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32.401 | Telecommunication management;Performance Management (PM);Concept and requirements | TS | 19.0.0 | S5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.401/32401-j00.zip | The present document describes the requirements for the management of performance measurements and the collection of performance measurement result data across GSM, UMTS and LTE networks. It defines the administration of measurement schedules by the Network Element Manager (EM), the generation of measurement results in the Network Elements (NEs) and the transfer of these results to one or more Operations Systems, i.e. EM(s) and/or Network Manager(s) (NM(s)).
The basic Performance Management concept that the present document is built upon is described in clause 4.
The requirements of how an EM administers the performance measurements and how the results can be collected are defined in detail in clause 5. Measurements available for collection by NEs are described in the following specifications:
- TS 52.402 for GSM systems;
- TS 32.405, TS 32.406, TS 32.407 and TS 32.408 for UMTS and combined UMTS/GSM systems;
- TS 32.409 for IMS networks;
- TS 32.425 for E-UTRAN;
- TS 32.426 for EPC;
- TS 32.452 for Home Node B (HNB) Subsystem (HNS);
- TS 32.453 for Home enhanced Node B (HeNB) Subsystem (HeNS);
- TS 28.402 for Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and non-3GPP access Interworking System;
- TS 28.403 for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN).
Effort has been made to ensure consistency in the definition of measurements between different NEs and generations. The performance measurement result is described in Performance Measurement File Format Definition (3GPP TS 32.432 [29]).
The following is beyond the scope of the present document, and therefore the present document does not describe:
- the formal definition of the interface that the EM uses to administer performance measurements in the NEs;
- the formal definition of the interface that the EM uses to collect measurement results from the NEs;
- how the data, once accumulated and collected, could or should be processed, stored, or presented to an end user;
- the information which may be obtained through the collection and processing of call or event related records which have been produced by the NEs primarily for the purpose of raising bills and other charges.
The management requirements have been derived from existing telecommunications operations experience. The management definitions were then derived from other standardisation work so as to minimise the re-invention factor. References are given as appropriate.
The objectives of this standardisation are:
- to provide the descriptions for a standard set of measurements;
- to produce a common description of the management technique for measurement administration and result accumulation; and
- to define a method for the bulk transmission of measurement results across a management interface.
The definition of the standard measurements is intended to result in comparability of measurement result data produced in a multi-vendor wireless network, for those measurement types that can be standardised across all vendors' implementations.
As far as possible, existing standardisation in the area of Performance Management has been re-used and enhanced where particular requirements, peculiar to the mobile telephony environment, have been recognised.
The present document considers all the above aspects of Performance Management for a GSM, UMTS or LTE network and its NEs defined in the core Technical Specifications. However, only those aspects which are specific to a GSM/UMTS/LTE system and particular to wireless network operation are included in the present document. |
32.421 | Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace concepts and requirements | TS | 19.2.0 | S5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.421/32421-j20.zip | The present document describes the requirements for the management of Trace and the reporting of Trace data (including FDD mode and TDD mode) across UMTS, EPS or 5G networks as it refers to subscriber tracing (tracing of IMSI or Public User Identity) and equipment tracing (tracing of IMEI or IMEISV). Trace also includes the ability to trace all active calls in a cell or multiple cells (Cell Traffic Trace). The present document also includes the description of Service Level Tracing (tracing of a specific service). It defines the administration of Trace Session activation/deactivation by the management system, the network or User Equipment (UE) itself via signalling, the generation of Trace results in the Network Elements (NEs) and UE and the transfer of these results to one or more Operations Systems.
GSM Trace is outside of the scope of this specification (see [7]).
The present document also describes the requirements for the management of Minimization of Drive Tests (MDT) across UMTS networks, EPS networks or 5G networks and Radio Link Failure (RLF) and RRC Connection Establishment Failure (RCEF) reporting across EPS networks and 5G networks.
Furthermore, it describes requirements for Random Access (RA) Report, Successful Handover Report (SHR), Successful PSCell Change Report (SPR), and Mobility History Information (MHI) Report reporting for 5G networks.
The present document is built upon the basic Subscriber and UE Trace concept described in clause 4.
The high-level requirements for Trace data, Trace Session activation/deactivation and Trace reporting are defined in clause 5. Clause 5 also contains an overview of use cases for Trace (the use cases are described in Annex A). Clause 6 defines the requirements for managing MDT. Clause 7 defines the requirements for managing RLF, RCEF, RA, SHR, SPR, and MHI reports. Trace control and configuration management are described in 3GPP TS 32.422 [2], and Trace data definition and management are described in 3GPP TS 32.423 [3].
The present document does not cover any Trace capability limitations within a NE (e.g. maximum number of simultaneous traced mobiles for a given NE) or any functionality related to these limitations (e.g. NE aborting a Trace Session due to resource limitations).
The objectives of the Trace specifications are:
a) to provide the descriptions for a standard set of Trace and MDT data;
b) to produce a common description of the management technique for Trace, MDT, RLF, RCEF, RA, SHR, SPR, and MHI administration and result reporting;
c) to define a method for the reporting of Trace, MDT, RLF, RCEF, RA, SHR, SPR, and MHI results across the management interfaces.
The following is beyond the scope of the present document, and therefore the present document does not describe:
- tracing non-Subscriber or non-UE related events within an NE;
- tracing of all possible parties in a multi-party call (although multiple calls related to the IMSI specified in the Trace control and configuration parameters are traceable).
The definition of Trace and MDT data is intended to result in comparability of Trace and MDT data produced in a multi-vendor wireless UMTS, EPS and/or 5G network(s), for those Trace control and configuration parameters that can be standardised across all vendors' implementations.
Vendor specific extensions to the Trace control and configuration parameters and Trace and MDT data are discussed in 3GPP TS 32.422 [2] and 3GPP TS 32.423 [3].
All functions (trace, MDT etc.) specified in this specification support Network Sharing, with the following conditions:
- It is accepted that the recorded information from the shared nodes is available to the Primary Operator. Recorded information that is collected in a non shared node or cell will only be available to the operator managing the non shared node or cell.
- It is accepted that the recorded information from the shared network shall be delivered to the Participating Operator whose PLMN recording is requested, taking user consent into account. Operators must also agree on sharing the information, but how that agreement is done is outside the scope of this specification. The mapping of TCE IP addresses and TCE addresses must be coordinated among the operators that shares the network. How that coordination is done is outside the scope of this specification.
- It is accepted that the inter-PLMN recorded information for Logged MDT from the non-shared nodes of Participating Operators may be available to the Primary Operator.
- For signalling based activation, the operators that share a network must coordinate the TCE IP addresses and the TCE address mapping must be coordinated. How that coordination´ is done is outside the scope of this specification.
For UMTS and EPS the 3GPP Management reference model, 3GPP TS 32.101 [1] is followed.
For 5GS the 3GPP Services Based Management Architecture, 3GPP TS 28.533 [20] is followed. |
32.422 | Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace control and configuration management | TS | 19.3.0 | S5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.422/32422-j30.zip | The present document describes the mechanisms used for the control and configuration of the Trace, Minimization of Drive Test (MDT), Radio Link Failure (RLF), RRC reporting and RRC Connection Establishment Failure (RCEF) reporting functionality at the management system (at the Element Manager (EM) and or Network Manager (NMs)), Network Elements (NEs), Network Functions (NFs), and User Equipment (UEs). The Trace, MDT, RLF reporting, RCEF reporting are supported in UMTS, LTE and 5G.
The present document also describes the mechanisms used for control and configuration of the 5GC UE level measurement collection at the management system, Network Functions (NFs) and User Equipment (UEs).
The 5GC UE level measurement collection is supported in 5GC only.
For Trace functionality, it covers the triggering events for starting/stopping of subscriber/UE activity traced over 3GPP standardized signalling interfaces, the types of trace mechanisms, configuration of a trace, level of detail available in the trace data, the generation of Trace results in the NEs and UE and the transfer of these results to management system. For MDT, it also covers logged MDT and immediate MDT mechanisms in both management based and signalling based scenarios. For 5GC UE level measurements collection, it also covers management based and signalling based scenarios.
The mechanisms for Trace, MDT, RLF, RCEF and RRC reporting, and 5GC UE level measurements activation/deactivation are detailed in clause 4; clause 5 details the various Trace, MDT, RLF, RCEF and RRC reporting, and 5GC UE level measurements control and configuration parameters and the triggering events that can be set in a network. Trace, MDT, RLF, RCEF and RRC reporting concepts and requirements are covered in 3GPP TS 32.421 [2] while Trace and MDT data definition and management is covered in 3GPP TS 32.423 [3]. The 5GC UE level measurements definitions covered in 3GPP TS 28.558 [62].
The conditions for supporting Network Sharing are stated in 3GPP TS 32.421 [2].
The condition for supporting user consent handling for MDT does not apply to Standalone Non-Public Network, i.e., SNPN as per TS 23.501[40]. |
32.423 | Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace data definition and management | TS | 19.3.0 | S5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/32_series/32.423/32423-j30.zip | The present document describes Trace data definition and management. It covers the trace records content, their format and transfer across UMTS networks, EPS networks or 5GS networks. GSM Trace is outside of the scope of this specification..
The present document also describes the data definition for Minimization of Drive Tests (MDT) and 5GC UE level measurements across 3GPP networks.
The objectives of the present document are:
- To provide the descriptions for a standard set of Trace and MDT data;
- To define the common format of trace, MDT records and 5GC UE level measurements; and
- To define a method for the reporting of Trace, MDT and 5GC UE level measurements results across the management interfaces.
Clause 4 details the various Trace records content, Clause 5 defines GPB trace format for NR, Annex A provides Trace, MDT and 5GC UE level measurements report file format, Annex B provides the trace report file conventions and transfer procedure, Annex C provides the trace reporting functional architecture and Annex D provides some trace,MDT and 5GC UE level measurements files examples, Annex G provides normative GPB trace record schema and examples.
Trace and MDT concepts and requirements are covered in TS 32.421 [2] . The 5GC UE level measurements definitions and use cases are covered in 3GPP TS 28.558 [47]. TheTrace control and configuration management for trace, MDT and 5GC UE level measurements collection are described in 3GPP TS 32.422 [3].
The definition of Trace, MDT data and 5GC UE level measurements is intended to result in comparability of Trace, MDT data and 5GC UE level measurements produced in a multi-vendor wireless 3GPP networks.
The following is beyond the scope of the present document, and therefore the present document does not describe:
- Any notification mechanisms or IRPs for trace. Only file transfer mechanism is specified for trace data transfer;
- Any data compression mechanisms for trace data transfer;
- Any Trace capability limitations (e.g. maximum number of simultaneous traced mobiles for a given NE). |
33.102 | 3G security; Security architecture | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.102/33102-j10.zip | This specification defines the security architecture, i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms, for the third generation mobile telecommunication system.
A security feature is a service capability that meets one or several security requirements. The complete set of security features address the security requirements as they are defined in "3G Security: Threats and Requirements" (TS 21.133 [1]) and implement the security objectives and principles described in TS 33.120 [2]. A security mechanism is an element that is used to realise a security feature. All security features and security mechanisms taken together form the security architecture.
An example of a security feature is user data confidentiality. A security mechanism that may be used to implement that feature is a stream cipher using a derived cipher key.
This specification defines 3G security procedures performed within 3G capable networks (R99+), i.e. intra-UMTS and UMTS-GSM. As an example, UMTS authentication is applicable to UMTS radio access as well as GSM radio access provided that the serving network node and the MS are UMTS capable. Interoperability with non-UMTS capable networks (R98-) is also covered.
GSM security functions are defined in the TS 43.020 [36].
NOTE: The usage of the authentication management field (AMF) is specified in Annex H and applies for the third (UMTS), fourth (LTE) and fifth (5G system) generation of mobile telecommunication systems. |
33.108 | 3G security; Handover interface for Lawful Interception (LI) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.108/33108-j00.zip | The present document specifies the handover interfaces for Lawful Interception (LI) of Packet-Data Services, Circuit Switched Services, Multimedia Services within the UMTS network and Evolved Packet System (EPS). The handover interface in this context includes the delivery of Intercept Related Information (IRI) through the Handover Interface 2 (HI2) and Content of Communication (CC) through the Handover Interface 3 (HI3) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF). |
33.116 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the MME network product class | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.116/33116-j00.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the MME network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the MME network product class. |
33.117 | Catalogue of general security assurance requirements | TS | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.117/33117-j20.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are deemed applicable, possibly after adaptation, to several network product classes.
Several network product classes share very similar if not identical security requirements for some aspects. Therefore, these are collected in this "catalogue" document applicable to many network product classes. In addition to this catalogue, requirements specific to different network product classes will be captured in separate documents. |
33.122 | Security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) for 3GPP northbound APIs | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.122/33122-j10.zip | The present document specifies the security architecture i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms for the common API framework (CAPIF) as per the architecture and procedures defined in 3GPP TS 23.222 [3]. |
33.126 | Lawful Interception requirements | TS | 19.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.126/33126-j30.zip | The present document specifies Stage 1 Lawful Interception requirements for 3GPP networks and services.
Regional interception requirements can be satisfied by meeting the correct subset of requirements from the present document. Which CSP services are subject to Lawful Interception is defined by national regulations.
The presence of a requirement in the present document does not in itself imply or mandate that a 3GPP operator has an obligation to implement any network service capability, which is not otherwise required to meet LI obligation compliance in relation to specific regulated services, offered by that 3GPP operator. Only those specific requirements and sub-clauses of the present document which are applicable to specific network and/or service capabilities implemented in a 3GPP operator's network will be considered in scope for that operator. In all cases, laws and regulations define which requirements are applicable to 3GPP operators in each country relative to the services offered by each 3GPP operator.
As such not all requirements in the present document will apply in all national jurisdictions or to all 3GPP operator deployments (e.g. if an operator does not offer voice services, then voice LI requirement in the present document do not apply).
The interception system defined in the present document provides LI based on specific target identifiers. |
33.127 | Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and functions | TS | 19.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.127/33127-j30.zip | The present document specifies both the architectural and functional system requirements for Lawful Interception (LI) in 3GPP networks. The present document provides an LI architecture supporting both network layer based and service layer based Interception.
National regulations determine the specific set of LI functional capabilities that are applicable to a specific 3GPP operator deployment. |
33.128 | Security; Protocol and procedures for Lawful Interception (LI); Stage 3 | TS | 19.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.128/33128-j30.zip | The present document specifies the protocols and procedures required to perform Lawful Interception within a 3GPP network. The present document addresses both internal interfaces used internally with a 3GPP network and external handover interfaces used to handover intercepted communications to law enforcement.
The present document describes the detailed targeting of communications in each point of interception within a 3GPP network and the information that a point of interception needs to be able to capture. Furthermore, the detailed data formats for both the internal and external interfaces are also defined.
National regulations determine the applicable set of information that needs to be handed over or excluded from handover to law enforcement for a given 3GPP operator service. |
33.180 | Security of the Mission Critical (MC) service | TS | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.180/33180-j20.zip | The present document specifies the security architecture, procedures and information flows needed to protect the mission critical service (MCX). The architecture includes mechanisms to protect the Common Functional Architecture and security mechanisms for mission critical applications. This includes Push-To-Talk (MCPTT), Video (MCVideo) and Data (MCData). Additionally, security mechanisms relating to on-network use, off-network use, roaming, migration, interconnection, interworking and multiple security domains are described.
This specification complements the Common Functional Architecture defined in TS 23.280 [36], the functional architecture for MCPTT defined in 3GPP TS 23.379 [2], the functional architecture for MCVideo defined in TS 23.281 [37], the functional architecture for MCData defined in TS 23.282 [38] and mission critical services using 5GS in TS 23.289 [54].
The MC service can be used for public safety applications and also for general commercial applications e.g. utility companies and railways. As the security model is based on the public safety environment, some MC security features may not be applicable for commercial purposes. |
33.203 | 3G security; Access security for IP-based services | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.203/33203-j10.zip | The scope for this technical specification is to specify the security features and mechanisms for secure access to the IM subsystem (IMS) for the 3G mobile telecommunication system.
Since the scope also encompasses the use of these security features and mechanisms for secure access to IMS in the context of fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks, Annex L and Annex S specify how the material in the main body and other normative Annexes of this document apply to the fixed broadband networks and 3GPP2 networks respectively.
The IMS supports IP Multimedia applications such as video, audio and multimedia conferences. SIP, Session Initiation Protocol, was chosen as the signalling protocol for creating and terminating Multimedia sessions, cf. RFC 3261 [6]. This specification only deals with how the SIP signalling is protected between the subscriber and the IMS, how the subscriber is authenticated and how the subscriber authenticates the IMS. |
33.210 | Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network layer security | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.210/33210-j10.zip | The present document defines the security architecture for network domain IP based control planes, which shall be applied to NDS/IP-networks (i.e. 3GPP and fixed broadband networks). The scope of network domain control plane security is to cover the control signalling on selected interfaces between network elements of NDS/IP networks. . The present document furthermore serves as a central repository for cryptographic profiles for security above IP layer. |
33.216 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the evolved Node B (eNB) network product class | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.216/33216-j10.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the eNB network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the eNB network product class. |
33.246 | 3G Security; Security of Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.246/33246-j00.zip | The Technical Specification covers the security procedures of the Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) for 3GPP systems (UTRAN, GERAN and E-UTRAN). MBMS is a 3GPP system network bearer service over which many different applications could be carried. The actual method of protection may vary depending on the type of MBMS application. |
33.250 | Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.250/33250-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the PGW network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the PGW network product class. |
33.256 | Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.256/33256-j10.zip | The present document specifies the security features in support of the architecture enhancements for supporting Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) connectivity, identification, tracking and pairing authorization defined in TS 23.256 [3], according to the use cases and service requirements defined in TS 22.125 [6]. |
33.310 | Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) | TS | 19.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.310/33310-j40.zip | The scope of this Technical Specification is limited to authentication of network elements, which are using NDS/IP or TLS, and to Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations as described in the present document.
In the case of NDS/IP this specification includes both the authentication of Security Gateways (SEG) at the corresponding Za-interfaces and the authentication between NEs and between NEs and SEGs at the Zb-interface. Authentication of end entities (i.e. NEs and SEGs) in the intra-operator domain is considered an internal issue for operators. This is quite much in line with [1] which states that only Za is mandatory and that the security domain operator can decide if the Zb-interface is deployed or not, as the Zb-interface is optional for implementation. Validity of certificates may be restricted to the operator's domain in case of Zb interface or in case of Za-interface between two security domains of the same operator.
NOTE: In case two SEGs interconnect separate network regions under a single administrative authority (e.g. owned by the same mobile operator) then the Za-interface is not subject to interconnect agreements, but the decision on applying Za-interface is left to operators.
The NDS architecture for IP-based protocols is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1: NDS architecture for IP-based protocols [1]
In the case of TLS this Specification concentrates on authentication of TLS entities across inter-operator links. For example, TLS is specified for inter-operator communications between IMS and non-IMS networks TS 33.203 [9] and on the Zn' interface in GBA TS 33.220 [10]. Authentication of TLS entities across intra-operator links is considered an internal issue for operators. However, NDS/AF can easily be adapted to the intra-operator use case since it is just a simplification of the inter-operator case when all TLS NEs and the PKI infrastructure belong to the same operator. Validity of certificates may be restricted to the operator's domain. An Annex contains information on the manual handling of TLS certificates in case automatic enrolment and revocation according to NDS/AF for TLS is not implemented. |
33.328 | IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) media plane security | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.328/33328-j00.zip | The present document presents IMS media plane security for RTP and MSRP based media, IMS data channels (i.e., SCTP over DTLS) as well as security for BFCP as used in IMS conferencing. The security mechanisms are designed to meet the following three main objectives:
1) to provide security for media usable across all access networks
2) to provide an end-to-end (e2e) media security solution for RTP and data channel-based media to satisfy major user categories
3) to provide end-to-end (e2e) media security for important user groups like enterprises, National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) organizations and different government authorities who may have weaker trust in the inherent IMS security and/or may desire to provide their own key management service.
The media plane security for RTP based media is based on the well-established protocol SRTP. Key management solutions for SRTP are defined in this specification.
The media plane security for MSRP, used in session-based messaging, is based on TLS. TLS is also used to protect BFCP. Key management solutions for MSRP and BFCP security are defined in the present document. The media plane security for IMS data channels, i.e., SCTP over DTLS, is based on DTLS.
Two normative Annexes to the present document address IMS media plane security for immediate messaging and conferencing, respectively. The media plane security for session-based messaging is addressed in the main body of this specification. |
33.369 | Security aspects of ambient IoT services in 5G | TS | 0.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.369/33369-020.zip | The present document specifies the security and privacy aspects of AIoT services in the 5G System (5GS), complying to the requirements in TS 22.369 [4], applicable to the AIoT Device types, traffic types, use cases and connectivity topologies defined in TS 38.300 [3], and based on the architecture defined in TS 23.369 [2].
Security features for AIoT services include:
1. Network Layer Authentication between AIoT device and 5G core
a. AIoTF is the endpoint in the 5G core
b. Credentials are securely stored in the ADM on the network side
NOTE 1: The credentials are assumed to be stored in a secure environment in the ADM. How this is realized is left to implementation. The requirements will reflect this.
c. Secure storage and processing of credentials in the AIoT device.
NOTE 2: For SNPN deployment the storage of the credentials of non-AKA based methods is out of scope as described in TS 33.501[5] Annex I 2.2.
d. Security aspects of the storage of the credentials at the ADM
2. Confidentiality, anti-replay and integrity protection of information during AIoT service communication
3. Privacy of AIoT device identifiers using the AIoT Temp ID.
4. Security to protect the permanent disabling RF transmission capabilities of AIoT device(s).
Editor’s Note: Further refinement is FFS. |
33.401 | 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); Security architecture | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.401/33401-j00.zip | The present document specifies the security architecture, i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms for the Evolved Packet System and the Evolved Packet Core, and the security procedures performed within the evolved Packet System (EPS) including the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and the Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN). |
33.434 | Security aspects of Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) for verticals | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.434/33434-j00.zip | The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the Service Enabler Architecture Layer (SEAL) in 5G. Specifically security architecture, functional model(s), security aspects of SEAL reference points (e.g. SEAL-UU, etc.), Key Management (KM) procedures, Identity Management (IdM) procedures and SEAL access authentication and authorization for supporting efficient use and deployment of vertical applications over the 3GPP systems are specified. |
33.501 | Security architecture and procedures for 5G System | TS | 19.3.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.501/33501-j30.zip | The present document specifies the security architecture, i.e., the security features and the security mechanisms for the 5G System and the 5G Core, and the security procedures performed within the 5G System including the 5G Core and the 5G New Radio. |
33.503 | Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.503/33503-j10.zip | The present document specifies the security and privacy aspects of the Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS). 5G ProSe security features include: 5G ProSe Direct Discovery security, 5G ProSe Direct communication security, 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security, 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay security and security of emergency services for 5G ProSe Remote UE via 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security includes the security aspects for single-hop and multi-hop scenarios for both Layer-2 and Layer-3 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay security includes the security aspect of single-hop secenario for both Layer-2 and Layer-3 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay, and security aspect of Layer-3 multi-hop 5G ProSe UE-to-UE Relay scenario. |
33.511 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class | TS | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.511/33511-j20.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the gNB network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the gNB network product class.
NOTE: Test cases for the split gNB product classes are specified in TS 33.523 [9]. |
33.512 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Access and Mobility management Function (AMF) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.512/33512-j00.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network product class. |
33.513 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); User Plane Function (UPF) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.513/33513-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UPF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UPF network product class. |
33.514 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Management (UDM) network product class | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.514/33514-j10.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDM network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases. It also specifies the requirements and test cases unique to the UDM network product class. |
33.515 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Session Management Function (SMF) network product class | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.515/33515-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the SMF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SMF network product class. |
33.517 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) network product class | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.517/33517-j00.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the SEPP network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the SEPP network product class. |
33.518 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Network Repository Function (NRF) network product class | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.518/33518-j00.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the NRF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the NRF network product class. |
33.523 | 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Split gNB product classes | TS | 19.2.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.523/33523-j20.zip | The gNB can be deployed as more than one entity by splitting the gNB into gNB-CU and gNB-DU(s) and possibly further splitting the gNB-CU into gNB-CU-CP and gNB-CU-UP(s) (see TS 38.401 [5]). The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the various split gNB network product classes. Test cases for such deployments are provided, are based upon and borrow heavily from the specification for the gNB product class (see TS 33.511 [6]). The main differences are the inclusion of cases for the F1 signalling and user plane connection and the E1 signalling connection on the top of the gNB cases as well as some revised cases to account for the split functionality. The present document also refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements (see TS 33.117 [2]) and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the various split gNB network product class. |
33.527 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for 3GPP virtualized network products | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.527/33527-j00.zip | The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases to virtualized network product classes.
Several virtualized network product classes share very similar if not identical security requirements for some aspects. Therefore, these are collected in the present document applicable to many virtualized network product classes. In addition to this catalogue, requirements specific to different network product classes will be captured in separate documents. |
33.529 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF) network product class | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.529/33529-j10.zip | The present document contains objectives, security assurance requirements and test cases specific to the SMSF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements. It formulates specific adaptations of the requirements and test cases given in the catalogue. It also specifies requirements derived from other technical specifications and test cases unique to the SMSF network product class. |
33.530 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.530/33530-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the UDR network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements [2] and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the UDR network product class. |
33.537 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) Anchor Function (AAnF) | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.537/33537-j00.zip | The present document contains requirements and test cases that are specific to the AAnF network product class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AAnF network product class. |
33.545 | Security aspects of NR Femto | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.545/33545-j10.zip | The present document specifies the security architecture for NR Femto subsystem. This includes security requirements on NR Femto, and other NR Femto associated network nodes (e.g. SeGW and NR Femto MS), as well as the procedures and features which are provided to meet those requirements. |
33.558 | Security aspects of enhancement of support for enabling edge applications | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.558/33558-j00.zip | The present document specifies the security features and mechanisms to support the application architecture for enabling Edge Applications in 5G, i.e. security for the interfaces, procedures for the authentication and authorization between the entities of the application architecture, and procedures for the EES capability exposure. |
33.700-22 | Study on security aspects of Common API Framework (CAPIF) Phase3 | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-22/33700-22-j10.zip | The present document investigates the security and privacy impacts of the procedures introduced in the study on CAPIF Phase 3. Specifically, it covers the following:
- Resource owner authorization management
- CAPIF interconnection security
- Authorizing API invoker on one UE accessing resources related to another UE
- Nested API invocation
- Authentication and authorization of multiple API invokers
Note: More security and privacy aspects are up to the study progress in SA6. |
33.700-29 | Study on security aspects of 5G satellite access in the 5G architecture phase 3 | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-29/33700-29-j10.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3. It is comprised of the following parts:
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the regenerative payload generic architecture in 5GS/EPS.
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of the Store and Forward (S&F) Satellite operation both for NR NTN (5GS) and for IoT NTN (EPS).
- Identify and study the security and privacy key issues of UE-Satellite-UE communication enhancements for 5GS.
- The impact on regulatory services in the context of 5G satellite access. In particular, the assessment of the potential impact to lawful intercept in regenerative, Store and Forward (S&F), and UE-satellite-UE communication enhancement architecture. |
33.700-32 | Study on security aspects of user identities and authentication | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-32/33700-32-j10.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects for the creation and usage of user identities as studied in 3GPP TR 23.700-32 [2], with the following focus:
1) Study authentication and authorization of:
a) a user identifier associated with a subscription and used on a UE (i.e., human user) and
b) an identifier associated with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG.
2) Study privacy and security impacts of usage of user identifiers associated with a subscription or with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG, including exposure of user profile related information. |
33.700-41 | Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256bits | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.700-41/33700-41-j00.zip | The present document aims to address key requirements for introducing support for 256-bit symmetric algorithms into the 5G System as well as the coexistence of 128-bit and 256-bit cryptographic algorithms. Considering findings and conclusions from preceding work, the following points should be addressed as part of the present document:
Studying key issues and candidate solutions concerning the negotiation (selection) of key sizes between UE and network, including:
- Potential risks and impacts to the current system when supporting both 128-bit and 256-bit algorithms in parallel and the adoption of 256-bit algorithms in existing deployments where 128 bits is already supported, e.g. handover scenarios within 5G system.
- How to prioritise the use of 256-bit algorithms and mitigate bidding-down attacks when negotiating key sizes.
- How to ensure 256-bit security is achieved concerning varying levels of support for 256-bit algorithms by different UEs and within the network; potential dependencies in key-length selection of AS and NAS layers.
- Study the implications and requirements for the key hierarchies to support 256-bit cryptographic algorithms.
- Study the implications and requirements to AKA procedures. |
33.701 | Study on mitigations against bidding down Attacks | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.701/33701-j00.zip | The present document focuses on mitigating bidding down attack, i.e. how to prevent UEs that are currently connected to LTE/5G from establishing a connection with a GERAN/UTRAN FBS considering for example the decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks. In particular, the present document aims at:
- Identifying attack scenarios and threats in the context of decommissioning of GERAN and UTRAN networks, e.g. cell (re)selection or forced handovers on GERAN or UTRAN once LTE and 5G signalling are blocked when GERAN/UTRAN networks are decommissioned; and
- Documenting solutions for the identified security threats and requirements. |
33.702 | Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.702/33702-j00.zip | The following objectives are studied in the present document:
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new target TNAP within the same TNGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support AUN3 connecting to a new target RG under the same WAGF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support N5CW devices connecting to a new target Trusted WLAN AP within the same TWIF without performing full primary authentication.
- Study the security aspects and procedure enhancements needed to support UE connecting to a new WLAN AP that shares the same NSWOF without performing full authentication.
The present document does not cover actual mobility, where call/session continuity is maintained. I.e. when UE/device is moving from one AP/TNAP/TWAP to another, connectivity can break, and then UE will reconnect. |
33.713 | Study on security aspects of Ambient Internet of Things (AIoT) services in 5G | TR | 1.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.713/33713-100.zip | The present document identifies potential threats and security requirements to enable AIoT services for various use cases. Consideration for the energy and complexity constraints of AIoT devices is taken into account in identifying and developing potential security mechanisms to support AIoT services. Specifically, the present document focuses on the following:
1. Identify security and privacy and threats introduced by AIoT services for use cases captured in TS 22.369 [2], for topologies captured in RP-234058[3], and for architecture captured in TR 23-700-13[4].
2. Identify security requirements to address the identified threats.
3. Develop potential solutions that fulfil the security requirements, taking into account AIoT device constraints agreed upon in other 3GPP working groups.
NOTE 1: Enable/disable device operation is within the scope of the present document.
NOTE 2: In Release 19, the conclusion of present document focuses on security and privacy of AIoT device 1 and D1T1 with direct and indirect interface options. |
33.721 | Study on security aspects of 5G mobile metaverse services | TR | 19.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.721/33721-j01.zip | The present document studies security impacts of the procedures introduced in Study on Application enablement architecture for mobile metaverse services studied in TR 23.700-21 [2], specifically, the security aspects that are to be covered in the present document are as follows:
- authentication and authorization of digital identity (non-IMS based)
NOTE: The term digital identity is defined in clause 3.1.
- support security aspects of digital asset container
- security and privacy aspects of user sensitive information for Localized Mobile Metaverse Services |
33.727 | Lawful Intercept Handling of Protected Services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.727/33727-001.zip | Offering communication services with end-to-end (E2E) cryptographic protection is becoming more desirable and more common. 3GPP-defined services (such as those of the IMS framework) have so far largely relied on trustworthy network infrastructure, complemented by strong cryptographic access security and hop-by-hop protection in the core and service domains. However, also here, E2E protected services are gaining attractivity. Indeed, the solution defined in TS 33.535, Authentication and Key Management for Applications based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (AKMA), can be leveraged as a basis for protecting basically any IP-based service provided to a UE (an ME with USIM-credentials). While this trend is both natural and desirable from a user privacy point of view, it creates problems related to regulatory obligations for CSPs to provide Lawful Interception (LI). The problems are particularly emphasised in roaming scenarios, where each of two different CSPs in distinct jurisdictions might independently need to provide LI without reliance on co-operation by the other CSP and/or law enforcement in the other jurisdiction.
The currently dominant approach to tackle these issues has been to simply not activate the protection (encryption) when it potentially conflicts with LI requirements. Going forward, this is most likely not a sustainable solution. For example, it potentially exposes the traffic to any 3rd party and, moreover, it typically also results in data integrity being disabled, while the issues are predominantly tied to data confidentiality.
The present document provides a technical study on how to enable protected services without negative consequences for LI. The CSP’s LI obligation to provide communication with the encryption removed only applies when the CSP also provides the technical means enabling the protection (e.g. key management), and therefore the scope is limited to that use case. |
33.743 | Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity-based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.743/33743-j00.zip | The present document investigates and identifies the security (including privacy) threats, corresponding security (including privacy) requirements and potential solutions for Proximity Based Services (ProSe) in 5G System (5GS) phase 3, based on the architecture and system level enhancements studied in TR 23.700-03 [1], including
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-Network Relay (both Layer-2 and Layer-3 Relays).
- ProSe multi-hop UE-to-UE Relay (Layer-3 Relay only). |
33.745 | Study on security aspects of 5G Next Radio (NR) Femto | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.745/33745-j10.zip | The present document studies the potential security enhancements for supporting 5G NR Femto. More specifically, the study investigates potential security enhancements in the following areas:
- With the gap analysis, study the potential updates or enhancements needed for 5G NR Femto over TS 33.320[2].
- Study the security impacts for interworking between CAG and CSG cells.
- Study the security impacts of enabling provisioning of subscribers allowed to access 5G NR Femto cells and how to manage 5G NR Femto access control by the Closed Access Group (CAG) owner or an authorized administrator. |
33.749 | Study on security aspects of enhancement of support for edge computing in the 5G Core (5GC) phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.749/33749-j00.zip | The present document studies the security enhancements on the support for Edge Computing in the 5G Core network defined in TR 23.700-49 [2], and enhanced architecture for enabling Edge Applications defined in TS 23.558 [3]. Specifically, the present document focuses on the following:
1) Study the security aspects on the enhancements for EAS (re)discovery and UPF (re)selection with reducing impact on central 5GC NFs, enhancement of EAS and local UPF (re)selection, and EC Traffic Routing between local part of DN and central part of DN the Edge Hosting Environment information management.
2) Study the security on the enhancements to Edge Enabler layer (EEL) to support additional scenarios for edge services.
3) Study the authorization between EESes for both Application Context Relocation (ACR) and Edge Node Sharing (ENS) scenarios.
4) Study the secure retrieval of 5G system UE Ids and privacy related information in the EDGE.
The study is based on the work done in the TS 33.558 [4], TR 33.839 [5], TR 33.739 [6]. |
33.754 | Study on security aspects for multi-access(DualSteer +Access Traffic Steering, Switch and Splitting support in the 5G system architecture phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.754/33754-j00.zip | The present document aims to address the security aspects of Multi-Access, focusing on DualSteer devices and ATSSS Phase 4 (ATSSS Ph-4) enhancements, as identified in the FS_MASSS study in TR 23.700-54 [2].
The scope of this study includes the following key areas:
- Examine the security implications of a simplified architecture over non-3GPP access, where non-3GPP access does not rely on the current TNGF/N3IWF architecture. This involves assessing:
- Whether to keep NAS security context on non-3GPP access.
- Whether to keep IPsec on the user plane and/or control plane of non-3GPP access.
- Whether new security mechanisms are to be considered in UE procedures, particularly regarding registration and connectivity to the 5G system in the context of ATSSS between 3GPP and non-3GPP access without 5G NAS.
The present document leverages insights from the requirements and architectural considerations outlined in the TR 23.700-54 [2]. |
33.757 | Study on security for a PLMN hosting a Non-Public Network (NPN) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.757/33757-j00.zip | The present document studies the security when a PLMN hosts an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. A NPN customer may deploy on-premises NFs, or hosted NFs which reside in third-party premises, or both. A PLMN hosting an NPN is an example of a Public Network Integrated NPN (PNI-NPN). The term PNI-NPN applies to this study of a PLMN hosting an NPN.
More specifically, the present document:
- identifies key issues and potential security requirements for the scenarios of PLMN hosting an NPN with dedicated NFs deployed in the customer domain. Related dedicated NFs may be described in the key issues.
- when necessary, develops solutions to address the identified requirements. |
33.759 | Study on security enhancements of Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) Phase 3 | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.759/33759-j00.zip | The present document identifies potential security and privacy issues and provides potential security solutions to support additional scenarios and requirements for UAV (Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle) and UAM (Urban Air Mobility) including:
- identify potential security issues and provide solutions for the enhanced NEF services to support service exposure and interactions between MNOs and UTM functions, e.g. security impact of supporting multiple USS.
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to network-assisted/ground-based mechanism for DAA (Detect And Avoid).
- identify potential security and privacy issues related to no-transmit zones for UAVs
Furthermore, the present document makes potential recommendations for possible normative work taking into consideration the conclusions of TR 23.700-59 [2]. |
33.766 | Study on security aspects of energy savings in 5G | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.766/33766-j00.zip | The present document studies the security and privacy aspects of energy savings. More especially the document:
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security aspects of collecting energy related information.
- Identifies key issues concerning the privacy and security impacts of exposure of energy related information.
- If required, develops solutions addressing the identified key issues. |
33.776 | Study of Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.776/33776-j00.zip | The scope of this document is to identify key issues and study solutions addressed using ACME for automated certificate management in SBA.
Areas of study include:
- Automated certificate management protocol and procedures for certificate life cycle events (i.e., enrolment, renewal, and revocation) within 5G SBA (i.e., to be used by operator CAs and all 5GC NFs including NRF, SCP, SEPP, etc.), including the following:
- ACME transport and request/response messages for 5G SBA use cases
- ACME certificate profiles for all 5G SBA entities
- Mechanisms for establishing initial trust and chain of trust of Certificate Authority hierarchies, including the following:
- Existing ACME challenge types and if any new challenge types are needed for 3GPP use cases:
- Creation, deletion, rotation, revocation and storage of the certificates
- Ability to automate ACME challenge validation
- Suitability of existing mechanisms when 5G SBA is for standalone NPN (SNPN)
- Call flow of the messages exchanged between different entities in the chain of trust.
NOTE: Certificate management for the external interface of the SEPP is out of scope. |
33.784 | Study on security aspects of core network enhanced support for Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.784/33784-j00.zip | The present document studies the security aspects of enablers for network automation for the 5G system based on the outcome of TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3]. More specifically, this document identifies security issues and requirements and provides corresponding security solutions related to the following scenarios:
- Security aspects on enhancements to LCS to support AI/ML based Positioning considering the conclusions in TR 38.843[2] and TR 23.700-84[3].
- Security aspects of cross-domain (i.e. 5G Core and AF) Vertical Federated Learning, including authorization of members of the VFL group and security aspects of enhancements on the architecture in TR 23.700-84 [3] to support VFL. |
33.790 | Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2 | TR | 19.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.790/33790-j01.zip | The present document studies security impacts of the new features of the next generation real time communication studied in TR 23.700-77 [2], specifically, the security aspects that are to be covered in the present document are as follows:
- IMS third party identity security handling.
- The security handling of the enhancements to support the use cases of IMS based Metaverse services.
- The security and privacy issues and solutions related to the IMS data channel exposure. |
33.794 | Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security | TR | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.794/33794-j10.zip | The present document studies enablers for Zero-Trust Security in the 5G System. The document specifically includes security analysis with recommendations, key issues, potential security requirements and solutions with respect to the following objectives:
1. Data exposure for security evaluation and monitoring
- Identify potential threats and attacks on the 5G SBA layer intended to identify which data may be relevant to be exposed, and whether additional data exposure is necessary to detect the threats and attacks.
NOTE 1: The external security evaluation and monitoring is up to operator’s implementation and outside the 3GPP domain. The aspects to enable OAM based data collection are not in scope of the present document. The necessary adaptations specific to exposure services for providing data to the external security function.
2. Security mechanism for dynamic policy enforcement |
33.926 | Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes | TR | 19.4.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.926/33926-j40.zip | The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the aspects specific to one network product class. |
33.928 | ADMF logic for provisioning Lawful Interception (LI) | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.928/33928-j00.zip | The present document provides ADMF provisioning logic for LI in association with the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4]. |
33.929-1 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-1/33929-1-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based services that focus on illustrating the LI aspects of session-based IMS sessions which include the architecture topologies and the call flows covering basic sessions, redirected sessions, target non-local ID, conferencing, roaming (Local Breakout and Home-routed) scenarios. The IMS based STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting are illustrated in TR 33.929-2 [10].
The LI for IMS-based services is agnostic to the packet core network. |
33.929-2 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-2/33929-2-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based STIR/SHAKEN that focus on illustrating various STIR/SHAKEN related LI reporting scenarios that go along with the LI for IMS based services (TR 33.929-1 [10]). |
33.929-3 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for messaging services | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-3/33929-3-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the illustrations related LI for Messaging Services that include SMS over NAS and SMS over IP. |
33.929-4 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for data in 5G core | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-4/33929-4-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers the illustrations for LI for Data in 5G Core include the LI aspects of data interception focussing on the PDU session related events including the handover cases. |
33.929-5 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for ID association caching | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-5/33929-5-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3], TS 33.128 [4] and TR 33.928 [5].
The present document that covers illustrations of ID Association Caching focus on the capabilities used to provide the temporary identity to permanent identity (and vice-versa) associations known to the CSP network. The illustrations include the architectural concepts and few examples of use-cases encountering various timing scenarios. |
33.929-6 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for IMS based RCS | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-6/33929-6-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for IMS based RCS that include the illustrations covering the architecture topologies and the call flows when the RCS service is offered by the CSP or by a Third Party Provider. The LI for IMS based services are illustrated in TR 33.929-1 [10].
The LI for IMS-based RCS is agnostic to the packet core network. |
33.929-7 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI location acquisition capabilities | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-7/33929-7-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for Location Services that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for location reporting, LALS and Location Acquisition. |
33.929-8 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for MMS | TR | 0.0.2 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-8/33929-8-002.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for MMS that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for MMS. |
33.929-9 | Lawful Interception (LI) implementation guidance; LI for PTC | TR | 0.0.1 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.929-9/33929-9-001.zip | The present document provides architectural diagrams, conceptual scenarios, flow-diagrams, examples, and other background information which can be useful to implement the LI functions defined in TS 33.126 [2], TS 33.127 [3] and TS 33.128 [4].
The present document covers the LI for PTC that include the illustrations covering the conceptual overview and the flow diagrams for MCPTT and PoC commonly referred to as Push to Talk over Cellular. |
33.938 | 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/33_series/33.938/33938-j00.zip | The present document lists the security protocols that use cryptography in 3GPP specifications for the 5G System in the Standalone mode. They
• include the type of cryptography used by the protocol (symmetric/asymmetric)
• include the pointers to the protocol specification
• include the pointers to the relevant 3GPP cryptographic profiles
• include usage type (e.g., integrity, confidentiality, and/or authentication)
NOTE: the present document does not include resolution to PQC migration, and does not contain solutions that lead to any specification/normative work. |
34.229-1 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 1: Protocol conformance specification | TS | 19.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-1/34229-1-j10.zip | The present document specifies the protocol conformance testing for the User Equipment (UE) supporting the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP).
This is the first part of a multi-part test specification. The following information can be found in this part:
- the overall test structure;
- the test configurations;
- the conformance requirement and reference to the core specifications;
- the test purposes; and
- a brief description of the test procedure, the specific test requirements and short message exchange table.
The following information relevant to testing can be found in accompanying specifications:
- the applicability of each test case [5].
A detailed description of the expected sequence of messages can be found in the 3rd part of present test specification [6].
The Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro-forma can be found in the 2nd part of the present test specification [5].
The present document is valid for UE implemented according to 3GPP Releases starting from Release 5 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document.
Also, for clauses 8-18, 20 and 22, it is generally assumed that an IMS capable UE is compliant to GSMA PRD IR.92 [133] and GSMA PRD IR.94 [134]; any update of requirements in these GSMA PRD documents, which are relevant to the present document will be handled on a case by case basis, with due consideration given for grace period to be granted for the UE to comply to any updated requirements.
Editor's Note: it is to be clarified if we need to elaborate on clauses 19 and 21 here.
Test cases specified in Annexes G-K are targeted as indicated in their respective Scope sections. |
34.229-2 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 2: Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) specification | TS | 19.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-2/34229-2-j10.zip | The present document provides the Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma for 3rd Generation User Equipment (UE) supporting the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP), in compliance with the relevant requirements, and in accordance with the relevant guidance given in ISO/IEC 9646-7 [8] and ETS 300 406 [9].
The present document also specifies a recommended applicability statement for the test cases included in TS 34.229-1 [5] and TS 34.229-5 [95]. These applicability statements are based on the features implemented in the UE.
The present document is valid for UE implemented according to 3GPP releases starting from Release 5 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document.
Also, it is generally assumed that an IMS capable UE is compliant to at least one of the following GSMA PRD IR.92 [83], GSMA PRD IR.94 [75] or GSMA PRD NG.114 [99]: any update of requirements in these GSMA PRD documents, which are relevant to the present document will be handled on a case by case basis, with due consideration given for grace period and/or conditions to be granted for the UE to comply to any updated requirements. |
34.229-3 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 3: Abstract test suite (ATS) | TS | 19.0.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-3/34229-3-j00.zip | The present document specifies the protocol conformance testing in TTCN for the 3GPP User Equipment (UE) at the Gm interface.
The present document is the 3rd part of a multi-part test specification, 3GPP TS 34.229. The following TTCN test specification and design considerations can be found in the present document:
- the overall test suite structure;
- the testing architecture;
- the test methods and PCO definitions;
- the test configurations;
- the design principles, assumptions, and used interfaces to the TTCN tester (System Simulator);
- TTCN styles and conventions;
- the partial PIXIT proforma;
- the TTCN files for the mentioned protocols tests.
The Abstract Test Suites designed in the document are based on the test cases specified in prose (3GPP TS 34.229‑1 [5] and TS 34.229-5 [55]).
The present document is valid for UE implemented according 3GPP Releases starting from Release 5 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document. |
34.229-5 | Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); User Equipment (UE) conformance specification; Part 5: Protocol conformance specification using 5G System (5GS) | TS | 19.1.0 | R5 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/34_series/34.229-5/34229-5-j10.zip | The present document specifies the protocol conformance testing for the User Equipment (UE) supporting the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) when using the 5G System (5GS).
This is the fifth part of a multi-part test specification. The following information can be found in this part:
- the overall test structure;
- the test configurations;
- the conformance requirement and reference to the core specifications;
- the test purposes; and
- the test procedure.
The following information relevant to testing can be found in accompanying specifications:
- Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) pro-forma and the applicability of each test case [3].
The present document is valid for UE implemented according to 3GPP Releases starting from Release 15 up to the Release indicated on the cover page of the present document. |
35.205 | 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: General | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.205/35205-j00.zip | This report is a description of the work undertaken by an ETSI SAGE Task Force on the design of the Milenage Algorithm Set: an example set of 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions.
The 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Functions are not standardized. An example set of these algorithms has been produced on request from 3GPP with the intent that it shall be offered to the UMTS operators, to utilise instead of developing their own. An ETSI SAGE Task Force has carried out this work.
The requirement specification from 3GPP stated that operator personalisation of the example set shall be possible and that the basic kernel shall be possible to replace.
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael, which at the time was one of the AES candidates and the specification describes how the 7 algorithms used in 3GPP authentication and key generation are scheduled around this basic kernel. The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in three documents:
- A formal specification of both the modes and the example kernel [3]
- A detailed test data document, covering modes and the example kernel [4]
- A "black box" test data document [5]
A detailed summary of the evaluation is provided in a public evaluation report [6]
This report gives an overview of the overall work by the task force. |
35.231 | Specification of the TUAK algorithm set: A second example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.231/35231-j00.zip | The present document and the other Technical Specifications in the series, TS 35.232 [15] and 35.233 [16] contain an example set of algorithms which could be used as the authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* for 3GPP systems. All seven functions are operator-specifiable rather than being fully standardised and other algorithms could be envisaged. |
35.234 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 1: General | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.234/35234-j00.zip | The present document contains a high level specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set which constitutes an example set of 3GPP authentication and key generation functions with a 256-bit target security level.
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael-256-256 with 256-bit key and 256-bit block size [8, 14] (recall that the 128 bit Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-128, corresponds to Rijndael-128-128 [8]).
An optional-to-use function, f5**, was designed according to candidate solutions discussed in 3GPP SA3 [12], with the aim of countering certain replay attacks that can lead to traceability of subscribers [13]. When used, the optional function f5** replaces f5*.
The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in two documents:
- A formal specification of the mode and the example kernel [2].
- A detailed test data document, covering mode and the example kernel [3].
A detailed summary of the evaluation is provided in a public evaluation report [4].
The present document provides an overview of the overall work. |
35.235 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 2: algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.235/35235-j00.zip | This document contains a detailed specification of the general framework for the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set, together with specification for the cryptographic kernel used to instantiate the algorithm set.
The main new requirement for the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set, compared to previous 3GPP authentication and key generation functions, is to provide a 256-bit target security level, mainly motivated by future proofing 3GPP networks in case larger scale quantum computers become practical in the future. While this level of security can already be provided by the previously defined TUAK algorithm set [10], having another algorithm set, based on a different cryptographic kernel, provides a fallback, in case of future advances in conventional (non-quantum-computing based) cryptanalysis of the hash-function Keccak, the kernel used in TUAK.
The framework for MILENAGE-256 largely mirrors that of the previously defined MILENAGE algorithm set [9], but with a few important differences as discussed later in the present document.
In terms of the cryptographic kernel, MILENAGE-256 requires the use of a kernel mapping 256-bit inputs to 256-bit outputs, under the control of a 256-bit secret key. The present document provides kernel based on direct use of the Rijndael-256-256 block cipher with 256-bit block and key size.
The reader may recall that Rijndael was the candidate algorithm selected by NIST as the Advanced Encryption Standard, though the option to use a 256-bit block size was not adopted as part of the NIST AES requirements [5].
The algorithm set is named MILENAGE-256 since the intention is to provide full 256-bit security, which requires the use of 256-bit keys. Nonetheless MILENAGE-256 supports both 128-bit and 256-bit keys, to facilitate the transition to 256-bit security. If MILENAGE-256 is employed in a context containing components that do not yet support 256-bit keys, 128-bit keys can initially be employed, though it is recommended that the implementation supports a mechanism for transitioning to 256-bit keys in the future.
Associated test data for the MILENAGE-256 example algorithm set appears in a partner document comprising detailed test data, covering modes and the example kernel, and general design conformance test data [3].
Provisions are further made so that operators who so desire can customise the algorithm set to different degrees, providing some level of separation/isolation between implementations used by different operators. |
35.236 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 3: Implementors’ test data and design conformance test data | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.236/35236-j00.zip | The present document provides test data (also known as test vectors) that implementors can use to help verify that their implementations are correct, according to the technical specifications of MILENAGE-256 algorithm set [2,3]. A reference implementation in C/C++ is also provided in the Annex. |
35.246 | Specification of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm set: Specification of the 256-NEA6 encryption, the 256-NIA6 integrity, and the 256-NCA6 authenticated encryption algorithm for 5G; Document 1: algorithm specification | TS | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.246/35246-j00.zip | The present document contains the algorithm specification which could be used as the encryption and integrity protection function 256-NEA6, 256-NIA6 and the combined authenticated encryption 256-NCA6 protection function for 3GPP systems. |
35.249 | Specification of an example algorithm for f5** function for MILENAGE and Tuak; Algorithm specification and test data | TS | 19.1.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.249/35249-j10.zip | The present document presents an optional security enhancement for the MILENAGE [5, 6, 12, 13] and Tuak example algorithm set [7, 14, 15] for the 3GPP authentication and key agreement functions. The enhancement addresses a subscriber traceability issue discovered by academic researchers [9] and is provided as an alternative anonymity key generation function f5** that, when enabled, replaces the f5* function of the aforementioned example algorithm sets. A functionally equivalent security enhancement is already included in the new MILENAGE-256 example algorithm set [8]. |
35.937 | Specification of the MILENAGE-256 algorithm set; An example set of 256-bit 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* and f5**; Document 4: summary and results of design and evaluation | TR | 19.0.0 | S3 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/35_series/35.937/35937-j00.zip | The present document contains a detailed summary of the work performed during the design and evaluation of MILENAGE-256 algorithm set. It contains results and findings from this work and should be read as a supplement to the specifications of the algorithms [3] and the general project report [2].
The example set is based on the block cipher Rijndael-256-256 with 256-bit key and block size [8, 24] (recall that the 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard, AES-256, corresponds to Rijndael-128-256 [9], where the notation Rijndael-b-n is defined in clause 3.2 below).
An optional-to-use function, f5** with the aim of countering certain replay attacks that can lead to traceability of subscribers [20], was designed according to candidate solutions discussed in 3GPP TR 33.846 [12]. When used, the optional function f5** replaces f5*.
The specification and associated test data for the example algorithm set is documented in two documents:
- A formal specification of the mode and the example kernel [3]
- A test data document, covering mode and the example kernel [4] |
36.101 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.2.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.101/36101-j20.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics and minimum performance requirements for E-UTRA User Equipment (UE). |
36.102 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception for satellite access | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.102/36102-j00.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics and minimum performance requirements for E-UTRA User Equipment (UE) operating satellite access. |
36.104 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.104/36104-j10.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics and minimum performance requirements of E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT Base Station (BS). |
36.108 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Satellite Access Node radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.108/36108-j00.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics and minimum performance requirements of Satellite Access Node (SAN) supporting standalone NB-IoT operation or E-UTRA or NB-IoT operation in NTN NR in-band.
NOTE: Minimum requirements for NB-IoT operation in NTN NR guardband are not specified and guardband operation is SAN implementation specific. |
36.133 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for support of radio resource management | TS | 19.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.133/36133-j10.zip | The present document specifies requirements for support of Radio Resource Management for the FDD and TDD modes of Evolved UTRA. These requirements include requirements on measurements in UTRAN and the UE as well as requirements on node dynamical behaviour and interaction, in terms of delay and response characteristics. |
36.141 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Base Station (BS) conformance testing | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.141/36141-j00.zip | The present document specifies the Radio Frequency (RF) test methods and conformance requirements for E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT Base Stations (BS) operating either in the FDD mode (used in paired bands) or the TDD mode (used in unpaired bands). These have been derived from, and are consistent with the E-UTRA, E-UTRA with NB-IoT or NB-IoT Base Station (BS) specifications defined in [2]. |
36.171 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements for Support of Assisted Global Navigation Satellite System (A-GNSS) | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.171/36171-j00.zip | The present document establishes the minimum performance requirements for A-GNSS (including A-GPS) for FDD or TDD mode of E-UTRA for the User Equipment (UE). |
36.181 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Satellite Access Node conformance testing | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.181/36181-j00.zip | The present document specifies the Radio Frequency (RF) test methods and conformance requirements for Satellite Access Node (SAN) type 1-H and SAN type 1-O, supporting standalone NB-IoT operation or E-UTRA or NB-IoT operation in NTN NR in-band. These have been derived from and are consistent with the conducted requirements for SAN type 1-H, and radiated requirement for SAN type 1-H and SAN type 1-O in SAN specification defined in TS 36.108 [2]. |
36.211 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Physical channels and modulation | TS | 19.0.0 | R1 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.211/36211-j00.zip | The present document describes the physical channels for evolved UTRA. |
36.212 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Multiplexing and channel coding | TS | 19.0.0 | R1 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.212/36212-j00.zip | The present document specifies the coding, multiplexing and mapping to physical channels for E-UTRA. |
36.213 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Physical layer procedures | TS | 19.0.0 | R1 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.213/36213-j00.zip | The present document specifies and establishes the characteristics of the physicals layer procedures in the FDD and TDD modes of E-UTRA. |
36.307 | Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA); Requirements on User Equipments (UEs) supporting a release-independent frequency band | TS | 19.1.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.307/36307-j10.zip | The present document specifies requirements for Rel-18 UEs supporting release independent features like:
- additional E-UTRA operating frequency bands on top of Rel-18 of TS 36.101 [2], TS 36.102 [6] and TS 36.133 [3];
- additional E-UTRA CA configurations (intra-band/inter-band) on top of Rel-18 of TS 36.101 [2] and TS 36.133 [3];
- additional operating bands and/or CA configurations for specific features (like UE category 0, M1, NB1);
- other release independent features (like 4Rx antenna port, high speed scenario, 8Rx antenna port, NB-IoT or eMTC operation over NTN). |
36.719-01-01 | LTE REL-19 CA for x bands (1<=x<=6)DL with y bands (y=1,2) UL | TR | 0.5.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.719-01-01/36719-01-01-050.zip | The present document is a technical report on intra-band CA and inter-band CA for x bands DL (1≤x≤6) with y bands UL (y=1,2) under Rel-19 timeframe.
The purpose is to gather the relevant background information and studies, in order to address Rel-19 band combinations that are related to x bands (1≤x≤6) DL with y bands UL (y=1,2) bands UL CA requirements. The band combinations are requested in the Excel file of the WID [2] or its revisions. |
36.764 | LTE IoT NTN operating bands | TR | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.764/36764-j00.zip | The present document is a technical report for LTE IoT NTN operating bands. |
36.767 | Rel-19 High power UE (power class 2) and high power operation (power class 1) for fixed-wireless/vehicle-mounted use cases in a single LTE band | TR | 0.0.2 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/36_series/36.767/36767-002.zip | The present document is a technical report for Rel-19 High power UE (power class 2) and high power operation (power class 1) for fixed-wireless/vehicle-mounted use cases in a single LTE band WI band under Rel-19 time frame. The purpose is to gather the relevant background information and studies in order to address LTE single band PC1 and PC2 HPUE operation for the Rel-19.
This TR contains a general part and specific band combination part. The actual requirements are added to the corresponding technical specifications. |
37.104 | NR, E-UTRA, UTRA and GSM/EDGE; Multi-Standard Radio (MSR) Base Station (BS) radio transmission and reception | TS | 19.0.0 | R4 | https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/archive/37_series/37.104/37104-j00.zip | The present document establishes the minimum RF characteristics of NR, E-UTRA, UTRA, GSM/EDGE and NB-IoT Multi-Standard Radio (MSR) Base Station (BS). Requirements for multi-RAT and single-RAT operation of MSR BS are covered in the present document. The requirements in the present document for E-UTRA, UTRA and NB-IoT single-RAT operation of MSR BS are also applicable to E-UTRA, UTRA and NB-IoT multi-carrier capable single-RAT BS. Requirements for GSM BS that are only single-RAT capable in all supported operating bands are not covered. |
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