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7.3.6 Security bootstrapping for DS MIPv6 using MIP options
(From S3-070748) This procedure uses the MIP authentication options defined in RFC4285 [8] to provide authentication of Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages, namely the • MN-HA Mobility Message Authentication Option and the • MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option. The AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option is used when the MN and the HA do not yet have a shared key, i.e. in the situation requiring bootstrapping of the MN-HA key. It is assumed that the MN and the AAA server share a long-lived security association. NOTE: It is ffs whether there is a need to dynamically generate the MN-AAA key and, if so, how to do it. Alternatives would include derivation during network access authentication and GBA. The MN-HA key is derived from the MN-AAA key and a nonce. The nonce is requested by the MN in a Key Generation Nonce Request option and provided by the AAA server to the MN in a Key Generation Nonce Reply option. These options are described in draft-devarapalli-mip6-authprotocol-bootstrap [9]. NOTE: Instead of using a nonce for generating the MN-HA key from the MN-AAA key, also the timestamp from the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option, cf. below, could be used. This is ffs. The HA may provide a Home Address to the MN using the Home Address Options defined in draft-devarapalli-mip6-authprotocol-bootstrap [9]. The communication between the Home Agent and the AAA server is based on DIAMETER extensions described in draft-ietf-dime-mip6-split [10]. This communication is assumed to be authenticated (integrity-protected). Figure 8: Bootstrapping using Mobile IP options Description of the information flow in Figure 8: 1. When the Mobile Node (MN) does not yet share a key with the Home Agent (HA) the MN sends a DSMIPv6 Binding Update (BU) including the MN-AAA authentication mobility option. The MN also includes a Key Generation Nonce Request Option. If the MN does not yet have a Home Address (HoA) it also includes the Home Address Request Option in the BU. The MN shall include the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option defined in RFC 4285 [8] containing a timestamp. 2. When the Home Agent receives a BU with the MN-AAA mobility message authentication option, the HA forwards the BU to the AAA server for authentication. 3. The AAA server authenticates the BU by verifying the message authentication code in the MN-AAA authentication mobility option, using the MN-AAA shared key and the timestamp in the Mobility Message Replay Protection Option. 4. Upon successful authentication of the BU, the AAA server sends the parameters of the MN-HA security association (key, algorithm) to the HA. The AAA server also returns a nonce and algorithm identifier in the Key Generation Nonce Reply Option. 5. The HA sends a Binding Acknowledge (BA) message protected with the MN-HA security association received from the AAA server to the MN. The HA forwards the Key Generation Nonce Reply Option as part of the BA. The HA also includes the Assigned Home Address Option in the BU if the MN requested a HoA. The HA checks the validity of the timestamp and, if necessary, includes an indication of a timestamp mismatch, as described in RFC 4285 [8]. In the latter case, HA deletes the MN-HA security association after sending the BA. 6. The MN generates the MN-HA key from the MN-AAA key and the nonce. The MN then verifies the BA using the MN-HA authentication mobility option. If the BA contains an indication of a timestamp mismatch the MN resends the BU from step 1, but with the message authentication code in the MN-AAA authentication mobility option computed over the corrected timestamp. 7. For subsequent BUs, the MN uses the established MN-HA security association and does not include an MN-AAA authentication mobility option.
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7.4 Network based Mobility
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7.4.1 PMIP
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7.4.1.1 Introduction
This section looks at how PMIP messages need to be protected within the Evolved Packet Core and how PMIP protection needs to be handled if the PMIP messages originate from a trusted non-3GPP network node. This analysis is based on draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt [11] from which in particular the sections 4 and 11 have been used from a security viewpoint.
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7.4.1.2 Overview of PMIP usage in 3GPP
(From S3-070756) PMIPv6 defines a MAG (Mobile Access Gateway) and an LMA (Local Mobility Anchor) from which the LMA will be integrated in the PDN Gateway or Serving Gateway (for the roaming case). Figure 9: Protocols for MM control and user planes of S2a for the PMIPv6 option TS 23.402v130 section 5 is relevant in this respect and specifies that PMIPv6 may be used on following reference points: • S2a: Between a node in the trusted non-3GPP access network (Foreign agent) and the LMA (Home Agent) • S2b: Between the ePDG and the LMA (Home Agent). TS 23.402v130 section 4.2.1 mentions the use of PMIP based S5 reference point between the Serving Gateway and the PDN Gateway. The S5 reference point may also apply GTP, and is an intra-operator interface. PMIP usage over S5/S8b is currently included in the description of PMIP use over S2b, and (see section 5.4.2.4.3 TS 23.402) in case of roaming, the S-GW is the LMA for PMIP procedure in S2b between the ePDG and the S-GW and the PDN GW is the LMA for PMIP procedure in S8b between the S-GW and the PDN GW. In addition, PMIP over S5/S8b is discussed in section 5.4.2.6 TS 23.402 for E-UTRAN access.
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7.4.1.3 PMIP trust model
PMIPv6 is an IETF based network-based mobility management mechanism, and has applied the same trust model properties as the use of GTP for mobility management in UMTS and the EPC (for the S5 and S2b reference points). This means the MAG i.e. the Serving Gateway (S5) or ePDG (S2b), is sufficiently trusted by the LMA to register only those Mobile Nodes that are attached. However when the MAG is located in a trusted non-3GPP network (S2a), there is a little bit of a difference to the current 3GPP or PMIPv6 draft [11] trust model where a 3GPP network component (SGSN, S-GW) is trusted to register only attached MNs. Here, the MAG could e.g. be located in a WLAN AP which can much more easily be tampered with than an SGSN or S-GW. The implication of this scenario is for ffs (see also proposed decision at the end of this section). The trust between the LMA and the MAG is verified by the LMA by allowing only those MAGs to perform Binding Updates which are known by the LMA i.e. by the use of IKEv2 authentication. This measure defends against a Network Node trying to impersonate another MAG, and thus will protect against Denial-Of-Service attacks from the Mobile Node's viewpoint. The PMIPv6 draft [11] recognizes the threat of a compromised MAG that would send PMIP messages on behalf of a Mobile Node with a Mobile Node not present on the local link. From section 11 of [PMIPv6 draft]: "To eliminate the threats related to a compromised mobile access gateway, this specification recommends that the local mobility anchor before accepting a Proxy Binding Update message for a given mobile node, should ensure the mobile node is definitively attached to the mobile access gateway that sent the binding registration request. The issues related to a compromised mobile access gateway in the scenario where the local mobility anchor and the mobile access gateway in different domains, is outside the scope of this document. This scenario is beyond the applicability of this document." The last sentence from the extract is an indication for the fact that the S2a use is not covered by PMIPv6 draft [11] and needs additional considerations. Although required by PMIPv6 draft [11] it is unclear how the LMA should be able to verify that the MN has attached, rather this seems to be a property of the PMIP model that the MAG is trusted to apply those requirements. The authorization mechanisms on the MAG-LMA interfaces are inadequate for this. The effect of a potential misuse by the MAG could be limited to those MAGs on which the Mobile Node is authorized to attach. This authorization shall then be verified by the LMA. However, this explicit authorization-check may be cumbersome to administrate per user (and therefore not very effective), and if not administrated per user but per roaming partner, the authorization check rather takes place between the MAG and the LMA (via the lack of shared secrets for IKEv2, or certificate authorization checks), and this fits the PMIP trust model applying to S5 and S2b. Extending PMIPv6 by involving the UE in order to produce a fresh user involvement on the MAG that can be used towards the LMA, is a contradiction to the design guidelines of PMIPv6: "This protocol enables mobility support to a host without requiring its participation in any mobility related signaling." Furthermore verifying the user involvement would also increase the amount of signaling needed. So there is a trade-off between trust/security and amount of signaling. NOTE 1: For the other network based mobility management protocols e.g. GTP this has worked well in the past. The operator should be able to trace down suspicious registrations as long as the links are secured (physical or by NDS/IP). In case of S5, the node implementing the MAG may already be trusted to receive an EPS security context for a user, without proof of user involvement. NOTE 2: In case S-GW and MME are implemented on the same physical node. The risk caused by a misuse of the received key material is greater than the risk due the use of the PMIPv6 trust model. Verifying user involvement during mobility management registration would need to involve an additional authentication verifiable by the LMA only such that the compromised MAG cannot impersonate the user, where then we are back to the DSMIPv6 solution. Conclusion: a) use PMIPv6 as defined by IETF [draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt] for S5 and S2b b) if the trust relation between the MAG and the LMA is not there then additional security measures are needed. These security measures are for ffs.
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7.4.1.4 Security measures on the Reference points between the LMA and the MAG that have a trust relation
PMIPv6 draft [11] section 4 recommends the use of IPsec ESP in Transport Mode (RFC4303) as default security mechanism for integrity protection and data origin authentication for PMIP messages and IKEv2 end-to-end between the MAG and the LMA to establish IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection of PMIP messages is not required. Section 5.5.1 allows the use of one security tunnel between the MAG and the LMA instead of a dynamic set-up. "The bi-directional tunnel is established after accepting the ProxyBinding Update request message. The created tunnel may be shared with other mobile nodes attached to the same mobile access gateway and with the local mobility anchor having a Binding Cache entryfor those mobile nodes. Implementations MAY choose to use static tunnels instead of dynamically creating and tearing them down on a need basis." Therefore alternatives to the IKEv2 usage like NDS/IP (TS 33.210) should still be possible (RFC 2406 and IKEv1) and can provide the same security services. The only difference is the hop-by-hop approach with SEGs (requiring tunnel mode towards the SEG), which should not be a problem in viewpoint of security if the network owning the SEG and the LMA is sufficiently trusted. The use of TS 33.310 is needed when LMA and MAG belong to a different operator. The PDN gateway may already implement IKEv1/IPsec for protecting the signaling towards the AAA/HSS in case of DSMIPv6 and may already implement IKEv2 in case that such mechanism would be selected for DSMIPv6 protection towards the Mobile Node (which is for ffs at SA3#49). The ePDG already requires IKEv2 implementation towards the UE. Conclusion: SA3#49 agreed that the choice between IKEv1 (as defined by NDS/IP) or IKEv2 (as proposed by PMIPv2] for PMIP message protection between the MAG and the LMA needs further study a) Both IKEv2 and IKEv1 can provide the necessary security features. b) Referring to NDS/IP (TS 33.210) and NDS/AF (TS 33.310) allows a hop-by-hop security model. c) The difference between RFC2406 [which is referred by NDS/IP] and RFC4303 [which is referred by PMIPV6] is not essential for the decision.
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7.4.1.5 The need for using strong access authentication with Proxy Mobile IP
Clause 7.4.1.3 discusses the need for trust of the LMA in the correct operation of the MAG. Trust in the MAG means that the LMA can be ensured that the operation of MAG is not somehow influenced by an attacker. Clause 7.4.1.4 discusses the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA. Security on this reference point ensures that PMIP messages are originating from a trusted entity, and that no attacker could tamper with them in transit. This subclause discusses an additional requirement for the secure operation of PMIP: strong access authentication. In the context of PMIP, the authentication scheme shall be considered sufficiently strong by all stakeholders involved, in particular by the operators of MAG and LMA. In EPS the LMA is the PDN GW owned by a 3GPP EPS operator. This implies that the authentication scheme shall satisfy also 3GPP security requirements, i.e. it shall use a USIM. PMIP is based on the assumption that a MAG can securely identify which user is attached to the access network served by the MAG. This secure identification is realised by access authentication. If access authentication was weak then an attacker could impersonate a user in the access network. If this happened, a MAG would report in good faith to the LMA that a certain user was present in the access network, while in fact the attacker was present. This could result in Denial of Service to the impersonated user through the use of PMIP because all traffic destined to this user would then be routed to a wrong destination. An impersonation attack exploiting a weakness in access authentication could occur by attacking any part of the access network. Neither the trusted operation of the MAG nor the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA would prevent such an attack if access authentication was weak. In this sense, the requirement of using strong access authentication with PMIP is complementary to the requirements addressed in clauses 7.4.1.3 and 7.4.1.4. Section 4 of TR 33.922 requires USIM-based authentication also for non-3GPP access. Currently, AKA is the only authentication scheme known to use the USIM. As AKA-based authentication is considered sufficiently strong, also the requirement introduced in this subclause is considered fulfilled in EPS. Conclusion: When PMIP is used within EPS, strong access authentication is required. In EPS and as per clause 4 of TR 33.922, this requirement is fulfilled since the USIM-based authentication for non-3GPP access is mandated. The USIM-based authentication implies the use of the AKA protocol, which is considered sufficiently strong.
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7.4.1.6 No trust relation between LMA and MAG on S2a
NOTE:This section describes the case when there is no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. However, what this section describes is not aligned with the assumption of TS33.402v100 section 9.3.1.2.
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7.4.1.6.1 Security risks
MAG lies in the trusted non-3gpp IP access system in S2a. There may be no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA since they may belong to different operators. In this case, a compromised MAG may make an attack to UE in other MAG’s domain. Also, a compromised MAG may send fake PBU message to update the binding of UE who is served by other MAG. In this case, -the victim UE cannot receive the data since the data is routed to the compromised MAG; -the compromised MAG can eavesdrop the data of UE who is served by other MAG; -the compromised MAG may send a large amount of PBU to make the LMA in burden and a DoS attack may occur; PMIPv6 [draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-11] defines to use IPsec to protect PBU/PBA. However, the prerequisite is that there should be trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. PMIPv6 security mechanism cannot work for the condition of no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA.
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7.4.1.6.2 Possible measures
One possible way is to have the mapping between the UE and the serving MAG in one of network servers. When a MAG sends a PBU to a LMA, the LMA can ask this server to check whether this MAG is currently serving the UE. In this way, it will be avoided that a compromised MAG represents UE served by other MAGs to send the fake PBU. UE should run an EAP-AKA with MAG before PMIPv6 procedure. The AAA server in UE’s home network can record which MAG executed EAP-AKA procedure. In the meanwhile, AAA can keep the mapping between UE and its serving MAG. In this way, when a MAG sends a PBU message to a LMA, the LMA can ask the AAA server to have a check whether this MAG is serving the UE in the current time according to the identity of UE in PBU message. When UE moves to other MAG, AAA should know the change since AAA will be involved in changing MAG’s procedure. So the AAA can update the mapping between UE and the serving MAG. Editor’s Note: Another solution is that AAA sends a key to MAG which is related to the UE after EAP-AKA procedure. UE will participate in the EAP-AKA. So the MAG can obtain this key only when this MAG really serves the UE. This key can be used to protect the integrity of PBU messages. LMA interacts with AAA to check the integrity of PBU message. In this way, a compromised MAG cannot get the related key. So it can not send valid PBU message. When UE moves to other MAG, AAA should know the change since AAA will be involved in changing MAG’s procedure. So the AAA can update the related key and send the key to the current serving MAG. This solution may need clarify and FFS.
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7.4.2 NetLMM
In Network based Localized Mobility Management (NetLMM) the Localized Mobility Anchor (LMA) is configured with a globally routable network prefix which the IP address assigned to UE is composed of, and packets to/from the UE are tunnelled between LMA and Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs). MAG shares the same network prefix as LMA’s one, therefore, when the MN moves from one MAG to another, neither the subnet nor the MN IP address are changing. Here the LMA handles the packets incoming from Internet to the operator’s domain. Each MAG is configured with the information needed to contact the LMA. This is also depicted in Figure 10. Figure 10: Proxy mobility protocol scenario NetLMM does not bring any additional security threats. The protocol does face the general security threat of IP address ownership that is valid for all mobility protocols. Solution for this threat is to: - Secure Link Layer attachment (Packet Data Protocol Context secured by 3G AKA) - IP address allocation by the network over secured attachment. For NetLMM the countermeasure regarding the security threats in Section 7.1 are: - IP address ownership - Enforce IP address ownership at network attachment. IP address is allocated by network (e.g., DHCP, PDP) over secure network attachment (e.g., 3G AKA). IP address binding is enforced during communication. - (D)DoS attack - Attack on forwarding resources - Requires knowledge of the network prefix allocated for MNs - Outside Correspondent Node and MNs are aware - Attack on control plane endpoint resources - Requires knowledge of the anchor point IP address - NetLMM LMA IP address is hidden from MNs and outside CNs. - NetLMM shall be resilient to DoS because only the forwarding resources can be attacked. Those can be dealt with by over-provisioning the forwarding capacity. Editor’s note: further details should be added.
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8 Specific aspects of security for mobility between 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems
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8.1 Security for mobility between pre-SAE 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems
It needs to be clarified in the course of the work on SAE mobility to what extent mobility, and, in particular the related security aspects involving pre-SAE 3GPP access systems require a different handling. The goal is, of course, to minimise or completely avoid the differences, but it is currently not clear in how far this goal can be achieved.
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8.2 Security context transfer between 3GPP and trusted non-3GPP access networks
Security context is the information on the current state of a UE in the serving system required to re-establish the security association in the target system. Security context includes 1. Agreed security algorithms between the UE and the serving network, 2. Agreed/derived encryption and/or integrity protection keys and key identifiers. 3. Security association related information like key lifetime, sequence number, count values etc. 4. The temporary identity issued by the serving network NOTE: In 3GPP, temporary identity is used by the target network to identify the serving network, but it’s FFS for handover between 3GPP and non-3GPP networks whether temp IDs to be used for identifying the pervious access network. As 3GPP has already adopted security context transfer procedures for optimizing authentication during handover, it is reasonable for SAE to enable security context transfer between the 3GPP and non-3GPP networks. Editor’s note: the content of security context is FFS.
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8.3 ANDSF Security
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8.3.1 General
ANDSF (Access Network Discovery and Selection Function) is a mechanism of access network discovery and selection. It is provided in order to control the UE's inter-system handover decisions and in order to reduce the battery consumption for inter-system mobility. See TS23.402 for more details. However, the privacy of UE and the operator needs to be protected if private information will be sent between UE and ANDSF server. Reusing GBA and PSK TLS to establish SA between UE and ANDSF server will be easily implemented by both operators and vendors. PSK TLS can be used for the security association between UE and ANDSF server. It can provide confidentiality and integrity protection for ANDSF security. 8.3.2 Procedure Figure 11: ANDSF security using GBA 1. The UE and the BSF will process bootstrapping procedure. The master key Ks will be derived in this procedure. Editor’s note: It is FFS if 3GPP AAA can be the BSF in this scenario to be easily deployed by the operator. 2. The UE discovers the ANDSF server. See more details in TS23.402. Then the UE derives the Ks_ANDSF. 3. The UE starts communication with ANDSF server. UE sends application request to ANDSF server. 4. ANDSF server sends authentication request to the BSF for the key, 5. The BSF derives the Ks_ANDSF based the master key Ks. The derivation function is the same with Ks_NAF. And then BSF sends Ks_ANDSF and the key lifetime to the ANDSF server. 6. ANDSF server will inform UE that it gets the key Ks_ANDSF and can continue the ANDSF function, 7. The UE and the ANDSF server establish the security association based on the Ks_ANDSF. The detailed method i.e. PSK TLS, can be referenced to TS24.109. Editor’s note: It is FFS which method can also be used to establish the security association between the UE and the ANDSF server. 8. The UE and ANDSF server runs handover with ANDSF procedure after the SA was successfully established to protect the communication between them. Annex A: RFC 3957 From RFC 3957: “When the mobile node shares an AAA Security Association with its home AAA server, however, it is possible to use that AAA Security Association to create derived Mobility Security Associations between the mobile node and its home agent, and again between the mobile node and the foreign agent currently offering connectivity to the mobile node. …[RFC3957] specifies extensions to Mobile IP registration messages that can be used to create Mobility Security Associations between the mobile node and its home agent, and/or between the mobile node and a foreign agent.” Appendix B of RFC3957 contains message flows for Requesting and Receiving Key Generation Nonce: MN FA AAA Infrastructure <--- Advertisement----- (if needed) - RReq+AAA Key Req.--> --- RReq + AAA Key Req.---> <--- RRep + AAA Key Rep.--- <-- RRep+AAA Key Rep.-- Annex B: Change history Change history Date TSG # TSG Doc. CR Rev Subject/Comment Old New 2006-02 Creation of document 0.0.0 0.0.1 2006-07 Revision of the document 0.0.1 0.0.2 2006-11 Revision of the document 0.0.2 0.0.3 2007-05 Including 3.1of S3-070399 0.0.3 0.0.4 2007-07 Including 2.1of S3-070506, and S3-070531 0.0.4 0.0.5 2007-10 Including S3-070748 and S3-070820, S3-070732 and S3-070756 0.0.5 0.1.0 2007-12 Including S3a070980. 0.1.0 0.2.0 2008-02 Including S3-080049, S3-080129. 0.2.0 0.3.0 2008-03 Correct the release number. 0.3.0 0.3.1 2008-04 Including S3-080362. 0.3.0 0.4.0 2008-06 Including S3-080725, S3-080765. 0.4.0 0.5.0 2008 MCC clean up for presentation to SA 0.5.0 1.0.0 Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#41(08)0479 Meeting #41, 15 - 18 September 2008, Kobe, Japan Presentation of Specification to TSG Presentation to: TSG SA Meeting #41 Document for presentation: TR 33.922, Version 1.0.0 Presented for: Information Abstract of document: TR 33.922 is currently in inconsistent shape. It was useful during a certain period of the work towards TS 33.402, but the material in TR 33.922 was not updated when decisions contradicting or superseding the text in the TR were taken. Nevertheless, TR 33.922 can serve a useful purpose similar to TR 33.821 in relation to TS 33.401 on E-UTRAN security, namely to document the discussion process in 3GPP SA3, which led to the final version of the TS. In SA3 #52 meeting it was agreed to add a disclaimer to the “Scope” section of TR 33.922 to make it clear that text in the TR may be inaccurate or outdated. Changes since last presentation: This is the first time that the document is presented. Outstanding Issues: There are no outstanding issues. Contentious Issues: There are no contentious issues.
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1 Scope
The purpose of this document is to contain the updated Work Item Descriptions (WIDs) and capture status of all TSG SA WG5 work items of the current 3GPP Release in order for the group to get an overview of current ongoing work. This TR is used as a mean to provide input to the complete 3GPP work plan that is handled by MCC.
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. [1] http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Information/WORK_PLAN/ [2] http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Information/WI_Sheet/ SA5 Work Plan snapshoot Unique_ID Name Acronym % Cpl Impacted TSs and TRs Rapporteur 35041 OAM&P OAM7 28% Christian TOCHE 35042 Network Infrastructure Management OAM7-NIM 28% 35044 Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network) OAM7-NIM-NGN 10% 32.632, 32.633, 32.634, 32.635 BT 35045 IRP usage scenarios OAM7-NIM 0% new TR 32.8xy Lucent 35046 Co-operative Element Management interface (CO-OP) OAM7-NIM-COOP 75% new TR 32.8xy, 32.101 Motorola 35047 Network Management (NM) Itf-N performance criteria OAM7-NIM 30% new TS 32.yzx China Mobile 35048 Delta synchronization between IRP Manager and IRP Agent OAM7-NIM 55% new TR 32.8xy,new TSs 32.111-n,32.60n; For n = 1 to 5 Siemens 35049 Subscription Management (SuM) IRP Solution Sets OAM7-NIM-SuM 55% 32.101,32.175, new TSs 32.161,32.307,32.317,32.607,32.617,32.667 Ericsson 35050 Integration Reference Point (IRP) Security Management OAM7-NIM 40% New TSs 32.372,32.373,32.374; 32.111,32.30x,32.32x,32.33x,32.34x,32.35x,32.36x,32.41x,32.60x,32.61x,32.66x Huawei 35051 Integration Reference Point (IRP) Methodology OAM7-NIM 15% New TSs 32.15w,32.15x,32.15y,32.15z; 32.150,32.151,32.152 Ericsson 35052 Partial suspension of Itf-N during maintenance/testing OAM7-NIM 50% new TR 32.8xy, new TSs 32.30n,32.60n,32.61n; For n = 1 to 5 Siemens 35053 Advanced Alarming on Itf-N OAM7-NIM 35% new TR 32.8xy ; New TSs 32.111-n,32.30n; For n = 1 to 5 Siemens 35054 Management of Legacy Equipment OAM7-NIM 20% new TS 32.xxx, New TSs 32.62n,32.63n,32.64n,32.65n,32.71n,32.74n,32.69n; For n = 1 to 5 Siemens 35055 Rules for Vendor Specific Extensions OAM7-NIM 20% 32.62n; For n = 1 to 5 Siemens 35056 CN CS Bearer Transport Network (BTN) relative NRM OAM7-NIM 45% New Tss TS 32.xx1,TS 32.xx2,TS 32.xx3,TS 32.xx4 China Mobile 35064 Backward and Forward Compatibility of IRP systems OAM7-NIM-BFC 10% TR 32.805. new TS 32.15X Ericsson 35065 Study of Element Operations Systems Function (EOSF) definition OAM7-NIM- EOSF 15% new TR 32.8xy China Mobile 35066 Study of SOAP/HTTP IRP Solution Sets OAM7-NIM-SOAP 20% new TR 32.8xy Nortel 35067 Study of Itf-N Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) template OAM7-NIM-ICS 15% new TR 32.8xy China Mobile 35068 Study of IRP Information Model OAM7-NIM-IM 30% new TR 32.8xy Motorola 35071 Repeater Network Ressource Model (NRM) definition OAM7-NIM 5% 32.64n; For n = 1 to 5 China Mobile 35072 UTRAN radio channel power monitoring OAM7-NIM 20% 32.403, 32.64n; For n = 1 to 5 China Mobile 35074 NEW Study on SA5 MTOSI XML Harmonization OAM7-NIM-XML 0% new TR 32.8xy Nortel 35043 Performance Management OAM7-PM 33% 35057 Performance measurements definition for CN CS OAM7-PM 65% New TS 32.xyz China Mobile 35058 Enhancement UTRAN performance measurements definition OAM7-PM 20% 32.403 China Mobile 35059 Add TDD specific counters in Performance measurement OAM7-PM 75% 32.403 CATT 35060 ATM bearer network Performance measurements OAM7-PM 30% 32.403 ZTE 35061 IP bearer network Performance measurement definitions OAM7-PM 20% 32.403 China Mobile 35069 Performance measurements definition for IMS OAM7-PM-IMS 5% new TS 32.xyz China Mobile 35073 HSDPA performance measurements OAM7-PM 5% 32.403 China Mobile 35039 Trace Management OAM7-Trace 20% 35040 Trace Management for IMS OAM7-Trace-IMS 0% 32.421,32.422,32.423 Nortel 35062 End-to-end Service Level tracing for IMS OAM7-Trace-IMS 20% 32.101,32.421,32.422,32.423 Vodafone 35070 IRP for Subscriber and Equipment Trace Management OAM7-Trace-IRP 10% 32.421,32.422,32.423. 3 new TS 32.4x1,2,3 Nokia 35063 Trace record content for UTRAN TDD OAM7-Trace-TDD 75% 32.421,32.422,32.423 CATT Feature: Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning - OAM&P (OAM7) Unique_ID: 35041 Building Block: Network Infrastructure Management (OAM7-NIM) Unique_ID: 35042 Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#28(05)0302 Meeting #28, Quebec, CANADA, 06-08 June 2005 Source: SA5 (Telecom Management) Title: WID WT Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network) Document for: Approval Agenda Item: 7.5.3 3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-050280 Meeting #42, Montreal, CANADA, 09 - 13 May 2005 Work Item Description Title: Enhance NRM to accommodate NGN (IMS as basis of the Next Generation Network) Unique_ID: 35044 Acronym: OAM7-NIM-NGN 1 3GPP Work Area X Radio Access X Core Network Services 2 Linked work items OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7) WI Unique_ID OAM7 35041 Network Infrastructure Management (BB: OAM7-NIM) WI Unique_ID OAM7-NIM 35042 3 Justification The IMS has been adopted as the basis of the Next Generation Network (NGN). It is proposed to enhance the 3GPP NRM in TS 32.63x Configuration Management (CM); Core Network Resources Integration Reference Point (IRP) - to accommodate any additional requirements identified. 4 Objective In liaison with other groups (e.g. ETSI TISPAN, TeleManagement Forum (TMF), ITU-T SG4, Multiservice Switching Forum (MSF) to enhance the Core Network Resource Model to support the requirements of NGN Release 1 and Voice over IP (VoIP). 5 Service Aspects None 6 MMI-Aspects None 7 Charging Aspects None 8 Security Aspects None
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9 Impacts
Affects: UICC apps ME AN CN Others Yes X X No X X Don't know X
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10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary)
New specifications Spec No. Title Prime rsp. WG 2ndary rsp. WG(s) Presented for information at plenary# Approved at plenary# Comments 32.4xy Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements SA5 3GPPSA#31 13 - 15 Mar 200625 - 27 Sep 2006 3GPPSA#34 Dec 2006 32.4xy Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management IRP Information Service SA5 3GPPSA#33 25 - 27 Sep 2006 3GPPSA#34 Dec 2006 32.4xy Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): CORBA Solution Set SA5 3GPPSA#33 25 - 27 Sep 2006 3GPPSA#34 Dec 2006 Affected existing specifications Spec No. CR Subject Approved at plenary# Comments 32.421 3GPPSA#34 4 - 6 Dec 2006 32.422 3GPPSA#34 4 - 6 Dec 2006 32.423 3GPPSA#34 4 - 6 Dec 2006 Reason for re-scheduling: Recently SA5 identified some interworking between the Trace IRP and the Service Level Tracing (SLT). For SLT, SA5 just agreed on the Requirements and the Trace IRP got some input to the IRP requirement. 11 Work item rapporteur(s) [email protected] Toche 12 Work item leadership SA5 13 Supporting Companies Nortel, Nokia, Lucent Technologies, Huawei, Ericsson 14 Classification of the WI (if known) Feature (go to 14a) Building Block (go to 14b) X Work Task (go to 14c)
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14c The WI is a Work Task: parent Building Block
Trace Management (BB: OAM7-Trace) WI Unique_ID OAM7-Trace 35039
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32.307 Notification IRP SOAP SS
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32.317 Generic IRP Management SOAP SS
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32.807
32.607 Basic CM IRP SOAP SS
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32.807
32.617 Bulk CM IRP SOAP SS
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32.807
32.667 Kernel CM IRP SOAP SS
5 Service Aspects None 6 MMI-Aspects None 7 Charging Aspects None 8 Security Aspects None
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1 3GPP Work Area
Radio Access X Core Network Services 2 Linked work items OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7) WI Unique_ID OAM7 35041 Network Infrastructure Management (BB: OAM7-NIM) WI Unique_ID OAM7-NIM 35042 3 Justification Circuit is a logic link between two exchange network nodes which bear the user data such as voice, e.g. 64K slot of one 2M E1. Traffic route represents the route via which bearer flow to a specific destination. To learn the detailed circuit connection relationship between network nodes and traffic route configuration status of the CN CS, bearer transport network related NRM need to be defined, such as circuit, traffic route, etc. 4 Objective To define Bearer Transport Network (BTN) related NRM which are applicable to CN CS of UMTS. To specify Bearer Transport Network (BTN) relative NRM definition of the CN CS: • Specify BTN relative NRM management requirements • Specify BTN Network Resource Models (NRMs) • Specify CORBA Solution Set (SS) • Specify CMIP Solution Set (SS) 5 Service Aspects None 6 MMI-Aspects None 7 Charging Aspects None 8 Security Aspects None
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3.2 Principle of radio channel power monitoring
The transport channels and physical channels have mapping relations. The following is mapping of transport channels onto physical channels. 25.211 From the figure above, the mapping from transport channel to physical channel is mostly one to one. So, in most cases, we just need to monitor the physical channels. It is proposed to monitor the power of the following channels: • Transport channel: FACH、PCH • Uplink physical channel: DPCH (DPDCH/DPCCH)、PRACH • Downlink physical channel: DPCH (DPDCH/DPCCH)、CPICH、P-CCPCH、S-CCPCH、SCH、AICH、PICH In the above channel list, DPCH、PRACH、PDSCH are involved in power control. So, we should record the maximum and mean value of power level for those channels as performance measurements. For other channels, only the configured value will be retrieved. The following channel power parameters are already present in TS 32.642: • primaryCpichPower(1) • maximumTransmissionPower(2) • bchPower(3) • primaryCcpchPower(4) • dlpchPower(5) • schPower(6) The following parameters should be added: • fachPower (7) • dpchPower(8) • prachPower (9) • sccpchPower(10) • pdschPower(11) • pichPower(12) • aichPower(13) (8)、(9)、(11) are channels which are involved in power control. 4 Objective Add (7) (10) (12) (13) to TS 32.642 Add (8) (9) (11) to TS 32.403 Update UTRAN Network Resource Model (NRM) Requirements (if needed) Update UTRAN Network Resource Model (NRM) Update UTRAN NRM CORBA Solution Set (SS) Update UTRAN NRM CMIP Solution Set (SS) Update UTRAN NRM XML format definition Add UTRAN channel Measurements 5 Service Aspects None 6 MMI-Aspects None 7 Charging Aspects None 8 Security Aspects None
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14b The WI is a Building Block: parent Feature
(one Work Item identified as a feature) OAM&P (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning) (Feature: OAM7) Acronym Unique_ID OAM7 35041 Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#29(05)0627 Meeting #29, Tallinn, ESTONIA, 26-28 September 2005 Source: SA5 (Telecom Management) Title: WID WT End-to-end Service Level tracing for IMS (OAM7-Trace-IMS) Document for: Approval Agenda Item: 11.27 3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-058848 Meeting #43, Bordeaux, FRANCE, 29 Aug - 2 Sep 2005 Work Item Description Title: End-to-end Service Level tracing for IMS Unique_ID: 35062 Acronym: OAM7-Trace-IMS 1 3GPP Work Area X Radio Access X Core Network X Services 2 Linked work items a) Trace Management (SA5 BB: OAM7-Trace) b) Trace Management, SIP Enhancements for Trace – (CT1 WT : OAM7-Trace-SIP) WI Unique_ID a) OAM7-Trace 35039 b) OAM7-Trace-SIP 11046 3 Justification The Open Mobile Alliance™ (URL:http://www.openmobilealliance.org/) have developed a set of technology agnostic service level tracing requirements, which are now approved [see OMA-RD-OSPE-V1_0-20050614-C.pdf]. The intentions of Service Level Tracing are to improve and simplify end-to-end service diagnostics and to enhance the Mobile Operator’s ability to manage their complex services. Service Level Tracing is aimed at end-to-end service-level diagnostics, rather than per node tracing. By definition, Service Level Tracing is the ability to capture and log all relevant information at each component within a service chain, associated with a specific service that is initiated either by an end user or a component [see OMA-RD-OSPE-V1_0-20050614-C.pdf]. Considering the importance of IMS, 3GPP SA5 SWGD, in coordination with 3GPP CT1, CT3, CT4, will start developing the appropriate specifications for end-to-end service tracing for IMS, and wherever possible to reuse existing 3GPP speciation and their capabilities to fulfil the OMA OSPE service level tracing requirements. OMA OSPE service level tracing requirements specific to OMA enablers utilising IMS [see OMA-IMSinOMA-V1_0-20050204-C.zip] will be addressed within OMA. 4 Objective The objectives of this work item are: a) For 3GPP TSG SA5 to review the OMA requirements for Service Level Tracing and develop their Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 specifications for Trace as appropriate. b) For 3GPP TSG SA5, as primary group responsible for Trace in 3GPP, to co-ordinate with 3GPP TSG CT 1, CT3, and CT4 in order for those working groups to develop the specifications under their control that are impacted. 5 Service Aspects Refer to “OMA Service Provider Requirements” OMA-RD-OSPE-V1_0-20050614-C, The Open Mobile Alliance™ (URL:http://www.openmobilealliance.org/) 6 MMI-Aspects None 7 Charging Aspects Refer to “OMA Service Provider Requirements” OMA-RD-OSPE-V1_0-20050614-C, The Open Mobile Alliance™ (URL:http://www.openmobilealliance.org/) 8 Security Aspects Refer to “OMA Service Provider Requirements” OMA-RD-OSPE-V1_0-20050614-C, The Open Mobile Alliance™ (URL:http://www.openmobilealliance.org/)
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3 Open Work item status and approval time frame
This list reflects the open work items running under the responsibility of TSG SA WG5. Work items in this colour are closed or building blocks.
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4 Completed or Terminated Work items
This list reflects work items that have been completed or terminated. Annex A: Change history Change history Date TSG # TSG Doc. CR Rev Subject/Comment Old New Nov 2005 S5_44 S5-050529 -- -- Initial draft agreed by SA5#44 Dec 2005 SA_30 SP-050734 -- -- Submitted to SA#30 for Information Mar 2006 SA_31 SP-060073 -- -- Converted to TR 32.207. Submitted to SA#31 for Information 0.0.3
f4da59af4d170d3da6097a508a147acf
50.099
45.005 New frequency ranges
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50.099
45.050 Scenarios for new frequencies
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24.008 Classmark information elements
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50.099
45.008 Add frequency ranges
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50.099
45.001 Add frequency and channels
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50.099
43.030 Add frequency ranges
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43.022 Add channels to be searched
2080% Dec 2002 StartedOngoing Addition of frequency bands to GSM – Changes for conformance tests GP-022074 51.010-1 Add testing 0% Dec 2002 Started Enhanced Power Control GP-012748 Realization of Enhanced power control and signaling support GP-012749 Concept Changes to 43.051 Changes to 44.004 Changes to 44.018 Changes to 48.058 Changes to 45.001 Changes to 45.002 Changes to 45.003 Changes to 45.008 Nov 2001 Ready for Rel 5. Closed GERAN MS Conformance test for Enhanced Power Control GP-012750 • MS test 0% Dec 2002 Not started GERAN BTS Conformance test for Enhanced Power Control GP-012751 • BTS test 0% Dec 2002 Not started 8PSK AMR HR GP-012752 Definition of channel coding, performance requirements and signaling support GP-012753 • Concept • Changes to 44.018 • Changes to 45.001 • Changes to 45.002 • Changes to 45.003 • Changes to 45.005 • Changes to 24.008 • Changes to 48.058 Jun 2002 Ready for R5. Closed GERAN MS Conformance test for 8PSK HR GP-012754 • MS test 0% Dec 2002 GERAN BTS Conformance test for 8PSK HR GP-012755 • BTS test 1000% Dec 2002 GERAN enhancements for streaming services 1 GP-010430 GERAN enhancements for streaming services 1 GP-010430 • Concept • RLC protocol enhancement (SDU Discard) Oct 2001 Nov 2001???? Ready for R5. Closed GERAN enhancements for streaming services 2 GP-010429 GERAN enhancements for streaming services 2 GP-010429 Usage of ECSD Stage 2 Stage 3 • RLC PDU formats • MAC header Jun 2001 Jun 2002 Ready for R5. Closed Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes: Overall System Architecture SA2 Feature GERAN work for Intra Domain Connection of RAN Nodes to Multiple CN Nodes GP-020492 Stage 2 (changes to ) • 43.051 Introduction of support for IDNNS in GERAN Iu mode Stage 3 (changes to ) • 48.016 Use of Gb interface concepts when a network applies IDNNS • 48.018 Include MSC/VLR identity in CS IMSI paging Jun 2002 Ready for R5. Closed, accept changes for Gb over IP 700 MHz spectrum support GP-000449 GERAN support for the 700 MHz band • Signaling support • Physical layer definitions • Receiver performance and RF budget Ready for R4. Closed GERAN MS Conformance test for 700 MHz band GP-000451 • MS test Jun 2001 Closed GERAN BTS Conformance test for GERAN interface evolution GP-000452 • BTS test 0100% Dec 2002 Ongoing Real Time QoS for packet services including VoIP (UTRAN) HOs: maintenance of real-time QoS while moving between cells in the PLMN including inter-SGSN change and SRNS relocation or possibly other mechanisms (UTRAN) GP-010431 Handover for the packet switched domain • Stabile RT handover report 25.936 including header removal • Update of stage 2 • Update of relevant stage 3 specs Nov 2001 Closed Wideband telephony services (UMTS) Support of WB AMR in GERAN GP-000453 GMSK and 8PSK WB FR / HR support • Channel coding in 45.003 • Signalling for A interface • Signalling for Iu • Link adaptation in 45.009 • Receiver performance in 45.005 Apr 2002 Nov 2001 Jun 2002 Ready for R5. Closed GERAN MS Conformance test for WB AMR GP-000454 • MS test 0% Dec 2002 Not started GERAN BTS Conformance test for WB AMR GP-000455 • BTS test 1000% Dec 2002 Not startedOngoing Location service (UMTS) LCS interoprability aspects to GERAN GP-000456 • Co-ordinated development of GSM LCS Phase 2 and UMTS LCS, S2 and GERAN Ready for R5. Closed Location service for GERAN R4 GP-010932 • Work for aligning LCS R4 CN and GERAN Ready for R4. Closed Location Services (LCS) for GERAN in A/Gb Mode GP-011925 • GERAN LCS Stage Two • Gb interface support for LCS • L3 protocol support for LCS • Stage 3 specifications Feb. 2002 Ready for Rel-5. Closed Location Services (LCS) for GERAN in Iu Mode GP-011926 • GERAN LCS stage 2 • Iu interface support for LCS • Iur-g interface support for LCS • RRC protocol support for LCS • Additional impacts on Broadcast of LCS data on packet channels • Stage 3 specifications Stage 2-GERAN #8 Feb. 2002 Stage 3 – GERAN #9 Jun 2002 Ready for R5. Closed GERAN MS Conformance test for LCS GP-000458 • Develop LCS MS test case work plan (Release 98/99/4) • Develop LCS MS test cases ?% Dec 2002 (#11) Ongoing GERAN BTS Conformance test for LCS GP-000459 • Develop LCS BTS test case work plan (Release 99/99/4) • Develop LCS BTS test cases ?% Dec 2002 Work has not started Uplink TDOA feasibility study GP-012794 Uplink TDOA feasibility study GP-012794 • Performing of a feasitibility study Jun 2002 Closed. MS Conformance Testing of Dual Transfer Mode GP-023226 MS Conformance Testing of Dual Transfer Mode • MS Conformance Testing of Dual Transfer Mode 100% Feb 2003 Ongoing Single Antenna Receiver Interference Cancellation (SAIC) GP-023404GP-023316 Single Antenna Receiver Interference Cancellation (SAIC) • Determine feasibility of SAIC for GMSK and 8PSK scenarios under realistic synchronized and non-synchronized network conditions. Using a single Feasibility Study, both GMSK and 8PSK scenarios will be evaluated individually. • Realistic DIR (Dominant-to-rest of Interference Ratio) levels and distributions based on network simulations and measurements. • Robustness against different training sequences. • Determine method to detect/indicate SAIC capability. 10% April 2003 Ongoing Uplink TDOA location determination for GSM/GPRS GP-023316 Uplink TDOA location determination for GSM/GPRS • Addition of U-TDOA in the CS domain • Addition of U-TDOA in the PS domain April 2003 Nov 2003 Ongoing DTM MS test work item to be included in the next revision Closed work items New Specifications GSM No. TDOC CR Subject CR Comp. Resp. TSG Completion Date 43.051 GERAN overall description S. Gillaume (Nokia) GERAN Nov 00 43.059 Functional Stage 2 Description of Location Services in GERAN M. Livingston (Nokia) GERAN April 2001 44.118 GERAN Iu mode RRC S. Hamiti GERAN June 2002 44.160 GERAN Iu mode RLC/MAC ? GERAN June 2002 50.099 TR GERAN project schedule and open issues F. Mueller GERAN Dec 2002 xx.xxx TR Optimized speech in the IMS domain B. Guarino GERAN ?  Approved  Set on hold  #29 Send to SMG #29 CR0000A000 CR has been cancelled A-1 GERAN radio requirements A-1.1 Introduction The GERAN provides a range of bearer services to mobile and stationary users in a variety of application areas and operating environments. The radio access network will be connected to the third generation core network and will as far as possible extend the services of the fixed networks to mobile users. This document outlines the overall requirements for GERAN release 2000, which includes all GSM/EDGE work items of release 2000. More specific radio requirements, such as radio requirements for the AMR wide band speech codec, are included as references, if available, and are not discussed in this document. The requirements should be used as guidelines for the design of the radio access network.The requirements should be aligned with the requirements on UTRAN. A-1.2 Definitions and Abbreviations A-1.2.1 Definitions GSM/EDGE RAN GERAN is a term used to describe a GSM and EDGE based 200 kHz radio access network. The GERAN is based on GSM/EDGE release 99, and covers all new features for GSM Release 2000 and subsequent releases, with full backward compatibility to previous releases. A-1.2.2 Abbreviations 3G Third Generation BER Bit Error Rate CN Core network CS Circuit Switched GERAN GSM/EDGE Radio Access Network RAN Radio Access Network RAB Radio Access Bearer RB Radio Bearer QoS Quality of Service PS Packet Switched UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System UTRAN UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network A-1.3 High Level Requirements The following high level requirements have been initially identified for the GERAN in responsibility of SMG2: • All bearer classes (conversational, streaming, interactive and background) as defined for UTRAN shall be provided • The same quality of service handling and radio access bearer service attributes shall be supported as required for UTRAN (as described in TS 23.107). Whether the same range of values of the service attributes as supported by UTRAN shall be supported by GERAN in Release 2000 is for further study • Support for multiple QoS profiles in parallel shall be provided in the GERAN. A-1.4 Bearer Definition A-1.4.1 Radio Access Bearers GERAN shall provide the same radio access bearers as UTRAN. However, voice is foreseen to be important future service and therefor it seen as important to optimize the conversational radio access bearer class for IP voice services. It is required to have the GERAN support Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) CODEC speech and to be consistent with S2 requirements. Further, it is desired to have the GERAN support Tandem Free Operation (TFO) services. Further, voice radio access bearers should be provided with quality and delay comparable to current digital cellular systems. Figure 1 shows the UMTS QoS architecture. As illustrated in the figure the Radio Access Bearer Service is realized by a Radio Bearer Service and an Iu-Bearer Service. Figure 1. UMTS QoS architecture. A-1.4.1.1 Radio Access Bearer Attributes A set of attributes and their possible values are used to describe a radio access bearer capability. This set has been chosen so that a radio access bearer capability can be entirely defined by giving a value to each attribute of the set. In particular, the set and the associated allowed values enable characterization of future (not yet used or foreseen) transfer needs. For the GERAN the same set of attributes are chosen as for the UTRAN, which are defined in 23.107 [1]. The support of the different values may vary from the radio environment the user is in (indoor, urban, rural and etc.), see section A-1.4.2.1. The values used by the 3G CN are as follows: Table 1. Value ranges of the radio access bearer service attributes in UMTS. Traffic class Conversational class Streaming class Interactive class Background class Maximum bitrate [kbps] <2000 (1) (2) <2000 (1) (2) < 2000 – overhead (2) (3) <2000 - overhead (2) (3) Delivery order Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Maximum SDU size [octets] <1500 (4) <1500 (4) <1500 (4) <1500 (4) SDU format information (5) (5) Delivery of erroneous SDUs Yes/No/- Yes/No/- Yes/No/- Yes/No/- Residual BER 5*10-2, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4 (6) 5*10-2, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6 (6) 4*10-3, 10-5, 6*10-8 (6) (7) 4*10-3, 10-5, 6*10-8 (6) (7) SDU error ratio 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5 (6) 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5 (6) 10-3, 10-4, 10-6 (6) 10-3, 10-4, 10-6 (6) Transfer delay [ms] 80 – maximum value(6) 500 – maximum value (6) Guaranteed bit rate [kbps] <2000 (1) (2) <2000 (1) (2) Traffic handling priority 1,2,3 (8) Allocation/Retention priority 1,2,3 (8) 1,2,3 (8) 1,2,3 (8) 1,2,3 (8) Source statistic descriptor Speech/unknown Speech/unknown Speech/unknown Speech/unknown 1) Bitrate of 2000 kbps requires that UTRAN operates in transparent RLC protocol mode, in this case the overhead from layer 2 protocols is negligible. 2) The granularity of the bit rate parameters must be studied. Although the UMTS network has capability to support a large number of different bitrate values, the number of possible values must be limited not to unnecessarily increase the complexity of for example terminals, charging and interworking functions. Exact list of supported values shall be defined together with S1, N1, N3 and R2. 3) Impact from layer 2 protocols on maximum bitrate in non-transparent RLC protocol mode shall be estimated. 4) Maximum SDU size shall at least allow UMTS network to support external PDUs having as high MTU as Internet/Ethernet (1500 octets). The need for higher values must be investigated by N1, N3, S1, R2, R3. 5) Definition of possible values of exact SDU sizes for which UTRAN can support transparent RLC protocol mode, is the task of RAN WG3. 6) Values are indicative. Exact values on Residual BER, SDU error ratio and transfer delay shall defined together with S1, N1, N3 and R2. 7) Values are derived from CRC lengths of 8, 16 and 24 bits on layer 1. 8) Number of priority levels shall be further analysed by S1, N1 and N3. A-1.4.2 Radio Bearers Mapping of radio access bearers onto radio bearers is up to the RAN as long as the requested QoS is achieved. Each radio bearer will be mapped to one or more radio interface logical channels for the purposes of transmission over the GERAN. Suggested properties of the GERAN: • The design of GERAN should allow for several radio bearers to be used simultaneously with single user equipment. This could be used for instance to provide support for multiple QoS profiles in parallel • The design of GERAN should allow for optimised voice radio bearers in both the PS and the CS domain. The handling of TFO is for further study. The design of GERAN should allow efficient support of the wide variety of services, including future services, which have yet to be defined. A-1.4.2.1 Minimum radio bearer capabilities Giving one of the possible values to each RAB service attribute defines a possible radio access bearer service. However, not all combinations are necessarily supported by the GERAN system. The following table shows potential combinations for the attributes that are expected to change dependent on the radio environment. The values given under the different QoS classes are Maximum bitrate/BER/Max Transfer Delay 1. Table 2. Minimum radio bearer capabilities. Operating environment Propagation conditions Conversational Streaming Background Interactive Rural outdoor (Terminal relative speed to ground up to 250 km/h) HT100 850/900 Mhz: RA250 1800/1900 Mhz: RA130 T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. Urban/ Suburban outdoor (Terminal relative speed to ground up to 120 km/h) HT100 TU50 T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. Indoor/ Low range outdoor (Terminal relative speed to ground up to 10 km/h) Indoor TU3 T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. T.B.D. A-1.4.2.2 RTP/UDP/IP Header adaptation GERAN shall support header adaptation in order to provide an increase in spectral efficiency. In particular the header adaptation mechanism should not degrade the hand over performance and user perceived quality (e.g. header adaptation mechanism should not degrade the speech quality). Error propagation due to header adaptation should be kept to a minimum or avoided, if at all possible. In addition the header adaptation mechanism should operate under all expected BER and delay conditions. A-1.5 Handover requirements This section deals with both intra and inter GERAN handover and cell re-selection requirements. Cell re-selection refers to cell change when in idle mode or ready state, whereas handover refers to change of physical channel (in the same or possibly in a new cell) when in non-idle state. The overall requirements on GERAN handover and cell re-selection are: • For support of pre release 2000 terminals the GERAN should provide cell re-selection in the same way as (E)GPRS; • For support of pre release 2000 terminals the GERAN should provide handover in the same way as GSM; • Cell re-selection and handover should be in the responsibility of the radio access network2; • GERAN should support intra- (within a cell) and inter- (between cells) cell handovers; • For the GERAN release 2000, handover performance should be no worse than for GSM circuit switched services. In particular, the transmission gap should be no more than 150 ms; • In GERAN release 2000, other requirements related to the HO function shall be of same quality as in GSM release 99 (e.g. neighbourcell measurement rate). Table on Intra GERAN handover and cell reselection GERAN R00 PS GERAN R99 PS GERAN R00 CS GERAN R99 CS GERAN R00 PS HO CRS CRS No No GERAN R99 PS CRS CRS No No GERAN R00 CS No No HO HO GERAN R99 CS No No HO HO HO is for RT services CRS is for NRT services „No“ means neither HO or CRS is supported A-1.5.1 Interworking with other systems Specific requirements are expected from SA2. The following table should be seen as the working assumption on required handover scenarios between different systems while waiting input from SA2. Table on Inter GERAN handover and cell reselection ANSI 136 UTRAN R99 PS UTRAN R99 CS UTRAN R00 PS UTRAN R00 CS GERAN R00 PS No CRS No HO CRS No GERAN R00 CS FFS No HO No HO HO is for RT services CRS is for NRT services „No“ means neither HO or CRS is supported A-1.6 Security issues Specific requirements are expected from SMG10. A-1.7 Operational requirements A-1.7.1 Architecture requirements Specific requirements are expected from SA2. A-1.7.2 Radio operation environments GERAN should support all Radio Access Bearers in the radio environments specified in current GSM 05.05. A-1.7.3 Radio access network planning For a comparable services, GERAN should provide cell range at least as good as GSM Release 99. GERAN systems should not affect the performance of existing EGPRS/GSM systems. GERAN should support frequency planning similar to GSM Release 99. Note: Coverage for RT services of GERAN needs to be defined. A-1.7.4 Interference Management GERAN should support interference management at least similar to GSM Release 99. The GERAN solution should not preclude the use of smart antennas. A-1.7.5 Frequency bands and licensing GERAN systems should be deployable in at least those frequency bands defined in GSM 05.05 release 99. A-1.8 Efficient spectrum usage A-1.8.1 Spectral efficiency For comparable services, GERAN systems should have significantly higher spectral efficiency as compared to Release 99. It is understood that implementation of increased spectral efficiency may be restricted by the requirement of creating a Release 2000 Standard. A-1.8.2 Spectrum utilization For initial deployment GERAN shall support all services in at least 2.4 MHz of spectrum. GERAN shall support all packet domain services (real and non real time) in COMPACT mode deployment. It is recognized that spectrum efficiency may be greater with larger spectrum deployments. A-1.9 Deployment requirements A-1.9.1 Deployment GERAN should be flexible to support a variety of initial deployments. It should be possible to deploy GERAN with a minimum of upgrades to GSM Release 99 radio equipment. GSM/EDGE RAN may be deployed as a contiguous coverage, Island coverage, or Spot coverage system. It is anticipated that GERAN will also be deployed on a city-by-city basis. A-1.9.2 Backward compatibility It should be possible to deploy GERAN in spectrum shared with GSM Release 99, as well as other GSM systems. GERAN should be deployable in carriers and time slots adjacent to those supporting GSM Release 99, at least with fixed division of time slots between GERAN and the other systems. It is recognized that there may be advantages to dedicating radio resources system-wide to some types of GERAN operation. A-1.9.3 Complexity / cost It should be possible to provide a variety of MS as well as Base Station types of varying complexity, cost and capabilities in order to satisfy the needs of different types of operator and user scenarios. The Release 2000 is expected to imply the same RF properties as a Release 1999. A-1.9.4 Terminal GERAN systems should support a variety of terminal types, including advanced feature phones, PDA’s, PCMCIA cards, and other terminal types. Hand portables and PCMCIA card sized GERAN terminals should be optimized in terms of size, weight, operating time, range, and the effective radiated power and cost/performance ratio. A-1.9.5 Network For further study A-1.10 Requirements from bodies outside SMG A-1.10.1 Electromagnetic compatibility GERAN systems should cause no more interference to other equipment than current GSM-based systems. A-1.10.2 RF radiation GERAN systems should operate at RF emission power levels consistent with applicable recommendations and specifications for electromagnetic radiation. A-1.10.3 Security For further study A-1.11 Evolution of GERAN Release 2000 of GERAN should include efficient support of RT services in the PS domain and it should be aligned with UMTS. The GERAN shall be defined so that it can be implemented in phases with increasing functionality (for example making use of new technology), while allowing the maximum possible backwards compatibility. The introduction of new functions should be done in a manner that maximizes forward compatibility with enhancements expected in subsequent releases. The definition of GERAN should allow evolution to higher bit rates. A-1.12 Open Issues This section summerizes the open issues that have been identified in this document. 1. Is there support for multiple QoS profiles in parallel in R99 2. A discussion on the relation of TFO to the Transcoder (TRAU) position in the architecture highlighted the issue of how UTRAN deals with TFO. The following questions arose: 1. Clarification on how TFO is handled in UMTS (This is a question for 3GPP TSG S4)) 2. What voice requirements will come from S2 3. Input from SA2 is expected on the RAB attribute value ranges. 4. The T.B.D. in table 2 need to be resolved. Another open issue in the table is whether other propagation models should be included, e.g. BUx. 5. Verify that the speech gap during handover should be no more than 150 ms is a GSM requirement. 6. The delay and data loss requirements on different handovers and cell re-selection shall be specified further. The requirements depend on the service and that should be reflected as well. A-1.13 References [1] TSG SA2, 23.107, “QoS Concept and Architecture”. A-2 History Document history 23th February 2000 First draft (V0.0.1) 2nd April 2000 Updated after GERAN #1 and EDGE WS #13 (V0.0.2) 8th May 2000 Updated after SMG2 #35 (V0.0.3) 22nd May 2000 Updated after SMG2 GERAN WS #2 (V0.0.4) 24th May 2000 Updated during SMG2 #36 (V0.0.5) 2nd August 2000 Updated for 3GPP S3 meeting (V0.0.6) 28th August 2000 Updated after SMG2 GERAN release 2000 and beyond Adhoc #1 9th October 2000 Updated after TSG GERAN #1 as 50.099 (V0.0.1) 6th November 2000 Updated after TSG GERAN Adhoc on release 2000 and beyond #2 as 50.099 (V0.0.2) 12th February 2001 Updated after TSG GERAN #3 (V0.0.5) April 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #4 (V0.06) 7th May 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN Adhoc on released 2000 and beyond #5 (V0.07) 11th May 2001 Updated during TSG GERAN Adhoc on release 2000 and beyond #5 (V0.08) 28th May 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #5 (V0.09) 27th August 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #6 (V0.10) 26th Nov 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #7 (V0.11) 30th Nov 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #7 (V0.12) 30th Nov 2001 Updated for TSG GERAN #7 (V0.13) 15th April, 2002 Updated for TSG-GERAN #9 (v0.15) 19th April, 2002 Updated for TSG-GERAN #9 (v0.16) 24th June 2002 Updated for TSG-GERAN #10 (V0.17) 28th June 2002 Updated during TSG GERAN #10 (V0.18) 25th August 2002 Updated for TSG GERAN #11 (V0.19) 30th August 2002 Updated during TSG GERAN #11 (V0.20) 20th November 2002 Updated during TSG GERAN #12 (V0.21) Editor: Frank MuellerDavid Bladsjö, Ericsson Email: [email protected] Tel: +46-8-7570287 4048657
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1 Scope
This technical report defines methods for supporting push services by 3GPP bearers. The mechanisms defined apply to existing bearers for the 3GPP Packet Switched Domain (PS domain), Circuit-Switched Domain (CS Domain), and the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS), Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service, and Wireless LAN. This technical report addresses the requirements for supported push services as defined in 3GPP TS 22.174 Push Service; Service aspects (Stage 1). Any necessary changes identified during this work will be introduced by means of CRs to the appropriate specifications. Definition of push functions that apply to push application servers is outside the scope of this work. The definition of push functions that are best implemented in push application servers such as a Push Proxy and Push Initiator will be undertaken by other standards bodies and industry forums.
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: " Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications ". [2] 3GPP TS 22.060: " General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage ". [3] 3GPP TS 22.174: " Push Service; Service aspects (Stage 1) ". [4] 3GPP TS 23.039: " Interface protocols for the connection of Short Message Service Centres (SMSCs) to Short Message Entities (SMEs) ". [5] 3GPP TS 23.040: " Technical realization of the Short Message Service (SMS) ". [6] 3GPP TS 23.060: " General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2 ". [7] 3GPP TS 23.228: " IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem - Stage 2 ". [8] 3GPP TS 23.002: "Network Architecture". [9] 3GPP TS 29.007: "General Requirements on interworking between the PLMN and the ISDN or PSTN". [9] 3GPP TR 23.875974: "Support of Push Services". [10] 3GPP TR 23.910: "Circuit Switched Data Bearer Services".
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3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.174 [3] and the following apply. delivery network: a network that supports connectionless or connection oriented push services. A delivery network may simply be a GPRS network. application server: a server that provides push services through a delivery network, e.g. via an IP connection user IP address: an IP address provided by the delivery network that can be used by an application server to for access to a push services user. The address may be permanently assigned (static) or temporarily assigned (dynamic). user-ID: an identity or name that can be used to deliver push content to a user in a delivery network The format of user-ID is dependent on the protocol for the push services. user availability: the ability of an delivery network to provide push service to a subscribed user. user terminal: the end user equipment that receives push content. long-lived PDP Context: this is a PDP Context that remains active/open for an indefinite period of time. Also referred to as “always-on PDP context”. always-on PDP Context: this is a PDP Context that remains active/open for an indefinite period of time. Also referred to as “long-lived PDP context”. Push Data: data sent by the push initiator to the push recipient, of a format known to the receiver (push recipient), and not otherwise defined by the push service. Push function: the function in the PLMN that receives the Push Data from the Push initiator. The push function is responsible for delivering the push data to the Push recipient. The Push Function may also be referred to as a Push Proxy or Push Proxy Gateway. Push initiator: the entity that originates push data and submits it to the push function for delivery to a Push recipient. A Push initiator may be e.g. an application providing value added services. Push recipient: the entity that receives the push data from the Push function and processes or uses it. This may include the UE with which the PLMN communicates with, the user agent with the application level address, and the device, machine or person which uses the push data. A Push recipient is controlled by an individual user . Push service: a service capability offered by the PLMN. The Push Service is initiated by a Push Initiator in order to transfer push data (e.g. data, multimedia content) from the Push Initiator to the Push Recipient without a previous user action. The Push Service could be used as a basic capability or as component of a value added service. Push User agent: is any software or device associated with a Push recipient that interprets Push Data to the user. This may include textual browsers, voice browsers, search engines, machine or device interface software, etc.
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3.2 Symbols
For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: NAT Network Address Translator NRPCA Network Requested PDP Context Activation OTA Over The Air delivery protocol PP Push Proxy PI Push Initiator
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4 Architecture Requirements
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5 Push Architecture Overview
The Push Service Architecture overview is shown in figure 1. This includes the push application servers Push Function (or Push Proxy) and Push Initiator as well as the bearer services available as the delivery network and the Push Recipient or UE. The definition of functions in the Push Function (Push Proxy) and Push Initiator are outside the scope of this TR. Figure 1 also shows the Push Function performing bearer selection, the definition of how this is performed and the criteria for bearer selection are part of the definition of the Push Function and are outside the scope of this TR. Figure 1 depicts the Push Function being located within the PLMN, this is a logical representation of the Push Service Architecture and does not imply the physical co-location of a Push Function within the PLMN infrastructure. The definition description of the delivery network (bearers) used to support push services and how those bearers are established, maintained and withdrawn is the main focus of this sectionTR. Figure 1: Push Service Architecture Overview.
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5.1 Push Bearers in the PS Domain
This section describes the use of various mechanisms in the PS Domain to establish and/or maintain a bearer service connection to the UE over which Push services may be delivered. Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work • Push using Long Lived PDP Context ◦ This section describes the use of an existing PDP Context for Push services. ▪ Push with Static IP Address Assignment ◦ This section describes the use of 3GPP TS 23.060 section 9.2.2.2 Network-Requested PDP Context Activation procedure to establish and carry Push services to a UE. • Push with Dynamic IP Address Assignment ◦ This section describes a mechanism to establish a PDP Context that can be used to carry Push services to a UE when the PS Domain implements Dynamic IP address assignment. • Push using SMS in PS Domain ◦ The section describes how Push services can be delivered to a UE using the services defined for Short Message Service in the PS Domain.
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5.2 Push Bearers in the CS Domain
This section describes the use of various mechanisms in the CS Domain to establish and/or maintain a bearer service connection to the UE over which Push services may be delivered. Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work • Push over Circuit-Switched Data Bearer ◦ This section describes the use of a circuit-switched data bearer to deliver Push services. The Circuit-Switch Data connection is established based on the mechanisms described in 3GPP TR 23.910 Circuit-Switched Data Bearer Services and 3GPP TS 29.007 General Requirements on interworking between the PLMN and the ISDN or PSTN, section 9.2 Data Calls. • Push using SMS in CS Domain ◦ The section describes how Push services can be delivered to a UE using the services defined for Short Message Service in the CS Domain.
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5.3 Push in the IP Multimedia Subsystem
Editors Note: the following bullets provide guidance for further work • Push using SIP ◦ The solution described in this section defines a method using the SIP protocol in IMS to carry Push services to a UE.
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5.4 Push using MBMS
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5.5 Push using WLAN
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6 Analysis and Conclusion
Annex <A> (normative): <Normative annex title> Annex <B> (informative): <Informative annex title> Annex <X> (informative): Change history Change history Date TSG # TSG Doc. CR Rev Subject/Comment Old New 200301 Created at SA2#29 San Francisco 0.0.0 2003-01 Revised at SA2#29 San Francisco 0.0.1
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1 Scope
The present document summarises the results of the feasibility study about inclusion of Wideband Distribution Systems, or WDS, as part of third generation networks in 3GPP standards. It covers the history of the proposal, shows and discusses the results of relevant analysis and simulation activities, highlights the possible degree of integration to the current status of 3GPP network architecture and concludes with the indication for a possible way forward in the standardisation path.
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. [1] End to End Simulations Detail, TEK 3GPP ETE SD v.0.1, R4-011578 (RAN WG4 #20). [2] “Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); UE Radio Transmission and Reception (FDD) (3GPP TS 25.101 version 4.1.0 Release 4)”, Ref. RTS/TSGR-0425101Uv4R1, July 2001 [3] “Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); UTRA (BS) FDD; Radio transmission and Reception (3GPP TS 25.104 version 4.1.0 Release 4)”, Ref. RTS/TSGR-0425104Uv4R1, July 2001 [4] ADS simulation model parameters TEK 3GPP 21_ADS, R4-011579 (RAN WG4 #20) [5] Technical justification and overall advantages for UTRA Wideband Distribution Subsystems (WDS) R4-010668 (RAN WG4 #17). [6] Comments on WDS O&M impact from RAN3 and SA5, R4-011609 (RAN WG4 #20)
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3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
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3.2 Symbols
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3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project ACLR Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio ACS Adjacent Channel Sensitivity ALC Automatic Level Control BS Base Stations CPICH Common PIlot CHannel DL Downlink FDD Frequency Division Duplex GPS Global Positioning System ID Identification IPDL Idle Period for Down Link Iub Interface between RNC and BS LCS Location Services LLI Low Level Interface LMU Local Measurement Unit LNA Low Noise Amplifier MCPA Multi Carrier Power Amplifier O&M Operation and Maintenance QoS Quality of Service OTDOA Observed Time Difference of Arrival PCF Position Calculation Function RF Radio Frequency RNC Radio Network Controller TDD Time Division Duplex TR Technical Report UE User Equipment UDD Unconstrained Delay Data bearer service UL Uplink UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System UTRAN UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access WDS Wideband Distribution System WI Work Item 4 Definition of WDS in FDD UTRAN 4.1 Introduction UTRAN FDD Base Stations can sometime include Ancillary Equipment like masthead amplifiers or remote radio heads, that may add flexibility and reduce cost of installation. These solutions are embedded in BS as ancillary RF amplifiers and are therefore seen as integral part of it in a single-vendor deployment scenario. In order to improve flexibility of radio access network solution, a new type of equipment is proposed, here called Wideband Distribution System, or WDS. WDS are altogether similar devices, capable of remotisation of BS RF interface, but offering flexible and multiple RF interface to one or more BS or sub-equipped BS. The so-defined WDS shall include one or multiple RF front-ends, RF transmission, and interfaces capable of supporting one or multiple BS. WDS may be designed to operate in any full UTRA FDD paired or TDD bands according to regional requirements. Similar definitions are possible in TDD scenarios and may be considered as part of further work, and analysis of the TS 25.105 UTRA (BS) TDD specification has not highlighted any parameters that suggest WDS would not comply in a TDD environment. The degree of performance impact shall be assessed in this document to understand the effect on multi-carrier WCDMA signals in order to maintain compliance to the relevant standard in the coverage area. The test and simulation scenarios in this report are made with the assumption that of no impact from any passive distribution system. Therefore the results are of an ideal nature and may need to be adjusted to suit the class of base station utilised for deployment.
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4.2 WDS Architecture
The key attribute of WDS is its capability to enable the radio interface of a number of BS to be remote, and hence support a distributed multi-carrier and multi-operator network. WDS is in general an active device and includes, but is not limited to, one or multiple RF front-end (LNA, MCPA) and RF transmission interfaces capable of supporting one or multiple BS. Other ancillary functions may be included as required for best system integration. It also includes O&M facilities and interfaces in order to fulfil any supervision requirements. Figure 1 Network Configuration with WDS WDS generally include a number of functions that are required for correct operation. Those functions are listed and described in Table 1 here below: Function Definition Function Description Centralised multi-operator RF interface It provides RF independent interface to multiple BS belonging to different networks. It must include provisions such as RF isolation (>30dB), power threshold detectors, and ALC to prevent that any malfunctioning at one network may affect other networks. Transmit RF power at BS interface can be as low as a fraction of a Watt Transmission It provides the proper wideband link to a number of remotely placed sites that host suitable RF amplifiers and other devices (RF front-end) RF transmit MCPA It amplifies all available RF channels in the downlink direction, and therefore shall offer suitable in a multi-carrier scenario. Power classes can be defined on a wide range, and amplifier technology shall accordingly change to maintain best efficiency RF receive LNA It amplifies uplink signals before they are fed back to BS receivers. Its dimensioning is basic in order to optimise uplink dynamic range (NF, Intermods, Blocking) RF filtering/diplexing It provides a common TX/RX antenna connector at the remote site, and includes proper selectivity for achieving interference protection as required in the various deployment scenarios Other functions Other functions shall be included if applicable, e.g. diversity and O&M Table 1 – WDS functions breakdown
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4.3 Practical Deployment Examples of WDS
Two examples are given only for information and topology understanding purposes of practical deployment for WDS, with reference to previous functions listing in Table 1. Additional indications will require further study on a dedicated Technical Report on WDS Deployment Scenario. 4.3.1 In-building Deployment A standard layout is shown, where 2 centralised BS belonging to 2 different networks feed a WDS with 24 Remote Low Power RF Heads, with all RF channels distributed throughout the building (or part of it) in one single cell. The case could be easily expanded to a higher number of networks without affecting the concept. In this deployment case coverage antennas are often fed by means of a small passive distribution network, i.e. 5 to 20 metres coaxial cable and RF splitters/couplers, for maximum losses in the range of 10dB at UMTS frequencies. This loss adds up to the RF path loss. The number N of Remote Heads being conveyed on a single sector would increase UL NF by 10 Log N, and this will require further consideration in possible WDS specification and deployment scenarios. 4.3.2 Outdoor Deployment for Small Cells A possible layout is shown, where 2 centralised BS feed a WDS with 1 Remote RF Head, with dedicated RF channels to each of the small outdoor cells that may be possible with WDS. The case could be easily expanded to a higher number of networks without affecting the concept. In this deployment case receive diversity path has been added. Hence uplink time delay and RF gain inequality control must be considered as a possible requirement.
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4.4 Benefits of WDS
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4.4.1 Technical and Deployment Aspects
Because of its very principle, WDS may bring technical and economical advantages as summarised here: 1. Possible BS and RNC co-location in centralised equipment locations allowing shared facilities, increased implementation flexibility and trunking efficiency. 2. Distributed RF wideband microcellular heads, with lower RF transmission power to cope with most stringent environmental compatibility and scalable traffic capacity requirements. 3. Better and easier flexibility in network planning and upgrading, and on capacity and location systems implementation 4. Sharing opportunities, leading to cost reduction and reduced visual impact for cell sites with the added possibility of increased protection from co-channel and adjacent channel (intra-networks) interference 5. Faster and easier network rollout and maintenance in currently established transmission infrastructures 6. Enabling network manufacturers to shipping base stations and other network elements more quickly
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4.4.2 Standardisation Aspects
A standardisation process of WDS in the UMTS UTRA scenario is envisaged for: 1. Removing technical uncertainty risks from Operators and prevent from integration surprises 2. Reducing the burden of additional responsibility for Operators in defining their own specifications for WDS 3. Enabling fulfilment of EU recommendations on network sharing in specific scenarios by providing a common radio distribution solution
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5 RF Feasibility Study
5.1 RF Performance Discussion Starting from reference [5], the RF feasibility study addresses the technical analysis of WDS performance based on its non-linear characteristics that may affect RF transmission through it, and derived as a function of a set of RF parameters at its interface with BS. The following tables, extracted from the reference, may be useful to highlight why downlink behaviour is more critical than uplink, as this is the primary justification for the simulation work that has been carried out. BS on TS 25.104 WDS Repeater on TS 25.106 Transmit path (DL) 116dB 127dB 109dB Measured as distance in dB between output power and background noise in 1Hz bandwidth for comparable output power levels in the three cases: Po_Node B = 31dBm Po_WDS = 32dBm Po_Rpt = 30dBm Receive path (UL) 129dB 143dB 91dB Measured as distance in dB between input noise level in 1 Hz bandwidth and blocking level – BS, WDS and Repeaters are assumed with NF= 5dB Table 2 - Dynamic Range Comparison BS interface WDS transmission WDS RF Head <<1 microSec 5 microSec/Km* <<1microSec Note *: length of physical transmission medium, velocity factor = 0.65 Table 3 - WDS Incremental Time Delay (worst case) 5.2 Simulation Program and Assumptions The study is based on simulations carried out on a suitable simulation program that takes into account non-linear parameters of WDS and is capable of simulating an equivalent stimulus for one or more WCDMA Base Stations. Non Linear parameters of WDS are defined based on currently and realistically available technologies. 5.3 Definition of RF Power Levels For the scope of simulating overall performance, WDS RF transmit power levels utilised in the simulation were focussed mainly on the higher output power level (43dBm) specified in TS25.104. Some tests were carried out at the lower power levels of 20dBm and 33dBm in order to give an indication of likely performance with the yet undefined lower power BS classes. 5.4 RF Simulation Parameters The simulation programme was focussed on the downlink parameters which were highlighted as the primary concern for system feasibility. ACLR was identified as the main area of focus, in the single and multi-carrier scenario. Other parameters of interest included Spectrum Emissions (Out of Band) and Measurement of Occupied Bandwidth. In order to carry out initial simulations and attain RF parameters, a realistic WDS system model (Test model 1) was created for single carrier scenarios. The model assumed connection to a compliant BS as supplied in the software package. The model utilised for initial ACLR testing with output power of 20dBm and 33dBm is shown in Figure 2 below. Figure 2 Test model 1 of the WDS A more complex model (Test Model 2) was then created in order to individually model the non-linearities of each component and reflect values found from actual measurements on real world devices. The model block is shown below in Figure 3. Figure 3 Test model 2 of the WDS Greater detail of the test model parameters are available in reference [4].
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5.5 Simulation Results
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5.5.1 ACLR Testing
The simulations are carried out over a range of ACLR levels in order to assess the degradation attributable to the inclusion of a WDS and to attain the minimum ACLR input values to achieve the current specified output levels according to TS 25.104. The performance of the BS was adjusted in order to achieve the range of ACLR figures around the specification levels. This enabled the ACLR figures to be varied whilst the output power remained constant. Simulations were first taken without connecting WDS in order to attain the Input ACLR, and then repeated with WDS connected in order to attain the Output ACLR figures. 5.5.1.1 WDS Output Power 20dBm The BS model was set with a constant gain of 20dB, whilst attenuation of 25.36dB was inserted in order to attain an input level of –2dBm to the WDS, thus achieving a system output power of 20dBm. Test Model 1 was used for this simulation. Graphs 4 – 7 show the results found. Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 5.5.1.2 WDS Output Power 33dBm The BS model was set with a constant gain of 20dB, whilst attenuation was decreased to 12dB in order to increase the input level to the WDS to 11dBm, thus achieving system output power of 33dBm. Graphs 8 – 11 show the results found. Figure 8 Figure 9 Figure 10 Figure 11 5.5.1.3 WDS Output Power 43dBm Test Model 2 was utilised for this scenario, with different parameters related to a higher power WDS. Input ACLR was varied by means of adjustment of the performance of the BS in the same manner as in the previous set-up. The results found are shown in figures 12 – 15 below. Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15
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5.5.2 Multicarrier ACLR
In order to assess the impact of a multi-operator environment where multiple BS’s were connected to WDS, a test simulation was carried out with two BS, transmitting on adjacent carrier frequencies, connected to WDS Test Model 2 and the ACLR was measured. The test setup is shown in Figure 16 below. Figure 16 Test setup for multi-operator ACLR. The gain of the test set-up shown resulted in output power of 23dBm per channel. The ACLR figures shown below were measured as specified in TS 25.141 for multi-carrier tests. The first test utilises the test bed shown in figure 16 with dotted direct connection. The measurement gives therefore an indication of a multicarrier scenario without the added performance impact which WDS introduces. Test 2 (as shown in figure 16) was the same in all ways to Test 1 but with the WDS Test Model 2 included in order to record the performance impact. Only two measurement points were simulated due to extremely long simulation runs. The results are shown in table 4 below. ACLR offset +10 MHz +5MHz -5MHz -10MHz A B A B A B A B BS Direct connection 64.24 53.40 54.81 45.72 54.80 45.91 64.42 54.01 With WDS 64.09 50.05 54.54 43.13 54.43 43.80 64.07 50.10 Table 4 Results for multicarrier ACLR The BS output ACLR in the example [columns A] is that of a very high quality signal and it can be seen that the impact of WDS on this signal is minimal, whilst [columns B] reflect a TS 25.104 compliant BS and the impact of WDS is clearly visible. Simulation results show that the WDS ACLR in the multi-carrier scenario is similar to the single-carrier scenario.
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5.5.3 Measurement of Occupied Bandwidth
WDS test model 2 was used to measure the occupied bandwidth resulting from the inclusion of the WDS. The occupied bandwidth containing 99.5% of the integrated transmitted power (43dBm) was measured at 3.855MHz (see figure 17). Figure 17 Measurement of the occupied bandwidth. Results from Figure 17. Lower Side % Upper Side % Occupied Bandwidth (MHz) Total Power (dBm) 0.242 0.241 3.855 43.237
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5.5.4 Spectrum Emission Mask ( Out of Band Emissions )
The out of band emissions were measured as specified in TS25.141 for a single carrier scenario with output power of 43dBm using WDS model 2. The result found is shown in the graph below (figure 18) along with the relevant mask for Power Out greater than or equal to 43dBm (reference TS25.141 6.2.5.1) Figure 18 Measurement of the spectrum emission and relevant mask.
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5.6 Simulation Summary
The simulation programme and hence the results set out to demonstrate two specific areas of interest. 1. The range of input levels available to a system which would feed a WDS system and its relationship to current specifications. 2. The margin required with the introduction of WDS over a number of output power classes.
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5.6.1 ACLR
It was found that a 3dB margin is typically required to accommodate the effects of the inclusion of a WDS to an existing Base Station set-up. There is a minor difference in performance which is dependent on WDS input signal level. With low input power signal levels, as demonstrated in the example with 20dBm output power, the ACLR at +/- 10MHz becomes “non-linear” at high ACLR input levels. This effect is due to the closer proximity of the input signal level to the noise floor. A similar effect is evident for higher input power levels although this is found on the +/-5MHz area as the signal levels are subjected to WDS amplifier non-linearity. Two simulation runs were carried out to understand the impact of multi-carrier operation. The results indicated that for two carriers, each with output power of 23dBm, the impact on ACLR is similar to that seen with a single carrier.
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5.6.2 Occupied Bandwidth / Out of Band Emissions
Single carrier testing with WDS output power of 43dBm show that there is negligible impact on the occupied bandwidth or output emissions due to the inclusion of WDS.
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5.6.3 Conclusions
The simulations results show the impact of WDS from an RF perspective on most critical downlink parameters, with certain requirements at BS interface point. Any effects can be measured over a range of different power classes and implementation scenarios in order to define the interface conditions required to satisfy the relevant specification. Simulations have been limited to downlink parameters because of the utmost importance and higher criticality of this area. Reference [5] and RF performance discussion at 6.1 show that uplink parameters are less critical for WDS, while utilised technologies are of the same kind as for downlink. ACLR testing has demonstrated that a 3dB margin is desirable to account for WDS inclusion in a system. Further work may be required to verify the recommended margin consistency for the remaining uplink parameters (e.g. Noise Figure, Blocking, and Intermodulation) and downlink parameters (e.g. Modulation Accuracy, Frequency Stability and Accuracy, Output Power Stability and Accuracy) for all scenarios, particularly in the multi-carrier case. Out of band spurious emissions in any applicable environment are driven by the RF filtering on WDS; this will be designed to suit any of the regional requirements. 6 Network Performance Evaluation 6.1 End to End System Simulations The potential impact on network performance and QoS connected to the deployment of WDS were assessed by means of end to end system simulations. These simulations are not intended to replace or supersede any other similar simulations that are included in other WG4 works. Additional information can be found in reference [1], End to End Simulations Detail, TEK 3GPP ETE SD v.0.1, R4-011578]. 6.2 Simulation Scenarios and Parameters The simulations were set out to investigate whether there were impacts to the overall network performance as a result of the inclusion of a WDS. The network performance was assessed from a comparative perspective, with and without WDS, by performing simulations in a number of scenarios relevant to the key attributes of the WDS system. The main point of focus was the network performance impact when operator site sharing, enabled by WDS, was simulated. This was explored using a number of different scenarios and a set of parameters as detailed in [1]. 6.3 Simulation Results The details and key findings from the simulation programme are discussed in the mentioned simulation report [1]. All simulations were carried out at pedestrian velocity of 3Km/h with a data rate of 12.2 Kb/s unless otherwise stated. 6.4 Network Performance Simulation Summary A number of scenarios have been assumed in the simulations in order to assess the implications on the overall QoS that result from the site sharing opportunities offered by WDS. The simulations have also sought to demonstrate how the WDS can be utilised to enable greater network flexibility in terms of serving different practical scenarios. The findings are summarised in the following points. 1. The presence of two operators with equal offered traffic density and cellular layout (with equal cell radius) doesn’t cause a significant loss of quality or of capacity with respect to the single operator case. 2. The presence of WDS, which allows to share sites among operators a. Is not detrimental when the systems are scarcely loaded, while it tends to yield increasing benefits when the offered traffic increases. b. Is more resilient to adjacent carrier interference even when the ACS and ACLR values are substantially reduced (e.g. due to hardware failures or malfunctioning). 3. Deploying micro-cells (made possible by the introduction of WDS) allows increasing system capacity. Traffic density, which leads a system to congestion, may be served by means of an appropriate reduction of cell radius. 4. The maximum DL power can be reduced (to as low as 20 dBm) while offering satisfactory quality, provided that the cell radius is adequately reduced in order to compensate for the decreased coverage. 5. The advantages of site sharing appear more clearly when user bit rates higher than the basic 12.2 Kb/s are considered. 6. The system can accommodate mixed services with satisfactory quality, although when the data services bit rate increases there may be problems with DL quality that can be overcome by adjusting DL power. 7. The analysis of mixed layout systems (composed of both macro-cells and micro-cells) confirms that microcells can carry a traffic density significantly higher than macro-cells in spite of the higher interference they receive from neighbouring macro-cells. In this case, when terminals move faster we observe generally lower blocking and dropping probabilities, at the cost of a higher fraction of unsatisfied users. 8. The analysis of an indoor system with two operators shows that it is possible to carry a 2 Mb/s user for each operator, even in presence of a traffic “floor” due to voice users. When the voice traffic increases it was found that more voice calls are blocked, while the performance for the 2 Mb/s data user remain optimal.
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7 Operation & Maintenance
In order to identify any possible impact of a communication interface between WDS and other network elements R3-011933 [Ref. 2] and R5-010481 [Ref. 3] were discussed within RAN 3 and SA5 respectively. Either working group said that no impact was found on existing specs because of WDS, and it appeared that existing specifications don’t prevent possible network configuration including WDS. Detail outcomes are included in following sub-sections. 7.1 WDS O&M interface The O&M interface for WDS may be required to provide operational status and alarm information to each Network Operator having access to the system, under a network-specific set of parameters, i.e. including: • General information on common infrastructure available to all networks • Network specific information (i.e. any interface specific failure alarms) Transport bearer for O&M implementation may be compliant with TS 25.442, and that in order to re-use existing transport facilities it would share the same physical and data layer of Iub, as Implementation Specific O&M. 7.2 WDS O&M architecture O&M of WDS may be included as part of "O&M functions for co-located equipment", as its architecture could fulfil the requirement. So-called Interface-N is part of the standard (TS32.101, TS32.102) as the interface towards the systems at the network management level. This means that this interface con be offered either from an element manager or directly from the network elements. Special integration reference points "IRP's" are defined and standardised with different solutions sets (CMIP or CORBA) for alarms and configuration. One problem with the WDS may be related with independent requirement from network operators. At least two ways to solve the problem may be identified: • The WDS system complies with the IRP concept, or it offers e.g. an alarm IRP for fault management; or • The UMTS Telecom Management Architecture just offers a transparent connection to vendor specific management system for WDS. 7.3 WDS O&M activity plan Further work is required in order to address all practical issues that may arise from system integration activities. This work will require co-ordination between RAN4, RAN3, and SA5
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8 Location Services (LCS)
In order to assess any impact of WDS on location services, the co-existence between WDS and location services (LCS) is discussed in this section. Three methods for location services are currently specified in TS 25.305 – Stage 2 Functional Specification of Location Services in UTRAN. These are OTDOA, Cell ID based positioning and Network Assisted GPS.
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8.1 OTDOA/IPDL
The OTDOA/IPDL methods are based on the measurements of the UTRA pilot signal (CPICH) made by the UE and the Location Measurement Unit (LMU). The position of the UE is estimated by using the observed time difference of arrival from three or more base stations. As measurements are made by the UE who then reports them to the Position Calculation Function (PCF) in the serving RNC, any delays between the remote RF antenna and the serving BS which may be introduced by the WDS are not part of the LCS calculation. In this case the PCF must be aware of the geographical layout of the UTRAN transmitters as configured including WDS. 8.2 Cell ID Method In the cell ID based method the location of a UE is estimated with the knowledge of its serving BS. The information about the serving BS and cell may be obtained by paging, location area update, cell update, URA update or routing area update. The result of WDS deployment is that the cells have the potential to become smaller thereby giving greater accuracy compared to a larger cell.
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8.3 Network Assisted GPS
These methods make use of UE, which are equipped with radio receivers capable of receiving signals from the Global Positioning System (GPS). Therefore there are no implications to a WDS enhanced network.
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8.4 Summary of WDS impact on LCS
From the above discussion it is clear that no impact on LCS is envisaged due to inclusion of WDS The system calculations required in order to accommodate the provision of LCS information to the network rely primarily on the UE or high level network systems specifically dedicated to LCS. The only provision for inclusion of WDS will be the requirement that the RNC is aware of the base station architecture including the length of transmission delay in order to make accurate positional calculations.
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9 WDS Positioning on Existing 3GPP TS and WI
The present structure of 3GPP UTRAN FDD specifications includes BS (TS 25.104 [ref.1] / TS 25.141 [ref.2]) and Repeaters (TS 25.106 [ref.3]/ TS 25.143 [ref.4]). TS25.104 relates to Macro BS and its performance. Ongoing work on Base Station Classification WI (TR25.951). TS25.106 relates to RF Repeater and its performance. The following discussion identifies WDS positioning situation in 3GPP FDD UTRAN TS frame.
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9.1 WDS positioning discussion
Following points highlight specific technical positioning for WDS, starting from simulations results. 1. WDS are physically connected to BS according to capacity and coverage planning requirements. They are NOT used to complement radio coverage of a BS (so-called simulcasting), and therefore provide consistent and reliable performance as integral part of the access network, including minimisation of uncertainties in UE location; 2. Because of the tight interface to BS, WDS have low or moderate RF gain. Therefore they don’t need complex filtering techniques to provide control of in-band and out-of-band spurious emissions; additionally, WDS allow for controlled and reliable performance in both single- and multi-vendor scenarios, leading to ease of planning; similarly, a reliable alarm and management interface may be provided as discussed; 3. Standard technologies provide WDS instantaneous bandwidth capability to cope with UMTS UTRA FDD full band application, including the various regional requirements; 4. WDS allows BS and RNC to be co-located at centralised equipment locations, where upgrades and implementations can be effected with no requirement to visit remote sites. The above listed items show WDS ability to supplement and enhance FDD BS capability, and their substantial technical and deployment difference from repeaters. WDS are meant as radio interface remotisers for one or multiple dedicated BS.
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9.2 Potential Impact of WDS Standardisation
The Feasibility Study has highlighted the potential impact of WDS standardisation based on existing BS specifications TS25.104/TS25.141, with specific reference to the interface point between BS and WDS, where a more stringent performance than that of compliant BS may be required in order to guarantee full compliance to the standard for the new chain [BS + WDS]. Since Companies did not agree to changing existing specifications because of possible impact in future BS layout, no agreement has been reached at RAN WG4 about such an interface. The existing and ongoing status of the WI on UTRAN FDD Base Station Classification (TR25.951) offers instead benefits for WDS in certain deployment scenarios and can be related to it.
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10 Conclusions and Way Forward
The Feasibility Study has shown how WDS performance may impact on a 25.104 compliant generic BS, on a limited number of basically important parameters and, more in general, in the network configuration. A new set of compliance parameters should be investigated as a consequence of BS classification and further definition of deployment scenarios. Further work is required to verify the recommended margin consistency for the remaining uplink parameters (e.g. Noise Figure, Blocking, and Intermodulation) and downlink parameters (e.g. Modulation Accuracy, Frequency Stability and Accuracy, Output Power Stability and Accuracy) for all scenarios, particularly in the multi-carrier case. Since it was not yet possible to agree on any different requirements for BS specifications, and because of the specific interest for using WDS for small cell applications, it may be recommended to relate any further related work on WDS to the definition of BS classes for given deployment scenarios, and for those RF parameters that may be part of WDS technical nature. The way WDS may be included in 3GPP specs is not clear yet and needs further co-ordination with other ongoing work in related areas (e.g. BS classification and Repeaters). Annex <A>: History of the proposal RAN 4 Meeting #17, Gothenburg, Sweden (21-25 May 2001) Document R4- 010559 Technical justification and overall advantages of WDS Discussion document explained the concept and the benefits of a WDS. A hardware description and RF performance attributes were discussed in relation to the current TS25.104 specification. It was agreed to proceed with a feasibility study. RAN Plenary Meeting #12, Stockholm, Sweden (12-15 June 2001) Document RP-010488 Study Item description sheet for feasibility study on UTRA WDS Document detailed the justification for the system and set out the criteria which must be satisfied in order to proceed. This included addressing RF performance, end to end system performance and consideration of location service and O&M aspects. Study Item status was given. RAN 4 Meeting #18, Berlin, Germany (9-13 July 2001) Document R4-010935 WDS Study Item Status Update Document presented for information and to raise discussion items to be addressed in final study phase TR. Concerns were raised about impact on system performance due to inclusion of WDS. Difficulties were voiced on setting new requirements on TS25.104 for a low-level interface (LLI) between the BS and the WDS. Therefore clarifications on the concept were required. RAN 4 Meeting #19, Edinburgh, Scotland (3-7 September 2001) Document R4-011045 WDS Study Item Report Feasibility Study results presented for decision which covered the following subjects: 1. End to end system performance improvements shown through major simulation work. 2. RF up-link and downlink parameters for LLI, WDS and compliance to TS25.104 at antenna port. 3. Address all questions raised at previous RAN 4 meetings with detailed explanations of LLI concept, system degradation, LCS and O&M impact. It was noted by a number of delegates that there were no doubts of the benefits of WDS, specifically in order to provide the ability to share resources in indoor environments. Further concerns were raised by some delegates over the understanding of LLI, specifically on how it may physically interface with variable BS configurations and about its technical feasibility against existing TS 25.104. Due to recognised benefits of WDS, it was recommended that the study item phase be continued in order to close out the points raised. RAN plenary meeting #13, Beijing, China (18-21 September 2001) Document RP-010638 Status Report for information Completion date is expected at RP#14 with formal TR. It was commented that the included report was not a formal TR and that no agreement had yet been reached on it in WG4. RAN 4 Meeting #20, East Brunswick, NJ, USA (12-16 November 2001) Document R4-011516 Submission of present TR 25.867 v.0.1.0 Change history Change history Date TSG # TSG Doc. CR Rev Subject/Comment Old New
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1 Scope
The present document specifies an initial set of Parlay X Web Services. For each selected Web Service, this document describes the motivation for its inclusion, the commercial and technical rationale, and an illustrative usage scenario(s). This document also specifies the message(s) exchanged during invocations of each Web Service, by defining the semantics in English and the syntax using W3C WSDL. The OSA APIs are designed to enable creation of telephony applications as well as to "telecom-enable" IT applications. IT developers, who develop and deploy applications outside the traditional telecommunications network space and business model, are viewed as crucial for creating a dramatic whole-market growth in next generation applications, services and networks. The Parlay X Web Services are intended to stimulate the development of next generation network applications by developers in the IT community who are not necessarily experts in telephony or telecommunications. The selection of Web Services should be driven by commercial utility and not necessarily by technical elegance. The goal is to define a set of powerful yet simple, highly abstracted, imaginative, telecommunications capabilities that developers in the IT community can both quickly comprehend and use to generate new, innovative applications.
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2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. • References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific. • For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. • For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications". [2] 3GPP TS 22.101: "Service aspects; Service principles". [3] 3GPP TS 23.040: "Technical realization of Short Message Service (SMS)". [4] RFC 2396: "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax". [5] RFC 2732: "Format for Literal IPv6 Addresses in URL's". [6] RFC 2806: "URLs for Telephone Calls". [7] RFC 3261: "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol". [8] RFC 2848: "The PINT Service Protocol: Extensions to SIP and SDP for IP Access to Telephone Call Services".
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3 Definitions and abbreviations
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3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TS 22.101 [2] and the following apply. (Parlay X) Application: unless otherwise specified, the document will be using the term (Parlay X) application to refer to software that invokes or can invoke a Parlay X Web Service. Parlay X Gateway: used to describe the implementation of a set of Parlay X Web Services. In telecommunications parlance an implementation of a Parlay X Web Service on a Parlay X Gateway would also be referred to as a service.
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3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A/IN (Advanced) Intelligent Network AAA Authorization, Authentication, and Accounting AM Account Management API Application Programming Interface APP Application CBC Content Based Charging CC Call Control DIME Direct Internet Message Encapsulation EMS Enhanced Messaging Service FW (OSA/Parlay) Framework GIF Graphics Interchange Format GPRS General Packet Radio System IM Instant Messaging IP Internet Protocol ICQ ??? IT Information Technology IVR Interactive Voice Response JAIN Integrated Network APIs for the JavaTM platform JCP JavaTM Community ProcessSM JPay Payment API for the JavaTM platform MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions MM7 Communication protocol between MMS Relay/Server and MMS Application Server MMS Multimedia Message Service MMS-C Multimedia Message Service Center MPS Mobile Positioning System MS Mobile Station Why not UE User Equipment ???? - see 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] MSC Mobile Switching Center MSISDN Mobile Station ISDN Number OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards PIN Personal Identification Number PINT PSTN and Internet inter-networking PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network SAML Security Assertion Markup Language: i.e. an XML-based security standard for exchanging authentication and authorization information, developed by SSTC) SCF Service Capability Feature SCS Service Capability Server SIP Session Initiation Protocol SLA Service Level Agreement SMS Short Message Service SMS-C Short Message Service Center SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol SSTC Security Services Technical Committee (of OASIS) UCP Universal Computer Protocol URI Uniform Resource Identifier VASP Virtual Application Service Provider W3C World Wide Web Consortium WAP Wireless Application Protocol WG Working Group WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984 WS Web Service WSDL Web Service Definition Language WS-I Web Services-Interoperability Organization XML Extensible Markup Language
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4 Parlay X Web Services
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4.1 Selection Criteria
Each Parlay X Web Service should be abstracted from the set of telecommunications capabilities exposed by the Parlay APIs, but may also expose related capabilities that are not currently supported in the Parlay APIs where there are compelling reasons. These tiered levels of abstraction, and the Parlay – Parlay X relationship, are illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1: Parlay X Web Services, Parlay X APIs and Parlay APIs The selection criteria for the Parlay X Web Services are as follows: • The capabilities offered by a Parlay X Web Service may be either homogeneous (e.g. call control only) or heterogeneous (e.g. terminal location and user status). • The interaction between an application incorporating a Parlay X Web Service and the server implementing the Parlay X Web Service will be done with an XML-based message exchange. The message exchange should follow the synchronous request/response model and be initiated by the application; the 'response' from the Parlay X Web Service is optional. However asynchronous messages from the Parlay X Web Service implementation (on a Parlay X Gateway) to the application may be defined where there are compelling reasons; e.g. to implement a notification type web service. In the latter case, the message exchange would invoke an application web service using a similar, synchronous request/response model. • Parlay X Web Service invocations should not be correlated and the Web Service itself should be stateless from the perspective of the application, unless there are compelling reasons. In particular, in the case of asynchronous notifications from a Parlay X Web Service implementation (on a Parlay X Gateway) to an application, NO application-initiated invocations to provision (or de-provision) notification-related criteria in the Parlay X Web Service should be implemented. • Parlay X Web Services follow simple application semantics, allowing the developer to focus on access to the telecom capability using common Web Services programming techniques. • Parlay X Web Services are not network equipment specific, and not network specific where a capability is relevant to more than one type of network. • Parlay X Web Services should be based on the reference Web Service technology, as it is defined in the IT world and according to the Parlay Web Services WG recommendations; more specifically, at the moment, WSDL is the chosen standard to invoke and describe Parlay X Web Services. • The Parlay X APIs should be extendible; integration of third party provided interfaces must be supported using proven, reliable, and standard Web Service technology. • Parlay X Web Services are application interfaces and do not provide an implementation of AAA (Authorization, Authentication, and Accounting), service level agreements or other environment-specific capabilities. Rather, they shall rely on proven and reliable solutions provided by the Web Services infrastructure.
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4.2 Implementation Considerations
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4.2.1 Versioning
The namespace will contain a version number as a suffix for the service name. The suffix will be a separate path element consisting of: the letter 'v' followed by a major version number followed by an underscore and a minor version number. • The major version number will reflect the version of Parlay X for the last change to the API. • The minor version number will reflect maintenance of the API between Parlay X versions. EXAMPLE: www.csapi.org/wsdl/parlayx/account_management/v1_0 represents the initial public version of the Parlay X Account Management Web Service. The rationale for this version number scheme is as follows: • Prefixing the path element with "v" and using an underscore minimizes the possibility of tool issues. Using namespace elements that are only digits (or that contain characters other than letters, digits and underscores) may result in issues with different tools - e.g. period is a package delimiter • Adding the version path element after the API element, instead of after the "parlayx" element, means that as Parlay X changes, that APIs that do not change will not require changes to running services since their namespaces will not change • Using this convention eliminates parsing and related issues with two digit versions, leading zeros, etc. • This convention can also be applied to other Parlay X namespaces such as Common Data.
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4.3 Optional Parameters
Some parameters are defined as OPTIONAL. Within a message signature, the XML schema type definition for an optional parameter may use the nillable attribute to allow the actual value of the parameter to be "NULL" (or "NIL"). Since this approach is dependant upon the industry adoption of WS-I's Basic Profile 1.0, which is currently not widely implemented, this version of the Parlay X Web Services specification does not follow this approach. As a temporary measure this specification explicitly defines "NULL" values for parameters tagged OPTIONAL such that, if used, the actual value of the parameter must be considered "NULL". The following "NULL" values are defined for each OPTIONAL parameter data type: • Type String: the empty string (""). • Type DateTime: "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z". • Type Integer: "-1". • Type EndUserIdentifier (which encapsulates a URI): "null://null".
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4.4 Document Structure
The present document has the following clauses: 4) Parlay X Web Services 5) Common Data Definitions 6) Third Party Call 7) Network-Initiated Third Party Call 8) SMS 9) Multimedia Message 10) Payment 11) Account Management 12) User Status 13) Terminal Location Apart from this clause and clause 5, each of the remaining clauses specifies a Parlay X Web Service with the following structure: • Overview, describing the Web Service, the underlying commercial and/or technical rationale, its relationship to other specifications, and illustrative usage scenario(s). • A semantic specification of the message-based Parlay X API(s) that constitute the Web Service. • A definition of the Web-Service-specific data types and exceptions. • Web Service Syntax, referencing two types of WSDL files for this release of the Parlay X APIs: • A modular set of WSDL files that provide an 'rpc/literal' binding and follows the current draft provided by the WS-I Basic Profile. This set of files may be used by tools that support the features included in the Basic Profile definition. • A second set of monolithic WSDL files that provide an 'rpc/encoded' binding and use SOAP encoded arrays. This allows developers to use tools that do not yet support the features included in the Basic Profile definition. It is expected that tools will be updated over time, and that developers will migrate to the first set of files, to be compliant with the WS-I Basic Profile. This document structure, one clause for each Parlay X Web Service, facilitates future releases of the Parlay X specification. It minimizes the scope of editorial work required to either introduce a new Parlay X Web Service, which is accomplished by adding a new document clause, or to update an existing Parlay X Web Service, which is achieved by editing a single, existing document clause. In addition to the Parlay X Web Service-specific clauses, the present document (in clause 5) provides a listing of data definitions (including exceptions) that are common across multiple Parlay X Web Services. As more Web Services are defined in the future, the number of common data definitions may increase. Thus clause 5 has the following structure: • Record of Changes, providing a detailed record of any additions, deletions, modifications and other changes that have been applied to the data definitions since its previous public release. • An English language definition of the common data types and exceptions. • Common Data Definitions Syntax, referencing two types of WSDL files for this release of the Parlay X APIs.
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5 Common Data Definitions
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5.1 Common Data Type Definitions
Where possible standard XML Schema data types are used, as defined in http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-2/#built-in-datatypes. Other data types that are common to multiple Parlay X Web Services are defined in the following subclauses. 5.1.1 EndUserIdentifier The EndUserIdentifier data type is specified as a URI: [scheme]:[schemeSpecificPart] (RFC 2396 [4], amended by RFC 2732 [5]). Example schemes are tel (RFC 2806 [6]) and sip (RFC 3261 [7]).
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5.1.2 ArrayOfEndUserIdentifier
A collection of elements where each element is of data type EndUserIdentifier.
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5.1.3 ArrayOfURI
A collection of elements where each element is of data type URI.
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5.2 Common Exception Definitions
All of these exceptions are common to multiple Parlay X Web Services. Each exception is assigned an eight character identifier, where: • The first 3 characters "GEN" identify the exception as generic: i.e. common to multiple Parlay X services. The "GEN" string shall not be assigned to any Parlay X Web Service-specific exception. • The next 4 digits "1xxx" uniquely identifies the exception within the set of common exceptions. The "1xxx" string may be re-used by any Parlay X Web Service-specific exception defined in this specification. • The last character identifies the severity of the exception condition, as follows: • "F": fatal error, typically indicating an infrastructure problem; the operation triggering the exception should not be retried • "E": error, typically indicating an application or user error; the operation triggering the exception has not completed and may be retried • "W": warning, typically indicating that an operation has completed, but there are cautions or other caveats. The common exceptions are as follows: UNIQUE ID TEXT STRING MEANING GEN1000E UnknownEndUserException This fault occurs if the end user identification that is passed is unknown. GEN1001E InvalidArgumentException This fault occurs if an argument passed is semantically incorrect or when the parameter does not conform to the limits specified in the Parlay X specification: e.g. when passing the end user identification: "tel:www.parlay.org". GEN1002F ServiceException This fault is caused by generic platform or network errors. GEN1003E PolicyException This fault is caused by a violation of a policy of the Parlay X Web Service: e.g., when parameter values are used that are outside the scope of the service level agreement. GEN1004E ApplicationException This fault is caused by a generic error in an application web service when processing a message invocation from a Parlay X Web Service. The Parlay X Web Service can log this information and possibly raise an alarm when the number of exceptions reaches a pre-defined threshold. GEN1005W MessageTooLongException This fault is caused if a message to be sent exceeds the maximum length supported by the Web Service; e.g. the message may be too long for a destination terminal device.
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5.3 Common Data Definitions Syntax – WSDL
The rpc/literal files include two common files • parlayx_common_types.xsd • parlayx_common_faults.wsdl The rpc/encoded files contain these definitions within each service file.