config); } if ((getProperties().getProperty("principal")!=null) && (getProperties().getProperty("keytab")!=null)) { try { UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytab(getProperties().getProperty("principal"), getProperties().getProperty("keytab")); } catch (IOException e) { System.err.println("Keytab file is not readable or not found"); throw new DBException(e); } } try { synchronized(threadCount) { ++threadCount; if (connection == null) { connection = ConnectionFactory.createConnection(config); } } } catch (java.io.IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } if ((getProperties().getProperty("debug") != null) && (getProperties().getProperty("debug").compareTo("true") == 0)) { debug = true; } if ("false" .equals(getProperties().getProperty("hbase.usepagefilter", "true"))) { usePageFilter = false; } columnFamily = getProperties().getProperty("columnfamily"); if (columnFamily == null) { System.err.println("Error, must specify a columnfamily for HBase table"); throw new DBException("No columnfamily specified"); } columnFamilyBytes = Bytes.toBytes(columnFamily); // Terminate right now if table does not exist, since the client // will not propagate this error upstream once the workload // starts. String table = com.yahoo.ycsb.workloads.CoreWorkload.table; try { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); connection.getTable(tName).getTableDescriptor(); } catch (IOException e) { throw new DBException(e); } } #location 34 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); this.currentTable = connection.getTable(tName); if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } }
#vulnerable code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { this.currentTable = connection.getTable(tName); if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } } } #location 7 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void init() throws DBException { Properties props = getProperties(); String url = props.getProperty(URL_PROPERTY); String user = props.getProperty(USER_PROPERTY, USER_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); String password = props.getProperty(PASSWORD_PROPERTY, PASSWORD_PROPERTY_DEFAULT); Boolean newdb = Boolean.parseBoolean(props.getProperty(NEWDB_PROPERTY, NEWDB_PROPERTY_DEFAULT)); if (url == null) { throw new DBException(String.format("Required property \"%s\" missing for OrientDBClient", URL_PROPERTY)); } try { System.out.println("OrientDB loading database url = " + url); OGlobalConfiguration.STORAGE_KEEP_OPEN.setValue(false); db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url); if (db.exists()) { db.open(user, password); if (newdb) { System.out.println("OrientDB drop and recreate fresh db"); db.drop(); db.create(); } } else { System.out.println("OrientDB database not found, create fresh db"); db.create(); } System.out.println("OrientDB connection created with " + url); dictionary = db.getMetadata().getIndexManager().getDictionary(); if (!db.getMetadata().getSchema().existsClass(CLASS)) db.getMetadata().getSchema().createClass(CLASS); db.declareIntent(new OIntentMassiveInsert()); } catch (Exception e1) { System.err.println("Could not initialize OrientDB connection pool for Loader: " + e1.toString()); e1.printStackTrace(); return; } }
#vulnerable code public void init() throws DBException { // initialize OrientDB driver Properties props = getProperties(); String url; if (System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("win")) url = props.getProperty("orientdb.url", "plocal:C:/temp/databases/ycsb"); else url = props.getProperty("orientdb.url", "plocal:/temp/databases/ycsb"); String user = props.getProperty("orientdb.user", "admin"); String password = props.getProperty("orientdb.password", "admin"); Boolean newdb = Boolean.parseBoolean(props.getProperty("orientdb.newdb", "false")); try { System.out.println("OrientDB loading database url = " + url); OGlobalConfiguration.STORAGE_KEEP_OPEN.setValue(false); db = new ODatabaseDocumentTx(url); if (db.exists()) { db.open(user, password); if (newdb) { System.out.println("OrientDB drop and recreate fresh db"); db.drop(); db.create(); } } else { System.out.println("OrientDB database not found, create fresh db"); db.create(); } System.out.println("OrientDB connection created with " + url); dictionary = db.getMetadata().getIndexManager().getDictionary(); if (!db.getMetadata().getSchema().existsClass(CLASS)) db.getMetadata().getSchema().createClass(CLASS); db.declareIntent(new OIntentMassiveInsert()); } catch (Exception e1) { System.err.println("Could not initialize OrientDB connection pool for Loader: " + e1.toString()); e1.printStackTrace(); return; } } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Status update(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { if (debug) { System.out.println("Setting up put for key: " + key); } setTable(table); final MutateRowRequest.Builder rowMutation = MutateRowRequest.newBuilder(); rowMutation.setRowKey(ByteString.copyFromUtf8(key)); rowMutation.setTableNameBytes(ByteStringer.wrap(lastTableBytes)); for (final Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { final Mutation.Builder mutationBuilder = rowMutation.addMutationsBuilder(); final SetCell.Builder setCellBuilder = mutationBuilder.getSetCellBuilder(); setCellBuilder.setFamilyNameBytes(ByteStringer.wrap(columnFamilyBytes)); setCellBuilder.setColumnQualifier(ByteStringer.wrap(entry.getKey().getBytes())); setCellBuilder.setValue(ByteStringer.wrap(entry.getValue().toArray())); // Bigtable uses a 1ms granularity setCellBuilder.setTimestampMicros(System.currentTimeMillis() * 1000); } try { if (clientSideBuffering) { bulkMutation.add(rowMutation.build()); } else { client.mutateRow(rowMutation.build()); } return Status.OK; } catch (RuntimeException e) { System.err.println("Failed to insert key: " + key + " " + e.getMessage()); return Status.ERROR; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public Status update(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { if (debug) { System.out.println("Setting up put for key: " + key); } setTable(table); final MutateRowRequest.Builder rowMutation = MutateRowRequest.newBuilder(); rowMutation.setRowKey(ByteString.copyFromUtf8(key)); rowMutation.setTableNameBytes(ByteStringer.wrap(lastTableBytes)); for (final Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { final Mutation.Builder mutationBuilder = rowMutation.addMutationsBuilder(); final SetCell.Builder setCellBuilder = mutationBuilder.getSetCellBuilder(); setCellBuilder.setFamilyNameBytes(ByteStringer.wrap(columnFamilyBytes)); setCellBuilder.setColumnQualifier(ByteStringer.wrap(entry.getKey().getBytes())); setCellBuilder.setValue(ByteStringer.wrap(entry.getValue().toArray())); // Bigtable uses a 1ms granularity setCellBuilder.setTimestampMicros(System.currentTimeMillis() * 1000); } try { if (clientSideBuffering) { asyncExecutor.mutateRowAsync(rowMutation.build()); } else { client.mutateRow(rowMutation.build()); } return Status.OK; } catch (ServiceException e) { System.err.println("Failed to insert key: " + key + " " + e.getMessage()); return Status.ERROR; } catch (InterruptedException e) { System.err.println("Interrupted while inserting key: " + key + " " + e.getMessage()); Thread.currentThread().interrupt(); return Status.ERROR; // never get here, but lets make the compiler happy } } #location 28 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { this.currentTable = connection.getTable(tName); if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } } }
#vulnerable code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); this.currentTable = this.connection.getTable(tName); // suggestions from // http://ryantwopointoh.blogspot.com/2009/01/ // performance-of-hbase-importing.html if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = this.connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } } #location 10 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public int insert(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document toInsert = new Document("_id", key); for (Map.Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { toInsert.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().toArray()); } bulkInserts.add(toInsert); if (bulkInserts.size() == batchSize) { collection.insertMany(bulkInserts, INSERT_MANY_OPTIONS); bulkInserts.clear(); } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println("Exception while trying bulk insert with " + bulkInserts.size()); e.printStackTrace(); return 1; } }
#vulnerable code @Override public int insert(String table, String key, HashMap<String, ByteIterator> values) { try { MongoCollection<Document> collection = database .getCollection(table); Document toInsert = new Document("_id", key); for (Map.Entry<String, ByteIterator> entry : values.entrySet()) { toInsert.put(entry.getKey(), entry.getValue().toArray()); } bulkInserts.add(toInsert); if (bulkInserts.size() == batchSize) { collection.withWriteConcern(writeConcern) .insertMany(bulkInserts, INSERT_MANY_OPTIONS); bulkInserts.clear(); } return 0; } catch (Exception e) { System.err.println("Exception while trying bulk insert with " + bulkInserts.size()); e.printStackTrace(); return 1; } } #location 14 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); this.currentTable = connection.getTable(tName); if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } }
#vulnerable code public void getHTable(String table) throws IOException { final TableName tName = TableName.valueOf(table); synchronized (CONNECTION_LOCK) { this.currentTable = connection.getTable(tName); if (clientSideBuffering) { final BufferedMutatorParams p = new BufferedMutatorParams(tName); p.writeBufferSize(writeBufferSize); this.bufferedMutator = connection.getBufferedMutator(p); } } } #location 5 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void writeTo( Writer writer, WriterConfig config ) throws IOException { if( writer == null ) { throw new NullPointerException( "writer is null" ); } if( config == null ) { throw new NullPointerException( "config is null" ); } WritingBuffer buffer = new WritingBuffer( writer, 128 ); write( config.createWriter( buffer ) ); buffer.flush(); }
#vulnerable code public void writeTo( Writer writer, WriterConfig config ) throws IOException { WritingBuffer buffer = new WritingBuffer( writer, 128 ); write( config == null ? new JsonWriter( buffer ) : config.createWriter( buffer ) ); buffer.flush(); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override @CacheEvict(value={"metaCaches","metaCache"},allEntries=true,beforeInvocation=true) public void saveMeta(String type, String name, Integer mid) { if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(type) && StringUtils.isNotBlank(name)){ MetaCond metaCond = new MetaCond(); metaCond.setName(name); metaCond.setType(type); List<MetaDomain> metas = metaDao.getMetasByCond(metaCond); if (null == metas || metas.size() == 0){ MetaDomain metaDomain = new MetaDomain(); metaDomain.setName(name); if (null != mid){ MetaDomain meta = metaDao.getMetaById(mid); if (null != meta) metaDomain.setMid(mid); metaDao.updateMeta(metaDomain); //更新原有的文章分类 if(meta !=null) { contentService.updateCategory(meta.getName(), name); } } else { metaDomain.setType(type); metaDao.addMeta(metaDomain); } } else { throw BusinessException.withErrorCode(ErrorConstant.Meta.META_IS_EXIST); } } }
#vulnerable code @Override @CacheEvict(value={"metaCaches","metaCache"},allEntries=true,beforeInvocation=true) public void saveMeta(String type, String name, Integer mid) { if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(type) && StringUtils.isNotBlank(name)){ MetaCond metaCond = new MetaCond(); metaCond.setName(name); metaCond.setType(type); List<MetaDomain> metas = metaDao.getMetasByCond(metaCond); if (null == metas || metas.size() == 0){ MetaDomain metaDomain = new MetaDomain(); metaDomain.setName(name); if (null != mid){ MetaDomain meta = metaDao.getMetaById(mid); if (null != meta) metaDomain.setMid(mid); metaDao.updateMeta(metaDomain); //更新原有的文章分类 contentService.updateCategory(meta.getName(), name); } else { metaDomain.setType(type); metaDao.addMeta(metaDomain); } } else { throw BusinessException.withErrorCode(ErrorConstant.Meta.META_IS_EXIST); } } } #location 19 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String indexDataset(Dataset dataset) { logger.info("indexing dataset " + dataset.getId()); /** * @todo should we use solrDocIdentifierDataset or * IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" ? */ // String solrIdPublished = solrDocIdentifierDataset + dataset.getId(); String solrIdPublished = determinePublishedDatasetSolrDocId(dataset); String solrIdDraftDataset = IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" + dataset.getId() + IndexableDataset.DatasetState.WORKING_COPY.getSuffix(); // String solrIdDeaccessioned = IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" + dataset.getId() + IndexableDataset.DatasetState.DEACCESSIONED.getSuffix(); String solrIdDeaccessioned = determineDeaccesionedDatasetId(dataset); StringBuilder debug = new StringBuilder(); debug.append("\ndebug:\n"); int numReleasedVersions = 0; List<DatasetVersion> versions = dataset.getVersions(); for (DatasetVersion datasetVersion : versions) { Long versionDatabaseId = datasetVersion.getId(); String versionTitle = datasetVersion.getTitle(); String semanticVersion = datasetVersion.getSemanticVersion(); DatasetVersion.VersionState versionState = datasetVersion.getVersionState(); if (versionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED)) { /** * @todo for performance, should just query this rather than * iterating. Would need a new SQL query/method */ numReleasedVersions += 1; } debug.append("version found with database id " + versionDatabaseId + "\n"); debug.append("- title: " + versionTitle + "\n"); debug.append("- semanticVersion-VersionState: " + semanticVersion + "-" + versionState + "\n"); List<FileMetadata> fileMetadatas = datasetVersion.getFileMetadatas(); List<String> fileInfo = new ArrayList<>(); for (FileMetadata fileMetadata : fileMetadatas) { fileInfo.add(fileMetadata.getDataFile().getId() + ":" + fileMetadata.getLabel()); } int numFiles = 0; if (fileMetadatas != null) { numFiles = fileMetadatas.size(); } debug.append("- files: " + numFiles + " " + fileInfo.toString() + "\n"); } DatasetVersion latestVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); String latestVersionStateString = latestVersion.getVersionState().name(); DatasetVersion.VersionState latestVersionState = latestVersion.getVersionState(); DatasetVersion releasedVersion = dataset.getReleasedVersion(); if (releasedVersion != null) { if (releasedVersion.getVersionState().equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { DatasetVersion lookupAttempt2 = releasedVersion.getMostRecentlyReleasedVersion(); String message = "WARNING: called dataset.getReleasedVersion() but version returned was deaccessioned (database id " + releasedVersion.getId() + "). (releasedVersion.getMostRecentlyReleasedVersion() returns database id " + lookupAttempt2.getId() + " so that method may be better?). Look out for strange indexing results."; logger.severe(message); debug.append(message); } } Map<DatasetVersion.VersionState, Boolean> desiredCards = new LinkedHashMap<>(); /** * @todo refactor all of this below and have a single method that takes * the map of desired cards (which correspond to Solr documents) as one * of the arguments and does all the operations necessary to achieve the * desired state. */ StringBuilder results = new StringBuilder(); if (numReleasedVersions == 0) { results.append("No published version, nothing will be indexed as ") .append(solrIdPublished).append("\n"); if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, true); IndexableDataset indexableDraftVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); String indexDraftResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDraftVersion); results.append("The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: ") .append(latestVersionStateString).append(") and indexing was attempted for ") .append(solrIdDraftDataset).append(" (limited discoverability). Result: ") .append(indexDraftResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("Draft exists, no need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(" (and files). Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, false); /** * @todo delete published? */ /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DRAFT=true, * DEACCESSIONED=false, RELEASED=false} * * No published version, nothing will be indexed as dataset_17 * * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and indexing was attempted for dataset_17_draft * (limited discoverability). Result: indexed dataset 17 as * dataset_17_draft. filesIndexed: [datafile_18_draft] * * Draft exists, no need for deaccessioned version. Deletion * attempted for dataset_17_deaccessioned (and files). Result: * Attempted to delete dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. * updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, true); IndexableDataset indexableDeaccessionedVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); String indexDeaccessionedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDeaccessionedVersion); results.append("No draft version. Attempting to index as deaccessioned. Result: ").append(indexDeaccessionedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, false); String deletePublishedResults = removePublished(dataset); results.append("No published version. Attempting to delete traces of published version from index. Result: ").append(deletePublishedResults); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, false); /** * @todo delete drafts? */ /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DEACCESSIONED=true, * RELEASED=false, DRAFT=false} * * No published version, nothing will be indexed as dataset_17 * * No draft version. Attempting to index as deaccessioned. * Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17_deaccessioned. * filesIndexed: [] * * No published version. Attempting to delete traces of * published version from index. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17 from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18 from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: No released version and latest version is neither draft nor deaccesioned"; } } else if (numReleasedVersions > 0) { results.append("Released versions found: ").append(numReleasedVersions) .append(". Will attempt to index as ").append(solrIdPublished).append(" (discoverable by anonymous)\n"); if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED) || latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, true); IndexableDataset indexableReleasedVersion = new IndexableDataset(releasedVersion); String indexReleasedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableReleasedVersion); results.append("Attempted to index " + solrIdPublished).append(". Result: ").append(indexReleasedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, false); List<String> solrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete = findSolrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete(dataset); String deleteDraftDatasetVersionResult = removeSolrDocFromIndex(solrIdDraftDataset); StringBuilder deleteDraftFilesResults = new StringBuilder(); for (String doomed : solrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete) { String result = removeSolrDocFromIndex(doomed); deleteDraftFilesResults.append(result); } results.append("The latest version is published. Attempting to delete drafts. Result: ") .append(deleteDraftDatasetVersionResult).append(deleteDraftFilesResults).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(". Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {RELEASED=true, * DRAFT=false, DEACCESSIONED=false} * * Released versions found: 1. Will attempt to index as * dataset_17 (discoverable by anonymous) * * Attempted to index dataset_17. Result: indexed dataset 17 as * dataset_17. filesIndexed: [datafile_18] * * The latest version is published. Attempting to delete drafts. * Result: Attempted to delete dataset_17_draft from Solr index. * updateReponse was: {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}} * * No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for * dataset_17_deaccessioned. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { IndexableDataset indexableDraftVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, true); String indexDraftResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDraftVersion); results.append("The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: ") .append(latestVersionStateString).append(") and will be indexed as ") .append(solrIdDraftDataset).append(" (limited visibility). Result: ").append(indexDraftResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, true); IndexableDataset indexableReleasedVersion = new IndexableDataset(releasedVersion); String indexReleasedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableReleasedVersion); results.append("There is a published version we will attempt to index. Result: ").append(indexReleasedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(". Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DRAFT=true, * RELEASED=true, DEACCESSIONED=false} * * Released versions found: 1. Will attempt to index as * dataset_17 (discoverable by anonymous) * * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and will be indexed as dataset_17_draft (limited * visibility). Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17_draft. * filesIndexed: [datafile_18_draft] * * There is a published version we will attempt to index. * Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17. filesIndexed: * [datafile_18] * * No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for * dataset_17_deaccessioned. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: There is at least one published version but the latest version is neither published nor draft"; } } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: Negative number of released versions? Count was: " + numReleasedVersions; } }
#vulnerable code public String indexDataset(Dataset dataset) { logger.info("indexing dataset " + dataset.getId()); /** * @todo should we use solrDocIdentifierDataset or * IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" ? */ // String solrIdPublished = solrDocIdentifierDataset + dataset.getId(); String solrIdPublished = determinePublishedDatasetSolrDocId(dataset); String solrIdDraftDataset = IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" + dataset.getId() + IndexableDataset.DatasetState.WORKING_COPY.getSuffix(); // String solrIdDeaccessioned = IndexableObject.IndexableTypes.DATASET.getName() + "_" + dataset.getId() + IndexableDataset.DatasetState.DEACCESSIONED.getSuffix(); String solrIdDeaccessioned = determineDeaccesionedDatasetId(dataset); StringBuilder debug = new StringBuilder(); debug.append("\ndebug:\n"); int numReleasedVersions = 0; List<DatasetVersion> versions = dataset.getVersions(); for (DatasetVersion datasetVersion : versions) { Long versionDatabaseId = datasetVersion.getId(); String versionTitle = datasetVersion.getTitle(); String semanticVersion = datasetVersion.getSemanticVersion(); DatasetVersion.VersionState versionState = datasetVersion.getVersionState(); if (versionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED)) { /** * @todo for performance, should just query this rather than * iterating. Would need a new SQL query/method */ numReleasedVersions += 1; } debug.append("version found with database id " + versionDatabaseId + "\n"); debug.append("- title: " + versionTitle + "\n"); debug.append("- semanticVersion-VersionState: " + semanticVersion + "-" + versionState + "\n"); List<FileMetadata> fileMetadatas = datasetVersion.getFileMetadatas(); List<String> fileInfo = new ArrayList<>(); for (FileMetadata fileMetadata : fileMetadatas) { fileInfo.add(fileMetadata.getDataFile().getId() + ":" + fileMetadata.getLabel()); } int numFiles = 0; if (fileMetadatas != null) { numFiles = fileMetadatas.size(); } debug.append("- files: " + numFiles + " " + fileInfo.toString() + "\n"); } DatasetVersion latestVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); String latestVersionStateString = latestVersion.getVersionState().name(); DatasetVersion.VersionState latestVersionState = latestVersion.getVersionState(); DatasetVersion releasedVersion = dataset.getReleasedVersion(); if (releasedVersion.getVersionState().equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { logger.severe("WARNING: called dataset.getReleasedVersion() but version returned was deaccessioned. Look out for strange indexing results."); } Map<DatasetVersion.VersionState, Boolean> desiredCards = new LinkedHashMap<>(); /** * @todo refactor all of this below and have a single method that takes * the map of desired cards (which correspond to Solr documents) as one * of the arguments and does all the operations necessary to achieve the * desired state. */ StringBuilder results = new StringBuilder(); if (numReleasedVersions == 0) { results.append("No published version, nothing will be indexed as ") .append(solrIdPublished).append("\n"); if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, true); IndexableDataset indexableDraftVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); String indexDraftResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDraftVersion); results.append("The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: ") .append(latestVersionStateString).append(") and indexing was attempted for ") .append(solrIdDraftDataset).append(" (limited discoverability). Result: ") .append(indexDraftResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("Draft exists, no need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(" (and files). Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, false); /** * @todo delete published? */ /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DRAFT=true, * DEACCESSIONED=false, RELEASED=false} * * No published version, nothing will be indexed as dataset_17 * * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and indexing was attempted for dataset_17_draft * (limited discoverability). Result: indexed dataset 17 as * dataset_17_draft. filesIndexed: [datafile_18_draft] * * Draft exists, no need for deaccessioned version. Deletion * attempted for dataset_17_deaccessioned (and files). Result: * Attempted to delete dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. * updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, true); IndexableDataset indexableDeaccessionedVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); String indexDeaccessionedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDeaccessionedVersion); results.append("No draft version. Attempting to index as deaccessioned. Result: ").append(indexDeaccessionedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, false); String deletePublishedResults = removePublished(dataset); results.append("No published version. Attempting to delete traces of published version from index. Result: ").append(deletePublishedResults); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, false); /** * @todo delete drafts? */ /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DEACCESSIONED=true, * RELEASED=false, DRAFT=false} * * No published version, nothing will be indexed as dataset_17 * * No draft version. Attempting to index as deaccessioned. * Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17_deaccessioned. * filesIndexed: [] * * No published version. Attempting to delete traces of * published version from index. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17 from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18 from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: No released version and latest version is neither draft nor deaccesioned"; } } else if (numReleasedVersions > 0) { results.append("Released versions found: ").append(numReleasedVersions) .append(". Will attempt to index as ").append(solrIdPublished).append(" (discoverable by anonymous)\n"); if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED) || latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, true); IndexableDataset indexableReleasedVersion = new IndexableDataset(releasedVersion); String indexReleasedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableReleasedVersion); results.append("Attempted to index " + solrIdPublished).append(". Result: ").append(indexReleasedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, false); List<String> solrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete = findSolrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete(dataset); String deleteDraftDatasetVersionResult = removeSolrDocFromIndex(solrIdDraftDataset); StringBuilder deleteDraftFilesResults = new StringBuilder(); for (String doomed : solrDocIdsForDraftFilesToDelete) { String result = removeSolrDocFromIndex(doomed); deleteDraftFilesResults.append(result); } results.append("The latest version is published. Attempting to delete drafts. Result: ") .append(deleteDraftDatasetVersionResult).append(deleteDraftFilesResults).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(". Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {RELEASED=true, * DRAFT=false, DEACCESSIONED=false} * * Released versions found: 1. Will attempt to index as * dataset_17 (discoverable by anonymous) * * Attempted to index dataset_17. Result: indexed dataset 17 as * dataset_17. filesIndexed: [datafile_18] * * The latest version is published. Attempting to delete drafts. * Result: Attempted to delete dataset_17_draft from Solr index. * updateReponse was: {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}} * * No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for * dataset_17_deaccessioned. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else if (latestVersionState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { IndexableDataset indexableDraftVersion = new IndexableDataset(latestVersion); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT, true); String indexDraftResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableDraftVersion); results.append("The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: ") .append(latestVersionStateString).append(") and will be indexed as ") .append(solrIdDraftDataset).append(" (limited visibility). Result: ").append(indexDraftResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED, true); IndexableDataset indexableReleasedVersion = new IndexableDataset(releasedVersion); String indexReleasedVersionResult = addOrUpdateDataset(indexableReleasedVersion); results.append("There is a published version we will attempt to index. Result: ").append(indexReleasedVersionResult).append("\n"); desiredCards.put(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED, false); String deleteDeaccessionedResult = removeDeaccessioned(dataset); results.append("No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for ") .append(solrIdDeaccessioned).append(". Result: ").append(deleteDeaccessionedResult); /** * Desired state for existence of cards: {DRAFT=true, * RELEASED=true, DEACCESSIONED=false} * * Released versions found: 1. Will attempt to index as * dataset_17 (discoverable by anonymous) * * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and will be indexed as dataset_17_draft (limited * visibility). Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17_draft. * filesIndexed: [datafile_18_draft] * * There is a published version we will attempt to index. * Result: indexed dataset 17 as dataset_17. filesIndexed: * [datafile_18] * * No need for deaccessioned version. Deletion attempted for * dataset_17_deaccessioned. Result: Attempted to delete * dataset_17_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=1}}Attempted to delete * datafile_18_deaccessioned from Solr index. updateReponse was: * {responseHeader={status=0,QTime=0}} */ String result = getDesiredCardState(desiredCards) + results.toString() + debug.toString(); logger.info(result); return result; } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: There is at least one published version but the latest version is neither published nor draft"; } } else { return "No-op. Unexpected condition reached: Negative number of released versions? Count was: " + numReleasedVersions; } } #location 46 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void init() { if (dataset.getId() != null) { // view mode for a dataset dataset = datasetService.find(dataset.getId()); editVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); ownerId = dataset.getOwner().getId(); } else if (ownerId != null) { // create mode for a new child dataset editMode = EditMode.CREATE; dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); dataset.setVersions(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDataset(dataset); editVersion.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(null); editVersion.setVersionState(VersionState.DRAFT); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editVersion.setVersionNumber(new Long(1)); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); dataset.getVersions().add(editVersion); } else { throw new RuntimeException("On Dataset page without id or ownerid."); // improve error handling } setCitationFields(dataverseService.findCitationDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); setOtherMetadataFields(dataverseService.findOtherMetadataDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); }
#vulnerable code public void init() { if (dataset.getId() != null) { // view mode for a dataset dataset = datasetService.find(dataset.getId()); editVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); ownerId = dataset.getOwner().getId(); } else if (ownerId != null) { // create mode for a new child dataset editMode = EditMode.CREATE; dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); dataset.setVersions(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDataset(dataset); editVersion.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(null); editVersion.setVersionState(VersionState.DRAFT); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editVersion.setVersionNumber(new Long(1)); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); dataset.getVersions().add(editVersion); } else { throw new RuntimeException("On Dataset page without id or ownerid."); // improve error handling } setCitationFields(dataverseService.findCitationDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); setOtherMetadataFields(dataverseService.findOtherMetadataDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String releaseDraft() { if (releaseRadio == 1) { return releaseDataset(false); } else { return releaseDataset(true); } }
#vulnerable code public String releaseDraft() { if (releaseRadio == 1) { dataset.getEditVersion().setVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getVersionNumber().intValue() + 1)); dataset.getEditVersion().setMinorVersionNumber(new Long(0)); } else { dataset.getEditVersion().setVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getVersionNumber().intValue())); dataset.getEditVersion().setMinorVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getMinorVersionNumber().intValue() + 1)); } return releaseDataset(false); } #location 6 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void init() { if (dataset.getId() != null) { // view mode for a dataset dataset = datasetService.find(dataset.getId()); editVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); ownerId = dataset.getOwner().getId(); } else if (ownerId != null) { // create mode for a new child dataset editMode = EditMode.CREATE; dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); dataset.setVersions(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDataset(dataset); editVersion.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(null); editVersion.setVersionState(VersionState.DRAFT); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editVersion.setVersionNumber(new Long(1)); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); dataset.getVersions().add(editVersion); } else { throw new RuntimeException("On Dataset page without id or ownerid."); // improve error handling } setCitationFields(dataverseService.findCitationDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); setOtherMetadataFields(dataverseService.findOtherMetadataDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); }
#vulnerable code public void init() { if (dataset.getId() != null) { // view mode for a dataset dataset = datasetService.find(dataset.getId()); editVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); ownerId = dataset.getOwner().getId(); } else if (ownerId != null) { // create mode for a new child dataset editMode = EditMode.CREATE; dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); dataset.setVersions(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDataset(dataset); editVersion.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(null); editVersion.setVersionState(VersionState.DRAFT); editVersion.setDatasetFieldValues(editVersion.initDatasetFieldValues()); editVersion.setVersionNumber(new Long(1)); editValues = editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues(); citationValues = extractValues(editValues, true); otherMetadataValues = extractValues(editValues, false); dataset.getVersions().add(editVersion); } else { throw new RuntimeException("On Dataset page without id or ownerid."); // improve error handling } setCitationFields(dataverseService.findCitationDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); setOtherMetadataFields(dataverseService.findOtherMetadataDatasetFieldsByDataverseId(ownerId)); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String releaseDraft() { if (releaseRadio == 1) { return releaseDataset(false); } else { return releaseDataset(true); } }
#vulnerable code public String releaseDraft() { if (releaseRadio == 1) { dataset.getEditVersion().setVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getVersionNumber().intValue() + 1)); dataset.getEditVersion().setMinorVersionNumber(new Long(0)); } else { dataset.getEditVersion().setVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getVersionNumber().intValue())); dataset.getEditVersion().setMinorVersionNumber(new Long(dataset.getReleasedVersion().getMinorVersionNumber().intValue() + 1)); } return releaseDataset(false); } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void deleteContainer(String uri, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration sc) throws SwordError, SwordServerException, SwordAuthException { // swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) sc; DataverseUser vdcUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); logger.fine("deleteContainer called with url: " + uri); urlManager.processUrl(uri); logger.fine("original url: " + urlManager.getOriginalUrl()); if (!"edit".equals(urlManager.getServlet())) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "edit servlet expected, not " + urlManager.getServlet()); } String targetType = urlManager.getTargetType(); if (!targetType.isEmpty()) { logger.fine("operating on target type: " + urlManager.getTargetType()); // StudyServiceLocal studyService; Context ctx; try { ctx = new InitialContext(); // studyService = (StudyServiceLocal) ctx.lookup("java:comp/env/studyService"); } catch (NamingException ex) { logger.info("problem looking up studyService"); throw new SwordServerException("problem looking up studyService"); } if ("dataverse".equals(targetType)) { /** * @todo throw SWORD error recommending use of 4.0 "native" API * to delete dataverses */ // String dvAlias = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); // List<VDC> userVDCs = vdcService.getUserVDCs(vdcUser.getId()); // VDC dataverseToEmpty = vdcService.findByAlias(dvAlias); // if (dataverseToEmpty != null) { // if ("Admin".equals(vdcUser.getNetworkRole().getName())) { // if (swordConfiguration.allowNetworkAdminDeleteAllStudies()) { // // /** // * @todo: this is the deleteContainer method... // * should move this to some sort of "emptyContainer" // * method // */ // // curl --insecure -s -X DELETE https://sword:sword@localhost:8181/dvn/api/data-deposit/v1/swordv2/edit/dataverse/sword // Collection<Study> studies = dataverseToEmpty.getOwnedStudies(); // for (Study study : studies) { // logger.info("In dataverse " + dataverseToEmpty.getAlias() + " about to delete study id " + study.getId()); // studyService.deleteStudy(study.getId()); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "DELETE on a dataverse is not supported"); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Role was " + vdcUser.getNetworkRole().getName() + " but admin required."); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Couldn't find dataverse to delete from URL: " + uri); // } } else if ("study".equals(targetType)) { String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); logger.info("globalId: " + globalId); if (globalId != null) { Dataset study = null; try { study = datasetService.findByGlobalId(globalId); } catch (EJBException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + uri); } if (study != null) { Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = study.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(vdcUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { DatasetVersion.VersionState studyState = study.getLatestVersion().getVersionState(); if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { logger.info("destroying working copy version of study " + study.getGlobalId()); /** * @todo in DVN 3.x we had a convenient * destroyWorkingCopyVersion method but the * DeleteDatasetCommand is pretty scary... what * if a released study has a new draft version? * What we need is a * DeleteDatasetVersionCommand, I suppose... */ // studyService.destroyWorkingCopyVersion(study.getLatestVersion().getId()); try { engineSvc.submit(new DeleteDatasetCommand(study, vdcUser)); /** * @todo re-index after deletion * https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3544#note-21 */ logger.info("dataset deleted"); } catch (CommandExecutionException ex) { // internal error throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Can't delete dataset: " + ex.getMessage()); } catch (CommandException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Can't delete dataset: " + ex.getMessage()); } /** * @todo think about how to handle non-drafts */ } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED)) { // logger.fine("deaccessioning latest version of study " + study.getGlobalId()); // studyService.deaccessionStudy(study.getLatestVersion()); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " has already been deaccessioned."); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.ARCHIVED)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " has been archived and can not be deleted or deaccessioned."); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.IN_REVIEW)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " is in review and can not be deleted or deaccessioned."); } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Operation not valid for study " + study.getGlobalId() + " in state " + studyState); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "User " + vdcUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to modify " + dvThatOwnsStudy.getAlias()); } } else { throw new SwordError(404); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study to delete from URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unsupported delete target in URL:" + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "No target for deletion specified"); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void deleteContainer(String uri, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration sc) throws SwordError, SwordServerException, SwordAuthException { // swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) sc; DataverseUser vdcUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); logger.fine("deleteContainer called with url: " + uri); urlManager.processUrl(uri); logger.fine("original url: " + urlManager.getOriginalUrl()); if (!"edit".equals(urlManager.getServlet())) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "edit servlet expected, not " + urlManager.getServlet()); } String targetType = urlManager.getTargetType(); if (!targetType.isEmpty()) { logger.fine("operating on target type: " + urlManager.getTargetType()); // StudyServiceLocal studyService; Context ctx; try { ctx = new InitialContext(); // studyService = (StudyServiceLocal) ctx.lookup("java:comp/env/studyService"); } catch (NamingException ex) { logger.info("problem looking up studyService"); throw new SwordServerException("problem looking up studyService"); } if ("dataverse".equals(targetType)) { /** * @todo throw SWORD error recommending use of 4.0 "native" API * to delete dataverses */ // String dvAlias = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); // List<VDC> userVDCs = vdcService.getUserVDCs(vdcUser.getId()); // VDC dataverseToEmpty = vdcService.findByAlias(dvAlias); // if (dataverseToEmpty != null) { // if ("Admin".equals(vdcUser.getNetworkRole().getName())) { // if (swordConfiguration.allowNetworkAdminDeleteAllStudies()) { // // /** // * @todo: this is the deleteContainer method... // * should move this to some sort of "emptyContainer" // * method // */ // // curl --insecure -s -X DELETE https://sword:sword@localhost:8181/dvn/api/data-deposit/v1/swordv2/edit/dataverse/sword // Collection<Study> studies = dataverseToEmpty.getOwnedStudies(); // for (Study study : studies) { // logger.info("In dataverse " + dataverseToEmpty.getAlias() + " about to delete study id " + study.getId()); // studyService.deleteStudy(study.getId()); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "DELETE on a dataverse is not supported"); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Role was " + vdcUser.getNetworkRole().getName() + " but admin required."); // } // } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Couldn't find dataverse to delete from URL: " + uri); // } } else if ("study".equals(targetType)) { String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); logger.info("globalId: " + globalId); if (globalId != null) { Dataset study = null; try { /** * @todo don't hard code this, obviously. In DVN 3.x we * had a method for * studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId) */ // study = studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId); long databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset = 10; study = datasetService.find(databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset); } catch (EJBException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + uri); } if (study != null) { Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = study.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(vdcUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { DatasetVersion.VersionState studyState = study.getLatestVersion().getVersionState(); if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT)) { /** * @todo use getGlobalId when it's available */ logger.info("destroying working copy version of study " + study.getIdentifier()); /** * @todo in DVN 3.x we had a convenient * destroyWorkingCopyVersion method but the * DeleteDatasetCommand is pretty scary... what * if a released study has a new draft version? * What we need is a * DeleteDatasetVersionCommand, I suppose... */ // studyService.destroyWorkingCopyVersion(study.getLatestVersion().getId()); try { engineSvc.submit(new DeleteDatasetCommand(study, vdcUser)); /** * @todo re-index after deletion * https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3544#note-21 */ logger.info("dataset deleted"); } catch (CommandExecutionException ex) { // internal error throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Can't delete dataset: " + ex.getMessage()); } catch (CommandException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Can't delete dataset: " + ex.getMessage()); } /** * @todo think about how to handle non-drafts */ } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.RELEASED)) { // logger.fine("deaccessioning latest version of study " + study.getGlobalId()); // studyService.deaccessionStudy(study.getLatestVersion()); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DEACCESSIONED)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " has already been deaccessioned."); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.ARCHIVED)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " has been archived and can not be deleted or deaccessioned."); } else if (studyState.equals(DatasetVersion.VersionState.IN_REVIEW)) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Lastest version of study " + study.getGlobalId() + " is in review and can not be deleted or deaccessioned."); } else { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Operation not valid for study " + study.getGlobalId() + " in state " + studyState); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "User " + vdcUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to modify " + dvThatOwnsStudy.getAlias()); } } else { throw new SwordError(404); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study to delete from URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unsupported delete target in URL:" + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "No target for deletion specified"); } } #location 78 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String indexDataset(Dataset dataset) { logger.info("indexing dataset " + dataset.getId()); String solrIdDraftStudy = "dataset_" + dataset.getId() + "_draft"; String solrIdPublishedStudy = "dataset_" + dataset.getId(); StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); sb.append("rationale:\n"); List<DatasetVersion> versions = dataset.getVersions(); for (DatasetVersion datasetVersion : versions) { Long versionDatabaseId = datasetVersion.getId(); String versionTitle = datasetVersion.getTitle(); String semanticVersion = datasetVersion.getSemanticVersion(); String versionState = datasetVersion.getVersionState().name(); boolean versionIsReleased = datasetVersion.isReleased(); boolean versionIsWorkingCopy = datasetVersion.isWorkingCopy(); sb.append("version found with database id " + versionDatabaseId + "\n"); sb.append("- title: " + versionTitle + "\n"); sb.append("- semanticVersion-STATE: " + semanticVersion + "-" + versionState + "\n"); sb.append("- isWorkingCopy: " + versionIsWorkingCopy + "\n"); sb.append("- isReleased: " + versionIsReleased + "\n"); } DatasetVersion latestVersion = dataset.getLatestVersion(); String latestVersionState = latestVersion.getVersionState().name(); DatasetVersion releasedVersion = dataset.getReleasedVersion(); if (latestVersion.isWorkingCopy()) { sb.append("The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: " + latestVersionState + ") and will be indexed as " + solrIdDraftStudy + " (only visible by creator)\n"); if (releasedVersion != null) { String releasedVersionState = releasedVersion.getVersionState().name(); String semanticVersion = releasedVersion.getSemanticVersion(); sb.append("The released version is " + semanticVersion + " (releasedVersionState: " + releasedVersionState + ") and will be indexed as " + solrIdPublishedStudy + " (visible by anonymous)"); /** * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and will be indexed as dataset_17_draft (only visible * by creator) * * The released version is 1.0 (releasedVersionState: RELEASED) * and will be indexed as dataset_17 (visible by anonymous) */ logger.info(sb.toString()); String indexDraftResult = indexDatasetAddOrUpdate(dataset); String indexReleasedVersionResult = indexDatasetAddOrUpdate(dataset); return "indexDraftResult:" + indexDraftResult + ", indexReleasedVersionResult:" + indexReleasedVersionResult + ", " + sb.toString(); } else { sb.append("There is no released version yet so nothing will be indexed as " + solrIdPublishedStudy); /** * The latest version is a working copy (latestVersionState: * DRAFT) and will be indexed as dataset_33_draft (only visible * by creator) * * There is no released version yet so nothing will be indexed * as dataset_33 */ logger.info(sb.toString()); String indexDraftResult = indexDatasetAddOrUpdate(dataset); return "indexDraftResult:" + indexDraftResult + ", " + sb.toString(); } } else { sb.append("The latest version is not a working copy (latestVersionState: " + latestVersionState + ") and will be indexed as " + solrIdPublishedStudy + " (visible by anonymous) and we will be deleting " + solrIdDraftStudy + "\n"); if (releasedVersion != null) { String releasedVersionState = releasedVersion.getVersionState().name(); String semanticVersion = releasedVersion.getSemanticVersion(); sb.append("The released version is " + semanticVersion + " (releasedVersionState: " + releasedVersionState + ") and will be (again) indexed as " + solrIdPublishedStudy + " (visible by anonymous)"); /** * The latest version is not a working copy (latestVersionState: * RELEASED) and will be indexed as dataset_34 (visible by * anonymous) and we will be deleting dataset_34_draft * * The released version is 1.0 (releasedVersionState: RELEASED) * and will be (again) indexed as dataset_34 (visible by anonymous) */ logger.info(sb.toString()); String deleteDraftVersionResult = removeDatasetDraftFromIndex(solrIdDraftStudy); String indexReleasedVersionResult = indexDatasetAddOrUpdate(dataset); return "deleteDraftVersionResult: " + deleteDraftVersionResult + ", indexReleasedVersionResult:" + indexReleasedVersionResult + ", " + sb.toString(); } else { sb.append("We don't ever expect to ever get here. Why is there no released version if the latest version is not a working copy? The latestVersionState is " + latestVersionState + " and we don't know what to do with it. Nothing will be added or deleted from the index."); logger.info(sb.toString()); return sb.toString(); } } }
#vulnerable code public String indexDataset(Dataset dataset) { logger.info("indexing dataset " + dataset.getId()); Collection<SolrInputDocument> docs = new ArrayList<>(); List<String> dataversePathSegmentsAccumulator = new ArrayList<>(); List<String> dataverseSegments = new ArrayList<>(); try { dataverseSegments = findPathSegments(dataset.getOwner(), dataversePathSegmentsAccumulator); } catch (Exception ex) { logger.info("failed to find dataverseSegments for dataversePaths for " + SearchFields.SUBTREE + ": " + ex); } List<String> dataversePaths = getDataversePathsFromSegments(dataverseSegments); SolrInputDocument solrInputDocument = new SolrInputDocument(); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.ID, "dataset_" + dataset.getId()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.ENTITY_ID, dataset.getId()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.TYPE, "datasets"); if (dataset.isReleased()) { solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataset.getPublicationDate()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, publicGroupString); } else if (dataset.getOwner().getCreator() != null) { /** * todo why is dataset.getCreateDate() null? For now I guess we'll * use the createDate of it's parent dataverse?! https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3806 */ // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataset.getCreateDate()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataset.getOwner().getCreateDate()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPerUserPrefix + dataset.getOwner().getCreator().getId()); /** * @todo: replace this fake version of granting users access to * dataverses with the real thing, when it's available in the app */ if (dataset.getOwner().getCreator().getUserName().equals("pete")) { // figure out if cathy is around DataverseUser cathy = dataverseUserServiceBean.findByUserName("cathy"); if (cathy != null) { // let cathy see all of pete's dataverses solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPerUserPrefix + cathy.getId()); } } } else { /** * todo why is dataset.getCreateDate() null? For now I guess we'll * use the createDate of it's parent dataverse?! https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3806 */ // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataset.getCreateDate()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataset.getOwner().getCreateDate()); /** * @todo: remove this once everyone has dropped their database and * won't get NPE's from dataverse.getCreator */ solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, npeGetCreator); } /** * @todo: remove this fake "has access to all data" group */ solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPrefix + tmpNsaGroupId); addDatasetReleaseDateToSolrDoc(solrInputDocument, dataset); if (dataset.getLatestVersion() != null) { DatasetVersionUI datasetVersionUI = null; try { datasetVersionUI = new DatasetVersionUI(dataset.getLatestVersion()); } catch (NullPointerException ex) { logger.info("Caught exception trying to instantiate DatasetVersionUI for dataset " + dataset.getId() + ". : " + ex); } if (datasetVersionUI != null) { String citation = null; try { citation = datasetVersionUI.getCitation(); if (citation != null) { solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.CITATION, citation); } } catch (NullPointerException ex) { logger.info("Caught exception trying to get citation for dataset " + dataset.getId() + ". : " + ex); } } for (DatasetField dsf : dataset.getLatestVersion().getFlatDatasetFields()) { DatasetFieldType dsfType = dsf.getDatasetFieldType(); String solrFieldSearchable = dsfType.getSolrField().getNameSearchable(); String solrFieldFacetable = dsfType.getSolrField().getNameFacetable(); if (dsf.getValues() != null && !dsf.getValues().isEmpty() && dsf.getValues().get(0) != null && solrFieldSearchable != null) { logger.info("indexing " + dsf.getDatasetFieldType().getName() + ":" + dsf.getValues() + " into " + solrFieldSearchable + " and maybe " + solrFieldFacetable); if (dsfType.getSolrField().getSolrType().equals(SolrField.SolrType.INTEGER)) { String dateAsString = dsf.getValues().get(0); logger.info("date as string: " + dateAsString); if (dateAsString != null && !dateAsString.isEmpty()) { SimpleDateFormat inputDateyyyy = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy", Locale.ENGLISH); try { /** * @todo when bean validation is working we * won't have to convert strings into dates */ logger.info("Trying to convert " + dateAsString + " to a YYYY date from dataset " + dataset.getId()); Date dateAsDate = inputDateyyyy.parse(dateAsString); SimpleDateFormat yearOnly = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy"); String datasetFieldFlaggedAsDate = yearOnly.format(dateAsDate); logger.info("YYYY only: " + datasetFieldFlaggedAsDate); solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldSearchable, Integer.parseInt(datasetFieldFlaggedAsDate)); if (dsfType.getSolrField().isFacetable()) { solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldFacetable, Integer.parseInt(datasetFieldFlaggedAsDate)); } } catch (Exception ex) { logger.info("unable to convert " + dateAsString + " into YYYY format and couldn't index it (" + dsfType.getName() + ")"); } } } else { // _s (dynamic string) and all other Solr fields if (dsf.getDatasetFieldType().getName().equals("authorAffiliation")) { /** * @todo think about how to tie the fact that this * needs to be multivalued (_ss) because a * multivalued facet (authorAffilition_ss) is being * collapsed into here at index time. The business * logic to determine if a data-driven metadata * field should be indexed into Solr as a single or * multiple value lives in the getSolrField() method * of DatasetField.java */ solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.AFFILIATION, dsf.getValues()); } else if (dsf.getDatasetFieldType().getName().equals("title")) { // datasets have titles not names but index title under name as well so we can sort datasets by name along dataverses and files solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.NAME_SORT, dsf.getValues()); } if (dsfType.isControlledVocabulary()) { for (ControlledVocabularyValue controlledVocabularyValue : dsf.getControlledVocabularyValues()) { solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldSearchable, controlledVocabularyValue.getStrValue()); if (dsfType.getSolrField().isFacetable()) { solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldFacetable, controlledVocabularyValue.getStrValue()); } } } else { solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldSearchable, dsf.getValues()); if (dsfType.getSolrField().isFacetable()) { solrInputDocument.addField(solrFieldFacetable, dsf.getValues()); } } } } /** * @todo: review all code below... commented out old indexing of * hard coded fields. Also, should we respect the * isAdvancedSearchField boolean? */ // if (datasetField.isAdvancedSearchField()) { // advancedSearchFields.add(idDashName); // logger.info(idDashName + " is an advanced search field (" + title + ")"); // if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.title)) { // String toIndexTitle = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // if (toIndexTitle != null && !toIndexTitle.isEmpty()) { // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.TITLE, toIndexTitle); // } // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.authorName)) { // String toIndexAuthor = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // if (toIndexAuthor != null && !toIndexAuthor.isEmpty()) { // logger.info("index this author: " + toIndexAuthor); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.AUTHOR_STRING, toIndexAuthor); // } // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.productionDate)) { // String toIndexProductionDateString = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // logger.info("production date: " + toIndexProductionDateString); // if (toIndexProductionDateString != null && !toIndexProductionDateString.isEmpty()) { // SimpleDateFormat inputDateyyyy = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy", Locale.ENGLISH); // try { // logger.info("Trying to convert " + toIndexProductionDateString + " to a YYYY date from dataset " + dataset.getId()); // Date productionDate = inputDateyyyy.parse(toIndexProductionDateString); // SimpleDateFormat yearOnly = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy"); // String productionYear = yearOnly.format(productionDate); // logger.info("YYYY only: " + productionYear); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PRODUCTION_DATE_YEAR_ONLY, Integer.parseInt(productionYear)); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PRODUCTION_DATE_ORIGINAL, productionDate); // } catch (Exception ex) { // logger.info("unable to convert " + toIndexProductionDateString + " into YYYY format"); // } // } // /** // * @todo: DRY! this is the same as above! // */ // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.distributionDate)) { // String toIndexdistributionDateString = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // logger.info("distribution date: " + toIndexdistributionDateString); // if (toIndexdistributionDateString != null && !toIndexdistributionDateString.isEmpty()) { // SimpleDateFormat inputDateyyyy = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy", Locale.ENGLISH); // try { // logger.info("Trying to convert " + toIndexdistributionDateString + " to a YYYY date from dataset " + dataset.getId()); // Date distributionDate = inputDateyyyy.parse(toIndexdistributionDateString); // SimpleDateFormat yearOnly = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy"); // String distributionYear = yearOnly.format(distributionDate); // logger.info("YYYY only: " + distributionYear); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.DISTRIBUTION_DATE_YEAR_ONLY, Integer.parseInt(distributionYear)); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.DISTRIBUTION_DATE_ORIGINAL, distributionDate); // } catch (Exception ex) { // logger.info("unable to convert " + toIndexdistributionDateString + " into YYYY format"); // } // } // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.keywordValue)) { // String toIndexKeyword = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // if (toIndexKeyword != null && !toIndexKeyword.isEmpty()) { // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.KEYWORD, toIndexKeyword); // } // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.distributorName)) { // String toIndexDistributor = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // if (toIndexDistributor != null && !toIndexDistributor.isEmpty()) { // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.DISTRIBUTOR, toIndexDistributor); // } // } else if (name.equals(DatasetFieldConstant.description)) { // String toIndexDescription = datasetFieldValue.getStrValue(); // if (toIndexDescription != null && !toIndexDescription.isEmpty()) { // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.DESCRIPTION, toIndexDescription); // } // } // } else { // notAdvancedSearchFields.add(idDashName); // logger.info(idDashName + " is not an advanced search field (" + title + ")"); // } } } solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.SUBTREE, dataversePaths); // solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.HOST_DATAVERSE, dataset.getOwner().getName()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PARENT_ID, dataset.getOwner().getId()); solrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PARENT_NAME, dataset.getOwner().getName()); docs.add(solrInputDocument); List<DataFile> files = dataset.getFiles(); for (DataFile dataFile : files) { SolrInputDocument datafileSolrInputDocument = new SolrInputDocument(); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.ID, "datafile_" + dataFile.getId()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.ENTITY_ID, dataFile.getId()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.TYPE, "files"); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.NAME, dataFile.getName()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.NAME_SORT, dataFile.getName()); if (dataset.isReleased()) { /** * @todo: are datafiles supposed to have release dates? It's * null. For now just set something: https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3806 */ // datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getReleaseDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getOwner().getOwner().getCreateDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, publicGroupString); } else if (dataset.getOwner().getCreator() != null) { /** * todo why is dataFile.getCreateDate() null? For now I guess * we'll use the createDate of its parent datase's dataverset?! https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3806 */ // datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getCreateDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getOwner().getOwner().getCreateDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPerUserPrefix + dataset.getOwner().getCreator().getId()); /** * @todo: replace this fake version of granting users access to * dataverses with the real thing, when it's available in the * app */ if (dataset.getOwner().getCreator().getUserName().equals("pete")) { // figure out if cathy is around DataverseUser cathy = dataverseUserServiceBean.findByUserName("cathy"); if (cathy != null) { // let cathy see all of pete's dataverses datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPerUserPrefix + cathy.getId()); } } } else { /** * @todo: remove this once everyone has dropped their database * and won't get NPE's from dataverse.getCreator */ /** * todo why is dataFile.getCreateDate() null? For now I guess * we'll use the createDate of its parent dataset's dataverse?! https://redmine.hmdc.harvard.edu/issues/3806 */ // datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getCreateDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.RELEASE_OR_CREATE_DATE, dataFile.getOwner().getOwner().getCreateDate()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, npeGetCreator); } /** * @todo: remove this fake "has access to all data" group */ datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PERMS, groupPrefix + tmpNsaGroupId); // For the mime type, we are going to index the "friendly" version, e.g., // "PDF File" instead of "application/pdf", "MS Excel" instead of // "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet" (!), etc., // if available: datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.FILE_TYPE_MIME, dataFile.getFriendlyType()); // For the file type facets, we have a property file that maps mime types // to facet-friendly names; "application/fits" should become "FITS", etc.: datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.FILE_TYPE, FileUtil.getFacetFileType(dataFile)); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.DESCRIPTION, dataFile.getDescription()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.SUBTREE, dataversePaths); // datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.HOST_DATAVERSE, dataFile.getOwner().getOwner().getName()); // datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PARENT_NAME, dataFile.getDataset().getTitle()); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PARENT_ID, dataFile.getOwner().getId()); if (!dataFile.getOwner().getLatestVersion().getTitle().isEmpty()) { datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(SearchFields.PARENT_NAME, dataFile.getOwner().getLatestVersion().getTitle()); } // If this is a tabular data file -- i.e., if there are data // variables associated with this file, we index the variable // names and labels: if (dataFile.isTabularData()) { List<DataVariable> variables = dataFile.getDataTable().getDataVariables(); String variableNamesToIndex = null; String variableLabelsToIndex = null; for (DataVariable var : variables) { // Hard-coded search fields, for now: // TODO: immediately: define these as constants in SearchFields; // TODO: eventually: review, decide how datavariables should // be handled for indexing purposes. (should it be a fixed // setup, defined in the code? should it be flexible? unlikely // that this needs to be domain-specific... since these data // variables are quite specific to tabular data, which in turn // is something social science-specific... // anyway -- needs to be reviewed. -- L.A. 4.0alpha1 if (var.getName() != null && !var.getName().equals("")) { if (variableNamesToIndex == null) { variableNamesToIndex = var.getName(); } else { variableNamesToIndex = variableNamesToIndex + " " + var.getName(); } } if (var.getLabel() != null && !var.getLabel().equals("")) { if (variableLabelsToIndex == null) { variableLabelsToIndex = var.getLabel(); } else { variableLabelsToIndex = variableLabelsToIndex + " " + var.getLabel(); } } } if (variableNamesToIndex != null) { logger.info("indexing " + variableNamesToIndex.length() + " bytes"); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField("varname_s", variableNamesToIndex); } if (variableLabelsToIndex != null) { logger.info("indexing " + variableLabelsToIndex.length() + " bytes"); datafileSolrInputDocument.addField("varlabel_s", variableLabelsToIndex); } } // And if the file has indexable file-level metadata associated // with it, we'll index that too: List<FileMetadataFieldValue> fileMetadataFieldValues = dataFile.getFileMetadataFieldValues(); if (fileMetadataFieldValues != null && fileMetadataFieldValues.size() > 0) { for (int j = 0; j < fileMetadataFieldValues.size(); j++) { String fieldValue = fileMetadataFieldValues.get(j).getStrValue(); FileMetadataField fmf = fileMetadataFieldValues.get(j).getFileMetadataField(); String fileMetadataFieldName = fmf.getName(); String fileMetadataFieldFormatName = fmf.getFileFormatName(); String fieldName = fileMetadataFieldFormatName + "-" + fileMetadataFieldName + "_s"; datafileSolrInputDocument.addField(fieldName, fieldValue); } } docs.add(datafileSolrInputDocument); } /** * @todo allow for configuration of hostname and port */ SolrServer server = new HttpSolrServer("http://localhost:8983/solr/"); try { server.add(docs); } catch (SolrServerException | IOException ex) { return ex.toString(); } try { server.commit(); } catch (SolrServerException | IOException ex) { return ex.toString(); } return "indexed dataset " + dataset.getId(); // + ":" + dataset.getTitle(); } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public synchronized String CalculateMD5 (String datafile) { FileInputStream fis = null; try { fis = new FileInputStream(datafile); } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { throw new RuntimeException(ex); } return CalculateMD5(fis); /* byte[] dataBytes = new byte[1024]; int nread; try { while ((nread = fis.read(dataBytes)) != -1) { md.update(dataBytes, 0, nread); } } catch (IOException ex) { throw new RuntimeException(ex); } byte[] mdbytes = md.digest(); StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(""); for (int i = 0; i < mdbytes.length; i++) { sb.append(Integer.toString((mdbytes[i] & 0xff) + 0x100, 16).substring(1)); } return sb.toString(); */ }
#vulnerable code public synchronized String CalculateMD5 (String datafile) { MessageDigest md = null; try { md = MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5"); } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { throw new RuntimeException(e); } FileInputStream fis = null; try { fis = new FileInputStream(datafile); } catch (FileNotFoundException ex) { throw new RuntimeException(ex); } byte[] dataBytes = new byte[1024]; int nread; try { while ((nread = fis.read(dataBytes)) != -1) { md.update(dataBytes, 0, nread); } } catch (IOException ex) { throw new RuntimeException(ex); } byte[] mdbytes = md.digest(); StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(""); for (int i = 0; i < mdbytes.length; i++) { sb.append(Integer.toString((mdbytes[i] & 0xff) + 0x100, 16).substring(1)); } return sb.toString(); } #location 22 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void handleDropBoxUpload(ActionEvent e) { // Read JSON object from the output of the DropBox Chooser: JsonReader dbJsonReader = Json.createReader(new StringReader(dropBoxSelection)); JsonArray dbArray = dbJsonReader.readArray(); dbJsonReader.close(); for (int i = 0; i < dbArray.size(); i++) { JsonObject dbObject = dbArray.getJsonObject(i); // Extract the payload: String fileLink = dbObject.getString("link"); String fileName = dbObject.getString("name"); int fileSize = dbObject.getInt("bytes"); logger.info("DropBox url: " + fileLink + ", filename: " + fileName + ", size: " + fileSize); DataFile dFile = null; // Make http call, download the file: GetMethod dropBoxMethod = new GetMethod(fileLink); int status = 0; InputStream dropBoxStream = null; try { status = getClient().executeMethod(dropBoxMethod); if (status == 200) { dropBoxStream = dropBoxMethod.getResponseBodyAsStream(); // If we've made it this far, we must have been able to // make a successful HTTP call to the DropBox server and // obtain an InputStream - so we can now create a new // DataFile object: dFile = ingestService.createDataFile(editVersion, dropBoxStream, fileName, null); newFiles.add(dFile); } } catch (IOException ex) { logger.warning("Failed to access DropBox url: " + fileLink + "!"); continue; } finally { if (dropBoxMethod != null) { dropBoxMethod.releaseConnection(); } if (dropBoxStream != null) { try { dropBoxStream.close(); } catch (Exception ex) { //logger.whocares("..."); } } } } }
#vulnerable code public void handleDropBoxUpload(ActionEvent e) { // Read JSON object from the output of the DropBox Chooser: JsonReader dbJsonReader = Json.createReader(new StringReader(dropBoxSelection)); JsonArray dbArray = dbJsonReader.readArray(); dbJsonReader.close(); for (int i = 0; i < dbArray.size(); i++) { JsonObject dbObject = dbArray.getJsonObject(i); // Extract the payload: String fileLink = dbObject.getString("link"); String fileName = dbObject.getString("name"); int fileSize = dbObject.getInt("bytes"); logger.info("DropBox url: " + fileLink + ", filename: " + fileName + ", size: " + fileSize); DataFile dFile = null; // Make http call, download the file: GetMethod dropBoxMethod = new GetMethod(fileLink); int status = 0; InputStream dropBoxStream = null; try { status = getClient().executeMethod(dropBoxMethod); if (status == 200) { dropBoxStream = dropBoxMethod.getResponseBodyAsStream(); dFile = new DataFile("application/octet-stream"); dFile.setOwner(dataset); // save the file, in the temporary location for now: datasetService.generateFileSystemName(dFile); if (ingestService.getFilesTempDirectory() != null) { logger.info("Will attempt to save the DropBox file as: " + ingestService.getFilesTempDirectory() + "/" + dFile.getFileSystemName()); Files.copy(dropBoxStream, Paths.get(ingestService.getFilesTempDirectory(), dFile.getFileSystemName()), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); File tempFile = Paths.get(ingestService.getFilesTempDirectory(), dFile.getFileSystemName()).toFile(); if (tempFile.exists()) { long writtenBytes = tempFile.length(); logger.info("File size, expected: " + fileSize + ", written: " + writtenBytes); } else { throw new IOException(); } } } } catch (IOException ex) { logger.warning("Failed to access DropBox url: " + fileLink + "!"); continue; } finally { if (dropBoxMethod != null) { dropBoxMethod.releaseConnection(); } if (dropBoxStream != null) { try { dropBoxStream.close(); } catch (Exception ex) { } } } // If we've made it this far, we must have downloaded the file // successfully, so let's finish processing it as a new DataFile // object: FileMetadata fmd = new FileMetadata(); fmd.setDataFile(dFile); dFile.getFileMetadatas().add(fmd); fmd.setLabel(fileName); fmd.setCategory(dFile.getContentType()); if (editVersion.getFileMetadatas() == null) { editVersion.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); } editVersion.getFileMetadatas().add(fmd); fmd.setDatasetVersion(editVersion); dataset.getFiles().add(dFile); // When uploading files from dropBox, we don't get the benefit of // having the browser recognize the mime type of the file. So we'll // have to rely on our own utilities (Jhove, etc.) to try and determine // what it is. String fileType = null; try { fileType = FileUtil.determineFileType(Paths.get(ingestService.getFilesTempDirectory(), dFile.getFileSystemName()).toFile(), fileName); logger.fine("File utility recognized the file as " + fileType); if (fileType != null && !fileType.equals("")) { dFile.setContentType(fileType); } } catch (IOException ex) { logger.warning("Failed to run the file utility mime type check on file " + fileName); } newFiles.add(dFile); } } #location 64 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String getCitation(boolean isOnlineVersion, DatasetVersion version) { return version.getCitation(isOnlineVersion); }
#vulnerable code public String getCitation(boolean isOnlineVersion, DatasetVersion version) { String str = ""; boolean includeAffiliation = false; String authors = version.getAuthorsStr(includeAffiliation); if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(authors)) { str += authors; } if (this.getPublicationDate() == null || StringUtil.isEmpty(this.getPublicationDate().toString())) { //if not released use current year if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } str += new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy").format(new Timestamp(new Date().getTime())) ; } else { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } str += new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy").format(new Timestamp(this.getPublicationDate().getTime())); } if ( version.getTitle() != null ) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(version.getTitle())) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } str += "\"" + version.getTitle() + "\""; } } if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(this.getIdentifier())) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } if (isOnlineVersion) { str += "<a href=\"" + this.getPersistentURL() + "\">" + this.getIdentifier() + "</a>"; } else { str += this.getPersistentURL(); } } //Get root dataverse name for Citation Dataverse root = this.getOwner(); while (root.getOwner() != null) { root = root.getOwner(); } String rootDataverseName = root.getName(); if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(rootDataverseName)) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } str += " " + rootDataverseName + " "; } if (version.getVersionNumber() != null) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += ", "; } str += " V" + version.getVersionNumber(); str += " [Version]"; } /*UNF is not calculated yet if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(getUNF())) { if (!StringUtil.isEmpty(str)) { str += " "; } str += getUNF(); } String distributorNames = getDistributorNames(); if (distributorNames.trim().length() > 0) { str += " " + distributorNames; str += " [Distributor]"; }*/ return str; } #location 46 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public DepositReceipt getEntry(String uri, Map<String, String> map, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration swordConfiguration) throws SwordServerException, SwordError, SwordAuthException { DataverseUser dataverseUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); logger.fine("getEntry called with url: " + uri); urlManager.processUrl(uri); String targetType = urlManager.getTargetType(); if (!targetType.isEmpty()) { logger.fine("operating on target type: " + urlManager.getTargetType()); if ("study".equals(targetType)) { String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); Dataset dataset = null; try { dataset = datasetService.findByGlobalId(globalId); } catch (EJBException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + uri); } if (dataset != null) { Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = dataset.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(dataverseUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { ReceiptGenerator receiptGenerator = new ReceiptGenerator(); String baseUrl = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(uri); DepositReceipt depositReceipt = receiptGenerator.createReceipt(baseUrl, dataset); if (depositReceipt != null) { return depositReceipt; } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not generate deposit receipt."); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "User " + dataverseUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to retrieve entry for " + dataset.getGlobalId()); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unsupported target type (" + targetType + ") in URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unable to determine target type from URL: " + uri); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public DepositReceipt getEntry(String uri, Map<String, String> map, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration swordConfiguration) throws SwordServerException, SwordError, SwordAuthException { DataverseUser dataverseUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); logger.fine("getEntry called with url: " + uri); urlManager.processUrl(uri); String targetType = urlManager.getTargetType(); if (!targetType.isEmpty()) { logger.fine("operating on target type: " + urlManager.getTargetType()); if ("study".equals(targetType)) { String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); Dataset dataset = null; try { /** * @todo don't hard code this, obviously. In DVN 3.x we had * a method for studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId) */ // study = studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId); long databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset = 10; dataset = datasetService.find(databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset); } catch (EJBException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + uri); } if (dataset != null) { Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = dataset.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(dataverseUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { ReceiptGenerator receiptGenerator = new ReceiptGenerator(); String baseUrl = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(uri); DepositReceipt depositReceipt = receiptGenerator.createReceipt(baseUrl, dataset); if (depositReceipt != null) { return depositReceipt; } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not generate deposit receipt."); } } else { /** * @todo need study.getGlobalId() from DVN 3.x */ throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "User " + dataverseUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to retrieve entry for " + dataset.getIdentifier()); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unsupported target type (" + targetType + ") in URL: " + uri); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Unable to determine target type from URL: " + uri); } } #location 25 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String save() { dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); //TODO get real application-wide protocol/authority dataset.setProtocol("doi"); dataset.setAuthority("10.5072/FK2"); dataset.setIdentifier("5555"); //TODO add replication for logic if necessary if (replicationFor){ //dataset.getVersions().get(0).getDatasetFields(). } //Todo pre populate deposit date //If new ds get create date user if (dataset.getId() == null){ dataset.setCreator(session.getUser()); dataset.setCreateDate(new Timestamp(new Date().getTime())); } if (!(dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas() == null) && !dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas().isEmpty()) { int fmdIndex = 0; for (FileMetadata fmd : dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas()) { for (FileMetadata fmdTest : editVersion.getFileMetadatas()) { if (fmd.equals(fmdTest)) { dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas().get(fmdIndex).setDataFile(fmdTest.getDataFile()); } } fmdIndex++; } } /* * Save and/or ingest files, if there are any: */ if (newFiles != null && newFiles.size() > 0) { try { if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && !Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { /* Note that "createDirectories()" must be used - not * "createDirectory()", to make sure all the parent * directories that may not yet exist are created as well. */ Files.createDirectories(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory()); } } catch (IOException dirEx) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to create study directory " + dataset.getFileSystemDirectory().toString()); } if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { for (UploadedFile uFile : newFiles.keySet()) { DataFile dFile = newFiles.get(uFile); String tempFileLocation = getFilesTempDirectory() + "/" + dFile.getFileSystemName(); boolean ingestedAsTabular = false; boolean metadataExtracted = false; datasetService.generateFileSystemName(dFile); if (ingestService.ingestableAsTabular(dFile)) { /* try { ingestedAsTabular = ingestService.ingestAsTabular(tempFileLocation, dFile); dFile.setContentType("text/tab-separated-values"); } catch (IOException iex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, iex); ingestedAsTabular = false; } */ dFile.SetIngestScheduled(); } else if (ingestService.fileMetadataExtractable(dFile)) { try { dFile.setContentType("application/fits"); metadataExtracted = ingestService.extractIndexableMetadata(tempFileLocation, dFile, editVersion); } catch (IOException mex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Caught exception trying to extract indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName(), mex); } if (metadataExtracted) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Successfully extracted indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName()); } else { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Failed to extract indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName()); } } /* Try to save the file in its permanent location: * (unless it was already ingested and saved as tabular data) */ if (!ingestedAsTabular) { try { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Will attempt to save the file as: " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString()); Files.copy(uFile.getInputstream(), dFile.getFileSystemLocation(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); MD5Checksum md5Checksum = new MD5Checksum(); try { dFile.setmd5(md5Checksum.CalculateMD5(dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString())); } catch (Exception md5ex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Could not calculate MD5 signature for the new file " + dFile.getName()); } } catch (IOException ioex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Failed to save the file " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation()); } } // Any necessary post-processing: ingestService.performPostProcessingTasks(dFile); } } } try { dataset = datasetService.save(dataset); } catch (EJBException ex) { StringBuilder error = new StringBuilder(); error.append(ex + " "); error.append(ex.getMessage() + " "); Throwable cause = ex; while (cause.getCause() != null) { cause = cause.getCause(); error.append(cause + " "); error.append(cause.getMessage() + " "); } logger.info("Couldn't save dataset: " + error.toString()); FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + error.toString())); return null; } newFiles.clear(); editMode = null; // Queue the ingest jobs for asynchronous execution: for (DataFile dataFile : dataset.getFiles()) { if (dataFile.isIngestScheduled()) { dataFile.SetIngestInProgress(); Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Attempting to queue the file " + dataFile.getName() + " for ingest."); ingestService.asyncIngestAsTabular(dataFile); } } return "/dataset.xhtml?id=" + dataset.getId() + "&faces-redirect=true"; }
#vulnerable code public String save() { dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); //TODO get real application-wide protocol/authority dataset.setProtocol("doi"); dataset.setAuthority("10.5072/FK2"); dataset.setIdentifier("5555"); //TODO add replication for logic if necessary if (replicationFor){ //dataset.getVersions().get(0).getDatasetFields(). } //Todo pre populate deposit date //If new ds get create date user if (dataset.getId() == null){ dataset.setCreator(session.getUser()); dataset.setCreateDate(new Timestamp(new Date().getTime())); } if (!(dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas() == null) && !dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas().isEmpty()) { int fmdIndex = 0; for (FileMetadata fmd : dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas()) { for (FileMetadata fmdTest : editVersion.getFileMetadatas()) { if (fmd.equals(fmdTest)) { dataset.getVersions().get(0).getFileMetadatas().get(fmdIndex).setDataFile(fmdTest.getDataFile()); } } fmdIndex++; } } /* * Save and/or ingest files, if there are any: */ if (newFiles != null && newFiles.size() > 0) { try { if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && !Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { /* Note that "createDirectories()" must be used - not * "createDirectory()", to make sure all the parent * directories that may not yet exist are created as well. */ Files.createDirectories(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory()); } } catch (IOException dirEx) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to create study directory " + dataset.getFileSystemDirectory().toString()); } if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { for (UploadedFile uFile : newFiles.keySet()) { DataFile dFile = newFiles.get(uFile); String tempFileLocation = getFilesTempDirectory() + "/" + dFile.getFileSystemName(); boolean ingestedAsTabular = false; boolean metadataExtracted = false; datasetService.generateFileSystemName(dFile); if (ingestService.ingestableAsTabular(dFile)) { try { ingestedAsTabular = ingestService.ingestAsTabular(tempFileLocation, dFile); dFile.setContentType("text/tab-separated-values"); } catch (IOException iex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, iex); ingestedAsTabular = false; } } else if (ingestService.fileMetadataExtractable(dFile)) { try { dFile.setContentType("application/fits"); metadataExtracted = ingestService.extractIndexableMetadata(tempFileLocation, dFile, editVersion); } catch (IOException mex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Caught exception trying to extract indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName(), mex); } if (metadataExtracted) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Successfully extracted indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName()); } else { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Failed to extract indexable metadata from file " + dFile.getName()); } } /* Try to save the file in its permanent location: * (unless it was already ingested and saved as tabular data) */ if (!ingestedAsTabular) { try { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Will attempt to save the file as: " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString()); Files.copy(uFile.getInputstream(), dFile.getFileSystemLocation(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); MD5Checksum md5Checksum = new MD5Checksum(); try { dFile.setmd5(md5Checksum.CalculateMD5(dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString())); } catch (Exception md5ex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Could not calculate MD5 signature for the new file " + dFile.getName()); } } catch (IOException ioex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Failed to save the file " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation()); } } // Any necessary post-processing: ingestService.performPostProcessingTasks(dFile); } } } try { dataset = datasetService.save(dataset); } catch (EJBException ex) { StringBuilder error = new StringBuilder(); error.append(ex + " "); error.append(ex.getMessage() + " "); Throwable cause = ex; while (cause.getCause() != null) { cause = cause.getCause(); error.append(cause + " "); error.append(cause.getMessage() + " "); } logger.info("Couldn't save dataset: " + error.toString()); FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + error.toString())); return null; } newFiles.clear(); editMode = null; return "/dataset.xhtml?id=" + dataset.getId() + "&faces-redirect=true"; } #location 87 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Path("dsPreview/{datasetId}") @GET @Produces({ "image/png" }) public InputStream dsPreview(@PathParam("datasetId") Long datasetId, @Context UriInfo uriInfo, @Context HttpHeaders headers, @Context HttpServletResponse response) /*throws NotFoundException, ServiceUnavailableException, PermissionDeniedException, AuthorizationRequiredException*/ { Dataset dataset = datasetService.find(datasetId); if (dataset != null) { logger.warning("Preview: dataset service could not locate a Dataset object for id "+datasetId+"!"); return null; } String imageThumbFileName = null; List<DataFile> dataFiles = dataset.getFiles(); for (DataFile dataFile : dataFiles) { if (dataFile.isImage()) { imageThumbFileName = ImageThumbConverter.generateImageThumb(dataFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString(), 48); break; } } if (imageThumbFileName == null) { imageThumbFileName = getWebappImageResource (DEFAULT_DATASET_ICON); } if (imageThumbFileName != null) { InputStream in; try { in = new FileInputStream(imageThumbFileName); } catch (Exception ex) { // We don't particularly care what the reason why we have // failed to access the file was. // From the point of view of the download subsystem, it's a // binary operation -- it's either successfull or not. // If we can't access it for whatever reason, we are saying // it's 404 NOT FOUND in our HTTP response. return null; } return in; } return null; }
#vulnerable code @Path("dsPreview/{datasetId}") @GET @Produces({ "image/png" }) public InputStream dsPreview(@PathParam("datasetId") Long datasetId, @Context UriInfo uriInfo, @Context HttpHeaders headers, @Context HttpServletResponse response) /*throws NotFoundException, ServiceUnavailableException, PermissionDeniedException, AuthorizationRequiredException*/ { Dataset dataset = datasetService.find(datasetId); String imageThumbFileName = null; List<DataFile> dataFiles = dataset.getFiles(); for (DataFile dataFile : dataFiles) { if (dataFile.isImage()) { imageThumbFileName = ImageThumbConverter.generateImageThumb(dataFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString(), 48); break; } } if (imageThumbFileName == null) { imageThumbFileName = getWebappImageResource (DEFAULT_DATASET_ICON); } if (imageThumbFileName != null) { InputStream in; try { in = new FileInputStream(imageThumbFileName); } catch (Exception ex) { // We don't particularly care what the reason why we have // failed to access the file was. // From the point of view of the download subsystem, it's a // binary operation -- it's either successfull or not. // If we can't access it for whatever reason, we are saying // it's 404 NOT FOUND in our HTTP response. return null; } return in; } return null; } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public Statement getStatement(String editUri, Map<String, String> map, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration swordConfiguration) throws SwordServerException, SwordError, SwordAuthException { this.swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) swordConfiguration; swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) swordConfiguration; if (authCredentials == null) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "auth credentials are null"); } if (swordAuth == null) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "swordAuth is null"); } DataverseUser vdcUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); urlManager.processUrl(editUri); String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); if (urlManager.getTargetType().equals("study") && globalId != null) { logger.fine("request for sword statement by user " + vdcUser.getUserName()); Dataset study = datasetService.findByGlobalId(globalId); // try { // study = studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId); // } catch (EJBException ex) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + editUri); // } Long studyId; try { studyId = study.getId(); } catch (NullPointerException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "couldn't find study with global ID of " + globalId); } Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = study.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(vdcUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { String feedUri = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(editUri) + "/edit/study/" + study.getGlobalId(); /** * @todo is it safe to use this? */ String author = study.getLatestVersion().getAuthorsStr(); String title = study.getLatestVersion().getTitle(); Date lastUpdated = study.getLatestVersion().getLastUpdateTime(); if (lastUpdated == null) { /** * @todo why is this date null? */ logger.info("why is lastUpdated null?"); lastUpdated = new Date(); } AtomDate atomDate = new AtomDate(lastUpdated); // AtomDate atomDate = new AtomDate(study.getLatestVersion().getLastUpdateTime()); String datedUpdated = atomDate.toString(); Statement statement = new AtomStatement(feedUri, author, title, datedUpdated); Map<String, String> states = new HashMap<String, String>(); states.put("latestVersionState", study.getLatestVersion().getVersionState().toString()); /** * @todo DVN 3.x had a studyLock. What's the equivalent in 4.0? */ // StudyLock lock = study.getStudyLock(); // if (lock != null) { // states.put("locked", "true"); // states.put("lockedDetail", lock.getDetail()); // states.put("lockedStartTime", lock.getStartTime().toString()); // } else { // states.put("locked", "false"); // } statement.setStates(states); List<FileMetadata> fileMetadatas = study.getLatestVersion().getFileMetadatas(); for (FileMetadata fileMetadata : fileMetadatas) { DataFile studyFile = fileMetadata.getDataFile(); // We are exposing the filename for informational purposes. The file id is what you // actually operate on to delete a file, etc. // // Replace spaces to avoid IRISyntaxException String fileNameFinal = fileMetadata.getLabel().replace(' ', '_'); String studyFileUrlString = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(editUri) + "/edit-media/file/" + studyFile.getId() + "/" + fileNameFinal; IRI studyFileUrl; try { studyFileUrl = new IRI(studyFileUrlString); } catch (IRISyntaxException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Invalid URL for file ( " + studyFileUrlString + " ) resulted in " + ex.getMessage()); } ResourcePart resourcePart = new ResourcePart(studyFileUrl.toString()); /** * @todo get this working. show the actual file type */ // resourcePart.setMediaType(studyFile.getOriginalFileFormat()); resourcePart.setMediaType("application/octet-stream"); /** * @todo: Why are properties set on a ResourcePart not * exposed when you GET a Statement? */ // Map<String, String> properties = new HashMap<String, String>(); // properties.put("filename", studyFile.getFileName()); // properties.put("category", studyFile.getLatestCategory()); // properties.put("originalFileType", studyFile.getOriginalFileType()); // properties.put("id", studyFile.getId().toString()); // properties.put("UNF", studyFile.getUnf()); // resourcePart.setProperties(properties); statement.addResource(resourcePart); } return statement; } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "user " + vdcUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to view study with global ID " + globalId); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not determine target type or identifier from URL: " + editUri); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public Statement getStatement(String editUri, Map<String, String> map, AuthCredentials authCredentials, SwordConfiguration swordConfiguration) throws SwordServerException, SwordError, SwordAuthException { this.swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) swordConfiguration; swordConfiguration = (SwordConfigurationImpl) swordConfiguration; if (authCredentials == null) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "auth credentials are null"); } if (swordAuth == null) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "swordAuth is null"); } DataverseUser vdcUser = swordAuth.auth(authCredentials); urlManager.processUrl(editUri); String globalId = urlManager.getTargetIdentifier(); if (urlManager.getTargetType().equals("study") && globalId != null) { logger.fine("request for sword statement by user " + vdcUser.getUserName()); // Study study = null; /** * @todo don't hard code this, obviously. In DVN 3.x we had a method * for editStudyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId) */ // Study study = editStudyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId); long databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset = 10; Dataset study = datasetService.find(databaseIdForRoastingAtHomeDataset); // try { // study = studyService.getStudyByGlobalId(globalId); // } catch (EJBException ex) { // throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not find study based on global id (" + globalId + ") in URL: " + editUri); // } Long studyId; try { studyId = study.getId(); } catch (NullPointerException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "couldn't find study with global ID of " + globalId); } Dataverse dvThatOwnsStudy = study.getOwner(); if (swordAuth.hasAccessToModifyDataverse(vdcUser, dvThatOwnsStudy)) { /** * @todo getIdentifier is equivalent to getGlobalId, right? */ // String feedUri = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(editUri) + "/edit/study/" + study.getGlobalId(); String feedUri = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(editUri) + "/edit/study/" + study.getIdentifier(); /** * @todo is it safe to use this? */ String author = study.getLatestVersion().getAuthorsStr(); String title = study.getLatestVersion().getTitle(); Date lastUpdated = study.getLatestVersion().getLastUpdateTime(); if (lastUpdated == null) { /** * @todo why is this date null? */ logger.info("why is lastUpdated null?"); lastUpdated = new Date(); } AtomDate atomDate = new AtomDate(lastUpdated); // AtomDate atomDate = new AtomDate(study.getLatestVersion().getLastUpdateTime()); String datedUpdated = atomDate.toString(); Statement statement = new AtomStatement(feedUri, author, title, datedUpdated); Map<String, String> states = new HashMap<String, String>(); states.put("latestVersionState", study.getLatestVersion().getVersionState().toString()); /** * @todo DVN 3.x had a studyLock. What's the equivalent in 4.0? */ // StudyLock lock = study.getStudyLock(); // if (lock != null) { // states.put("locked", "true"); // states.put("lockedDetail", lock.getDetail()); // states.put("lockedStartTime", lock.getStartTime().toString()); // } else { // states.put("locked", "false"); // } statement.setStates(states); List<FileMetadata> fileMetadatas = study.getLatestVersion().getFileMetadatas(); for (FileMetadata fileMetadata : fileMetadatas) { DataFile studyFile = fileMetadata.getDataFile(); // We are exposing the filename for informational purposes. The file id is what you // actually operate on to delete a file, etc. // // Replace spaces to avoid IRISyntaxException String fileNameFinal = fileMetadata.getLabel().replace(' ', '_'); String studyFileUrlString = urlManager.getHostnamePlusBaseUrlPath(editUri) + "/edit-media/file/" + studyFile.getId() + "/" + fileNameFinal; IRI studyFileUrl; try { studyFileUrl = new IRI(studyFileUrlString); } catch (IRISyntaxException ex) { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Invalid URL for file ( " + studyFileUrlString + " ) resulted in " + ex.getMessage()); } ResourcePart resourcePart = new ResourcePart(studyFileUrl.toString()); /** * @todo get this working. show the actual file type */ // resourcePart.setMediaType(studyFile.getOriginalFileFormat()); resourcePart.setMediaType("application/octet-stream"); /** * @todo: Why are properties set on a ResourcePart not * exposed when you GET a Statement? */ // Map<String, String> properties = new HashMap<String, String>(); // properties.put("filename", studyFile.getFileName()); // properties.put("category", studyFile.getLatestCategory()); // properties.put("originalFileType", studyFile.getOriginalFileType()); // properties.put("id", studyFile.getId().toString()); // properties.put("UNF", studyFile.getUnf()); // resourcePart.setProperties(properties); statement.addResource(resourcePart); } return statement; } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "user " + vdcUser.getUserName() + " is not authorized to view study with global ID " + globalId); } } else { throw new SwordError(UriRegistry.ERROR_BAD_REQUEST, "Could not determine target type or identifier from URL: " + editUri); } } #location 40 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public String save() { dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); //TODO get real application-wide protocol/authority dataset.setProtocol("doi"); dataset.setAuthority("10.5072/FK2"); dataset.setIdentifier("5555"); /* * Save and/or ingest files, if there are any: */ if (newFiles != null && newFiles.size() > 0) { try { if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && !Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { /* Note that "createDirectories()" must be used - not * "createDirectory()", to make sure all the parent * directories that may not yet exist are created as well. */ Files.createDirectories(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory()); } } catch (IOException dirEx) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to create study directory " + dataset.getFileSystemDirectory().toString()); } if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { for (DataFile dFile : newFiles) { String tempFileLocation = getFilesTempDirectory() + "/" + dFile.getFileSystemName(); // These are all brand new files, so they should all have // one filemetadata total. You do NOT want to use // getLatestFilemetadata() here - because it relies on // comparing the object IDs of the corresponding datasetversions... // Which may not have been persisted yet. // -- L.A. 4.0 beta. FileMetadata fileMetadata = dFile.getFileMetadatas().get(0); String fileName = fileMetadata.getLabel(); //boolean ingestedAsTabular = false; boolean metadataExtracted = false; datasetService.generateFileSystemName(dFile); if (ingestService.ingestableAsTabular(dFile)) { /* * Note that we don't try to ingest the file right away - * instead we mark it as "scheduled for ingest", then at * the end of the save process it will be queued for async. * ingest in the background. In the meantime, the file * will be ingested as a regular, non-tabular file, and * appear as such to the user, until the ingest job is * finished with the Ingest Service. */ dFile.SetIngestScheduled(); } else if (ingestService.fileMetadataExtractable(dFile)) { try { dFile.setContentType("application/fits"); metadataExtracted = ingestService.extractIndexableMetadata(tempFileLocation, dFile, editVersion); } catch (IOException mex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Caught exception trying to extract indexable metadata from file " + fileName, mex); } if (metadataExtracted) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Successfully extracted indexable metadata from file " + fileName); } else { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Failed to extract indexable metadata from file " + fileName); } } // Try to save the file in its permanent location: //if (!ingestedAsTabular) { try { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Will attempt to save the file as: " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString()); Files.copy(new FileInputStream(new File(tempFileLocation)), dFile.getFileSystemLocation(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); MD5Checksum md5Checksum = new MD5Checksum(); try { dFile.setmd5(md5Checksum.CalculateMD5(dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString())); } catch (Exception md5ex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Could not calculate MD5 signature for the new file " + fileName); } } catch (IOException ioex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Failed to save the file " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation()); } //} // Any necessary post-processing: ingestService.performPostProcessingTasks(dFile); } } } Command<Dataset> cmd; try { if (editMode == EditMode.CREATE) { cmd = new CreateDatasetCommand(dataset, session.getUser()); } else { cmd = new UpdateDatasetCommand(dataset, session.getUser()); } dataset = commandEngine.submit(cmd); } catch (EJBException ex) { StringBuilder error = new StringBuilder(); error.append(ex + " "); error.append(ex.getMessage() + " "); Throwable cause = ex; while (cause.getCause() != null) { cause = cause.getCause(); error.append(cause + " "); error.append(cause.getMessage() + " "); } logger.info("Couldn't save dataset: " + error.toString()); FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + error.toString())); return null; } catch (CommandException ex) { FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + ex.toString())); Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); } newFiles.clear(); editMode = null; // Queue the ingest jobs for asynchronous execution: for (DataFile dataFile : dataset.getFiles()) { if (dataFile.isIngestScheduled()) { dataFile.SetIngestInProgress(); Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Attempting to queue the file " + dataFile.getFileMetadata().getLabel() + " for ingest."); ingestService.asyncIngestAsTabular(dataFile); } } return "/dataset.xhtml?id=" + dataset.getId() + "&faces-redirect=true"; }
#vulnerable code public String save() { dataset.setOwner(dataverseService.find(ownerId)); //TODO get real application-wide protocol/authority dataset.setProtocol("doi"); dataset.setAuthority("10.5072/FK2"); dataset.setIdentifier("5555"); //TODO update title in page itself if (replicationFor) { updateTitle(); } /* * Save and/or ingest files, if there are any: */ if (newFiles != null && newFiles.size() > 0) { try { if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && !Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { /* Note that "createDirectories()" must be used - not * "createDirectory()", to make sure all the parent * directories that may not yet exist are created as well. */ Files.createDirectories(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory()); } } catch (IOException dirEx) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Failed to create study directory " + dataset.getFileSystemDirectory().toString()); } if (dataset.getFileSystemDirectory() != null && Files.exists(dataset.getFileSystemDirectory())) { for (DataFile dFile : newFiles) { String tempFileLocation = getFilesTempDirectory() + "/" + dFile.getFileSystemName(); // These are all brand new files, so they should all have // one filemetadata total. You do NOT want to use // getLatestFilemetadata() here - because it relies on // comparing the object IDs of the corresponding datasetversions... // Which may not have been persisted yet. // -- L.A. 4.0 beta. FileMetadata fileMetadata = dFile.getFileMetadatas().get(0); String fileName = fileMetadata.getLabel(); //boolean ingestedAsTabular = false; boolean metadataExtracted = false; datasetService.generateFileSystemName(dFile); if (ingestService.ingestableAsTabular(dFile)) { /* * Note that we don't try to ingest the file right away - * instead we mark it as "scheduled for ingest", then at * the end of the save process it will be queued for async. * ingest in the background. In the meantime, the file * will be ingested as a regular, non-tabular file, and * appear as such to the user, until the ingest job is * finished with the Ingest Service. */ dFile.SetIngestScheduled(); } else if (ingestService.fileMetadataExtractable(dFile)) { try { dFile.setContentType("application/fits"); metadataExtracted = ingestService.extractIndexableMetadata(tempFileLocation, dFile, editVersion); } catch (IOException mex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, "Caught exception trying to extract indexable metadata from file " + fileName, mex); } if (metadataExtracted) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Successfully extracted indexable metadata from file " + fileName); } else { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Failed to extract indexable metadata from file " + fileName); } } // Try to save the file in its permanent location: //if (!ingestedAsTabular) { try { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Will attempt to save the file as: " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString()); Files.copy(new FileInputStream(new File(tempFileLocation)), dFile.getFileSystemLocation(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); MD5Checksum md5Checksum = new MD5Checksum(); try { dFile.setmd5(md5Checksum.CalculateMD5(dFile.getFileSystemLocation().toString())); } catch (Exception md5ex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Could not calculate MD5 signature for the new file " + fileName); } } catch (IOException ioex) { Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.WARNING, "Failed to save the file " + dFile.getFileSystemLocation()); } //} // Any necessary post-processing: ingestService.performPostProcessingTasks(dFile); } } } Command<Dataset> cmd; try { if (editMode == EditMode.CREATE) { cmd = new CreateDatasetCommand(dataset, session.getUser()); } else { cmd = new UpdateDatasetCommand(dataset, session.getUser()); } dataset = commandEngine.submit(cmd); } catch (EJBException ex) { StringBuilder error = new StringBuilder(); error.append(ex + " "); error.append(ex.getMessage() + " "); Throwable cause = ex; while (cause.getCause() != null) { cause = cause.getCause(); error.append(cause + " "); error.append(cause.getMessage() + " "); } logger.info("Couldn't save dataset: " + error.toString()); FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + error.toString())); return null; } catch (CommandException ex) { FacesContext.getCurrentInstance().addMessage(null, new FacesMessage(FacesMessage.SEVERITY_ERROR, "Dataset Save Failed", " - " + ex.toString())); Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); } newFiles.clear(); editMode = null; // Queue the ingest jobs for asynchronous execution: for (DataFile dataFile : dataset.getFiles()) { if (dataFile.isIngestScheduled()) { dataFile.SetIngestInProgress(); Logger.getLogger(DatasetPage.class.getName()).log(Level.INFO, "Attempting to queue the file " + dataFile.getFileMetadata().getLabel() + " for ingest."); ingestService.asyncIngestAsTabular(dataFile); } } return "/dataset.xhtml?id=" + dataset.getId() + "&faces-redirect=true"; } #location 130 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private DatasetVersion createNewDatasetVersion() { DatasetVersion dsv = new DatasetVersion(); dsv.setVersionState(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT); DatasetVersion latestVersion = getLatestVersion(); //if the latest version has values get them copied over if (latestVersion.getDatasetFields() != null && !latestVersion.getDatasetFields().isEmpty()) { dsv.setDatasetFields(dsv.copyDatasetFields(latestVersion.getDatasetFields())); } dsv.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); for (FileMetadata fm : latestVersion.getFileMetadatas()) { FileMetadata newFm = new FileMetadata(); newFm.setCategory(fm.getCategory()); newFm.setDescription(fm.getDescription()); newFm.setLabel(fm.getLabel()); newFm.setDataFile(fm.getDataFile()); newFm.setDatasetVersion(dsv); dsv.getFileMetadatas().add(newFm); } // I'm adding the version to the list so it will be persisted when // the study object is persisted. getVersions().add(0, dsv); dsv.setDataset(this); return dsv; }
#vulnerable code private DatasetVersion createNewDatasetVersion() { DatasetVersion dsv = new DatasetVersion(); dsv.setVersionState(DatasetVersion.VersionState.DRAFT); DatasetVersion latestVersion = getLatestVersion(); //if the latest version has values get them copied over if (latestVersion.getDatasetFields() != null && !latestVersion.getDatasetFields().isEmpty()) { dsv.setDatasetFields(dsv.copyDatasetFields(latestVersion.getDatasetFields())); } dsv.setFileMetadatas(new ArrayList()); for (FileMetadata fm : latestVersion.getFileMetadatas()) { FileMetadata newFm = new FileMetadata(); newFm.setCategory(fm.getCategory()); newFm.setDescription(fm.getDescription()); newFm.setLabel(fm.getLabel()); newFm.setDataFile(fm.getDataFile()); newFm.setDatasetVersion(dsv); dsv.getFileMetadatas().add(newFm); } dsv.setVersionNumber(latestVersion.getVersionNumber() + 1); // I'm adding the version to the list so it will be persisted when // the study object is persisted. getVersions().add(0, dsv); dsv.setDataset(this); return dsv; } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public DataModel getDatasetFieldsDataModel() { List values = new ArrayList(); int i = 0; for (DatasetFieldValue dsfv : editVersion.getDatasetFieldValues()){ DatasetField datasetField = dsfv.getDatasetField(); Object[] row = new Object[4]; row[0] = datasetField; row[1] = getValuesDataModel(dsfv); row[2] = new Integer(i); row[3] = datasetField; values.add(row); i++; } return new ListDataModel(values); }
#vulnerable code public DataModel getDatasetFieldsDataModel() { List values = new ArrayList(); int i = 0; for (DatasetFieldValue dsfv : dataset.getEditVersion().getDatasetFieldValues()){ DatasetField datasetField = dsfv.getDatasetField(); Object[] row = new Object[4]; row[0] = datasetField; row[1] = getValuesDataModel(datasetField); row[2] = new Integer(i); row[3] = datasetField; values.add(row); i++; } return new ListDataModel(values); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties = new HashSet<>(); systemProperties.add( SystemProperty.createSystemProperty("loop", "for.prop1", "for_value") ); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, systemProperties).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Map<String, Serializable> expectedInputs = new HashMap<>(); expectedInputs.put("text", 1); expectedInputs.put("sp_arg", "for_value"); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, firstTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 2); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, secondTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 3); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, thirdTask.getInputs()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertTrue(firstTask.getInputs().containsValue(1)); Assert.assertTrue(secondTask.getInputs().containsValue(2)); Assert.assertTrue(thirdTask.getInputs().containsValue(3)); } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidStatementAndTrim() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" min in collection "); ListForLoopStatement listForLoopStatement = validateListForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("min", listForLoopStatement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", listForLoopStatement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidStatementAndTrim() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" min in collection "); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.LIST, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("min", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidMapStatement() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k, v in collection"); MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = validateMapForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("k", mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName()); Assert.assertEquals("v", mapForLoopStatement.getValueName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidMapStatement() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k, v in collection"); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.MAP, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("k v", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidStatement() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("x in collection"); ListForLoopStatement listForLoopStatement = validateListForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("x", listForLoopStatement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", listForLoopStatement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidStatement() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("x in collection"); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.LIST, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("x", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) { String repositoryPath = System.getProperty("path"); String testsPath = System.getProperty("testPath"); String testSuitsArg = System.getProperty("testSuits"); Validate.notNull(repositoryPath, "You must pass a path to your repository"); repositoryPath = FilenameUtils.separatorsToSystem(repositoryPath); Validate.isTrue(new File(repositoryPath).isDirectory(), "Directory path argument \'" + repositoryPath + "\' does not lead to a directory"); String[] testSuits = null; if(testSuitsArg != null){ testSuits = testSuitsArg.split(","); } ApplicationContext context = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("/META-INF/spring/testRunnerContext.xml"); SlangBuild slangBuild = context.getBean(SlangBuild.class); try { int numberOfValidSlangFiles = slangBuild.buildSlangContent(repositoryPath, testsPath, testSuits); System.out.println("SUCCESS: Found " + numberOfValidSlangFiles + " slang files under directory: \"" + repositoryPath + "\" and all are valid."); System.exit(0); } catch (Exception e) { System.out.println(e.getMessage() + "\n\nFAILURE: Validation of slang files under directory: \"" + repositoryPath + "\" failed."); // TODO - do we want to throw exception or exit with 1? System.exit(1); } }
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) { String repositoryPath = System.getProperty("path"); String testsPath = System.getProperty("testPath"); String testSuitsArg = System.getProperty("testSuits"); Validate.notNull(repositoryPath, "You must pass a path to your repository"); repositoryPath = FilenameUtils.separatorsToSystem(repositoryPath); Validate.isTrue(new File(repositoryPath).isDirectory(), "Directory path argument \'" + repositoryPath + "\' does not lead to a directory"); String[] testSuits = null; if(testSuitsArg != null){ testSuits = testSuitsArg.split(","); } ApplicationContext context = new AnnotationConfigApplicationContext(SlangBuildSpringConfiguration.class); SlangBuild slangBuild = context.getBean(SlangBuild.class); try { int numberOfValidSlangFiles = slangBuild.buildSlangContent(repositoryPath, testsPath, testSuits); System.out.println("SUCCESS: Found " + numberOfValidSlangFiles + " slang files under directory: \"" + repositoryPath + "\" and all are valid."); System.exit(0); } catch (Exception e) { System.out.println(e.getMessage() + "\n\nFAILURE: Validation of slang files under directory: \"" + repositoryPath + "\" failed."); // TODO - do we want to throw exception or exit with 1? System.exit(1); } } #location 15 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public List<Value> bindAsyncLoopList( AsyncLoopStatement asyncLoopStatement, Context flowContext, Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties, String nodeName) { Validate.notNull(asyncLoopStatement, "async loop statement cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(flowContext, "flow context cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(systemProperties, "system properties cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(nodeName, "node name cannot be null"); List<Value> result = new ArrayList<>(); try { Value evalResult = scriptEvaluator.evalExpr(asyncLoopStatement.getExpression(), flowContext.getImmutableViewOfVariables(), systemProperties); if (evalResult != null && evalResult.get() != null) { //noinspection unchecked for (Serializable serializable : ((List<Serializable>)evalResult.get())) { Value value = ValueFactory.create(serializable, evalResult.isSensitive()); result.add(value); } } } catch (Throwable t) { throw new RuntimeException(generateAsyncLoopExpressionMessage(nodeName, t.getMessage()), t); } if (CollectionUtils.isEmpty(result)) { throw new RuntimeException(generateAsyncLoopExpressionMessage(nodeName, "expression is empty")); } return result; }
#vulnerable code public List<Value> bindAsyncLoopList( AsyncLoopStatement asyncLoopStatement, Context flowContext, Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties, String nodeName) { Validate.notNull(asyncLoopStatement, "async loop statement cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(flowContext, "flow context cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(systemProperties, "system properties cannot be null"); Validate.notNull(nodeName, "node name cannot be null"); List<Value> result = new ArrayList<>(); try { Value evalResult = scriptEvaluator.evalExpr(asyncLoopStatement.getExpression(), flowContext.getImmutableViewOfVariables(), systemProperties); if (evalResult.get() != null) { //noinspection unchecked for (Serializable serializable : ((List<Serializable>)evalResult.get())) { Value value = serializable instanceof Value ? (Value)serializable : ValueFactory.create(serializable, evalResult.isSensitive()); result.add(value); } } } catch (Throwable t) { throw new RuntimeException(generateAsyncLoopExpressionMessage(nodeName, t.getMessage()), t); } if (CollectionUtils.isEmpty(result)) { throw new RuntimeException(generateAsyncLoopExpressionMessage(nodeName, "expression is empty")); } return result; } #location 14 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testMultipleInsAreTrimmed() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" in in in "); ListForLoopStatement listForLoopStatement = validateListForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("in", listForLoopStatement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testMultipleInsAreTrimmed() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" in in in "); Assert.assertEquals("in", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("in", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidMapStatementAndTrimMultipleWhitSpaces() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" k, v in collection "); MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = validateMapForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("k", mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName()); Assert.assertEquals("v", mapForLoopStatement.getValueName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidMapStatementAndTrimMultipleWhitSpaces() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" k, v in collection "); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.MAP, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("k v", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void beginTask(@Param(ScoreLangConstants.TASK_INPUTS_KEY) List<Input> taskInputs, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.LOOP_KEY) LoopStatement loop, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.RUN_ENV) RunEnvironment runEnv, @Param(EXECUTION_RUNTIME_SERVICES) ExecutionRuntimeServices executionRuntimeServices, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.NODE_NAME_KEY) String nodeName, @Param(ExecutionParametersConsts.RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID) Long RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.NEXT_STEP_ID_KEY) Long nextStepId, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.REF_ID) String refId) { try { startStepExecutionPathCalc(runEnv); runEnv.removeCallArguments(); runEnv.removeReturnValues(); Context flowContext = runEnv.getStack().popContext(); Map<String, Serializable> flowVariables = flowContext.getImmutableViewOfVariables(); fireEvent(executionRuntimeServices, runEnv, ScoreLangConstants.EVENT_INPUT_START, "Task inputs start Binding", Pair.of(LanguageEventData.BOUND_INPUTS,(Serializable)retrieveInputs(taskInputs)), Pair.of( LanguageEventData.levelName.TASK_NAME.name(), nodeName)); //loops if (loopStatementExist(loop)) { LoopCondition loopCondition = loopsBinding.getOrCreateLoopCondition(loop, flowContext, nodeName); if (!loopCondition.hasMore()) { runEnv.putNextStepPosition(nextStepId); runEnv.getStack().pushContext(flowContext); return; } if (loopCondition instanceof ForLoopCondition) { ForLoopCondition forLoopCondition = (ForLoopCondition) loopCondition; if (loop instanceof ListForLoopStatement) { // normal iteration String varName = ((ListForLoopStatement) loop).getVarName(); loopsBinding.incrementListForLoop(varName, flowContext, forLoopCondition); } else { // map iteration MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = (MapForLoopStatement) loop; String keyName = mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName(); String valueName = mapForLoopStatement.getValueName(); loopsBinding.incrementMapForLoop(keyName, valueName, flowContext, forLoopCondition); } } } // Map<String, Serializable> flowVariables = flowContext.getImmutableViewOfVariables(); Map<String, Serializable> operationArguments = inputsBinding.bindInputs(taskInputs, flowVariables, runEnv.getSystemProperties()); //todo: hook sendBindingInputsEvent(taskInputs, operationArguments, runEnv, executionRuntimeServices, "Task inputs resolved", nodeName, LanguageEventData.levelName.TASK_NAME); updateCallArgumentsAndPushContextToStack(runEnv, flowContext, operationArguments); // request the score engine to switch to the execution plan of the given ref requestSwitchToRefExecutableExecutionPlan(runEnv, executionRuntimeServices, RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID, refId, nextStepId); // set the start step of the given ref as the next step to execute (in the new running execution plan that will be set) runEnv.putNextStepPosition(executionRuntimeServices.getSubFlowBeginStep(refId)); // runEnv.getExecutionPath().down(); } catch (RuntimeException e) { logger.error("There was an error running the begin task execution step of: \'" + nodeName + "\'. Error is: " + e.getMessage()); throw new RuntimeException("Error running: " + nodeName + ": " + e.getMessage(), e); } }
#vulnerable code public void beginTask(@Param(ScoreLangConstants.TASK_INPUTS_KEY) List<Input> taskInputs, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.LOOP_KEY) LoopStatement loop, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.RUN_ENV) RunEnvironment runEnv, @Param(EXECUTION_RUNTIME_SERVICES) ExecutionRuntimeServices executionRuntimeServices, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.NODE_NAME_KEY) String nodeName, @Param(ExecutionParametersConsts.RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID) Long RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.NEXT_STEP_ID_KEY) Long nextStepId, @Param(ScoreLangConstants.REF_ID) String refId) { try { runEnv.getExecutionPath().forward(); runEnv.removeCallArguments(); runEnv.removeReturnValues(); Context flowContext = runEnv.getStack().popContext(); //loops if (loopStatementExist(loop)) { LoopCondition loopCondition = loopsBinding.getOrCreateLoopCondition(loop, flowContext, nodeName); if (!loopCondition.hasMore()) { runEnv.putNextStepPosition(nextStepId); runEnv.getStack().pushContext(flowContext); return; } if (loopCondition instanceof ForLoopCondition) { ForLoopCondition forLoopCondition = (ForLoopCondition) loopCondition; if (loop instanceof ListForLoopStatement) { // normal iteration String varName = ((ListForLoopStatement) loop).getVarName(); loopsBinding.incrementListForLoop(varName, flowContext, forLoopCondition); } else { // map iteration MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = (MapForLoopStatement) loop; String keyName = mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName(); String valueName = mapForLoopStatement.getValueName(); loopsBinding.incrementMapForLoop(keyName, valueName, flowContext, forLoopCondition); } } } Map<String, Serializable> flowVariables = flowContext.getImmutableViewOfVariables(); Map<String, Serializable> operationArguments = inputsBinding.bindInputs(taskInputs, flowVariables, runEnv.getSystemProperties()); //todo: hook sendBindingInputsEvent(taskInputs, operationArguments, runEnv, executionRuntimeServices, "Task inputs resolved", nodeName, LanguageEventData.levelName.TASK_NAME); updateCallArgumentsAndPushContextToStack(runEnv, flowContext, operationArguments); // request the score engine to switch to the execution plan of the given ref requestSwitchToRefExecutableExecutionPlan(runEnv, executionRuntimeServices, RUNNING_EXECUTION_PLAN_ID, refId, nextStepId); // set the start step of the given ref as the next step to execute (in the new running execution plan that will be set) runEnv.putNextStepPosition(executionRuntimeServices.getSubFlowBeginStep(refId)); runEnv.getExecutionPath().down(); } catch (RuntimeException e) { logger.error("There was an error running the begin task execution step of: \'" + nodeName + "\'. Error is: " + e.getMessage()); throw new RuntimeException("Error running: " + nodeName + ": " + e.getMessage(), e); } } #location 18 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public ReturnValues getExecutionReturnValues(){ // if(StringUtils.isEmpty(result)){ // throw new RuntimeException("Result of executing the test " + testCaseName + " cannot be empty"); // } return new ReturnValues(outputs, result); }
#vulnerable code public ReturnValues getExecutionReturnValues(){ if(StringUtils.isEmpty(result)){ throw new RuntimeException("Result of executing the test " + testCaseName + " cannot be empty"); } if (outputs == null){ outputs = new HashMap<>(); } return new ReturnValues(outputs, result); } #location 6 #vulnerability type THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test(timeout = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) public void doJavaActionSetKeyOnNonSerializableSessionTest() { //prepare doAction arguments RunEnvironment runEnv = new RunEnvironment(); HashMap<String, Object> nonSerializableExecutionData = new HashMap<>(); GlobalSessionObject<ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject> sessionObject = new GlobalSessionObject<>(); ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject employee = new ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject("John"); sessionObject.setResource(new ContentTestActions.NonSerializableSessionResource(employee)); nonSerializableExecutionData.put("name", sessionObject); Map<String, Serializable> initialCallArguments = new HashMap<>(); initialCallArguments.put("value", "David"); runEnv.putCallArguments(initialCallArguments); //invoke doAction actionSteps.doAction(runEnv, nonSerializableExecutionData, JAVA, ContentTestActions.class.getName(), "setNameOnNonSerializableSession", executionRuntimeServicesMock, null, 2L); Assert.assertTrue(nonSerializableExecutionData.containsKey("name")); @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") GlobalSessionObject<ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject> updatedSessionObject = (GlobalSessionObject<ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject>) nonSerializableExecutionData.get("name"); ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject nonSerializableObject = updatedSessionObject.get(); String actualName = nonSerializableObject.getName(); Assert.assertEquals("David", actualName); }
#vulnerable code @Test(timeout = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) public void doJavaActionSetKeyOnNonSerializableSessionTest() { //prepare doAction arguments RunEnvironment runEnv = new RunEnvironment(); HashMap<String, Object> nonSerializableExecutionData = new HashMap<>(); GlobalSessionObject<ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject> sessionObject = new GlobalSessionObject<>(); ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject employee = new ContentTestActions.NonSerializableObject("John"); sessionObject.setResource(new ContentTestActions.NonSerializableSessionResource(employee)); nonSerializableExecutionData.put("name", sessionObject); Map<String, Serializable> initialCallArguments = new HashMap<>(); initialCallArguments.put("value", "David"); runEnv.putCallArguments(initialCallArguments); //invoke doAction actionSteps.doAction(runEnv, nonSerializableExecutionData, JAVA, ContentTestActions.class.getName(), "setNameOnNonSerializableSession", executionRuntimeServicesMock, null, 2L); Map<String, Serializable> outputs = runEnv.removeReturnValues().getOutputs(); Assert.assertTrue(outputs.containsKey("name")); Assert.assertEquals("David", outputs.get("name")); } #location 18 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties = new HashSet<>(); systemProperties.add( SystemProperty.createSystemProperty("loop", "for.prop1", "for_value") ); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, systemProperties).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Map<String, Serializable> expectedInputs = new HashMap<>(); expectedInputs.put("text", 1); expectedInputs.put("sp_arg", "for_value"); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, firstTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 2); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, secondTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 3); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, thirdTask.getInputs()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertTrue(firstTask.getInputs().containsValue(1)); Assert.assertTrue(secondTask.getInputs().containsValue(2)); Assert.assertTrue(thirdTask.getInputs().containsValue(3)); } #location 15 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidMapStatementWithoutSpaceAfterComma() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k,v in collection"); MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = validateMapForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("k", mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName()); Assert.assertEquals("v", mapForLoopStatement.getValueName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidMapStatementWithoutSpaceAfterComma() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k,v in collection"); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.MAP, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("k v", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); StepData thirdStep = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", thirdStep.getName()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", thirdTask.getName()); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public Long trigger(SlangTestCase testCase, CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact, Map<String, ? extends Serializable> inputs, Map<String, ? extends Serializable> systemProperties) { String testCaseName = testCase.getName(); String result = testCase.getResult(); //add start event Set<String> handlerTypes = new HashSet<>(); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.EVENT_EXECUTION_FINISHED); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.SLANG_EXECUTION_EXCEPTION); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.EVENT_OUTPUT_END); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_ERROR_EVENT); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_FAILURE_EVENT); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_FINISHED_EVENT); TriggerTestCaseEventListener testsEventListener = new TriggerTestCaseEventListener(testCaseName, result); slang.subscribeOnEvents(testsEventListener, handlerTypes); Long executionId = slang.run(compilationArtifact, inputs, systemProperties); while (!testsEventListener.isFlowFinished()) { try { Thread.sleep(200); } catch (InterruptedException ignore) {} } slang.unSubscribeOnEvents(testsEventListener); ReturnValues executionReturnValues = testsEventListener.getExecutionReturnValues(); String executionResult = executionReturnValues.getResult(); String errorMessageFlowExecution = testsEventListener.getErrorMessage(); if (BooleanUtils.isTrue(testCase.getThrowsException())) { if(StringUtils.isBlank(errorMessageFlowExecution)) { throw new RuntimeException("Failed test: " + testCaseName + " - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\nFlow " + compilationArtifact.getExecutionPlan().getName() +" did not throw an exception as expected"); } return executionId; } if(StringUtils.isNotBlank(errorMessageFlowExecution)){ // unexpected exception occurred during flow execution throw new RuntimeException("Error occured while running test: " + testCaseName + " - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\n" + errorMessageFlowExecution); } if (result != null && !result.equals(executionResult)){ throw new RuntimeException("Failed test: " + testCaseName +" - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\nExpected result: " + result + "\nActual result: " + executionResult); } return executionId; }
#vulnerable code public Long trigger(SlangTestCase testCase, CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact, Map<String, ? extends Serializable> inputs, Map<String, ? extends Serializable> systemProperties) { String testCaseName = testCase.getName(); String result = testCase.getResult(); //add start event Set<String> handlerTypes = new HashSet<>(); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.EVENT_EXECUTION_FINISHED); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.SLANG_EXECUTION_EXCEPTION); handlerTypes.add(ScoreLangConstants.EVENT_OUTPUT_END); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_ERROR_EVENT); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_FAILURE_EVENT); handlerTypes.add(EventConstants.SCORE_FINISHED_EVENT); TriggerTestCaseEventListener testsEventListener = new TriggerTestCaseEventListener(testCaseName, result); slang.subscribeOnEvents(testsEventListener, handlerTypes); Long executionId = slang.run(compilationArtifact, inputs, systemProperties); while (!testsEventListener.isFlowFinished()) { try { Thread.sleep(200); } catch (InterruptedException ignore) {} } slang.unSubscribeOnEvents(testsEventListener); ReturnValues executionReturnValues = testsEventListener.getExecutionReturnValues(); String executionResult = executionReturnValues.getResult(); String errorMessageFlowExecution = testsEventListener.getErrorMessage(); if(StringUtils.isBlank(errorMessageFlowExecution) && BooleanUtils.isTrue(testCase.getThrowsException())){ throw new RuntimeException("Failed test: " + testCaseName + " - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\nFlow " + compilationArtifact.getExecutionPlan().getName() +" did not throw an exception as expected"); } if(StringUtils.isNotBlank(errorMessageFlowExecution) && BooleanUtils.isFalse(testCase.getThrowsException())){ // unexpected exception occurred during flow execution throw new RuntimeException("Error occured while running test: " + testCaseName + " - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\n" + errorMessageFlowExecution); } if (result != null && !executionResult.equals(result)){ throw new RuntimeException("Failed test: " + testCaseName +" - " + testCase.getDescription() + "\nExpected result: " + result + "\nActual result: " + executionResult); } return executionId; } #location 41 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); StepData fourthStep = stepsData.get(FOURTH_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", fourthStep.getName()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); StepData fourthTask = stepsData.get(FOURTH_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", fourthTask.getName()); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidMapStatementAndTrim() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" k, v in collection "); MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = validateMapForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("k", mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName()); Assert.assertEquals("v", mapForLoopStatement.getValueName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidMapStatementAndTrim() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform(" k, v in collection "); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.MAP, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("k v", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("collection", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithBreak() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_break_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/operation_that_goes_to_custom_when_value_is_2.sl").toURI(); URI operation2 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1), SlangSource.fromFile(operation2)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); List<String> actualSteps = getStepsOnly(stepsData); Assert.assertEquals(2, actualSteps.size()); StepData secondStep = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", secondStep.getName()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithBreak() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_break_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/operation_that_goes_to_custom_when_value_is_2.sl").toURI(); URI operation2 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1), SlangSource.fromFile(operation2)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getSteps(); List<String> actualTasks = getTasksOnly(stepsData); Assert.assertEquals(2, actualTasks.size()); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", secondTask.getName()); } #location 15 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testStepPublishValues() throws Exception { URL resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/binding_scope_flow.sl"); URI operation = getClass().getResource("/yaml/binding_scope_op.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource.toURI()), path); Map<String, Value> userInputs = Collections.emptyMap(); Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties = Collections.emptySet(); // trigger ExecutionPlan RuntimeInformation runtimeInformation = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, systemProperties); Map<String, StepData> executionData = runtimeInformation.getSteps(); StepData stepData = executionData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); Assert.assertNotNull("step data is null", stepData); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testStepPublishValues() throws Exception { URL resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/binding_scope_flow.sl"); URI operation = getClass().getResource("/yaml/binding_scope_op.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource.toURI()), path); Map<String, Value> userInputs = Collections.emptyMap(); Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties = Collections.emptySet(); // trigger ExecutionPlan RuntimeInformation runtimeInformation = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, systemProperties); Map<String, StepData> executionData = runtimeInformation.getSteps(); StepData stepData = executionData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); Assert.assertNotNull("step data is null", stepData); verifyStepPublishValues(stepData); } #location 19 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValues() throws Exception { // compile URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/formats/values_flow.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/formats/values_op.sl").toURI(); URI operation2 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/noop.sl").toURI(); SlangSource dep1 = SlangSource.fromFile(operation1); SlangSource dep2 = SlangSource.fromFile(operation2); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(dep1, dep2); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); // trigger Map<String, StepData> steps = prepareAndRun(compilationArtifact); // verify StepData flowData = steps.get(EXEC_START_PATH); StepData taskData = steps.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); verifyExecutableInputs(flowData); verifyExecutableOutputs(flowData); verifyTaskInputs(taskData); verifyTaskPublishValues(taskData); verifySuccessResult(flowData); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValues() throws Exception { // compile URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/formats/values_flow.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/formats/values_op.sl").toURI(); URI operation2 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/noop.sl").toURI(); SlangSource dep1 = SlangSource.fromFile(operation1); SlangSource dep2 = SlangSource.fromFile(operation2); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(dep1, dep2); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); // trigger Map<String, StepData> steps = prepareAndRun(compilationArtifact); // verify StepData flowData = steps.get(EXEC_START_PATH); StepData taskData = steps.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData oneLinerTaskData = steps.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); verifyExecutableInputs(flowData); verifyExecutableOutputs(flowData); verifyTaskInputs(taskData); verifyTaskPublishValues(taskData); verifyOneLinerInputs(oneLinerTaskData); verifySuccessResult(flowData); } #location 25 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, null); StepData fourthTask = stepsData.get(FOURTH_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", fourthTask.getName()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithMapLoopsWithCustomNavigation() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/loop_with_custom_navigation_with_map.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, null); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(FOURTH_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertEquals("print_other_values", thirdTask.getName()); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidMapStatementWithExpression() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k, v in dictionary.items()"); MapForLoopStatement mapForLoopStatement = validateMapForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("k", mapForLoopStatement.getKeyName()); Assert.assertEquals("v", mapForLoopStatement.getValueName()); Assert.assertEquals("dictionary.items()", statement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidMapStatementWithExpression() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("k, v in dictionary.items()"); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.MAP, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("k v", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("dictionary.items()", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Set<SystemProperty> systemProperties = new HashSet<>(); systemProperties.add( SystemProperty.createSystemProperty("loop", "for.prop1", "for_value") ); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, systemProperties).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Map<String, Serializable> expectedInputs = new HashMap<>(); expectedInputs.put("text", 1); expectedInputs.put("sp_arg", "for_value"); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, firstTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 2); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, secondTask.getInputs()); expectedInputs.put("text", 3); Assert.assertEquals(expectedInputs, thirdTask.getInputs()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlowWithLoops() throws Exception { URI resource = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/simple_loop.sl").toURI(); URI operation1 = getClass().getResource("/yaml/loops/print.sl").toURI(); Set<SlangSource> path = Sets.newHashSet(SlangSource.fromFile(operation1)); CompilationArtifact compilationArtifact = slang.compile(SlangSource.fromFile(resource), path); Map<String, Serializable> userInputs = new HashMap<>(); Map<String, StepData> stepsData = triggerWithData(compilationArtifact, userInputs, EMPTY_SET).getTasks(); StepData firstTask = stepsData.get(FIRST_STEP_PATH); StepData secondTask = stepsData.get(SECOND_STEP_KEY); StepData thirdTask = stepsData.get(THIRD_STEP_KEY); Assert.assertTrue(firstTask.getInputs().containsValue(1)); Assert.assertTrue(secondTask.getInputs().containsValue(2)); Assert.assertTrue(thirdTask.getInputs().containsValue(3)); } #location 16 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testValidStatementWithSpaces() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("x in range(0, 9)"); ListForLoopStatement listForLoopStatement = validateListForLoopStatement(statement); Assert.assertEquals("x", listForLoopStatement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("range(0, 9)", listForLoopStatement.getCollectionExpression()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testValidStatementWithSpaces() throws Exception { ForLoopStatement statement = transformer.transform("x in range(0, 9)"); Assert.assertEquals(ForLoopStatement.Type.LIST, statement.getType()); Assert.assertEquals("x", statement.getVarName()); Assert.assertEquals("range(0, 9)", statement.getCollectionExpression()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void testRetryForResultAndThrowable() { // Given retry for null exec = new AsyncExecution(callable, new RetryPolicy().retryWhen(null), scheduler, future, null); // When / Then assertFalse(exec.complete(null)); assertTrue(exec.retryFor(null, null)); exec.prepare(); assertTrue(exec.retryFor(1, new IllegalArgumentException())); exec.prepare(); assertFalse(exec.retryFor(1, null)); // Then assertEquals(exec.getExecutions(), 3); assertTrue(exec.isComplete()); assertEquals(exec.getLastResult(), Integer.valueOf(1)); assertNull(exec.getLastFailure()); verifyScheduler(2); verify(future).complete(1, null, true); // Given 2 max retries exec = new AsyncExecution(callable, new RetryPolicy().retryWhen(null).withMaxRetries(1), scheduler, future, null); // When / Then resetMocks(); assertFalse(exec.complete(null)); assertTrue(exec.retryFor(null, e)); exec.prepare(); assertFalse(exec.retryFor(null, e)); // Then assertEquals(exec.getExecutions(), 2); assertTrue(exec.isComplete()); assertNull(exec.getLastResult()); assertEquals(exec.getLastFailure(), e); verifyScheduler(1); verify(future).complete(null, e, false); }
#vulnerable code public void testRetryForResultAndThrowable() { // Given retry for null inv = new AsyncExecution(callable, new RetryPolicy().retryWhen(null), scheduler, future, null); // When / Then assertFalse(inv.complete(null)); assertTrue(inv.retryFor(null, null)); inv.prepare(); assertTrue(inv.retryFor(1, new IllegalArgumentException())); inv.prepare(); assertFalse(inv.retryFor(1, null)); // Then assertEquals(inv.getExecutions(), 3); assertTrue(inv.isComplete()); assertEquals(inv.getLastResult(), Integer.valueOf(1)); assertNull(inv.getLastFailure()); verifyScheduler(2); verify(future).complete(1, null, true); // Given 2 max retries inv = new AsyncExecution(callable, new RetryPolicy().retryWhen(null).withMaxRetries(1), scheduler, future, null); // When / Then resetMocks(); assertFalse(inv.complete(null)); assertTrue(inv.retryFor(null, e)); inv.prepare(); assertFalse(inv.retryFor(null, e)); // Then assertEquals(inv.getExecutions(), 2); assertTrue(inv.isComplete()); assertNull(inv.getLastResult()); assertEquals(inv.getLastFailure(), e); verifyScheduler(1); verify(future).complete(null, e, false); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void testCompleteOrRetry() { // Given retry on IllegalArgumentException exec = new AsyncExecution(callable, scheduler, future, configFor(new RetryPolicy())); // When / Then exec.completeOrRetry(null, e); assertFalse(exec.isComplete()); exec.before(); exec.completeOrRetry(null, null); // Then assertEquals(exec.getExecutions(), 2); assertTrue(exec.isComplete()); assertNull(exec.getLastResult()); assertNull(exec.getLastFailure()); verifyScheduler(1); verify(future).complete(null, null, null, true); }
#vulnerable code public void testCompleteOrRetry() { // Given retry on IllegalArgumentException exec = new AsyncExecution(callable, scheduler, future, configFor(new RetryPolicy())); // When / Then exec.completeOrRetry(null, e); assertFalse(exec.isComplete()); exec.before(); exec.completeOrRetry(null, null); // Then assertEquals(exec.getExecutions(), 2); assertTrue(exec.isComplete()); assertNull(exec.getLastResult()); assertNull(exec.getLastFailure()); verifyScheduler(1); verify(future).complete(null, null, null); } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { try { // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); // git for-each-ref --format='%(refname:short)' refs/heads/hotfix/* final String hotfixBranches = executeGitCommandReturn( "for-each-ref", "--format=\"%(refname:short)\"", "refs/heads/" + gitFlowConfig.getHotfixBranchPrefix() + "*"); if (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixBranches)) { throw new MojoFailureException("There is no hotfix branches."); } String[] branches = hotfixBranches.split("\\r?\\n"); List<String> numberedList = new ArrayList<String>(); StringBuffer str = new StringBuffer( "hotfix branch name to finish: ["); for (int i = 0; i < branches.length; i++) { str.append((i + 1) + ". " + branches[i] + " "); numberedList.add("" + (i + 1)); } str.append("]"); String hotfixNumber = null; try { while (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixNumber)) { hotfixNumber = prompter .prompt(str.toString(), numberedList); } } catch (PrompterException e) { getLog().error(e); } String hotfixName = null; if (hotfixNumber != null) { int num = Integer.parseInt(hotfixNumber); hotfixName = branches[num - 1]; } if (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixName)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Hotfix name to finish is blank."); } // git checkout master executeGitCommand("checkout", gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); // git tag -a ... executeGitCommand( "tag", "-a", gitFlowConfig.getVersionTagPrefix() + hotfixName.replaceFirst( gitFlowConfig.getHotfixBranchPrefix(), ""), "-m", "tagging hotfix"); // check whether release branch exists // git for-each-ref --count=1 --format="%(refname:short)" // refs/heads/release/* final String releaseBranch = executeGitCommandReturn( "for-each-ref", "--count=1", "--format=\"%(refname:short)\"", "refs/heads/" + gitFlowConfig.getReleaseBranchPrefix() + "*"); // if release branch exists merge hotfix changes into it if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(releaseBranch)) { // git checkout release executeGitCommand("checkout", releaseBranch); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); } else { // git checkout develop executeGitCommand("checkout", gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); // get current project version from pom String currentVersion = getCurrentProjectVersion(); String nextSnapshotVersion = null; // get next snapshot version try { DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( currentVersion); nextSnapshotVersion = versionInfo.getNextVersion() .getSnapshotVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } if (StringUtils.isBlank(nextSnapshotVersion)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Next snapshot version is blank."); } // mvn versions:set -DnewVersion=... -DgenerateBackupPoms=false executeMvnCommand(VERSIONS_MAVEN_PLUGIN + ":set", "-DnewVersion=" + nextSnapshotVersion, "-DgenerateBackupPoms=false"); // git commit -a -m updating poms for next development version executeGitCommand("commit", "-a", "-m", "updating poms for next development version"); } // git branch -d hotfix/... executeGitCommand("branch", "-d", hotfixName); } catch (CommandLineException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { try { // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); // git for-each-ref --format='%(refname:short)' refs/heads/hotfix/* final String hotfixBranches = executeGitCommandReturn( "for-each-ref", "--format=\"%(refname:short)\"", "refs/heads/" + gitFlowConfig.getHotfixBranchPrefix() + "*"); if (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixBranches)) { throw new MojoFailureException("There is no hotfix branches."); } String[] branches = hotfixBranches.split("\\r?\\n"); List<String> numberedList = new ArrayList<String>(); StringBuffer str = new StringBuffer( "hotfix branch name to finish: ["); for (int i = 0; i < branches.length; i++) { str.append((i + 1) + ". " + branches[i] + " "); numberedList.add("" + (i + 1)); } str.append("]"); String hotfixNumber = null; try { while (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixNumber)) { hotfixNumber = prompter .prompt(str.toString(), numberedList); } } catch (PrompterException e) { getLog().error(e); } String hotfixName = null; if (hotfixNumber != null) { int num = Integer.parseInt(hotfixNumber); hotfixName = branches[num - 1]; } if (StringUtils.isBlank(hotfixName)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Hotfix name to finish is blank."); } // git checkout master executeGitCommand("checkout", gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); // git tag -a ... executeGitCommand( "tag", "-a", gitFlowConfig.getVersionTagPrefix() + hotfixName.replaceFirst( gitFlowConfig.getHotfixBranchPrefix(), ""), "-m", "tagging hotfix"); // check whether release branch exists // git for-each-ref --count=1 --format="%(refname:short)" // refs/heads/release/* final String releaseBranch = executeGitCommandReturn( "for-each-ref", "--count=1", "--format=\"%(refname:short)\"", "refs/heads/" + gitFlowConfig.getReleaseBranchPrefix() + "*"); // if release branch exists merge hotfix changes into it if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(releaseBranch)) { // git checkout release executeGitCommand("checkout", releaseBranch); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); } else { // git checkout develop executeGitCommand("checkout", gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); // git merge --no-ff hotfix/... executeGitCommand("merge", "--no-ff", hotfixName); String nextSnapshotVersion = null; // get next snapshot version try { DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( project.getVersion()); nextSnapshotVersion = versionInfo.getNextVersion() .getSnapshotVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } if (StringUtils.isBlank(nextSnapshotVersion)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Next snapshot version is blank."); } // mvn versions:set -DnewVersion=... -DgenerateBackupPoms=false executeMvnCommand(VERSIONS_MAVEN_PLUGIN + ":set", "-DnewVersion=" + nextSnapshotVersion, "-DgenerateBackupPoms=false"); // git commit -a -m updating poms for next development version executeGitCommand("commit", "-a", "-m", "updating poms for next development version"); } // git branch -d hotfix/... executeGitCommand("branch", "-d", hotfixName); } catch (CommandLineException e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } #location 59 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { try { // set git flow configuration initGitFlowConfig(); // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); // check snapshots dependencies if (!allowSnapshots) { checkSnapshotDependencies(); } // fetch and check remote if (fetchRemote) { if (notSameProdDevName()) { gitFetchRemoteAndCompare(gitFlowConfig .getDevelopmentBranch()); } gitFetchRemoteAndCompare(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); } // git for-each-ref --count=1 refs/heads/release/* final String releaseBranch = gitFindBranches( gitFlowConfig.getReleaseBranchPrefix(), true); if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(releaseBranch)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Release branch already exists. Cannot start release."); } // need to be in develop to get correct project version // git checkout develop gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); if (!skipTestProject) { // mvn clean test mvnCleanTest(); } // get current project version from pom final String currentVersion = getCurrentProjectVersion(); String defaultVersion = null; if (tychoBuild) { defaultVersion = currentVersion; } else { // get default release version try { final DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( currentVersion); defaultVersion = versionInfo.getReleaseVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } } if (defaultVersion == null) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Cannot get default project version."); } String version = null; if (settings.isInteractiveMode()) { try { version = prompter.prompt("What is release version? [" + defaultVersion + "]"); } catch (PrompterException e) { getLog().error(e); } } else { version = releaseVersion; } if (StringUtils.isBlank(version)) { version = defaultVersion; } // execute if version changed if (!version.equals(currentVersion)) { // mvn set version mvnSetVersions(version); // git commit -a -m updating versions for release gitCommit(commitMessages.getReleaseStartMessage()); } if (notSameProdDevName()) { // git checkout master gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); gitMerge(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch(), releaseRebase, releaseMergeNoFF); } if (!skipTag) { if (tychoBuild && ArtifactUtils.isSnapshot(version)) { version = version.replace("-" + Artifact.SNAPSHOT_VERSION, ""); } // git tag -a ... gitTag(gitFlowConfig.getVersionTagPrefix() + version, commitMessages.getTagReleaseMessage()); } if (notSameProdDevName()) { // git checkout develop gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); } String nextSnapshotVersion = null; // get next snapshot version try { final DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( version); nextSnapshotVersion = versionInfo.getNextVersion() .getSnapshotVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } if (StringUtils.isBlank(nextSnapshotVersion)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Next snapshot version is blank."); } // mvn set version mvnSetVersions(nextSnapshotVersion); // git commit -a -m updating for next development version gitCommit(commitMessages.getReleaseFinishMessage()); if (installProject) { // mvn clean install mvnCleanInstall(); } if (pushRemote) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch(), !skipTag); if (notSameProdDevName()) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch(), !skipTag); } } } catch (CommandLineException e) { getLog().error(e); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { try { // set git flow configuration initGitFlowConfig(); // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); // check snapshots dependencies if (!allowSnapshots) { checkSnapshotDependencies(); } // fetch and check remote if (fetchRemote) { if (notSameProdDevName()) { gitFetchRemoteAndCompare(gitFlowConfig .getDevelopmentBranch()); } gitFetchRemoteAndCompare(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); } // git for-each-ref --count=1 refs/heads/release/* final String releaseBranch = gitFindBranches( gitFlowConfig.getReleaseBranchPrefix(), true); if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(releaseBranch)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Release branch already exists. Cannot start release."); } // need to be in develop to get correct project version // git checkout develop gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); if (!skipTestProject) { // mvn clean test mvnCleanTest(); } // get current project version from pom final String currentVersion = getCurrentProjectVersion(); String defaultVersion = null; if (tychoBuild) { defaultVersion = currentVersion; } else { // get default release version try { final DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( currentVersion); defaultVersion = versionInfo.getReleaseVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } } if (defaultVersion == null) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Cannot get default project version."); } String version = null; if (settings.isInteractiveMode()) { try { version = prompter.prompt("What is release version? [" + defaultVersion + "]"); } catch (PrompterException e) { getLog().error(e); } } if (StringUtils.isBlank(version)) { version = defaultVersion; } // execute if version changed if (!version.equals(currentVersion)) { // mvn set version mvnSetVersions(version); // git commit -a -m updating versions for release gitCommit(commitMessages.getReleaseStartMessage()); } if (notSameProdDevName()) { // git checkout master gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch()); gitMerge(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch(), releaseRebase, releaseMergeNoFF); } if (!skipTag) { if (tychoBuild && ArtifactUtils.isSnapshot(version)) { version = version.replace("-" + Artifact.SNAPSHOT_VERSION, ""); } // git tag -a ... gitTag(gitFlowConfig.getVersionTagPrefix() + version, commitMessages.getTagReleaseMessage()); } if (notSameProdDevName()) { // git checkout develop gitCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch()); } String nextSnapshotVersion = null; // get next snapshot version try { final DefaultVersionInfo versionInfo = new DefaultVersionInfo( version); nextSnapshotVersion = versionInfo.getNextVersion() .getSnapshotVersionString(); } catch (VersionParseException e) { if (getLog().isDebugEnabled()) { getLog().debug(e); } } if (StringUtils.isBlank(nextSnapshotVersion)) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Next snapshot version is blank."); } // mvn set version mvnSetVersions(nextSnapshotVersion); // git commit -a -m updating for next development version gitCommit(commitMessages.getReleaseFinishMessage()); if (installProject) { // mvn clean install mvnCleanInstall(); } if (pushRemote) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getProductionBranch(), !skipTag); if (notSameProdDevName()) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getDevelopmentBranch(), !skipTag); } } } catch (CommandLineException e) { getLog().error(e); } } #location 81 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { validateConfiguration(); try { // set git flow configuration initGitFlowConfig(); // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); String tag = null; if (settings.isInteractiveMode()) { // get tags String tagsStr = gitFindTags(); if (StringUtils.isBlank(tagsStr)) { throw new MojoFailureException("There are no tags."); } try { tag = prompter.prompt("Choose tag to start support branch", Arrays.asList(tagsStr.split("\\r?\\n"))); } catch (PrompterException e) { throw new MojoFailureException("support-start", e); } } else if (StringUtils.isNotBlank(tagName)) { if (gitCheckTagExists(tagName)) { tag = tagName; } else { throw new MojoFailureException("The tag '" + tagName + "' doesn't exist."); } } else { getLog().info("The tagName is blank. Using the last tag."); tag = gitFindLastTag(); } if (StringUtils.isBlank(tag)) { throw new MojoFailureException("Tag is blank."); } // git for-each-ref refs/heads/support/... final boolean supportBranchExists = gitCheckBranchExists(gitFlowConfig .getSupportBranchPrefix() + tag); if (supportBranchExists) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Support branch with that name already exists."); } // git checkout -b ... tag gitCreateAndCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getSupportBranchPrefix() + tag, tag); if (installProject) { // mvn clean install mvnCleanInstall(); } if (pushRemote) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getSupportBranchPrefix() + tag, false); } } catch (CommandLineException e) { throw new MojoFailureException("support-start", e); } }
#vulnerable code @Override public void execute() throws MojoExecutionException, MojoFailureException { validateConfiguration(); try { // set git flow configuration initGitFlowConfig(); // check uncommitted changes checkUncommittedChanges(); // get tags String tagsStr = gitFindTags(); if (StringUtils.isBlank(tagsStr)) { throw new MojoFailureException("There are no tags."); } String tagName = null; try { tagName = prompter.prompt("Choose tag to start support branch", Arrays.asList(tagsStr.split("\\r?\\n"))); } catch (PrompterException e) { throw new MojoFailureException("support-start", e); } // git for-each-ref refs/heads/support/... final boolean supportBranchExists = gitCheckBranchExists(gitFlowConfig .getSupportBranchPrefix() + tagName); if (supportBranchExists) { throw new MojoFailureException( "Support branch with that name already exists."); } // git checkout -b ... tag gitCreateAndCheckout(gitFlowConfig.getSupportBranchPrefix() + tagName, tagName); if (installProject) { // mvn clean install mvnCleanInstall(); } if (pushRemote) { gitPush(gitFlowConfig.getSupportBranchPrefix() + tagName, false); } } catch (CommandLineException e) { throw new MojoFailureException("support-start", e); } } #location 22 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public <T, S extends Geometry> RTree<T, S> deserialize(long sizeBytes, InputStream is, Func1<byte[], T> deserializer) throws IOException { byte[] bytes = readFully(is, (int) sizeBytes); Tree_ t = Tree_.getRootAsTree_(ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes)); Node_ node = t.root(); Context<T, S> context = new Context<T, S>(t.context().minChildren(), t.context().maxChildren(), new SelectorRStar(), new SplitterRStar(), new FactoryImmutable<T, S>()); final Node<T, S> root; if (node.childrenLength() > 0) root = new NonLeafFlatBuffersStatic<T, S>(node, context, deserializer); else { List<Entry<T, S>> entries = FlatBuffersHelper.createEntries(node, deserializer); root = new LeafDefault<T, S>(entries, context); } return SerializerHelper.create(Optional.of(root), (int) t.size(), context); }
#vulnerable code public <T, S extends Geometry> RTree<T, S> deserialize(long sizeBytes, InputStream is, Func1<byte[], T> deserializer) throws IOException { byte[] bytes = readFully(is, (int) sizeBytes); Tree_ t = Tree_.getRootAsTree_(ByteBuffer.wrap(bytes)); Node_ node = t.root(); Context<T, S> context = new Context<T, S>(t.context().minChildren(), t.context().maxChildren(), new SelectorRStar(), new SplitterRStar(), new FactoryImmutable<T, S>()); Node<T, S> root = new NonLeafFlatBuffersStatic<T, S>(node, context, deserializer); return SerializerHelper.create(Optional.of(root), 1, context); } #location 9 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") static <T, S extends Geometry> List<Entry<T, S>> createEntries(Node_ node, Func1<byte[], T> deserializer) { List<Entry<T, S>> list = new ArrayList<Entry<T, S>>(node.entriesLength()); for (int i = 0; i < node.entriesLength(); i++) { Entry_ entry = node.entries(i); Geometry_ g = entry.geometry(); final Geometry geometry; if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Box) { Box_ b = g.box(); geometry = Rectangle.create(b.minX(), b.minY(), b.maxX(), b.maxY()); } else if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Point) { Point_ p = g.point(); geometry = Point.create(p.x(), p.y()); } else if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Circle) { Circle_ c = g.circle(); geometry = Circle.create(c.x(), c.y(), c.radius()); } else throw new RuntimeException("unexpected"); ByteBuffer bb = entry.objectAsByteBuffer(); byte[] bytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(bb.array(), bb.position(), bb.limit()); list.add(EntryDefault.<T, S> entry(deserializer.call(bytes), (S) geometry)); } return list; }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") static <T, S extends Geometry> List<Entry<T, S>> createEntries(Node_ node, Func1<byte[], T> deserializer) { List<Entry<T, S>> list = new ArrayList<Entry<T, S>>(node.entriesLength()); for (int i = 0; i < node.entriesLength(); i++) { Entry_ entry = node.entries(i); Geometry_ g = node.entries(i).geometry(); final Geometry geometry; if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Box) { Box_ b = g.box(); geometry = Rectangle.create(b.minX(), b.minY(), b.maxX(), b.maxY()); } else if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Point) { Point_ p = g.point(); geometry = Point.create(p.x(), p.y()); } else if (g.type() == GeometryType_.Circle) { Circle_ c = g.circle(); geometry = Circle.create(c.x(), c.y(), c.radius()); } else throw new RuntimeException("unexpected"); ByteBuffer bb = entry.objectAsByteBuffer(); byte[] bytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(bb.array(), bb.position(), bb.limit()); list.add(EntryDefault.<T, S> entry(deserializer.call(bytes), (S) geometry)); } return list; } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private List<Node<T, S>> createChildren() { List<Node<T, S>> children = new ArrayList<Node<T, S>>(node.childrenLength()); for (int i = 0; i < node.childrenLength(); i++) { Node_ child = node.children(i); if (child.childrenLength() > 0) children.add(new NonLeafFlatBuffersStatic<T, S>(child, context, deserializer)); else children.add(new LeafDefault<T, S>( FlatBuffersHelper.<T, S> createEntries(child, deserializer), context)); } return children; }
#vulnerable code private List<Node<T, S>> createChildren() { List<Node<T, S>> children = new ArrayList<Node<T, S>>(node.childrenLength()); for (int i = 0; i < node.childrenLength(); i++) { children.add( new NonLeafFlatBuffersStatic<T, S>(node.children(i), context, deserializer)); } return children; } #location 5 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void roundTrip(InternalStructure structure, boolean backpressure) throws Exception { RTree<Object, Point> tree = RTree.star().maxChildren(10).create(); tree = tree.add(GreekEarthquakes.entries()).last().toBlocking().single(); long t = System.currentTimeMillis(); File file = new File("target/file"); FileOutputStream os = new FileOutputStream(file); Serializer<Object, Point> fbSerializer = createSerializer(); serialize(tree, t, file, os, fbSerializer); deserialize(structure, file, fbSerializer, backpressure); }
#vulnerable code private void roundTrip(InternalStructure structure, boolean backpressure) throws Exception { RTree<Object, Point> tree = RTree.star().maxChildren(10).create(); tree = tree.add(GreekEarthquakes.entries()).last().toBlocking().single(); long t = System.currentTimeMillis(); File file = new File("target/file"); FileOutputStream os = new FileOutputStream(file); SerializerFlatBuffers<Object, Point> fbSerializer = createSerializer(); serialize(tree, t, file, os, fbSerializer); deserialize(structure, file, fbSerializer, backpressure); } #location 9 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") static <S extends Geometry> S toGeometry(Geometry_ g) { final Geometry result; byte type = g.type(); if (type == GeometryType_.Box) { result = createBox(g.box()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Point) { Point_ p = g.point(); result = Geometries.point(p.x(), p.y()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Circle) { Circle_ c = g.circle(); result = Geometries.circle(c.x(), c.y(), c.radius()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Line) { result = createLine(g.line()); } else throw new RuntimeException("unexpected"); return (S) result; }
#vulnerable code @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") static <S extends Geometry> S toGeometry(Geometry_ g) { final Geometry result; byte type = g.type(); if (type == GeometryType_.Box) { result = createBox(g.box()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Point) { result = Geometries.point(g.point().x(), g.point().y()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Circle) { Circle_ c = g.circle(); result = Geometries.circle(c.x(), c.y(), c.radius()); } else if (type == GeometryType_.Line) { result = createLine(g.line()); } else throw new RuntimeException("unexpected"); return (S) result; } #location 8 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private List<Node<T, S>> createChildren() { List<Node<T, S>> children = new ArrayList<Node<T, S>>(node.childrenLength()); // reduce allocations by resusing objects int numChildren = node.childrenLength(); for (int i = 0; i < numChildren; i++) { Node_ child = node.children(i); if (child.childrenLength()>0) { children.add(new NonLeafFlatBuffers<T, S>(child, context, deserializer)); } else { children.add(new LeafFlatBuffers<T,S>(child, context, deserializer)); } } return children; }
#vulnerable code private List<Node<T, S>> createChildren() { List<Node<T, S>> children = new ArrayList<Node<T, S>>(node.childrenLength()); // reduce allocations by resusing objects int numChildren = node.childrenLength(); for (int i = 0; i < numChildren; i++) { Node_ child = node.children(i); children.add(new NonLeafFlatBuffers<T, S>(child, context, deserializer)); } return children; } #location 7 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testSerializeRoundTrip() throws IOException { RTree<Object, Point> tree = RTree.star().maxChildren(10).create(); tree = tree.add(GreekEarthquakes.entries()).last().toBlocking().single(); long t = System.currentTimeMillis(); File output = new File("target/file"); FileOutputStream os = new FileOutputStream(output); FlatBuffersSerializer serializer = new FlatBuffersSerializer(); serializer.serialize(tree, new Func1<Object, byte[]>() { @Override public byte[] call(Object o) { return EMPTY; } }, os); os.close(); System.out.println("written in " + (System.currentTimeMillis() - t) + "ms, " + "file size=" + output.length() / 1000000.0 + "MB"); System.out.println("bytes per entry=" + output.length() / tree.size()); InputStream is = new FileInputStream(output); t = System.currentTimeMillis(); RTree<Object, Geometry> tr = serializer.deserialize(output.length(), is, new Func1<byte[], Object>() { @Override public Object call(byte[] bytes) { return "a"; } }); System.out.println("read in " + (System.currentTimeMillis() - t) + "ms"); int found = tr.search(Geometries.rectangle(40, 27.0, 40.5, 27.5)).count().toBlocking() .single(); System.out.println("found=" + found); assertEquals(22, found); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testSerializeRoundTrip() throws IOException { RTree<Object, Point> tree = RTree.star().maxChildren(10).create(); tree = tree.add(GreekEarthquakes.entries()).last().toBlocking().single(); long t = System.currentTimeMillis(); File output = new File("target/file"); FileOutputStream os = new FileOutputStream(output); FlatBuffersSerializer serializer = new FlatBuffersSerializer(); serializer.serialize(tree, new Func1<Object, byte[]>() { @Override public byte[] call(Object o) { return EMPTY; } }, os); os.close(); System.out.println("written in " + (System.currentTimeMillis() - t) + "ms, " + "file size=" + output.length() / 1000000.0 + "MB"); System.out.println("bytes per entry=" + output.length() / tree.size()); InputStream is = new FileInputStream(output); if (false) { RTree<Object, Geometry> tr = serializer.deserialize(is, new Func1<byte[], Object>() { @Override public Object call(byte[] bytes) { return "a"; } }); } } #location 20 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { Client client = new TransportClient().addTransportAddress(new InetSocketTransportAddress("localhost", 9300)); BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(new File("/home/ansj/temp/20140421.txt")))); String temp = null; int a = 0 ; while ((temp = br.readLine()) != null) { if(a++%100==0) System.out.println(a); try { JSONObject job = JSON.parseObject(br.readLine()); client.prepareIndex().setIndex("testdoc").setType("testdoc").setSource(job).setTimeout("10s").execute().actionGet(); } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } }
#vulnerable code public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { Client client = new TransportClient().addTransportAddress(new InetSocketTransportAddress("localhost", 9300)); BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(new FileInputStream(new File("/home/ansj/temp/20140421.txt")))); String temp = null; while ((temp = br.readLine()) != null) { System.out.println("in"); try { JSONObject job = JSON.parseObject(br.readLine()); client.prepareIndex().setIndex("testdoc").setType("testdoc").setSource(job).execute().actionGet(); } catch (Exception e) { e.printStackTrace(); } } } #location 14 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private void findOrderBy(MySqlSelectQueryBlock query, Select select) throws SqlParseException { SQLOrderBy orderBy = query.getOrderBy(); if (orderBy == null) { return; } List<SQLSelectOrderByItem> items = orderBy.getItems(); addOrderByToSelect(select, items, null); }
#vulnerable code private void findOrderBy(MySqlSelectQueryBlock query, Select select) throws SqlParseException { SQLOrderBy orderBy = query.getOrderBy(); if (orderBy == null) { return; } List<SQLSelectOrderByItem> items = orderBy.getItems(); List<String> lists = new ArrayList<>(); for (SQLSelectOrderByItem sqlSelectOrderByItem : items) { SQLExpr expr = sqlSelectOrderByItem.getExpr(); lists.add(FieldMaker.makeField(expr, null,null).toString()); if (sqlSelectOrderByItem.getType() == null) { sqlSelectOrderByItem.setType(SQLOrderingSpecification.ASC); } String type = sqlSelectOrderByItem.getType().toString(); for (String name : lists) { name = name.replace("`", ""); select.addOrderBy(name, type); } lists.clear(); } } #location 15 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code private SearchRequestBuilder explan(SQLQueryExpr SQLQueryExpr) throws SqlParseException { Select select = new SqlParser().parseSelect(SQLQueryExpr); Query query = null; if (select.isAgg) { query = new AggregationQuery(client, select); } else { query = new DefaultQuery(client, select); } return query.explan(); }
#vulnerable code private SearchRequestBuilder explan(SQLQueryExpr SQLQueryExpr) throws SqlParseException { Select select = new SqlParser().parseSelect(SQLQueryExpr); Query query = null; Client client = new TransportClient(); if (select.isAgg) { query = new AggregationQuery(client, select); } else { query = new DefaultQuery(client, select); } return query.explan(); } #location 13 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public IonValue singleValue(String ionText) { CloseableIterator<IonValue> it = iterate(ionText); return singleValue(it); }
#vulnerable code public IonValue singleValue(String ionText) { Iterator<IonValue> it = iterate(ionText); return singleValue(it); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public IonValue singleValue(byte[] ionData) { CloseableIterator<IonValue> iterator = iterate(ionData); return singleValue(iterator); }
#vulnerable code public IonValue singleValue(byte[] ionData) { Iterator<IonValue> it = iterate(ionData); return singleValue(it); } #location 4 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testFlushingUnlockedSymtab() throws Exception { byte[] bytes = flushUnlockedSymtab(false); assertEquals(0, bytes.length); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testFlushingUnlockedSymtab() throws Exception { iw = makeWriter(); iw.writeSymbol("force a local symtab"); SymbolTable symtab = iw.getSymbolTable(); symtab.intern("fred_1"); symtab.intern("fred_2"); iw.writeSymbol("fred_1"); // This would cause an appended LST to be written before the next value. iw.flush(); IonReader reader = IonReaderBuilder.standard().build(myOutputStream.toByteArray()); assertEquals(IonType.SYMBOL, reader.next()); assertEquals("force a local symtab", reader.stringValue()); assertEquals(IonType.SYMBOL, reader.next()); assertEquals("fred_1", reader.stringValue()); assertNull(reader.next()); } #location 20 #vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEAK
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code protected void testTypeAnnotationHashCode(String text, IonType type) { String sharedSymbolTable = "$ion_symbol_table::{imports:[{name:\"foo\", version: 1, max_id:90}]}"; checkType(type, oneValue("annot1::" + text)); checkType(type, oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::" + text), oneValue("annot2::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::annot2::" + text), oneValue("annot1::annot2::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text), oneValue("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::" + text), oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$98::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::" + text), oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::$97::" + text), oneValue(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::$97::" + text)); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::" + text, "annot2::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::annot2::" + text, "annot2::annot1::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text, "annot3::annot2::annot1::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::" + text, sharedSymbolTable + "$98::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::" + text, sharedSymbolTable + "$98::$99::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq(sharedSymbolTable + "$99::$98::$97::" + text, sharedSymbolTable + "$97::$98::$99::" + text); }
#vulnerable code protected void testTypeAnnotationHashCode(String text, IonType type) { checkType(type, oneValue("annot1::" + text)); checkType(type, oneValue("$99::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::" + text), oneValue("annot2::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::annot2::" + text), oneValue("annot1::annot2::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text), oneValue("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("$99::" + text), oneValue("$98::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("$99::$98::" + text), oneValue("$99::$98::" + text)); assertIonEqImpliesHashEq(oneValue("$99::$98::$97::" + text), oneValue("$99::$98::$97::" + text)); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::" + text, "annot2::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::annot2::" + text, "annot2::annot1::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("annot1::annot2::annot3::" + text, "annot3::annot2::annot1::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("$99::" + text, "$98::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("$99::$98::" + text, "$98::$99::" + text); assertIonNotEqImpliesHashNotEq("$99::$98::$97::" + text, "$97::$98::$99::" + text); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void testGetMovieChangesList() throws MovieDbException { LOG.info("getMovieChangesList"); List<ChangeListItem> result = instance.getChangeList(MethodBase.MOVIE, null, null, null); assertFalse("No movie changes.", result.isEmpty()); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void testGetMovieChangesList() throws MovieDbException { LOG.info("getMovieChangesList"); TmdbResultsList<ChangedMedia> result = instance.getChangeList(MethodBase.MOVIE, null, null, null); assertFalse("No movie changes.", result.getResults().isEmpty()); } #location 4 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void skillViolationAtAct1_shouldWork(){ SolutionAnalyser analyser = new SolutionAnalyser(vrp,solution, new SolutionAnalyser.DistanceCalculator() { @Override public double getDistance(String fromLocationId, String toLocationId) { return vrp.getTransportCosts().getTransportCost(fromLocationId,toLocationId,0.,null,null); } }); VehicleRoute route = solution.getRoutes().iterator().next(); Boolean violated = analyser.hasSkillConstraintViolationAtActivity(route.getActivities().get(0), route); assertFalse(violated); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void skillViolationAtAct1_shouldWork(){ SolutionAnalyser analyser = new SolutionAnalyser(vrp,solution, new SolutionAnalyser.DistanceCalculator() { @Override public double getDistance(String fromLocationId, String toLocationId) { return vrp.getTransportCosts().getTransportCost(fromLocationId,toLocationId,0.,null,null); } }); VehicleRoute route = solution.getRoutes().iterator().next(); Boolean violated = analyser.skillConstraintIsViolatedAtActivity(route.getActivities().get(0),route); assertFalse(violated); } #location 11 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Override public void begin(VehicleRoute route) { currentLoad = stateManager.getRouteState(route, StateFactory.LOAD_AT_BEGINNING, Capacity.class); this.route = route; }
#vulnerable code @Override public void begin(VehicleRoute route) { currentLoad = (int) stateManager.getRouteState(route, StateFactory.LOAD_AT_BEGINNING).toDouble(); this.route = route; } #location 3 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code @Test public void whenSolving_deliverService1_shouldBeInRoute(){ VehicleRoutingProblem.Builder vrpBuilder = VehicleRoutingProblem.Builder.newInstance(); new VrpXMLReader(vrpBuilder).read("src/test/resources/simpleProblem_iniRoutes.xml"); VehicleRoutingProblem vrp = vrpBuilder.build(); VehicleRoutingAlgorithm vra = new SchrimpfFactory().createAlgorithm(vrp); Collection<VehicleRoutingProblemSolution> solutions = vra.searchSolutions(); VehicleRoutingProblemSolution solution = Solutions.bestOf(solutions); SolutionPrinter.print(vrp,solution, SolutionPrinter.Print.VERBOSE); Job job = getInitialJob("1",vrp); assertTrue(hasActivityIn(solution,"veh1", job)); }
#vulnerable code @Test public void whenSolving_deliverService1_shouldBeInRoute(){ VehicleRoutingProblem.Builder vrpBuilder = VehicleRoutingProblem.Builder.newInstance(); new VrpXMLReader(vrpBuilder).read("src/test/resources/simpleProblem_iniRoutes.xml"); VehicleRoutingProblem vrp = vrpBuilder.build(); VehicleRoutingAlgorithm vra = new SchrimpfFactory().createAlgorithm(vrp); Collection<VehicleRoutingProblemSolution> solutions = vra.searchSolutions(); VehicleRoutingProblemSolution solution = Solutions.bestOf(solutions); assertTrue(hasActivityIn(solution.getRoutes().iterator().next(),"1")); } #location 12 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE
Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information.
#fixed code public void read(String filename){ BufferedReader reader = getBufferedReader(filename); String line; Coordinate[] coords = null; int[] demands = null; Integer capacity = null; List<Integer> depotIds = new ArrayList<Integer>(); boolean isCoordSection = false; boolean isDemandSection = false; boolean isDepotSection = false; int dimensions = 0; while( ( line = getLine(reader) ) != null ){ if(line.startsWith("EOF")){ break; } if(line.startsWith("DIMENSION")){ String[] tokens = line.split(":"); String dim = tokens[1].trim(); dimensions = Integer.parseInt(dim); coords = new Coordinate[dimensions]; demands = new int[dimensions]; continue; } if(line.startsWith("CAPACITY")){ String[] tokens = line.split(":"); capacity = Integer.parseInt(tokens[1].trim()); continue; } if(line.startsWith("NODE_COORD_SECTION")){ isCoordSection = true; isDemandSection = false; isDepotSection = false; continue; } if(line.startsWith("DEMAND_SECTION")){ isDemandSection = true; isCoordSection = false; isDepotSection = false; continue; } if(line.startsWith("DEPOT_SECTION")){ isDepotSection = true; isDemandSection = false; isCoordSection = false; continue; } if(isCoordSection){ if(coords == null) throw new IllegalStateException("DIMENSION tag missing"); String[] tokens = line.trim().split("\\s+"); coords[Integer.parseInt(tokens[0]) - 1] = Coordinate.newInstance(Double.parseDouble(tokens[1]), Double.parseDouble(tokens[2])); continue; } if(isDemandSection){ if(demands == null) throw new IllegalStateException("DIMENSION tag missing"); String[] tokens = line.trim().split("\\s+"); demands[Integer.parseInt(tokens[0]) - 1] = Integer.parseInt(tokens[1]); continue; } if(isDepotSection){ if(line.equals("-1")){ isDepotSection = false; } else{ depotIds.add(Integer.parseInt(line)); } } } close(reader); vrpBuilder.setFleetSize(VehicleRoutingProblem.FleetSize.INFINITE); for(Integer depotId : depotIds){ VehicleTypeImpl type = VehicleTypeImpl.Builder.newInstance("typeId").addCapacityDimension(0,capacity).build(); VehicleImpl vehicle = VehicleImpl.Builder.newInstance("vehicle").setStartLocationId(depotId.toString()) .setStartLocationCoordinate(coords[depotId - 1]).setType(type).build(); vrpBuilder.addVehicle(vehicle); } for (int i = 0; i < coords.length; i++) { String id = "" + (i + 1); if(depotIds.isEmpty()){ if(i==0) { VehicleImpl vehicle = VehicleImpl.Builder.newInstance("start") .setStartLocation(Location.Builder.newInstance().setId(id) .setCoordinate(coords[i]).build()) .build(); vrpBuilder.addVehicle(vehicle); continue; } } Service service = Service.Builder.newInstance(id) .setLocation(Location.Builder.newInstance().setId(id).setCoordinate(coords[i]).build()) .addSizeDimension(0, demands[i]).build(); vrpBuilder.addJob(service); } }
#vulnerable code public void read(String filename){ BufferedReader reader = getBufferedReader(filename); String line; Coordinate[] coords = null; Integer[] demands = null; Integer capacity = null; List<Integer> depotIds = new ArrayList<Integer>(); boolean isCoordSection = false; boolean isDemandSection = false; boolean isDepotSection = false; while( ( line = getLine(reader) ) != null ){ if(line.startsWith("DIMENSION")){ String[] tokens = line.split(":"); String dim = tokens[1].trim(); coords = new Coordinate[Integer.parseInt(dim)]; demands = new Integer[Integer.parseInt(dim)]; continue; } if(line.startsWith("CAPACITY")){ String[] tokens = line.split(":"); capacity = Integer.parseInt(tokens[1].trim()); continue; } if(line.startsWith("NODE_COORD_SECTION")){ isCoordSection = true; isDemandSection = false; isDepotSection = false; continue; } if(line.startsWith("DEMAND_SECTION")){ isDemandSection = true; isCoordSection = false; isDepotSection = false; continue; } if(line.startsWith("DEPOT_SECTION")){ isDepotSection = true; isDemandSection = false; isCoordSection = false; continue; } if(isCoordSection){ if(coords == null) throw new IllegalStateException("DIMENSION tag missing"); String[] tokens = line.split("\\s+"); coords[Integer.parseInt(tokens[0]) - 1] = Coordinate.newInstance(Double.parseDouble(tokens[1]), Double.parseDouble(tokens[2])); continue; } if(isDemandSection){ if(demands == null) throw new IllegalStateException("DIMENSION tag missing"); String[] tokens = line.split("\\s+"); demands[Integer.parseInt(tokens[0]) - 1] = Integer.parseInt(tokens[1]); continue; } if(isDepotSection){ if(line.equals("-1")){ isDepotSection = false; } else{ depotIds.add(Integer.parseInt(line)); } } } close(reader); vrpBuilder.setFleetSize(VehicleRoutingProblem.FleetSize.INFINITE); for(Integer depotId : depotIds){ VehicleTypeImpl type = VehicleTypeImpl.Builder.newInstance("typeId").addCapacityDimension(0,capacity).build(); VehicleImpl vehicle = VehicleImpl.Builder.newInstance("vehicle").setStartLocationId(depotId.toString()) .setStartLocationCoordinate(coords[depotId - 1]).setType(type).build(); vrpBuilder.addVehicle(vehicle); } for(int i=0;i<demands.length;i++){ if(demands[i] == 0) continue; String id = "" + (i+1); Service service = Service.Builder.newInstance(id).setLocationId(id).setCoord(coords[i]).addSizeDimension(0,demands[i]).build(); vrpBuilder.addJob(service); } } #location 71 #vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE