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2025 Northampton Town Council election | See also | See also
2025 West Northamptonshire Council election, for the unitary authority held alongside the town council election |
2025 Northampton Town Council election | References | References
Category:Politics of Northampton
Category:2025 elections in the United Kingdom |
2025 Northampton Town Council election | Table of Content | refimprove, Results by ward, See also, References |
Draft:OptoFidelity | AFC submission | |
Draft:OptoFidelity | OptoFidelity | OptoFidelity
OptoFidelity Oy is a Finnish based technology company operating in Finland, United States and China specializing in automated testing solutions for smart devices, with a focus on augmented reality, virtual reality, mixed reality, and advanced display technologies. Founded in 2005 and headquartered in Tampere, Finland, the company designs and manufactures high-precision test systems that simulate human perception to assess the performance and quality of consumer electronics, optical devices and components. |
Draft:OptoFidelity | History | History
OptoFidelity was founded in 2005 in Tampere, Finland, by a group of technology professionals with a background in optics, robotics, and software engineering. The company initially focused on custom test automation solutions for the mobile device industry. Over the years, it expanded its portfolio to include specialized test systems for display modules, touchscreen technologies, and later, augmented reality and virtual reality head-mounted devices (HMDs).
The company's first product, an EMC 100 display testing solution, was released in 2006. This was followed by the introduction of touch performance testers like TPPT Touch for smartphones and later, user interface performance measurement tools such as WatchDog. Over the years, OptoFidelity expanded its focus to address the emerging needs of the AR/VR/MR sector. In 2022, they launched optical metrology systems, including the WG-IQ for waveguide image quality measurement and the WG-GAT diffractometer for AR waveguide characterization.
In August 2017, OptoFidelity was acquired by Changyuan Group Ltd (CYG), a Chinese high-tech enterprise. In January 2018, OptoFidelity opened a manufacturing and assembly facility in Shenzhen, China. |
Draft:OptoFidelity | Awards and Recognition | Awards and Recognition
OptoFidelity has received nominations and awards for its contributions to the technology and business sectors:
Internationalization Award of the President of the Republic of Finland (2016): OptoFidelity was awarded for its success in international markets and its contributions to the Finnish economy.
Photonics Company of the Year (2018): Recognized by Photonics Finland for its international growth, development of new solutions, and investments in optical and imaging-based measurement technologies.
Leading European Tech Scaleups (LETS) List (2024): OptoFidleity was awarded in its growth and technological leadership in its sector. |
Draft:OptoFidelity | References | References |
Draft:OptoFidelity | Table of Content | AFC submission, OptoFidelity, History, Awards and Recognition, References |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Qudrat E Khoda (born: June 16 1985) is the leader of Muhammadi Islam and the director of | Qudrat E Khoda (born: June 16 1985) is the leader of Muhammadi Islam and the director of Dewanbag Sharif, the coordinator and problem solver. His father named him Qadr because he was born on the night of the holy Laylatul Qadr. Being the Imam of Muhammadi Islam, he is also addressed as Imam Huzur. Before his death, the Murshid entrusted all the responsibilities of the Darwad to him. |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Early Life | Early Life |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Education | Education |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Career | Career |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Bibliography | Bibliography
Morsheder Darbare Murider Koronyio
Mohammadi Islamer Taleem |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Charity Work | Charity Work |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | References | References |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | External links | External links
https://dewanbagsharif.org/
https://muhammadiislam.org/ |
Draft:Qudrat E Khoda | Table of Content | Qudrat E Khoda (born: June 16 1985) is the leader of Muhammadi Islam and the director of, Early Life, Education, Career, Bibliography, Charity Work, References, External links |
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Elena Drobychevskaja | [[:Elena Drobychevskaja]] | :Elena Drobychevskaja
– (View AfDView log | edits since nomination)
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Non notable artist. Primary sourced promotion lacking coverage in independent reliable sources. duffbeerforme (talk) 08:49, 20 May 2025 (UTC)
Note: This discussion has been included in the deletion sorting lists for the following topics: Artists, Women, and Belarus. Shellwood (talk) 09:37, 20 May 2025 (UTC)
Delete - fails WP:ARTIST No reliable sourcing in the article. I am not finding any RS with a simple Google search.
See source table below --WomenArtistUpdates (talk) 01:10, 21 May 2025 (UTC)
Your second link throws no "security warning" for me. If there is a warning for you (you do not say what kind of warning, nor what tools you are using), will be for the archive service, not the cited website, bcdb.com, which is widely cited on Wikipedia.
The security warning for your 7th site is an expired certificate, and does not preclude its use as a source.
The nwzonline.de page is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20160306054146/http://www.nwzonline.de/varel/ausstellung-im-caf-hafenblick_a_1,0,611902600.html - but you simply dismiss it as a "dead link".
The cavallo.de page is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20160617055333/http://www.cavallo.de/ausstellung-rotes-pferd.304497.233219.htm - but you dismiss it as "redirecting to home page".
Why is an "archived defunct directory" discounted?
Since when did we count exhibition listings at a gallery as primary for the artist?
The artfontainebleau.net page is archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20120613220257/http://www.artfontainebleau.net/article-31285597.html - but you dismiss it as "404". Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 10:46, 21 May 2025 (UTC) |
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Elena Drobychevskaja | Table of Content | [[:Elena Drobychevskaja]] |
Category:Seychellois women ambassadors | [[Category:Women ambassadors]] | Category:Women ambassadors
Category:Seychellois women diplomats
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Category:Seychellois women ambassadors | Table of Content | [[Category:Women ambassadors]] |
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Simonna | [[:Simonna]] | :Simonna
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()
Promotional autobiography for notable actor and singer. None of here roles are good for NACTOR. No sign of any charting/gold/rotation/major awards for her music. Her Eurovision participation was only in qualifying, she did not make it to Eurovision. No major awards. Lacks coverage about her in independent reliable sources. (Whilst I call it an autobiography, multiple people (including her) are using the one account that contributed much of the content) duffbeerforme (talk) 08:51, 20 May 2025 (UTC)
Note: This discussion has been included in the deletion sorting lists for the following topics: Actors and filmmakers, Bands and musicians, Women, and Lithuania. Shellwood (talk) 09:38, 20 May 2025 (UTC) |
Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Simonna | Table of Content | [[:Simonna]] |
File:Flourished Peony.jpg | Orphaned non-free revisions | |
File:Flourished Peony.jpg | Summary | Summary |
File:Flourished Peony.jpg | Licensing | Licensing |
File:Flourished Peony.jpg | Table of Content | Orphaned non-free revisions, Summary, Licensing |
Draft:Vincent Vangeel | AfC submission | Vincent Vangeel (born 18 September 1987) is a Belgian radio presenter at Qmusic since 2010.
In 2024, he made a podcast about De Kiekeboes together with Thomas Smolders. |
Draft:Vincent Vangeel | References | References
:Category:Living people
:Category:1987 births
:Category:Belgian radio presenters
:Category:People from Mechelen |
Draft:Vincent Vangeel | Table of Content | AfC submission, References |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Short description | Park Chan-dae (; born 10 May 1967) is a South Korean accountant and politican that currently serves as a acting leader of the Democratic Party of Korea since 9 April 2025 following the resignation of Lee Jae-myung as a party leader. Apart from serving as acting party leader, he also served as a floor leader of Democratic Party of Korea since 30 May 2024 and the member of the National Assembly since 2016. |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Biography | Biography |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Early life and education | Early life and education
Born on 10 May 1967 in Yonghyeon-dong, Incheon (then part of Gyeonggi Province), he is the youngest between three sons and one daughter. His family were from Andong, North Gyeongsang Province and moved to Incheon just before he was born. During his childhood, he attended and graduated from Incheon YongHyeon Elementary School, Incheon Daegeon Middle School, and Dong Incheon High School.
After his graduation from high schools, in 1984, he entered Bachelor of Business Administration, College of Business Administration, Inha University. During his tenure as university student, he played important role for student movement during military role of Chun Doo-hwan, particularly as a participant of June Democratic Struggle. After graduated from Inha University, he served at the Republic of Korea Armed Forces in 1988 as administrative officer of 31st Infantry Division unit, and was discharged on 27 December 1990. After discharged from military, he entered Graduate School of Public Administration (GSPA) at Seoul National University and got a Master's degree in 1998.
From 1997 to 1999, he worked in the International Department of Sedong Accounting Corporation, and from 1999 to 2000, he worked in the International Department of Samil Accounting Corporation. From 2001 to 2003, he worked in the Accounting Supervision Bureau and the Information Disclosure Supervision Bureau of the Financial Supervisory Service. From 2003 until December 2015, he was the head of the Gyeongin Branch of Hanmi Accounting Corporation, and also the vice president of the company. |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Political career | Political career
In 2009, Park joined the Democratic Party due to death of former President Roh Moo-hyun. |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Electoral history | Electoral history |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | General elections | General elections
Election Year Constituency Political party Votes (%) Remarks20th 2016 Incheon Yeonsu A DP 30,047 (40.57%) Won21st 2020 Incheon Yeonsu A DP 45,479 (56.87%) Won22nd 2024 Incheon Yeonsu A DP 58,663 (52.44%) Won |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | References | References |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | External links | External links
Park Chan-dae at Instagram
Park Chan-dae on X
Park Chan-dae on Youtube
Category:1967 births
Category:Living people
Category:Members of the National Assembly (South Korea)
Category:Democratic Party of Korea politicians
Category:21st-century South Korean politicians
Category:People from Incheon |
Park Chan-dae (politician) | Table of Content | Short description, Biography, Early life and education, Political career, Electoral history, General elections, References, External links |
Category:Permanent representatives of Seychelles to the African Union | Portal | Seychelles
African Union |
Category:Permanent representatives of Seychelles to the African Union | Table of Content | Portal |
TSH-T3 shunt | Short description | TSH-T3 shunt is a feed-forward mechanism of the hypothalamic–pituitary–thyroid axis (HPT axis) in which pituitary thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH) directly augments secretion of the biologically active thyroid hormone triiodothyronine (T3) by the thyroid gland. Besides stimulating production of the pro-hormone thyroxine (T4), TSH up-regulates intrathyroidal deiodination of T4 to T3 via type II iodothyronine deiodinase (DIO2), effectively “shunting” part of the gland’s T4 output into active T3 before release.
The pathway buffers circulating free T3 (FT3) against fluctuations in thyroid output and contributes to the circadian rhythm of serum T3. Recognition of a TSH-T3 shunt has refined models of thyroid homeostasis and influences interpretation of thyroid function tests and the management of hypothyroidism. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Background | Background
In euthyroid adults about 80 % of circulating T3 arises from peripheral deiodination of T4, while ~20 % is secreted directly by the thyroid. Under high TSH drive – for example in iodine deficiency or after exogenous TSH administration – the thyroidal fraction of T3 secretion rises substantially. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Mechanism | Mechanism |
TSH-T3 shunt | Intrathyroidal deiodination | Intrathyroidal deiodination
TSH activates cAMP-dependent signalling that stimulates expression and activity of DIO2 (and to a lesser extent DIO1) in follicular cells, promoting rapid conversion of stored T4 to T3 and increasing the T3:T4 ratio of secreted hormone. TSH concurrently shortens thyroglobulin residence time, favouring release of newly formed T3. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Quantitative contribution | Quantitative contribution
Mathematical sensitivity analysis places the shunt gain (GT) at 15–30 pmol s−1 / 109 thyrocytes, sufficient to stabilise FT3 against ±30 % changes in T4 output. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Physiological role | Physiological role
The shunt acts as a buffering, feed-forward element complementing negative feedback by thyroid hormones on TSH secretion. In population studies FT3 varies little across a six-fold range of TSH, whereas FT4 shows a strong log-linear inverse relationship with TSH. The shunt therefore underlies the relative constancy of T3 supply critical for metabolic stability. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Evidence | Evidence |
TSH-T3 shunt | Clinical studies | Clinical studies
In 1 768 euthyroid adults FT3 remained normal across wide TSH and FT4 ranges, whereas 287 athyreotic patients on levothyroxine (LT4) displayed FT3 proportional to exogenous T4, indicating loss of thyroidal T3 secretion.
Serial measurements after recombinant human TSH injection showed a prompt, transient rise of FT3 peaking ≈2 h after the TSH peak, with minimal FT4 change.
Children in the upper TSH reference quartile had higher FT3 but unchanged FT4 compared with peers in the lower quartile, consistent with TSH-driven T3 secretion. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Experimental studies | Experimental studies
Disruption of Dio2 in mice produced pituitary resistance to T4 and reduced circulating T3, demonstrating the importance of thyroidal DIO2 for systemic hormone balance. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Mathematical modelling | Mathematical modelling
In silico models incorporating a TSH-dependent T3 secretion term replicate the observed circadian FT3 rhythm and the stability of FT3 across variable gland capacities, whereas models without the shunt do not. Sensitivity analysis shows that shunt gain profoundly influences TSH responsiveness and FT3 homeostasis. |
TSH-T3 shunt | Clinical significance | Clinical significance |
TSH-T3 shunt | Implications for therapy | Implications for therapy
Standard LT4 monotherapy cannot replace the thyroidal component of T3 secretion; a subset of treated patients have low-normal FT3 and persistent symptoms despite normal TSH. Combination LT4 + LT3 or tailored TSH targets have been proposed to restore physiological FT3 levels in these patients. |
TSH-T3 shunt | History | History
Disproportionate thyroidal T3 secretion under TSH stimulation was described in the 1960s, but the term “TSH-T3 shunt” and its formal cybernetic treatment were introduced in 2012–2018. |
TSH-T3 shunt | See also | See also
Iodothyronine deiodinase
Thyroid disease
Thyroid hormone replacement therapy |
TSH-T3 shunt | References | References |
TSH-T3 shunt | External links | External links
“Mathematical modelling of the pituitary–thyroid feedback loop” – open-access article (Frontiers in Endocrinology)
“Deiodinase-regulated thyroid hormone signalling” – review (Endocrine Reviews) |
TSH-T3 shunt | Further reading | Further reading
Category:Thyroid
Category:Endocrinology
Category:Physiology |
TSH-T3 shunt | Table of Content | Short description, Background, Mechanism, Intrathyroidal deiodination, Quantitative contribution, Physiological role, Evidence, Clinical studies, Experimental studies, Mathematical modelling, Clinical significance, Implications for therapy, History, See also, References, External links, Further reading |
Template:Bangladeshi Summiters of Mount Everest | Navbox
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Template:Bangladeshi Summiters of Mount Everest | Table of Content | Navbox
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List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Short description | The following list of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering provides a detailed account of financial institutions implicated in schemes designed to help Iran circumvent international sanctions, particularly those targeting its oil exports. These operations often involved complex networks of front companies, deceptive trade practices, and sophisticated financial maneuvers to obscure the origin and destination of funds.
+Bank's nameRoleRepercussionsHalkbank (Turkey)Turkey's state-owned Halkbank was central to a multibillion-dollar oil-for-gold and fake trade scheme that helped Iran evade U.S. sanctions. From 2012 to 2016, Halkbank illicitly transferred about $20 billion in restricted Iranian oil and gas proceeds by funneling them through front companies and money service businesses in Turkey, the UAE, and elsewhere. Senior Halkbank executives (aided by high-ranking Turkish officials) devised fraudulent gold purchases and phony food/medicine transactions to disguise oil revenue transfers and deceive U.S. regulators. In 2019, U.S. prosecutors indicted Halkbank on charges including bank fraud and money laundering for its "systemic participation" in moving billions of dollars for Iran while lying to regulators.Noor Islamic Bank (UAE)Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank was a major channel for Iranian oil money until 2012. It reportedly handled as much as 60% of Iran's oil sales (tens of billions of dollars) by routing foreign currency earnings from Iranian oil through its accounts.Under U.S. pressure, Noor Islamic abruptly severed ties with Iranian banks in late 2011 and shut down Iran's "single largest channel" for repatriating oil revenues. This was an embarrassment for the UAE (Noor Islamic is partly state-owned) and effectively cut off a key laundering conduit that Iran had used to access the international banking system.Bank of Kunlun (China)China's Bank of Kunlun (affiliated with state-owned CNPC) served as the primary payment conduit for China-Iran oil trade. Nearly all Chinese purchases of Iranian oil (about $1.5 billion per month at one point) were funneled through Bank of Kunlun in yuan or euros.In 2012, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Bank of Kunlun for "knowingly conducting significant financial transactions" for Iranian banks and an entity linked to Iran's Revolutionary Guard, effectively cutting it off from the U.S. financial system. Despite sanctions, Kunlun continued for years as a lifeline for Iranian oil revenues outside the dollar system until facing renewed pressure in 2018 to halt Iran-related payments. Standard Chartered (UK) London-based Standard Chartered Bank admitted to illegally processing hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran-linked clients, mainly through its Dubai branch, in violation of U.S. and UK sanctions. U.S. authorities found that over nearly a decade the bank removed identifying information from Iranian wire transfers ("stripping") to let them pass undetected through the U.S. financial system. In 2012 Standard Chartered paid $667 million in U.S. settlements for sanctions breaches, and in 2019 it paid another $1.1 billion to U.S. and British regulators for continued violations involving Iran and other sanctioned countries. New York regulators accused the bank of hiding some 60,000 Iran-linked transactions worth $250 billion, calling its past conduct a "brazen scheme" to evade sanctions.BNP Paribas (France)France's largest bank, BNP Paribas, pleaded guilty in 2014 to conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions by processing billions of dollars for clients in Iran, Sudan, and Cuba.The U.S. Justice Department noted BNP had effectively been a "central bank" for sanctioned regimes, concealing transactions by stripping wire details. BNP Paribas was fined a record $8.9 billion for these violations, the largest ever sanctions-related penalty. The bank admitted full responsibility and was put on probation, marking the first time a global bank pled guilty to U.S. sanctions chargesreuters.com. A significant portion of BNP's misconduct involved routing Iranian oil revenue and other funds through the U.S. financial system by disguising their origin.Lloyds & Santander (UK)In 2024, reports emerged that two major UK banks, Lloyds Banking Group and Santander UK, had been used by Iranian petrochemical interests to evade sanctions via front companies. Iran's state-controlled Petrochemical Commercial Company (PCC), under U.S. sanctions since 2018, allegedly set up shell companies in the UK to funnel hundreds of millions in oil-related earnings through business accounts at these banks. For example, one front company registered to a house in Surrey held an account at Santander that PCC used, and another front company held an account at Lloyds. Both banks deny knowingly facilitating sanction evasion, but UK authorities launched inquiries as the revelations raised concerns that Britain's financial system was "being used to launder cash or hide illicit payments" tied to Iranian oil revenues theguardian.com theguardian.com. Lloyds had earlier paid $350 million in 2009 for sanction violations involving Iran. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Key legal cases & investigations | Key legal cases & investigations |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Halkbank indictment & Zarrab case (U.S. v. Halkbank) | Halkbank indictment & Zarrab case (U.S. v. Halkbank)
A landmark U.S legal case unfolded from 2017–2019 exposing how Halkbank executives and associates helped Iran bypass sanctions. Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab was arrested in 2016 and later testified in a New York trial that he bribed Turkish officials and worked with Halkbank to launder billions in Iranian oil revenue through gold purchases and fake food shipments. Zarrab pleaded guilty and became a cooperating witness. In early 2018, Halkbank's deputy GM Mehmet Hakan Atilla was convicted for his role in the scheme. U.S. prosecutors then indicted Halkbank itself in 2019 on seven counts, detailing how from 2012–2016 the bank conspired with Iranian oil companies to funnel proceeds out of blocked accounts by falsifying records. The indictment alleges senior Turkish government officials protected the plot and took millions in bribes. Halkbank has fought the U.S. charges (even appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court on jurisdictional grounds), but the case stands as one of the most prominent prosecutions of a foreign bank for Iranian money laundering. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | IRGC Qods Force oil network (U.S. v. Shahriyari et al.) | IRGC Qods Force oil network (U.S. v. Shahriyari et al.)
In 2022, the U.S. unsealed charges against an elaborate oil-smuggling and money laundering network orchestrated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force. The indictment named high-ranking IRGC figures (like ex-IRGC commander Morteza Ghasemi) along with Turkish businessmen Sitki Ayan and others who ran an energy conglomerate as a front for Iran. According to prosecutors, from 2019 onward this network delivered millions of barrels of Iranian oil to buyers in China, Russia, and Syria, then laundered the proceeds through layers of shell companies and fraudulent trade. Funds were concealed via Turkish companies (Ayan's ASB Group), routed through Oman and Cyprus based intermediaries, and even smuggled as bulk cash or camouflaged as payments for Russian goods. Notably, about $2 billion of these illicit oil profits transited the U.S. banking system via complex transfers involving a China-based front company. U.S. authorities also seized $108 million and a shipment of 500,000 barrels of Iranian fuel as part of this operation. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | BNP Paribas sanctions case | BNP Paribas sanctions case
A major financial investigation culminated in 2014 when BNP Paribas admitted to a decade-long conspiracy to violate U.S. sanctions. From 2004–2012, BNP systematically processed transactions for Iranian oil companies (as well as Sudanese and Cuban entities), deliberately stripping identifying information to evade detectionreuters.comreuters.com. The U.S. DOJ and New York regulators built a case showing BNP executives routed payments through unaffiliated banks and used satellite branches to hide the origin. BNP ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal charges of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and was sentenced in 2015 to pay $8.9 billion and serve five years probation. This case, the first guilty plea of a global bank for sanctions violations, was a turning point that put other banks on notice. Internal BNP emails (revealed in the investigation) showed awareness that they were handling "oil dollars" for Iran and Sudan, demonstrating willful misconduct. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Standard Chartered & Others - Regulatory actions | Standard Chartered & Others - Regulatory actions |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Standard Chartered | Standard Chartered
U.S. and UK regulators investigated Standard Chartered for handling Iranian transactions through its branches in the UAE. In 2012, New York's Department of Financial Services accused the bank of scheming with the Iranian regime to hide $250 billion worth of transactions. Standard Chartered settled and later entered a deferred prosecution agreement. When further violations (through 2014) came to light, including dealings with Iranian-controlled companies in Dubai, the bank in 2019 paid another $1.1 billion in penalties reuters.comreuters.com. A former Dubai-based Standard Chartered banker even pled guilty in a NY court as part of this sanctions case. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Commerzbank & Others | Commerzbank & Others
Germany's Commerzbank, the Netherlands' ING Bank, France's Crédit Agricole and Société Générale, Britain's Lloyds, settled U.S. charges in the 2009–2015 period for illicitly moving funds for Iran (often involving oil or petrochemical trade payments). For instance, Commerzbank paid $1.45 billion in 2015 for, among other things, helping Iranian shipping company accounts circumvent U.S. restrictions, and Lloyds TSB paid $350 million in 2009 for falsifying records of Iranian and Sudanese wire transfers. These cases, while not always as large as BNP's, collectively exposed a pattern of global banks laundering Iranian oil earnings by concealing the nature of transactions. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | U.S. Civil Forfeiture (Oil proceeds seizures) | U.S. Civil Forfeiture (Oil proceeds seizures)
In addition to criminal prosecutions, U.S. authorities have pursued civil actions to seize illicit Iranian oil money. A recent example (2025) is a civil forfeiture complaint for $47 million obtained from the sale of Iranian oil that was masqueraded as Malaysian. In that scheme, nearly 1 million barrels of Iranian petroleum were sold through a complex fraud: Iran's agents falsified documents and tampered with ship tracking to pretend the oil came from Malaysia, stored it in a Croatian facility under false pretenses, then sold it on the market. The proceeds, traced to the IRGC, were stashed in foreign bank accounts. U.S. ICE and FBI investigators intercepted those funds (which had briefly passed through U.S. correspondent banks) and filed for forfeiture as property involved in funding a terrorist organization (the IRGC). |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Sanctions and regulatory actions | Sanctions and regulatory actions
International sanctions, particularly by the United States (and to a lesser extent the EU and UN), form the backdrop that made Iran's oil money laundering both necessary for Tehran and illegal for banks. Key sanctions and actions include: |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | U.S. oil and banking sanctions | U.S. oil and banking sanctions
The U.S. has long prohibited Iran from accessing the U.S. financial system and, since 2010, has enacted secondary sanctions to deter foreign banks from handling Iranian oil revenue. Laws like CISADA (2010) and sections of the 2012 NDAA threatened to cut off any foreign bank from the U.S. market if they knowingly facilitated significant transactions for Iran's oil sector. For example, the U.S. Treasury in 2012 explicitly sanctioned China's Bank of Kunlun and Iraq's Elaf Bank for such activities. The OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) maintains stringent regulations blocking Iranian government assets and listing Iranian banks, oil companies (e.g. NIOC, NITC), and front companies on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Any bank touching these entities' funds risks severe penalties. This legal pressure has led to major enforcement actions: fines against Standard Chartered, BNP Paribas, and others (detailed above) were largely for breaching U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil money. The U.S. also designates networks of facilitators. For instance, in Dec 2022, OFAC sanctioned Sitki Ayan and his Turkey-based network of companies for brokering Iranian oil deals and laundering the proceeds. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | EU sanctions | EU sanctions
The European Union imposed its own embargo on Iranian oil in 2012 and sanctioned key Iranian banks and entities. EU regulations barred European banks from transferring Iranian oil earnings (except for limited humanitarian trade) and cut off Iranian banks from the SWIFT international payment system. Notably, the EU sanctioned Iran's central bank and major commercial banks, which meant European financial institutions risked penalties for dealing with them. Some European banks' Iran dealings predated the EU embargo or exploited gray areas (like using non-EU subsidiaries), but after 2012 the EU stance hardened. In cases like the Lloyds/Santander front companies in the UK, while those banks weren't directly dealing with an Iranian entity on paper, the fact that Iran's PCC was under sanctions means EU and UK regulations were likely breached if the banks failed to detect the true ownership. Following the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), the EU lifted many sanctions in 2016, but when the U.S. reimposed sanctions in 2018, many EU companies and banks pulled back from Iran again. The UK, now independently sanctioning Iran post-Brexit, recently fined a UK fintech (Starling Bank) £29 million for lax controls related to sanctions screening. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | United Nations & global measures | United Nations & global measures
While UN sanctions on Iran (prior to 2016) targeted its nuclear and military programs more than oil revenues explicitly, UN designations (e.g. banning Iranian arms exports) indirectly pressured Iran's finances. The UN did call on member states to exercise vigilance over Iranian banks (UNSCR 1929 in 2010), and some of those banks were involved in oil transactions. Additionally, global standard-setters like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) labeled Iran a high-risk jurisdiction for money laundering and terrorism finance. FATF's warnings urged countries to apply counter-measures, which in practice meant closer scrutiny of any Iran-linked transactions. This international climate made many banks either shun Iranian funds or, in the illicit cases we've discussed, resort to elaborate concealment. Countries like Malaysia and Oman, which did not strictly enforce U.S./EU sanctions, came under diplomatic pressure to cooperate. For instance, the U.S. in 2023 warned that Iran's oil exports were relying on Malaysian-based shippers and urged Malaysia to crack down. Likewise, Gulf states like the UAE and Oman have been pressed by Western allies to tighten oversight of exchange houses and re-export companies that might be aiding Iran. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Targeting shadow banking networks | Targeting shadow banking networks
In recent years, U.S. authorities have aggressively focused on Iran's "shadow banking" networks, the webs of money changers, front companies, and offshore accounts that handle oil revenue outside formal banking channels. In June 2024, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned nearly 50 entities and individuals across Iran, Turkey, UAE, Hong Kong, and elsewhere that formed part of a "sprawling shadow banking network" moving funds for Iran's Ministry of Defense and IRGC home.treasury.gov home.treasury.gov. These networks used foreign shell companies and exchange houses to launder billions of dollars of oil and petrochemical proceeds for Iran's military apparatus. By designating these actors, OFAC effectively cuts them off from the global financial system and signals to banks worldwide that facilitating such schemes will have consequences. The U.S. has also used Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to deem jurisdictions or institutions as "primary money laundering concerns". For example, in 2011 Iran's entire financial sector (including the Central Bank) was flagged, and more recently, in 2020 the U.S. designated Iran's financial sector under Executive Order 13902, threatening secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions dealing with it. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Investigation outcomes | Investigation outcomes
The crackdown on schemes laundering Iranian oil revenues has led to significant legal and financial outcomes: |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Convictions and guilty pleas | Convictions and guilty pleas
Several individuals involved in sanctions evasion have been brought to justice. Reza Zarrab, the architect of the Turkey-Iran gold-oil laundering ring, pleaded guilty in U.S. court and became a witness justice.gov. Mehmet Hakan Atilla of Halkbank was convicted and jailed in the U.S. (later returning to Turkey). Other co-conspirators in that case, including a former Turkish minister, remain fugitives. In the IRGC Qods Force network case, while the primary defendants (including Sitki Ayan) are at large in countries that won't extradite, the U.S. has demonstrated its reach by seizing assets and filing charges that could restrict their travel and businesses. For the banks, BNP Paribas formally pleaded guilty to criminal charges in U.S. court, an unprecedented outcome that put the bank under probation and compliance monitorship. Other banks like Standard Chartered and HSBC entered deferred prosecution agreements, essentially admitting wrongdoing and accepting external oversight to avoid indictment. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Massive financial penalties | Massive financial penalties
Enforcement agencies have levied multibillion-dollar penalties. The $8.9 billion fine against BNP Paribas in 2014 set a record. Standard Chartered's repeated sanctions breaches cost it over $1.6 billion in total fines (2012 and 2019 combined). Likewise, other European banks paid hundreds of millions each in U.S. settlements (e.g. ING $619 million, Commerzbank $1.45 billion, HSBC $1.9 billion, though HSBC's was partly for Mexican money laundering, it included Iran sanctions failures). These penalties not only punish past conduct but also fund sanctions enforcement and terrorism victim compensation funds in the U.S. In the UK, regulators (like the FCA) have also fined banks for sanctions control failures, as seen by the FCA's £102 million fine on Standard Chartered in 2019 for lax due diligence in its UAE operations. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Sanctions designations and bans | Sanctions designations and bans
A direct outcome for many entities caught laundering Iranian oil money is blacklisting via sanctions. Banks like Bank of Kunlun (China) and Noor Islamic Bank (Dubai) essentially lost access to U.S. dollar clearing. Kunlun was formally sanctioned in 2012, and while Noor Islamic was not individually designated, it shut down Iran operations under threat of U.S. action. The U.S. has sanctioned numerous Iranian banks (Melli, Mellat, Saderat, Sepah, etc.) and front companies; any foreign bank transacting with them can be cut off from U.S. banks (the so-called "secondary sanctions" penalty). Individuals like Sitki Ayan were added to OFAC's SDN list in 2022, freezing any assets under U.S. jurisdiction and forbidding U.S. or partner institutions from dealing with him. Similarly, the dozens of firms in the 2024 "shadow banking" crackdown by OFAC are now effectively isolated from legitimate finance. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Disrupted networks and seizures | Disrupted networks and seizures
Perhaps the most impactful outcome is the disruption of active sanction-evasion networks. Investigations by U.S. Homeland Security, FBI, and Treasury have resulted in the seizure of both funds and physical oil shipments. In addition to the $47 million from the Malaysia-Croatia oil scheme, the U.S. has seized Iranian oil tankers on the high seas (e.g. the 2020 seizure of 1.1 million barrels from Iranian shipments bound for Venezuela, and a 2021 seizure of an oil shipment off the UAE, proceeds of which, tens of millions of dollars, were forfeited. These enforcement actions deprive Iran of hard currency it desperately seeks from illicit oil sales. They also expose the methods used, from fake documents to ship-to-ship transfers, enabling authorities to tighten loopholes. For example, revelations about Iran disguising oil as Iraqi or Malaysian have led to closer monitoring of those trade routes by international partners. The UAE has closed certain exchange houses tied to Iran; Malaysia has faced U.S. diplomatic pressure to better police its maritime and financial sectors. Each major investigation, whether resulting in a trial or not, yields intelligence that helps sanctioning bodies update their regulations and advisories, like FinCEN's advisories on Iranian illicit finance. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Deterrence and ongoing monitoring | Deterrence and ongoing monitoring
The high-profile legal cases and fines have deterred mainstream banks. Most large banks worldwide now enhance sanctions screening and are extremely wary of dealings with Iranian entities. Iran has thus been into more opaque channels (small foreign exchange firms, trading companies, and barter deals). Enforcement outcomes also shows international resolve: U.S. officials regularly share evidence with European and Asian counterparts to spur joint actions. For instance, after the UK front company scandal (Lloyds/Santander) broke, British parliamentarians called for inquiries and stricter controls. The successes in courtrooms and sanctions lists to date have at least raised the stakes: foreign banks and countries now know that helping Iran bypass oil restrictions can result in severe legal and financial consequences, from billion-dollar fines to being cut off from the global financial network. |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | See also | See also
Money laundering in Iran
International sanctions against Iran
Sepehr Energy Jahan
Financial system
Oil smuggling in Iran
China-Iran trade relations |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | References | References
Category:Iran
Category:Banks
Category:Money laundering
Category:Money laundering by country
Category:Financial systems
Category:Sanctions against Iran |
List of banks involved in Iranian oil money laundering | Table of Content | Short description, Key legal cases & investigations, Halkbank indictment & Zarrab case (U.S. v. Halkbank), IRGC Qods Force oil network (U.S. v. Shahriyari et al.), BNP Paribas sanctions case, Standard Chartered & Others - Regulatory actions, Standard Chartered, Commerzbank & Others, U.S. Civil Forfeiture (Oil proceeds seizures), Sanctions and regulatory actions, U.S. oil and banking sanctions, EU sanctions, United Nations & global measures, Targeting shadow banking networks, Investigation outcomes, Convictions and guilty pleas, Massive financial penalties, Sanctions designations and bans, Disrupted networks and seizures, Deterrence and ongoing monitoring, See also, References |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | AFC submission | |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | Certified ESG Planner (CEP) | Certified ESG Planner (CEP)
The Certified ESG Planner (CEP) is a professional development programme established by the International Chamber of Sustainable Development (ICSD) in 2021. It aims to equip practitioners with knowledge and competencies in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues relevant to corporate sustainability, ESG reporting, and responsible investment. |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | Background | Background
The programme was developed in response to increasing global and regional demand for ESG expertise, particularly in light of emerging regulatory requirements and investor expectations for sustainability disclosures. The CEP programme has been supported by educational institutions in Hong Kong and incorporates elements aligned with international ESG frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | Curriculum and Methodology | Curriculum and Methodology
The core of the CEP programme is the CEPAR five-step methodology:
Challenge: Identify ESG-related business issues across environmental, social, and governance dimensions.
Evaluation: Determine the materiality of these challenges using stakeholder engagement and double materiality principles.
Planning: Develop strategies aligned with international standards and define key performance indicators.
Action: Implement ESG action plans, including resource allocation and training.
Review: Evaluate outcomes using both qualitative and quantitative metrics.
Topics covered in the programme include ESG investment practices, sustainability strategy, ESG reporting standards, and sustainable business models. Participants are required to complete an applied project or paper based on real-world ESG scenarios. |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | Academic and Professional Integration | Academic and Professional Integration
The CEP programme has been incorporated into the curriculum of local institutions. Notably, the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Chinese University of Hong Kong has adopted the programme as a credit-bearing undergraduate course (Course Code: EESC3810).
Graduates of the programme are active in various fields including sustainability reporting, ESG consulting, corporate responsibility, and sustainable finance. |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | References | References |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | See also | See also
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
Sustainable development
Professional certification
:Category:Professional certification
:Category:Sustainable development
:Category:Environmental education |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | References | References |
Draft:Certified ESG Planner | Table of Content | AFC submission, Certified ESG Planner (CEP), Background, Curriculum and Methodology, Academic and Professional Integration, References, See also, References |
Category:Hungary–Seychelles relations | Foo–Bar relations category | |
Category:Hungary–Seychelles relations | Table of Content | Foo–Bar relations category |
Category:Luxembourg–Seychelles relations | Foo–Bar relations category | |
Category:Luxembourg–Seychelles relations | Table of Content | Foo–Bar relations category |
2011 Asian Junior Badminton Championships – Teams event | Short description | The team tournament at the 2011 Asian Junior Badminton Championships took place from 2 to 5 July 2011 at Babu Banarasi Das Indoor Stadium in Lucknow, India. A total of 15 countries competed in this event. Iran withdrew from the tournament. |
2011 Asian Junior Badminton Championships – Teams event | Group stage | Group stage |
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