develop their own stabilization policies at a time of rapid price increases and risk of hyperinflation during the second half of 1989. The proposal to block liquidity originated in academic debate and was imposed upon the main presidential candidacies. Ultimately, the government was unable to reduce spending, reducing its ability to use many of the aforementioned tools. Reasons ranged from an increased share of the federal tax revenue to be shared with the individual states to a "job stability" clause for government employees in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution which prevented the size reduction as announced at the start of the plan. This vindicated economists such as Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Mário Henrique Simonsen, both former finance ministers, who had predicted at the start of the plan that the government's fiscal situation would make it impossible for the plan to work. Collor Plan II The second Collor Plan took place in January 1991. It included a new freezing of prices and the replacement of the overnight rate with new financial instruments which included in its yield calculation the anticipated rates of both private and federal papers. The plan managed to produce only a short-term drop in inflation, and it began to climb again in May 1991. Marcílio Plan On May 10, 1991, Zélia was replaced as finance minister by Marcílio Marques Moreira, a Georgetown-educated economist who was at the time of his nomination the Brazilian ambassador to the United States. Marcílio's plan was considered more gradual than its predecessors, utilizing a combination of high interest rates and a restrictive fiscal policy. At the same time, prices were liberalized and, working along with Pedro Malan, a US$2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund secured to shore up internal currency reserves. Inflation rates during the Marcílio Plan remained at hyperinflationary levels. Marcílio left the finance ministry to his successor, Gustavo Krause, on October 2, 1992. President Fernando Collor de Mello had been impeached by congress four days earlier, on September 28, 1992, over charges of corruption in an influence-peddling scheme, marking the end of his government's attempts at ending hyperinflation. Between the end of the Marcílio Plan and the beginning of the next "named" plan, the Plano Real, inflation continued to grow, reaching 48% in June 1994. Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy (PICE) Running along in parallel with the Collor Plan was the PICE, a program which aimed to both raise real