did not show any activation. The battalion chief David Maxwell (BC-31) then asked the dispatcher to call back the person who called in the report of smoke so that they could get a better location. The dispatchers’ call was answered by an answering machine so no additional information was available. Following Standard Operation Procedures the units on scene sent a crew member to the roof. Once there, he noticed the glow of fire which was located several buildings down the block at the Clark building. At 3:39 a.m. Battalion Commander Maxwell (BC-31) transmitted a 10-75 radio signal to confirm a working fire which prompted dispatchers to assign a Deputy Chief (DC-6) as well as an additional battalion chief (BC-35), an additional engine company, a rescue company, and a squad company. Both Ladder companies 110 and 118 made entry into the Clark structure. The building was equipped with a standpipe-Siamese connection so the engine companies proceeded up the stairway with rolled packs of 2.5-inch hose. As they ascended the stairs, they noticed numerous large holes in the floors (made to remove furniture and fixtures) which stopped them in their tracks. This was relayed to BC-31 and the crews proceeded to do a quick primary search for any vagrants who might still be in the building. When the engine crews arrived to the eighth floor, they observed heavy fire above them on the ninth floor which was dropping down through the various openings into the eighth. Firefighters connected their lines to standpipe outlets on the eighth floor and prepared to attack the fire. Outside, Fire hydrant and Siamese connections were made and the standpipe supplied. Unbeknownst to the firefighters at the time, the standpipe had been vandalized with parts of the pipe missing so the water never made it up to the firefighters. The interior fire crews then descended to the fourth floor and dropped their lines out of windows to members below for an exterior stretch. The fire had grown rapidly during this time and consumed almost all of the 8th, 9th and 10th floors. In addition to its vertical progression, it had also extended downward via holes, stairways and elevator shafts and horizontally into exposure #4, the Marquee building, through open interconnecting doorways on several floors. A second alarm and a request for an additional 95-foot tower ladder were transmitted at 4:02 a.m. by BC-31. The Field Communications Unit and