nature. Theories of regulation The art of regulation has long been studied, particularly in the utilities sector. Two ideas have been formed on regulatory policy: positive theories of regulation and normative theories of regulation. The former examine why regulation occurs. These theories include theories of market power, "interest group theories that describe stakeholders' interests in regulation," and "theories of government opportunism that describe why restrictions on government discretion may be necessary for the sector to provide efficient services for customers." These theories conclude that regulation occurs because: the government is interested in overcoming *information asymmetries and in aligning their own interest with the operator, customers desire protection from market power in the presence of non-existent or ineffective competition, operators desire protection from rivals, or operators desire protection from government opportunism. Normative economic theories of regulation generally conclude that regulators should encourage competition where feasible, minimize information asymmetry costs by gathering information and incentivizing operators to improve their performance, provide for economically efficient price structures, and establish regulatory processes that provide for "regulation under the law and independence, transparency, predictability, legitimacy, and credibility for the regulatory system." Alternatively, many heterodox economists and legal scholars stress the importance of market regulation for "safeguarding against monopoly formation, the overall stability of markets, environmental harm, and to ensure a variety of social protections." These draw on sociologists (such as Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, Neil Fligstein, and Karl Marx) and the history of government institutions partaking in regulatory processes. "To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society." *Information asymmetry deals with transactions in which one party has more information than the other, which creates an imbalance in power that at the worst can cause a kind of market failure. They are most commonly studied in the context of principal-agent problems. Principal-agent theory addresses issues of information asymmetry. Here, the government is the principal, and the operator the agent, regardless of who owns the operator. Principal-agent theory is applied in incentive regulation and multi-part tariffs. Regulatory metrics The World Bank's Doing Business database collects data from 178 countries on the costs of regulation in certain areas, such as starting a business, employing workers, getting credit, and paying taxes. For example, it takes an average of 19 working days