text: Supreme Court Judgments
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  K. Ramaswamy,
  B.L. Hansaria, S.B. Majmudar K. Ramaswamy, J.
  ACT:
  HEAD NOTE:
  WITH
  C.A.NOS. 12004,12007,12005-06,12008 AND 12002/96 11430 (Arising out of SLP (C)
  Nos. 412, 924, 490,/1913/96 and 27355/95) AND WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 146 OF 1996
  J U D
  G M E N T
  Common
  questions of law have arisen in all these cases.
  The
  facts in Gajraj Singh's case are sufficient for disposal of all these cases.
  Though notices were served on respondents, Shri Goel appeared for the State and
  Shri Promod Swarup for the UPSRTU, none is appearing in other cases.
  In
  1988, the appellant was granted a stage carriage permit on the Meerut-Baraut
  route under Section 47(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) (for
  short, the 'Repealed Act') for a period of 3 years. The Motor Vehicles Act,
  1988 (59 of 1988) (for short, the 'Act') came into force w.e.f. July 1, 1989. The said permit was renewed under
  Section 81 of the Act in 1991 for a further period of 5 years and the second
  renewal was granted in 1995.
  Respondents
  3 to 17 had applied under Section 70 for grant of stage carriage permits under
  Section 72 on the Meerut- Gangoh route which intersects part of the route on
  which the appellant was operating his stage carriage. Despite objections raised
  by the appellant, the State Transport Authority (for short, 'STA') granted
  permits to them on November 23, 1992 which came be challenged by the appellants
  in revision filed under Section 90 before the State Transport Appellate
  Tribunal (for short, 'STAT'). The respondents questioned the appellant's locus standi
  under the preliminary objection that the renewal granted under Section 81 to
  the appellant was void. By order dated August 9, 1995, the STAT upheld the preliminary
  objection and held that the appellant has no locus standi to object the grant
  of permits to the respondents, since the renewal of the permit granted to the
  appellant was not valid in law as he had not got any new permit under the Act.
  The High Court in the impugned judgment dated October 13, 1995 made in Writ Petition No.26132 of 1995 has upheld the order
  of the STAT.
  Thus,
  this appeal by special leave.
  Shri
  K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that the
  renewal of the permit of the appellant granted under the Repealed Act is a
  permit under the Act and its operation was saved by Section 217(2) (a) read
  with sub-section. In support thereof, he
  placed strong reliance on M/s Gurcharan Singh Baldev Singh vs. Vashwant Singh
  & Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC 428 ]. He further contended that this Court in
  Secretary, Quillon Distt. Motor Transport Workers' Cooperative Society Ltd. vs.
  Regional Transport Authority & Ors. [(1994) Supp (3) SCC 210] did not
  intend to lay down that after the Act came into force, all the holders of stage
  carriage permits granted under the Repealed Act would be required to obtain
  fresh permits under the Act.Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (for short,
  the 'GC Act') read with Section 217(2) (a) and (4) saves operation of all those
  permits which were alive when the Act came into force.
  Consequently,
  renewals granted under Section 81 were valid.
  For
  contra construction, an argument of inconvenience was forcefully projected. He
  argued that Section 217(2) (b) would be applicable only if the permit is
  inconsistent with the provisions of the Act in which event the life of the
  permit granted under the Repealed Act gets extended only for the balance period
  of permit.
  Shri
  S.K. Dhaon, learned Counsel appearing in C.A. @ SLP (C) No.27335/95, contended
  that the permits granted to the existing operators under the nationalised
  scheme in Chapter IV-A of the Repealed Act are not required to be renewed under
  Section 81 of the Act as they have already been saved being existing permits.
  So the need to obtain fresh permits under the Act would be inconsistent with
  the scheme of the Repealed Act as well as the Act. Shri Venugopal buttresses
  the contention emphasising that the renewal is only a continuation of the
  existing permit granted under the Repealed Act. The need for fresh permit
  arises only if the renewal is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.
  Therefore, the view of the High Court is clearly not sustainable in law. In
  support thereof, Shri Venugopal places strong reliance on D.Nataraja Mudaliar
  vs. The State Transport Authority, Madras [(1978) 4 SCC 290], State of Punjab vs. Manohar Singh [(1955) 1 SCR 893] and M/s. Universal Imports Agency
  & Anr. vs. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors. [(1961) 1
  SCR 305].
  Shri Harish
  N.Salve, appearing for some of the existing operators in the nationalised
  schemes, contended that they were not paid compensation since permits in their
  names were saved with corridor restrictions. They are, therefore, entitled to
  renewal of permits as a matter of right.
  Shri Adarsh
  Kumar Goel, learned counsel for the State, resisted the contentions. According
  to him, the scheme of the Act in many a provision is inconsistent with the
  scheme of operation in the Repealed Act. When the Legislature manifested its
  intention as to its inconsistency in the operation of the Act with the
  provisions of the Repealed Act, the STA or the Regional Transport Authority
  (for short,'RTA'), as the case may be, would be devoid of power and
  jurisdiction to grant renewal of permit under the Act.
  Consequently,
  the erstwhile holders of permits are required to obtain fresh permits under the
  Act. The Repealed Act has been saved only to the extent of validating, under
  Section 217(2) (b), the continuation of the permit for the unexpired period
  granted under the Repealed Act. The owner of the vehicle, thereby, became
  entitled to operate, for the balance period, stage carriage on the respective
  route. On its expiry, the erstwhile holder of the permit ceases to have the
  permit under the Act until he obtains afresh stage carriage permit under the
  Act. To obviate the difficulty of running the stage carriage between the date
  of application for permit and the date of grant, the Act provides for grant of
  temporary permits. There is no hiatus in the operation in that behalf and any
  grant of permit or renewal should only be consistent with the provisions of the
  Act. Otherwise, the Repealed Act continues to remain in operation, in spite of
  its express repeal by Section 217(1) of the Act. The ratio of this Court in
  Secretary, Quillon District Motor Transport Worker's cooperative Society Ltd.'s
  case (for short, 'Quillon's case) would be applicable to the situation. The
  ratio in Gurucharan Singh's case (supra) would be applicable only to a pending
  application for renewal filed before the Act came into force which would be
  disposed of by operation of Section 217(2) (a) as saved by Section 217(4) of
  the Act.
  If so
  understood, there is no inconsistency in the ratio of the aforesaid two
  decisions of this Court and the operation of the provisions of the two Acts.
  We
  issued notice to Shri Promod Swarup to appear on behalf of STUs and argue on
  the question of renewal of permits covered by the schemes. He contended that
  they are not entitled to renewal under Chapter VI of the Act. Chapter V does
  not apply to them. Therefore, they have no right to apply or obtain permit
  under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81.
  We may
  make it clear at this juncture that when the cases had come up for admission
  and Shri Venugopal had pointed out to plausible misapprehension in the
  operation of the ratio laid down by this Court in the above two cases, we had
  referred the matter to three Judge Bench. Thus, the matter has come before this
  Bench.
  The
  question for consideration is: whether the holder of a stage carriage permit
  under the Repealed Act is required to obtain fresh permit or a renewal of the
  permit as per the provisions of the Act? To appreciate to contentions in proper
  perspective, it would be profitable to refer to the provisions of the Act,
  extent of their operation and their inconsistency with the provisions in the
  Repealed Act so as to focus the true intentment and operation of the Act.
  Section 2(31) of the Act defines "permit" to mean a permit issued by
  the State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this
  behalf under the Act (emphasis supplied) authorising the use of motor vehicle
  as a transport vehicle. "Transport vehicle" has been defined under
  Section 2(47) to mean a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an
  educational institution bus or a private service vehicle. "Stage
  carriage" has been defined under Section 2(40) to mean motor vehicle
  constructed or adapted to carry more than six passengers excluding the driver
  for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers,
  either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey. "Route"
  has been defined under Section 2(38) to mean a line of travel which specifies
  the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and
  another. "Public service vehicle" has been defined by Section 2(35)
  to meas any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of
  passengers for hire or reward, and includes a maxicab, a motorcab, contract
  carriage, and stage carriage.
  These
  definitions similarly had found place in the Repealed Act with slight
  variations.
  Chapter
  V of the Act under the heading "Control of transport vehicle"
  regulates use of, or permission for use of, the vehicles and the necessity to
  obtain permits in that behalf by an owner of motor vehicle. Section 66 enjoins
  every owner of a motor vehicle to obtain permit and no owner shall use the
  motor vehicle as stage carriage except in accordance with the conditions of the
  permit granted or countersigned by the prescribed authority for its use in the
  public place. The manner in which the vehicle should be used gets regulated by
  the conditions of the permit, the rules and the law; the details thereof are
  not material. Section 67 empowers the State Government to control road
  transport.
  Section
  68 enumerates the manner in which the RTA or the STA or other authorities under
  the Act would exercise the powers and perform functions specified under the
  Act. Section 69 enjoins the owner of a vehicle to make application for permit.
  Section
  70 specifies the procedure for making an application to obtain stage carriage
  permit and the conditions subject to which the application is required to be
  dealt with. Section 71 prescribes the procedure for STA or RTA to consider such
  applications for grant of stage carriage permits. It envisages, under
  sub-section (3) thereof, that subject to the number of vehicles, road
  conditions and other relevant matters, the State Government shall, by a
  notification, direct and STA or RTA to limit the number of stage carriages
  generally or of any specified, type as may be fixed and specified in the
  notification, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less
  than five lakhs. Its operation is subject to clauses (b) and (c) thereof. The
  proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 71 envisages that other conditions being
  equal, preference shall be given to applications for permits from
  (i)
  State transport undertakings;
  (ii) co-operative
  societies registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment for
  the time being in force;
  (iii)
  ex- servicemen; and
  (iv) any
  other class or category of persons, as the State Government may, for reasons to
  be recorded in writing, consider necessary. On other routes, except town service,
  no restrictions are imposed unlike in Section 47(3) of the Repealed Act to
  grant stage carriage permits. Section 72 empowers the RTA or STA to decide an
  application for grant of a permit to operate a stage carriage with any one or
  more of the conditions enumerated under sub-section (2) thereof or the rules or
  conditions attached to the permit.
  Section
  80 prescribes procedure to apply for and grant of renewal of permits.
  Sub-section (2) envisages that on an application made under sub-section (1) at
  any time, the STA or RTA or any prescribed authority under Section 66,shall not
  ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made under the
  Act. (emphasis supplied). The proviso lifts the embargo of sub-section (2) and
  permits summary refusal of the application, if such a grant would have the
  effect of "increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified
  in a notification" under Section 71(3) (a) or of the contract carriages as
  fixed and specified in a notification under Section 74(3(a). Under the proviso
  to Section 71 (1), prior to its amendment thereof by Section 23 of Amendment
  Act 54 of 1994, the RTA/STA was prohibited to grant permit for a route of 50
  kilometers or less to all juristic persons and to grant permit "only to an
  individual or a State Transport undertaking". The Amendment became
  operative from November
  14, 1994 and the above
  prohibition no longer operates.
  Section
  81 regulates renewal of permits and duration thereof, sub-section (1) visualises
  that a permit, other than a temporary permit issued under Section 87 or special
  permit issued under Section 88(8), shall be effective from the date of issuance
  or renewal thereof for a period of 5 years. Under the proviso, the period of
  countersigned permit is coterminus with the validity of the primary permit.
  Sub- section (2) prescribes the limitation within which an application for
  renewal should be made before expiry of original grant or renewal. Sub-section
  (3) gives discretion to condone the delay in making the application for the
  grounds mentioned thereunder. Sub-section (4) enumerates grounds for refusal of
  renewal of a permit for one or more of the grounds enumerated thereunder. The
  terms and conditions subject to which stage carriage permit is required to be
  renewed are different from those of Section 58 of the Repealed Act except the
  procedural part. Sub- section (2) of Section 58 of the Repealed Act gives
  preferential treatment for renewal of a permit in favour of the holder of the
  permit, while Section 81 of the Act does not give such preferential right to
  renewal. On the other hand, if the permit granted under Section 72 exceed the
  limit prescribed by the State Government for town service, there would be
  danger of refusal of renewal subject to giving reasons in support thereof.
  Equally, in relation to other routes, discretion is given to reject renewal of
  a permit for reasons to be recorded in the order.
  Chapter
  VI deals with special provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings (for
  short, 'STU') which is equivalent to Chapter IV-A of the Repealed Act. By
  operation of Section 98, Chapter VI and the rules and orders made thereunder
  shall have overriding effect over the inconsistent provisions contained in
  Chapter V or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument
  having effect by virtue of any such law. The STU shall provide an efficient,
  adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service on the
  notified area or route or portion thereof to the exclusion of the private
  operators except as exempted in the scheme itself which itself is a
  self-operative law. The details are not material for the purpose of this case
  except that under the said Chapter, there is no specific provision, like
  Section 68F (1D) for renewal in favour of any person or any class in relation
  to an area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme for renewal, or
  Section 68F (1E) in favour of STU.
  Section
  217 repeals the existing laws and provides savings from its operation.
  Sub-section (1) specifically repeals Act 4 of 1939 and any law corresponding to
  that Act in force in any State before July 1, 1989. Sub-section (2) with a non obstante
  clause provides certain savings as provided thereunder:
  Clause
  (a) of Section 217(2) provides that notwithstanding the repeal of Act 4 of 1939
  or any other analogous enactments in operation, any notification issued, rule,
  regulation made, order passed or notice issued or any appointment or
  declaration made, or exemption granted or any confiscation made, or any penalty
  or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done (emphasis
  supplied) or any other action taken under the Repealed Act and in force
  immediately before July 1, 1989 shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with
  the provisions of the Act (emphasis supplied) be deemed to have been issued,
  made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of the Act. In
  other words, clause (a) saves such of those enumerated events under the
  Repealed Act which are consistent with the provisions in the Act.
  Clause
  (b) of Section 217(2) provides that any certificate of fitness or registration
  or licence or permit (emphasis supplied) issued or granted under the repealed
  enactment shall continue to have effect after such commencement under "the
  same conditions and for the same period" as if the Act had not been passed
  (emphasis supplied). In an emphatic manner, the saving provision provides that,
  notwithstanding the repeal of Act 4 of 1939 or any corresponding law, the
  permit issued under the Repealed Act should continue to operate proprio vigore
  till its life expires under the same conditions and for the same period as if
  the Act was not passed. Other clauses are not relevant. Hence they are not
  dealt with.
  Clause
  (e) deals with the scheme under Section 68-C or under the corresponding law in
  operation, which shall be disposed of under Section 100 of the Act. Similarly,
  temporary permits issued under sub-section (1A) of Section 68F of the Repealed
  Act or under the corresponding provisions shall, because of use of clause (f),
  continue to remain in force until approved scheme under Chapter VI of the Act
  is published. The omission to provide similar right of renewal of permanent
  permit like one available under Section 68F(1D) to a private operator or to STU
  under Section 68F(1F) is significant and deliberate. It should be presumed that
  the Parliament having made similar provision in Section 81 for renewal of
  permits issued in Chapter V of the Act, the omission thereof in Chapter VI in
  relation to the private operators manifests the intention of the Parliament
  that the right to obtain stage carriage permit, contract carriage permit or
  temporary permit on the notified area or route or a portion thereof has been
  frozen to all private operators except to the extent of the right to ply stage
  carriage on the basis of the permits saved under Chapter IV-A of the Repealed
  Act. Therefore, the result would be that even the private operators whose
  permits were saved also would have limited operation under Section 217(2) (b)
  to ply their stage carriages for the unexpired period only. So, limited
  validity of permits to run stage carriages etc, on the nationalised routes or
  notified area or portion thereof in the approved scheme was saved so that the
  holder of the stage carriage permits will have full course of unexpired life of
  the permits granted under the Repealed Act. In other words, Section 217(2)(b)
  breathed limited life into all permits granted under the repealed Act except
  those granted to STU under approved or draft schemes to run its full course. It
  was so manifested by Section 217(4) and Section 6 of the GC Act. The operation
  of law in Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act as declared by this Court would be of
  much assistance for interpretation in this behalf.
  In Mysore
  State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal
  [(1974) 2 SCC 750], it was held that no licence can be granted to any private
  operator whose route traversed or overlapped any part of a notified route or
  routes as prohibited in Chapter IV-A of the Repealed Act. An applicant seeking
  grant of a permit on a route which overlapped even on a portion of a notified
  route was held to be not entitled to the grant of the permit. In Adarsh Travels
  Bus Service and Another vs. State of U.P.
  & Ors. [(1985) 4 SCC 557], a Constitution Bench of this Court approved the
  above law and had held that under Sections 68FF, 68B, 68C, 68D read with
  Section 2 (28A), once a scheme was published under Section 68D in relation to
  any area or a route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or
  partial, of other persons or otherwise, no person than the State Transport
  Undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as
  provided in the scheme itself. No private operator can operate his vehicle on
  any portion of the notified area or notified route unless authorised to do so
  by terms of the scheme itself. Therefore, corridor shelter was impermissible on
  a notified area, route or a portion of the route. It was further held that
  unless the scheme provides for exempting operators already having permit for
  common sector from the scheme by incorporating appropriate conditional clauses
  in the scheme to enable them to ply their vehicles over common sectors without
  picking up or setting down passengers on the common sectors, it was not open to
  the RTA or STA to grant permits on the notified area or notified route
  providing corridor shelter.
  In
  T.V. Nataraj & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1994) 2 SCC 32], a
  Bench of two Judges of this Court considered the integrity of the route, the
  effect of the notification of the scheme under Section 68C of the Repealed Act
  and held that on publication of the approved scheme under Section 68A, the
  private operators were excluded, unless saved by the scheme under Section 68A,
  the private operators were excluded, unless saved by the scheme itself, to
  operate on an approved area or route by obtaining permits to run the stage
  carriage on the approved route under the scheme. In the absence of any express
  exemption in the scheme, the exclusion of the private operators to operate the
  stage carriage on the approved scheme is total and complete. It was only for
  the State Government to take steps to put vehicles on approved schemes so as to
  avoid any inconvenience to the travelling public.
  In Ram
  Krishan Verma & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1992) 2 SCC 620]
  another Bench of two Judges had considered the scheme of Chapter IV-A of the
  Repealed Act and Sections 80 and 98 of the Act. It was held that the scheme
  published under Section 68D of the Repealed Act (Chapter VI of the Act) is a
  law and it has over-riding effect over Chapter IV of the Repealed Act (Chapter
  V of the Act). The scheme operates against everyone unless it is modified. It
  excluded private operators from the notified area or notified route or a
  portion thereof covered under the scheme except to the extent saved under the
  scheme itself. The right of the private operators to apply for and to obtain
  permits under Chapter IV of the Repealed Act (Chapter V of the Act) had been
  totally frozen and prohibited. The result was that on the approved nationalised
  route or area, the private operators were totally prohibited to obtain permits
  under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 of the Act to ply their stage
  carriages. This ratio was reiterated by another Bench in Nisar Ahmad & Ors.
  vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1994) Supp. 3 SCC 460] holding that the approved
  scheme is a law by itself and everyone, whether or not party to the earlier
  order of this Court K.K. Verma's case, was bound by the law laid down and
  directions given by this Court under Article 142(2) of the Constitution.
  It is
  seen that Chapter VI of the Act empowers STU to frame schemes which have
  over-riding effect, by operation of Section 98, on Chapter V and other laws.
  Section 101 with a non obstante clause gives power to the STU to operate
  additional services for the conveyance of the passengers on special occasions
  such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings. Section 102 empowers the
  State Government to modify or cancel the approved scheme only in the public
  interest. Section 103 gives exclusive right to the STU to apply for and obtain
  stage carriage permits or goods carriage permits or contract carriage permits
  in respect of a notified area or notified route or portion thereof.
  Section
  104 prohibits STA or RTA to grant any permit except in accordance with the
  scheme. Thus private operators whose named permits were saved from the scheme,
  became entitled to operate their stage carriages subject to corridor
  restrictions of picking up and setting down the passengers enroute on the
  overlapped route.
  It
  would, thus, be clear that there is no provision like Section 68F(1D) of the
  Repealed Act to obtain renewal of a permit saved under the scheme to private
  operators. In contrast, sub-section (2) of Section 103 gives power to the STA
  or RTA, on application made by the STU under Section (1) thereof, either to
  grant any other permit or reject a pending application or to cancel an existing
  permit or to modify the terms of an existing permit in the manner indicated in
  clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 103.
  It
  would, thereby, indicate the inconsistency with the provisions contained in
  Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act.
  Whenever
  an Act is repealed it must be considered, except as to transactions past and
  closed, as if it had never existed. The effect thereof is to obliterate the Act
  completely from the record of the Parliament as if it had never been passed in effect came to be non-existent
  except as regards the transactions, past and closed or saved.
  In
  Crawford's Interpretation of Law (1989) at page 626, it is stated that
  " page 627,
  it is stated that "[ Moreover,. vs. The Commercial
  Tax Officer, Bnavanipore & Ors. [(1975) 3 SCC 512 at 517] in paras 6 and
  11, a Bench of three Judges had held that repeal connotes abrogation.
  When
  there is a repeal and simultaneous re-enactment, Section 6 of the GC Act would
  apply to such a case unless contrary intention can be gathered from the
  repealing Act.
  Section
  6 would be applicable in such cases unless the new legislation manifests
  intention inconsistent with or contrary to the application of the section. Such
  incompatibility would have to be ascertained from all relevant provisions of
  the new Act. Therefore, when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on
  the same subject, the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of
  the new Act only for the purpose of determining whether the new Act only for
  the purpose of determining whether the new Act indicates different intention.
  The object of repeal and re-enactment is to obliterate the Repealed Act and to
  get rid of certain obsolete matters.
  On
  "Saving of rights acquired", in the Principles of Statutory
  Interpretation by G.P. Singh [(Sixth Edition) - 1996] at page 413, the learned
  author has stated that the effect of clauses (c) to (e) of Section 6 of GC Act
  is, speaking briefly, to prevent the obliteration of a statute in spite of its
  repeal to keep intact rights acquired or accrued and liabilities incurred
  during its operation and permit continuance of institution of any legal
  proceedings or recourse to any remedy which may have been available before the
  repeal for enforcement of such rights and liabilities. At page 418, the learned
  author has stated that the privilege to get an extension of a licence under an
  enactment is not an accrued right and no application can be filed after the
  repeal of the enactment for renewal of the licence. In Legislation and
  Interpretation by Jagdish Swarup (1974 Ed,) at page 539, it is stated that the
  power to lake advantage of an enactment may without impropriety be termed as a
  "right", but the question is whether it is a "right
  accrued". A mere right (assuming it to be properly so called) existing in
  the members of the community or any of them to take advantage of an amendment,
  without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right,
  cannot properly be deemed a "right accrued".
  In Bishambhar
  Nath Kohil & Ors.. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [AIR 1966 SC 573] a Constitution Bench of this
  Court was to consider application of Section 6 of the GC Act to Section 27 of
  the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Regarding saving of rights
  accrued thereunder by operation of section 6 of the GC Act this Court, after an
  elaborate consideration, had held that by Section 58 (3) of the Administration
  of Evacuee Property Act the Legislature had not expressed any reservation in
  the application of that section and none can be implied. The order of the
  Deputy Custodian was declared final by operation of Section 30 (6) of Ordinance
  1 of 1949, but the liability was subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1)
  to (5) of Section 30. If fictionally order is deemed to have been passed under
  Act 31 of 1950 (Administration of Evacuee Property Act ) as if the Act were in
  operation on October 12, 1949, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
  the order would be subject to the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the
  authorities who have the appellate or revisional power by virtue of provisions
  conferring those powers and which must also be deemed to have been in force on
  the date when the impugned order was passed. It was held that Section 6 was
  inapplicable to revive the Act that became final.
  The question,
  therefore, is: what rights were preserved by saving provisions in Section
  217(2) of the Act? In Crawford's Statutory Interpretation it is stated under
  Section 322 at page 657 thus:
  "Often
  the legislature instead of simply amending a pre-existing statute, will repeal
  the old statute in its entirety and by the same enactment pre-existing law. Of
  course, the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly
  the effect of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under the original
  statute.
  Are
  those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The authorities are
  divided as to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re-enact-enactment neutralizes
  the repeal, thereby continuing the law in force without interruption.
  Logically,
  the former attitude is correct, for the old statute does cease to exist as an
  independent enactment, but all practical considerations favour the majority
  view. This is so even where the statute involved is a penal act." In
  Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Ed.) it is stated at page 17
  that the effect of repealing Acts passed after August 30, 1889, is now dealt
  with by Section 38(2) of the Interpretation Act. Such repealing Acts are,
  unless the contrary intention appears, not".
  In
  Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Edition) Vol. I by Horack, in paras 2043
  to 2045, it is stated that:
  .
  Effect
  on vested rights Under common law principles of construction and interpretation
  the repeal of a statute or the abrogation of a common law principle operates to
  divest all the rights accruing under the repealed statute or the abrogated
  common law, and to halt all proceedings not concluded prior to the repeal.
  However, a right which has become vested is not dependent upon the common law
  or the statute under which it was acquired for its assertion, but has an
  independent existence. Consequently, the repeal of the statute or the
  abrogation of the common law from which it originated does not efface a vested
  right, but it remains enforceable without regard to the repeal.
  In
  order to become vested, the right must be a contract right, a property right,
  or a right arising from a transaction in the nature of a contract which has
  become perfected to the degree that the continued existence of the statute
  cannot further enhance its acquisition.
  Effect
  up On inchoate rights Rights of action which are dependent upon a statute, and
  which are still inchoate and not reduced to possession or perfected by final
  judgment, are lost by the repeal of the statute from which they stem.
  This
  rule of construction is simply a restatement of the common law principle of
  construction that the repeal of a statute operates to divest all rights
  accruing under the repealed statute and all proceedings not concluded prior to
  the repeal, since inchoate rights are by definition not vested rights such as
  to escape the common law rule of effacement. The inchoate rights are but an
  incident to the statute and fall with its repeal." In Francis Bennion's
  Statutory Interpretation (Second Edition) it is stated at page 210 thus:
  "Where
  an Act passed after 1978 repeals and re-enacts as enactment (with or without
  modification) then, unless the contrary intention appears, anything done, or
  having effect as if done, under the enactment repealed, in so far as it could
  have been done under the provision re-enacted, has effect as if done under that
  provision." In Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation (3rd Edition) by
  Randall, A.E., 1924, it is stated at page 531-32 thus:
  "Their
  lordships... conceive that, in dealing with a statute which professes merely to
  repeal a former statute of limited operation, and to reenact its provisions in
  an amended form, they are not necessarily to presume an intention to extend the
  operation of those provisions to classes of persons not previously subject to
  them, unless the contrary is shown, but that they are to determine on a fair
  construction of the whole statute, considered with reference to the surrounding
  circumstances, whether such an intention existed." Brown v. Mc Lachlan (1872),
  L.R. 4 P.C. 543, at p. 550; 42 L.J.P.C. 18, at p.23, Sir W. Colville,
  delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee.
  "Where
  you have a repeal, and you have also a saving clause, you have to consider
  whether the substituted enactment contains anything incompatible with the
  previously existing enactment. The question is, Aye or No. is there
  incompatibility between the two? And in those cases the judges, in holding that
  there was a saving clause large enough to annul the repeal, says that you must
  see whether the true effect was to substitute something incompatible with the
  enactment in the Act repealed; and that if you found something in the repealing
  Act incompatible with the general enactments in the repealed Act, then you must
  treat the jurisdiction under the repealed Act as pro tanto wiped out. That is
  settled by the cases of In re Busfield (1886), 32 Ch. D. 123; 55 L.J. Ch. 467;
  and Hume V. Somerton (1890), 25 Q.B.D. 239; 59 L.J. Q. B. 420." In re R.,
  (1906) 1 Ch. 730, at p. 736; 75 L.J. Ch.421, at
  p.423, Collins, M.R." It is already seen that the operation of sub-section
  (1) of Section 217 is to obliterate the Act 4 of 1939 and any corresponding law
  in force in any State from operation with effect from 1st July, 1989. However, repeal shall not affect
  any right or liability acquired, accrued or incurred.
  Sub-section
  (2) enumerates and saves from the obliteration of Act 4 of 1939 and
  corresponding law by fiction with its non obstante clause. Ex abundenti cautela
  clauses (a) to (e) elaborate the enumeration of rights. They would apply to
  specific rights given to an individual upon the happening of one or other of
  the events specified in the statute. Clause (a) preserves continued operation
  of any notification, rules, regulations, order or notice issued etc, and any
  appointment or declaration made etc, under the Repealed Act in force
  immediately before July 1, 1989. Those enumerated acts or actions shall be
  deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the
  corresponding provisions of the Act which are not inconsistent with the
  provisions of the Act. In other words, Section 217 (2) (a) gives an elongated
  operation as regards all transactions, which being consistent with the
  provisions of the Act should be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done
  or taken under the corresponding provisions of the Act. Existence of the
  corresponding provisions similar to the repealed provisions is a condition
  precedent. If the operation of the provisions in the Act is inconsistent and
  incompatible, it gets obliterated and the earlier provisions no longer revive
  or survive. If analogous provision in the Repealed Act does not find place in
  the Act, the rights accrued or acquired thereunder would not continue under the
  Act unless fresh rights are acquired under the Act.
  By
  operation of clause (b), any certificate of fitness of a motor vehicle or its
  registration or licence issued or permit granted under the repealed enactments,
  shall continue to have effect after such commencement under the same conditions
  and for the same period as if this Act had not been passed. In other words, a
  permit granted under the Repealed Act 4 of 1939 shall continue to have the same
  operation under the Act under the same terms and conditions and for the same
  period, as if the Repealed Act was in operation and as if the Act had not been
  passed. This is the fiction of law by which, though Act 4 of 1939 was wiped
  out, its operation gets revived. The intention, thereby, appears to be that the
  Act breaths life into the dead permits etc, and allows full play to the permits
  granted under the Repealed Act, even if inconsistent, till their period expired
  by efflux of time.
  On
  expiry of the period of permit granted under Act 4 of 1939 or corresponding law
  what would be the consequence is the question. It is true, as contended by Shri
  Venugopal, that by operation of sub-section (4) of Section 217, read with
  clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 217, Section 6 of the GC Act steps in
  and the conjoint operation thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the
  notification issued, rules or regulations made, orders passed, notice issued,
  or any appointment or a declaration made, exemption granted or any confiscation
  made or any penalty or find imposed in or any other thing done or any other
  action taken under the repealed enactment in force immediately before such
  commencement shall, as far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the
  Act, be deemed to have been correspondingly issued, made, granted, done or
  taken under the Act and their operation thereby gets saved by appropriate
  clause in Section 6 of the GC Act read with Section 217(2)(a) to (e) of the
  Act. In other words, proceedings initiated before Act 4 of 1939 was repealed,
  would be continued and concluded under the Act as if the Act was not enacted.
  However, four things would emerge from its operation. First, there must exist a
  corresponding provision under the Act pari materia with the Repealed Act;
  secondly,
  that the order or permit granted must exist and be in operation as on July 1,
  1989- the day on which the Act had come into force: thirdly, it must not be
  inconsistent with the provisions of the Act; and fourthly some positive acts
  should have been done before July 1, 1989 to further secure any right. All the
  four conditions should be satisfied as conditions precedent for application of
  Section 6 of the GC Act by operation of sub-section [4] of Section 217 and then
  clause [a] of sub-section [2] of Section 217 steps in and starts operation
  thereof. We are concerned with permits, let it be said that a permit is
  preceded by an order granting permit by the concerned RTA or STA, as the case
  may be, under the Repaled Act. The said order stands merged with the grant of
  permit and gets exhausted.
  This
  may be angulated from yet another legal perspective, namely, consequences that
  would flow from the meaning of the word `renewal' of a permit under Section 81
  of the Act. Black`s Law Dictionary defines the word `renewal' at page 1296
  thus:
  "The
  act of renewing or reviving.
  A
  revival or rehabilitation of an expiring subject; that which is made anew or
  re-established. The substitution of a new right or obligation for another of
  the same nature. A change of something old to something new. To grant or obtain
  extension of;" In P. Ramanatha Aivar's "The law Lexicon"
  [Reprint Edition 1987], the word `renewal' is defined at page 1107 to mean
  "a change of something old for something new. The renewal of a `license'
  means a new license granted by way of renewal". The renewal of a
  negotiable bill or note is regarded simply as a prolongation of the original
  The
  office of a "renewal", as it is termed, of a life policy, is to
  prevent discontinuance of forfeiture.
  In Provash
  Chandra Dalui & Anr. v. Biswanath Banerjee & Anr. [[1989] Supp. 1 SCC
  487 at 496] in para 14, this Court drew the distinction between the meaning of
  the words extension and renewal. It was held that breaths life into
  the operation of the previous lease or licence granted as per existing
  appropriate provisions of the Act, rules or orders or acts intra vires or as
  per the law in operation as on the date of renewal. The right to get renewal of
  a permit under the Act is not a vested right but a privilege subject to
  fulfillment of the conditions precedent enumerated under the Act. Under Section
  58 of the Repealed Act, renewal of a permit is a preferential right and refusal
  thereof is an exception. But the Act expresses different intention. Sections
  66, 70, 71 and 80 prescribe procedure for making application and compliance of
  the conditions mentioned therein. Existence of the provisions of the Act
  consistent with the Repealed Act is a pre-condition. Grant of renewal under
  Section 81 is a discretion given to the authority [STA or RTA] subject to the
  conditions and the requirement of law. Discretion given by a statute connotes
  making a choice between competing considerations according to rules of reason
  and justice and not arbitrary or whim but legal and regular.
  Sections
  70 and 71 read with Section 81 do indicate that grant of permit or renewal
  thereof is not a matter of right or course. It is subject of rejection for
  reasons to be recorded in support thereof. Therefore, right to renewal of a
  permit under Section 81 is not a vested or accrued right but a privilege to get
  renewal according to law in operation and after compliance with the
  pre-conditions and abiding the law.
  In Ambika
  Quarry Workis v. State of Gujarat [[1987] 1 SCC 213] this Court was to deal
  with right to renewal of a mining lease under the Gujarat Mines and Minerals
  Concessions Rules. When the renewal of the lease was not granted, due to
  statutory embargo created by Section 2 of the Forest [Conservation] Act, 1980,
  this Court had held that though the right to renewal was in accordance with the
  rules, with the interposition of the Act for conservation of the forests, it
  puts an embargo on the right to renewal.
  Therefore,
  the refusal to grant renewal of lease was upheld.
  In
  Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [[1989] Supp. 1 SCC
  504 at 523-24] after considering the above ratio, it was held that though the
  lessees of the mines were entitled to apply for renewal as per the law and
  clauses in the lease, this Court prohibited obtaining of renewals applying
  Section 2 of the Forests [Conservation] Act, 1980.
  In
  State of M.P. & Ors. v. Krishnadas Tikaram [[1995] Supp. 1 SCC 587] this
  Court had held that it is settled law that renewal is a fresh grant and must be
  granted consistent with law in operation as on that date. In that case, it was
  held that renewal of mining lease in the forest area for extraction of minerals
  under Mining and Mineral Concessions Rules should be consistent with Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Section 2
  mandates the State Government, renewal granted without prior approval was
  subsequently cancelled.
  When
  its validity was questioned the High Court set aside the order. On appeal, this
  Court reversed the High Court's order and had held that the Government was not
  precluded to cancel the renewal of the lease granted without obtaining prior
  approval of the Central Government. The order of cancellation was, therefore,
  upheld.
  There
  is a distinction between right acquired or accrued, and privilege, hope and
  expectation to get a right, as rightly pointed out by the High Court in the
  impugned judgment. A right to apply for renewal and to get a favorable order
  would not e deemed to be a right accrued unless some positive acts are done,
  before repeal of Act 4 of 1939 or corresponding law to secure that right of
  renewal. In Gujarat Electricity Board vs.Shantilal [AIR 1969 SC 239], this
  Court had pointed out that before Section 71 of the Electricity Supply Act was
  amended the appellant had issued a notice under Section 7 thereof, exercising
  the option to purchase the undertaking. It was held that a right to purchase
  the electrical undertaking which has accrued to the Electricity Board was saved
  by Section 6 of the GC Act.
  So, if
  no action under the Repealed Act was set in motion before July 1, 1989, by a
  valid application for renewal of a permit, there was no right acquired or
  accrued to pursue the remedy under the Act. The privilege to obtain renewal of
  a permit is not an accrued right. Section 58(2) of the Repealed Act gives, as
  stated super, preferential right to a holder of a permit for renewal thereof.
  Section 71 of the Act gives preferential right in favour of STU for grant of
  permit in Chapter V which is not available under the Repealed Act. Therefore,
  even for grant of a permit or a renewal under Section 72 or 81, the STU is
  entitled to preferential right over the private citizens. Thereby, the Act
  manifests intention inconsistent with and incompatible to that in Chapter IV of
  the Repealed Act. Similarly, even on the approved routes under a scheme framed
  in Chapter IVA, an exception has been carved out in the scheme with a non obstante
  clause in favour of STU, which is a self-operatiive law by itself. The rights
  of the existing operators for renewal thereof under Section 68F(1D) under the
  repealed Act were saved. But, under the Act, Chapter VI does not speak of
  renewal of the permits to the private operators, though permits were saved in
  the scheme itself. In other words, Chapter VI manifested inconsistency in its
  operation from the law in Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act. Similarly, other
  provisions are inconsistent with those in Act 4 of 1939 which exist in the Act
  as are apparent but they are not relevant for our present purpose and hence
  need no elaboration. Therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (2) would not get
  attracted, even if it were to apply to grant of permit being a "thing
  done" as contended by Shri Venugopal.
  So,
  any permit issued to operate a stage carriage under the Repealed Act would
  survive, by virtue of clause (b) of sub- section (2) of Section 217 of the Act
  by fictional operation of law; and this would be on the same conditions and for
  the same period mentioned under the Repealed Act, as if the Act was not
  enacted. Any other view would tantamount to allowing the Repealed Act to remain
  in operation in perpetuity simultaneously with the operation of the Act.
  Both
  cannot co-exist in the same shelter.
  In
  State of Punjab v. Hohar Singh [1955 SCR 893] the facts were that the
  respondent filed a claim as an evacuee under EP (Registration of Land Claims)
  Act, 1948. The claim was investigated into and it was found to be false; it was
  held to be an offence under the Act. At the trial, on his confession, the
  respondent was convicted and was sentenced to imprisonment. On suo motu
  revision, the District Magistrate found the sentence to be inadequate and
  referred the case to the High Court to be dealt with under Section 437, Cr.P.C.
  The High Court found that since the Ordinance was repealed, he could not be
  convicted under Section 7 of the Act. This Court, on appeal, reversed the
  decision and upheld the conviction applying Section 6 of the GC Act.
  Interpreting
  that section, this Court had held that the words "anything done"
  occurring in Section 11 of 1948 Ordnance did not mean act done by a person but
  an official act done by the authority in exercise of the powers conferred by or
  under the ordinance. Far from helping the appellants, the ratio would apply to
  official acts done or orders issued etc, covered by Section 217(2)(a) of the
  Act.
  As
  stated earlier, after permit was in fact issued, the order passed by STA or RTA
  outlived its purpose and grant of the permit and its operation was saved to the
  extent provided in clause (b) of Section 217 (2).
  The
  ratio of M/s. Universal Imports Agency and Anr. v. The Chief Controller of
  Imports and Exports & Ors. [(1961) 1 SCR 305] also is not of assistance to
  the appellants.
  Therein,
  before the Government of India issued notification applying the French
  Establishments' (Application of Laws) Order, 1954 to the territory of Pondicherry,
  the appellant had entered into a contract with the foreign buyers for the
  import of the goods which, after the said order came into force, were imported
  into Pondicherry. The question therein was whether Section 6 of the GC Act
  would apply, Majority of three judges, dissented by minority opinion of two
  judges, had held that the words "things done" in para 6 of the French
  Establishments' (Application of Laws) order was comprehensive enough to take
  within its ambit not only things done but also the effect of the legal
  consequences flowing therefrom. The ratio is not at all applicable to the facts
  of this case.
  We,
  therefore hold that grant of renewal of the stage carriage permit should
  necessarily be preceded by a grant of a permit to stage carriage under Section
  72, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Sections 70 and 71. This
  should be made before the expiry of the period prescribed in the permit granted
  under the Repealed Act. Therefore, for stage carriage permits granted under
  Chapter IV of the Repealed Act, if they stand to expire or expired after 1st
  July, 1989, without any pending application for renewal having been made under
  Section 58 as on 1st July, 1989, fresh applications under Section 70 should be
  filed and after consideration under Section 71, permits be obtained as per law
  under Section 72. If there is any delay to obtain permits pending
  consideration, by operation of Section 76, to avoid hiatus in continued
  operation of providing stage carriage service, section 87 gives power to grant
  temporary permit without following the procedure laid down in Section 70.
  In Mithilesh
  Garg & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC
  168], this Court had laid down different criteria for grant of inter-region,
  intra-region and interstate permits under the Act under Section 88 and 80 of
  the Act which did not find place in the Repealed Act. It was held that such
  distinction was neither discriminatory nor violative of Article 14 of the
  Constitution. Thus considered, the argument of arbitrariness, discrimination or
  avoidable inconvenience to the holders of permits etc, under the Repealed Act
  and to the travelling public would be hypothetical and without force.
  The
  appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 924/96, 1913/96, 27355/95 relate to renewal of
  stage carriage permits of the appellants, whose permits were saved under the nationalised
  schemes. It is an admitted position that before the Act had come into force on
  July 1, 1989 they had their permits saved by the schemes approved and published
  under Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act and renewable under Section 68F (1D) of
  the Repealed Act and were renewed under Section 81 of the Act without obtaining
  fresh permits under the Act. The extreme contention of Sri S.K. Dhaon was that
  the definition of "permit" under Section 2(31) of the Act is so wide
  as to include permits granted under the Repealed Act and the approval and
  publication of the schemes under Section 68D of Chapter IVA of the Repealed Act
  stands nullified since there is no saving thereof under the Act. Therefore,
  every one is free to obtain permits under the nationalised scheme after expiry
  of the period for which the permit was granted under the Repealed Act. We find
  it difficult to give acceptance to the extreme contention. It is settled law
  that the scheme approved under Chapter IVA, which is equivalent to Chapter VI
  of the Act, is a self-contained and self- operative scheme and is a law by
  itself. The scheme operates to the exclusion of private operators with non obstante
  clause that the STU should obtain permits to run stage carriages in the
  notified area, routes or a portion thereof to provide coordinated efficient,
  adequate and economical road transport service. Thereby the right to apply for
  and obtain a stage carriage permit has been frozen to all private operators,
  except as saved under the scheme itself. Until the scheme gets modified or
  cancelled by the State it would continues to be in operation. We find no
  inconsistency under the Repealed Act and the Act in this behalf, Resultantly,
  all schemes remain operative under Section 217 (2) (a) of the Act.
  The
  question, therefore, is: whether a private operator saved under the scheme is
  not liable to get permits under Section 72 and renewal of the permits under
  Section 81 of the Act? It is true that Section 68F (1D) and Section 68F (1F) of
  the Repealed Act had prescribed that renewal of the permits granted to the
  private operators and STU should be renewed under the scheme; similar provision
  do not find place in Chapter VI of the Act. Rules do prescribe procedure to
  apply for renewal by the private operators as well as STU but the rules or
  procedure do not confer substantive right to renewal of the permits granted
  under the scheme; when Chapter VI is sub silentio, rules cannot travel beyond
  the Act.
  The
  question, therefore, is: whether the named holder of a specified stage carriage
  permit has the right of renewal under the Act after the expiry of the period
  mentioned in the permit granted under the Repealed Act? Did the Parliament
  intend to put an end to and denude the right of a private named operator to
  operate the stage carriage; or to that extent the right to apply for and obtain
  permit under Sections 70 to 72 or renewal under Section 81 was preserved? Two
  views are plausible under the scheme of the Act.
  The
  first is that after the expiry of the permit or renewed permit under the
  Repealed Act, the named private operator saved under the scheme gets denuded of
  his right of renewal of his permit under the Act, since "permit"
  defined under Section 2(31) would mean permit granted under the Act, which
  occasion does not arise as the field, occupied by the exclusive right to operate
  stage carriages was given to STU.
  Thereby,
  he ceases thereafter to have any right to ply stage carriages, though saved
  under the self operative scheme which continues to be in existence after the
  Act came into force. The other view is that the rights of the private named operators
  whose specified permits were saved under the respective schemes, were not
  expressly taken away under the Act. Being private operators, they would be
  entitled to avail of the right and remedy given in Chapter v of the Act, with
  exclusion of other private competitors. Thereby they should apply for and
  obtain permit afresh under Section 72 and renewal thereafter under Section 81.
  In this behalf, it is relevant to note the contention of S/Shri Venugopal and
  Salve. Their contention is that in the scheme, such named operators whose
  specified permits were mentioned in the scheme alone were given exclusive
  rights to ply their stage carriages on the named routes subject to corridor
  restrictions mentioned in the scheme. Other persons whose permits were nationalised
  were paid compensation under the Repealed Act or under Section 105 of the Act
  but the appellants were not paid compensation as their permits were saved. By
  operation of Section 217 (2) (e) and Section 100 of the Act, even pending
  schemes should be finalised under the Act within the limitation prescribed
  therein. Until its finalisation, the existing operators are allowed to ply
  their vehicles and to obtain temporary permits. This would indicate the
  legislative intention that the Act did not intend to destroy the rights, saved
  under the respective schemes, of the named operators in respect of the
  specified permits. The contention of Mr. Pramod Swarup for U.P.S.R.T.U. is that
  after the expiry of the period mentioned in the permits granted to the named
  operators of the specified permits, they lost their right to renewal of their
  permits since the right to renewal, similar to Section 68F (1D),does not find
  place in Chapter VI. The grant of renewal to them, unless modified by the
  scheme under Section 102 of the Act, is inconsistent and, therefore, the their
  permits. The exclusive right, thereby, was given to the STU to ply their stage
  carriages, goods carriages or contract carriages so as to avoid inconvenience
  and hardship to the travelling public.
  After
  giving careful and anxious consideration to the respective contentions, we find
  that there is some force in the contention of the respective counsel for the
  appellants.
  It
  bears repetition to state that the approved scheme under the Repealed Act or in
  the Act is a self-contained and self- operative scheme. It is a law by itself.
  The schemes published under the Repealed Act, as held earlier, are saved by
  Section 217 (2) (a) of the Act. Therefore, until they are modified or cancelled
  under Section 102, the scheme should continue to be in operation in the
  notified area, route or part thereof. The right to apply for and obtain permit
  in the notified scheme was totally frozen to the private operators giving
  exclusive right to the STU to apply for and obtain permits to run the stage
  carriages or additional service under Section 101 of the Act on the notified
  area, route or a part thereof and none else. With a non obstante clause in
  Section 101, the right to apply for and obtain temporary permits under Section
  87 by private operators was taken away. There is no need for STU to obtain such
  permits, as an intimation to concerned RTA of its providing such additional
  service on special occasion like fair or religious gatherings for conveyance of
  passengers, is sufficient. Yet the scheme itself saved and preserved the rights
  of the named existing operators in respect of over lapping routes in the
  specified permits, subject to the corridor restrictions of picking up and
  setting down the passengers en route the prescribed prohibited route. They
  became entitled to run their stage carriages subject to the law. Though, their
  permits are saved, the named operators being private operators, the Parliament
  appear to have though that there was no necessity to expressly retain in
  Chapter VI itself there right of renewal as the same was already provided in
  Section 81 of the Act corresponding to Section 68F(1D) of Chapter IV-A of the
  Repealed Act. The Reason appears to be obvious. Every private operators falls
  within the field covered by Chapter v of the Act. It would seem that the
  Parliament is of the view that the named operators, being saved under the
  schemes, are entitled to apply for and obtain necessary permit or renewal
  thereof to ply their stage carriages only on ovrelapped routed subject to the
  corridor restrictions mentioned in the scheme itself.
  It may
  be stated that we do not find any express indication of their rights being
  taken away under the Act; nor do we find it by necessary implication in that
  behalf and to that effect. This view does justice also to all concerned.
  As far
  as the STU is concerned, they having had the monopoly to ply stage carriages,
  goods carriages, contract carriages or special services in the notified areas
  or route or part thereof under the scheme, it was though unnecessary to bother
  them to obtain renewal of permits for of stage carriages etc. Section 101
  itself provides for such an intention. Resultantly, the Legislature appears to
  have obviated the need to obtain periodical renewals of permits for stage
  carriages etc, run by the STU. Parliament was aware of the need to obtain the
  renewal of permits by the STU under Section 68F (1F) of the Repealed Act and
  absence of such a provision in the Act is further eloquent and self-
  explanatory.
  4 SCC
  258], a contention was raised that since Section 100(4) of the Act prescribes
  limitation within which the State Government should here and consider the
  objections on the draft scheme, finalise the scheme and publish the same in the
  official Gazette, after the Act had come into force, the limitation of one year
  stood lapsed. Though Section 217(2)(e) empowers the State Government to finalise
  the pending draft schemes, they stood lapsed from the date on which draft
  scheme was published. The contention was rejected by this Court for the obvious
  reason that the Repealed Act did not prescribe any limitation to finalise the
  draft scheme as indicated in sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Act. As
  years rolled by from the date of publication of draft scheme for finalisation,
  the Parliament for the first time prescribed limitation in Section 100(4)
  putting a fetter on the exercise of the power of the Government in approving
  the draft scheme and publication thereof after complying with the requirements
  of law. The right of the private operators and the remedy of finalisation of
  the draft scheme were harmoniously interpreted by this Court and it held that
  the limitation of one year starts running from the date the Act had come into
  force, namely, July 1,1989. We are of the view that same
  harmonious interpretation is required to be adopted in this case also. Applying
  the same harmonious interpretation, we hold that the rights of named private
  operators to apply for and obtain permits and renewal of the specified stage carriage
  permits are saved and they alone are eligible to avail of that right and remedy
  under Chapter V of the Act, while preserving the monopoly of the STU in Chapter
  VI.
  In
  Chapter V, permits are required to be obtained on non-nationalised routes. The
  STU also has the right to apply for and obtain permits to run the stage
  carriages, goods carriages or contract carriages on permits, as the case may
  be, and in some instances the preferential right under the Act is given to the
  STU. In respect of permits had under the Repealed Act or the Act, the need to
  apply for and obtain renewals of the stage carriage permits, goods carriages or
  contract carriage permits for plying on non- nationalised routes was to comply
  with the procedure prescribed in Chapter V, which should be adhered to. This is
  in relation to non nationalised routes only. But as regards the approved
  schemes, in Chapter VI or continued schemes saved by section 217(2)(a) read
  with sub-section (4) read with Chapter IVA of the Reopeaked Act, there is no need
  for STU to obtain periodical renewals of permits of stage carriages, contract
  carriages, or goods carriages in respect of the notified area, route or portion
  thereof, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V. The STU retains its
  exclusive right to ply the stage carriages or special service or goods carriage
  or contract carriage on the notified area or route or part thereof, until the
  scheme is duly modified or cancelled in accordance with law prescribed in
  Section 102 of Chapter VI.
  It is
  required to be stated that. The RTA or STA, as
  the case may be, should verify the original scheme under which the named
  operator, whose specified permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the
  stage carriage in approved scheme with the condition of the corridor
  restrictions imposed.
  In Mithilesh
  Garg's case (supra) a Bench of three Judges considered the right of the
  existing operators in conformity with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and
  the procedure prescribed under the liberal policy for grant of permits to the
  new entrants, while continuing the same right to existing operators under the
  new provisions in the Act.
  It was
  harmoniously interpreted and this Court had held that there was no cause for
  complaint by the existing operators when the liberal policy had given right to
  apply for and obtain permits under Chapter V on the non-nationalised routes to
  augment facility to the travelling public.
  Section
  104 does not stand in the way of the named private operators whose specified
  permits were/are saved in that behalf. On the contrary, it would say
  "except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme".
  Thus
  considered, we are of the view that the rights of the existing named operators
  saved in the appropriate approved schemes in respect of specified permits were
  not destroyed. By necessary implication of Section 104, they were saved. They
  became entitled to avail of their right to apply for grant of permit in
  accordance with the procedure prescribed under Sections 70 and 71 and to obtain
  permit under Section 72, before the expiry of the permit or renewed permit
  saved under the approved scheme and should obtain permit afresh to ply their
  stage carriages before expiry of the period mentioned therein; periodical
  renewals from time to time should be obtained under Section 81 of the Act in
  accordance with the operation of the law. The RTA or STA, as the case may be,
  should consider and may grant permits or renewal of permits as per law or
  rejection thereof for reasons to be recorded in that behalf.
  It is
  true that some renewals of stage carriage permits to the holders of permits or
  renewed permits under the Repealed Act were granted under Section 81. Some of
  them are still in operation. With a view to prevent hiatus in operational
  efficacy we would declare that though renewals of state carriage permits were
  granted under Section 81, they must be deemed to be temporary permits granted
  under Section 87, till regular permits are granted or refused.
  The
  ratio of Gurucharan's case (supra), does not help the appellants. Therein the
  application for renewal of stage carriage permit under section 58 (2) of the
  Repealed Act was pending consideration as on 1st July, 1989. Consequently, Section 6 of the GC Act saved its operation.
  This Court had, therefore, held that applications for renewal filed under
  Section 58 of the Repealed Act must be disposed of under section 80 read with
  section 81 of the Act. However, it is stated that disposal must be taken to be,
  not of a permit granted under the Act, but one under deemed fiction.
  There
  would be no further fiction of law created under the Act to be a deemed renewal
  of permit under the Act.
  In Quillon's
  case (supra) this Court did not have the occasion to consider the effect of
  section 6 of the GC Act and clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 217 since
  the case fell under clause (b). Therein, the proviso to unamended Section 71(1)
  prohibited the Society to obtain a permit. Consequently, it could not obtain
  renewal of stage carriage permit, being inconsistent with the provisions of the
  Act. It was held that the stage carriage permit issued under the Repealed Act
  would remain operative for the period for which it was granted as if the Act
  had not been passed.
  After
  its expiry, the appellant therein was required to obtain a permit under Section
  72 of the Act. Thereby, it was held that the Society was not entitled to the
  renewal under Section 81 of the Act. In view of the consideration of the
  operation of the relevant provisions mentioned herein before, there is no
  conflict between Gurcharan Singh's case and Quilon's case. The interpretation
  in Quilon's case is also consistent with the consideration herein before made.
  The
  next contention of Shri Venugopal is that the Act intends that all permits
  issued under the Repealed Act would be continued under the Act and be given
  effect in toto so long as such of those permits or certificates or licences are
  not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. To that extent, their
  operations are saved giving limited operation under clause (b) of sub-section
  (2) of Section 217. However, notifications etc, issued under the Repealed Act
  and saved by clause (a) of sub-section 217, as mentioned earlier, are distinct
  from the permits issued in furtherance of the orders passed by the STA or RTA,
  as the case may be.
  The
  further contention that such a construction creates and brings about invidious
  discrimination offending Article 14 of the Constitution is without force.
  Section 217(2)(a) of the GC Act read with Section 217(4) of the Act manifest
  the distinction between the acts done or actions taken consistent with the
  previsions of the Repealed Act but inconsistent t with the Act. The Act saves
  only acts done or actions taken etc. Which are consistent with the provisions.
  By implication, all inconsistent acts done or actions taken, except those
  completed and closed, would not be considered to be done or taken under the Act
  and consequently could not be operative under the Act. They are obliterated
  completely from statute as if they never existed except to the extent of
  limited operation provided in the appropriate clauses in sub-section (2) of
  Section 217 of the Act.
  Accordingly,
  we hold that the named transport operators whose permits were saved in the
  relevant scheme shall apply for permits under Section 70 and 71 and obtain
  permits afresh under Section 72 of the Act before the expiry of the period
  mentioned in the permit issued either under Section 47 or Section 48 or renewal
  under Section 58 or Section 68F(1D) of the Repealed Act. No third party/private
  operators are entitled to apply for permits on the same notified route or part
  thereof, nor are they entitled to compete with them for grant of permit, since
  the right of all other private operators to apply for and operate in the
  approved notified area, route or a part thereof, has been frozen. The right is
  reserved only in relation to the named operators and that too for specified
  permit, and none else. on over lapping routes. The RTA or STA, as the case may
  be, should verify the original scheme under which the named operator, whose
  specified permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the stage carriage in
  the approved scheme with the condition of the corridor restrictions. The
  authorities should consider their applications in accordance with the law and
  the prescribed procedure and may grant new permits under Section 72 and later
  on before the expiry thereof, to renew it in accordance with the procedure
  prescribed in Section 80 and 81, that too on compliance with law, until the
  scheme is duly modified or cancelled in accordance with law. We reiterate that
  this right is available exclusively to the named private operators and that too
  in respect of the specified permits and with same restrictions continued in the
  scheme and none else and no more.
  Since
  the appellants had obtained permits by mistake of the law and misconception of
  law on the part of the competent authorities applied under Section 81 and had
  been granted renewal of their respective permits under Section 81 after July 1,
  1989, such grant of renewal of the permits should be treated to be temporary
  permits under Section 87 of the Act. Therefore, the private operators, be they
  covered by Chapter V or VI, should apply for and obtain afresh permits before
  the expiry of the period mentioned in their respective permits or renewed for
  consideration under Section 71 and grant under Section 72 of the permits afresh
  consistently with Section 2(31) of the Act. Such permit alone would be a permit
  defined in Section 2 (31) of the Act. Thereafter, before expiry thereof, they
  shall apply for and the concerned STA/RTA person authority may grant or refuse
  renewals of permit for reasons to be recorded under Section 81 of the Act.
  This
  interpretation of the law would relieve undue hardship to all the operators and
  at the same time it would also be consistent with the scheme of the Act to subserve
  the rights and protection provided under the Act so as to avoid rigour in the
  operation of the law.
  Thus
  considered, for the reasons given above, the view taken by the High Court is in
  conformity with law but subject to above modification in the judgment.
  The
  appeals and the writ petition are accordingly disposed of but, under the
  circumstances, without costs.
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