on scene at 4:18 a.m. and was briefed by DC-6 and BC-31 he immediately called for a fifth alarm and assumed command. Within a few minutes after his arrival on scene the fire had completely consumed the top floors of the Clark and Marquee buildings, and had flames shooting up more than 100 feet in the air. Collapse was imminent so the Command Post was quickly moved out of the collapse zone and positioned on Clark Street east of the fire building. Directly across the street from the fire building at 52 Clark Street was exposure 1, another high-rise building in which many elderly and handicapped people lived. The only exit from this building was onto Clark Street directly across the street from the fire building. Evacuation would require the 450 residents to walk within 40 feet of the fire. With the risk of collapse and the intense radiant heat the decision was made to keep those residents in the building and move them to the rear apartments as far back as possible and protect them in place. Confronted with these immediate problems, DAC DeRosa called for a reorganization of the attack so better control of the incident would be possible. The incident was soon divided into three sectors, or branches: the Clark Street Branch, the Hicks Street Branch, and the Pineapple Street Branch. A second tactical radio channel was designated for the units operating from the Pineapple Street Branch. A staging area was established at Clark and Henry and a staging officer was assigned. The field communications unit which was commanded by Captain John Timulty and was assisted by Battalion Chief Jackson responded and located units on the command board, set up command channels, kept contact with the staging area and coordinated all communications with the dispatcher Jeanne Williams. DAC DeRosa requested an additional alarm to respond to calls for embers igniting roof areas of surrounding buildings. With the increased need for dependable water flow at the scene, he requested that the city water department augment the supply by opening up the grids in that area thereby increasing the pressure to the main lines. As the incident continued to grow and complicate the incident command system was expanded. This expansion included a Safety Sector headed by two battalion chiefs, an information sector, an arson task force, a communications sector, a staging sector, an operations sector and a support units’