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5.1 Solution #1
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The first solution for getting low output power is described in Annex B. As it can be seen in this annex, this solution implies only one change to the current specifications, which is the following:
• TS 25.433 (NBAP protocol specification). A new IE must be created, containing the following information:
• External_Gain_DL: This is the DL gain of the external distribution system. This parameter also includes the losses of the coupling system between the low output power base station and the distribution system.
• External_Gain_UL: This is the UL gain of the external distribution system. It comprises all the way from the distribution system remote antenna connector and the low output power base station antenna connector.
The main advantages of this solution are the following:
• It minimises the changes to the specifications.
• There are not backwards compatibility problems with the node B and/or the UE.
From the TSG RAN WG4 point of view, this is a feasible solution for getting low output power, but due to the fact that all the changes that this solution implies affect to RAN specifications under TSG RAN WG3 control, the feasibility of this solution is conditioned to TSG RAN WG3 review.
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5.2 Solution #2
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Another way of getting low output power would be to introduce these two parameters, as described in Solution #1, DL and UL gain of the distribution system, into the O&M system.
By doing this, the base station would be aware of the presence of this equipment and could therefore adjust its output power, so as to provide the expected power at the antenna port, that is, at the Uu interface.
To provide this information, two possibilities could be foreseen:
a) These two parameters could be stored into the local database of the base station.
b) It could also be possible to include these parameters in the network manager database, though this seems to be indeed more complex, because this information would have to be sent to the base station via the itf-N interface.
Comparing both alternatives, option a) seems to be much simpler than option b), as it would minimise the impact to the specifications. Besides, it would not be needed to involve TSG SA WG5, responsible for the standardisation of the itf-N interface.Therefore, option a) would be the one chosen when referring to Solution #2.
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6 Conclusions
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TSG RAN WG3 has reviewed solution #1 and concluded that, although this could be a feasible solution, it does not seem to be the optimal one.
Therefore, a second solution, solution #2, was proposed trying to minimize the changes to the current specifications.
As option a) of solution #2 seems to be the simplest solution, TSG RAN WG3 agrees to adopt this alternative to provide low output power.
Annex A:
Description of solution #1 for getting low output power
The first solution that one can think of for getting low output power is to change the Iub signalling information elements, so that the RNC can order the node B to transmit the desired power. So this was the first approach taken to obtain low output power. But this solution leads to several problems:
• The changes in the Iub signalling affect not only to the node B, but to the UE [3]. The CPICH power value sent to the UE by the RNC does not correspond to the CPICH power at the distribution system antenna connector. This can lead to problems with some RNC functionality like admission control or the adjustment of the initial power of the PRACH.
• The changes to the Iub signalling are not backwards compatible. A node B or a UE that is not Release 6 compatible would not understand the changes done to the signalling [3].
Because of this, a more feasible solution has been considered. With this solution, current information elements are not changed. The node B and the RNC are the ones that perform the necessary corrections to obtain the low output power. Figure B.1.1 shows an example of this solution.
In this example, we want a Pmax at the distribution system antenna interface of +30 dBm. The gain of the feeder between the node B and the distribution system, plus the distribution system gain, is 30 dB. Therefore, the node B should be ordered to transmit with a Pmax of 0 dBm. But the RNC orders the node B to transmit 30 dBm, which should be the maximum output power at the distribution system antenna interface. The order is sent by using a non changed Release 99 IE. According to this, the node B should transmit with a Pmax of 30 dBm at its antenna interface. But the RNC sends to the node B a new IE, which tells the node B that there is a distribution system connected to its antenna interface. This new IE contains the UL and DL gain of the distribution system. Then the node B is able to correct its output power, and therefore, it transmits with a Pmax of 0 dBm, so that the Pmax at the remote antenna interface is 30 dBm. In order that the RNC can send to the node B the gain of the external distribution system, it is necessary to add two parameters to the RNC, operator configurable, which contain the UL and DL gain of the external distribution system.
Figure B.1: Solution #1 for getting low output power
On the other hand, the CPICH power value sent to the UE by the RNC is 18 dBm, which is the CPICH transmit power at the distribution system antenna interface. With this solution, the correct CPICH power value is sent to the UE, and there are not backwards compatibility problems with the UE's. The only change to the specifications is the new IE in the NBAP protocol, containing the UL and DL gain of the distribution system. There would be no changes in the RRC protocol, and there would be no backward compatibility problems with the NBAP IE's.
In the previous explanation of the approach, no mention has been made of the possible use of the distribution system UL gain for the node B and/or the RNC. It could be useful for correcting the measurement reports received from the node B, because if these reports are not relative to the distribution system antenna connector (the point at which the CPICH power value is given), it could lead to problems with some RNC functionality.
It should also be pointed out that if the or distribution system connected to the node B has several antenna ends, all of them should be configured to transmit the same output power. If not, it would be impossible for the node B to correct its transmit power so that the correct output power is transmitted at all antenna ends. This comment should be included in the relevant documents, for instance in the WDS technical report.
This solution is not fully closed yet. Subsequent modifications or additions to this solution can be incorporated into this TR by means of TSG RAN WG's contributions.
Annex B:
Use of the downlink and uplink gain
To clarify the use of both parameters, downlink and uplink gain of any distributed antenna system connected after the base station, the following structure is to be considered.
Figure C.1: General topology in case of Low Output Power
First of all, it seems clear that, indisputably, the downlink gain of the distributed antenna system connected at the output of the base station will be a value needed by the base station, in order to be able to adjust its output power accordingly. By doing this, the Primary CPICH power at the antenna connector can be correct, as indicated on the BCH.
On the other hand, the purpose of the uplink gain could be less obvious, although it is also important, for this parameter will be used to compensate any dissymmetry between both, uplink and downlink, so as to receive an exact - as accurate as possible - initial power for the PRACH preambles. To clarify this point, it would be useful to analyse in detail how the calculation of this power is performed by the UE.
The formula the UE uses to estimate the power of the initial preamble for the PRACH, Preamble_Initial_Power, is given in 3GPP TS 25.331 as follows:
Preamble_Initial_Power = Primary CPICH TX power IE - CPICH_RSCP
+ UL Interference IE
+ Constant Value IE
Where:
- The Primary CPICH TX power IE is the transmitted Primary CPICH power sent to the UE on the Uu interface. This IE is indicated on the BCH in the System Information Block, SIB, type 6 (or SIB 5, if SIB 6 is not being broadcasted).
- The CPICH_RSCP is measured by the UE as the received value of the Primary CPICH.
- The UL Interference IE is the estimated uplink interference already existing in the cell. This IE is present on the BCH in SIB7.
- The Constant Value IE is a constant chosen by the RNC. This IE is radiated to the UE on the BCH in SIB 6 (or SIB 5, if SIB 6 is not being broadcasted).
In fact, the first two terms represent the estimation of the downlink path loss. Of course, it can only be correct if the Primary CPICH power at the antenna connector is equal to the Primary CPICH TX power IE. So, this is obviously the reason why the base station needs to be aware of the presence of the external element connected at its output before the antenna itself, adjusting its output power in accordance.
Additionally, a constant value is chosen so as to enable RRC connection establishment without delay and without creating too much uplink interference.
Finally, in order to take into account the presence of other UEs in the cell, the UL interference IE is included. This estimation will only be correct if the base station is aware of the UL gain of the external element connected.
As it could be noticed, this formula does not explicitly contain uplink and downlink path losses, but on the contrary, symmetry between both links is implied. This means that the UE assumes that uplink and downlink path losses are almost the same. This hypothesis is usually valid at the antenna connector reference point, that is, immediately after (or before) any external element connected at the output (input) of the base station on the downlink (on the uplink). It is important to maintain this symmetry up to the base station itself, so that the initial power of the preambles would be correct enough.
If either uplink or downlink is not compensated correctly, then the Preamble_Initial_Power may not be accurate enough:
- Being too low, the RRC connection establishment might be delayed or even impossible.
- Being too high, too much uplink interference will be created in the cell.
Annex C:
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
03/2004
23
RP-040076
-
-
Approved at TSG RAN #23 and placed under Change Control
1.0.0
6.0.0
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1 Scope
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The present document specifies the Remote Electrical Tilting Application Part (RETAP) between the implementation specific O&M transport function and the RET Antenna Control unit function of the Node B. It defines the Iuant interface and its associated signaling procedures.
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2 References
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The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TS 25.460: "UTRAN Iuant Interface: General Aspects and Principles".
[2] ISO/IEC 13239 (2nd Edition, March 2000): "Information Technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – High-level data link control (HDLC) procedures".
[3] 3GPP TS 25.462: "UTRAN Iuant Interface: Signalling Transport".
[4] 3GPP TS 25.461: ”UTRAN Iuant Interface: Layer 1”.
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25.463
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply.
Active alarm: An alarm which has an alarm state that has been raised, but not cleared
Alarm: Persistent indication of a fault
Alarm code: A code that identifies a specific alarm. The alarm code set is a subset of the return code set. The alarm codes are listed in annex A of this TS
Alarm state: A condition or state in the existence of an alarm. Alarm states are raised and cleared
ASCII character: A character forming part of the International Reference Version of the 7-bit character set defined in ISO/IEC 646:1991
Calibrate: Exercise the antenna drive unit over its entire range of travel to ensure fault-free operation and synchronise the measured and actual beam tilt of the antenna
Configuration data: A stored table or function defining the relationship between the physical position of the drive and electrical beam tilt
Data type: A definition determining the value range and interpretation of a series of octets. The following specified data types are used in this TS:
Name:
Definition:
AlarmCode
1 octet unsigned enumerated code
All AlarmCode values are listed in annex A of this TS
FieldNumber
1 octet unsigned enumerated code
All field number values are listed in annex B of this TS
ProcedureCode
1 octet unsigned enumerated code
ReturnCode
1 octet unsigned enumerated code
All ReturnCode values are listed in annex A of this TS
TextString
Octets with integer values in the range of 32 to 126 to be interpreted as ASCII characters
Elementary procedure: The RETAP protocol consists of elementary procedures (EPs). An elementary procedure is a unit of interaction between the primary device (Node B) and the secondary devices (RET devices)
An EP consists of an initiating message and possibly a response message.
Two kinds of EPs are used:
- Class 1: Elementary procedures with response (success or failure).
- Class 2: Elementary procedures without response.
For Class 1 EPs, the types of responses can be as follows:
Successful
- A signalling message explicitly indicates that the elementary procedure has been successfully completed with the receipt of the response.
Unsuccessful
- A signalling message explicitly indicates that the EP failed.
Class 2 EPs are considered always successful.
Error: Deviation of a system from normal operation
Fault: Lasting error condition
Little endian: The order of transmission in which the least-significant octets of a multi-octet representation of a number are transmitted first. Little endian only applies to binary integer representations
MaxDataReceiveLength: SecondaryPayloadReceiveLength minus 3 octets (see subclause 4.8.1 in [3])
MaxDataTransmitLength: SecondaryPayloadTransmitLength minus 3 octets (see subclause 4.8.1 in [3])
Procedure code: A code identifying an elementary procedure
Reset: A process by which the device is put in the state it reaches after a completed power-up
Return code: A code which defines information about the outcome of an elementary procedure execution
Tilt (also downtilt, tilt angle, beamtilt): The elevation angle between the direction orthogonal to the antenna element axis and the maximum of its main beam in the elevation plane. A positive electrical tilt angle means that the antenna beam is directed below the direction orthogonal to the antenna axis. An antenna has separate values for electrical and mechanical tilt. The mechanical tilt is fixed by the geometry of the installation. In this TS the tilt referred to is always the electrical tilt unless otherwise stated
Tilt value: A signed integer used in elementary procedures to define the electrical tilt setting of the antenna. The tilt value is 10 times the antenna electrical tilt angle in degrees.
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3.2 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
EP Elementary Procedure
HDLC High-Level Data Link Control
RET Remote Electrical Tilting
RETAP Remote Electrical Tilting Application Part
TCP Time-Consuming Procedure
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4 General
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4.1 Procedure specification principles
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The principle for specifying the procedure logic is to specify the functional behaviour of the RET antenna control unit exactly and completely. The Node B functional behaviour is left unspecified.
The following specification principles have been applied for the procedure text in clause 6:
- The procedure text discriminates between:
1) Functionality which "shall" be executed
The procedure text indicates that the receiving node "shall" perform a certain function Y under a certain condition. If the receiving node supports procedure X but cannot perform functionality Y requested in the REQUEST message of a Class 1 EP, the receiving node shall respond with the message used to report unsuccessful outcome for this procedure, containing an appropriate cause value.
2) Functionality which "shall, if supported" be executed
The procedure text indicates that the receiving node "shall, if supported," perform a certain function Y under a certain condition. If the receiving node supports procedure X, but does not support functionality Y, the receiving node shall proceed with the execution of the EP, possibly informing the requesting node about the not supported functionality.
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4.2 Forwards and backwards compatibility
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The forwards and backwards compatibility of all versions of the protocol shall be assured by a mechanism in which all current and further messages will not be changed in the future. These parts can always be decoded regardless of the standard version.
New functionalities are added into the specification by introducing new procedures and thus the existing messages are not changed in the future.
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4.3 Multi-antenna units
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The RETAP elementary procedures are split into a single-antenna oriented part, a multi-antenna oriented part and a common part for both device types in order to support RET units controlling single- or multi-antenna devices. The RET unit responds, upon request, the number of antennas it controls. All multi-antenna oriented elementary procedures include a parameter stating which antenna the elementary procedure addresses. Antennas are numbered 1 and upwards.
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4.4 Integer representation
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Multi-octet integer values are transmitted in little endian order. Signed integers are represented as 2-complement values.
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5 Services expected from signalling transport
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RETAP requires an assured in-sequence delivery service from the signalling transport and notification if the assured in-sequence delivery service is no longer available.
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5.1 Elementary procedure format
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Layer 2 provides a full-duplex link for the transmission of RETAP messages.
There are two types of RETAP elementary procedures:
Class 1: Initiating messages are sent either from the primary to a secondary device, or from a secondary to the primary device, in order to initiate some action within the receiving device. The other device sends a response message completing the procedure.
Class 2: Initiating messages are sent either from the primary to a secondary device, or from a secondary to the primary device. No response message is expected.
All RETAP messages use the same basic format:
Table 5.1.1: Basic format for all RETAP messages
Elementary procedure
Number of data octets
Data
1 octet
2 octets
MaxDataReceiveLength or MaxDataTransmitLength.
NOTE: Response messages have the same basic format as initiating messages. The elementary procedure code shall be the same in the response message as in the associated initiating message.
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5.1.1 Initiating message
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The data part of an initiating message may contain parameters as specified in clause 6 of this TS.
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5.1.2 Response message
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Elementary procedures shall, unless otherwise specified, provide a response message within 1 second. The response time is measured from the time the message frame was received by the transport layer to the time the response message is ready for transfer by the transport layer.
If the class1 elementary procedure requested by the initiating message was successfully executed, the response message data part from a single-antenna device shall contain return code <OK>. Additional information may follow in the data part. The response message data part from a multi-antenna device starts with the antenna number followed by return code <OK> and optional additional information.
If the elementary procedure requested by the initiating message was not successfully executed, the response message data part from a single-antenna device shall contain return code <FAIL>.
The following octet shall contain a second return code which describes why the execution of the requested procedure failed. The response message data part from a multi-antenna device starts with the antenna number followed by return code <FAIL> and a second return code which describes why the execution of the requested procedure failed.
In some situations an initiating message can cause a change of operating conditions, for instance a SetTilt procedure might cause a RET device to discover that an adjuster is jammed or that a previously jammed adjuster works normally again. In these cases an alarm procedure reporting the change of operating conditions shall be used in addition to the regular <OK> or <FAIL> return codes in response message.
A complete annotated table of all return codes with their corresponding hexadecimal numbers is provided in annex A of this TS.
Return codes marked with an X in the Alarm column of annex A in this TS are used to report operating conditions in alarm procedures (see subclauses 6.6.5 and 6.7.6 for details).
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6 Control elementary procedures
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6.1 State model
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The state model describing the RET device is shown in figure 6.1 with procedures written in italic.
The relation to the connection state model for layer 2 can be found in [3].
Figure 6.1: State model for the RET device
If an application software is not missing the RET device enters the state OperatingMode.
If an application software is missing, the RET device enters the state DownloadMode. In this state only software download functionality is supported in order to restore the application software.
The primary device will be notified that the RET device has entered the state DownloadMode when a procedure which only is supported in the state OperatingMode fails with the return code WorkingSoftwareMissing.
If no software download functionality is supported, then only the state OperatingMode for the RET device is supported.
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6.2 General procedure handling
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6.2.1 Alarms
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When a fault is detected, the corresponding alarm state shall be changed to state raised by the secondary device. When the fault no longer exists, the corresponding alarm state shall be changed to state cleared by the secondary device. Alarm changes are reported through the AlarmIndication or AntennaAlarmIndication elementary procedures. Whenever an AlarmIndication or AntennaAlarmIndication elementary procedure message is transmitted, it shall contain all the alarm states changed that have not yet been reported as described in subclauses 6.6.5 and 6.7.6.
All alarm states shall be cleared by any type of reset.
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6.2.2 Procedure message interpretation
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The following message interpretation rules shall apply to a secondary device in the order mentioned:
- Any message shorter than 3 octets shall be disregarded. In case of Multi-Antenna-Procedures any messages shorter than 4 octets shall be disregarded.;
- If a message has a length inconsistent with its “Number of data octets” field value it shall be responded with a failure message stating “FormatError” as the cause of failure. The response message shall be to the initiating message identified by the procedure code;
- If a secondary device in the OperatingMode state receives a procedure message which is undefined for this device type, it shall respond with "Unknown Procedure";
- If a secondary device in the OperatingMode state is receiving a procedure message of an optional procedure not supported, it shall respond with a failure message stating “UnsupportedProcedure” as the cause of failure;
- If a secondary device receives a procedure message, part of the software download procedure sequence described in Annex C, without having received the previous procedure messages in that sequence it shall respond with a failure message stating “InvalidProcedureSequence” as the cause of failure;
- If a secondary device in the DownloadMode state is receiving a procedure message not supported in that state it shall respond with a failure message stating “WorkingSoftwareMissing” as the cause of failure;
- If a message has a length inconsistent with the defined message length in the procedure definition it shall be responded with a failure message stating “FormatError” as the cause of failure. The response message shall be to the initiating message identified by the procedure code;
- If a secondary device in the OperatingMode state is receiving a procedure message which addressed device subunit does not exist “FormatError” shall be returned.
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6.2.3 Parallel procedure handling
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The secondary device shall support parallel execution of in maximum one additional EP only in parallel to one of the Time-Consuming Procedures defined in table 6.2.3.1:
Table 6.2.3.1: Definition of TCPs and the execution of procedures in parallel to a TCP
Elementary Procedure
TCP
Execution in parallel to a TCP
Common Procedure Set
(Reserved)
Reset Software
no
mandatory
Get Alarm Status
no
mandatory
Get Information
no
mandatory
Clear Active Alarms
no
disallowed
Read User Data
no
optional
Write User Data
no
optional
Alarm Subscribe
no
optional
Self Test
yes
disallowed
Download Start
no
disallowed
Download Application
no
disallowed
Download End
no
disallowed
Vendor specific procedure
vendor specific
optional
Single-Antenna Procedure Set
Set Device Data
no
optional
Get Device Data
no
optional
Calibrate
yes
disallowed
Send Configuration Data
no
disallowed
Set Tilt
yes
disallowed
Get Tilt
no
optional
Alarm Indication
no
optional
Multi-Antenna Procedure Set
Antenna Calibrate
yes
optional
Antenna Send Configuration Data
no
disallowed
Antenna Set Tilt
yes
optional
Antenna Get Tilt
no
optional
Antenna Set Device Data
no
optional
Antenna Get Device Data
no
optional
Antenna Alarm Indication
no
optional
Antenna Clear Active Alarms
no
disallowed
Antenna Get Alarm Status
no
mandatory
Antenna Get Number of Antennas
no
mandatory
“yes” in the "TCP" column indicates that the procedure is a TCP, “no“ in the "TCP" column indicates that the procedure is not a TCP. “mandatory” in the "Execution in parallel to a TCP" column indicates that the procedure shall be executed in parallel to an ongoing TCP. “optional” in this column indicates, that the support of the execution of the procedure in parallel to an ongoing TCP is optional and “disallowed” indicates that the procedure shall not be executed in parallel to a TCP.
If a secondary device receives an initiating message for an EP which cannot be executed due to the ongoing execution of other EPs, the secondary device shall respond with a failure message stating “Busy” as the cause of failure.
Parallel execution of one TCP marked “optional” in the "Execution in parallel to a TCP" column in table 6.2.3.1 may be supported for each antenna by the secondary device. The EPs AntennaSetTilt and AntennaCalibrate shall be executed in parallel only for different antenna numbers. If more than one TCP is executed, ResetSoftware shall be executed anyway and never be responded with “Busy”.
If the EPs Get Tilt and Antenna GetTilt are executed in parallel with a TCP, their response message shall deliver a tilt value sampled during their execution.
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6.3 Overview of elementary procedures
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The set of elementary procedures for RET antenna control provides procedure-oriented instructions. An overview of the procedures is given in annex D. Table 6.3.1 lists all common elementary procedures described in subclause 6.5. Table 6.3.2 lists all elementary procedures specific for single-antenna device types described in subclause 6.6. Table 6.3.3 lists all elementary procedures specific for multi-antenna device types described in subclause 6.7. subclause 6.4 describes how to interpret the elementary procedure definitions in subclauses 6.5 to 6.7.
Some elementary procedures shall be performed in sequence as described in Annex C for the software download.
Table 6.3.1: Common elementary procedure set for all device types
Elementary procedure
Requirement
Comment
Reset Software
mandatory
Get Alarm Status
mandatory
Get Information
mandatory
Clear Active Alarms
mandatory
Alarm Subscribe
mandatory
Read User Data
mandatory
Write User Data
mandatory
Self Test
mandatory
Download Start
optional
This procedure is mandatory if the software download feature is supported
Download Application
optional
This procedure is mandatory if the software download feature is supported
Download End
optional
This procedure is mandatory if the software download feature is supported
Vendor specific procedure
optional
Table 6.3.2: Elementary procedure set for single-antenna device type
Elementary procedure
Requirement
Comment
Calibrate
mandatory
Send Configuration Data
mandatory
Set Tilt
mandatory
Get Tilt
mandatory
Alarm Indication
mandatory
Set Device Data
mandatory
Get Device Data
mandatory
Table 6.3.3: Elementary procedure set for multi-antenna device type
Elementary procedure
Requirement
Comment
Antenna Calibrate
mandatory
Antenna Send Configuration Data
mandatory
Antenna Set Tilt
mandatory
Antenna Get Tilt
mandatory
Antenna Set Device Data
mandatory
Antenna Get Device Data
mandatory
Antenna Alarm Indication
mandatory
Antenna Clear Active Alarms
mandatory
Antenna Get Alarm Status
mandatory
Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
mandatory
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6.4 Description of elementary procedures
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Table 6.4.1: Description of elementary procedures
Name:
The name used to refer to the elementary procedure
Code:
The code is defined here. All other code references are informative
Issued by:
Primary device or secondary device
Procedure class:
Class 1 or Class 2
DownloadMode state:
Defines whether the procedure shall be supported in the DownloadMode state.
Power mode:
Defines the secondary device power consumption as described in [4] during the execution of the elementary procedure.
Table 6.4.2: Initiating and response message parameters and format
Number
Length
Type
Description
The enumerated order in which the parameter occurs in the data field of the message. The first number is 1.
The length of the parameter, in number of octets, if defined.
The data type used in the parameter.
Description of the parameter.
Table 6.4.3: Response message parameters and format for common class 1
elementary procedures upon error
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code FAIL
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Reason for failure
Table 6.4.4: Response message parameters and format for single-antenna class 1 elementary procedures upon error
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code FAIL
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Reason for failure
Table 6.4.5: Response message parameters and format for multi-antenna class 1 elementary procedures upon error
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code FAIL
3
1 octet
ReturnCode
Reason for failure
NOTE: The response message in the elementary procedure AntennaGetAntennaNumber, has the format given in table 6.4.4, although it is defined as a multi-antenna class 1 elementary procedure.
Description:
Describes the purpose of the elementary procedure.
Table 6.4.6: Return codes
OK
FAIL
Comment
All return codes applicable in a response message to a successful procedure, except “OK”, are listed here. The return codes are listed by name as defined in annex A.
All return codes applicable in a response message to a failing procedure, except “FAIL” are listed here. The return codes are listed by name as defined in annex A.
Any comment needed for clarification.
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6.5 Common elementary procedures
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6.5.1 Reset Software
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Table 6.5.1.1: Elementary procedure Reset Software
Name:
ResetSoftware
Code:
0x03
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state.
Yes
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.1.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Reset Software
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.1.3: Response message parameters and format for Reset Software
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On the receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall reset the application. All alarm states shall be cleared.
If the initiating message is received in the OperatingMode state, the transport layer shall remain unaffected.
If the initiating message is received in the DownloadMode state, the ResetSoftware procedure shall reset the entire device without activating any new application software downloaded since entering the DownloadMode state.
The device shall not execute the reset procedure before transport layer acknowledgement through sequence number update is received for the response.
Table 6.5.1.4: Return codes for Reset Software
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
In case of format error, the procedure code validity is not secured.
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6.5.2 Get Alarm Status
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Table 6.5.2.1: Elementary procedure Get Alarm Status
Name:
GetAlarmStatus
Code:
0x04
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.2.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Get Alarm Status
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.2.3: Response message parameters and format for Get Alarm Status
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
i + 1
1 octet
AlarmCode
Active alarm number i
i = 1 … N
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device reports the alarm codes of the active alarms.
Table 6.5.2.4: Return codes for Get Alarm Status
OK
FAIL
Comment
All return codes marked as used for alarms in Annex A.
FormatError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
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6.5.3 Get Information
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Table 6.5.3.1: Elementary procedure Get Information
Name:
GetInformation
Code:
0x05
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
Yes
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.3.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Get Information
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.3.3: Response message parameters and format for Get Information
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Length of parameter 3 in number of octets
3
TextString
Product number
4
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Length of parameter 5 in number of octets
5
TextString
Serial number
6
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Length of parameter 7 in number of octets
7
TextString
Hardware Version
8
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Length of parameter 9 in number of octets
9
TextString
Software Version
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall return the product number ProdNr and the serial number SerNr of the secondary device. If known, also the hardware version and the software version may be returned. The software version should indicate the version number of the currently executed software.
The parameters HWVersion and SWVersion in the response message refer to the version designators of the hardware and installed software of the secondary device. If the application is missing or no HW or SW version number is found, then an empty string shall be returned as the HW or SW version number. The empty string is represented as a length field equals 0 and no octets in the TextString field.
The response message length shall be less than or equal to the minimum SecondaryPayloadTransmitLength as given in subclause 4.8.1 in [3].
Table 6.5.3.4: Return codes for Get Information
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
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6.5.4 Clear Active Alarms
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Table 6.5.4.1: Elementary procedure Clear Active Alarms
Name:
ClearActiveAlarms
Code:
0x06
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.4.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Clear Active Alarms
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.4.3: Response message parameters and format for Clear Active Alarms
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall first clear all stored alarm information and then return a procedure response message.
Table 6.5.4.4: Return codes for Clear Active Alarms
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
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6.5.5 Alarm Subscribe
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Table 6.5.5.1: Elementary procedure Alarm Subscribe
Name:
AlarmSubscribe
Code:
0x12
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.5.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Alarm Subscribe
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.5.3: Response message parameters and format for Alarm Subscribe
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall start reporting alarms to the primary device.
Table 6.5.5.4: Return codes for Alarm Subscribe
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
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6.5.6 Self Test
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Table 6.5.6.1: Elementary procedure Self Test
Name:
SelfTest
Code:
0x0A
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
High
Table 6.5.6.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Self Test
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.6.3: Response message parameters and format for Self Test
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
i + 1
1 octet
AlarmCode
Alarm code for alarm i detected during self test.
i = 1 … N
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall execute a test procedure which may include a check of physical and processor functions. The specific tests to be performed are implementation specific, and may include the movement of the adjuster, which shall not exceed +-5% of total available tilting range starting from the current adjuster position.
The response message of the secondary device on the procedure provides information on detected faults or, if no fault is detected, with confidence that the operation of the device is normal in all respects.
During the test the operational parameters of the device shall not change beyond operationally acceptable limits and on completion all parameters shall be returned to their initial values.
In the normal response message, after the self test was executed successfully, the return codes are set to report possible detected faults during the self test. If no faults are detected, this shall be signalled by no return codes following the return code <OK>.
In the case of a failure response message, the self test could not be executed successfully and the reported return code relates to the inability of the device to perform the requested self-test operation.
Table 6.5.6.4: Return codes for Self Test
OK
FAIL
Comment
All return codes marked as alarms in annex A.
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
NotCalibrated
NotScaled
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6.5.7 Void
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6.5.8 Void
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6.5.9 Read User Data
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Table 6.5.9.1: Elementary procedure Read User Data
Name:
ReadUserData
Code:
0x10
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.9.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Read User Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
2 octets
Unsigned integer
Memory offset
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Number of octets to read
NOTE: Number of octets to read shall be less than, or equal toMaxDataTransmit Length minus 1.
Table 6.5.9.3: Response message parameters and format for Read User Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
2
Number of octets given by parameter 2 of the initiating message
User specific
User data
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall send back user specific data stored in a user data area to the primary device.
The user data area is intended for storage of user defined data, e.g. inventory information.
Table 6.5.9.4: Return codes for Read User Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
OutOfRange
The return code OutOfRange is used, if the given memory address range is outside the valid address space.
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6.5.10 Write User Data
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Table 6.5.10.1: Elementary procedure Write User Data
Name:
WriteUserData
Code:
0x11
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.10.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Write User Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
2 octets
Unsigned integer
Memory offset
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Number of octets to write
3
Message specific, given by parameter 2
User specific
Data to write
NOTE: Number of octets to write shall be less than, or equal to MaxDataReceiveLength minus 3.
Table 6.5.10.3: Response message parameters and format for Write User Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall store user data in non-volatile memory. The user data is stored in the user data area using the relative memory address offset given in the initiating message and starting with zero.
The user data area is intended for storage of user defined data, e.g. inventory information.
Table 6.5.10.4: Return codes for Write User Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
HardwareError
OutOfRange
The return code OutOfRange is used if the given memory address range is outside the valid address space.
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6.5.11 Download Start
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Table 6.5.11.1: Elementary procedure Download Start
Name:
DownloadStart
Code:
0x40
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
Yes
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.11.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Download Start
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.11.3: Response message parameters and format for Download Start
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of this initiating message the software download process shall be initiated. Following transition to the DownloadMode state, the secondary device sends return code <OK>. Previous subscription of alarms by use of the AlarmSubscribe procedure is cancelled.
Table 6.5.11.4: Return codes for Download Start
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
UnsupportedProcedure
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6.5.12 Download Application
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Table 6.5.12.1: Elementary procedure Download Application
Name:
DownloadApplication
Code:
0x41
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
Yes
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.12.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Download Application
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
Less than, or equal to MaxDataReceiveLength
Vendor specific
Software data
Table 6.5.12.3: Response message parameters and format for Download Application
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
This elementary procedure is used once or several times to transfer software data from the primary device to the secondary device.
Table 6.5.12.4: Return codes for Download Application
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
InvalidFileContent
InvalidProcedureSequence
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6.5.13 Download End
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Table 6.5.13.1: Elementary procedure Download End
Name:
DownloadEnd
Code:
0x42
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
Yes
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.5.13.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Download End
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.5.13.3: Response message parameters and format for Download End
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
This elementary procedure signals the end of a multi-message data transfer to the secondary device. The secondary device shall respond after verifying the received data. The secondary device shall reset autonomously after completion of the layer 2 response and activate the new application software.
Table 6.5.13.4: Return codes for Download End
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
ChecksumError
InvalidFileContent
InvalidProcedureSequence
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6.5.14 Vendor specific procedure
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Table 6.5.14.1: Elementary procedure Vendor Specific Procedure
Name:
VendorSpecificProcedure
Code:
0x90
Issued by:
Vendor specific
Procedure class:
Vendor specific
DownloadMode state:
Vendor specific
Power mode:
Vendor specific
Table 6.5.14.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Vendor Specific Procedure
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
2 octets
ASCII
Vendor code
1 + i
Vendor specific
Vendor specific
i = 1 … N
Table 6.5.14.3: Response message parameters and format for Vendor Specific Procedure
Number
Length
Type
Description
i
Vendor specific
Vendor specific
Vendor specific
i = 1 … N
Description:
The vendor specific procedure is intended for vendor specific purposes like e.g. testing.
Table 6.5.14.4: Return codes for vendor specific procedure
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
UnsupportedProcedure
If the Vendor code in the initiating message does not match that of the RET device, UnsupportedProcedure shall be returned.
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6.6 Single-antenna elementary procedures
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6.6.1 Calibrate
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Table 6.6.1.1: Elementary procedure Calibrate
Name:
Calibrate
Code:
0x31
Issued by:
Primary Device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
High
Table 6.6.1.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Calibrate
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.6.1.3: Response message parameters and format for Calibrate
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall perform a calibration of the RET antenna where the actuator is driven through its whole tilt range.
The response time to this Calibrate procedure shall be less than 4 minutes.
Table 6.6.1.4: Return codes for Calibrate
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
MotorJam
ActuatorJam
NotConfigured
UnsupportedProcedure
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6.6.2 Send Configuration Data
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Table 6.6.2.1: Elementary procedure Send Configuration Data
Name:
SendConfigurationData
Code:
0x32
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.6.2.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Send Configuration Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
Less than, or equal to MaxDataReceiveLength
Vendor specific
Configuration data
Table 6.6.2.3: Response message parameters and format for Send Configuration Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall store the provided vendor and antenna specific configuration data for the relationship between the movement of the drive system and the beam tilt position of the antenna.
If the configuration data exceeds MaxDataReceiveLength, the data shall be split into a number of MaxDataReceiveLength segments and one final segment with whatever is left. The primary device transmits the segments in order. The layer 2 sequence numbers guarantee that no segment will be lost or received out of order.
Table 6.6.2.4: Return codes for Send Configuration Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
ChecksumError
InvalidFileContent
UnsupportedProcedure
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6.6.3 Set Tilt
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Table 6.6.3.1: Elementary procedure Set Tilt
Name:
SetTilt
Code:
0x33
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
High
Table 6.6.3.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Set Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
2 octets
Signed integer
Tilt value
Table 6.6.3.3: Response message parameters and format for Set Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall set the electrical tilt in increments of 0.1°.
The secondary device shall respond to the initiating message in less than 2 minutes.
The tilt value corresponding to the actual tilt angle shall not go outside of the range between the tilt value corresponding to the current tilt angle and the tilt value corresponding to the requested tilt angle by more than 5 during this operation.
The format of the value of parameter 1 is given in subclause 3.1.
Table 6.6.3.4: Return codes for Set Tilt
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
MotorJam
ActuatorJam
NotConfigured
NotCalibrated
OutOfRange
UnsupportedProcedure
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6.6.4 Get Tilt
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Table 6.6.4.1: Elementary procedure Get Tilt
Name:
GetTilt
Code:
0x34
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.6.4.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Get Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.6.4.3: Response message parameters and format for Get Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
2
2 octets
Signed integer
Tilt value
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall return the current tilt value.
The returned tilt value is given in the format specified in subclause 3.1.
Table 6.6.4.4: Return codes for Get Tilt
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
NotCalibrated
NotConfigured
UnsupportedProcedure
HardwareError shall only be used, if error is detected in tilt detector.
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6.6.5 Alarm Indication
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Table 6.6.5.1: Elementary procedure Alarm Indication
Name:
AlarmIndication
Code:
0x07
Issued by:
Secondary device
Procedure class:
2
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.6.5.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Alarm Indication
Number
Length
Type
Description
2 i – 1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Return code i; see annex A
2 i
1 octet
Unsigned integer
State flag i
i = 1 … N
Description:
The secondary device uses this procedure to report alarm state changes to the primary device. This procedure shall only be performed if the secondary has performed an AlarmSubscribe procedure since its latest reset.
For each alarm, the current alarm state and alarm code shall be reported if and only if any change in its state has occurred during the period of time since the last reported state. An AlarmIndication procedure shall be performed if at least one alarm shall be reported. The first AlarmIndication procedure after the AlarmSubscribe procedure shall report the active alarms.
Alarm state changes are considered as reported at the time the message is passed to the transport layer.
State flag = 0 represents alarm state cleared.
State flag = 1 represents alarm state raised.
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6.6.6 Set Device Data
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Table 6.6.6.1: Elementary procedure Set Device Data
Name:
SetDeviceData
Code:
0x0E
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.6.6.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Set Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Field number, see annex B
2
See annex B
See annex B
Data to write
Table 6.6.6.3: Response message parameters and format for Set Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall write the data given in the parameters of the initiating message into the fields optionally provided for configuration data and listed in annex B of this TS. If an attempt is made to write to fields which are designated as read only, the return code ReadOnly is returned and the data for those fields is ignored. If an attempt is made to write to fields which are not supported by the device the return code UnknownParameter is returned and the data for those fields is ignored.
Table 6.6.6.4: Return codes for Set Device Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
HardwareError
ReadOnly
UnknownParameter
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6.6.7 Get Device Data
|
Table 6.6.7.1: Elementary procedure Get Device Data
Name:
GetDeviceData
Code:
0x0F
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.6.7.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Get Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Field number; see annex B
Table 6.6.7.3: Response message parameters and format for Get Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
2
See annex B
See annex B
Field value
Description:
In this procedure the secondary device shall return the data stored in the field for configuration data specified by the field number in the procedure and listed in annex B of this TS.
Table 6.6.7.4: Return codes for Get Device Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
UnknownParameter
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6.7 Multi-antenna elementary procedures
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6.7.1 Antenna Calibrate
|
Table 6.7.1.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Calibrate
Name:
AntennaCalibrate
Code:
0x80
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
High
Table 6.7.1.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Calibrate
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
Table 6.7.1.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Calibrate
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall perform a calibration of the antenna addressed by the antenna number. During calibration the actuator is driven through the whole tilt range of the antenna.
The response time to this Antenna Calibrate procedure shall be less than 4 minutes.
Table 6.7.1.4: Return codes for Antenna Calibrate
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
MotorJam
ActuatorJam
NotConfigured
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
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6.7.2 Antenna Set Tilt
|
Table 6.7.2.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Set Tilt
Name:
AntennaSetTilt
Code:
0x81
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
High
Table 6.7.2.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Set Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
2 octets
Signed integer
Tilt value
Table 6.7.2.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Set Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall set the electrical tilt of the antenna addressed by the antenna number in increments of 0.1°.
The secondary device shall respond to the initiating message in less than 2 minutes.
The tilt value corresponding to the actual tilt angle shall not go outside of the range between the tilt value corresponding to the current tilt angle and the tilt value corresponding to the requested tilt angle by more than 5 during this operation.
The format of the value of parameter 2 is given in subclause 3.1.
Table 6.7.2.4: Return codes for Antenna Set Tilt
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
MotorJam
ActuatorJam
NotConfigured
NotCalibrated
OutOfRange
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.3 Antenna Get Tilt
|
Table 6.7.3.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Get Tilt
Name:
AntennaGetTilt
Code:
0x82
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.3.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Get Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned interger
Antenna number
Table 6.7.3.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Get Tilt
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
3
2 octets
Signed integer
Tilt value
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall return the current tilt value of the antenna addressed by the antenna number.
The returned tilt value is in the format specified in subclause 3.1.
Table 6.7.3.4: Return codes for Antenna Get Tilt
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
NotConfigured
NotCalibrated
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
HardwareError shall only be used, if an error is detected in tilt detector.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.4 Antenna Set Device Data
|
Table 6.7.4.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Set Device Data
Name:
AntennaSetDeviceData
Code:
0x83
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.4.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Set Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Field number; see annex B
3
See annex B
See annex B
Data to write
Table 6.7.4.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Set Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall write the provided data for the antenna addressed by the antenna number into the fields optionally provided for configuration data and listed in annex B of this TS. If an attempt is made to write to fields which are designated as read only for the addressed antenna the return code ReadOnly is returned and the data for those fields is ignored. If an attempt is made to write to fields which are not supported for the addressed antenna the return code UnknownParameter is returned and the data for those fields is ignored.
Table 6.7.4.4: Return codes for Antenna Set Device Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
ReadOnly
UnknownParameter
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.5 Antenna Get Device Data
|
Table 6.7.5.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Get Device Data
Name:
AntennaGetDeviceData
Code:
0x84
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.5.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Get Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Field number to read; see annex B
Table 6.7.5.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Get Device Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
3
See annex B
See annex B
Field value
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall return the data stored for the addressed antenna in the field for configuration data specified by the field number in the initiating message and listed in annex B of this TS.
Table 6.7.5.4: Return codes for Antenna Get Device Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
UnsupportedProcedure
UnknownParameter
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.6 Antenna Alarm Indication
|
Table 6.7.6.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Alarm Indication
Name:
AntennaAlarmIndication
Code:
0x85
Issued by:
Secondary device
Procedure class:
2
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.6.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Alarm Indication
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2 i
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Return code i; see annex A
2 i +1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
State flag i
i = 1 … N
Description:
The multi-antenna secondary device uses this procedure to report antenna alarm state changes to the primary device. This procedure shall only be performed if the secondary has performed an AlarmSubscribe procedure since its latest reset. Multi-antenna devices shall use this AntennaAlarmIndication procedure only for multi-antenna specific alarms and the AlarmIndication procedure in subclause 6.6.5 for the other alarms.
For each alarm, the current alarm state and alarm code shall be reported if and only if any change in its state has occurred during the period of time since the last reported state. An AntennaAlarmIndication procedure shall be performed if at least one multi-antenna specific alarm shall be reported. The first AntennaAlarmIndication procedure after the AlarmSubscribe procedure shall report the active alarms.
Alarm state changes are considered as reported at the time the message is passed to the transport layer.
State flag = 0 represents alarm state cleared.
State flag = 1 represents alarm state raised.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.7 Antenna Clear Active Alarms
|
Table 6.7.7.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Clear Active Alarms
Name:
AntennaClearActiveAlarms
Code:
0x86
Issued by:
Secondary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.7.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Clear Active Alarms
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
Table 6.7.7.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Clear Active Alarms
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall first clear all stored alarm information for the addressed antenna and then return a procedure response message.
Table 6.7.7.4: Return codes for Antenna Clear Active Alarms
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
WorkingSoftwareMissing
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.8 Antenna Get Alarm Status
|
Table 6.7.8.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Get Alarm Status
Name:
AntennaGetAlarmStatus
Code:
0x87
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.8.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Get Alarm Status
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
Table 6.7.8.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Get Alarm Status
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
i + 2
1 octet
AlarmCode
Active alarm number i
i = 1 ... N
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall report the alarm codes of the active alarms for the addressed antenna.
Table 6.7.8.4: Return codes for Antenna Get Alarm Status
OK
FAIL
Comment
All return codes marked as used for alarms in Annex A
FormatError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.9 Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
|
Table 6.7.9.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
Name:
AntennaGetNumberOfAntennas
Code:
0x88
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.9.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
Number
Length
Type
Description
None
0 octets
None
No data carried
Table 6.7.9.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
2
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Number of antennas
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall return the number of antennas it controls.
Table 6.7.9.4: Return codes for Antenna Get Number Of Antennas
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
UnsupportedProcedure
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
6.7.10 Antenna Send Configuration Data
|
Table 6.7.10.1: Elementary procedure Antenna Send Configuration Data
Name:
AntennaSendConfigurationData
Code:
0x89
Issued by:
Primary device
Procedure class:
1
DownloadMode state:
No
Power mode:
Low
Table 6.7.10.2: Initiating message parameters and format for Antenna Send Configuration Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned Integer
Antenna number
2
Less than, or equal to MaxDataReceiveLength minus 1
Vendor specific
Configuration data
Table 6.7.10.3: Response message parameters and format for Antenna Send Configuration Data
Number
Length
Type
Description
1
1 octet
Unsigned integer
Antenna number
2
1 octet
ReturnCode
Return code OK
Description:
On receipt of the initiating message the secondary device shall store the provided vendor and antenna specific configuration data for the relationship between the movement of the drive system and the beam tilt position of the addressed antenna.
If the configuration data exceeds MaxDataReceiveLength minus 1, the data shall be split into a number of MaxDataReceiveLength minus 1 segments and one final segment with whatever is left. The primary device transmits the segments in order. The layer 2 sequence numbers guarantee that no segment will be lost or received out of order.
Table 6.7.10.4: Return codes for Antenna Send Configuration Data
OK
FAIL
Comment
FormatError
Busy
HardwareError
WorkingSoftwareMissing
ChecksumError
InvalidFileContent
UnsupportedProcedure
If the addressed antenna is not existing, FormatError is returned.
|
1de16545e4a78484b5596a06529f4503
|
25.463
|
7 Unknown elementary procedures
|
Void.
Annex A (normative):
Return codes for secondary devices
Table A.1: Return Codes for Secondary Devices
Code
Meaning
Alarm
DownloadMode state
0x00
OK
Normal response
X
0x02
Motor Jam
Motor cannot move
X
0x03
ActuatorJam
Actuator jam has been detected. No movement of the actuator, but movement of the motor was detected
X
0x05
Busy
The device is busy and cannot respond until an ongoing activity is completed
0x06
ChecksumError
Checksum incorrect for otherwise valid data..
0x0B
FAIL
Abnormal response. Indicates that a procedure has not been executed successfully
X
0x0E
NotCalibrated
The device has not completed a calibration operation, or calibration has been lost
X
0x0F
NotConfigured
Actuator configuration data is missing
X
0x11
HardwareError
Any hardware error which cannot be classified. May not be reported as an alarm until the fault is likely to be persistent
X
X
0x13
OutOfRange
A parameter given by an operator (e.g. tilt value or memory offset) is out of range
0x19
UnknownProcedure
Received procedure code is not defined
X
0x1D
ReadOnly
Invalid device data parameter usage
X
0x1E
UnknownParameter
Specified parameter is not supported for the used procedure
X
0x21
WorkingSoftwareMissing
The unit is inDownloadMode state. Returned upon unsupported procedure when in DownloadMode state
X
0x22
InvalidFileContent
The data being downloaded is detected to be of wrong format or size
X
0x24
FormatError
Procedure message is inconsistent or if an addressed field or antenna is invalid or the data parameter field length is inconsistent with the corresponding field length parameter
X
0x25
UnsupportedProcedure
The procedure is optional and not supported or the procedure does not apply to this device type
0x26
InvalidProcedureSequence
Procedure sequence as described in annex C is expected but not experienced by the secondary device
0x27
ActuatorInterference
An actuator movement outside the control of the RET unit has been detected. Probable cause is manual interference
X
Annex B (normative):
Assigned fields for additional data
The following standard fields have no operational impact and are used by the procedures SetDeviceData, GetDeviceData, AntennaSetDeviceData and AntennaGetDeviceData. Little endian order is used for storage of multiple-octet numbers. Where ASCII variables are shorter than the assigned field lengths the characters are right aligned and leading blanks are filled with null characters (0x00).
Table B.1: Assigned fields for additional data
Field No.
Length (octets)
Format
Description
0x01
15
ASCII
Antenna model number
0x02
17
ASCII
Antenna serial number
0x03
2
16-bit unsigned
Antenna operating band(s): see below
0x04
8
4 x 16-bit unsigned
Beamwidth for each operating band in band order (deg), beginning with lowest band. The lowest band is transmitted within the first 16-bit value. (unused values are assigned to 0x0000)
(example: width for band I, width for band III)
0x05
4
4 x 8-bit unsigned
Gain [dBi] for each operating band in band order , expressed in gain value times 10 , beginning with the lowest band. The lowest band is transmitted within the first 8-bit value. (unused values are assigned to 0x00)
(example: gain for band I, gain for band III)
0x06
2
16-bit signed
Maximum supported electrical tilt [degree], expressed in tilt value times 10 , format as in subclause 3.1
0x07
2
16-bit signed
Minimum supported electrical tilt tilt [degree], expressed in tilt value times 10 , format as in subclause 3.1
0x21
6
ASCII
Installation date
0x22
5
ASCII
Installer's ID
0x23
32
ASCII
Base station ID
0x24
32
ASCII
Sector ID
0x25
2
16-bit unsigned
Antenna bearing [degree], in the range of 0 – 359,9 degree, expressed as bearing value times 10
0x26
2
16-bit signed
Installed mechanical tilt [degree], expressed in tilt value times 10 , format as in subclause 3.1
Table B.2: Coding for operating bands in field 0x03
Bit no
15…10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Operating band
Spare
X
IX
VIII
VII
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
The operating bands are defined in subclause 4.3.7 in [4].
Bits are numbered from 0 to 15, bit no 0 set=1 represents the value 0x0001.
Bit set=1 represents operating band is supported.
Bit set=0 represents operating band is not supported.
Spare bits shall be set=0.
Unused Beamwidth and Gain octets shall be set to 0x0000.
Examples of operating bands: 0000 0000 0001 0000 = Operating band II
0000 0000 0011 1000 = Operating band I, II and III
Annex C (normative):
Procedure sequence for download of software to a secondary device
Figure C.1: Procedure sequence for Software Download
The erasure of the secondary device application software shall not be done before the reception of the Download Application message. The data content of the Download Application message is implementation specific but it is recommended to support an application software validity feature that shall minimise the risk of downloading faulty or invalid application software.
Annex D (informative):
Overview of elementary procedures
Table D.1: Elementary Procedures and Procedure Codes
Elementary Procedure
Procedure Code
Issued by
DownloadMode state
Common Procedure Set
(Reserved)
0x01
Reset Software
0x03
primary device
yes
Get Alarm Status
0x04
primary device
no
Get Information
0x05
primary device
yes
Clear Active Alarms
0x06
primary device
no
Read User Data
0x10
primary device
no
Write User Data
0x11
primary device
no
Alarm Subscribe
0x12
primary device
no
Self Test
0x0A
primary device
no
Download Start
0x40
primary device
yes
Download Application
0x41
primary device
yes
Download End
0x42
primary device
yes
Vendor Specific Procedure
0x90
primary device
Vendor specific
Single-Antenna Procedure Set
Set Device Data
0x0E
primary device
no
Get Device Data
0x0F
primary device
no
Calibrate
0x31
primary device
no
Send Configuration Data
0x32
primary device
no
Set Tilt
0x33
primary device
no
Get Tilt
0x34
primary device
no
Alarm Indication
0x07
secondary device
no
Multi-Antenna Procedure Set
Antenna Calibrate
0x80
primary device
no
Antenna Send Configuration Data
0x89
primary device
no
Antenna Set Tilt
0x81
primary device
no
Antenna Get Tilt
0x82
primary device
no
Antenna Set Device Data
0x83
primary device
no
Antenna Get Device Data
0x84
primary device
no
Antenna Alarm Indication
0x85
secondary device
no
Antenna Clear Active Alarms
0x86
primary device
no
Antenna Get Alarm Status
0x87
primary device
no
Antenna Get Number of Antennas
0x88
primary device
no
NOTE: The notion "yes" in the DownloadMode state column indicates that the listed procedures are mandatory if the DownloadMode state can be entered by the secondary device.
Annex E (informative):
Change history
Change history
Date
TSG #
TSG Doc.
CR
Rev
Subject/Comment
Old
New
September 2004
TSG-RAN#25
RP-040346
_
_
presentation to TSG-RAN for information
_
1.0.0
September 2004
TSG-RAN#25
RP-040346
_
_
approved at TSG-RAN#25 and placed under change control
1.0.0
6.0.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
1
2
Reduction of risk of accidentional erasure of Ret application SW
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
2
-
Clarification of allowed tilt operation during self test
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
3
-
State Model for RET device
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
4
-
Corrections and editorial changes to 25.463 according to RAN3#44
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
5
1
Antenna Send Configuration Data procedure missing
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
7
1
Introduction of Software Download State model
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
8
3
Alarm handling clarification
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
9
2
RET DC power consumption clarification
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
10
2
Response message format clarification
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
12
2
Return code clean-up and clarification
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
15
2
Clarification on the intention of the elementary procedures ReadUserData and WriteUserData
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
16
2
Maximum data payload size in elementary procedures
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
17
-
Definition of response time in the appication layer
6.0.0
6.1.0
12/2004
26
RP-040445
18
2
Redefinition of the Elementary Procedures GetDeviceData and SetDeviceData
6.0.0
6.1.0
03/2005
27
RP-050061
20
Wrong numbering in table 6.7.6.2
6.1.0
6.2.0
03/2005
27
RP-050061
23
1
Editorial Corrections to 25.463 after RAN3#45
6.1.0
6.2.0
03/2005
27
RP-050061
24
Minor Corrections to 25.463 after RAN3#45
6.1.0
6.2.0
03/2005
27
RP-050061
25
2
Clarification on antenna movement during Set Tilt
6.1.0
6.2.0
03/2005
27
RP-050061
26
1
Redefinition or the Software Reset procedure
6.1.0
6.2.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
31
Antenna Set Device Data
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
32
Editorial Corrections to 25.463
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
35
Clarification of Tilt
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
36
Definition of "empty string"
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
37
Improvement of Annex B
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
38
Vendor specific procedure
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
39
2
Set Tilt Correction
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
43
3
Parallel procedure handling
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050237
48
Forward and backward compatibility clarification
6.2.0
6.3.0
06/2005
28
RP-050226
34
Introduction of UMTS 2.6 GHz frequency band definition
6.3.0
7.0.0
09/2005
29
RP-050439
54
Missing definitions for Vendor Specific EP
7.0.0
7.1.0
12/2005
30
RP-050703
55
Introduction of UMTS 900
7.1.0
7.2.0
12/2005
30
RP-050704
56
Introduction of UMTS 1700
7.1.0
7.2.0
06/2006
32
RP-060286
58
1
Return codes in response message
7.2.0
7.3.0
12/2006
34
RP-060704
59
Introduction of Band X (Extended UMTS 1.7/2.1 GHz) in 25.463
7.3.0
7.4.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
61
1
Disregarded message length (paragraph 6.2.2)
7.4.0
7.5.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
63
1
Correction of MaxDataReceiveLength
7.4.0
7.5.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
65
3
Correction of procedure message interpretation
7.4.0
7.5.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
67
1
Correction of additional data resolution description (Annex B)
7.4.0
7.5.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
69
1
Definition of antenna bearing resolution (Annex B)
7.4.0
7.5.0
03/2007
35
RP-070055
71
1
Clarification of additional data beamwidth description
7.4.0
7.5.0
NOTE: Contents of the present TS is transferred to 3GPP TS 25.466, and 25.463 was closed at RAN#35. No further maintenance will be performed on the present document.
|
80bd8af9e1bdc5bd7ba4dda70412c370
|
33.129-2
|
1 Scope
|
Editor's note: clean up the scope in each part.
The present document is one of a multi-part TS, and contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the Lawful Interception elements of a 3GPP network: Administration Function (ADMF), Point of Interception (POI), Triggering Function (TF), Location Acquisition Requesting Function (LARF), Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF).
It refers to the TS 33.117 Catalogue of general security assurance requirements [2] and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the Lawful Interception system.
The present document covers SCAS tests for NF-embedded LI functions.
|
80bd8af9e1bdc5bd7ba4dda70412c370
|
33.129-2
|
2 References
|
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[5] 3GPP TS 33.126: "Lawful Interception Requirements".
[6] 3GPP TS 33.127: "Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and functions".
[7] 3GPP TS 33.128: "Protocol and procedures for Lawful Interception (LI); Stage 3".
[8] Editor's Note: TODO: NESAS "How to"
[X] Editor's Note: TODO: Add TS 103-221-1
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
It is preferred that the reference to TR 21.905 be the first in the list.
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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This clause and its three (sub) clauses are mandatory. The contents shall be shown as "void" if the TS/TR does not define any terms, symbols, or abbreviations.
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Symbol format (EW)
<symbol> <Explanation>
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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4 Overview
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4.1 Approach
This TS was developed based on the guidance and methodology described in 3GPP TR 33.916 "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products" [3]. 3GPP has organized SCAS documents by publishing one TS per architectural network element. In contrast, we take a different approach in the LI space and collect all LI SCAS in the present TS.
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5 Prerequisites
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5.1 Network administration
There are multiple privilege levels in the network. At a minimum, there are at least two:
• Lawful Interception privileged
• Non-LI privileged
Editor's Note: here are at least three categories at least: "root," "day-to-day operations," LI
Deployments in the field may split access more granularly, but this is the minimum required to perform tests in the present specification.
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6 NF-Embedded-LI SCAS
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6.1 Introduction
The present clause contains requirements and test cases that pertain to NF-Embedded LI elements, such as POIs, TFs.
6.2 Requirements
The following TS 33.126 requirements are tested in the present document:
TS 33.126 R6.6-30: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
Editor's Note: This section will contain a full listing of requirements covered in this document.
6.3 Test cases
6.3.1 Baseline
6.3.1.1 Unauthorized detection of target under LI, log leak method
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-LOG-01
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_LOG_LEAK
Purpose:
Ensure that general privileged administrators cannot detect whether an a-priori chosen subscriber is under LI.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. A minimal network and two user agents are available, sufficient to start a communication session between two parties.
2. An LI system is available in the above network, sufficient to provision a target for LI.
3. On the LI system, the tester has an account prepared from which a target can be provisioned.
4. On an NF that contains a POI or a TF, the tester has prepared an account with sufficient privileges to access logs.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester notes the start time of the test, to be used later to pull the log that corresponds to the test period.
2. The tester starts a communication session from any user account and records any identifiers pertaining to this account.
3. The tester stops the communication session.
4. The tester pulls the logs from the NF for the period of the communication session.
5. The tester sets this log aside for later comparison with another.
6. The tester logs into the LI privileged account on the ADMF and sets up the same user account used in step 2 as an LI target.
7. The tester performs the same previous steps (1 through 5) from the LI target account.
8. The tester diffs the two logs.
Expected Results:
The expectation is that there is nothing in the result of the test that can be used to determine that the a priori chosen target is under LI.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester submits a human-readable diff and a plain-language conclusion whether the general privileged admin can use this log leak method to ascertain that LI is occurring.
6.3.1.2 Unauthorized detection of target under LI, configuration file method
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-CONFIG-02
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_CONFIG_DIFF_ANALYSIS
Purpose:
Ensure that general privileged administrators (e.g., config reviewers, system auditors) cannot detect that interception is taking place by analysing configuration files before and after LI provisioning.
Editor's note: configuration aspects other than configuration files are not covered by this test case.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. The tester has administrative access to a network element that contains a POI that supports configuration snapshots.
2. An LI system is available in the network, sufficient to provision a target for LI.
3. On the LI system, the tester has an account prepared from which a target can be provisioned.
4. The configuration mechanism is file-based or produces structured output (e.g., XML, YAML, JSON).
5. The system supports exporting these configurations.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester logs in using the general privileged account and exports a complete configuration snapshot.
2. The snapshot is timestamped and saved securely for later comparison.
3. The tester logs in using the LI privileged account and provisions an interception target.
4. The tester repeats the configuration export from the general privileged account.
5. The tester performs a diff on the two snapshots.
6. The tester inspects the diff for any structural or content-level indication that LI has been configured, including:
a. new service entries
b. altered service entries
c. any difference that could indicate LI activity
Expected Results:
The expectation is that there is nothing in the result of the test that can be used to determine that the a priori chosen target is under LI.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester submits a human-readable diff and a plain language conclusion on whether any observed changes in config can be used to infer the presence of an LI target.
6.3.1.3 Unauthorized detection of LI, CPU utilization side-channel attack method one
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-RES-CPU-03
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_NON_AUTHORISED_TARGET_DETECTION_CPU_METHOD_ONE
Purpose:
Ensure that general privileged network administrators cannot detect whether an a-priori chosen target is under LI.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. A minimal network and two user agents are available, sufficient to start a communication session between two parties.
2. An LI system is available in the above network, sufficient to provision a target for LI.
3. On the LI system, the tester has an account prepared from which a target can be provisioned.
4. On an NF that contains a POI or a TF, the tester has prepared appropriate CPU utilization monitoring tools. The availability of these depends on the platform. The following are offered as non-exhaustive examples: top, htop, mpstat, vmstat, iostat -c for physical hosts, or top, virsh domstats / virt-top, cgroups/systemd-cgtop, docker stats for virtual deployments.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester measures the CPU utilization on the host, notes the baseline.
2. The tester starts a new communication session as a regular network user, using any network user account.
3. The tester takes a new measurement of the CPU utilization, records the measurement, and calculates the delta between the baseline from step 1 and this new value. It is essential that these two measurements be as close in time as possible. An automated (scripted) process should be used to take multiple samples.
4. The tester inserts a new target into the LI stack, provisioning the interception for full content.
5. The tester repeats the above measurements steps.
Expected Results:
The expectation is that there is nothing in the result of the test that can be used to determine that the a priori chosen target is under LI.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester will provide the two raw measurements, and the delta in tabular form, both for the non-target and target calls respectively along with a plain-language conclusion whether the test can detect LI activity.
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6.3.1.4 Unauthorized detection of LI, CPU utilization side-channel attack method two
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Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-RES-CPU-04
Test case:
Test Name: LI_EMBEDDED_UNAUTHORISED_INTERCEPTION_DETECTION_CPU_METHOD_TWO
Purpose:
Ensure that non-LI authorized network administrators cannot detect whether the LI function in an NF is performing interception.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. A minimal network and two user agents are available, sufficient to start a voice communication session between two parties.
2. An LI system is available in the above network, sufficient to provision a target for LI.
3. On the LI system, the tester has an account prepared from which a target can be provisioned.
4. On an NF that contains a POI or a TF, the tester has prepared appropriate CPU utilization monitoring tools. The availability of these depends on the platform. The following are offered as non-exhaustive examples: top, htop, mpstat, vmstat, iostat -c for physical hosts, or top, virsh domstats / virt-top, cgroups/systemd-cgtop, docker stats for virtual deployments.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester logs into the system from both the non-LI-authorized account and the LI-authorized account.
2. The tester measures the CPU utilization on the host, notes the baseline.
3. The tester conducts a call using a test device configured as a regular network user, and:
a. Continuously monitors the CPU utilization
b. Records the raw CPU utilization measurements at the following steps of the call:
i. STEP 1 (Initial INVITE is seen at the NF)
ii. STEP 2 (call is answered)
iii. STEP 3 (BYE is seen at the NF)
iv. STEP 4 (Session is closed)
4. For each measurement in step 3b, the tester calculates the delta between the baseline and the measured CPU utilization.
5. The tester repeats steps 2-4 five times and calculates the average CPU usage at each step.
6. The tester (in LI-authorized mode) activates a new task to intercept the test device including both IRI and CC with no service scoping.
7. The tester (in non-LI-authorized mode) repeats steps 2-5.
8. The tester compares the average calculated in step 5 with the average calculated in step 7.
Expected Results:
The expectation is that there is nothing in the result of the test that can be used to determine that the a priori chosen target is under LI.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester will provide the two raw measurements, and the delta in tabular form, both for the non-target and target calls respectively, along with a plain-language conclusion whether the non-LI-authorised admin can use the CPU utilization side channel to detect LI.
6.3.1.5 Unauthorized detection of target under LI, bandwidth utilization side-channel attack method
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-RES-NET-05
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_NON_AUTHORISED_TARGET_DETECTION_BANDWIDTH_METHOD
Purpose:
Ensure that general privileged network administrators cannot detect whether an a-priori chosen target is under LI.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. A minimal network and two user agents are available, sufficient to start a voice communication session between two parties.
2. An LI system is available in the above network, sufficient to provision a target for LI.
3. On the LI system, the tester has an account prepared from which a target can be provisioned.
4. On an NF that contains a POI or a TF, the tester has prepared appropriate network bandwidth probes on all the network interfaces on the NF. The availability of these depends on the platform. The following are offered as non-exhaustive examples: iftop, nload, ip -s link, bmon, etc. in physical hosts, or ethtool -S <iface>, ovs-vsctl or ovs-ofctl for Open vSwitch, libvirt / virsh domifstat for KVM/QEMU VMs, cAdvisor / Prometheus and Grafana for Docker/Kubernetes virtual deployments
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester measures the network interface utilization on the host, notes the baseline.
2. The tester starts a new communication session as a regular network user, using any network user account.
3. The tester takes a new measurement of the network interface utilization, records the measurement, and calculates the delta between the baseline from step 1 and this new value. It is essential that these two measurements be as close in time as possible. An automated (scripted) process should be used to take five samples.
4. The tester inserts a new target into the LI stack, provisioning the interception for full content.
5. The tester repeats the above measurements steps.
Expected Results:
The expectation is that there is nothing in the result of the test that can be used to determine that the a priori chosen target is under LI.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester will provide the two raw measurements, and the delta in tabular form, both for the non-target and target calls respectively along with a plain-language conclusion whether the test can detect LI activity.
6.3.1.6 Detection of LI via Timing Anomalies
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-TIMING-06
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED _TIMING_SIGNATURE_LEAK
Purpose:
Ensure that LI activity cannot be detected by observing timing patterns (e.g., bursts, jitter, periodicity) in non-LI network traffic.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. The tester has access to all network interfaces on the network function that contains the POI.
2. The tester has LI privileges and can activate LI on the same network function.
3. The tester has access to traffic timing statistics or packet captures from the POI-to-MDF interface and can also stimulate LI traffic.
4. An LI system is ready to provision IRI and CC.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. Tester provisions a high-content communication session (e.g., 60 seconds of voice or data) between two non-LI involved endpoints, one of which is on the same network function as the POI.
2. The tester captures packet timing and burst intervals over a 5-minute window under no LI activity as a baseline.
3. The tester provisions an interception target on the POI in the NF under test.
4. The tester starts a communication session between the target and another party, that will cause the POI to capture and deliver LI product.
5. The tester repeats the measurements under LI-active conditions.
6. The tester applies statistical analysis (e.g., inter-packet arrival histograms, burst length variability) to both captures.
Expected Results:
It is expected that there is no statistically distinguishable pattern (e.g., a burst every X seconds, or sudden jitter) that would indicate when LI is active.
Expected format of evidence:
A statistical plot or summary (e.g., variance, kurtosis of inter-arrival times) and a plain-language conclusion indicating whether LI presence could be inferred from timing anomalies.
Editor's Note: The group has discussed tests up to here (specifically, 7, 8, 9 haven't been discussed - but 10 and further have.)
6.3.1.7 Detection of MDF to LEMF LI Product Flow via Timing Anomalies
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-TIMING-07
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_MDF_LEMF_LI_PRODUCT_TIMING_SIGNATURE_LEAK
Purpose:
Ensure that internal administrators with access to MDF/LEMF transport segments cannot detect the presence of LI activity by observing timing patterns (e.g., bursts, jitter, periodicity) in non-LI network traffic.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. The MDF and LEMF are logically separate components on the network.
2. The LI product transport between MDF and LEMF is observable at a transport layer (e.g., netflow, mirrored span port).
3. The tester has access to traffic timing statistics or packet captures from the MDF-to-LEMF interface.
4. An LI system is ready to provision IRI and CC.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester captures packet timing and burst intervals between MDF and LEMF over a 5-minute window under no LI activity.
2. The tester provisions a new target for full IRI and CC.
3. The tester repeats the traffic capture under LI-active conditions.
4. The tester applies statistical analysis (e.g., inter-packet arrival histograms, burst length variability) to both captures.
Expected Results:
It is expected that there is no statistically distinguishable pattern (e.g., a burst every X seconds, or sudden jitter) that would indicate when LI is active.
Expected format of evidence:
A statistical plot or summary (e.g., variance, kurtosis of inter-arrival times) and a plain-language conclusion indicating whether LI presence could be inferred from timing anomalies.
6.3.1.8 Interruption of POI-MDF Link
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-INTERRUPTION-07
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_POI-MDF_LINK_FAULT_CONDITIONS
Purpose:
To ensure that the LI system does not exhibit differential behaviour during delivery path faults between POI and MDF, such that an internal administrator without LI privilege cannot distinguish whether LI is active based on service degradation patterns.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. A test call generator and an LI system are available to initiate full CC/IRI on a test UE.
2. The network segment between POI and MDF is under controlled lab conditions, capable of simulating link failure (e.g., disabling an interface, simulating packet drop via tc or iptables).
3. Logging mechanisms on POI/MDF are available for correlation.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. Tester provisions a high-content communication session (e.g., 60 seconds of voice or data) between two non-LI involved endpoints, one of which is on the same network function as the POI.
2. At second 30 of the call, tester introduces an artificial failure on the LI product delivery path (e.g., disables interface, blocks TCP/UDP port).
3. Tester restores the path at second 45.
4. Tester monitors the communication from step 1 for:
a. Gaps
b. Jitter or misaligned timestamps
c. Recovery mechanisms triggered (e.g., buffering, retransmit)
d. Log entries on the NF
5. Tester provisions interception of a high-content session (e.g., 60 seconds, voice or data) on a separate target (not the same as the endpoint in step 1) on the same logical node.
6. Tester performs the same procedure from steps 2-4.
7. Tester compares the behaviour of the function between the two cases.
Expected Results:
The NF is expected to behave in the same way in both cases (LI active and not active).
Expected format of evidence:
Packet trace timestamps, POI/MDF log excerpts, and human-readable summary of whether the system degraded gracefully or failed differently in the two cases.
6.3.1.9 Unauthorized detection of target under LI, TLS session count method
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01
Threat reference: T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_SESSION_COUNT_ANALYSIS
Purpose:
Ensure that lawful interception provisioning does not create observable differences in TLS session counts or handshake patterns that could be used to infer LI activity.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. The network or function uses TLS for control or media transport.
2. TLS session logs, counters, or telemetry are accessible to general privileged roles.
3. LI infrastructure is in place and uses secure links.
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester initiates standard traffic sessions and records the number of TLS sessions/handshakes initiated per session from the general privileged account.
2. The tester provisions an LI target and repeats the session.
3. The tester compares the TLS session metrics between the surveilled and non-surveilled flows.
4. The tester analyses whether additional TLS handshakes (e.g., toward MDF) correlate with the surveilled session.
5. The tester checks whether handshake timing, mutual TLS behaviour, or cert exchange patterns leak interception status.
Expected Results:
It is expected that the TLS metrics are be indistinguishable between surveilled and non-surveilled flows. LI MDF must not be visible as secondary TLS endpoints or cause measurable handshake side effects.
Expected format of evidence:
The tester supplies a TLS session count comparison and an interpretation of whether a general privileged observer could detect LI activity from the metrics.
Editor's note: for the next message (TLS) cast a wider net:
1. reverse direction
2. X2/3
3. send X1 commands on an X2/3 (or other SBI) interface
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33.129-2
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6.3.1.10 LI_X1 HTTP connection is disallowed
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Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01,
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01,
Threat reference: T-CONFIG-02, T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_X1_HTTP_DISALLOWED
Purpose:
To verify that non secured X1 connection attempts fail.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester issues a GetAllDetails command over LI_X1 interface towards the POI under test using HTTP.
Expected Results:
The HTTP transaction fails.
Expected format of evidence:
Any suitable evidence (e.g. output of netcat or packet capture), or plain language description of the failure.
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33.129-2
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6.3.1.11 LI_X1 is protected by TLS
|
Editor's Note: Is there a way to verify the layer 3/4 handshake only, without using any meaningful application layer message as a first step - using a simple testing harness/simulator, that doesn't necessarily have any layer 7/app layer knowledge.
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01,
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01,
Editor's Note: Write a separate test that verifies that the POIs are not visible from the Internet at large (external attackers)
Editor's Note: Mutually authenticated TLS
Threat reference: T-CONFIG-02 Editor's Note: this test is relevant whether this is configurable or hard-coded - T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_X1_PROTECTED_BY_TLS
Purpose:
To verify that TLS is used to protect LI_X1.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1. The POI under test shall expose an ETSI TS 103 221-1 LI_X1 interface
2. The tester shall have the capability to connect to LI_X1 over HTTPS (including relevant certificates).
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester issues a GetAllDetails command over LI_X1 interface towards the POI under test using HTTPS and supplying valid credentials.
2. The tester issues a GetAllDetails command over LI_X1 interface towards the POI under test using HTTP.
Expected Results:
The HTTPS transaction from execution step 1 succeeds.
The HTTP transaction from execution step 2 does not succeed (fails at the transport layer).
Expected format of evidence:
Any suitable evidence (e.g. output of netcat or packet capture).
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33.129-2
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6.3.1.12 LI_X1 is protected by TLS - failure for other reasons
|
Editor's Note: Is there a way to verify the layer 3/4 handshake only, without using any meaningful application layer message as a first step - using a simple testing harness/simulator, that doesn't necessarily have any layer 7/app layer knowledge.
Requirement Name: Undetectability by Non-Authorized Parties.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.126 R6.6-30.
Requirement Description: The CSP shall ensure that non-authorized personnel or processes (including automated or Artificial Intelligence based systems) that are part of the service cannot detect that interception is taking place.
References:
Asset reference: AS-TARGET-01,
Attacker reference: AT-INTERNAL-01,
Editor's Note: Write a separate test that verifies that the POIs are not visible from the Internet at large (external attackers)
Editor's Note: Mutually authenticated TLS
Threat reference: T-CONFIG-02 Editor's Note: this test is relevant whether this is configurable or hard-coded - T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Test case:
Test Name: TC_LI_EMBEDDED_X1_PROTECTED_BY_TLS
Purpose:
The tester shall prove that using anything else but a valid certificate will fail.
Editor's Note: write separate tests for the following:
e.g.:
1. expired certs
2. revoked certs
3. cert IDs don’t match the LI_X1 IDs
4. LI_X1 ID (or other parameters) missing altogether
5. NEID in LI_X1 doesn't match the NEID of the POI under test
6. valid cert that hangs under the wrong root of trust
7. partial vs full cert chain verification by the POI (root of trust is valid, but the sub-CA is wrong)
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Condition:
1.
2.
3. The POI under test shall expose an ETSI TS 103 221-1 LI_X1 interface
4. The tester shall have the capability to connect to LI_X1 over HTTPS (including relevant certificates).
Execution Steps
Execute the following steps:
1. The tester issues a GetAllDetails command over LI_X1 interface towards the POI under test using HTTPS and supplying valid credentials.
2. The tester issues a GetAllDetails command over LI_X1 interface towards the POI under test using HTTP.
Expected Results:
The HTTPS transaction from execution step 1 succeeds.
The HTTP transaction from execution step 2 does not succeed (fails at the transport layer).
Expected format of evidence:
Any suitable evidence (e.g. output of netcat or packet capture).
Editor's note: Write MOAT: The tester shall verify that ALL interfaces are not vulnerable to the top (20?) common OWASP vulnerabilities / CBEs
6.3.2 Additional Tests
Editor's Note: This clause will contain tests that are not directly traceable to TS 33.126 requirements
6.3.2.1 COMMON New Requirement Test Name
Annex <A> (normative):
<Normative annex for a Technical Specification>
Start each annex on a new page.
Annexes are labelled A, B, C, etc. and designated either "normative" or "informative" depending on their content.
Normative annexes only to appear in Technical Specifications. Use style "Heading 8".
Annex <B> (informative):
<Informative annex for a Technical Specification>
Informative annexes may appear in both Technical Specifications and Technical Reports. Use style "Heading 8" for use in TSs.
Informative annexes shall not contain requirements for the implementation of the Technical Specification.
B.1 Heading levels in an annex
Heading levels within an annex are used as in the main document, but for Heading level selection, the "A.", "B.", etc. are ignored. e.g. B.1.2 is formatted using Heading 2 style.
Annex <C>:
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Informative annexes in Technical Reports do not use "(informative") in the title, since all annexes in TRs are informative. Use style "Heading 9" in TRs.
Annex <D> (informative):
Bibliography
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Bibliography is optional. If it exists, it shall follow the last technical annex in the document.
The following material, though not specifically referenced in the body of the present document (or not publicly available), gives supporting information.
Bibliography format
<Publication>: "<Title>".
Annex <E> (informative):
Index
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Index is optional. If it exists, it shall immediately precede the Changes history annex.
Generate the index using MS Word's index field feature.
Annex <F> (informative):
Change history
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
This is the last annex for TS/TSs which details the change history using the following table.
This table is to be used for recording progress during the WG drafting process till TSG approval of this TS/TR.
For TRs under change control, use one line per approved Change Request
Date: use format YYYY-MM
CR: four digits, leading zeros as necessary
Rev: blank, or number (max two digits)
Cat: use one of the letters A, B, C, D, F
Subject/Comment: for TSs under change control, include full text of the subject field of the Change Request cover
New vers: use format [n]n.[n]n.[n]n
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-07
SA3#98-LI
s3i250358
-
-
-
First introduction of baseline to the group.
0.0.10
Change history of this template:
2001-07
Copyright date changed to 2001; space character added before TTC in copyright notification; space character before first reference deleted.
1.3.3
2002-01
Copyright date changed to 2002.
1.3.4
2002-07
Extra Releases added to title area.
1.3.5
2002-12
"TM" added to 3GPP logo.
1.3.6
2003-02
Copyright date changed to 2003.
1.3.7
2003-12
Copyright date changed to 2004. Chinese OP changed from CWTS to CCSA
14.0
2004-04
North American OP changed from T1 to ATIS
1.5.0
2005-11
Stock text of clause 3 includes reference to 21.905.
1.6.0
2005-11
Caters for new TSG structure. Minor corrections.
1.6.1
2006-01
Revision marks removed.
1.6.2
2008-11
LTE logo line added, © date changed to 2008, guidance on keywords modified; acknowledgement of trade marks; sundry editorial corrections and cosmetic improvements
1.7.0
2010-02
3GPP logo changed for cleaner version, with tag line;
LTE-Advanced logo line added;
© date changed to 2010;
editorial change to cover page footnote text;
trade marks acknowledgement text modified;
additional Releases added on cover page;
proforma copyright release text block modified
1.8.0
2010-02
Smaller 3GPP logo file used.
1.8.1
2010-07
Guidance note concerning use of LTE-Advanced logo added.
1.8.2
2011-04-01
Guidance of use of logos on cover page modified; copyright year modified.
1.8.3
2013-05-15
Changed File Properties to MCC macro default.
Removed R99, added Rel-12/13.
Modified Copyright year.
Guidance on annex X Change history.
1.8.4
2014-10-27
Updated Release selection on cover. In clause 3, added "3GPP" to TR 21.905.
1.8.5
2015-01-06
New Organizational Partner TSDSI added to copyright block.
Old Releases removed.
1.9.0
2015-12-03
Provision for LTE Advanced Pro logo
Update copyright year to 2016
1.10.0
2016-03-08
Standarization of the layout of the Change History table in the last annex.(Unreleased)
1.11.0
2016-06-15
Minor adjustment to Change History table heading
1.11.1
2017-03-13
Adds option for 5G logo on cover
1.12.0
2017-05-03
Smaller 5G logo to reduce file size
1.12.1
2019-02-25
Replacement of frames on cover pages by in-line text.
Clarification of help text on when to use 5G logo.
Removal of defunct keywords frame on page 2.
Add Rel-16, Rel-17 options, eliminated earlier, frozen, Releases (cover page, below title)
Corrections to some guidance text, addition of guidance text concerning automatic page headers under Word 2016 ff.
Use of modal auxiliary verbs added to Foreword.
More explicit guidance on Bibliography and Index annexes.
Converted to .docx format.
1.13.0
2019-09-12
Cover page table outline shown dotted for ease of logo selection. (Author to hide outline after logo selection.) User now needs to delete whole table rows instead of individual cells, which proved to be tricky.
Change of style for "notes" in the Foreword to normal paragraphs.
Insertion of new bookmarks, correction of location of existing bookmarks. (To improve navigation.)
Improvements to guidance text.
1.13.1
2021-06-18
Provision for 5G Advanced logo
Update copyright year to 2021
Additional guidance on the use of Heading 8/9 in annexes C, D and X.
1.14.0
2022-04-01
Correction of table formatting
Update copyright year to 2022
1.15.0
2023-03-14
Updated copyright year to 2023
Updated URLs from HTTP to HTTPS
Updated FTP link to HTTP counterpart
Fixed numbering of annexes
1.16.0
2024-03-19
Updated copyright year to 2024
1.17.0
2024-09-06
Adds option for 6G logo on the cover page
1.18.0
2024-10-15
Correction of table formatting to ease outline hiding after logo selection.
1.18.1
2024-10-18
Addition/removal of spaces in Release indications and update of Release in the example within the body.
Unlock "update field" for ToC
1.19.0
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33.129-1
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1 Scope
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The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the Lawful Interception elements of a 3GPP network: Administration Function (ADMF), Point of Interception (POI), Triggering Function (TF), Location Acquisition Requesting Function (LARF), Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF).
It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the Lawful Interception system.
The present document covers common ...
Editor's note (April 7th):
Also, consider breaking down along this line: elements that have provisioning ability and elements that don't. The idea is that compromising an element that does have provisioning ability into other elements can be more damaging, while taking control of an element that does not have provisioning ability keeps the damage localized.
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33.129-1
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2 References
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Editor's Note: 1) English vs American spelling (e.g., "artefacts" vs "artifacts"), 2) full stops in lists.
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products".
[4] 3GPP TS 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes".
[5] 3GPP TS 33.126: "Lawful Interception Requirements".
[6] 3GPP TS 33.127: "Lawful Interception (LI) architecture and functions".
[7] 3GPP TS 33.128: "Protocol and procedures for Lawful Interception (LI); Stage 3".
[8] GSMA FS.50: "Network Equipment Security Assurance Scheme - Requirements for Security Assurance Specification Development".
[9] GSMA FS.62: "Network Security Assurance Scheme - Adoption Procedure for Security Assurance Specifications".
[10]
…
[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".
It is preferred that the reference to TR 21.905 be the first in the list.
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33.129-1
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3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
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This clause and its three (sub) clauses are mandatory. The contents shall be shown as "void" if the TS/TR does not define any terms, symbols, or abbreviations.
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33.129-1
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3.1 Terms
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For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Definition format (Normal)
<defined term>: <definition>.
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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33.129-1
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3.2 Symbols
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For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Symbol format (EW)
<symbol> <Explanation>
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33.129-1
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3.3 Abbreviations
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For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Abbreviation format (EW)
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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33.129-1
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4 Overview
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4.1 Approach
This TS was developed based on the guidance and methodology described in 3GPP TR 33.916 "Security Assurance Methodology (SECAM) for 3GPP network products" [3]. 3GPP has organized SCAS documents by publishing one TS per architectural network element. In contrast, we take a different approach in the LI space and collect all LI SCAS in the present TS.
Within each clause, TS 33.126 "Lawful Interception Requirements" [5] is used to derive LI element specific requirements and tests. Requirement numbering from TS 33.126 is referenced herein to enable compliance tracking.
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33.129-1
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4.2 Document Part Organization
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Editor's Note: The part structure of 33.129 should be re-visited when the maturity of the project warrants it, and likely not settle to its final form until the project is ~80%+ along.
• Part 1 - Common
Part 1 of TS 33.129 contains the general framework of LI SCAS. This part contains descriptions of threats and attacks, but not any tests.
• Part 2 - NF-Embedded LI functions
Part 2 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests for LI functions that are embedded in network functions - i.e., their lifecycle is inexorably tied to a network function. Inevitably, a tension exists because access control to the network function and access control to the embedded LI function have to be separated. Most tests in this part exercise the implementation of this separation.
• Part 3 - Non-NF-Embedded LI functions
Part 3 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests for LI functions that are stand-alone - i.e., not associated with any network functions. This separation tends to reduce security considerations when compared to embedded functions. The figure below reflects examples of stand-alone LI functions.
• Part 4 - Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF)
Part 4 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests that apply to the Mediation and Delivery Function (MDF).
• Part 5 - Administration Function (ADMF)
Part 5 of TS 33.129 contains SCAS tests that apply to the LI Administration Function (ADMF).
Figure 4.2-1: TS 33.129 parts coverage
The LEMF is outside the scope of the present document series, but attributes of the LEMF (such as delivery paths in the MDF) are.
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33.129-1
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5 Security Elements
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33.129-1
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5.1 Assets
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5.1.1 Assets Overview
Assets are categorized more granularly than functional blocks. These are the specific elements that, if exposed or influenced, could compromise LI.
Table 5.1.1-1: Asset definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AS-TARGET-01
Target Identifier(s)
E.g., IMSI, MSISDN, IP address, used to define or tag a target in the system.
2
AS-LI-CREDS-02
LI Access Credentials
Tokens, passwords, certificates used to authenticate LI operations.
3
AS-NF-03
Network Function
Over and above SA3 general assumptions, e.g., log states, memory artifacts, ephemeral labels.
4
AS-NETWORK-SERVICE-04
Network Service
Normal functioning of a network service.
5
AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
LI Function
LI function internal state and artifacts - e.g., job queues, service status, inter-process calls.
6
AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
LI Product Delivery Link
Continuity (interruptions), quality (jitter, timing anomalies) of the delivery of LI product, between POIs and MDF, or MDF and LEMF.
7
AS-LEMF-07
LEMF Attributes
LEMF attributes, such as IP address, domain names, paths, etc.
8
AS-USER-PATTERN-08
Network User Behavior Attributes
Application or flow-level characteristics that may affect network user attributes (e.g., privacy).
9
AS-CRYPTO-STORE-09
Crypto Store
System-trusted certificate lists, keystores, or chains.
10
AS-API-CONF-10
API or Configuration State
Network API configuration artifacts.
11
AS-LI-PRODUCT-11
LI Product
LI content or metadata.
5.1.2 Detailed Asset Descriptions
5.1.2.1 Target Identifiers
Asset Code: AS-TARGET-01
Asset Name: Target Identifiers
Asset Description:
These are the identifiers used to tag or define interception subjects within the network, such as IMSI, MSISDN, IP addresses, MAC addresses, or session tokens. They represent the direct linkage between a legal warrant and its technical enforcement. Exposure of these identifiers may allow unauthorized parties to determine the existence or identity of surveillance targets. Even indirect inference, such as recognizing frequent lookups of a particular subscriber's IMSI, could compromise the confidentiality of an LI operation. As such, these identifiers must be protected across all stages of LI provisioning and delivery.
5.1.2.2 LI Access Credentials
Asset Code: AS-LI-CREDS-02
Asset Name: LI Access Credentials
Asset Description:
These are the authentication elements used to authorize and secure LI operations. They may include passwords, API tokens, client certificates, SSH keys, or internal authorization grants. If compromised, they could allow an attacker to impersonate an authorized LI system or operator, potentially activating or modifying interceptions, disabling audit trails, or extracting sensitive data. The scope of access these credentials enable makes them high-risk, warranting isolation, short rotation intervals, and hardware-based protection where possible (e.g., HSM-backed keystores).
5.1.2.3 Network Function
Asset Code: AS-NF-03
Asset Name: Network Function
Asset Description:
A network function (NF) encompasses any virtualized or physical function that plays a role in packet handling, control signaling, or service delivery. Beyond SA3’s baseline assumptions, this asset includes ephemeral internal states, such as memory artifacts, temporary routing rules, and runtime labels, that may be visible to co-located workloads or side-channel analysis. An attacker compromising an NF could potentially observe or disrupt LI-related actions indirectly, especially in service-based architectures where functions communicate over open or loosely controlled interfaces.
5.1.2.4 Network Service
Asset Code: AS-NETWORK-SERVICE-04
Asset Name: Network Service
Asset Description:
This can be thought of simplistically as a chain of network functions. However, this category includes the end-to-end behavior of services delivered by the network, including latency, throughput, jitter, and session continuity. Deviations in these metrics, if correlated with LI activity, could enable detection of interception events, particularly by observant external agents or passive observers. An LI system that degrades network services in a distinguishable way may inadvertently disclose its presence. Ensuring uniform service behavior, whether or not interception is active, is critical to undetectability requirements.
5.1.2.5 LI Function
Asset Code: AS-LI-FUNCTION-05
Asset Name: LI Function
Asset Description:
This asset represents the internal mechanisms and runtime state of the LI function itself. It includes service status flags, job queues, inter-process communication, service mesh labels, and other operational artifacts. Exposure of this state, even in logs, metrics, or crash dumps, could reveal active or planned LI operations, or offer an attacker insights into provisioning timing and volume. The integrity of this component is essential to ensure lawful provisioning, reliable delivery, and resistance to insider threats.
5.1.2.6 LI Product Delivery
Asset Code: AS-LI-PRODUCT-06
Asset Name: LI Product Delivery
Asset Description:
This refers to the delivery chain that carries LI content and Intercept Related Information (IRI) from network function Points of Interception (POIs) to the mediation function (MDF), and from there to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF). Attributes of this path, such as timing consistency, jitter, delays, retransmissions, or packet loss, can serve as side-channel indicators. Disruptions in delivery may undermine undetectability or signal to adversaries that surveillance is occurring. High availability, quality-of-service masking, and traffic normalization are essential to protect this asset.
5.1.2.7 LEMF Attributes
Asset Code: AS-LEMF-07
Asset Name: LEMF Attributes
Asset Description:
This includes the IP address, domain name, or network path of the LEMF endpoint. If the LEMF is statically assigned or its routing patterns are predictable, adversaries may correlate traffic to or from the LEMF to active surveillance. This can compromise the confidentiality of LI recipients and potentially enable network mapping of enforcement infrastructure. Protection of this asset includes obfuscation, dynamic addressing, and encrypted transport.
5.1.2.8 Network User Behavior
Asset Code: AS-USER-PATTERN-08
Asset Name: Network User Behavior Attributes
Asset Description:
These are behavioral signatures or application-layer patterns associated with end users. They may include traffic types, flow durations, usage spikes, or session frequency. If LI functions inadvertently introduce changes to these patterns, such as additional latency, altered timing, or injected traffic, it may be possible to detect surveillance through behavioral analysis. Conversely, behavioral data may also be used to infer target identities if not adequately decoupled. Safeguards should include behavior-preserving interception, noise injection, and usage anonymization.
5.1.2.9 Crypto Store
Asset Code: AS-CRYPTO-STORE-09
Asset Name: Crypto Store
Asset Description:
This includes keystores, certificate chains, and lists of trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) used within LI systems or the broader network. A compromised certificate store could allow an attacker to issue fraudulent credentials, intercept or forge LI traffic, or break TLS-protected communication. Certificate stores must be tightly controlled, auditable, and isolated from other runtime environments. Particular care should be taken when sharing trust anchors between LI and non-LI systems.
5.1.2.10 API or Configuration State
Asset Code: AS-API-CONF-10
Asset Name: API or Configuration State
Asset Description:
This encompasses the current state and metadata of network APIs, configuration templates, or orchestrator settings used in service delivery. Improper exposure may include target-specific parameters, interception flags, or routing modifications indicative of active LI sessions. Even passive reads of this state can reveal the operational context of LI functions. Configuration drift, race conditions, or excessive verbosity in status endpoints must be mitigated to avoid exposing this asset.
5.1.2.11 LI Product
Asset Code: AS-LI-PRODUCT-11
Asset Name: LI Product
Asset Description:
The LI product comprises content (e.g., voice, SMS, data) and metadata (e.g., call records, IP flow info) delivered as IRI to the LEMF. This is among the highest-value assets in the system and the direct object of the lawful interception operation. Any compromise, whether through leakage, misdelivery, or tampering, can breach both confidentiality and chain-of-custody requirements. It must be protected in transit and at rest using strong cryptographic measures, secure transport channels, and rigorous access logging.
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5.2 Attackers
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5.2.1 Attackers Overview
Attackers can be human or automated. The following table lists the attackers considered in the present multi-part document.
Table 5.2-1: Attacker definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
AT-INTERNAL-01
Internal administrator
Has privileged access to network functions or management interfaces but no LI authorization. May be, for example:
◦ A log auditor
◦ A config manager
◦ A general platform admin
◦ A network analytics observer
◦ A data center operator
Editor's Note : consider expanding this in sub-categories
2
AT-EXTERNAL-02
External agent
Has no legitimate access to any internal network interface (although may have access to an external interface such as an end user). May exploit e.g., exposed APIs, timing, network resources.
3
AT-AUTO-AI-03
Automated or AI Agent
Operates at higher scales, capable of fast deep analysis and pattern detection or timing inference.
4
AT-PASSIVE-04
Passive Observer
Non-real-time observer with access to historical data, can compare pre and post provisioning states, correlate metrics across tenants/users.
5
AT-COMPROMISED_NF-05
Compromised NF
An attacker has taken control of an NF and uses it as a pivot point to attack other NFs in the same "perimeter".
Editor's Note: Do not limit attacker to "casual" level
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5.2.2 Detailed Attacker Descriptions
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5.2.2.1 Internal Administrator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-01
Attacker Name: Internal Administrator
Attacker Description:
An internal administrator refers to a human actor with privileged access to core network systems, but without explicit authorization to access or manage Lawful Interception (LI) functions. This attacker may hold legitimate operational roles, such as log auditor, configuration manager, infrastructure administrator, or analytics engineer, and typically has routine access to sensitive systems, including logging platforms, telemetry pipelines, or network orchestration tools. Due to proximity and privilege level, this attacker is capable of indirect inference or misuse of general-purpose tools to extract sensitive LI-related insights. These threats are particularly insidious because they originate from trusted roles within the perimeter. Editor's Note: Sub-categorization may be warranted to reflect functional boundaries and privilege tiers.
5.2.2.2 Internal Administrator Granular Breakdown
5.2.2.2.1 Internal Log Auditor
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-LOG-01
Attacker Name: Internal Log Auditor
Attacker Description:
This attacker has legitimate access to system and application logs for operational, compliance, or troubleshooting purposes. While not authorized for LI access, they may infer surveillance activity by observing timing correlations, unusual service requests, or log entries tied to specific identifiers. Because log data often spans multiple services and timestamps, the log auditor can piece together patterns across different layers, particularly when logs are insufficiently redacted or when metadata about LI functions is leaked due to poor segregation. The risk is elevated in environments where centralized observability tools are broadly accessible. Importantly, such individuals may not always be direct employees of the CSP; they may include contractors, outsourced service providers, or regulatory agency auditors. The presence of third parties with log visibility adds further complexity to managing access boundaries and ensuring strict compartmentalization of LI-related activity.
5.2.2.2.2 Internal Configuration Manager
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-CONFIG-02
Attacker Name: Internal Configuration Manager
Attacker Description:
This internal actor has control over or visibility into network and service configuration interfaces, such as provisioning databases, orchestration tools, or infrastructure-as-code systems. While they may not intentionally target LI systems, their access could expose sensitive artifacts like target identifiers, service activation records, or routing behaviors that indirectly reveal LI activity. A misconfiguration, audit bypass, or direct misuse of privilege could lead to the exposure or tampering of LI-related parameters. This attacker is especially dangerous when configuration changes are not subject to strict role-based access control and change logging.
5.2.2.2.3 Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-INFRA-03
Attacker Name: Internal Infrastructure/Platform Administrator
Attacker Description:
An infrastructure administrator manages underlying compute, storage, and networking resources. They typically have root-level access to virtual machines, containers, or Kubernetes clusters where LI functions may reside. While this actor may not understand the semantics of LI operations, their access allows for memory inspection, storage snapshotting, or inter-process observation that could compromise confidentiality. Their role sits beneath LI in the stack, creating a high-privilege threat vector. This risk is heightened in cloud-native environments with shared platforms or insufficient tenant isolation.
5.2.2.2.4 Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-OBSERVE-04
Attacker Name: Internal Analytics or Monitoring Observer
Attacker Description:
This attacker uses monitoring dashboards, telemetry pipelines, or data visualization tools to analyze network performance and user behavior. Although not involved in LI, they may observe outliers, such as sudden QoS changes, endpoint redirection, or anomalous traffic patterns, that align with surveillance activities. Their access is typically read-only, but because they work across many users and services, they can form inferences at scale. If monitoring tools lack data masking or correlation protections, this actor could indirectly deanonymize LI operations.
5.2.2.2.5 Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
Attacker Code: AT-INTERNAL-DATACENTER-05
Attacker Name: Internal Facilities or Data Center Operator
Attacker Description:
This role includes physical or environmental access, such as rack technicians, cabling engineers, or maintenance personnel. Though easily overlooked, data center operators may intercept or observe physical indications of LI provisioning (e.g., device identifiers, port activation, or localized power usage). If surveillance workloads are not obfuscated within broader platform operations, these actors could observe installation patterns or hardware identifiers tied to LI. This threat is particularly relevant in private or hybrid data centers where physical separation is minimal and operator duties cross tenant boundaries.
5.2.2.3 External Agent
Attacker Code: AT-EXTERNAL-02
Attacker Name: External Agent
Attacker Description:
An external agent is a threat actor entirely outside the administrative domain of the Communication Service Provider (CSP). This entity lacks any legitimate access to internal network functions or LI systems, but may attempt to exploit publicly exposed services, such as user-facing APIs, mobile access interfaces, or Internet-exposed network resources. Attacks may include techniques such as timing analysis, metadata harvesting, endpoint compromise, or denial-of-service strategies. While the external agent has the least direct access, the increasing attack surface from 5G cloud-native and multi-access edge architectures can make this attacker class surprisingly effective, especially when combined with reconnaissance automation.
5.2.2.4 Automated or AI Agent
Attacker Code: AT-AUTO-AI-03
Attacker Name: Automated or AI Agent
Attacker Description:
An automated or AI-driven attacker is a non-human agent capable of processing vast quantities of data in real time or near-real time. These agents leverage machine learning, pattern recognition, or inference engines to discover anomalies, detect provisioning patterns, or identify LI-related events across large data streams. Whether deployed internally or externally, this attacker type can operate continuously, scaling beyond human capacity, and is particularly effective in identifying subtle timing correlations, job queue patterns, or service quality variations. Such agents may be adversarially trained and can pose a significant risk in hybrid environments where observability is distributed.
5.2.2.5 Passive Observer
Attacker Code: AT-PASSIVE-04
Attacker Name: Passive Observer
Attacker Description:
A passive observer is an attacker who does not interfere with live operations but gains access to historical data, telemetry, or pre/post-state snapshots. This actor may compare logs, traces, or service states before and after suspected LI provisioning to infer the presence of surveillance activities. Passive observers may exist within the CSP’s environment or in adjacent systems such as logging infrastructure or analytics data lakes. While they do not actively engage in attacks, their ability to correlate changes over time, particularly across multi-tenant environments, makes them a notable threat, especially when data retention and separation controls are weak.
5.2.2.6 Compromised Network Function
Attacker Code: AT-COMPROMISED_NF-05
Attacker Name: Compromised Network Function (NF)
Attacker Description:
This attacker class represents a network function that has been overtaken, either fully or partially, by an adversary. The compromised NF operates under the control of the attacker and can serve as a pivot point to reach LI systems, intercept provisioning messages, or disrupt internal communications. It may impersonate trusted roles, inject misleading telemetry, or undermine confidentiality by leaking sensitive artifacts. Compromised NFs are especially dangerous in service-mesh architectures where trust boundaries are often implicit. Lateral movement across internal APIs or through shared memory spaces between co-located functions increases the threat radius substantially.
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33.129-1
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5.3 Threats
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33.129-1
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5.3.1 Threats Overview
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The following table contains named threat types. Each SCAS test can point to one or more.
Table 5.3.1-1: Threat definitions
Code
Name
Description
1
T-LOG-01
Log leak
LI activity generates logging artifacts observable by non-LI authorized parties.
2
T-CONFIG-02
Config leak
LI activity is inferred by analysing config files extracted before and after LI provisioning.
3
T-RES-CPU-03
LI leak via CPU side channel 1
LI activity is inferred by analysing CPU utilization levels, method 1.
4
T-RES-CPU-04
LI leak via CPU side channel 2
LI activity is inferred by analysing CPU utilization levels, method 2.
5
T-RES-NET-05
LI leak via network flow side channel
LI activity is inferred by analysing network bandwidth utilization levels.
6
T-TIMING-06
LI detection via timing anomalies.
Detection of LI via timing anomalies.
7
T-TIMING-07
MDF-LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
Detection of MDF to LEMF LI product flow via timing anomalies.
8
T-INTERRUPTION-08
POI-MDF Link Failure
Link-level interruption between POI and MDF used to infer presence or behaviour of LI functions.
9
T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Session Count
LI detection by session count analysis.
10
T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Interface security
Allowance of insecure (non-TLS) connections.
"Simple MISconfiguration"
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33.129-1
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5.3.2 Detailed Threat Descriptions
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.1 Log Leak
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Threat Code: T-LOG-01
Threat Name: Log Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Certain system or network logs may unintentionally record details of Lawful Interception (LI) operations, such as interface initialization, provisioning events, or errors specific to LI services. If such logs are accessible to non-LI-authorized users or monitoring systems, this could result in the detection of LI activity, violating confidentiality and undetectability requirements.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.2 Config Leak
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Threat Code: T-CONFIG-02
Threat Name: Config Leak
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Configuration files or system state snapshots taken before and after LI provisioning may reveal changes indicative of interception functionality, such as new interfaces, active LI modules, or altered routing behaviors. If such configurations are accessible to unauthorized administrators or third-party tools, they may be used to infer the existence or target of an LI operation.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.3 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 1
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Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-03
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern A)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI operations may cause observable variations in CPU utilization due to additional processing, packet duplication, or encryption tasks. If an attacker monitors CPU resource usage patterns over time and correlates spikes or periodicity with specific events, it may be possible to infer the presence of active LI functions or associated targets.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.4 LI Leak via CPU Side Channel 2
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Threat Code: T-RES-CPU-04
Threat Name: LI Leak via CPU Side Channel (Pattern B)
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: A refined side-channel analysis leveraging advanced statistical or machine learning methods may identify LI-related process signatures at a lower resolution or across virtualized environments. Unlike direct CPU utilization spikes, this method relies on deeper behavioral fingerprinting (e.g., cache usage, execution timing patterns), which may allow even more covert inference of LI presence.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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5.3.2.5 LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
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Threat Code: T-RES-NET-05
Threat Name: LI Leak via Network Flow Side Channel
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: LI systems typically duplicate or redirect traffic to an MDF or mediation device. This may introduce subtle, but detectable changes in bandwidth utilization, jitter, or packet duplication observable from within the network or via flow records (e.g., NetFlow, sFlow). An attacker monitoring network flow metadata may detect patterns associated with interception activity.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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5.3.2.6 LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
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Threat Code: T-TIMING-06
Threat Name: LI Detection via Timing Anomalies
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The addition of LI processing steps (e.g., duplication, filtering, routing to MDF) can result in increased latency or jitter during communication sessions. An attacker may detect the presence of LI by statistically analyzing round-trip times or response behaviors that differ from baseline behavior when LI is not active.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.7 MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection
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Threat Code: T-TIMING-07
Threat Name: MDF–LEMF LI Product Flow Detection via Timing
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: The flow of intercepted traffic (IRI or CC) from the MDF to the LEMF may generate detectable timing patterns, especially if LI sessions are rare or traffic volume fluctuates. Observers with visibility into network patterns or inter-domain timestamps could detect and potentially correlate this flow with LI activities, violating the principle of transparency.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers; AS-LI-PRODUCT-11 LI Product
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.8 POI–MDF Link Failure
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Threat Code: T-INTERRUPTION-08
Threat Name: POI–MDF Link Failure
Threat Category: Denial of Service
Threat Description: A network or logical interruption between the Point of Interception (POI) and the MDF may unintentionally reveal the existence of LI. If LI sessions degrade differently from normal user sessions under such link failure conditions, an attacker could induce or observe faults to probe for LI presence or behavior.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers; AS-LI-PRODUCT-11 LI Product
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5.3.2.9 Session Count
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Threat Code: T-SESSION-COUNT-09
Threat Name: LI Detection via Session Count
Threat Category: Information Disclosure
Threat Description: Provisioning of LI may introduce additional sessions (e.g., replicated flows, internal signaling) that appear in session monitoring tools or access logs. If the session count increases in a predictable manner during LI activation, an unauthorized observer could infer LI activity simply by counting active or historical sessions.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
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33.129-1
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5.3.2.10 Interface Security
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Threat Code: T-INTERFACE-SEC-10
Threat Name: Interface Security Misconfiguration
Threat Category: Tampering / Information Disclosure
Threat Description: If LI-related interfaces (e.g., between POI, MDF and LEMF) are not properly secured using cryptographic protocols such as TLS, an attacker may eavesdrop on or manipulate LI product traffic. This threatens both confidentiality and integrity of intercepted data and may result in exposure of sensitive law enforcement operations.
Threatened Asset: AS-TARGET-01 Target Identifiers
6 Common Tests
Editor's Note: This section is expected to contain tests that are common across the LI architecture, and parts of the 33.129 series of documents.
Annex <A> (normative):
<Normative annex for a Technical Specification>
Start each annex on a new page.
Annexes are labelled A, B, C, etc. and designated either "normative" or "informative" depending on their content.
Normative annexes only to appear in Technical Specifications. Use style "Heading 8".
Annex <B> (informative):
Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
B.1 Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
Table B.1-1: Vulnerability/Compromise Spectrum
Code
Name
Description
Notes
Test IDs Failed
Criticality
(None,
Low,
Medium,
High,
Critical)
1
LI capability exists
The presence of an installed LI capability was detected.
e.g., on disk, but not running
2
LI capability characterization
Capabilities of the installed LI function were extracted.
e.g., capacity numbers, in terms of targets provisionable or bandwidth available for LI
3
LI running state detection
Detected that LI is currently running on the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
4
LI running instance characterization
Capabilities of the running instance of LI were extracted, such as number of targets provisionable, etc.
e.g., number of current taps
5
LI running state manipulation
LI was either started or stopped against normal procedures.
6
LI topology
Extracted network/physical location of other functions that may (do?) contain LI capability.
e.g., information about other POIs, MDFs, ADMFs, or even LEMFs
7
Target ID extracted
A (any) target ID was extracted.
without a priori choice of target
8
Specific target ID detected
A specific target ID was detected on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
9
IRI extracted
IRI was extracted pertaining to any current target ID on the TOE.
without a priori choice of target
10
Content extracted
Content was extracted pertaining to any current target ID on the TOE.
without a priori choice of target
11
Specific target IRI extracted
IRI was extracted pertaining to a specific target ID on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
12
Specific target content extracted
Content was extracted pertaining to a specific target ID on the TOE.
with a priori choice of target
13
One new target was inserted
A new target inserted outside normal procedures.
14
Multiple targets inserted
More than one target inserted outside normal procedures.
pathway to LI DOS
15
Full target list extracted
A complete list of target IDs on the TOE was extracted.
16
IRI of all targets extracted
IRI pertaining to all targets was extracted.
17
Content of all targets extracted
Content pertaining to all targets was extracted.
18
Control of non-LI functionality achieved through LI entry
Control of TOE functionality outside LI was achieved.
Editor's notes (Apr 7 call):
* Add DELETION (targets, IRI, content),
* modify (INSERT/DELETE) delivery endpoints
* insert before 7: access/token compromise/privilege escalation
EDITORS NOTES:
Parking Lot
0. Find a way to publish an implementation/configuration guide to state "the obvious", e.g. 33.128 Annex, or its own document, etc.
1. Think about a test for trust domain crossing. If a (non-LI) network function is required to take some action on behalf of LI and does not have a POI, this creates a security concern.
2. Test that POI code and data are not accessible from outside the enclave.
3. Inter-LEA confidentiality. Is there a way to test it explicitly, or do we rely on inference from a subset of tests.
Annex <C>:
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>
Informative annexes in Technical Reports do not use "(informative") in the title, since all annexes in TRs are informative. Use style "Heading 9" in TRs.
Annex <D> (informative):
Bibliography
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Bibliography is optional. If it exists, it shall follow the last technical annex in the document.
The following material, though not specifically referenced in the body of the present document (or not publicly available), gives supporting information.
Bibliography format
<Publication>: "<Title>".
Annex <E> (informative):
Index
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
The Index is optional. If it exists, it shall immediately precede the Changes history annex.
Generate the index using MS Word's index field feature.
Annex <F> (informative):
Change history
Use style "Heading 8" in TSs and "Heading 9" in TRs. Do not use "informative" in the title in TRs.
This is the last annex for TS/TSs which details the change history using the following table.
This table is to be used for recording progress during the WG drafting process till TSG approval of this TS/TR.
For TRs under change control, use one line per approved Change Request
Date: use format YYYY-MM
CR: four digits, leading zeros as necessary
Rev: blank, or number (max two digits)
Cat: use one of the letters A, B, C, D, F
Subject/Comment: for TSs under change control, include full text of the subject field of the Change Request cover
New vers: use format [n]n.[n]n.[n]n
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-07
SA3#98-LI
s3i250357
-
-
-
First introduction of the baseline to the group.
0.0.8
Change history of this template:
2001-07
Copyright date changed to 2001; space character added before TTC in copyright notification; space character before first reference deleted.
1.3.3
2002-01
Copyright date changed to 2002.
1.3.4
2002-07
Extra Releases added to title area.
1.3.5
2002-12
"TM" added to 3GPP logo.
1.3.6
2003-02
Copyright date changed to 2003.
1.3.7
2003-12
Copyright date changed to 2004. Chinese OP changed from CWTS to CCSA
14.0
2004-04
North American OP changed from T1 to ATIS
1.5.0
2005-11
Stock text of clause 3 includes reference to 21.905.
1.6.0
2005-11
Caters for new TSG structure. Minor corrections.
1.6.1
2006-01
Revision marks removed.
1.6.2
2008-11
LTE logo line added, © date changed to 2008, guidance on keywords modified; acknowledgement of trade marks; sundry editorial corrections and cosmetic improvements
1.7.0
2010-02
3GPP logo changed for cleaner version, with tag line;
LTE-Advanced logo line added;
© date changed to 2010;
editorial change to cover page footnote text;
trade marks acknowledgement text modified;
additional Releases added on cover page;
proforma copyright release text block modified
1.8.0
2010-02
Smaller 3GPP logo file used.
1.8.1
2010-07
Guidance note concerning use of LTE-Advanced logo added.
1.8.2
2011-04-01
Guidance of use of logos on cover page modified; copyright year modified.
1.8.3
2013-05-15
Changed File Properties to MCC macro default.
Removed R99, added Rel-12/13.
Modified Copyright year.
Guidance on annex X Change history.
1.8.4
2014-10-27
Updated Release selection on cover. In clause 3, added "3GPP" to TR 21.905.
1.8.5
2015-01-06
New Organizational Partner TSDSI added to copyright block.
Old Releases removed.
1.9.0
2015-12-03
Provision for LTE Advanced Pro logo
Update copyright year to 2016
1.10.0
2016-03-08
Standarization of the layout of the Change History table in the last annex.(Unreleased)
1.11.0
2016-06-15
Minor adjustment to Change History table heading
1.11.1
2017-03-13
Adds option for 5G logo on cover
1.12.0
2017-05-03
Smaller 5G logo to reduce file size
1.12.1
2019-02-25
Replacement of frames on cover pages by in-line text.
Clarification of help text on when to use 5G logo.
Removal of defunct keywords frame on page 2.
Add Rel-16, Rel-17 options, eliminated earlier, frozen, Releases (cover page, below title)
Corrections to some guidance text, addition of guidance text concerning automatic page headers under Word 2016 ff.
Use of modal auxiliary verbs added to Foreword.
More explicit guidance on Bibliography and Index annexes.
Converted to .docx format.
1.13.0
2019-09-12
Cover page table outline shown dotted for ease of logo selection. (Author to hide outline after logo selection.) User now needs to delete whole table rows instead of individual cells, which proved to be tricky.
Change of style for "notes" in the Foreword to normal paragraphs.
Insertion of new bookmarks, correction of location of existing bookmarks. (To improve navigation.)
Improvements to guidance text.
1.13.1
2021-06-18
Provision for 5G Advanced logo
Update copyright year to 2021
Additional guidance on the use of Heading 8/9 in annexes C, D and X.
1.14.0
2022-04-01
Correction of table formatting
Update copyright year to 2022
1.15.0
2023-03-14
Updated copyright year to 2023
Updated URLs from HTTP to HTTPS
Updated FTP link to HTTP counterpart
Fixed numbering of annexes
1.16.0
2024-03-19
Updated copyright year to 2024
1.17.0
2024-09-06
Adds option for 6G logo on the cover page
1.18.0
2024-10-15
Correction of table formatting to ease outline hiding after logo selection.
1.18.1
2024-10-18
Addition/removal of spaces in Release indications and update of Release in the example within the body.
Unlock "update field" for ToC
1.19.0
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30.801
|
1 Scope
|
This permanent document describes the principle and the working method of the Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs), the scope, reference and output of each individual IGC and the overall time plan.
|
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30.801
|
2 Working method of the technical Inter-Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs)
|
TSG-SA has a responsibility of technical co-ordination within 3GPP. TSG-S2 has been allocated a task to divide the feature descriptions defined by TSG-S1 to a Building blocks or Work packages based on System architecture and elaborate a project plan.
Therefore Inter Group Co-ordination ad-hocs (IGCs) are created. The outcome of the IGCs should be a draft 3GPP wide project plan for each feature, defining the work that is needed and proposing the responsible WGs/TSGs and a time schedule. These draft project plans will become 3GPP project plans after they have been approved by all relevant WGs/TSGs and finally by TSG-SA. The project plans will be elaborated with all concerned working group of the technical subject, where from each working group a contact person is nominated.
The task of the IGCs is not to perform any technical work of substance on the technical issue (e.g. as architectural work).
The method of working of the IGC meetings shall be mainly by email or tele-conferencing.
For each IGC, a permanent document is maintained comprising
• Work identified to fullfill the requirements
• List of all the deliverables applicable to the subject
Note that a deliverable can be applicable to more than one technical project co-ordination subject
• Time plan
for Release 99 and subsequently for future releases.
|
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