guerrillas later handed Lee rifles had some initial difficulty operating and using them, while Lt. Col. Huntington's Marines had no such problems. The first major combat use of the M1895 occurred during the land campaign to capture Guantánamo Bay, Cuba from June 9–14, 1898 with the First Marine Battalion, in particular at the battles of Camp McCalla and Cuzco Wells. During the battle of Cuzco Wells, Marines using the M1895 Lee effectively engaged concentrations of Spanish troops at ranges up to 1,200 yards, using volley fire against groups of enemy soldiers while their officers called out the range settings. Though some problems were noted with the new rifle, the flat ballistics, accuracy and rate of fire of the M1895 and the light weight of its 6mm ammunition proved to be of considerable benefit during offensive infantry operations over mountainous and jungled terrain against both Spanish regulars and loyalist guerrilla forces. The extra cartridges proved useful when early ammunition resupply from Navy ships was disrupted at the outset of the Guantanamo operation, allowing Marines to continue their assault even while individually resupplying Cuban rebels who had run short of ammunition. After the battle of Cuzco Wells, the surviving members of the retreating Spanish garrison informed the Spanish General Pareja at Ciudad Guantánamo that they had been attacked by 10,000 Americans. The M1895 would see considerable action in the Pacific during the Spanish–American War and the early stages of the later Philippine–American War with U.S. Navy and Marine personnel. During the Moro Rebellion of 1899–1913, it was reported that some Marines preferred the M1892/98 Springfield (Krag) rifle and its .30-caliber ammunition to the M1895 Lee Navy and its 6mm U.S.N. cartridge, believing the latter to have inadequate shocking or stopping power against frenzied bolo-wielding Moro juramentados, who attacked from jungle cover at extremely close distances.Arnold, James R., The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902–1913, Bloomsbury Publishing USA, , (2011), p. 95 In this situation, the 6mm Lee bullet may have overpenetrated without causing sufficient shock and trauma to the enemy, a situation which the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance had foreseen as early as 1895, when he acknowledged the concern that "the wounds produced by small-caliber bullets will frequently not be sufficient to put the wounded out of action and their shock will not stop the onset of excited men at short range".Heinl,