order to halt inertial inflation. The freeze caused a strong reduction in trade and output of industry. With the reduction in the money supply from 30% to 9% of GDP, the rate of inflation dropped from 81% in March to 9% in June. The government faced two choices: they could either hold the freeze, and risk a recession brought about by the reduction of economic activity, or re-monetize the economy by "unfreezing" money flow and risk the return of inflation. Rapid, uncontrolled re-monetization of the economy had been named as the cause the failure of the previous economic stabilization plans in controlling inflation. The Collor government would have to "throttle" the re-monetization in order to keep inflation down. To do so, it could utilize a wide combination of economic tools to affect the speed of re-monetization, such as taxes, exchange rates, money flow, credit and interest rates. For the next few months after the plan was implemented inflation continued on an upward trend. By January 1991, nine months after the plan began, it had climbed back to 20% a month. The failure of the Plano Color I in controlling inflation is credited by both Keynesian and monetarist economists to the Collor government's failure to control the re-monetization of the economy. The government had opened several "loopholes" which contributed to the increase of the money flow: Taxes and other government bills issued prior to the freeze could be paid with the old Cruzado, creating a form of "liquidity loophole" which was fully exploited by the private sector. A number of individual exceptions to individual sectors of the economy were opened by the government, such as retirees' savings and "special financing" for the government payroll. As the government issued more and more exceptions granting liquidity, these were later dubbed little faucets (Portuguese: torneirinhas). According to Carlos Eduardo Carvalho, from Departamento de Economia da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo: The Collor Plan itself began to be formatted by the president-elects advisors at the end of December 1989, after his victory in the runoff election. The final draft was probably strongly influenced by a document discussed by the advisors of PMDB party candidate Ulysses Guimarães, and later by advisors of PT party candidate Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, during the period between the general election and the runoff. In spite of the differences in their general economic strategies, these competing candidates failed to