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# Foreign And Military Intelligence Book I

FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STFDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14),1976
U.S. GoVERNMENT PIUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1976
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35
tions in DIA. There has been a similar potential pr<?blem in NSA, although it has provoked fa! less concern than DIA smce NSA must also serve national and tactIcal needs. In 1961 the JCS at!e?TIpted to gain control of that agency,49 and in recent years some <:rItI<:B at the other extreme have suggested taking NSA out of DOD, ~mce I! serves many non-military needs. The entIr~ pr?ble~ of dealing WIth. the mutual relations of national and tactIcal mtellIgence may ~ clarified as the DCI assumes the additional authority granted to hIm by the President's Executive Order of F.ebrua!y 1S! 1976.

.

While establishment of a Pentagon mtellIgence c~ar m.th~ form of the new Deputy Secretary may reduce fragt?enta~lOn ~Ithm t?-e d.epartment and improve the coherence of mI~tar:y mtellIgence, It WIll probably have a major im!>act on the coordmatmg r?le o~ the DCI.

Given that the overwhelmmg volume of total U.S. mtellIgence collection and production occurs within DOD, th~ .Deputy Secret~ry could become, in effect, a second DCI: The defimt~~n of the r~latIOn between these two officials will be the smgle mO!lt crI~lCal factor m toplevel organization for management of natIonal mtellIgence.

4-. Requirement8 for Oongre88ional Oversight.

.

If Congress- attempts to exe!cise mo~ comprehe.nsI.ve and detailed oversight of intelligence agenCIes, the bIggest Issue I!l lIkely to be what information the exec-ntive branch should make av~tllable. On defense intelligence there is likely to be less ofa problem If Congress conce~
trates on issues of intelligence process rather than substance. Ther~ IS, of course, a limit as to how far it is possible to eyaluate the former ~Ith
out considering the latter. Therefore, norms wIl! have. to be. estabhsh~d about what kinds of material (for exalXlple1 fimsh~d mtell~g;ence) WIll be subject to scrutiny by Q0I?-gress on.a routme baSIS. PrOVIsIon should also be made to keep basIC mformatI<!n on budgets and reso.urce allocation in a clear and available form m the Pent~gon, obtamable bI
the oversight committee on demand. More conSIstent and th?roug documentation of the. chain of command could al8(') be requU"(;d m internal correspondence (thus avo!~ing the:r;>roblem. of "unattrl~ut
wble" records of controversial deCISIOns turnmg up m the files, I.e., unsigned directives or cables which cannot clearly be traced to an authoritative source).

.

.

If independent ongoing <!versight O! the substance of defense m~lligence is the goal, an ove:r~Ight corm~nttee sh(;mld have st;aff expertI~
in several areas: (1) PolItIcal, to ~eIgh the rIsks. and gams of certam programs and targets; (2) ScientIfic a~d Techmcal, t<! ~valuate sensOrs; (3) Economic, to judge cost-effect~veness; (~) MIlItary, to consider non-national strategIc and tactIcal reqUIrements of DOD
intelligence.

## Xvi. Disclosure Of Budget Information On The Intelligence Community'

~t.t~e present t~e the aggregate amount spent for the intelligen~
actIVItIes of the Umted States Government is classified. The individual budgets for the C~ntral Intel~gen~e ~gency, the National Security Agency, and certam other umts wIthm the Department of Defense which gather national intelligence are likewise classified.

The budgets for these agencies-which spend billions of dollars annually-are kept not only from the American people but also from most Members of Congress. This secrecy prevents the public and most
~em?ers of Congress from knowing how much is spent on national mtelligence and from determining whether that amount is consistent with other national needs and priorities. It prevents the public and most Members of Congress from knowing how much is spent by each of the national intelligence agencies and from determining whether that alloca~ion among agencies is appropriate. Because funds for these agenCIes are concealed in the budgets of o.ther agencies, the public and most Members of Congress cannot be certam that funds in the open appropriations are used for the purposes for which they were approprIated. No item in the overall federal budget is above suspicion as ~ hiding place for intelligence agency funds. 1 Finally and most serIOusly, the present system of secrecy is inconsistent with the constitutional provision. which states:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.2
1 During the recent debate in the House of Representatives on the publication of the CIA's budget Congressman Kooh described an encounter with DCI Helms in which Congressman Koch asked about -the size of the CIA budget and the num:
ber of CIA employees, questions that DCI Helms told Congressman K0Ch "we don't ans~er." As Congressman Koch described it, he then asked Mr. Helms "Are you tellmg me that I, a Member of Congress, do not have the right to know what the budget is, so that when I vote, I do not know what I am voting on?" DCI Helms said, "Ye!'l ... The item is placed in some other larger item, and you do not know." Congressman Koch then asked, "Do you mean that it might be included under Social Security?", to which DCI Helms replied, "We have not used that one yet, but that is not a bad idea." Congo Rec. H9359, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of ReP., Kpcp. )
and policy issu()s involved, see "Tbe CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,"
84 Yale Law *Journal* 608 (1975), "Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can Accountability and Oonfidentiality Coexist?" 7 New York University Jourritll,'-of International Law *and Politics* 493 (1974), and "Cloak and Ledger:
Is CIA Funding Constitutional?" 2 Hastings Oonstitutional Law *Quarterly* 717
(1975).

## A. The Present Budgetary Process For Intelligence Community Agencies And Its Consequences

At present, the Director of Central ~ntel1igenc~ subl!1its ~o the President recommendations for a consolIdated natIOllal IntellIgence program budget. The consolidated national intelligEmce budget, as well as the budget requests from the various agencies within the intelligence community, are reviewed by the Office of Man~gement and BudO"et (OMB) in the "same detail that [OMB] reVIews the b
.

b h
"3 A f budget requests of any other executIve ranc agency.

s ormer OMB Director Roy Ash described it:
The specific amounts of the CIA's approved appropriations request an~ the identification of th~ approl?riation estimates in the PreSIdent's annual Budget, wIthm whICh these amounts are included, are formally provided by the Director o~ O~B
to the chairmen of the Senate and House ApprOprIatIOns Committees.4
.

In the past, special subcommittees of the House and Sena~ Appropriations Committees have considered the .C~A budget. In closed session' the chairman of the House ApproprIatIOns CommIttee noted that hi~ subcommittee "tried and tried and tried to hold the secrecy of these matters as closely as we could.:' 5
-
These practices have ?een changIng .. T?e entIre House Defense Appropriation SubcommIttee now scrutImzes the CI1\ b.udget. In September of 1975 the Chairman of the House ApproprIatlOn~ Committee invited all the Members of the House of Representat~ve~ to review the executive session hearings of the Defense ApprOprIatIOns Subcommittee on the CIA's budget, although Members had to agree not to remove any documents from the room" not to take notes, and llot to reveal the classified information to 'unauthorized persons."
While the Chairman invited this review by the Members, the full
.. House Appropriations Committee voted not to receive figures on the CIA's budget from the Defense A~propriatio~s Subcommittee.

Np,;ther the Sena,t.e AppronrIatIOns CommIttee as a whole nor the Senate as a whole is informed, even in se?ret s~sion, of. the budget:
figures for the CIA. NSA or certain other lJ!-te~hgenre um!s.

Once the subcommittees of the ApproprIatIons Co.mmIttee, agree upon bhe level of funding for the intelligence agenCIes,. these fUl!-ds are concealed in appropriation requests for other agenCIes on WhICh the full Appropriations Committees and Senate and House of Representatives vote.

. .

.

After congressional approval of these appropna~lOns, the. chaIrmen of the Senate and House Appropriatio~s CommIttees notI,fy the Office of Management and Bud,q:et of the SIze and true locatIOn of intelligence agency funds. Funds for the CIA are then transferred
3 Letter from Roy Ash to Senator Proxmire, 4/29/74, quoted in Congo R:Ci S9604, daily ed., *tI/4/74,* remarks of ~en, P~oxmire. It might b~ argued t :s the intelligence budgets should be reVIewed III even greater detaIl h~ ?M~ in neither the Congress as a whole nor the public can ~ntly. partIcIpa e tIle process of reviewing and debating the budget requests ill thIS area.

- Ash letter, 4/29/74.

U t"l 1974
5 Congo Rec. H9363, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Mahon..

n I
, even the names of members of these special subcommittees were WIthheld from the public.

to the CIA from these appropriations.s Former OMB Director Ash noted:
rhe transfer of funds to CIA . . . is accomplished by the Issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, ... are approved by OMB.7
. This whole pr?cess tr~ats the CIA and other intelligence agencies ill a mann.er radIcally dIfferent from other highly sensitive agencies o~ t~e Umted States Government, such as the Atomic Energy CommISSIOn and the pepartment of Defense. While intelligence agency budgets ~ay reqUIre somewhat different handling, it is important that any speCIal approach reflect real needs justifying departure from the careful processes which Congress has developed over the years for maintaining its power over the purse.

## B. The Constitutional Requirement

. The present budgetary process apparently violates Article 1 SectIon9, Clause '7 of the Constitution, which reads:
'
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations, made by Law; and a regular Statemen~ and ACC01Int of the Receipts and Expenditures of all publIc Money shall be published from time to time.

This constitutional provision was intended to insure that Congress
~ould control the governmental purse and that the public would be Informed of how Congress and the Executive spend public funds.s In keeping with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted 31
U.S.C. 66b (a), which provides that:
the Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for t~e inforylllation of the Presiodent, the Congress, 'and the publIc, as WIll present the results of the financial operrutions of the Government.

6 This is done pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 403f which autIlorizes the CIA to transfer to. and receive from other government agencies funds as approved by the OMB.

Ash letter, 4/29/74. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB
for transfer to the CIA are limited to the amounts which tIle chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees specified to OMB.

8 See D. Robertson, Debates ana Other Proceedings ot the Convention ot Virginia, 1788 .(Richmond, 1805), p. 326. The Chancellor of New York asked if the public were more anxious about any thing under heaven than the expenditUre of their moneY?" 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the SeveraZ States' Conventions on the Adoption ot the Federal *Constitution,* (Philadelphia: 'J. B. Lippencott, 1836), p.347.

.

The clause was implemented during the first Congress. The act creating the Treasury Department required the Treasurer to annually present each House of Congress with "fair and accurate copies of all accounts" and a "true and perfect account of the state of the Treasury." Act of Sept. 2, 1789, Chapter 12, Section I, I Statute 65, This Act was replaced by 31 U.S.C. 1029, which provides, "It shall be tIle duty of the Secretary of the Treasury annually to lay before Congress ... an accurate, combined statement of the receipts and expenditures during the last preceding fiscal year of all public monies." The receipts, wherever practicable, we!"e to he divided hy ports, districts, and states, and the expenditures by each separate head of appropriation.

Fulfilling its charge, the Treasury DepaI4tment publishes a Oombi;wd Statement of Receipt8, Expenditure8, and Balance8 of *the* Dn~ted State8 G01Jernment, which is recognized as the offi:cial p~biication of the details ~f .receipt 'and outlay data:Wlth whIch all other.r~ports con~nmg similar dJai'ba must be m agreement. In addItIOn to servmg t~e needs of Congress, [the report i8 U8ed b?{] the general pubZw in its continuing review of the operatwnB of Government.

[Emphasis added.] 9
The *Oombined Statement,* however, contains. no entry for the Ce~
tral Intelligence .A:gency, the National Secunty Agency or c.ertam other intelligence units within the Department of Defense .. WhIle the figure for total funds received and ~xpended by the Umted ~tates Government isaccurake, some funds hsted 'as expended by partIcular agencies 'are, in fact, merely tmnsferred from them to the Central Intelligence Agency.

William Colby, former Director o~ th~ 9IA, has argued t~at ~he
-
present practice is constitutional, mam~ammg that the ConstItutIon permits concealment of funds f~r agenCIes such as the C~A: Not only does this posi,tion ignore the plam text o~ th~ Clause, but I~ IS n~ supported by the deb~tes, ~ither at ~he ConstitutIOIl!al ConventIOn or m the ratifying conventIOns m the V'arlOUS States.

Mr. Colby'sargument relies .chiefly on t?-e fact. that when the State ment and Account Clause was mtroduced It prOVIded for annual publication of the account, but it was subsequently amended to allow congressional discretion over timing.10
The amendment was intended, however, not to perI~llt concealment of expenditures from the full Cong:ess and the AmerIcan I?eople,. but rather to insure that the informatIOn would be .made aV!J:Ilable In a fashion permitting its thorough comprehensIOn.

1

1 NeIther p~o
ponents nor opponents of the amendment argued agamst the assertion draft [of the Constitution]. The language ~rst sugg~ted by George Mi~n woul~
have required an annual account of publIc expendltures. J"nmes Ma~lson, ho~
ever argued for making a change to require reporting 'from time to time,' Ma~
son ~:x;plained that the intenJt of his amendment was to 'l'~ve e~ough to the mscretion of the Legislature.' Patrick Henry opposed the MadIso~ 'language b~US~
it made concealment possible. But w.hen the debate wa-s over, It was the MadISO
view that prevailed.'~
.

Mr. 00lby 'also argued that the provision allowing Congress lto.keep theIr p~
ceeding-asecret demonstrated the intent of the Fr3JIDers to prOVIde fo~ .concea ment. That provision, unlike the Statement and Account Clause explICItly provides for secrecy; moreover, the Statement and Account. Claus.e guarantees an accounting for aU puiblic money. For a fuller treatment of thIS arg-UInent, see
"The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,:' Yale *L..J.* 608.(1975).

e It could be argued that the constitutional reqUlrement.Ig not vlOlated ~s th Combined Statement provides an accurate total for recelpts and expendlturest Under this theory .all government funds could be appropriated to one governme~
agency and secretly transferred to the other agen.cies: As long ~s the total afJrb -
priated and expended were published, the constItutlOnal reqUIrement wou e fu~il~: Farrand, Records of the FetlerwZ *Oonvention* of 1787 New Haven: Yale UniYersity Press, 1966), pp. 618-19.

that the people had a "right to know" how their funds were being spent.u It should also be noted that the proponents of congressional discretion did not argue that secrecy was needed. Rather they contended that leaving the interval of publication to be fixed by Congress would result in fuller disclosure, since no agency would be forced to publish an incomplete report to meet an inflexible and unrealistic deadlineY
A fixed schedule would result in statements that would be "incomplete" 14 or "too general to be satisfactory." 15 The proponents of the amendment ridiculed the possibility that granting Congress discretion would mean that information would be concealed. forever; Congress would publish the reports at regular, frequent intervals.16
It has been implied that the constitutional requirement has been met, at least in the House of Representatives, in that all Members can examine the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's executive session hearings on the CIA budget.n As one Member of the House noted:
Secrecy in Government is distasteful to a free society, but preservation of our free society demands that we maintain a prudent cloak over vital intelligence operations, so long as the Representatives of the people have the right to examine what is covered-as they do in this situation.18
Knowledge on the part of *all* of Congress, would satisfy part of the constitutional requirpment. As Justice Story noted. one of the purposes of the constitutional requirements is :
to secure regularity, punctuality and fidelity in the disbursements of the public money ... it is highly proper, that Congress should possess the power to decide how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise, the executive would 'possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation .... The power to control and direct the appropriations constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public speculation. . . . It is wise to interpose in a republic, every restraint, by which the public treasure, the common fund of all, should be applied with unshrinking honesty to such objects as legitimately belong to the common defense and the general welfare.19
But even if all of Congress had the information now held by the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, the Constitution would still be violated. The Constitntion requires that the *public* know how its funds are being spent. The Constitution requires that the statement and account be made public "from time to time." 20 This re-
.

.

d t make congressional responsibility "more I'rement was Impose
0
d th t'
qu
"21 b
11 win the people to check Congress an
. e execu lve perfect y a. o.

f?;
f' f.ormati.on on what "money IS expended, through the pubhcatIOdnb.o mh t authority." 22 As Chancellor Livingfor what purposes, an Y w a st.on pointed out:
.

y will give up to your state legislature everythmg dear
. and valuable' but you will give no power to Congress, ~ecause
't rna be abused' you will give them no revenue, ecause
~he Jblic treasur~s may be squandered. Bl.:!-t do you ~ot see her~ a ca ital check ~ Congress are to publ~sh, from tIme to f a~count of their receipts and expendItures. These may
~:~~l~;ared together; and if the former, year after year, e~
ceed the latter, the co~ruPtiondwi11 be tetect~d, and the pe.op e may use the c.onstitutIonal mo eo re ress.

.

.

The debates and later commentary indicate that the cQnshtutIO~al
.

reqUlremen t was designed to all.ow citizens t.o chart the course .of PO~ICy
., f t I
penditures-t.o determme, thr.ough an exammatIOn 0 gh'ernmen. a ex t defense and t.o.o little for example, whether t.o.o muc m.oney IS spen:-
h uld be allocated
~~l :~~~~:~s~~:~i!~~i~~~d~h~~i~~h~:mh~~~n :.o~~t ~obyent~1:;:c~
e.o Ie with C.ongress, to determl'Il.e w et er expen I ~.

f
~tiJe c~nf.orm to the intent .of the apprQpria~~n. Pubhca~lO~ fy f~f~~~
priations and expenditures w.ould a~s.o 'provl d an .opp~~ un~ were for pe.ople to ascertain if both appr.oprratIOns an expen 1 ure c.onst~tuti.onal purposels.

24 h h l;nf.ormation .on appr.opriations It IS h.owever unc ear ow muc
'U
bI" h d N
and expenditu~ is required by the. C.ons~ituti.on to ~e pu l!s:erlio~
.one at the Constituti.onal ConventIOn dlsaftzood WIt:!: t~e hilling"
~:!;\:f:~dp~~~Pdi:~f~u~~ ~~:~r~o;ri~~i~~ ;d:;p~nditu~~
of n.onsensitive g.overnmen~al ag~ncles, there IS a hmIt t.o the amo
.of detail which can be pubhshed.

2511
ted. a stand-
The Su reme Court in United States v. Robel, sUf?;ges
.

d h hP might !be used to fix the constituti.onal reqUlrement partIcuar W' IC
.

.

f th b dget w.ould damage n'alarly when claims that pubhcrutI.on .0
e u
'd t to'ts 'tizens ti.onal security are. raised ~ainst the ?,.ov;::en!: a:la~un~1 of reto publish from tIme to tlIDe a regu ar
. me
'" 2 J. Story, Sec. 1348, pp. 222--223.

.. Ibid.

23 2 J. Elliot, p. 345.

1
ntators on the Constitution wrote
.. Rs David Ramsey, one of the ear Y comme r than those set forth If Congress applied any funds for purposes. othe Th Clause provides in the Constitution, they would have efxctheed~ ~~::{ ~~~~s'whOe pay, are to be information so that "[t]he people 0
e.

~~
judges how far their money is properly apPchedi'
on the subject of the Federal
"An address to the Freemen of South ll;ro l.na
.

St t p. 374
Com,titution;" in Pamphlets on the ConstttutlOn of the Umted
"a es,
(Pro 6~~~u~~ ~~
S:a~\~l~~~!~;~~~~:: ;?~~~~h S:o~~~J~ed,.isavailable under the F~edom of Information Act.

25&389 U.S. 258 (1967).

ceipts and expenditures .of all public m.oney. The Court held that
''when legitimate concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on First Amendment activities, C.ongress must achieve its gQal by means which 'have the least drastic impact on the c.ontinued Vitality of First Amendment freedoms." 26
Under this test the c.onstitutionality of a level of discl.osure .of inf.ormation .on expenditures depends on whether there is another system of greater discl.osure which, without endangering nati.onal security, w.ould have a "less drastic" impact .on the public's right t.o know how its funds are being spent. It is clear, however, that the present secrecy surr.ounding the appropriations and expenditures for intelligence-particularly the inflation .of unspecified appropriatiQns ill which funds for intelligence are concealed-vitiates the constituti.onal guarantee.27 Under the present system neither the public nQr the C.ongress as a whole kn.ows h.ow much is beillg spent on natiQnal intelligence.or by each intelligence agency. In addition, both Congress as a whole and the public are "deceived'" as one Senat.or put it,28 about the
"true" size .of other agency budgets. As certain unspecified general appr.opriati.ons c.ontain funds which are secretly transferred to the CIA, it is impossible for m.ost Members of Congress .or the public to kn.ow the exact am.ount .of money which actually is destined for any g.overnment agency.29 C.ongress is thus unable to set pri.orities through the allocation .of funds,30 or to determine if expenditures by the executive conform to congressional intent and are being spent wisely and well. Members .of the public cannot determine with any confidence whether they agree willi C.ongress' allocatiQn .of res.ources and cannot m.onit.or expenditures by the executive branch.

26 389 U.S. 258, 268. While the public's right to information on governmental expenditures has not been accO'rded the "preeminent" status of the First Amendment, the test is an appropriate place to begin an analysis.

lIT As Justice Black wrote, "The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our republic." New Yorlc Time8 00. v. Unite(l *States,* 403 U.S. 713 at 719 (1971). In th'e same case, Justice Stewart wrote, "In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the area of national defense and international affairs may be in an enli~htened citizenry." *[(t.* at 728. Justice Stewart's remarks apply equally well to the exercises of power by the Congress.

28 Congo Rec. S9602, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.

29 Congo Rec., H9361, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Evans. As Congressman Evans recently noted, the secrecy surrounding th'ese funds for the intelligence community is infectious: "When we are tucking it away in another pocket in the budget, we are also making a secret of something else that should not be a secret."
30 *See e.g.,* Congo Rec;, H9372, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Leggett. Congressman Leggett noted, "How can we 'oversee' in any fu-shion if we have no knowledge of the Agency's command on our resources? How can we set budgetaTy priorities in a meaningful fashion, if we have no basis for comparing intelligence with unemployment, health, or other competing program areas?"

## C - .Alternatives To Concealing Intelligence Budgets From Con- Gress And The Public

Within certain limits, Congress has the. power to det.ermine ho~
information about the receipts and expendItures of publIc moneys IS
made available to the public.31
-
Congress could choos,,: to p~blish CIA or NSAbudg~t~ and expenditures, for example, m detail.equal to those of nonsel"!-sItIve ~gen
cies. This approach, however, mIght threaten ~he secunty of mtelligence operations or agents. Congress ha~ avaIlable ~noth~r. ~odel for budget disclosure to protect the securIty of certam actIvItIes.

Since 1793, certain agencies, such as the AEC, the F~I, and the Department of State have been appropriated funds speCIfically for
"confidential purposes," which for seeuri~y reasons, are exempt from normal accounting procedures.32 In each mstance, ho~ever, C~mgress appropriates funds to the agen~y ?irectl~ a~d pU~~lCly spec~fies the small percentage of the approprIatIOn whIch. IS for confidentIal P:urposes" and thus exempt from nor:qJ.al accountmg proce?-ures. Drawmg on this practice Congress obviously could publish detaIled budgets for the intelligence' agencies while providing a lump sum to each for "confidential purposes."
ld bI" h Congress could also devise other models. Congress cou pu IS
only the total appropriated to each int~lligence agency.ss As the Special Senate Committee To Study QuestIOns Relate4 to ~ecret and Confidential Documents 34 suggested in 1973, the publIcatIOn of such funds should provide members ~ith. the minimal information they should have about our mtellige~ce ope~a
tions. Such information would also end, th~ pra?tIce of m-
Hating certain budget figures for use to hIde mtelhgence costs and would insure that all Members wopld know the true cost of each budget item they must vote upon.

m. Oincinnati Soap 00. v. Unitea *State8,* 301 U.S. 308 (193&). In fixin~ the level of detail revealed, however, a congress~onal decis~on cannot overnde a constitutional requirement such as that of Article 1, SectIOn 9, Clause 7, particularly as one purpose of that requirement was to serve as a check on Co~gress.

so The first such statute authorized special procedures for sums relatmg to foreign ''intercourse or treaty." By the Act of February 9, 1793, Congress provided: "that in all cases, where any sum or sums of money h~ve "issned, or shall hereafter isuP, from the treasury, for the purposes of mtercourEe or treaty, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized to cause the, same to be duly settled annually with the accounting officers of the Treasury m the manner following, that is to say; by causing the same to be acc~)Unt.ei .for, specifically in 'all inStJances wherein the expenditures thereof may, m, hlS Judgment be made public; and by making a certificate or certificates, or causmg the Secr~~
tary of State to make a certificate or certificates of the amount of such expendI- tures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every su<;.h certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therem expre~sed to have been expended." [Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 300, codified as 31 U.S.C. 107 (1970).J
TJ:e Sp~cia~ Committee recommended that the Appropriations CommIttee ItemIze the Defense Department appropriations bill in order that the "total sums proposed to be appropriated for intelligence activities by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense .Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National ReconnaIssance Office, and any separate intelligence units within the Army, Navy, and Air Force" could be revealed.s5
Finally, th~ Congress. could decide. that only the total budget figure for natIOnal mtellIgence be publIshed. This would be the aggregate of funds provided to CIA, NSA, DIA, and the national intelligence components in the Departments of Defense, State, and Jre3:sury. Alth<?ugh there ma:r be problems defining w~at constitutes natIOnal mtellIgence," the DIrector of Central IntellIgence already prepares a national intelligence budget. The Director could, with the appropriate congressional committees determine what agencies or departments would be included.36
The secrecy presently surrounding intelligence expenditures vitiates the constitutional guarantee. Even publishing one figure-the total appropriations and expenses for national intelligence-would have a salutory effect. It would eliminate the inflation of figures presently in the Budget and in the Combined Statement resulting from the concealment of. intelligence agency funds in other agency appropriations and ~xpendItures. Congress would be able to establish its priorities by placmg the amount appropriated for national intelligence activities against other claims on the public purse; the public could make its own independent judgment about priorities.aT
~s Se~ator ~roxmir,,: noted, publication of the aggrega.te budget for natIonal mtellIgence mIght also have the effect of deterrmg potential adversaries by showing that the United States Government continues to spend sizeable amounts on intelligence.38 As former DCI and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted, publication of this figure might also
85 The Committee specifically did not request that any line items be revealed, although they did recommend the publication of the total number of personnel employed by each agency.

36 The Senate Select Committee has proposed an oversight committee which would have jurisdiction over authorization for national intelligence activities of the United States Government, S. 93--2893.

.., Former Director Colby has argued that publication of the CIA budget would
not aid the public in any way. As he put it, "Knowledge of the Agency budget would not enable the public to make a judgment on the appropriateness of the amount without the knowledge of the product and the ways it is obtained."
(William Colby testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75, p. 123.)
.

36 Congo Rec. S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, Remarks of Senator Proxmire. However, as Senator Pastore noted, if the public figure declined "then the Russians and the Chinese Communists know that we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious." *la,* at S9605.

decrease speculation about the budget and focus the debate on intelligence on more significant issues.39
Finally, the disclosure of any figures on intelligence expenditures might well increase the effectiveness of oversight of the intelligence agencies by both individual members of Congress and by the appropriately charged congressional committees. Members of the House might be encouraged to inspect executive session hearings on intelligence agency budgets; 40 members of the oversight committees of both houses might be spurred to review the proposed budgets more closely, in anticipation of a possible debate on the figures. 41

## D. The Effect Upon National Security Of Varying Levels Of Budget Disclosure

Even given the constitutional requirement, any disclosure of budgetary information on agencies in the Intelligence Community has been strongly resisted. In responding to a proposal for the publication of the total sum budgeted for the. national intelligence community, Senator Stennis noted that:
[I] f it becomes law and is carried out, [it] would, as its practical effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effectiveness of much of our most important work in the field of intelligence.42
And Congressman Burlison told the House that if an amendment which provided for publication of the total figure budgeted for the CIA were adopted, "i [t] will totally paralyze the intelligence community." 43
An examination of the effect on national security of publication of any data on the intelligence community budgets is difficult, in part beCause the examination itself must not be allowed to jeopardize the national security. Given the constitutional guarantee, however, the burden of proof must fall on those who would deny this information to
.. During testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Schlesinger was asked whether there was a good reason for actually publishing a budget figure.

He replied: "Only in that the public debate at the present time covers so wide a range that if you had an official number, the debate would tend to die down and focus on something more significant than whether we're spending $11 billion on intelligence." (James Schlesinger testimony, 2/2/76, p. 54.)
Mr. Schlesinger was later asked whether he thought there was any chance of convincing the American people or the enemy of the truthfulness of any figure that is published, to which Mr. Schlesinger replied: "I do not believe that you could persuade the Soviets that that is a truthful figure, but I am not sure that that is our objective. Whether or not you could persuade the American public, I
think there is a large segment of the American public that would be persuaded. ... " SchleSinger, 2/2/76, p. 56.)
the public. The possible effects on the national security of certain levels of budget dIsclosure are examined below.44

## 1. The Effect On Nation?L Security Of Publication Of The National Intell1Gence Oomrnumty Budget Many I!1Diyiduals Familiar With The Intelligence Community Agree

~h~t publIcatIOn of a gross figure for national intelli!!ence would not m Itse~f, dan:age the national security.

I:>
, DUrIng Ius confir!nation hearings as Director of Central Intelligence' James Schlesmger, former Secretary of Defense and past head
~f tl~e OMB, told Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., in regard to the publIcatIon <?f the gross figure for national intelligence: "I think that the securIty concerns are minimal. The component figures I would be more concer!1ed about but .for t~e gross national intellige~ce program figures, I thmk we could lIve WIth that on a security basis, yes." 45
. Former DCI HelI?-s t?ld the Senate Select Committee that because It .was so larg~, publIcatIOn of a single figure for national intelligence mIght be "satIsfactory." 46
While it p.as b~en s~ggested that the publication of even a total for th~ natIOnal mtelhgence budget would aid our enemies,41 Mr.

,~chlesl1lger to~d the Senate Select Committee that our enemies already know I~l the first place and it's broadly published. All that you would have IS a confirmed official figure for information. That is
.44 There are. many pos~~ble variants of budget disclosure running from the full dIsclosure polIcy governIng such government agencies as the Department of Agric~lture, throug~ the bUdge~ d~sclosure utilized by the FBI and AEe which pro-
VIdes for a specIfic appropnatIOn of funds for "confidential" purposes which are exempted from normal accounting reqUirements, to the possible disclosure of an aggregate figure for each national intelligence agency or for national intelligence as. a 'Y"hole. The Committee has not attempted to analyze the constitutional implIcatIOns and effect on national security of each, but has focused on the disclosure
?f th~ global sum for national intelligence and the aggregate budgets of each Intelhgence agency.

: Q~oted in Congo Re~., S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.

Rlchard Helms testImony, *1130/76,* pp. 36,37. Because the figure is so large the introd~;~ion of expensive. collection systems would not result in a "conspic~
uous b~mp In the budget WhlCh would alert hostile powers to new activities by the Umte~ St:;ttes. For 51 ful1er discussion of this argument and its relationship to the publIcatIon of the CIA's aggregate budget, see pp. 378-381.

John Clarke, a former Comptroller of the CIA and an advisor to DCI Colby was -asked about the effects of publication of the total national intelligence budget and specifically whether publication of the figure would disclose the existence
?of, Or the start of, a high-cost technical collection systf'm. Mr. Clarke responded I have not run the studies on this, but I would be very hard pressed to find' ~
ca.se that I could supPort. The budget figures don't reflect that. They are down.

HIstorically, at. least .they have bE>~n down inside of a larger figure and it doesn't really pop out In a bIg way. And It can be explained away." (John Clarke testimony, 2/5/76, p. 47.)
41 See e.g. p. 376 .

more or less in the public domain anyhow without public confirmation.

without official confirmation." 48
'
Mr. Schlesinger described for the Select Committee the impact of publishing the total national intelligence budget:
I am not so concerned about that from the security aspect as some people are. I'm not sure I recommend it, but I'm not so concerned about it from the security aspect.

It could do some good in that there are some inflated notions around about how much the United States Government is actually spending on intelligence, and if you had an official statement, I think that would put the total amount of expenditures in better context for the public.4sa

13. The Effect on National Seowity of Disclosure of the Total Appropriated to or Expended by Each National Intelligence Agency
Publication of the total of the CIA's budget or of the other agencies'
budgets has also been opposed. In a Freedom of Information Act suit, DCI Colby argued against publication of the Agency's budget total, as follows:
Publication of eieher the CIA budget or the expenditures made by CIA for any given year would show the amounts planned to be expended or in fact expended for objects of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature. This information would be of considerable value to a potentially hostile foreign government. For example, if the total expenditures made by the Agency for any particular year were publicized, these disclosures, when taken with other information publicly available ... would enable such governments to refine their estimates of the activities oia major component of the United States intelligence community, including specifically the personnel strength, technological capabilities, clandestine operational activities, and the extent of the United States Government intelligence analysis and dissemination machinery ....

The subsequent pUblicrution of simiLar daita for 'Other fiscal years . . . would enable a potentially hostile power to refine its estimat.es of trends in the United States Government intelligence efforts.

He continued:
The business of intelligence is to a large extent a painstaking collection of data and the formation of conclusions utilizing a multitude of bits and pieces of information. The revelation of one such piece, which might not appear to be of significance to anyone not familiar with the process of intelligence analy-
<S Schlesinger. 2/2/76. p. 52. Mr. Schlesinger noted that. as the Intelligence Community has "no constituenC'y," it b>ndR to be "blam('d for one t.hing or another," and "if you had an openly publish('d figure . . . there would be pressure within the Congress at budget mark-up time to take a 15 percent or 20 percent whack at it just for good measure and ... there is no way of having a public debate about the merits of intelligence." *lrI.* at 51-52. Mr. Schlesinger's argument implies that Congress as a whole should not be given information because it should not be allowed to exercise its control over the purse.

sis (and which, therefore, might not arguably be said to be damaging to the national security) would, when combined with other similar data, make available ... information of great use and which would result in significant damage to the national security of the United States.

He provided the following example of the impact on the nation's security of publication of the CIA's budget:
If it were learned that CIA expenditures have increased significantly in anyone given year, but that there has beep.

no increase in Agency personnel ( apparent from traffic, cars in the parking lots, etc.) it would be possible to make some reasonable estimates and conclusions to the effect that, for example, CIA had developed a costly intelligence collection system which is technological rather than manpower intensive; and that such system is operational. Knowledge readily availa;bleat the time about reconnaissance aircraft photography, and other technology, can result in a more accurate analysis ,about a new collection system which would enable a potentially hostile power to take steps to counter its effectiveness . . . the development of the U-2 aircraft as an effective collection device wou1d not have been possible if the CIA
budget had been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget u:creased significantl:y during the development phase of that alrcraft. Thrut fact, If publIc, would have aJttractedattention .... If itihad 'been supplemented by knowledge (Iavailable perhaps from technical magazines, industry rumor, or advanced espionage techniques) that funds were being committed to a major aircraft manuacturer and to a manufacturer of sophisticated mapping cameras, the correct conclusion would have been simple to draw. The U.S. manufacturers in question ... would have become high priority intemgence
;targets .... And I'm sure that ,the Soviets would have taken steps earlier to ,acquire a capability to destroy very -highaltitude aircraft. They did indeed take these steps, with eventual success, but only sometime after the 'aircraft 'began operating over their territory-that is, once they had knowledge of a U.S. intelligence project.49
A close examination of Mr. Colby's statement raises a number of questions as to the effecJt of publication of the CIA's aggregate budget.

Although Mr. Colby notes that the CIA's total budget figure would allow governments to "refine their estimates of the activities of a major component of the Un~ted States intelligence community," he provides no evidence of *h010* the publication of this one figure would increase the other government's knowledge of, for example, the clan-
Action No. 75-0676, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Pp. 3-5. Other knowledgeable figures have reached different conclusions about the effect. of publishing the CIA's budget. For example, Elliot Richardson, pre!'ently Secretary of (1ommerce and formerly Secr('tary of Defense, hqs stated that publication of the amount of the CIA's expenditures would not be damaging to the national security.

destine DperatiDnal activities *'Of* the CIA.50 There wDuld, *'Of* CDUrse~
be SDme "refinement" if it were knuwn that the CIA's budget was
$X milliDns rather than $X + 1 milliDns. Such refinement goes 'On at all times, but the questiDn is whether such a gain by hostile powers is sufficient to justify 'Overriding the cDnstitutiQnal reQui~ement tha~ the American peQple be told hDW their funds are spent. Havmg an offiCIally acknDwledged budget tQtal does nut signal tD a hostile PQwer manpuwer levels in the Clandestine Service, let alQne the number *'Of* deep CDver agents. Having an 'Officially acknowledged aggregate figure does not reveal the CQst 'Of a reconnaissance vehicle, let alQne its technical capability.

.

Mr. CDlby has maintained that 'One-time publicatiDn 'Of the total amQunt budgeted for the CIA would set a precedent and that infDnnutiQn revealed thrDugh successive publicatiDn WQuld prDvide hostile pDwers with insights intQ United States intelligence activities.

Of particular importance is Mr. Colby's. claim that successive disclosures 'Of .the CIA's aggregate budget WQuld eliminate the effectiveness *'Of* ma;or technicrt.l cQllection systems like the U-2. A change in the CIA's tQtal budget frDm 'One year to the next may be due tQ a number
'Of faotors: inflatiDn, cutbacks in -activities, 'a major reorganizlatiQn, or long term gains in efficiency, fQr example. Assuming that an increase in the CIA's budget alerted hoStile PQwers to some change in the Agency's activities, it would nQt in itself reveal what the new aotivity was-a new CQvert aetion proiect, mQre materi,al procurement, 'Or an increase in analytical capwbility through mechanizatiQn. For Mr.

CQlby's argument tQ be valid nQt 'Only must the hostile power be able 'accuraJbe.ly tQ determine what the ,activity is--fDr instance, a new reconnaissance system-bnt that power WQuld have tD gain, cQvertly, an enQrmQUS amount 'Of tightly guarded inrormation, sw:~h as the techno-
IQgical capabilities 'Of the vehicle and the surveillance systems which it cDntained.51 It WQuld seem that a hostile PQwer able to gain that informatiQn wouJd be ruble tQ discover t,he total 'Of the CIA's budget, a much mQre widely knQwn figure. The possibility that a hostile power mav pieree all the barriers designed to limit disseminatiQn
'Of clQsely held infDrmatiQn cannQt be used tQ ;ustify denying the American peQple infQrmatiDn which the CDnstitutiDn guarantees them, and which is widely published, and which must be assumed tQ be within the grasp 'Of hostile PQwers.

It is far frQm clear, mDreQVer. that the develQpment and intrDductiQn *'Of* a majQr new system will be annQunced by a change in the Agency's total budget.

The CIA budget may be large enQugh not tQ change substantially when a new system CQmes 'On line. A preliminary analysis *'Of* past CIA
budgets has indicated that majQr new activities have nDt always resulted in "bumps" and that SDme "bumps" in the budget still are nDt
50 Mr. Colby's statement ignores the fact that figures for the CIA budget are already widely publicized. although not officiallY confirmed. In this regard. it is interesting to note that the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its objection to the far more detailed budget diselosure in The OIA and the Oult of IntelUgenoe by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.

~r:r~~iie~ti~~~~~.52 Because *'Of* the impDrtance 'Of expensive techth"
.

b - ms, hDwever, the Select CQmmittee believes that e CQnSpICUDUS ump" argument deserves fulle st d b th f
~::{!g::: ~h~~gigrtt~es,~ Pfirticulfarly in.light .of t.h~ re~ufts If t.h~ p~;bli~
by the Committee. ga e gure 'Or natIOnal IntellIgence recQmmended Finally .. the. claims abDut damage tD the national securit resultin frDm pubhcatlOn of the ao-gregate figure for each . t lr y g must be viewed in the light *'Of* far mDre detailed ~~de c~~~:~i~ge~c~
~Dsure *'Of* the budgets Q.f 'Other a.gencies vital tD the natiDnal sec~~it~
fo nQ~mQus amounts *'Of* InfOrmatIOn have been prDvided tQ the publlc'
At~ri~taE~~r~DC~!~i:i~~ 'Of t~d pelPartmenft *'Of* Defense an~ th~
and d db' e ISC Qsure '0 funds apprDprIated t'
jxpen e 1 these agencies did not and dDes not reveal vltal na ab:t ~hcrets.

s SenatQr Symingt?n noted, "There's nDthing secret G-5A " But '''k costl *iIf* a f~chlear aIrcraft carrier 'Or the CDSt of the th'
nDwe geD
e CDSt does not eaual knQwledO"e *'Of* hQW
edf} W~~fDhs 'Operate Dr how .they ~Quld be utilized." Similariy,knDwl-
1ge
} ~ 'Overall ~Qst *'Of* IntellIgence does nDt in any way entail the rfune eats.e '0
InlfDrmatlOn ~bout how the variDus -intelligence groups c lOn, 'Or p an tQ functIOn." 54

## E. The Argument That Publicatiqn *'Of* Any Infdrmatidn Will Inevitably Result In Demands Fdr Further Infdrmatidn -

lis~i:e 'Opponents *'Of* budget discl.osure., while admitting that pube g agg~egat~llfigures fDr the IntellIgence community Dr intelli ftc~~i~~g;rCIeSh fi nQt h~r~ na~iQnal security, have argued that pub:
d t il A nl!C
gures WIll mevItably lead tQ demands fDr ever mDre g:n~e; s IrectDr Colby tolc1 the HDUse Select CDmmittee 'On Intellie aI.s prQ ably wDuld grDW. What dDes it include 2 What d ryeDver b
, 'Once the budget total is revealed, the demand fDr
~Des It e~clude ~ Why did it gQ up ~ Why did 't d .

2 I
It wDrth It? HQW dQes it wQrk? .

I gQ 'Own. s
52 One series of activities which did b'
Agency's activities in Laos, which we~:u:I~:rlYu~P III ~e CIA's budge! was the U.S. but were kept secret from the Am'
nlown
0 powers hostile to the
53 If encan peop e for many y a new systems would be revealed by "b .".

e rs.

tion other than denying all information on 3~s III td~e CIA's budget a solupeople might be found J
.

expen ItlIres to the American figure could be based ~n :~~~l S~~l\~~:~';en~a~ s~fge~t:1 that the published dollars which could be spent. while obli'
y e rather than on the the years, actual outlays "tend to gatlOns may fluctuate dramatically over
(S~hJeSinger, *2/2176,* p. 55.)
_
move smoothly over a period of years."
117 Congo Rec., p. S42925 remarks of S
S
.

gett o~ the House Armed Se~vices Committ:~' nJ:U:~~' ~s Congressman Leg-
CommIttee Report of about 4000
t
.

e ave a book here, the they talk about the money for th~~~ ~ ~h~ D~p~rtment of Defense in whieh works? The answer is: no.

- -
II ye
0 we know how the SAM-D
"We have the details of the money for Th'l d
..

we know what the money is actually used f
?a~ an , and It IS spelled out. But do
"We can go through the FBI b or .

O.

The answer is: no." (Cong. Rae udi{i37~o~ \hat dtelll0lIs what they are doing?

Leggett.)
."
al y e.,
/1/75, remarks of Rep.

There would be revelations ... which would gradually reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence services tc? concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least hke to attract
. their attention.

.

.

We-and I specifically mean in this instance both Intelhgence professionals and Members of Congress-would h~ve an acute problem when the matter of our budget arose In the floor of the House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would have two unpleasant choi?es--to remain.silent in the face of all questions and allegatIOns, however maccurate, or to attempt to keep the debate on accurate grOlmds by at least hinting at the full story.

.

Mv concern that one revelation will lead to another IS based on more than a "feeling." The atomic weapons bu~get was considered very sensitive, and the Manhattan. ProJect was concealed completely during World War.II. WIth the est~b
lishment of the AEC however, the deciSIOn was made to Include in the 194'7 budget a one-line.item for the weapons account. That limitation was short-hved. By 19'74, a 15-page breakout and discussion of the Atomic Weapons Program was being published. Were the intelligence budget ~o uIl:dergo a similar experience, major aspects of our mtelhgence strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed.55
.

p. ~!~ator McClellan described the consequences of publishing the total budget for national intelligence. "That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to know all the details and how the money is spent. But, if you get the overall figures of one billion dollars or half-a-billion dollars or five billion, or w.hatever, then how are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you Judge or. n:ake .an intelligl'nt judgment on whether that is too much or too little, .whether It IS bemg expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the detaIls? .

.

"How? You cannot know. And, if you receive these figures and If you end thIS
ignorance as to the total amount, next you will want to end the. i~orance as to the different agenCies and how it is spent, an~ t~rough whom It IS spent. Next will want to end the ignorance of what It IS spent for. Nex~ you want to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procurpd. There IS no end to it." (Cong Rec. S9609, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. McClellan:)
.

During the same debate Senator Humphrey noted that 'Yhlle .he d~d not oppose tbe purpose of the disclosure of the total budget for natl?nal mteillgence,
"the problem is it is sort of like loose string or a ball of twme, so. to speak, that starts to unravel." *(ld.* at S9606, remarks of Sen. Humphrey.) Dunng a more recent House debate on the publication of the CIA's budget, Congref'sman !Otlllg described such publicrttion as "the first baby step." (Cong. Rec. H9376, dallyed.,
10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Young.)
As James Schlesinger told the Splect Committee, "But onpof the problems here is the camel's nose under the ed~e of the tent, and I think that th~t is the fundamental problem in the area. There are very few people who ca~ a~tlculately argue tbat the publication of those figures in and of themgelves, If It stopp.ed there would be harmful. The argument is that then the pressure would buIld up t~ do somethhi.g else, that once you have publish~d for example the .. , budget. that the pressures would build up to reveal tbe kmds of systems tIl.at are bemg bought for tbat money, and it is regarded as the first steD down a slIDperY
slope for those who worry' about those kinds of things." (Schlesinger, 2/2/76, p.53.)
Ther~ are several problems with this argument. While there obviously WIll be pressure, the problem as Mr. Helms agreed "is not insuperable." 56 For many years Congress has refused to reveal the figures tor t~e national i~telligence budget and the aggregate budgets of the Intelhgence. agenCIes. It seems ~likely that given this past history, Congre~ WIll suddenly reverse Itself and fail to protect information
~hose dIsclosure w~uld harm the national security. Much more likely IS. that Congress WIll, as Senator Church proposed, "establish very stringe~t rules when it came to handling the money figures." 57
More Importantly, as Congressman Koch noted:
The real fear on bOth sides of the aisle that some have expressed is.' '~Gee, if we do that, that is the first step."
Maybe It IS, but, whatever the second step is, it is what this House wants it to be, and if this House decides that this is the last step, so be it. If the House decides that it wants to have more information it will have to have a vote on it.

What is wrong with that? That is what is called the democratic system. We are sent here to be part of that system. 58
. It is i~structiv~ to note in this context the amount of budgetary InfOrmatIOn prOVIded on the Atomic Energy Commission. That information has constantly ~ncreas~d: Y~t each step of the way, Congress has had the opportumty to lImIt dIsclosure and chose not to. This experience confirms congressional control over the process. More importantly the national security was not harmed by disclosure of a substantial amount of budgetary information about an -agency and a weapons program crucial to the defense of the United States.

Finally, the argument is without limits. It could be used to justify mu?h great~r secrecy. It could be used to justify the withholding of allmformatlOn on the Defense Department because information which the Congress wis~es ~ protect .would _~ threatened by pressures caused by the pubhcatIOn of any rnformatIon on that Department.

## F. The Argument That The United States Should Not Publish Information Of Its I:R.""Telligence Budget Since No Other Govern- Ment In The World Does

. I~ has. also been argued that the United States should not publish Its rntellIgence budget when no other government in the world does. 59
Yet as Congressman Moss noted:
I point out to those Members who do not know the difference between this country and others, and the fact that we
'become un.ique in disclosing this that, thank God, we do become umque. We have grO!W1l great and maintained our strength as an open society and we should continue to be an open society to the maximum consistent with our true security requirements.

I t the Russians 0'1' the Chinese
, I dO' *nDt* w;~~.: ~~~~~: !. the operatiDn Qf t~e variQus Dr even Qur rr.l ts under their QffiCIal secrets agencies Df theIr gye~en to realize the strength that we acts and ather 'areas. wan us d f ad electorate.so gain rDman alert electorate an m Qrm

## G. Summary And Cdnclusidn

-
.

tl vern the Central Intelli-
The budget procedures Whld: presen e~!~lli nee cDmmunity p'regence Agency and Dther agenCIes of t~l as the ~ublic from knD'Ylllg vent most Membe~s of Congress a~f ';;~~e a ncies or even hQW much hQW much m~)lley ~s spent by ant 1 In adltion mQst Members of is spent on mtelhgen~ as a ;
0. e. d ,about the ~pprQpriations and Congress and the pl1bhc 'are ecelve
.

hose bud t'I"OIl-Q are inflated d
f -'-h gQvernment aO"P.]lCles w b V
"':
expen Itures 0
Ot,; er
.

.

o~ mmunit The faIlure to proto conceal funds fQ!" the mtelhgen~ 00
th~ Congre6S prevents vide this illform~tlOn 'tdth.e PUb~I~ti~~ at;:d violates Article 1, Seceither from effectIvely or e;rmg pno t
9 Clause 7 which proVIdes that:
.

IOn ,
'
b t CQnse No MDney shall be. d~awn frDm thL;:~~~d~ r~~u~~r State~
quence Qf ApproprlatIQnS made .by d' E
d;tures 'Of all ent and Account O'f the ReceIpts an.

xpe~ 1

~lblic MQney shall be published frQm tIme to' tIme.
b!"
t"
Qf the aO"o'!'eo-ate figure fQr The CQmmittee finds that, p~ lCa I(n f the cQ:Stit:tiQnal requirenatiDnal intelligence would be~ to' :.a IS {securitv. While substantial ment .and WQul.d nDbt da~ge i t~ ~~l~i;~etween the cQnstitutiQnal requestIOns remam a Qut.

~ re a 10.

the Committee recommends the quirement and the D!atlOnal secunty, fi The CDmmittee alsO' recannual publication Qf the aggreg3:~~eefs~~dy the effects of publis~ng Qmmends that ~ny succ~ssor cQmm h 'bI d ts of the intelligence agenCIes.

more detailed mformatIOn Qn 't e
11 ge

## Xvii. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biologi- Cal Agents By The Intelligence Community

Under its mandate 1 the Select CQmmittee has studied the testing and use Qf chemical and biDIQgical agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed descriptiQns Qf the prQgrams cQnducted by intelligence agencies invO'lving chemical and biQlQgical agents will be included in a separately published appendix *to'* the .senate .select CQmmittee's repQrt. This sectiO'n *O'f* the repO'rt will discuss the ratiO'nale fQr the prO'grams, their mO'nitO'ring and cO'ntrQl, and what the CO'mmittee's investigatiQn has revealed abO'ut the relatiO'nships amO'ng the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other gO'vernment agencies and private institutions and individuals. 2
Fears that countries hostile *to'* the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the develDpment Df a defensive prDgram designed *to'* discDver techniques for American intelligence agencies *to'* detect 'and COlmteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.

Research and developnient programs to find materials which could be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing O'f drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests using unwitting, nQnvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biO'logical agen,ts when used O'perationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug.

The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch 0'1' CQngress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an O'bservatiQn made by the CIA InspectO'r General that, "the knQwledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activiate (Section 2(4) and (8;
"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11 ;
"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13) )."
a The details of these programs may never 'be known. The programs were highly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.