aircraft descends through at an airspeed of 155 knots. 12:45:15 - the aircraft, now at , begins a deviation to the right (maximum bank angle: 30°) to line up with the grass strip 34R. 12:45:23 - the aircraft completes the deviation at a height of and an airspeed of 141 knots. During this manoeuvre, a fluctuation in the radio altimeter height corresponds to the aircraft passing over a patch of trees (whereas before and after this fluctuation, the readings of the radio altimeter and those of the barometric altimeter match perfectly). Three seconds later, the aircraft descends through at an airspeed of 132 knots. The Captain begins to flare the aircraft (he lifts the nose 4°) to level its flight. The aircraft levels off at . 12:45:30 - nose-up attitude increases to 7°. 12:45:35 - nose-up attitude is now 15° and speed is 122 knots. TOGA power is applied. Four seconds later, the aircraft begins striking the treetops. Aircraft and engines Investigators found that the aircraft had been airworthy, that its weight and centre-of-gravity had been within limits, and that there was no evidence of mechanical or electronic systems failure. The flight deck crew believed that the engines had failed to respond to the application of full power. With the CFM56-5 engines, four seconds are required to go from 29% N1 (flight idle) to 67%. It then takes one second more to go from 67 to 83% N1. From the engine parameters recorded on the DFDR and spectral analysis of the engine sounds on the CVR, it was determined that five seconds after TOGA power was applied, the N1 speed of Nº1 engine was 83% while that of Nº2 engine was 84%. Spectral analysis of the engine sounds indicated that 0.6 seconds later, both engines had reached 91% (by this stage, they were starting to ingest vegetation). This response of the engines complied with their certification data. Official report The official report from BEA concluded that the probable cause of the accident was a combination of the following: Very low flyover height, lower than surrounding obstacles; Speed very slow and reducing to reach maximum possible angle of attack; Engines speed at flight idle; and Late application of go-around power. Furthermore, the bureau concluded that if the descent below 100 feet was not deliberate, it may have resulted from a failure by the crew to take proper account of the visual