bootloader_support: fix Coverity scan warning
Null pointer dereferences  (REVERSE_INULL) :
Null-checking "part" suggests that it may be null, but it has already been dereferenced on all paths leading to the check.
@@ -127,25 +127,27 @@ static esp_err_t image_load(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_
uint32_t checksum_word = ESP_ROM_CHECKSUM_INITIAL;
uint32_t *checksum = (do_verify) ? &checksum_word : NULL;
bootloader_sha256_handle_t sha_handle = NULL;
+ bool verify_sha;
#if (SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE == 1)
/* used for anti-FI checks */
uint8_t image_digest[HASH_LEN] = { [ 0 ... 31] = 0xEE };
uint8_t verified_digest[HASH_LEN] = { [ 0 ... 31 ] = 0x01 };
#endif
+
+ if (data == NULL || part == NULL) {
+ return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
+ }
+
#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
// For Secure Boot V2, we do verify signature on bootloader which includes the SHA calculation.
- bool verify_sha = do_verify;
+ verify_sha = do_verify;
#else // Secure boot not enabled
// For secure boot V1 on ESP32, we don't calculate SHA or verify signature on bootloaders.
// (For non-secure boot, we don't verify any SHA-256 hash appended to the bootloader because
// esptool.py may have rewritten the header - rely on esptool.py having verified the bootloader at flashing time, instead.)
- bool verify_sha = (part->offset != ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET) && do_verify;
+ verify_sha = (part->offset != ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET) && do_verify;
#endif
- if (data == NULL || part == NULL) {
- return ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
- }
-
if (part->size > SIXTEEN_MB) {
err = ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG;
FAIL_LOAD("partition size 0x%x invalid, larger than 16MB", part->size);
