text: Supreme Court Judgments
  Subscribe
  04/09/1970 HEGDE, K.S.
  HEGDE, K.S.
  GROVER, A.N.
  CITATION: 1971 AIR 293 1971 SCR (2) 35 1970
  SCC (2) 728
  ACT:
  Customs Act, 1962, s. 111(d)-"Any
  prohibition" if includes restrictions-Mare imported for breeding, if pet
  animal.
  HEADNOTE:
  The appellant, a breeder of horses imported
  into India a mare "Jury Maid", for purpose of breeding. The customs
  authorities objected on the ground that the mare had been imported in
  contravention of the provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. 1947
  and confiscated the mare.
  On the questions, (i) whether the mare was a
  "pet animal" within the meaning of that expression in the
  notification dated January 2, 1961 issued by the Government and therefore
  exempt as personal baggage and (ii) whether the expression
  "prohibition" contained in s. 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962
  includes prohibition of imports Coupled with it power to permit importation
  under certain conditions,
  HELD : (i) The mare "Jury Maid" was
  not a 'pet animal'. A pet is "any animal tamed and fondled". There
  was no evidence to show that jury maid was tamed or treated with fondness by
  the appellant. He obtained that animal on lease for certain specified purpose
  and in respect of that animal he had only a business connection.
  (ii)The expression "any
  prohibition" in s. 111 (d) of the Customs Act, 1962, includes
  restrictions. Merely because s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act,
  1947, uses three different expressions "prohibiting",
  'restricting" or "otherwise controlling," the amplitude of the
  word any prohibition in s. 111 (d) of the Act cannot be cut down.
  "Any prohibition" means every
  prohibition and restriction is one type of prohibition. From item (1) of Sch. I
  Part IV to Import Control Order. 1955, it is clear that import of living
  animals of all sorts is prohibited. But Certain exceptions art, provided for.
  But none the less the prohibition continues.
  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
  1645 of 1966.
  Appeals from the judgment and order dated
  February, 7, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 114 of 1965.
  A. N. Sinha and P. K. Mukherjee, for the
  appellant.
  B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent.
  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
  Hegde, J. In this appeal by certificate two questions of law arise namely (1)
  whether on the facts of this case the mare "'Jury Maid" can be
  considered as a "pet animal" within the meaning of that expression in
  the notification issued by the Government of 36 India, Ministry of Commerce and
  Industries, Import Trade Control Public Notice No. 1 I.T.C.(PN)/61 dated 2nd
  January 1961 and (2) whether the expression "prohibition" contained
  in S. 111 (d) of the Customs Act 1962 (which will hereinafter be referred to as
  the Act) includes prohibition of imports coupled with a power to permit
  importation under certain conditions. him their pending her producing two foals by
  the appellant's breeding race hot-se "Pieta" after which the mare
  will be returned to with on foal. The appellant returned to Calcutta on
  November 7, 1964 by air.
  At the Dum Dum Airport he gave a declaration
  showing that his seven unaccompanied bagages will follow.
  The first question that arises for decision
  is whether by importing the mare in question the appellant contravened the
  provisions of the Act.
  Section 111 (d) of the Act provides:
  "The following goods brought from a
  place outside India shall be liable to confiscation:-(d)any goods which are
  imported or attempted to be imported or are brought within the Indian customs
  37 waters for the purpose of being imported, contrary to any prohibition
  imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in
  force." "Prohibited goods" is defined in S. 2(33) of the Act.
  That definition reads :
  " ."." Section 3(1) of the
  Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947' provides:
  "Powers to prohibit or restrict imports
  and exports.(1 descripttion;
  (b)the bringing into any port or place in
  India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of India
  without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which they are being
  carried." In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 of the Imports and'
  Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Government of India promulgated an order known
  as the "Imports Control" Order, 1955 dated 7th December, 1955. Clause
  3(1) of the said order reads "Restriction on Import of Certain Goods.-(I)
  Save as otherwise provided in this order, no person shall import any goods of
  the description specified in Schedule 1, except under, and in accordance with,
  a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by
  any officer specified in Schedule II." 38 The relevant Entry is to be
  found in Item I of Schedule I in part IV which is as follows:-SL. Name of
  Article Item of First Schedule to No. Indian Triff Act 1934.
  (1) (2) (3) Part IV 1. Animals, living all I
  and I (1).
  sorts.
  By the notification dated January 2, 1961
  referred to earlier certain exemptions were provided for personal baggage of a
  passenger. One of the exemptions granted is for clearance of one dog, pet
  animal and birds in a limited number subject to certain conditions.
  Now we shall go back to the question whether
  "Jury Maid" can be considered as a pet animal. A pet is explained in
  Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English as "any animal tamed and kept
  as favourite or treated with fond 39 lions, tigers and
  even crocodiles. It was not intended to make the baggage rules a warrant for
  transforming passengers ships into a Noah's Ark.. . ." We entirely agree
  with those observations and reject the contention of the appellant that
  "Jury Maid" was a pet animal.
  This takes us to the question whether by
  importing the mare "Jury Maid" the appellant contravened S. 111(d)
  read with s.
  125 of the Act. It was urged on behalf of the
  appellant that expression "prohibition" in s. 111(d) must be
  considered as a total prohibition and that expression does not bring within its
  fold the restrictions imposed by cl.
  (3) of the Imports Control Order, 1955.
  According to the learned Counsel for the appellant cl. (3) of that order deals
  with the restrictions of import of certain goods.
  Such a restriction cannot be considered as a
  prohibition under s. 111 (d) I of the Act. While elaborating his argument the
  learned Counsel invited our attention to the fact that while s. 111 (d) of the
  Act uses the word "prohibition", s. 3 of the Imports and Exports
  (Control) Act, 1947 takes in not merely prohibition of imports and exports, it
  also includes "restrictions or otherwise controlling" all imports and
  exports. According to him restrictions cannot be considered as prohibition more
  particularly under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 IIs that statute
  deals with "restrictions or otherwise controlling" separately from
  prohibitions. We are not impressed with this argument. What cl. (d) of s. 111
  says is that any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported contrary
  to "any prohibition imposed by any law for the time being in force in this
  country" is liable to be confiscated. "Any prohibition" referred
  to III that section applies to every type of prohibition". That
  prohibition may be complete or partial. Any restriction on import or export is
  to an extent a prohibition. The expression "any prohibition" in s.
  III (d) of the Customs Act, 1962 includes restrictions. Merely because s. 3 of
  the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 uses three different expressions
  "prohibiting" "restricting" or "otherwise
  controlling", we cannot cut down the amplitude of the word "any
  prohibition" in s. 111(d) of the Act. "Any prohibition" means
  every prohibition. In other words all types of prohibitions.
  Restriction is one type of prohibition. From
  item (1) of Schedule I, Part IV to Import Control Order, 1955, it is clear that
  import of living animals of all sorts is prohibited. But certain exceptions ire
  provided for. But none the less the prohibition continues.
  In the result this appeal is dismissed with
  costs. Y. P.
  Appeal dismissed.
  Back