This thesis is not intended to constitute a treatise of the Algeciras Conference, but to relate only that part taken by the United States in the conference. However, in presenting this material it has been thought necessary to offer a preliminary treatment of the Triple Alliance and the Entente Cordiale to serve as a background to interpret the significance of the Morocco Crisis as it presented itself to the world in 1908. In dealing with the Morocco Crisis we have considered not the Moroccan problem itself, but the place which that conflict took in the European diplomacy prior to the opening of the Algeciras Conference.
Briefly the outline of this thesis is as follows! First, a summary of the alliance system as it developed after the Franco-Prussian War. This is followed by a brief consideration of the Morocco Crisis, referring to Morocco proper only when necessary to explain the moves of the Powers. The last two chapters deal with the United States' participation in the Algeciras Conference with emphasis on the role played by President Roosevelt.