Maxi-water system responded automatically on a second alarm. Once the exterior hose stretch was completed, it was charged and firefighters began to attack the fire. At this point the Command Post was in the street in front of the building and BC-31 was still incident commander. Due to increasingly hazardous conditions, the interior fire crews had to terminate their attack and BC-35 gave the order to remove the interior attack crews. The fire was spreading so rapidly that the handlines were abandoned. Meanwhile, Tower Ladder 119 was set up in front of the building in anticipation of an exterior attack of the heavy fire. TL-119 was ordered to not begin operating until all of the interior firefighters working inside the Clark building were outside. Deputy Chief John W. Kelly (DC-6) arrived on scene at 4:03 a.m., requested a third alarm at 4:06 a.m. and then assumed incident command as the fire began to engulf the Marquee building. The Third alarm brought in four engines, two trucks, the Mask Service Unit (MSU) and a Medical Command Unit. The fire quickly began to produce a huge volume of fire brands, some of which drifted into open windows of apartments and set them alight. DC-6 assigned BC-35 to exposure 4 to stop the fire from spreading through the marquee building to the attached buildings on the eastern side. A primary search was performed in the Marquee building, but due to its poor structural condition crews were instructed to attack that portion of the fire from the next building East- the Weller Building. This essentially made the Marquee building a buffer zone. As additional companies arrived they were assigned to the building with the greatest life hazard, the Tower Building. The standpipes in the Grill and the Tower buildings were charged while companies began the task of searching and evacuating the residents of the building. As the fire continue to spread an additional Deputy Chief was requested to the scene to take control of the third exposure- the buildings on Pineapple Street. Several Battalion Chiefs were also called as the need for more supervisory personnel became critical. Already en route from the second alarm, Deputy Assistant Chief Steven C. DeRosa who was the Citywide Tour Commander that day was able to see the flames as he drove over the Brooklyn Bridge from Manhattan and requested a fourth alarm at 4:11 a.m. When he arrived