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  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Is Free Trade Passé?", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol1. No. 2 (Autumn, 1987)',
    quote: 'If there were an Economist\'s Creed, it would surely contain the affirmations \'I understand the Principle of Comparative Advantage\' and \'I advocate Free Trade\''
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt", The American Economic Review, Vol81. No. 2, (199105)',
    quote: 'If there is one single area of economics in which path dependence is unmistakable, it is in economic geography – the location of production in space.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"How I Work", American Economist (1993)',
    quote: 'In the course of describing my formative moment in 1978, I have already implicitly given my four basic rules for research. Let me now state them explicitly, then explain. Here are the rules:\n1. Listen to the Gentiles2. Question the question3. Dare to be silly4. Simplify, simplify'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"How I Work", American Economist (1993)',
    quote: 'I do not mean to say that formal economic analysis is worthless, and that anybody\'s opinion on economic matters is as good as anyone else\'s. On the contrary! I am a strong believer in the importance of models, which are to our minds what spear-throwers were to stone age arms: they greatly extend the power and range of our insight. In particular, I have no sympathy for those people who criticize the unrealistic simplifications of model-builders, and imagine that they achieve greater sophistication by avoiding stating their assumptions clearly. The point is to realize that economic models are metaphors, not truth. By all means express your thoughts in models, as pretty as possible (more on that below). But always remember that you may have gotten the metaphor wrong, and that someone else with a different metaphor may be seeing something that you are missing.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Incidents from my career (1995)',
    quote: 'But the honest truth is that what drives me as an economist is that economics is fun. I think I understand why so many people think that economics is a boring subject, but they are wrong. On the contrary, there is hardly anything I know that is as exciting as finding that the great events that move history, the forces that determine the destiny of empires and the fate of kings, can sometimes be explained, predicted, or even controlled by a few symbols on a printed page. We all want power, we all want success, but the ultimate reward is the simple joy of understanding.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Slate, 19970206; as cited by Orrin Judd at brothersjuddblog, 20040814',
    quote: 'If you want a simple model for predicting the unemployment rate in the United States over the next few years, here it is: It will be what Greenspan wants it to be, plus or minus a random error reflecting the fact that he is not quite God.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"What should trade negotiators negotiate about?" Journal of Economic Literature, Vol35. No. 1 (Mar., 1997)',
    quote: 'If economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a World Trade Organization. The economist\'s case for free trade is essentially a unilateral case- that is, it says that a country serves its own interests by pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Is Capitalism Too Productive?", Foreign Affairs (September/199710)',
    quote: 'It is a bit funny, but also quite sad: Those who preach the doctrine of global glut are tilting at windmills, when there are some real monsters out there that need slaying.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Ricardo\'s Difficult Idea," in G. Cook (ed.), Freedom and Trade: The Economics and Politics of International Trade, Vol2. (1998)',
    quote: 'The idea of comparative advantage—with its implication that trade between two nations normally raises the real incomes of both—is, like evolution via natural selection, a concept that seems simple and compelling to those who understand it. Yet anyone who becomes involved in discussions of international trade beyond the narrow circle of academic economists quickly realizes that it must be, in some sense, a very difficult concept indeed.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Why most economists\' predictions are wrong", The Red Herring, 199806',
    quote: 'By 2005 or so, it will become clear that the Internet\'s impact on the economy has been no greater than the fax machine\'s.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Why aren\'t we all Keynesians yet?", Fortune (19980803)',
    quote: 'Now I’m not saying that Keynes was right about everything, that we should treat The General Theory as a sort of secular bible - the way that Marxists treat Das Kapital. But the essential truth of Keynes’s big idea - that even the most productive economy can fail if consumers and investors spend too little, that the pursuit of sound money and balanced budgets is sometimes (not always!) folly rather than wisdom - is as evident in today’s world as it was in the 1930s. And in these dangerous days, we ignore or reject that idea at the world economy’s peril.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Baby-Sitting the Economy", Slate (19980813)',
    quote: 'So the story of the baby-sitting co-op is not a mere amusement. If people would only take it seriously—if they could only understand that when great economic issues are at stake, whimsical parables are not a waste of time but the key to enlightenment—it is a story that could save the world.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Two Cheers for Formalism", The Economic Journal, Vol108. No. 451 (Nov., 1998)',
    quote: 'Here, then, is a revised version of Marshall\'s rules: (1) Figure out what you think about an issue, working back and forth among verbal intuition, evidence, and as much math as you need. (2) Stay with it till you are done. (3) Publish the intuition, the math, and the evidence - all three - in an economics journal. (4) But also try to find a way of expressing the idea without the formal apparatus. (5) If you can, publish that where it can do the world some good.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Is the Economic Crisis a Crisis for Economics?", Slate (19981113)',
    quote: 'In short, the success of macroeconomic activism, in both theory and practice, has made it possible for free market microeconomics to survive--again both in theory and in practice.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"The Hangover Theory", Slate (19981204)',
    quote: 'The hangover theory, then, turns out to be intellectually incoherent; nobody has managed to explain why bad investments in the past require the unemployment of good workers in the present. Yet the theory has powerful emotional appeal. Usually that appeal is strongest for conservatives, who can\'t stand the thought that positive action by governments (let alone—horrors!—printing money) can ever be a good idea. Some libertarians extol the Austrian theory, not because they have really thought that theory through, but because they feel the need for some prestigious alternative to the perceived statist implications of Keynesianism. And some people probably are attracted to Austrianism because they imagine that it devalues the intellectual pretensions of economics professors. But moderates and liberals are not immune to the theory\'s seductive charms—especially when it gives them a chance to lecture others on their failings.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Don\'t Laugh at Me, Argentina", Slate (19990720)',
    quote: 'The serious lesson of the antics in Argentina, then, is that the big issues of monetary economics--fixed vs. flexible exchange rates, whether countries should have independent currencies at all--are still wide open. It\'s an eternal controversy, and not even the pope can resolve it.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"O Canada", Slate (19991019)',
    quote: 'So you can take your pick as to which Mundell you prefer; but the Nobel committee basically honored Mundell the younger, the economist who was iconoclastic enough to imagine that Canada, of all places, was the economy of the future--and was right.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Thinking About the Liquidity Trap", Journal of the Japanese and International Economies (2000)',
    quote: 'The whole subject of the liquidity trap has a sort of Alice-through-the-looking glass quality. Virtues like saving, or a central bank known to be strongly committed to price stability, become vices; to get out of the trap a country must loosen its belt, persuade its citizens to forget about the future, and convince the private sector that the government and central bank aren’t as serious and austere as they seem.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'When asked to define the economic policy of the Bush administration in a BuzzFlash interview, 20030911',
    quote: 'There is no economic policy. That\'s really important to say. The general modus operandi of the Bushies is that they don\'t make policies to deal with problems. They use problems to justify things they wanted to do anyway. So there is no policy to deal with the lack of jobs. There really isn\'t even a policy to deal with terrorism. It\'s all about how can we spin what\'s happening out there to do what we want to do.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Krugman, Paul (20060417). "Enemy of the Planet". The New York Times. Retrieved on 20181224.',
    quote: '...Exxon Mobil is a worse environmental villain than other big oil companies...Exxon, headed by Mr. Raymond, chose a different course of action: it decided to fight the science....And that\'s just what Exxon Mobil has done: lavish grants have supported a sort of alternative intellectual universe of global warming skeptics....the fact is that whatever small chance there was of action to limit global warming became even smaller because ExxonMobil chose to protect its profits by trashing good science.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Response to Nelson and Schwartz, Journal of Monetary Economics 55 (2008)',
    quote: 'It’s a tribute to the importance of Friedman’s work that questions about his legacy bear so directly on contemporary policy issues. But for that reason it’s also important not to engage in hagiography. Friedman was a great economist, but like every other great economist in history, he was also wrong about some important things.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"The Increasing Returns Revolution in Trade and Geography", The American Economic Review (Jun., 2009)',
    quote: 'Whether the influence of increasing returns on trade and geography is rising or falling, one thing is clear: much was learned from the intellectual revolution that brought increasing returns into the heart of how we think about the world economy. It wasn\'t just that economists could make sense of previously puzzling data, we found ourselves able to see things that had previously been in an intellectual blind spot. Many people contributed to this process of enlightenment; I\'m proud to have been a part of the journey.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"The Big Zero", The New York Times (27th 200912)',
    quote: 'So let’s bid a not at all fond farewell to the Big Zero — the decade in which we achieved nothing and learned nothing.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"The Curious Politics of Immigration", 20100426, The Conscience of a Liberal blog at The New York Times',
    quote: 'I know that when I look at today’s Mexicans and Central Americans, they seem to me fundamentally the same as my grandparents seeking a better life in America. On the other side, however, open immigration can’t coexist with a strong social safety net; if you’re going to assure health care and a decent income to everyone, you can’t make that offer global. So Democrats have mixed feelings about immigration; in fact, it’s an agonizing issue.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Australian Financial Review, 20100906, p15, "Time for Obama to abandon caution". Also seen in the Sacramento Bee [1]',
    quote: '… politics determine who has the power, not who has the truth.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '"Mr Keynes and the moderns" (20110621)',
    quote: 'It’s a great honour to be asked to give this talk, especially because I’m arguably not qualified to do so. I am, after all, not a Keynes scholar, nor any kind of serious intellectual historian. Nor have I spent most of my career doing macroeconomics. Until the late 1990s my contributions to that field were limited to international issues; although I kept up with macro research, I avoided getting into the frontline theoretical and empirical disputes.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'on CNN\'s "Fareed Zakaria GPS", 20110821. [2]',
    quote: 'If we discovered that, you know, space aliens were planning to attack and we needed a massive buildup to counter the space alien threat and really inflation and budget deficits took secondary place to that, this slump would be over in 18 months. … There was a Twilight Zone episode like this in which scientists fake an alien threat in order to achieve world peace. Well, this time, we don\'t need it, we need it in order to get some fiscal stimulus.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'This Week with Christiane Amanpour, 20111120',
    quote: '...and Newt [Gingrich] — although somebody said "he’s a stupid man’s idea of what a smart person sounds like," but he is more plausible than the other guys that they’ve been pushing up.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory & Policy, 9th edition (2012)',
    quote: 'International trade in goods and services has expanded steadily over the past six decades thanks to declines in shipping and communication costs, globally negotiated reductions in government trade barriers, the widespread outsourcing of production activities, and a greater awareness of foreign cultures and products. New and better communications technologies, notably the Internet, have revolutionized the way people in all countries obtain and exchange information.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Paul Krugman and Richard Layard, "A Manifesto for Economic Sense" (20120627)',
    quote: 'More than four years after the financial crisis began, the world\'s major advanced economies remain deeply depressed, in a scene all too reminiscent of the 1930s. And the reason is simple: we are relying on the same ideas that governed policy in the 1930s. These ideas, long since disproved, involve profound errors both about the causes of the crisis, its nature, and the appropriate response.\nThese errors have taken deep root in public consciousness and provide the public support for the excessive austerity of current fiscal policies in many countries. So the time is ripe for a Manifesto in which mainstream economists offer the public a more evidence-based analysis of our problems.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Of his paper "The Theory of Interstellar Trade"; quoted in The Economist, 20131026, p86',
    quote: 'This is a serious analysis of a ridiculous subject, which is of course the opposite of what is usual in economics.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: '“Depressions are Different”, in Robert M. Solow, ed. Economics for the Curious: Inside the Minds of 12 Nobel Laureates. 2014.',
    quote: 'When the economy is in a depression, scarcity ceases to rule. Productive resources sit idle, so that it is possible to have more of some things without having less of others; free lunches are all around. As a result, all the usual rules of economics are stood on their head; we enter a looking-glass world in which virtue is vice and prudence is folly. Thrift hurts our future prospects; sound money makes us poorer. Moreover, that\'s the kind of world we have been living in for the past several years, which means that it is a kind of world that students should understand. […] Depression economics is marked by paradoxes, in which seemingly virtuous actions have perverse, harmful effects. Two paradoxes in particular stand out: the paradox of thrift, in which the attempt to save more actually leads to the nation as a whole saving less, and the less-well-known paradox of flexibility, in which the willingness of workers to protect their jobs by accepting lower wages actually reduces total employment. […] In times of depression, the rules are different. Conventionally sound policy – balanced budgets, a firm commitment to price stability – helps to keep the economy depressed. Once again, this is not normal. Most of the time we are not in a depression. But sometimes we are – and 2013, when this chapter was written, was one of those times.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'in Paul Krugman Interview by Norwegian TV channel NRK (20140108)',
    quote: 'I do not think this is a permanent condition. The craziness comes more from cultural ethnic issues than anything else, because you have a… A lot of the real craziness come from, if you like, from rural White Americans who feel that they’re losing their country, they’re losing ownership of the country. And they are right — we are becoming more diverse, more multicultural. And in the end, they are they…they…they are not the future. In the end, the power they still have will go away. But it’s a very difficult time until then. So the future is Mayor Deblasio of New York, but Ted Cruz is still out there with the ability to do a lot of damage.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Preface',
    quote: 'Economics is harder than physics; luckily it is not quite as hard as sociology. Why is economics such a hard subject? Part of the answer has to do with complexity. The economy cannot be put in a box. [...] Another reason economics is hard is that the critical sociologist is right: it involves human beings, who do not behave in simple, mechanical ways.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Intro: Looking for Magicians',
    quote: 'As the example of Ronald Reagan shows, real political success comes not simply from appealing to the interests that people currently perceive but from finding ways to redefine their perceived interests, to harness their discontent in favor of changes that you can lead.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Intro: Looking for Magicians',
    quote: 'Why did the magic economy go away? Hundreds of books have been written on that topic. This isn\'t one of them ― although I\'ll devote part of a chapter to some plausible stories and take a number of stabs at the issue along the way. But let me cut to the chase: the real answer is that we don\'t know. There are a lot of stories out there. Most of them, including the ones that have achieved the widest currency, are dead wrong on logical or factual grounds. There are some less popular stories that could be right ― but if you are honest with yourself, you will admit that nobody, yourself included, knows which if any of these stories actually is right.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Intro: Looking for Magicians',
    quote: 'Where do ideas about economics come from? They come, of course from economists—where by an "economist" I mean someone who thinks and writes regularly about economic issues. But not all economists are alike, and in fact the genus includes two radically distinct species: The professors and the policy entrepreneurs.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Intro: Looking for Magicians',
    quote: 'No, the problem that the politicians have with the professors is not one of failure to communicate; it is one of failure to say what politicians want (need) to hear, especially when they are trying to seize power from other politicians. And necessity is the mother of invention: a different group, the policy entrepreneurs, has arisen to fill the gap.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'There are many economic puzzles, but there are only two really great mysteries.\nOne of these mysteries is why economic growth takes places at different rates over time and across countries. Nobody really knows why the U.\nS. economy could generate 3 percent annual productivity growth before 1973 but only 1 percent afterward, nobody really knows why Japan surged from defeat to global economic power after World War II, while Britain slid slowly into third-rate status. At any given time there are always policy entrepreneurs willing to claim that they have all the answers, but we\'ll come to that story in later chapters.\nThe other mystery is the reason why there is a business cycle ― the irregular rhythm of recessions and recoveries that prevents economic growth from being a smooth trend. It was in challenging the orthodox, Keynesian view of business cycles that conservatives first forced a major rethinking of economics.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'The phenomenon of recessions puzzled many economists in the early years of this century, and led many of them produce their worst work. Thorstein Veblen went from his brilliant Theory of the Leisure Class to write a really terrible book (The Engineers and the Price System) purporting to explain economic slumps. Joseph Schumpeter, whose magnificent vision of the "creative destruction" inherent in capitalist growth continues to inspire many economists, wrote a turgid, almost meaningless two-volume study, Business Cycles. Marxists gleefully seized upon the biggest recession of all, the Great Depression of the 1930s, as evidence of the irrationality of capitalism; yet they never offered a good explanation of why and how such things happen, just assurances that socialism would cure them.\nIt fells to the British economist John Maynard Keynes to provide a clear story about what happens during a recession, and some useful advice about how to get out of one.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'The usual and basic Keynesian answer to recessions is a monetary expansion. But Keynes worried that even this might sometimes not be enough, particularly if a recession had been allowed to get out of hand and become a true depression. Once the economy is deeply depressed, households and especially firms may be unwilling to increase spending no matter how much cash they have, they may simply add any monetary expansion to their board. Such a situation, in which monetary policy has become ineffective, has come to be known as a "liquidity trap"; Keynes believed that the British and American economies had entered such a trap by the mid-1930s, and some economists believed that the United States was on the edge of such a tap in 1992.\nThe Keynesian answer to a liquidity trap is for the government to do what the private sector will not: spend. When monetary expansion is ineffective, fiscal expansion—such as public works programs financed by borrowing—must take its place. Such a fiscal expansion can break the vicious circle of low spending and low incomes, "priming the pump: and getting the economy moving again. But remember that this is not by any means an all-purpose policy recommendation; it is essentially a strategy of desperation, a dangerous drug to be prescribed only when the usual over-the-counter remedy of monetary policy has failed.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'Like any major intellectual contribution, Keynes\'s ideas were bitterly criticized. To many people it seems obvious that massive economic slumps must have deep roots. To them, Keynes\'s argument that they are essentially no more than a problem of mixed signals, which can be cured by printing a bit more money, seems unbelievable.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'The first stage of Friedman\'s attack on Keynes was his effective thought somewhat slippery critique of the idea that monetary and fiscal policy can be actively used to smooth out the business cycle. Friedman argued that such active policy is not only unnecessary but actually harmful, worsening the very economic instability that it is supposed to correct, and should be replaced by simple, mechanical monetary rules. This is the doctrine that came to be known as "monetarism."'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'On the whole, the monetarism for which Friedman first became famous seems clever, brilliantly argued, but shallow ― and perhaps even a bit disingenuous. Friedman\'s writings from that period have the feel of a smart man who knows what be wants to believe looking hard for supporting arguments. And I think it is fair to say that up until the late 1960s Friedman and his followers, while influential, were regarded by many of their colleagues as faintly disreputable.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch1. The Attack on Keynes',
    quote: 'Milton Friedman was not surprised. In 1968, in one of the decisive intellectual achievements of postwar economics, Friedman not only showed why the apparent tradeoff embodied in the idea of the Phillips curve was wrong; he also predicted the emergence of combined inflation and high unemployment, which Paul Samuelson dubbed "stagflation."'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch2. Taxes, Regulation, and Growth',
    quote: 'Feldstein pointed out that throughout the tax system inflation was turning tolerable paper tax rates into very high effective rates. Corporations, for example, were supposed to pay a tax rate of 42 percent on their profits. Feldstein calculated, however, that when the effects of inflation were taken into account, the true tax on any profits from investing in equipment was more like 75 percent.\nYou don\'t need to be a Republican to accept that tax rates this high might discourage investment and hurt economic growth. But was the interaction between inflation and investment really a major villain in America\'s economic difficulties? There the evidence was less clear.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch2. Taxes, Regulation, and Growth',
    quote: 'By 1980, the work of Feldstein, Boskin, Summers, and others had convinced many economists that U.\nS. taxes were in fact a significant obstacle to investment. Nor was this all: another major U.\nS. policy, the Social Security system, was also discouraging saving and investment.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch2. Taxes, Regulation, and Growth',
    quote: 'In the world of politics, however, the actual content of an academic movement may be less important than the way it affects the tone of the discussion. During the 1970s there was a growing public sense of disillusionment with government, which first fed grass-roots tax revolts in California and Massachusetts, then helped elect Ronald Reagan. And there was also a determined effort by a few extremely conservative journalists and politicians to promote radical tax-cutting plans. No matter how careful the research of conservative public finance theorists like Martin Feldstein might be, in that political climate it was inevitable that it would be widely seen as basically confirming popular prejudices. There was a huge intellectual gulf between Feldstein or Boskin and the sweeping claims of Arthur Laffer; but in the public mind, they were in effect allies.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch4. Growth',
    quote: 'In a way, the worst sin of the conservatives was that of hypocrisy. They proclaimed growth as their objective, offered it as the answer to all problems, all while following policies that actually inhibited that growth at least a bit. At the end of the day, however, the most striking fact is how little happened to U.\nS. long-term growth, good or bad, on their watch.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch6. The Budget Deficit',
    quote: 'In the court of conventional wisdom, Ronald Reagan stands accused of inflicting a huge burden of debt upon his country. He cut taxes on the rich, increased military spending, and failed to cut enough spending elsewhere to pay for his largesse. The result was a string of unprecedented peacetime deficits, and a debt that will be a drag on the national standard of living for decades to come.\nReagan is guilty as charged. The supply-side apologists\' claim that some extraordinary economic success vindicates Reaganomics in spite of the deficits just doesn\'t hold up in the face of the evidence. The question, however, is whether the crime was a felony or a misdemeanor.\nThe answer proposed here will not satisfy those with a taste for drama. Reagan created a deficit, and it hurt American economic growth. But even if the effects of the visible deficit are supplemented with appeals to several alleged hidden deficits of the 1980s, the cost was not catastrophic. The deficit is not nearly the monster some people imagine.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Ch9. The Economics of QWERTY',
    quote: 'The new trade theory picture of the world looks something like this: Each country has, at any given time, a set of broad resources—land, skilled labor, capital, climate, general technological competence. These resources define up to a point the industries in which the country can hope to be competitive on world markets. [...] But a country\'s resources do not fully determine what it produces, because the detailed pattern of advantage reflects the self-reinforcing virtuous circles, set in motion by the vagaries of history.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Peddling Prosperity (1994). Epilogue',
    quote: 'It\'s tempting to give up—either to retreat to the ivory tower, or to start to play the policy entrepreneur game. After all, what is the use of sophisticated policy thinking or careful examination of the facts if simplistic ideas win every time?\nOne answer is simply that it would be wrong to give up. If the people with good ideas do not fight for them, they have no right to complain about the outcome.\nBut good ideas will still often lose to convenient nonsense. When that happens, every serious economist is ultimately sustained by a faith that the right ideas will eventually prevail.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'Economists, like everyone, have their political biases, but these are by no means as strong an influence on what they are willing to consider as you might think. For example, one might have thought that strongly liberal economists like, say, James Tobin would be at least mildly sympathetic to the views of radical economists who draw their inspiration from Marx, or of heterodox economic thinkers like Galbraith. After all, in such fields as history and sociology the Marxist or post-Marxist left has long received a respectful hearing. And yet you don\'t find this happening: liberal economists are almost as quick as their conservative colleagues to condemn heterodox leftist ideas as foolish it was the liberal Robert Solow, not Milton Friedman, who defended orthodoxy in the bitter "capital controversy" with British radicals.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'Consider John Kenneth Galbraith or Lester Thurow, both leading economists in the view of the general public, both with all the formal qualifications, both totally ignored by the academic mainstream. Or consider Robert Mundell, who is still revered for his contributions to international monetary theory, yet whose later incarnation as the father of supply-side economics has similarly been ignored.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'In the last few years it has become apparent that during the 1940s and 1950s, a core of ideas emerged regarding external economies, strategic complementarity, and economic development that remains intellectually valid and may continue to have practical applications. This set of ideas which I will refer to as "high development theory" — anticipated in a number of ways the cutting edge of modern trade and growth theory. But these ideas have had to be rediscovered. Between 1960 and 1980 high development theory was virtually buried, essentially because the founders of development economics failed to make their points with sufficient analytical clarity to communicate their essence to other economists, and perhaps even to each other. Only recently have changes in economics made it possible to reconsider what the development theorists said, and to regain the valuable ideas that have been lost.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'A casual reading of the development literature suggests that there is a dividing line circa 1960. Before 1960 writers on development generally assumed as a matter of course that economies of scale were a limiting factor on the ability to profitably establish industries in less developed countries, and that in the presence of such economies of scale pecuniary external economies assume real welfare significance. They seem, however, to have been unaware of the degree to which economies of scale raise problems for explicit modeling of competition, and/or of the extent to which the drive for formalism was pushing economics toward explicit models.\nAfter 1960, by contrast, economists working on development had been trained in the formalism of constant-returns general equilibrium, and did not so much reject the possibility that economies of scale might matter as simply fail to notice it.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'In this part of the lecture I have argued that a number of works in development economics written during the 1950s contained, more or less explicitly and more or less self-consciously, a theory in which strategic complementarity played a key role in development: external economies arose from a circular relationship in which the decision to invest in large-scale production depended on the size of the market, and the size of the market depended on the decision to invest. Whatever the practical relevance of this theory, it made perfectly good logical sense. Yet this development theory was subsequently abandoned, to such an extent that classic papers in the field began to seem, as the physicist Wolfgang Pauli used to say, "not even wrong" — simply incomprehensible.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'From the point of view of a modern economist, the most striking feature of the works of high development theory is their adherence to a discursive, nonmathematical style. Economics has, of course, become vastly more mathematical over time. Nonetheless, development economics was archaic in style even for its own time. Of the four most famous high development works, Rosenstein-Rodan\'s was approximately contemporary with Samuelson\'s formulation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, while Lewis, Myrdal, and Hirschman were all roughly contemporary with Solow\'s initial statement of growth theory.\nThis lack of formality was not because development economists were peculiarly mathematically incapable. Hirschman made a significant contribution to the formal theory of devaluation in the 1940s, while Fleming helped create the still influential Mundell-Fleming model of floating exchange rates. Moreover, the development field itself was at the same time generating mathematical planning models first Harrod-Domar type growth models, then linear programming approaches that were actually quite technically advanced for their time.\nSo why didn\'t high development theory get expressed in formal models? Almost certainly for one basic reason: the difficulty of reconciling economies of scale with a competitive market structure.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch1.. The Fall and Rise of Development Economics',
    quote: 'The irony, of course, is that high development theory was right. By this I do not mean that the Big Push is really the right story of how development takes place, or even that the issues raised in high development theory are necessarily the key ones for making poor countries rich. What I do mean is that the unconventional themes put forth by the high development theorists their emphasis on strategic complementarity in investment decisions and on the problem of coordination failure — did in fact identify important possibilities that are neglected in competitive equilibrium models. But the high development theorists failed to convince their colleagues of the importance of those possibilities. Worse, they failed even to communicate clearly what they were talking about. And so good ideas, important ideas, were ignored for a generation after they were first enunciated.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch2.. Geography Lost and Found',
    quote: 'The history of economic geography of the study of the location of economic activity is more like the story of geological thought about the shapes and location of continents and mountain ranges. The location of production is an obvious feature of the economic world. Indeed, I began to get interested in economics as a schoolchild by looking at those old-fashioned maps of countries that used picturesque symbols to represent economic activity: sheaves of wheat to represent agriculture, little miners\' carts to represent resource extraction, little factories to represent industry, and so on. And yet there is almost no spatial analysis in mainstream economics.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch2.. Geography Lost and Found',
    quote: 'So why did spatial issues remain a blind spot for the economic profession? It was not a historical accident: there was something about spatial economics that made it inherently unfriendly terrain for the kind of modeling mainstream economists know how to do. That something was, as you might well guess, the problem of market structure in the face of increasing returns, a problem that is even more acute in economic geography than in development economics. In development the crucial role that high development theory assigned to increasing returns was a hypothesis crucial to that doctrine, but not necessarily crucial to understanding development in general. One could do meaningful theorizing about developing countries, albeit not in the grand tradition, without sacrificing the convenient assumptions of constant returns and perfect competition. In spatial economics, however, you really cannot get started at all without finding a way to deal with scale economies and oligopolistic firms.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch2.. Geography Lost and Found',
    quote: 'So what\'s the moral? We\'ve seen how the insistence on models that meet the standards of rigor in mainstream economics can lead to neglect of clearly valuable ideas. Does this mean that the whole emphasis on models is wrong? Should we make a major effort to open up economics, to relax our standards about what constitutes an acceptable argument? No—the moral of my tale is nowhere near that easy. Economists can often be remarkably obtuse, failing to see things that are right in front of them. But sometimes a bit of obtuseness is not entirely a bad thing.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch3.. Models and Metaphors',
    quote: 'Homo economicus is an implausible caricature, but a highly productive one, and no useful alternative has yet been found.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch3.. Models and Metaphors',
    quote: 'Many of those who reject the idea of economic models are ill-informed or even (perhaps unconsciously) intellectually dishonest. Still, there are highly intelligent and objective thinkers who are repelled by simplistic models for a much better reason: they are very aware that the act of building a model involves loss as well as gain.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch3.. Models and Metaphors',
    quote: 'The problem is that there is no alternative to models. We all think in simplified models, all the time. The sophisticated thing to do is not to pretend to stop, but to be self-conscious — to be aware that your models are maps rather than reality.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Development, Geography, and Economic Theory (1995). Ch3.. Models and Metaphors',
    quote: 'A temporary evolution of ignorance, a period when our insistence on looking in certain directions leaves us unable to see what is right under our noses, may be the price of progress, an inevitable part of what happens when we try to make sense of the world\'s complexity.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Intro of Pop Internationalism (1996)',
    quote: 'Whose fault is the replacement of serious discussion of world trade by what I have come to think of as "pop internationalism"? To some extent, of course, it is the result of basic human instincts: intellectual laziness, even among those who would be seen as wise and deep, will always be a powerful force. To some extent it also reflects the decline in the influence of economists in general: the high prestige of the profession a generation ago had much to do with the presumed effectiveness of Keynesian macroeconomic policies, and has suffered greatly as macroeconomics has dissolved into squabbling factions. And one should not ignore the role of editors, who often prefer what pop internationalists have to say to the disturbingly difficult ideas of people who know how to read national accounts or understand that the trade balance is also the difference between savings and investment. Indeed, some important editors, like James Fallows at The Atlantic or Robert Kuttner at The American Prospect are pop internationalists themselves; they deliberately use their magazines as platforms for what amounts to an anti-intellectual crusade.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession (1994)',
    quote: 'The idea that a country\'s economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply not the case that the world\'s leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession (1994)',
    quote: 'This article makes three points. First, it argues that concerns about competitiveness are, as an empirical matter, almost completely unfounded. Second, it tries to explain why defining the economic problem as one of international competition is nonetheless so attractive to so many people. Finally, it argues that the obsession with competitiveness is not only wrong but dangerous, skewing domestic policies and threatening the international economic system.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession (1994)',
    quote: 'To make a harsh but not entirely unjustified analogy, a government wedded to the ideology of competitiveness is as unlikely to make good economic policy as a government committed to creationism is to make good science policy, even in areas that have no direct relationship to the theory of evolution.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession (1994)',
    quote: 'So let\'s start telling the truth: competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Asia\'s Miracle (1994)',
    quote: 'First, most of the speculation about the superiority of the communist system - including the popular view that Western economies could painlessly accelerate their own growth by borrowing some aspects of that system - was off base. Rapid Soviet economic growth was based entirely on one attribute: the willingness to save, to sacrifice current consumption for the sake of future production. The communist example offered no hint of a free lunch.\nSecond, the economic analysis of communist countries\' growth implied some future limits to their industrial expansion - in other words, implied that a naive projection of their past growth rates into the future was likely to greatly overstate their real prospects. Economic growth that is based on expansion of inputs, rather than on growth in output per unit of input, is inevitably subject to diminishing returns. It was simply not possible for the Soviet economies to sustain the rates of growth of labor force participation, average education levels, and above all the physical capital stock that had prevailed in previous years. Communist growth would predictably slow down, perhaps drastically.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Asia\'s Miracle (1994)',
    quote: 'If growth in East Asia is indeed running into diminishing returns, however, the conventional wisdom about an Asian-centered world economy needs some rethinking.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Pop Internationalism (1996). Asia\'s Miracle (1994)',
    quote: 'That\'s a hard answer to accept, especially for those American policy intellectuals who recoil from the dreary task of reducing deficits and raising the national savings rate. But economics is not a dismal science because the economists like it that way; it is because in the end we must submit to the tyranny not just of the numbers, but of the logic they express.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Self-Organizing Economy (1996). Preface',
    quote: 'In this book I try to show how models of self-organization can be applied to many economic phenomena - how the principle of "order from instability," which explains the growth of hurricanes and embryos, can also explain the formation of cities and business cycles; how the principle of "order from random growth" can explain the strangely simple rules that describe the sizes of earth quakes, meteorites, and metropolitan areas. I believe that the ideas of self-organization theory can add substantially to our understanding of the economy; whatever their ultimate usefulness, these ideas are very exciting, and playing around with them is tremendous fun.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Self-Organizing Economy (1996). Ch9.. Concluding Thoughts',
    quote: 'The world is full of self-organizing systems, systems that form structures not merely in response to inputs from outside but also, indeed primarily, in response to their own internal logic. Global weather is a self-organizing system; so, surely, is the global economy.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Age of Diminished Expectations (1990; 1994; 1997). Preface',
    quote: 'There are three kinds of writing in economics: Greek-letter, up-and-down, and airport. Greek-letter writing formal, theoretical, mathematical is how professors communicate. Like any academic field, economics has its fair share of hacks and phonies, who use complicated language to hide the banality of their ideas; it also contains profound thinkers, who use the specialized language of the discipline as an efficient way to express deep insights. [...] Up-and-down economics is what one encounters on the business pages of newspapers, or for that matter on TV. It is preoccupied with the latest news and the latest numbers, hence its name. [...] Finally, airport economics is the language of economics bestsellers. These books are most prominently displayed at airport bookstores, where the delayed business traveler is likely to buy them. Most of these books predict disaster: a new great depression, the evisceration of our economy by Japanese multinationals, the collapse of our money. A minority have the opposite view, a boundless optimism: new technology or supply-side economics is about to lead us into an era of unprecedented economic progress. Whether pessimistic or optimistic, airport economics is usually fun, rarely well informed, and never serious.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Age of Diminished Expectations (1990; 1994; 1997). Ch1. Productivity Growth. p11.',
    quote: 'Productivity isn\'t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A country\'s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Accidental Theorist: And Other Dispatches From The Dismal Science (1998). "Virus Strikes Again", Originally "Supply-Side Virus Strikes Again: Why there is no cure for this virulent infection", undated draft at web.\nmit.\nedu of a "The Dismal Science" column for Slate',
    quote: 'The appeal to the intellectually insecure is also more important than it might seem. Because economics touches so much of life, everyone wants to have an opinion. Yet the kind of economics covered in the textbooks is a technical subject that many people find hard to follow. How reassuring, then, to be told that it is all irrelevant -- that all you really need to know are a few simple ideas! Quite a few supply-siders have created for themselves a wonderful alternative intellectual history in which John Maynard Keynes was a fraud, Paul Samuelson and even Milton Friedman are fools, and the true line of deep economic thought runs from Adam Smith through obscure turn-of-the-century Austrians straight to them.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Accidental Theorist: And Other Dispatches From The Dismal Science (1998). "The Gold Bug Variations", Originally published in Slate (19961123)',
    quote: 'The legend of King Midas has been generally misunderstood. Most people think the curse that turned everything the old miser touched into gold, leaving him unable to eat or drink, was a lesson in the perils of avarice. But Midas’s true sin was his failure to understand monetary economics. What the gods were really telling him is that gold is just a metal. If it sometimes seems to be more, that is only because society has found it convenient to use gold as a medium of exchange—a bridge between other, truly desirable, objects. There are other possible mediums of exchange, and it is silly to imagine that this pretty, but only moderately useful, substance has some irreplaceable significance.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Fuzzy Math: The Essential Guide to the Bush Tax Plan (2001). Intro',
    quote: 'Will the tax cut destroy America’s prosperity? Probably not. As Adam Smith observed, there’s a deal of ruin in a nation. We have a huge, resilient economy that can survive and recover from even quite bad government policies. Yet while the tax cut may not be a matter of economic life or death, it is a very serious issue. For one thing, like it or not, the tax cut has become the central political issue in the United States right now. Conservatives who want to reshape America view passage of a large tax cut as a first step toward realizing their vision. For that reason, those who do not share this vision feel, rightly, that they must oppose the plan.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal (2007). Ch13.. The Conscience of a Liberal',
    quote: 'To be a progressive, then, means being a partisan—at least for now. The only way a progressive agenda can be enacted is if Democrats have both the presidency and a large enough majority in Congress to overcome Republican opposition. And achieving that kind of political preponderance will require leadership that makes opponents of the progressive agenda pay a political price for their obstructionism—leadership that, like FDR, welcomes the hatred of the interest groups trying to prevent us from making our society better.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal (2007). Ch13.. The Conscience of a Liberal. W. W. Norton & Company. 352 p1. SBN 978-0-393-06069-0, 1st edition (2007)',
    quote: 'I believe in a relatively equal society, supported by institutions that limit extremes of wealth and poverty. I believe in democracy, civil liberties, and the rule of law. That makes me a liberal, and I’m proud of it.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Return of Depression Economics and The Crisis of 2008 (2009). Intro',
    quote: 'Most economists, to the extent that they think about the subject at all, regard the Great Depression of the 1930s as a gratuitous, unnecessary tragedy.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Return of Depression Economics and The Crisis of 2008 (2009). Intro',
    quote: 'The kind of economic trouble that Asia experienced a decade ago, and that we\'re all experiencing now, is precisely the sort of thing we thought we had learned to prevent. In the bad old days big, advanced economies with stable governments-like Britain in the 1920s-might have had no answer to prolonged periods of stagnation and deflation; but between John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, we thought we knew enough to keep that from happening again.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Return of Depression Economics and The Crisis of 2008 (2009). Intro',
    quote: 'At the time, I thought of it this way: it was as if bacteria that used to cause deadly plagues, but had long been considered conquered by modem medicine, had reemerged in a form resistant to all the standard antibiotics. Here\'s what I wrote in the introduction to the first edition: "So far only a limited number of people have actually fallen prey to the newly incurable strains; but even those of us who have so far been lucky would be foolish not to seek new cures, new prophylactic regimens, whatever it takes, lest we tum out to be the next victims." Well, we were foolish. And now the plague is upon us.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Return of Depression Economics and The Crisis of 2008 (2009). Ch10.. The Return of Depression Economics',
    quote: 'We will not achieve the understanding we need, however, unless we are willing to think clearly about our problems and to follow those thoughts wherever they lead. Some people say that our economic problems are structural, with no quick cure available; but I believe that the only important structural obstacles to world prosperity are the obsolete doctrines that clutter the minds of men.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Economics (4th ed., 2015). Preface',
    quote: 'Many of the stories economists tell take the form of models—for whatever else they are, economic models are stories about how the world works.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'Economics (4th ed., 2015). Ch33.. Macroeconomics: Events and Ideas',
    quote: 'As is often the case with major disputes in economics, the argument over fiscal policy went on for years, with some critics of fiscal policy still defending their position when this book went to press. It seems fair, however, to say that among economists a more or less Keynesian view of the effects of fiscal policy came to prevail. Careful statistical studies at the International Monetary Fund and else where showed that austerity policies have historically been followed by contraction, not expansion. Recent experience, in which countries like Spain and Greece that were forced into severe austerity also experienced severe slumps, seemed to confirm that observation. Furthermore, it was clear that those who had predicted a sharp rise in U.\nS. interest rates due to budget deficits, leading to conventional crowding out, had been wrong: U.\nS. long-term interest rates remained near record lows even during the years from 2009 to 2012, when the government ran very large deficits.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. "Dubya\'s Double Dip?", The New York Times, 20020802',
    quote: 'To fight this recession the Fed needs more than a snapback; it needs soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment. And to do that, as Paul McCulley of Pimco put it, Alan Greenspan needs to create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble. Judging by Mr. Greenspan\'s remarkably cheerful recent testimony, he still thinks he can pull that off. But the Fed chairman\'s crystal ball has been cloudy lately; remember how he urged Congress to cut taxes to head off the risk of excessive budget surpluses? And a sober look at recent data is not encouraging.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Op-ed, "Franklin Delano Obama," New York Times, 20081110 [3]',
    quote: 'What saved the economy, and the New Deal was the enormous public-works project known as World War II, which finally provided a fiscal stimulus adequate to the economy\'s needs.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?", The New York Times (20090902)',
    quote: 'When it comes to the all-too-human problem of recessions and depressions, economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets work perfectly. The vision that emerges as the profession rethinks its foundations may not be all that clear; it certainly won’t be neat; but we can hope that it will have the virtue of being at least partly right.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Regarding the ongoing 2013 U.\nS. government shutdown',
    quote: 'I do not think that word “compromise” means what Mr. Ryan thinks it means. Above all, he failed to offer the one thing the White House won’t, can’t bend on: an end to extortion over the debt ceiling. Yet even this ludicrously unbalanced offer was too much for conservative activists, who lambasted Mr. Ryan for basically leaving health reform intact.\nDoes this mean that we’re going to hit the debt ceiling? Quite possibly; nobody really knows, but careful observers are giving no better than even odds that any kind of deal will be reached before the money runs out. Beyond that, however, our current state of dysfunction looks like a chronic condition, not a one-time event. Even if the debt ceiling is raised enough to avoid immediate default, even if the government shutdown is somehow brought to an end, it will only be a temporary reprieve. Conservative activists are simply not willing to give up on the idea of ruling through extortion, and the Obama administration has decided, wisely, that it will not give in to extortion.\nSo how does this end? How does America become governable again?'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Regarding the last-minute deal that ended the 2013 U.\nS. government shutdown just before the U.\nS. defaulted on its debt',
    quote: 'Things could have been even worse. This week, we managed to avoid driving off a cliff. But we’re still on the road to nowhere.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Paul Krugman (20150717). "Liberals and Wages". New York Times. Retrieved on 20150717.',
    quote: 'Many liberals have changed their views in response to new evidence. It’s an interesting experience; conservatives should try it some time.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Sanders Over The Edge (20160408)',
    quote: 'Holding people accountable for their past is O.\nK., but imposing a standard of purity, in which any compromise or misstep makes you the moral equivalent of the bad guys, isn’t. Abraham Lincoln didn’t meet that standard; neither did F.\nD.\nR. Nor, for that matter, has Bernie Sanders (think guns).'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Sanders Over The Edge (20160408)',
    quote: 'The Sanders campaign has brought out a lot of idealism and energy that the progressive movement needs. It has also, however, brought out a streak of petulant self-righteousness among some supporters. Has it brought out that streak in the candidate, too?'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Prediction in the aftermath of Donald Trump\'s presidential election victory. Markets recovered the following day.',
    quote: 'If the question is when markets will recover, a first-pass answer is never.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. The Populism Perplex, The New York Times (20161125)',
    quote: 'The fact is that Democrats have already been pursuing policies that are much better for the white working class than anything the other party has to offer. Yet this has brought no political reward.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. The Populism Perplex, The New York Times (20161125)',
    quote: 'Nobody can credibly promise to bring the old jobs back; what you can promise — and Mrs. Clinton did — are things like guaranteed health care and higher minimum wages. But working-class whites overwhelmingly voted for politicians who promise to destroy those gains.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. The Populism Perplex, The New York Times (20161125)',
    quote: 'You can’t explain the votes of places like Clay County as a response to disagreements about trade policy. The only way to make sense of what happened is to see the vote as an expression of, well, identity politics — some combination of white resentment at what voters see as favoritism toward nonwhites (even though it isn’t) and anger on the part of the less educated at liberal elites whom they imagine look down on them.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. The Populism Perplex, The New York Times (20161125)',
    quote: 'Democrats have to figure out why the white working class just voted overwhelmingly against its own economic interests, not pretend that a bit more populism would solve the problem.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Warren Versus the Petty Plutocrats (20190930)',
    quote: 'With great wealth comes great pettiness.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. God Is Now Trump’s Co-Conspirator (20191014)',
    quote: 'Nonetheless, William Barr — again, the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, responsible for defending the Constitution — is sounding remarkably like America’s most unhinged religious zealots, the kind of people who insist that we keep experiencing mass murder because schools teach the theory of evolution. Guns don’t kill people — Darwin kills people!'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. Trump and His Corrupt Old Party: For Republicans, there is no bottom (20191121)',
    quote: 'The [Trump impeachment] inquiry hasn’t found a smoking gun; it has found what amounts to a smoking battery of artillery.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. comment on Trump Is Abusing His Tariff Power, Too (20200123)',
    quote: 'The way to deal with China would have been a broad coalition of countries that play by the rules. Instead, we\'ve conveyed the message that big countries don\'t need no rules. And China is a very big country.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Times Columns. column (20200323)',
    quote: 'Republicans Add Insult to Illness'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'If Keynes was Luther, Friedman was Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits. And like the Jesuits, Friedman’s followers have acted as a sort of disciplined army of the faithful, spearheading a broad, but incomplete, rollback of Keynesian heresy. By the century’s end, classical economics had regained much though by no means all of its former dominion, and Friedman deserves much of the credit.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'Keynesian theory initially prevailed because it did a far better job than classical orthodoxy of making sense of the world around us, and Friedman’s critique of Keynes became so influential largely because he correctly identified Keynesianism’s weak points. And just to be clear: although this essay argues that Friedman was wrong on some issues, and sometimes seemed less than honest with his readers, I regard him as a great economist and a great man.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'Keynes didn’t make an all-out assault on Economic Man, but he often resorted to plausible psychological theorizing rather than careful analysis of what a rational decision-maker would do. Business decisions were driven by “animal spirits,” consumer decisions by a psychological tendency to spend some but not all of any increase in income, wage settlements by a sense of fairness, and so on.\nBut was it really a good idea to diminish the role of Economic Man that much? No, said Friedman, who argued in his 1953 essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics” that economic theories should be judged not by their psychological realism but by their ability to predict behavior. And Friedman’s two greatest triumphs as an economic theorist came from applying the hypothesis of rational behavior to questions other economists had thought beyond its reach.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'One interesting footnote: although Friedman made great strides in macroeconomics by applying the concept of individual rationality, he also knew where to stop. In the 1970s, some economists pushed Friedman’s analysis of inflation even further, arguing that there is no usable trade-off between inflation and unemployment even in the short run, because people will anticipate government actions and build that anticipation, as well as past experience, into their price-setting and wage-bargaining. This doctrine, known as “rational expectations,” swept through much of academic economics. But Friedman never went there.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'In effect, Japan in the Nineties offered a fresh opportunity to test the views of Friedman and Keynes regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy in depression conditions. And the results clearly supported Keynes’s pessimism rather than Friedman’s optimism.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Who Was Milton Friedman?", The New York Review of Books (20070215)',
    quote: 'What’s odd about Friedman’s absolutism on the virtues of markets and the vices of government is that in his work as an economist’s economist he was actually a model of restraint. As I pointed out earlier, he made great contributions to economic theory by emphasizing the role of individual rationality—but unlike some of his colleagues, he knew where to stop. Why didn’t he exhibit the same restraint in his role as a public intellectual?\nThe answer, I suspect, is that he got caught up in an essentially political role. Milton Friedman the great economist could and did acknowledge ambiguity. But Milton Friedman the great champion of free markets was expected to preach the true faith, not give voice to doubts. And he ended up playing the role his followers expected. As a result, over time the refreshing iconoclasm of his early career hardened into a rigid defense of what had become the new orthodoxy.\nIn the long run, great men are remembered for their strengths, not their weaknesses, and Milton Friedman was a very great man indeed—a man of intellectual courage who was one of the most important economic thinkers of all time, and possibly the most brilliant communicator of economic ideas to the general public that ever lived. But there’s a good case for arguing that Friedmanism, in the end, went too far, both as a doctrine and in its practical applications. When Friedman was beginning his career as a public intellectual, the times were ripe for a counterreformation against Keynesianism and all that went with it. But what the world needs now, I’d argue, is a counter-counterreformation.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, "Our Giant Banking Crisis—What to Expect", The New York Review of Books (20100513)',
    quote: 'Equally important, the financial industry’s political power has not gone away. Banks have waged a fierce campaign against what many expected to be an easily passed reform proposal, the creation of a new agency to protect financial consumers. Despite the steady drumbeat of scandalous revelations—most recently, the discovery that Goldman Sachs helped Greece cook its books, while Lehman cooked its own books—top financial executives continue to have ready access to the corridors of power. And as many have noted, President Obama’s chief economic and financial officials are men closely associated with Clinton-era deregulation and financial triumphalism; they may have revised their views but the continuity remains striking.\nIn that sense, this time really is different: while the first great global financial crisis was followed by major reforms, it’s not clear that anything comparable will happen after the second. And history tells us what will happen if those reforms don’t take place. There will be a resurgence of financial folly, which always flourishes given a chance. And the consequence of that folly will be more and quite possibly worse crises in the years to come.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The New York Review of Books articles. "Why We’re in a New Gilded Age", The New York Review of Books (20140508)',
    quote: 'Piketty ends Capital in the Twenty-First Century with a call to arms — a call, in particular, for wealth taxes, global if possible, to restrain the growing power of inherited wealth. It’s easy to be cynical about the prospects for anything of the kind. But surely Piketty’s masterly diagnosis of where we are and where we’re heading makes such a thing considerably more likely. So Capital in the Twenty-First Century is an extremely important book on all fronts. Piketty has transformed our economic discourse; we’ll never talk about wealth and inequality the same way we used to.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. "A Dark Age of Macroeconomics", 20090127',
    quote: 'We’re living in a Dark Age of macroeconomics. Remember, what defined the Dark Ages wasn’t the fact that they were primitive — the Bronze Age was primitive, too. What made the Dark Ages dark was the fact that so much knowledge had been lost, that so much known to the Greeks and Romans had been forgotten by the barbarian kingdoms that followed.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. "Economics in the Crisis" (20120305)',
    quote: 'The best you can say about economic policy in this slump is that we have for the most part avoided a full repeat of the Great Depression. I say “for the most part” because we actually are seeing a Depression-level slump in Greece, and very bad slumps elsewhere in the European periphery. Still, the overall downturn hasn’t been a full 1930s replay. But all of that, I think, can be attributed to the financial rescue of 2008-2009 and automatic stabilizers. Deliberate policy to offset the crash in private spending has been largely absent.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. "The Beatings Must Continue", 20130430',
    quote: 'Sometimes economists in official positions give bad advice; sometimes they give very, very bad advice; and sometimes they work at the OECD.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. "Iron Men of Wall Street", 20140216',
    quote: 'We’re now in the seventh year of a slump brought on by Wall Street excess; the wizardly job of “allocating the economy’s investment resources” consisted, we now know, largely of funneling money into a real estate bubble.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. Keynesianism Explained (20150915)',
    quote: 'I would summarize the Keynesian view in terms of four points:\n1. Economies sometimes produce much less than they could, and employ many fewer workers than they should, because there just isn’t enough spending. Such episodes can happen for a variety of reasons; the question is how to respond.\n2. There are normally forces that tend to push the economy back toward full employment. But they work slowly; a hands-off policy toward depressed economies means accepting a long, unnecessary period of pain.\n3. It is often possible to drastically shorten this period of pain and greatly reduce the human and financial losses by “printing money”, using the central bank’s power of currency creation to push interest rates down.\n4. Sometimes, however, monetary policy loses its effectiveness, especially when rates are close to zero. In that case temporary deficit spending can provide a useful boost. And conversely, fiscal austerity in a depressed economy imposes large economic losses.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. Questions of Character (20160517)',
    quote: 'It has been obvious for quite a while that Sanders — not just his supporters, not even just his surrogates, but the candidate himself — has a problem both in facing reality and in admitting mistakes.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. The New Climate Of Treason (20170714)',
    quote: 'As Branko says, there was a time when Serbs and Croats seemed to get along fairly well, indeed intermarrying at a high rate. But could anyone now put Yugoslavia back together? At this rate, we’ll soon be asking the same question about America.'
  },
  {
    figure: 'Paul Krugman',
    mark: 'The Conscience of a Liberal blog. 20190105, New York Times',
    quote: 'What does Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez know about tax policy? A lot.'
  },
]