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+158-100-7003 / Counsel a Subordinate
+TSP Number / Title
+09 Jul 2011
+Effective Date
+Supersedes TSP(s) / Lesson(s) TSP Users
+Use this TSP in Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A, Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS), and Warrior Leader Course (WLC)
+Proponent
+158 - Army Leadership (Individual)
+Improvement Comments
+Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028, "Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms".  Completed forms, or equivalent
+response, will be mailed or attached to electronic e-mail and transmitted to:
+Army Training Help Desk Telephone (Commercial): (800) 275-2872 Option # 1 Telephone (DSN):        826-3666 https://athd.army.mil
+None
+Security Clearance / Access Foreign Disclosure Restrictions
+FD3. The materials contained in this training event/course have been reviewed by the training/educational developers in coordination with the [installation/activity name] FD authority. This training event/course is NOT releasable to students from foreign countries.
+
+## Preface Purpose
+
+| Task Number   | Task Title                                             |
+|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| 158-100-4003  | Communicate Effectively at the Direct Leadership Level |
+| 158-100-7003  | Counsel a Subordinate                                  |
+
+## Contents
+
+Preface Lesson 1
+Section I. Administrative Data
+
+Section II. Introduction
+Terminal Learning Objective - Counsel a subordinate
+Section III. Presentation Section IV. Summary Section V. Student Evaluation
+Appendix A - Viewgraph Masters Appendix B - Test(s) and Test Solution(s) (N/A)
+Appendix C - Practical Exercises and Solutions Appendix D - Student Handouts (N/A)

markdown/army/ad2010_02.md

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+## Memorandum For See Distribution Subject: Army Directive 2010-02 (Guidance For Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities)
+
+1. This directive implements Department of Defense (DoD) reporting requirements for death investigations established in Change 1 to DoD Instruction 1300.18 (Department of Defense Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures). It also provides guidance for the redaction of investigation reports of deaths and fatalities that are provided to surviving Families.
+
+2. Commanders will follow the enclosed reporting and redaction procedures conceming a unit- or agency-level investigation into the death or fatality of a Soldier or DoD civilian to ensure that surviving Families are apprised of and updated on any and all ongoing DoD investigations concerning the death or fatality.
+
+3. This directive is effective immediately. The guidance in this directive is applicable to all cases for which the deceased Soldier or DoD civilian is a reportable casualty as outlined in AR 600-8-1 (Army Casualty Program). The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1
+(DAPE-ZA) must approve supplementation of this guidance.
+
+4. These changes will be incorporated into the next revision of AR 600-8-1 .
+5. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 is the proponent for this policy.
+Encl DISTRIBUTION:
+Principal Officials of Headquarters, Departmen of the Army Commander U.S. Army Forces Command U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command U.S. Army Materiel Command U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Central U.S. Army North U.S. Army South
+(CONT)
+
+## Subject: Army Directive 2010-02 (Guidance For Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities)
+
+DISTRIBUTION: (CONT)
+U.S. Army Pacific U.S. Army Africa U.S. Army Special Operations Command Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command Eighth U.S. Army U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9~ Signal Command (Army) U.S. Army Medical Command U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command U.S. Army Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Military District of Washington U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command U.S. Army Reserve Command U.S. Army Installation Management Command Superintendent, United States Military Academy Director, U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center CF:
+Commander, U.S. Army Corrections Command Commander, U.S. Army Accessions Command Chief, General Officer Management Office
+
+## Reporting Requirements And Redacting Investigation Reports Of Deaths And Fatalities Reporting Requirements
+
+Army commanders who initiate or conduct investigations into the cause or circumstances surrounding the death of a Soldier or DoD civilian employee who became a fatality while accompanying military personnel in the field or as a result of military-related action-including AR 15-6 investigations, line of duty investigations, etc.-will immediately notify the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center
+(CMAOC). Use the casualty reporting system for unit-level investigations and directly contact CMAOC at (703) 325-0395 or [email protected] for agency-level investigations. Give CMAOC the:
+
+- Name of the unit, command, or agency conducting the investigation.
+- Type of investigation(s) being conducted.
+- Existence and releasability of reports that have been or will be issued as a result of
+the investigation(s).
+- Unit or command point of contact (POC) and contact information to provide the
+status of completion of the investigation report(s) at 30-day intervals until the report
+is complete.
+- Procedures for Family members to obtain a copy of the completed report(s), to the
+extent such reports may be provided consistent with Title 5, United States Code,
+sections 552 and 552a, and to obtain assistance in receiving a copy of the
+completed report(s), following the additional guidance for unit-level investigations
+(beginning on page 3 of this enclosure).
+- Procedures for Family members to obtain answers to their questions on the
+completed investigation report from a fully qualified representative, in accordance
+with the procedures outlined for unit-level investigations.
+Headquarters, Department of the Army-level proponent agencies will include these reporting requirements in the next revision of applicable regulations or other official publications pertaining to the initiation or conduct of an investigation into the cause or circumstances surrounding the death of a Soldier or 000 civilian employee who became a fatality while accompanying military personnel in the field or as a result of military-related action.
+
+To ensure that the Family is kept fully informed while the investigation is underway, commanders will notify CMAOC (through the casualty reporting system for unit-level investigations and by direct contact for agency-level investigations) of any new factual information leamed through the investigation about the circumstances of death as soon as the information becomes known, even if the investigation is ongoing.
+
+E-mail monthly updates on the progress of the investigation(s) and the estimated completion date(s) to CMAOC at [email protected]. For criminal investigations, U.S. Anmy Criminal Investigation Command (CID) will provide monthly updates to CMAOC. CID may withhold information to protect the due process concems of potential criminal defendants, the Privacy Act concems of other parties, the integrity of the investigation, and the viability of remaining investigation leads.
+
+CMAOC will pass the information updates to the Family's casualty assistance officer
+(CAO) who, in tum, will make sure the Family is kept apprised of all aspects of the investigation(s). The CAO and CID representatives providing information to the Family will coordinate their infonmation before giving any briefings. Additionally, the CAO will help the Family:
+
+- schedule a Fatal Incident Family Brief, when requested, for those categories of
+investigations that require a briefing offer; and
+- request a copy of the investigation report in accordance with the Freedom of
+Infonmation Act (FOIA) for those categories of fatality reports that are not required to
+be offered to the Family as an Qutbrief, or in those cases where the Family declines
+the offer for the Fatal Incident Family Brief.
+When the investigation is completed, commanders who have release authority
+(exclusive of commanders who command Headquarters, Department of the Anmy-Ievel investigative agencies) will e-mail a scanned copy of the unredacted investigation report to CMAOC so that CMAOC can compare the investigation results with the circumstances of the casualty previously reported to the Family. Send unclassified reports to [email protected] and classified reports to [email protected]. In tum, CMAOC will provide all unredacted investigation reports of suspected suicides to the Anmy Suicide Prevention Office. That office will consolidate lessons leamed and disseminate them to the field, as well as to CID and the Office of the Anmed Forces Medical Examiner.
+
+All death investigation or fatality reports (other than those fatal military accident investigation findings that will be briefed in person to the Family by a colonel-level briefer under the provisions of AR 600-34 (Fatal Training/Operational Accident Presentations to the Next of Kin')) will be delivered in person to the appropriate requesting Family member through the CAO. Therefore, if the Family has requested a copy of the investigation report, release authorities must contact the investigation POC
+for CMAOC to coordinate hand delivery of the report through the CAO to the Family.
+
+The Family member requesting a report may waive the requirement for hand delivery.
+
+Once the CAO or CMAOC receives the redacted report of investigation, CMAOC will assume all statutory time requirements for delivering FOIA-requested investigation reports to the Family.
+
+For deployed units and commands, the release authority's letter of transmittal of the report(s) to the Family should include this wording:
+If you have questions about the enclosed report of investigation, please contact the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center, Investigations Section by telephone at (703) 325-0395; bye-mail at [email protected]; or by U.S. mail at CDR, U.S. Army Human Resources Command (AHRC-PDC-M), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332. That office will coordinate with this command to ensure that your questions are promptly answered.
+
+Provide CMAOC with the name and contact information of a knowledgeable field grade officer to serve as the unit or command POC to address any questions the Family may have about the investigation results or processes.
+
+For units and commands that are not deployed, the release authority's letter of transmittal of the report(s) to the Family should include the name and contact information of a knowledgeable field grade officer to serve as the unit or command POC
+who can address questions the Family may have about the investigation results or processes.
+
+For CID investigations, the release authority's letter of transmittal will identify a central POC who can locate and query the investigating agents who handled the incident.
+
+Release authorities will withhold any public release of the results of a death investigation to make sure the Family is informed of those results before public release.
+
+Units and agencies must coordinate with CMAOC to provide the investigation results to the Family before making any public release.
+
+## Unit-Level Redaction Requirements And Guidance For Death Investigation And Fatality Reports Provided To Surviving Family Members
+
+The redaction process is intended to protect the privacy of third parties who may be mentioned in the report and to safeguard information that pertains to national security or that would jeopardize unit operations and the safety of other individuals if made public.
+
+The release authority cannot withhold information merely because it may be emotionally difficult for the surviving Family members to see or hear.
+
+Potentially upsetting information should be segregated from the body of the report and made available in a separate sealed envelope that is clearly marked as potentially upsetting information. Examples of such content include suicide notes, accusations against Family members by the deceased individual or third parties, photographs or gruesome descriptions of the death scene, and any other content that the release authority deems to be potentially upsetting to the surviving Family members.
+
+Before providing the investigation report(s) to the Family, make sure the report(s) is redacted in accordance with FOIA provisions by individuals with appropriate expertise in FOIA redaction requirements. Refer those sections of an investigation report that were generated by other agencies to those agencies for a release determination. For example, CID reports should be referred to the CID FOIA officer, and medical reports should be referred to the U.S. Army Medical Command FOIA officer.

markdown/army/ar12-7.md

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+Security Assistance and International Logistics
+
+## Security Assistance Teams
+
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 23 June 2009
+
+## Summary Of Change Ar 127 Security Assistance Teams
+
+This major revision, dated 23 June 2009--
+
+o Expands responsibilities of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for
+Defense Exports and Cooperation (para 1-4b).
+o Limits the Security Assistance Team duration to a period not to exceed 3 years
+(para 3-2).
+o Modifies procedures for requesting and approving permanent change of station
+and temporary duty teams (chaps 3 and 4).
+o Makes administrative changes (throughout).
+23 June 2009
+
+# Effective 23 July 2009
+
+## Security Assistance And International Logistics Security Assistance Teams
+
+this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without the prior approval from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology) (SAALZA), 1777 North Kent Street, Suite 8200, Arlington, Virginia 22209.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense E x p o r t s  &  C o o p e r a t i o n  ( S A A L - N P ) , 1777 North Kent Street, Suite 8200, Arlington, Virginia 22209.
+
+H i s t o r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i s  a  m a j o r revision.
+
+S u m m a r y .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  i m p l e m e n t s changes in procedures and responsibilities for security assistance teams.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+
+The proponent of this regulation is Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology). The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations.
+
+The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through t h e i r  h i g h e r  h e a d q u a r t e r s  t o  t h e  p o l i c y proponent. Refer to AR 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+Distribution. This regulation is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and/or E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.
+
+Army management control process.
+
+This regulation contains management cont r o l  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  A R 112, but it does not identify key management controls that must be evaluated.
+
+## S U P P L E M E N T A T I O N .  S U P P L E M E N T A T I O N  O F
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Department of the Army civilians and contracted employees serving on teams deployed by the U.S. Army.
+
+## Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1 General, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
+Responsibilities - 14, page 1 Scope - 15, page 4
+Chapter 2 General Security Assistance Team Administration, page 4
+General - 21, page 4
+Security Assistance Team command relationships - 22, page 4
+Security Assistance Team Chief - 23, page 5
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Security cooperation officer or designated security cooperation representative (incountry) - 24, page 5 U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization - 25, page 7 Selection of personnel - 26, page 7 Language requirements/interpreter support - 27, page 7 Country and area clearances - 28, page 7 Passports and visas - 29, page 7
+Civilian clothing - 210, page 7
+Mission-related travel - 211, page 8 Pre-deployment team activities - 212, page 8 Support for security assistance teams - 213, page 8 Mission funding - 214, page 8 Disclosure of classified information - 215, page 9 Medical services for team personnel - 216, page 9 Correspondence - 217, page 9 Personnel evaluation reports - 218, page 9 Reports - 219, page 9 Relationships - 220, page 10 U.S. Army Aviation Team - 221, page 10 Non-United States equipment - 222, page 10 Military justice jurisdiction - 223, page 10
+Chapter 3 Permanent Change of Station Teams, page 10
+General - 31, page 10 Permanent change of station security assistance team request and authorized use - 32, page 11
+Permanent change of station team process - 33, page 11
+Request for team continuation - 34, page 12 Support requirements and authorized Family members - 35, page 12
+Overseas tour lengths - 36, page 12
+Team members and authorized dependents legal status - 37, page 13
+Pre-deployment activities - 38, page 13 Permanent change of station orders - 39, page 13 Flight physicals - 310, page 14
+Chapter 4 Temporary Duty Teams, page 14
+General - 41, page 14 Temporary duty security assistance team request and authorized use - 42, page 15
+Drawdown decision security assistance team requirements - 43, page 16 Family members - 44, page 16 Temporary duty orders - 45, page 16 Pre-deployment activities - 46, page 16 Team members legal status - 47, page 16
+Chapter 5 Contractor-Staffed Teams, page 17
+General - 51, page 17 Provisions specific to contractors - 52, page 17
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 18
+B.
+Permanent Change of Station Team Dates and Actions, page 19
+C.
+Temporary Duty Team Dates and Actions, page 20
+D.
+Format for Security Assistance Team Request/Call-up, page 21
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+E.
+Instructions and Format for Security Assistance Team Effectiveness Evaluation, page 23
+F.
+Format for Quarterly Assessment Report, page 25
+G.
+Operation Reporting3 Report Procedures and Format, page 26
+
+## Figure List
+
+Figure 11: Types of security assistance teams, page 3
+Figure 12: Criteria for team composition, page 4 Figure 31: Initial and continuation request for PCS teams, page 13
+Figure 41: Initial and extension requests for TDY teams, page 15 Figure D1: Team Request Memorandum (TRM), page 21 Figure D2: Format for submitting request for TRM, page 22 Figure D2: Format for submitting request for TRM- continued, page 23 Figure F1: Quarterly assessment format, page 25 Figure G1: OPREP-3 Report Procedures & Format, page 26 Figure G1: OPREP-3 Report Procedures & Format-continued, page 27 Figure G1: OPREP-3 Report Procedures & Format-continued, page 28
+
+## Glossary
+
+11. Purpose This regulation establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for providing U.S. Army Security Assistance Teams (SAT) to foreign governments and international organizations under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act as amended. This regulation also defines types of SAT teams (fig 11), discusses the process for requesting, programming, deploying teams, highlights quality of life and mission sustainment issues associated with team deployment. The SAT consists of U.S. Military, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, or contractor personnel, deployed to a foreign country on temporary duty (TDY) less than 180 days, or permanent change of station (PCS)/ temporary change of station (TCS) more than 179 days status. An exception to this would be deployment in continental United States (CONUS) to support training on major equipment purchases.
+
+## 12. References Required And Related Publications And Prescribed And Referenced Forms Are Listed In Appendix A. 13. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms Abbreviations And Special Terms Used In This Regulation Are Explained In The Glossary.
+
+14. Responsibilities a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology). The ASA (ALT) acts for the Secretary of the Army (SA) in team policy matters.
+
+b. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation. The DASADE&C discharges ASA (ALT) responsibilities for SAT and will
+(1) Develop, coordinate, and promulgate Army-wide SA policy, including the development of Army-wide input to specific country SA programs in support of Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) missions.
+
+(2) Exercise policy responsibility for SAT under international military education and training (IMET); Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and other applicable authority as directed by the Department of Defense (DOD).
+
+(3) Receive, staff, and serve as final HQDA decision authority for resourcing requests for Army SAT from authorized command and agencies.
+
+(4) Request and coordinate with Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G3/5/7 for tasking responsible Army for approved SAT agencies and commands for execution.
+
+(5) Return disapproved requests to the requesting command or agency. (6) Be the final decision authority on discrepancies that occur between U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
+(TRADOC) and AMC on letter of request (LOR) and letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) issues.
+
+(7) Use this regulation in conjunction with AR 121 and AR 1215 for guidance in budgeting and programming. c. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The TRADOC will
+(1) Serve as the Army lead command for the operation, development, offer and execution of security cooperation training LOAs (LOA are also called cases).
+
+(2) Serve as the Army lead for the management and mission execution of HQDA approved SATs.
+
+( 3 )  T a s k  T R A D O C ,  C O N U S  A r m y  C o m m a n d s  ( A C O M s )  ( l e s s  U . S .  A r m y  S p e c i a l  O p e r a t i o n s  C o m m a n d
+(USASOC)) and other Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) to provide personnel, supplies, and equipment to countries and/ or to task training support materiel program of instruction (POI), and foreign disclosure in according with HQDA taskings.
+
+(4) Provide centralized financial management and distribution of FMS and IMET program training funds for all operating agencies and training providers.
+
+(5) As required, provide case/program funding to combatant commands (COCOMs) or Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) that resource SAT from their internal assets.
+
+(6) Maintain security cooperation training execution data sufficient to reply to standard request for information
+(RFI).
+
+(7) Maintains a capability to contract Army SAT. (8) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements. d. Army Materiel Command. The AMC will
+(1) Serve as the Army lead for the operation and execution of security assistance materiel LOA. (2) Coordinate and advise TRADOC for training request to support United States Army-procured equipment. (3) Serve as the Army central manager for all approved Army SA cases and exercise sole source approval for contracted Army SA training requirements.
+
+(4) Develop, plan, deploy, and support all new equipment training (NET), quality assurance teams (QAT), calibration teams, repair and return teams.
+
+(5) Coordinate all Army security assistance training team requirements with TRADOC during LOA development, except as listed in (4), above.
+
+(6) Before conducting training, provide Airworthiness assessment and certification for SA flight training when host nation aircraft will be flown by U.S. DOD/contractor personnel. Provide funding by case or other Government sources.
+
+(7) Provide timely response, and comply with tasking suspense and requirements from HQDA, DCS, G3/5/7
+designated SAT lead. If unable to support outside continental United States (OCONUS) SAT missions under this regulation, must respond to lead agent by memorandum signed by a general officer.
+
+(8) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements. e. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7. The DCS, G3/5/7 will ( 1 )  S e t  A r m y  p o l i c y  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  c o o p e r a t i o n  t o  e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  S e c r e t a r y  o f  D e f e n s e Guidance.
+
+(2) Develop, coordinate, and publish the Army Security Cooperation Plan and the Army Campaign Support Plan. (3) Receive, assess, and provide DCS, G3/5/7 position for Army security assistance team requests. (4) At the request of DAS DE&C, tasks HQDA, Army Commands, and DRU as appropriate for the sourcing and support to TRADOC for execution of approved Army SAT.
+
+(5) For HQDA approved Reserve Component and National Guard sourced teams, coordinates temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) funding for non-FMS (cash) SAT.
+
+f. Deputy Chief of Staff, G1. The DCS, G1 will (1) Participate in the HQDA review and approval process for Army security assistance team requests. (2) Provide guidance throughout the Army on the availability and provision of military (except Army Medical Department officers) and DA civilians to support PCS SAT.
+
+(3) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements. g. The Chief, Army Reserve. The CAR will
+(1) As directed by the DCS, G3/5/7, identify and activate Security Assistance Training Management Organization
+(SATMO) Soldiers to execute SAT missions in accordance with AR 135210.
+
+(2) Coordinate with TRADOC G3/ Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA) and other Army agencies to fund temporary tours of Active Duty (TTAD) funding and travel costs.
+
+(3) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements. h. The Chief, National Guard Bureau. The CNGB will
+(1) As directed by DCS, G3/5/7, identify and activate National Guard Soldiers to execute SAT mission in accordance with AR 135210.
+
+(2) Coordinate with SATMO and other Army agencies to fund TTAD and travel costs. (3) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements. i. The Surgeon General. The Surgeon General will
+(1) Participate in the HQDA review and approval process for Army medical SAT requests. (2) Assist and provide guidance to TRADOC regarding HQDA approved medical team missions, composition, and training support requirements based on the SAT request.
+
+(3) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements.
+
+j. The United States Army Corps of Engineers. The COE will be the overall supervisor and coordinator for all engineering activities associated with, and in support of, assigned security cooperation programs and projects.
+
+k. Army Service Component Commands.
+
+(1) Receive, review, and assess requests for Army SAT and recommend to the COCOM for approval, disapproval or execution within ASCC assets.
+
+(2) If the COCOM approves internal ASCC execution, coordinate any requirements external to the ASCC. For external funding, coordinate with the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) and TRADOC.
+
+(3) For ASCC-executed teams, the ASCC is responsible for all team preparation, pre-deployment, team support and re-deployment requirements.
+
+l. Other Army Commands, Army Staff agencies, and Direct Reporting Units. For HQDA DCS, G3/5/7 designated SAT lead tasking will
+(1) Provide military and DA civilian SAT members who meet qualifications specified in the taskings, and afford them sufficient time, guidance, and support to prepare for their OCONUS missions.
+
+(2) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements.
+
+15. Scope a. This regulation authorizes the SAT to conduct training, education, and assistance to the Security Assistance (SA)
+community. The completion of the SAT missions contributes to the U.S. security interests and building partnership capacity objective. This training is conducted within the CONUS, primarily at military training facilities and outside the CONUS by mobile education or training teams and at selected U.S. facilities overseas.
+
+b. This regulation covers the types of SAT and provides the policy and procedures of mission execution of SAT.
+
+Chapter 2 contains all administrative data relevant to all types of SAT. Chapter 3 covers issues specific to PCS teams. Chapter 4 covers issues specific to TDY teams, and chapter 5 covers issues specific to contract field service (CFS) teams.
+
+c. This regulation will be used in conjunction with the DOD 5105.38M (SAMM), AR 121, and AR 1215 for guidance in budgeting and programming and does not apply to Army Title X programs.
+
+## Chapter 2 General Security Assistance Team Administration
+
+21. General This chapter provides administrative information applicable to all SAT.
+
+a. Except for Army Service Component Command executed teams, HQDA will approve all security assistance training. For HQDA approved teams, TRADOC is the primary execution agent. For TRADOC executed teams, TRADOC is given tasking authority to fill teams from supporting ACOMs and DRU. Final approval authority and conflict resolution resides with the ASA ALT (DASA DE&C).
+
+b. Prohibited security assistance team activities. The SAT shall not engage in or provide assistance or advice to foreign forces in a combat situation. Additionally, SAT will not perform operational duties of any kind except as may be required in the conduct of on-the-job training in the operation and maintenance of equipment, weapons, or supporting systems. The SAT shall not perform SCO functions or be used to augment the SCO, except where specifically authorized by the host country in the LOA. Teams will not perform follow-on retraining or advisory roles, except in rare instances when the recipient country cannot provide qualified personnel from its own resources or hire qualified personnel from non-indigenous sources, or the SCO recommends it as in the best interest of the United States.
+
+22. Security Assistance Team command relationships a. The Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission through the SCOs, oversees SAT in-country activities to ensure that the SAT receives required administrative and logistical support for mission accomplishment. The SCO is required to monitor SAT and host nation activities to ensure that the stated mission is accomplished, and that the SAT is not diverted from its specified mission for activities or purposes outside the specific terms of the LOA, governing statutes, or other legal agreements.
+
+b. The SCO is responsible for coordinating the teams' activities to ensure compatibility with other DOD elements in or directly related to other ongoing in-country activities. The SCO ensures compliance with directives and keeps the Combatant Commander informed of SAT activities and progress. The SCO will identify problems and recommend solutions to the SATMO.
+
+23. Security Assistance Team Chief The SAT chief is the senior team member and assigns duties and responsibilities to team personnel. In accordance with the Security Assistance Management manual (SAMM), paragraph C11.13.4.1 the SAT chief is under the operational oversight of the SCO while in-country and is an integral part of the SCO in support of the overall SA mission. The team chief is responsible to the SATMO for the accomplishment of the SAT technical and/or training mission. Ensure Security Assistance Team chief is adequately trained. Responsibilities to supervise military, DOD civilian (General Schedule, National Security Personnel System, and other) and contracted personnel.
+
+a. Before deployment, communicate directly with the SCO to obtain additional information required to prepare for deployment and to successfully complete the mission.
+
+b. Prepare and execute the mission and be responsible for actions of team members. c. Work closely with the SCO to resolve any problems that may develop while in country. The team chief will report problems that cannot be resolved in country to SATMO commander. The SATMO will refer problems that it cannot resolve to other appropriate commands or agencies for resolution.
+
+d. Enforce force protection measures throughout the mission. e. Ensure SAT personnel are not used by the foreign country for purposes beyond the scope of the approved mission statement. The SAT personnel will not provide office services, chauffeuring services, messenger services, or services of a purely personal nature. Teams will not augment the SCO or the U.S. Embassy. If the team chief determines that the team's mission has been altered, he will prepare an objective assessment of the situation by message or memorandum to TRADOC/SATMO, with copy of the assessment to the SCO.
+
+f. Maintain property accountability and use properly in accordance with procedures established by SATMO, DOD
+and United States Army regulations.
+
+g. Take appropriate measures to ensure the SAT case-funded property is appropriately controlled and transferred to the foreign country representative or follow-on SAT.
+
+h. Manage and maintain proper accountability of all in-country support funds in accordance with SATMO policy, DOD and Army regulations. Provide monthly reports of fund use to SATMO.
+
+i. Provides quarterly assessments to the SCO. Upon completion of the mission, and before departing country, brief SCO authorities and appropriate country team leadership and complete a mission after action report in the format at appendix E. The team chief will present the original to the SCO before leaving the country and a copy to SATMO. When completing the report while in country is not possible, complete the report no later than (NLT) 30 days from redeployment.
+
+24. Security cooperation officer or designated security cooperation representative (incountry)
+The SCO exercises operational oversight and provides administrative and logistical support to the in-country SAT and is responsible for coordinating the teams' activities to ensure compatibility with other ongoing activities in country under the oversight of the United States diplomatic mission. The SCO
+a. Assists foreign countries in planning and programming SAT requirements, submitting validated requirements to appropriate agencies, administering approved programs in country and determining required skills and the duration of the assistance, consistent with the coordinated country's objectives.
+
+b. Evaluates the request for training assistance by the foreign government, validates the request, and ensures conformance with U.S. policy and compliance with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38, in coordination with the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission. This specifically includes increases and decreases to team sizes or durations.
+
+c. Makes recommendations concerning SAT. d. The SCO-developed annual country combined education and training plan (CETP) to identify future SAT
+requirements and provide the Army long lead-time planning notification.
+
+e. As specific SAT requirements solidify, as far in advance as possible, prepares a draft form team request memorandum (TRM) for coordination with the COCOM, ASCC and or TRADOC/SATMO.
+
+f. In accordance with timelines at figures 31 and 41, submits final TRM for specific SAT for validation by the COCOM and Army decision. (See app D.)
+g. Coordinates possible Special Operations Forces (SOF) SAT in accordance with paragraph 32b for PCS or paragraph 42e(4) for temporary duty (TDY).
+
+h. Performs initial planning and coordination of in-country SAT activities.
+
+i. Conducts and completes vetting requirements on all trainees prior to training, to ensure they meet prerequisites outlined in DOD/Department of State (DOS) policies and regulations, and maintains required trainee documentation.
+
+j. Enforces the chief of mission's weapons policy for SAT. k. Notifies the Combatant Commander and SATMO within 24 hours of the arrival and departure of the SAT
+members and dependents.
+
+l. Orients SAT personnel thoroughly on (as a minimum): training objectives; organization and capabilities of the forces to be trained; terms of reference; legal status in relation to the foreign country; political situation; history, culture and customs of the country; guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel; currency control; logistics and administrative support international cooperative administrative support services (ICASS), general support office (GSO), civilian personnel office (CPO), and so forth); threat level, force protection, individual and collective security requirements, and ROE as appropriate, within 24 hours of their arrival in country.
+
+m. Deliberately and specifically evaluates the need to arm SAT members, and if so, coordinates with the in-country diplomatic leadership and the COCOM. States clearly in the TRM, all related rules of engagement (ROE) and force protection considerations.
+
+n. Ensures each SAT performs only the missions specified in the TRM. Strongly emphasizes to the country requesting a SAT that the purpose of the team is to provide training or technical assistance and instruction only and not to provide administrative support or labor-intensive technical assistance such as installation or repair of equipment. Security Assistance Team personnel will not provide office services, chauffeuring services, messenger services, or services of a purely personal nature.
+
+o. Provides or arranges in-country support (for example, medical/dental support) for SAT personnel and family members.
+
+p. Coordinates with the SATMO commander prior to taking any unfavorable personnel action on a SAT member.
+
+Prepares a full report and forwards to SATMO commanders (for example, team personnel relieved for cause).
+
+q. Establishes policy and procedures for the accountability and use of team property. Ensures the team chief establishes supply and/or equipment accountability records that provide a complete audit trail from item acquisition to disposal, and that all non-expendable, durable property costing $50.00 or more is recorded on a property record.
+
+r. Periodically reviews team property and inventory records for accuracy. Maintains continuous in-country accountability by conducting a physical inventory prior to team and/or team chief departure from country. As a minimum, conducts an annual 100 percent physical inventory for all PCS teams.
+
+s. Ensures SAT case-funded property is appropriately controlled and transferred to foreign country representatives or to follow-on SAT.
+
+t. Acquaints the SAT personnel with specific U.S. Embassy requirements to make certain that security violations do not occur.
+
+u. Assists SAT personnel in receiving, dispatching, storing, and safeguarding military information, including classified information.
+
+v. Ensures SAT personnel have quarters in accordance with U.S. Embassy policy. Reviews residential leases to ensure quarters are appropriate for rank and dependent status of team members and comply with DOD and DOS standards. Ensures each lease request is submitted to the Embassy Interagency Housing Board for approval prior to signature by the appropriate contracting officer. If higher headquarters approval is required, ensure Embassy Interagency Housing Board reviews request before forwarding lease to the implementing agency.
+
+w. Submits a request to SATMO when a replacement for a SAT member is required, the reasons for the replacement and a recommended timeline to replace the SAT member.
+
+x. Submits all personnel actions for SAT members to SATMO. y. Oversees SAT in-country operational funds. z. At least monthly, the SCO or their designated representative will review the teams' monthly advice of obligation authority (AOA) report, ensuring they are adequately protected. Ensures all cash management is in accordance with U.S. Embassy budget and fiscal procedures. Assists SAT chief in establishing procedures with the Embassy for payroll support of any Foreign Service employees hired to support the SAT.
+
+(1) Ensures completion of quarterly assessments and forwards to DASADE&C. Ensures completion of the SAT
+after action report (AAR) (see app E) by the team chief, preferably before the team's departure from the country, but not later than 30 days after.
+
+(2) Performs surveillance and quality control as the Government point of contact for contractor-staffed teams; sends requests for revisions, cancellations and terminations to SATMO in a timely manner to minimize or avoid penalties.
+
+(3) For a contract SAT, ensures all support specified in the contract is provided to the SAT. The American Embassy does not provide logistical or administrative support for a contract team, unless it is expressly specified in the contract.
+
+(4) Establishes procedures to review all team TDY and approves requests for in and out-of-country travel. (5) Reviews SAT team chief's request for annual funding prior to submission to SATMO. (6) Provides to SATMO and the combatant commander a list of recommended and/or required quality of life (QOL)
+and/or mission sustainment (MS) items to be included in the LOA. Reviews all purchase requests for items required to execute the missions and ensures that all QOL and MS items are authorized by the LOA. Ensures that commercial vendor discussions and purchases are made through a United States Government contracting office.
+
+(7) Ensures all host nation trainees are properly vetted prior to training execution and preferably prior to SAT arrival in country.
+
+(8) The SCO in conjunction with the country is responsible for the aircraft air worthiness certification in accordance with AR 7062.
+
+25. U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization Implements the OCONUS portion of the Commanding General of TRADOC's training missions. Plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain and redeploy CONUS-based SATs to execute OCONUS Security Assistance missions in support of Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, Combatant Command's Theater Security Cooperation Plan and Ambassadors' Mission Performance Plans. Manage all financial transactions in support of SATs. For HQDA approved and DCS, G3/5/7 tasked SAT, TRADOC, through SATMO, is delegated tasking authority to further task lateral United States Army Commands, except SOC, and Direct Reporting Units for TDY teams, and Human Resources Command (HRC) for PCS teams. In addition, SATMO can request team members for both PCS and TDY teams from Army Reserves, National Guard, the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and other U.S. government entities such as the Coast Guard. The SATMO commander is authorized to enter into a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the country for the purpose executing SAT missions.
+
+26. Selection of personnel a. The furnishing command (HRC, ACOM, or DRU) will ensure Soldiers selected for SAT duties have the experience, technical ability, maturity, and personality to accomplish their duties in the best interests of the United States. Accordingly, furnishing organizations will select only the best-qualified for this duty. Consistent with countryspecified requirements, gender, race, ethnicity, religion and other factors bearing no relation to mission performance will not be selection criteria. Commanders will
+(1) Make maximum effort to select personnel who meet the desirable, as well as mandatory, qualifications. (2) Select personnel who are highly qualified in their respective fields. They should be the best available who meet all other qualifications.
+
+(3) Select personnel who are capable of working with others and have demonstrated their abilities to train and supervise effectively and conscientiously.
+
+(4) Ensure selected personnel are fully qualified for overseas deployment before departing home station. (5) Schedule selected SAT members for school as required to meet special qualifications for the mission. (6) Select team members who are medically fit to perform duty with the SAT in the designated country. Personnel with known physical disorders that may require medical attention or hospitalization will not be selected.
+
+(7) Select Soldiers with enough time remaining in their service before separation or retirement to complete the required period of their contract.
+
+b. Commander, SATMO, exercises final approval authority for all SAT members, and will ensure that all SAT
+members meet the qualifications of the TRM.
+
+27. Language requirements/interpreter support The TRM may indicate a desire for language capability, but will not state a mandatory requirement. Furnishing organizations will to the extent possible, furnish team members with requested foreign linguistic ability. If team members with linguistic ability are not available, the SCO must coordinate for the necessary interpreter support to meet mission requirements.
+
+## 28. Country And Area Clearances The Satmo Will Process Requests For Theater Or Area Clearances As Specified In Dodd 4500.54.
+
+29. Passports and visas Upon SATMO selecting the SAT members, they will submit passport and visa applications through their home station passport agencies. The SATMO will provide specific instructions and assistance with processing passport and visa requests.
+
+210. Civilian clothing An initial clothing allowance, in accordance with AR 70084, chapter 8, may be authorized when civilian clothing is required for mission accomplishment. Civilian clothing requirements must be stated in the TRM under uniform and clothing requirements. Costs, when approved, will be paid from case or program funds. The SATMO will validate the requirement and will process the civilian clothing allowance request.
+
+211. Mission-related travel The SATMO will issue travel instructions and provide funding information to team members for all mission-related travel.
+
+212. Pre-deployment team activities a. The SATMO will orient team members before departure for overseas assignment. The SATMO will designate a location for the SAT members to assemble to
+(1) Confirm that the persons selected are capable of performing the mission. (2) Familiarize the team with the SAT mission. (3) Permit SAT members to become acquainted with each other and to form a cohesive training unit. (4) Obtain orientation on the history and culture of the country and the organization and capabilities of the forces to be trained.
+
+(5) Review training material or equipment to be used and set up methods of instruction. (6) Prepare the program of instruction and lesson plans, and collect and prepare training aids. (7) Review terms of reference and rules of engagement, if applicable. b. All SAT members deployed OCONUS under the SA program must attend the Security Assistance Training Team Orientation Course (SATTOC) at Fort Bragg, NC. This training exposes SAT members to training on anti-terrorism, survival, escape, resistance, and evasion techniques (SERE), country intelligence/threat orientation, country-specific cross cultural considerations, medical and legal conditions of the country, counter-surveillance and driving techniques. The Commander, SATMO is authorized to waive attendance at SATTOC for individual SAT members when circumstances dictate. Should the combatant commander, or the host country team request that the entire team not attend SATTOC, a request with justification will be forwarded through Commander SATMO to TRADOC G3 for decision.
+
+c. The SATMO will provide the following information to the SCO prior to the SAT deploying to the country. (1) Estimated time of departure from CONUS. (2) Estimated time of arrival in the host country. (3) Travel/flight information.
+
+213. Support for security assistance teams a. Unless otherwise provided, SATMO, in coordination with TRADOC G-3/SATFA, the SCO, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, and other appropriate agencies, will ensure mission support of the SAT. The SCO must identify team support items in the SAT TRM. Such support will be fully reimbursable in accordance with the LOA. Mission support items that will be consumed or turned over to the country at mission completion, that is, training aids, publications, training equipment and materials, must be purchased using case/program funds. When the SAT is completed, the SCO will transfer all items purchased with case funds in support of the SAT mission to the host nation in accordance with the SAMM (DOD 5105.38M). The level and quality of support provided to SAT members shall be equivalent to that provided to other in-country DOD personnel of equivalent grade.
+
+b. Equipment and support materials required to support IMET-funded SAT must be approved prior to use of IMET
+funds. Requests for waiver to use IMET funds must be forwarded to DSCA. Such requests should be included with the initial IMET waiver request for the SAT, if possible. See AR 1215, chapters 4 and 13 for additional information concerning IMET-funded SAT and use of IMET funds to purchase SAT support materiel.
+
+c. Quality of life items may be purchased in accordance with AR 1215, chapter 13 and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) policies. Prior approval by the country SCO and Combatant Command is required before QOL items can be purchased. The IMET funds will not be used for the purchase of QOL items. The QOL items are not authorized for TDY SAT.
+
+d. The SCO must ensure that all host nation equipment on which training or technical assistance is to be conducted is available and operational, and that necessary tools, equipment, and facilities for operations and on-the-job training (OJT) are readily available at the training site. The team will not deploy until these conditions are met. The furnishing command may agree, in some instances, to provide limited specialized support items for team use. Such support is coordinated on a case-by-case basis.
+
+e. The host country will furnish necessary interpreter support or fund this support in accordance with the LOA.
+
+214. Mission funding The TRADOC G3/SATFA centrally manages all OCONUS training case funds and other SA program funds for HQDA approved SAT.
+
+a. For IMET-funded SAT, the SCO and/or Combatant Commander will get DSCA approved waiver prior to submitting the TRM to HQDA. See DOD 5105.38.M (SAMM) for waiver format.
+
+b. The DOD Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) and DOD Counter Narcotics Program (CNP) funded teams require HQDA approval for personnel sourcing and DCS, G3/5/7 tasking to TRADOC for execution.
+
+c. The TRADOC provides pricing and availability (P&A) data to the SCO, and the SCO provides that information to the host country.
+
+d. The TAFT/ETSS LOA will specify any support costs to be incurred by designated supporting activities in accordance with DOD 7000.14R, Vol 15. Supporting organizations will be reimbursed from the LOA for such costs.
+
+e. The LOA, TRM, type of funds or other agreements will determine which expenses the foreign government will bear as mission cost elements. These expenses may include
+(1) Personnel pay, allowances, and differentials. (2) Special training of personnel needed to satisfy peculiar requirements of the SAT. (3) Transportation and full range of support. (4) Temporary duty travel. (5) Training aids, supplies, and equipment needed for mission sustainment and QOL items that the LOA or SAT
+request/call-up message specify.
+
+(6) Foreign national personnel, and/or local hires in accordance with U.S. Embassy policies. (7) Department of State ICASS Expenses. (8) The AOA is a financial instrument, which allows a team to establish a "line of credit" with the in-country financial officer at the U.S. Embassy (or USMTM in the case of Saudi Arabia) to pay for authorized expenses. Team chiefs will be issued an AOA and will be responsible for authorizing expenditures. You may delegated daily custodianship to a team member, but delegation must be in writing with prior coordination with the SATMO Resource Management Office (RMO). A copy of the memorandum is to be forwarded to the U.S. Embassy and the SATMO RMO. The team chief must retain and maintain receipts for all expenses incurred against the AOA for five years in electronic media form. Identify any doubtful or specific situations not covered by this memorandum to the SATMO RMO for further guidance or clarification. The team chief is responsible for the accountability of funds issued.
+
+215. Disclosure of classified information Should the HQDA approved SAT mission include the use of U.S. classified information, TRADOC will obtain disclosure authorization preferably before the SAT deploys, but definitely before training begins. In such cases, SCO must ensure the recipients of classified information are properly cleared.
+
+216. Medical services for team personnel a. The LOA or other appropriate agreements will contain a standard note on medical and dental care. b. The U.S. Embassy's regional medical officer will make any referral decisions. When time permits they should contact the U.S. Embassy physician for a referral.
+
+c. If a military team member requires routine or emergency health and dental services and does not have ready access to the U.S. Embassy health or if the services required are not available at the health unit, the LOA authorizes the government to pay all costs incurred for medical and dental care.
+
+217. Correspondence All significant communications concerning SAT will include as addressees the SCO, Combatant Command, ASCC, TRADOC G3/SATFA/SATMO, furnishing command (for all TDY SAT), and ASA(ALT) (SAALZN) as information or action addressees, as appropriate.
+
+218. Personnel evaluation reports a. The SCO, in coordination with Commander, SATMO, will establish an officer evaluation report/noncommissioned officer evaluation report rating scheme, and provide it to the military team members immediately upon their arrival in country. The SCO will report initial rating chain information and changes as they occur to Commander SATMO.
+
+b. Unless otherwise stated in memorandum of understanding (MOU)/MOA, Commander USASATMO will be included in the rating scheme of SAT chiefs.
+
+c. For all Army SAT's greater than 90 days in duration, the military members will receive ratings per the rating scheme at the intervals specified by AR 6233 and the suspense established by USA SATMO HRM. For any assistance, the SCO should contact Chief, SATMO HRM.
+
+219. Reports
+a. The operation reporting (OPREP) 3- Serious Incident Report. b. Monthly Situation Reports, appendix F. c. The SAT chief will submit a quarterly assessment reports to Commander SATMO (see app F). d. Upon completion of an OCONUS SAT assignment, the team chief will prepare an AAR in accordance with
+appendix E on the effectiveness of the training or technical assistance rendered, and submits the original report to the SCO before the SAT returns to CONUS.
+(1) The SCO will endorse and forward the AAR to the Combatant Command and HQDA, furnishing a copy to
+SATMO, SATFA and to SATMOSAC. The endorsement will address any problems or make recommendations within the SCO's purview, and will evaluate the team's overall effectiveness and performance.
+
+(2) The SCO will forward a copy of the team's evaluation and the after-action report through the Combatant Command and the service component headquarters to SATMO with information copies to SATFA and SATMOSAC.
+
+(3) Addressees will take action, as required, when the comments of the SCO and combatant commands are received. e. The SCO is encouraged to make progress reports on team performance to Commander, SATMO.
+
+220. Relationships The SAT members will retain the title and rank held in the U.S. Army. They will conform to uniform and clothing regulations as prescribed by Army regulations and guidance from the SCO in country.
+
+a. Department of Defense civilians' personnel administration will be in accordance with U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and DOD civilian personnel regulations.
+
+b. The American Embassy staff and the host nation government will assist with local civilian labor to meet team requirements. The SAT will ensure that any directly hired local national's employment conditions, including pay and benefits, conform with U.S. Embassy policies and those established by the host nation government.
+
+c. The SAT members will have no command or directive authority or responsibility over personnel of the host nation armed services.
+
+221. U.S. Army Aviation Team a. Aircrew assigned to SAT will meet Flight Activity Category 2 (FAC 2) requirements, in accordance with Training Circular 1210, Aircrew Training Program. If all available time and resources have been appropriately utilized, and some Aircrew Training Manual (ATM) requirements are still not met, Commander, SATMO may waive those specific ATM requirements as authorized by AR 951.
+
+b. United States Army aviation team members and/or contractor aircrew members will not perform flight duties without aircraft airworthiness certification in accordance with DCMA Instruction 8210.1/AR 7062 and/or CFR, Title 14.
+
+222. Non-United States equipment A SAT does not normally provide training or assistance on non-standard or non-United States end items. The DASA DE&C must approve requests for exception to policy for training on non-standard or non-U.S. equipment.
+
+223. Military justice jurisdiction The combatant commander has general courts martial convening authority over all military personnel under his or her command, that is, personnel assigned to the command's Joint Manning Document or attached for Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) purposes. However, since disciplinary action is normally administered by a commander of the same Service as the offender, the combatant commander should direct the Army Service Component Commander, or that commander's designee, to take courts-martial jurisdiction over PCS team personnel. If the Army Service Component Commander believes a case within their discretion should be referred to a court-martial at a level he is not authorized to convene, he should inform the combatant commander. In these situations, the combatant commander will have the authority to take disciplinary action or return the case back to the component commander for disposition. The combatant commander reserves the right to exercise military justice jurisdiction in those cases impacting the mission, or affecting external relations. Personnel assigned permanent change of station orders and carried on the authorization document (table of distribution and allowances (TDA), modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), and so forth.) of the team management agency will remain under the military jurisdiction of that agency unless attached to the Combatant Command. The UCMJ jurisdiction over TDY team members resides with their parent organization commander, normally the SATMO commander. Article 15 jurisdiction for all personnel (both TDY and PCS) shall be exercised in accordance with Army regulations.
+
+## Chapter 3 Permanent Change Of Station Teams
+
+31. General a. This chapter provides specific information on the initial request for and continuation of U.S. Army PCS SA
+teams. A PCS team is a long duration team (more than 179 days) which may contain any mix of military, government civilian or contractor personnel. An example of a PCS sequence of dates and actions is outlined in appendix B. There are two types of PCS teams
+(1) *Technical assistance field team.* The TAFT provides in-country technical support to foreign personnel on specific equipment, technology, doctrine, weapons, and supporting systems when mobile training teams (MTT), technical assistance teams (TAT), and extended training services specialist (ETSS) are not appropriate. The TAFT is often the bridge between purely technical assistance and pure training. The TAFT members are technical experts in their fields and often provide formal and informal training to their counterparts as part of their primary mission of ensuring the continued operation of the equipment or support system. Additionally, TAFT is often used to set up operational maintenance and supply systems that will interface effectively with CONUS activities. In this sense, TAFT members are both doers and trainers. Also, TAFT set up and operates the systems, as well as trains their counterparts to assume full operational control as quickly as possible.
+
+(2) *Extended training services specialist.* The ETSS provides advice, instruction, and training in the installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems. Unless specifically approved by the DSCA, ETSS teams will be provided for no longer than 1 year.
+
+b. These teams provide advice, training, technical assistance, or support to personnel of the hosting country. This assistance is provided to meet specific objectives in connection with development of a country's capability and the Combatant Commander's Security Cooperation Strategy. The deployment of these teams should be based on consideration of all of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the use of this type of assistance, at a particular time, in a particular country, and should be consistent with DOD, Combatant Command, and Service security cooperation guidance or strategy. (SAMM), DOD 5105.38M, table C10.T1- (Legislation for International Training), provides a listing of the various authorities for deploying teams.
+
+c. The HQDA governing personnel sourcing principle is that all teams can be totally contractor, given that any team position that does not require military will be filled by a contractor or DA civilian.
+
+d. The TRM must provide compelling justification why military personnel are required in lieu of contractors and/or DA civilians. The justification must include why each individual team member's task cannot be accomplished using a contractor or a DA civilian; and jeopardizes the team's overall mission success. The selection considerations for team composition and priority of fill are at figure 12.
+
+32. Permanent change of station security assistance team request and authorized use A TAFT or ETSS will deploy for periods greater than 179 days and will not exceed three years in duration. A TAFT or ETSS team will be considered only if a short duration (less then 179 days) SAT cannot satisfy the requirement (see chap 4). Also, if the training requirement is too extensive for a short duration (less than 179 days) SAT, a TAFT or ETSS will replace the use of repetitive short duration SAT.
+
+a. The primary purpose of a TAFT or ETSS is to support a FMS case by providing training or technical assistance to a host nation that result in a specific military capability. The AMC/USASAC works in coordination with TRADOC/ SATFA in the development of the LOA to implement either a single case or separate materiel and training cases that support a total package approach (TPA).
+
+b. In accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 167 (10 USC 167), the SCO will direct any requests for Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) personnel to the theater Special Operations Command (SOC) for validation, then to the theater combatant commander, who will then forward the request to USSOCOM for approval. Upon approval, USSOCOM will direct team sourcing.
+
+33. Permanent change of station team process a. The PCS team request and Army decision process is depicted in figure 31. The process starts with the country team receiving a LOR or a country's request for a training team for an Army mission under an existing LOA. The country team will assist the country by preparing a detailed TRM. The TRM format is provided at appendix D.
+
+(1) Before submitting the TRM, the SCO may request assistance from TRADOC concerning team composition, training concept, cost information and general guidance on the availability of specific skills.
+
+(2) The TRM must be submitted 15 months prior to PCS team deployment. (3) The requirements must be written to achieve a specific objective during a specific timeframe. (4) The requirements must be tied into the current Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan or the country CETP to ensure specified objectives are achieved. Here are some examples of current COCOM and Army Strategic objectives:
+(a) Enhance partner capability to conduct internal stability operations. (b) Build partner capability to support COCOM missions with a focus on regional interoperability and stabilization operations, peace keeping operations, and humanitarian assistance.
+
+(c) Deter aggression and counter coercion, and defeat adversaries. (d) Develop capabilities of key allies and partners to dissuade potential adversaries. (5) Requests for P&A must use the TRM format (draft) containing the planning information necessary to estimate costs and survey availability.
+
+b. The country team will then submit a detailed TRM through the COCOM for validation to HQDA for decision.
+
+The TRM will clearly state the mission, training goals, end state of the mission, and the qualifications the team members should possess per paragraph 31. The SCO should also identify geographic or climatic conditions to be considered in selection of team members. For contractor-staffed SAT, the SCO will include, as part of the TRM, a statement of work (SOW) to be coordinated with TRADOC.
+
+(1) The TRM will be submitted through the appropriate COCOM authority that works Security Cooperation programs to validate the requirements.
+
+(2) Upon COCOM validation of the TRM, it will then be forwarded to HQDA for coordination and decision. The Army action agency address is DASA DE&C Suite 8200 (SAALNP), 1777 North Kent Street, Arlington, VA 22209.
+
+(3) The DASA DE&C will coordinate with the DCS, G1 and DCS, G3/5/7 and make a decision on the TRM. If the TRM is disapproved, it will be sent back through the COCOM to the country team with applicable justification. If the TRM is approved, DASA DE&C will draft an Execution Message to DCS, G3/5/7 ODO with a mission statement, metrics for measuring success, and a timeline for completion.
+
+(4) The DCS, G3/5/7 ODO upon receiving the draft execution message from DASA DE&C will send a tasker to the TRADOC G3/5/7 Central Tasking Office, which sends to TRADOC G-3/5/7 SATD/SATMO to fill the request.
+
+c. Given an approved and implemented LOA, TRADOC will execute the fill of the team and prepare them for deployment.
+
+(1) The SCO, in coordination with TRADOC ensures that all necessary equipment, supplies, instruction facilities, and technical publications are on hand or available for the arrival of the team. Tools and ancillary equipment needed for the training or technical assistance must be on-hand and available for the team use when the SAT team arrives in country.
+
+(2) The SCO ensures that foreign personnel to be trained meet the prerequisites necessary to comprehend the technical level of presentation and must vet them for training.
+
+(3) The SCO programs the in-country arrival date in accordance with appendix B, and must consider the availability of trainees, facilities, and equipment.
+
+d. The team chief, in coordination with SATMO and the SCO, will meet reporting requirements in paragraph 23.
+
+34. Request for team continuation Continuation of the duration of an Army non-contractor PCS SAT beyond 3 years requires HQDA approval. If a PCS team requires a continuation beyond 2 years, the SCO will submit a team continuation request memorandum (TCRM) through the same process as the TRM for approval. To meet Army personnel management timelines, the TCRM must be submitted by the end of the first year. No continuations will be granted without the HRC approval.
+
+35. Support requirements and authorized Family members In addition to Army PCS SAT support commitments provided in the TRM and LOA, supporting agencies will pay particular attention to the support requirements of authorized and approved team member dependents. If on an authorized accompanied tour, team members will complete all Family member pre-deployment screenings according to AR 600811. Family travel decisions (concurrent or deferred) will be based upon the response from the overseas commander.
+
+36. Overseas tour lengths Non-contractor PCS teams' tour length will be in accordance with AR 61430 and LOAs. If the Army regulation is in conflict with the LOA, the Army regulation will take precedence unless an exception is granted. The joint federal travel regulations govern overseas tours for DOD civilian personnel.
+
+37. Team members and authorized dependents legal status The SCO will provide in the TRM the legal status to include any substantiating documents required for team members and their dependent while deployed in country. Additionally, the LOA may contain an appropriate standard note or footnote on the legal status of SAT personnel.
+
+38. Pre-deployment activities Pre-deployment activities will include but not limited to SATTOC, Soldier readiness processing (SRP), POI development, refresher training and any specific activities as identified by SATMO.
+
+## 39. Permanent Change Of Station Orders The Satmo Will Provide Hrc With A Funding Citation And Assignment Instructions That Are Peculiar To The Taft/
+
+ETSS to include in the PCS orders. The personnel service battalion (PSB) of the TAFT/ETSS team member's installation will issue PCS orders with the appropriate funding citation, assignment instructions and any TDY en route.
+
+310. Flight physicals All aircrew personnel will complete a comprehensive annual flying duty medical examination (FDME) prior to departing home base. When aircrew are on duty at an OCONUS station with limited medical facilities, they will accomplish the FDME to the extent possible, and, In accordance with AR 40501, paragraph 68d, attach a cover letter explaining facility limitations. They will accomplish a comprehensive FDME within 90 days of return to a station with adequate medical facilities. See AR 40501, paragraph 68d for additional guidance.
+
+## Chapter 4 Temporary Duty Teams
+
+41. General This chapter provides information specific to TDY SAT. Temporary duty teams perform services for specific purposes and periods of time not to exceed 179 days under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). They provide in-country technical assistance and training to the armed forces of a friendly foreign government in doctrine and on specific equipment, technology, weapons, and supporting systems. There are 4 types of TDY teams which can be deployed into country; MTT, requirements survey teams (RST), TAT, and pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS). The TDY team request process is outlined in figure 41. The selection considerations for team composition and priority of fill are at figure 12.
+
+a. Mobile training teams. The MTT are composed of personnel on TDY for the purpose of training foreign personnel. The MTT conduct in-country training when it is more effective to bring the training to the country. The MTT provide training, rather than technical assistance. The MTT may be drawn from CONUS or within theater. Under exceptional circumstances, MTT may train foreign recipients at U.S. installations and facilities. Equipment used for this training must be either owned by, or allocated for, delivery to the recipient country. When the SCO does not have the subject matter expertise or capability to perform pre-deployment survey functions, and with concurrence of the SCO, PDSS will deploy before MTT.
+
+b. Requirements survey teams. The RST deploy TDY to an OCONUS location to determine specific country needs.
+
+The RST assesses the country's capabilities and determines requirements for equipment, team composition, and duration of future training or assistance missions.
+
+c. Technical assistance teams. The TAT deploys TDY to provide technical assistance other than training. The TAT
+maintains or repair U.S. equipment that has been provided to the host government. These teams may set up and place into operation such things as repair parts warehouses, personnel records systems, technical libraries and English language laboratories. The TAT often helps a country to maintain U.S. equipment or adopt U.S. management techniques. For the purposes of this regulation, OJT that is incidental to TAT activities is not considered training assistance. The SAMM, chapter 10, provides basic guidance on TAT.
+
+d. Pre-deployment site survey. The PDSS are generally five-day TDY by the team chief that precede deployment of a SAT to ensure preparations (such as billeting, classrooms, ranges, interpreters, training equipment, so forth.) are in place, and to perform other advance party functions. The PDSS may inspect the training site, determine requirements for special tools, equipment, and other support materials, and discuss the proposed training program with the SCO and host nation representatives. The PDSS can occur from three months to 30 days before the SAT deploys.
+
+42. Temporary duty security assistance team request and authorized use a. The TDY team request and Army decision process is depicted in figure 41. The process starts with the country team receiving a LOR or a country's request for an Army SAT under an existing LOA. The country team will assist the country by preparing a detailed TRM. The TRM format is provided at appendix D. The SCO must send the TRM (see app D) for a TDY team in accordance with figure 41 through the COCOM to HQDA a minimum of 10 months before the date of deployment. The COCOM will validate and endorse TRM that do not meet the timeline in paragraph 41(a), above and submit them with justification (operational requirements) to DASA DE&C for review and staffing to the Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (VCSA) for decision. Copies should be provided to TRADOC/SATFA and SATMO.
+
+(1) Before submitting the TRM, the SCO may request assistance from SATMO concerning team composition, training concept, cost information and general guidance on the availability of specific skills.
+
+(2) The requirements must be written to achieve a specific objective during a specific timeframe. (3) The requirements must be tied into the current Combatant Commander's Theater Security Cooperation Plan or the country CETP to ensure specified objectives are achieved. Here are some examples of current COCOM and Army Strategic objectives
+(a) Enhance partner capability to conduct internal stability operations.
+
+(b) Build partner capability to support COCOM missions with a focus on regional interoperability and stabilization operations, peace keeping operations, and humanitarian assistance.
+
+(c) Deter aggression and counter coercion, and defeat adversaries.
+
+(d) Develop capabilities of key allies and partners to dissuade potential adversaries.
+
+(4) Requests for P&A must use the TRM format (draft) containing the planning information necessary to estimate costs and survey availability.
+
+b. The Country Team will then submit a detailed TRM through the COCOM for validation. The TRM will clearly state the mission, training goals, end state of the mission, and the qualifications the team members should possess per paragraph 31. The SCO should also identify geographic or climatic conditions to be considered in selection of team members. The SCO will include a Statement of Work to be coordinated with SATMO as a part of the TRM.
+
+c. The applicable COCOM authorities will coordinate with the ASCC to determine if the mission can be satisfied from internal theater assets. If so, the mission is executed intra-theater with no HQDA involvement required.
+
+d. If not, the COCOM will forward the TRM to HQDA for decision. The Army action agency address is DASA
+DE&C Suite 8200 (SAALNP), 1777 North Kent Street, Arlington, VA 22209.
+
+(1) The DASA DE&C will coordinate with the DCS, G1 and DCS, G3/5/7 and make a decision on the TRM. If the TRM is disapproved, it will be sent back through the COCOM to the country team with applicable justification. If the TRM is approved, DASA DE&C will draft an Execution Message to DCS, G3/5/7 ODO with a mission statement, metrics for measuring success, and a timeline for completion.
+
+(2) The DCS, G3/5/7 ODO upon receiving the draft execution message from DASA DE&C will send a tasker to the TRADOC G3/5/7 Central Tasking Office to fill the request.
+
+e. Given an approved and implemented LOA, SATMO will execute the fill of the team and prepare them for deployment.
+
+(1) The SCO, in coordination with USA SATMO ensures that all necessary equipment, supplies, instruction facilities, and technical publications are on hand or available for the arrival of the team. Tools and ancillary equipment needed for the training or technical assistance must be on-hand and available for the team use when the SCT team arrives in country.
+
+(2) The SCO ensures that foreign personnel to be trained meet the prerequisites necessary to comprehend the technical level of presentation and must vet them for training.
+
+(3) The SCO programs the in-country arrival date in accordance with appendix C, and must consider the availability of trainees, facilities, and equipment.
+
+(4) In accordance with 10 USC 167, the SCO will direct any requests for ARSOF personnel to the theater SOC for validation, then to the theater combatant commander, who will forward the request to USSOCOM for approval. Upon approval, USSOCOM will direct team sourcing.
+
+f. Approval to use IMET funds for SATs requires that the combatant commander forward a request for waiver to DSCA for consideration and approval before sending the TRM to HQDA. The waiver request should include a cost estimate for training aids and training materials. The SCO can request P&A assistance from SATMO for the cost estimate for the IMET waiver.
+
+43. Drawdown decision security assistance team requirements Training and technical assistance related to presidential drawdown determinations will be programmed and conducted in accordance with the Execution Order.
+
+## 44. Family Members Family Members Are Not Authorized To Accompany Or Join Military Tdy Team Members In Country.
+
+45. Temporary duty orders The SATMO will provide furnishing commands with coordinating instructions and financial information for the preparation of TDY team orders.
+
+46. Pre-deployment activities Pre-deployment activities will include but not limited to SATTOC, SRP, POI development, refresher training and any specific activities as identified by SAMTO.
+
+## 47. Team Members Legal Status The Sco Will Provide In The Trm The Legal Status To Include Any Substantiating Documents Required For Team Members
+
+while deployed in country. Additionally, the LOA may contain an appropriate standard note or footnote on the legal status of SAT personnel.
+
+## Chapter 5 Contractor-Staffed Teams
+
+51. General This chapter provides information specific to SAT staffed by one or more contractors. Contractor staffed teams are the preferred means for filing a team unless specific circumstances and requirements dictates otherwise. The priority of fill for the team is contractor, DOD civilian and then military. Follow procedures in chapters 3 and 4 respectively for contractor staffed PCS and TDY teams, xontractors may comprise all or part of a team. The SCO must obtain authorization from the requesting country before accepting a contractor staffed SAT. A statement of work (SOW) must accompany the TRM.
+
+52. Provisions specific to contractors a. Contractors and their employees cannot (1) Work in policy-making positions or in positions of command, supervision, administration, or control over DOD
+personnel or personnel of other contractors.
+
+(2) Become part of the foreign government organization. b. Contract team members are entitled to privileges and support equivalent to that furnished to GS12 grade civilians, where available. When agreements between the U.S. and the foreign government do not expressly authorize the U.S. to accord these privileges to such personnel, they will be extended only with the consent of the foreign government.
+
+c. Security clearance for employees of contractors will conform to the requirements of DOD 5220.22R and as specified in the contract. Other administrative requirements such as those involving non-disclosure statements, certificates of performance, logistical support, travel, identification, privileges, and reports will conform to the appropriate provisions of Army regulations as incorporated within the contract for the services.
+
+d. In accordance with the terms of the contract, the contracting officer may require the contractor to remove from the job site any CFS employee who endangers persons or property or whose continued employment under the contract is inconsistent with the interests of the U.S. Government as determined by the SCO.
+
+e. Costs depend on the value of a negotiated contract with the civilian firm involved and include such costs as salary, in-country maintenance, travel, and overhead. The contract cost will be reflected as unit cost in the country program.
+
+f. Commander, SATMO will ensure personnel furnished by the contractor meet, as closely as possible, the qualifications and skills expected of their military counterparts.
+
+g. Contract team members will be medically fit to perform duty in the designated country. h. Routine health services and emergency medical evacuation are responsibilities of the U.S. contractor under provisions of the contract signed by the contractor and the contracting officer.
+
+i. The SCO must forward requests for extending contractor-staffed SAT duration through the combatant commander and HQDA. The HQDA will forward approve requests to TRADOC (SATFA & SATMO), and SATMO will coordinate a contract modification with the contracting officer.
+
+## Appendix A References Section I Required Publications
+
+AR 1131
+Army International Security Cooperation Policy (Cited in para 13b(7).)
+AR 121
+Security Assistance, International Logistics, Training, and Technical Assistance Support Policy and Responsibilities (Cited in para 13e(1).)
+AR 1215
+Joint Security Assistance Training Regulation (Cited in para 213.)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications A Related Publication Is A Source Of Additional Information. The User Does Not Have To Read It To Understand This Regulation.
+
+AR 112
+Management Control AR 40501
+Standards of Medical Fitness AR 40562
+Immunizations and Chemoprophylaxis AR 5546
+Travel Overseas (MPE)
+AR 6072
+Airworthiness Qualification of Aircraft Systems AR 7057
+Military-Civilian Technology Transfer AR 951
+Flight Regulations AR 135210
+Order to Active Duty as Individuals for Other Than a Presidential Selected AR 38010
+Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives AR 600811
+Reassignment AR 600814
+Identification Cards, Tags and Badges AR 6008105
+Military Orders AR 61430
+Overseas Service AR 70084
+Issue and Sale of Personal Clothing Training Circular 1210
+Aircrew Training Program Commander's Guide to Individual and Crew Standardization DOD 5105.38M
+Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)
+DOD 700014R, vol. 15
+Financial Management Regulation Policies and Procedures, Security Assistance Policy and Procedures DODD 4500.54G
+D0D Foreign Clearance Guide FORSCOM Regulation 35012
+Procedures for Tasking and Support From Active Component Installations and Units Joint Federal Travel Regulations Volumes 1 and 2
+
+## Section Iii Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iv Referenced Forms Dd Form 2060 Fms Obligation Authority (Available At Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Whs/Directives/Infomgt/Forms/Formsprogram.Htm.) Appendix B Permanent Change Of Station Team Dates And Actions
+
+B1. D18 Months C o n c e p t  A p p r o v a l  b y  D O S .  S C O  s u b m i t s  T R M  t o  C O C O M .  S C O  f o r w a r d s  r e q u e s t  f o r  L O A  ( i f  n o t  a l r e a d y implemented).
+
+## B2. D15 Months Cocom Submits Trm To Hqda. Loa Preparation. B3. D14 Months Receipt/Acceptance Of Loa By Host Country.
+
+B4. D12 Months LOA implemented and funding authorization granted. HQDA tasks TRADOC to support SAT. TRADOC sends request for military personnel to AHRC.
+
+## B5. D10 Months Tradco Initiates Contract Procedures And/Or Dod Civilian Term Hire Procedures. B6. D90 Days Team Chief Pdss In Country. Poi/Program Support Requirements Sent To Sco.
+
+B7. D30 Days until DDay Training materials prepared and shipped. Administrative processing completed. SATTOC completed at Fort Bragg. Final deployment preparation for completed.
+
+## B8. DDay Team Departure For Mission. Appendix C Temporary Duty Team Dates And Actions C1. D12 Months Concept Approval By Dos. Dod Hqda Finalization Of Cost Estimate. Sco Submits Lor & Trm To Cocom. C2. D10 Months Cocom Submits Trm To Hqda. Loa Preparation. C3. D09 Months Hqda Tasks Tradoc To Support Sat. Loa Processed/Implemented. C4. D210 Days Tradoc Tasks Supporting Command/Agency. C5. D120 Days Sat Source(S) Identified. Team Members Selected. C6. D90 Days Poi/Program Development Training Support Requirements Determined. Poi/Program Support Requirements Sent To Sco.
+
+C7. D30 Days Training materials prepared and shipped. Administrative processing completed. SATTOC completed at Fort Bragg. Final deployment preparation completed.
+
+## C8. DDay Team Departure For Mission. Appendix D Format For Security Assistance Team Request/Call-Up
+
+D1. Instructions The following format is from AR 1215, figure 41. For the purpose of this format, the term "training" is used; however, requests must specifically state whether training or technical assistance or both will be required.
+
+## D2. Requests For Teams The Format In Figure D1 Provides Guidance For Officially Requesting Trm. Appendix E Instructions And Format For Security Assistance Team Effectiveness Evaluation E1. Instructions The Following Format Is Taken From Ar 1215.
+
+E2. Security Assistance Team effectiveness
+The SAT effectiveness evaluation format is as follows:
+a. Team information. Include team type, designation number, and composition by name, grade, MOS/specialty, and
+parent unit/location.
+b. Relevant dates.
+(1) Date departed home station. (2) Dates and location of team assembly and orientation. (3) Date of arrival in host country. (4) Dates on which training/technical assistance started and ended. (5) Date of departure from host country. (6) Date of return to parent unit/agency.
+c. Mission.
+d. Training goals. Restate goals. e. End state. Restate end state. Discuss the mission's success or failure in achieving the end state and list reason
+why.
+f. Locations. Indicate the locations at which training/technical assistance was conducted.
+
+g. Number of trainees. Indicate the number of indigenous personnel trained by type, such as maintenance, supply, instructor, so forth. Indicate whether trainees were officers, enlisted, or civilians. Use actual number of individuals rather than unit designations such as battalion, company, so forth.
+
+h. Installations. Indicate schools, courses, or training installations/other facilities that were used or established.
+
+i. Adequacy. Indicate the adequacy of foreign country training installations/other facilities relating to the mission of the team.
+
+j. Materiel. Indicate the type, quantity, condition, and state of maintenance of materiel on which training/technical assistance was provided.
+
+k. Interpreter support. Indicate the adequacy and effectiveness of interpreter support provided. l. Training conditions. Provide a summary of training conditions as existed on arrival. m. Effectiveness Evaluate the effectiveness of training/technical assistance. Provide a summary of the success of the team effort to improve the effectiveness of the training program in the foreign country and qualification of foreign country personnel to carry on.
+
+n. Problems. Discuss problems encountered that affected the mission. o. Preparation. Indicate preparation for the mission. Answer the following questions: (1) Did notification of the selection of the team provide adequate guidance on mission, type and level of training/
+assistance desired, training material, and training aids required?
+
+(2) Were special or unusual problems anticipated? (3) Was the lead-time adequate for proper preparation for the mission? p. Support. Indicate the adequacy of the country team's support. Indicate any comments considered appropriate concerning accommodations, meals, medical facilities, transportation and overall treatment.
+
+q. Conclusions. Indicate conclusions and recommendations. Provide the following:
+(1) The necessity for the team as requested to accomplish the mission. (2) Indicate if the mission was accomplished and how the team could have been more useful. (3) The follow-up actions the SCO might take. (4) Recommendations for the further improvement of the foreign country's military that can be furnished by programs.
+
+(5) Essential information that should be passed on to future SAT to make the teams more effective.
+
+## Appendix F Format For Quarterly Assessment Report Requesters Must Provide The Information Stated In The Figure F1. Appendix G Operation Reporting3 Report Procedures And Format Provides Guidance For Oprep-3 Report Procedures And Format. Glossary Section I Abbreviations
+
+AAR
+after action review ACOM
+Army Command AECA
+Arms Export Control Act AMC
+Army Materiel Command AMEDD
+Army Medical Department AOA
+advice of obligation authority ARNG
+Army National Guard ARSOF
+Army Special Operations Forces ARSTAF
+Army Staff ASA (ALT)
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology)
+ASA (FM&C)
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller)
+ASCC
+Army Service Component Command ATM
+aircrew training manual AV
+aviation BN
+battalion CAR
+Chief, Army Reserve CDR
+commander CETP
+combined education training plan CFS
+contract field services CG
+commanding general CNP
+Counter Narcotics Program COCOM
+combatant commander; combatant command COE
+Corps of Engineers CONUS
+continental United States CPO
+civilian personnel office CTFP
+Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program DA
+Department of the Army DAMOODM
+Department of the Army military operations - Office of Deployment Management DASADE&C
+Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation DCS, G1
+Deputy Chief of Staff , G1
+DFAS
+Defense Finance and Accounting Service DOD
+Department of Defense DOS
+Department of State DRU
+Direct Reporting Unit DSCA
+Defense Security Cooperation Agency DSN
+defense switched network E-mail electronic mail ETSS
+extended training services specialist FAA
+Foreign Assistance Act FAC2
+flight activity category two FAX
+facsimile FDME
+flight duty medical exam FMF
+foreign military financing FMFP
+Foreign Military Financing Program FMS
+foreign military sales FORSCOM
+Forces Command FSTE
+foreign service tour extension FTS
+field training services GSO
+general service office HRC
+Human Resources Command HRM
+human resources management HQ
+Headquarters HQDA
+Headquarters, Department of the Army ICASS
+international cooperative administrative support services IMET
+international military education and training IMS
+international military student INL
+international narcotics and law enforcement ITO
+invitational travel order JCS
+Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+## Jscet Joint Security Cooperation Education And Training Jtr Joint Travel Regulations
+
+LOA
+letter of offer and acceptance LOR
+letter of request LV
+leave MICC
+Mission and Installation Contracting Center MILDEP
+military department
+
+## Mipr Military Inter-Departmental Purchase Request
+
+MOA
+memorandum of agreement MOS
+military occupational specialty MOU
+memorandum of understanding MPP
+mission performance plan MS
+mission sustainment MTOE
+modification table of organization and equipment MTT
+mobile training team MWR
+morale, welfare, and recreation NADR
+nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining and related matters NET
+new equipment training NGB
+National Guard Bureau NRCC
+North Region Contracting Center
+
+## Nsdd National Security Decision Directive
+
+OA
+obligational authority OCAR
+Office Chief of the Army Reserve OCONUS
+outside continental United States OJT
+on-the-job training OPM
+Office of Personnel Management OPR
+office of primary responsibility OPREP
+operation reporting OSD
+Office of the Secretary of Defense OTSG
+Office of the Surgeon General P&A
+price and availability PCS
+permanent change of station PDSS
+pre-deployment site survey PDST
+pre-deployment survey teams POC
+point of contact POI
+program of instruction POM
+program objective memorandum PPBES
+Planning Programming Budget Execution System PSB
+personnel service battalion QAT
+quality assurance team
+
+## Qol Quality Of Life Rfi Request For Information Rmo Resource Management Office Roe Rules Of Engagement Rst Requirements Survey Team
+
+SA
+security assistance SAALNI
+Director, Security Cooperation Integration SAALNP
+Director, Policy for Security Cooperation, Resources and Exports SAALZN
+Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASADE&C)
+
+## Samm Security Assistance Management Manual Sat Security Assistance Team Satfa Security Assistance Training Field Activity Satmo Security Assistance Training Management Organization Satp Security Assistance Training Program Sattoc Security Assistance Team Training And Orientation Course
+
+SC
+security cooperation
+
+## Sco Security Cooperation Organization Scetp Security Cooperation Education And Training Program Scetwg Security Cooperation Education And Training Working Group Secdef Secretary Of Defense Sere Survival, Escape, Resistance And Evasion Sja Staff Judge Advocate Sof Special Operations Forces Soc Special Operations Command Sow Statement Of Work
+
+SPT
+support
+
+## Srp Soldier Readiness Processing Ssn Social Security Number Taft Technical Assistance Field Team Tat Technical Assistance Team Tcrm Team Continuation Request Memorandum Tcs Temporary Change Of Station Tda Table Of Distribution And Allowances Tdy Temporary Duty Tjag Theater Judge Advocate General Tla Travel And Living Allowances Tpa Total Package Approach Tradoc U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Trm Team Request Memorandum Tsg The Surgeon General Tsoc Theater Special Operations Center Ttad Temporary Tour Of Active Duty Ucmj Uniform Code Of Military Justice Usajfkswcs U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center And School Usar U.S. Army Reserve Usasac U.S. Army Security Assistance Command Usasoc U.S. Army Special Operations Command Usg United States Government Ussocom U.S. Special Operations Command Vcsa Vice Chief Of Staff Of The Army Section Ii Terms A Contractual Sales Agreement Between The Usg And An Eligible Foreign Country Or Internal Organization.
+
+Collections Receipt in U.S. dollar currencies, checks, or other negotiable instruments from the purchasing foreign country to pay for defense articles, services, or training based on accepted FMS cases.
+
+Defense Security Cooperation Agency The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the principal DOD organization through which the Secretary of Defense carries out responsibilities for SA. The agency that performs administrative, management, and operational functions for SA programs at the DOD level under the policy direction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.
+
+Disclosure authorization Authorization by proper U.S. authority for the disclosure of U.S. classified information to international military student (IMS) who are appropriately cleared and certified by their government for access to classified information, as required, and in accordance with AR 38010.
+
+Extended training service specialists Those services performed by DOD personnel (normally on a PCS basis) who are technically qualified to provide instruction and training in the engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance of DOD weapons, equipment, and systems. The ETSS are not the same as mobile training teams.
+
+Familiarization training Practical experience and job-related training for specific systems, subsystems, functional areas, or other operations that require hands-on experience, to include maintenance training conducted at the depot level. This training does not provide for skill-level upgrading, which is provided under OJT when special procedures are required.
+
+## Follow-On-Training Sequential Training Following An Initial Course Of Training.
+
+Foreign military sales That portion of U.S. authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act as amended. This assistance differs from the Foreign Military Financing and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred.
+
+Formal training For the purpose of this regulation only, an officially designated course of instruction conducted or administered according to an approved course outline and training objectives.
+
+In-country training Training offered within the geographic boundaries of a recipient country and conducted by members of the U.S. Defense Department, other organizations, or contractors.
+
+Installation For the purpose of this regulation, the term installation is synonymous with base, post, camp, station, activity, squadron, ship, unit, school, and facility.
+
+International military education and training Specific courses that have been identified as building democracies, promoting peace, and recognize human rights and are available to both military and civilian IMS. International military education and training, for the purpose of this regulation only, is the portion of grant aid that includes formal or informal instruction of IMS in the U.S. or overseas by military or civilian personnel of the USG and contract technicians or instruction through informational publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, and military advice to foreign military units and forces. The IMET is authorized under the FAA.
+
+International military student A national of a foreign government, with military or civilian status of that government, who is receiving education or training or is touring USG activities under the sponsorship of SATP. For the purpose of this regulation, the term trainee is synonymous with student.
+
+Letter of offer and acceptance The agreement by which the USG offers to sell to an eligible country or international organization defense articles, services, or training pursuant to the AECA. The LOA lists the items, estimated costs, and terms and conditions of sale. It provides for an authorized agent of the eligible country or international organization to sign as an indication of acceptance.
+
+Mobile training team For the purpose of this regulation only, a team consisting of one or more U.S. personnel from DOD resources on TDY (not to exceed 179 consecutive days away from home station) to train IMSs in the operation, maintenance, and employment of weapon systems and support equipment or in other special skills related to military functions. The MTT are not the same as technical assistance teams.
+
+Obligational authority Authority on a DD Form 2060 (FMS Obligation Authority) or other document passed from DFAS to implementing MILDEP that allows obligations to be incurred against a given FMS case in an amount not to exceed the stated value in this authority.
+
+On the job training For the purpose of this regulation only, a training process whereby IMS acquire knowledge and skills through the actual performance of duties under competent supervision in accordance with an approved planned program.
+
+Operational oversight Authority that may be exercised by the receiving organization or command at any echelon. Operational oversight is granted by the parent organization to the receiving organization to ensure supervision of the deployed team's daily operations and mission accomplishment of the specific/cooperation assignment within the parameters of the LOA and TRM. Operational oversight is the authority to perform limited functions of command over deployed teams to ensure the teams are equipped and operate within the regulations and policies for operations within the organization and country. Receiving organizations do not have the authority to organize and employ the teams, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give authoritative direction, unless approved by the parent organization. The parent organization retains authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, and team training. Exceptions to the authorities outlined in operational oversight will be documented in an MOA between the parent and recipient organizations prior to team deployment.
+
+Outside the continental United States All geographic areas not within the territorial boundaries of the continental United States. As used in this regulation, OCONUS includes Hawaii and Alaska.
+
+Security Assistance Management Manual The DOD manual that contains policy guidance and procedures for programming, implementing, and reporting SA activities.
+
+Security Cooperation Organization A DOD element located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation functions under the FAA and AECA. The term SCO is used in this regulation generically and applies to all such activities regardless of the actual title assigned (for example, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Military Group, Military Mission, Defense Representative, Office of Military Cooperation, Office of Defense Cooperation, Defense Liaison Group, Security Cooperation Organization, and Defense Attache personnel designated to perform SA management functions). The acronym SCO also means "security cooperation officer," the chief of any Security Cooperation Organization.
+
+Security Assistance Training Management Organization A TRADOC agency that manages Army activities related to formation, preparation, and deployment of MTT, RST, PDSS, TAT, CFS, ETSS, and TAFT furnished from CONUS-based assets.
+
+Security assistance training team A team comprised of U.S. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, U.S. civilian personnel, contractors, or a combination of the above that provide in-country technical assistance and training to the armed forces of a friendly foreign government in doctrine or on specific equipment, technology, weapons and supporting systems.
+
+Security clearance For the purpose of this regulation only, determination of eligibility of an individual to have access to U.S. classified information. The IMS do not hold U.S. security clearances. The clearance specified in an invitational travel order (ITO) is that granted by the foreign government and not the United States. A disclosure authorization is required before granting an IMS access to U.S. classified information, and such access must be on an individual need-to-know basis.
+
+## Services Support Provided To A Foreign Government Under Other Than Materiel Items. Training Is Considered A Service.
+
+Technical assistance Technical Assistance aids foreign personnel on specific equipment, technology, doctrine, weapons, and supporting systems. U.S. technical experts provide formal and informal training to ensure the continued operation of equipment or support systems. Technical assistance includes: setting up and operating systems, training host nation personnel to assume full operational control as quickly as possible; setting up maintenance and supply systems that will interface effectively with CONUS activities; setting up and placing into operation such things as repair parts warehouses, personnel records systems, technical libraries and English language laboratories; or helping to maintain U.S. equipment or to adopt U.S. management techniques. Technical assistance often bridges between purely technical assistance and pure training, including OJT that is incidental to the assistance. Technical assistance cannot be provided with IMET funding.
+
+Technical assistance field team A DOD team or individual deployed on a PCS assignment of more than 179 days (usually for 1 year or more) to a foreign country to provide assistance in the operation, maintenance, and tactical employment of weapons systems and support equipment or in other special skills related to military functions.
+
+Technical assistance team A DOD team or individual dispatched for up to 179 days' TDY to place into operation, operate, maintain, and repair equipment provided under FMS. The TAT will not be used to provide technical training or instruction (except for OJT) that is necessary to transfer technical responsibility to the recipient country.
+
+Temporary tour of active duty A TTAD is voluntary active duty performed by USAR, ARNG and SATMO Soldiers who possess special expertise needed for short-term support or completion of an essential active force mission. The TTAD will not normally exceed 139 days in length.
+
+Total package approach The planning methodology that requires identification of spare parts, follow-on support items, training, and services required from USG or within the foreign country's resources to efficiently introduce and operationally sustain major items of equipment or systems.
+
+Training Instruction of IMS in the United States or overseas by personnel assigned to or sponsored by DOD. It also includes correspondence courses, training publications, training aids, and orientation tours.
+
+Travel and living allowance Those costs associated with transportation, excess baggage, and living allowance (per diem) of IMS authorized for payment under IMET.
+
+## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries. Usapd
+
+# Electronic Publishing System Onecol Formatter Win32 Version 254
+
+PIN:
+               038152000
+DATE:
+               06-24-09
+TIME:
+               09:22:07
+PAGES SET:
+               43
+
+DATA FILE:
+             C:\wincomp\r12-7.fil
+DOCUMENT:
+             AR 127
+
+SECURITY:
+UNCLASSIFIED
+DOC STATUS: REVISION

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+Military Police
+
+# Army Participation In Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau Of Investigation
+
+                     Headquarters
+                     Department of the Army
+                     Washington, DC
+                     8 November 2005
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Summary Of Change
+
+AR 19027 Army Participation in Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau of Investigation This major revision, dated 8 November 2005--
+
+o Changes the name of the publication from Army Participation in National Crime
+Information Center to Army Participation in Criminal Justice Information
+Systems, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+o Assigns proponency to the Provost Marshal General (para 1-4). o Assigns the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center responsibility as the
+Criminal Justice Information Systems Coordinator (para 1-4b).
+o Assigns responsibility to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation
+Management Agency and garrison commanders for processing requests for access and funding requirements (paras 1-4, 3-1, and 3-7).
+o Establishes procedures for participation in the National Crime Information
+Center (chap 3).
+o Establishes procedures for Army law enforcement participation in the
+Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (para 3-7).
+# Military Police Army Participation In Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau Of Investigation
+
+D u r i n g  m o b i l i z a t i o n ,  p r o c e d u r e s  i n  t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n  c a n  b e  m o d i f i e d  t o  s u p p o r t policy changes as necessary.
+
+H i s t o r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i s  a  m a j o r revision.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+
+The proponent of this regulation is the Provost Marshal General. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through t h e i r  h i g h e r  h e a d q u a r t e r s  t o  t h e  p o l i c y proponent. Refer to AR 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+S u m m a r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s policies and procedures for participation in the Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems; and State Criminal Justice Systems.
+
+Army management control process.
+
+This regulation contains management control provisions and identifies key management controls that must be evaluated.
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l Guard of the United States, and the U.S. A r m y  R e s e r v e  u n l e s s  o t h e r w i s e  s t a t e d .
+
+## S U P P L E M E N T A T I O N .  S U P P L E M E N T A T I O N  O F Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1 General, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
+Responsibilities - 14, page 1
+Chapter 2 Policy, page 2
+Authority - 21, page 2 Standards - 22, page 2
+this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited witho u t  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  f r o m  t h e  P r o v o s t M a r s h a l  G e n e r a l  ( D A P M - M P D - L E ) , 2 8 0 0  A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C 203102800.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Provost Mars h a l  G e n e r a l  ( D A P M - M P D - L E ) ,  2 8 0 0 A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C 203102800.
+
+Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Authorized access - 23, page 2
+
+## Chapter 3 Procedures For Participation In National Crime Information Center, Page 3
+
+Section I
+Participation, page 3
+Requesting an originating agency identifier - 31, page 3 Suspension or revocation - 32, page 5
+Section II Records, page 5
+Entry - 33, page 5 Modification - 34, page 7
+Cancellation - 35, page 7 Validation - 36, page 7
+Army participation in the Criminal Justice Information Systems - 37, page 7
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 8
+B.
+Management Control Checklist, page 8
+
+## Figure List
+
+Figure 31: Sample Originating Agency Identifier Request, page 4 Figure 32: Sample Originating Agency Identifier Holder Agreement, page 6
+
+## Glossary
+
+11. Purpose This regulation provides policies and procedures for Army participation in the Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS), National Crime Information Center (NCIC) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It supplements standards and procedures established in the NCIC operating manual and the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems (NLETS) Operating Manual.
+
+## 12. References Required And Related Publications And Prescribed And Referenced Forms Are Listed In Appendix A. 13. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms Abbreviations And Special Terms Used In This Regulation Are Explained In The Glossary.
+
+14. Responsibilities a. The Provost Marshal General (PMG) will (1) Establish policy and procedures for the Army's participation in CJIS, NCIC, NLETS, and Army access to state law enforcement and criminal justice agency information consistent with applicable State and Federal law.
+
+(2) Prepare and execute the Department of the Army's agreement to use the services of NLETS and participate in CJIS.
+
+b. The Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center will (1) Coordinate the installation provost marshal's or Director, Emergency Services' participation in CJIS and NCIC
+and resolve operational issues concerning the Department of the Army's participation in CJIS and NLETS.
+
+(2) Establish for the commander, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, internal NCIC operating policies based on rules and operating policies of the NCIC Advisory Policy Board and State control terminal agencies.
+
+(3) Appoint a Federal service coordinator to represent the PMG at working group meetings for CJIS and NLETS. (4) Enter into a user agreement with CJIS and, where applicable, State criminal justice agencies concerning the Army's adherence to all CJIS operating policies and regulations.
+
+c. The Director, Installation Management Agency will (1) Forward requests for participation that meet the criteria of this regulation to Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center (CICRXA), 6060 6th Street, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.
+
+(2) Ensure that installation provost marshals enter into State User Agreements for access to State Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems and agencies.
+
+d. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command will (1) Forward requests for participation that meet the criteria of this regulation to Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center (CICRXA), 6060 6th Street, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.
+
+(2) Ensure that installation provost marshals enter into State User Agreements for access to State Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems and agencies.
+
+e. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Medical Command will (1) Forward requests for participation that meet the criteria of this regulation to Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center (CICRXA), 6060 6th Street, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.
+
+(2) Ensure that installation provost marshals enter into State User Agreements for access to State Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems and agencies.
+
+f. The Director, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory will (1) Provide guidance which identifies live scan electronic fingerprint equipment that is compatible with the FBI
+Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification Standard, the American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Law Enforcement Standard for Finger/Palm Prints, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory's Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
+
+(2) Provide guidance which identifies live scan electronic palm print equipment that is compatible with the American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Law Enforcement Standard for Finger/Palm Prints, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory's Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
+
+(3) Oversee all Army Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System transactions involving latent finger or palm prints.
+
+(4) Coordinate Army law enforcement activities with the FBI concerning special latent cognizant file systems in the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
+
+(5) Enter into a user agreement with CJIS concerning the Army's adherence to all CJIS operating policies and regulations involving latent print transactions and special latent cognizant files.
+
+g. The installation provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services will
+(1) Ensure that funding requirements for equipment, software, and maintenance are submitted through the appropriate resource channels.
+
+(2) Ensure that all transactions are in compliance with this regulation, the operating policies of the NCIC, and State control terminal agencies.
+
+(3) Ensure that terminals are staffed 24 hours a day. (4) Ensure that terminal operators successfully complete required training on the NCIC and State systems. (5) Appoint a terminal coordinator in writing, identifying their duties and responsibilities. (6) Conduct NCIC inquiries for U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents in support of criminal investigations or related inquiries.
+
+(7) Be responsive to the Federal Service Coordinator and State control terminal agencies on operating the NCIC and State Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems, and access and dissemination of criminal information.
+
+h. The installation provost marshal terminal coordinator will (1) Ensure the accuracy of entries and records validation records. (2) Respond to inquiries. (3) Maintain physical security of the terminal. i. The terminal coordinator, U.S. Army Deserter Information Point, will (1) Ensure NCIC entries concerning U.S. Army deserters. (2) Ensure NCIC terminal operations at the Personnel Control Facility, Fort Knox, KY. (3) Conduct criminal history record checks for identifying and verifying Army deserters, parole violators, and escaped prisoners.
+
+(4) Keep up NCIC records of parole violators and escaped military prisoners.
+
+## Chapter 2 Policy
+
+21. Authority The authority for Army law enforcement agencies to access CJIS, NCIC, and NLETS is based on this regulation, user agreements between the installation law enforcement activity and the respective State control terminal agencies, and issuance of an originating agency identifier. All transactions must be according to the standards of this regulation, the NCIC operating manual, State user manuals, and State user agreements. In instances where there may be a conflict in standards, the strictest policy interpretation will apply.
+
+22. Standards
+The following standards must be followed in operating terminals:
+a. The NCIC will use for limited authorized criminal justice purposes (i.e., stolen vehicle checks or wants and
+warrants).
+b. Dissemination of information will be based on an official need to know. c. Only trained and authorized personnel will operate terminals.
+d. An Army agency queried over the NCIC must respond within 10 minutes. e. Required NCIC and State written documentation must be prepared and retained for audit by the NCIC or State
+control terminal agencies.
+f. Army law enforcement agencies will not use U.S. Department of Justice, Joint Automated Book System accounts
+to directly interface with CJIS.
+g. Only personnel in the Latent Print Division of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory may submit or
+receive Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System transactions involving latent finger or palm prints.
+23. Authorized access a. The NCIC terminal operators, in the performance of their official duties, are authorized access to files maintained in the NCIC.
+
+b. Participation in other Federal, State, and local police information systems is authorized.
+
+## Chapter 3 Procedures For Participation In National Crime Information Center Section I Participation
+
+31. Requesting an originating agency identifier a. To be considered for participation and assignment of an originating agency identifier, an activity must meet the standards of the NCIC and the State control terminal agencies.
+
+b. Requests for participation are initiated by the provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services and submitted to the garrison commander. Requests are then forwarded through the regional Installation Management Office or commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command or U.S. Army Medical Command. The regional Installation Management Office will forward its requests to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Installation Management Agency and to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center for a decision. The U.S. Army Materiel Command and U.S. Army Medical Command commanders will forward their request to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center for a decision. The Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center will disapprove requests that do not meet the criteria of this regulation, the NCIC, or State eligibility requirements (see figure 31 for an example of a request for an originating agency identifier).
+
+32. Suspension or revocation a. The NCIC and State control terminal agencies have the authority to suspend or revoke an Army terminal's access to files when operating policies are not correctly followed.
+
+b. Notification of serious violations, suspension, or revocation from the use of NCIC and State terminals and NCIC
+files will be immediately reported directly to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center, Federal Service Coordinator by the most expeditious means. The Federal Service Coordinator will review the circumstances and effect immediate coordination to resolve issues.
+
+c. When notified of a serious violation, the installation provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services will take corrective action required by the NCIC or State control terminal agencies.
+
+## Section Ii Records
+
+33. Entry a. Entry messages place a new record in the NCIC using the originating agency identifier assigned to the agency.
+
+Procedures for entering a new record are explained in each file of the NCIC operating manual.
+
+(1) The provost marshals within the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii will enter stolen or missing U.S.
+
+Government property valued at $500 or more and having a unique manufacturer assigned serial number. All U.S. Government or privately owned weapons reported lost, stolen, or recovered will be entered into the NCIC gun file, regardless of value.
+
+(2) The Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center enters stolen property and gun reports for provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services offices in overseas areas.
+
+b. Law enforcement activities not located on an Army installation or having access to a terminal may enter into a written agreement with an installation provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services to have the installation provost marshal office enter records and act as the originating agency identifier holder (see fig 32 for an example of an originating agency identifier holder agreement).
+
+34. Modification Modification messages are used to add, delete, or change a portion of data that is part of the NCIC entry. An entering agency may modify a record while it is in an active status following file procedures in the NCIC operating manual.
+
+35. Cancellation Cancellation of an NCIC entry removes the entire record from the NCIC. A record must be canceled by the entering originating agency identifier when it is determined to be invalid.
+
+36. Validation The NCIC periodically prepares a listing of records on file for validation by system users. Each State control terminal agency and Federal Service Coordinator receives a letter explaining the records on the validation list, the order in which records are listed, and general procedures for validating the records. Army participants must validate their records and respond to the State control terminal agency. Failure to comply with validation procedures could result in the record being deleted or administrative action taken against the entering agency.
+
+37. Army participation in the Criminal Justice Information Systems a. The FBI Criminal Justice Information Systems Division includes the NCIC, Uniform Crime Report, Fingerprint Identification that includes the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the National IncidentBased Reporting System.
+
+b. The provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services procedures for submitting data to the Uniform Crime Report, IAFIS, and National IncidentBased Reporting System are explained in AR 19045.
+
+c. The purchase of IAFIS equipment must be coordinated and approved by the Installation Management Agency or the U.S. Army Materiel Command, the U.S. Army Medical Command, and the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center. This will ensure that all IAFIS devices are compatible and that the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center properly submits all fingerprint submissions to IAFIS and the criminal history file of the NCIC.
+
+## Appendix A References Section I Required Publications
+
+National Crime Information Center Operating Manual
+(Cited in paras 11, 21, and 34. Obtained at the United States Government Printing Office, Purchase Division, Printing Procurement Department, Stop PPP, Room C817, Washington, DC 20401.)
+National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems Operating Manual
+(Cited in para 11. Obtained at the United States Government Printing Office, Purchase Division, Printing Procurement Department, Stop PPP, Room C817, Washington, DC 20401.)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications A Related Publication Is Merely A Source Of Additional Information. The User Does Not Have To Read It To Understand This Publication. Ar 1909 Absentee Deserter Apprehension Program And Surrender Of Military Personnel To Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Ar 19045 Law Enforcement Reporting. Ar 19047 The Army Corrections Systems. Section Iii Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iv Referenced Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Appendix B Management Control Checklist
+
+B1. Function The function covered by this checklist is Army participation in Criminal Justice Information Systems, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+
+B2. Purpose The purpose of this checklist is to assist assessable unit managers and management control administrators in evaluating the key management controls outlined below. It is not intended to cover all controls.
+
+B3. Instructions Answers must be based on the actual testing of key management controls (that is, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, other). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and corrective action indicated in supporting documentation. These key management controls must be formally evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that this evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 112R (Management Control Evaluation Certification Statement).
+
+B4. Test Questions
+a. Are installation provost marshals or Director, Emergency Services appointing terminal coordinators? b. Are terminal coordinators ensuring that NCIC use is limited to authorized criminal justice purposes? c. Are only trained personnel allowed to operate terminals?
+d. Are requests for participation initiated by the provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services and submitted to the garrison commander?
+
+e. Are notification of serious violations, suspension, or revocation from the use of NCIC and State terminals and NCIC files immediately reported to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center, Federal Service Coordinator by the most expeditious means?
+
+f. Are all U.S. Government or privately owned weapons reported lost, stolen, or recovered entered into the NCIC
+gun file, regardless of value?
+
+## B5. Suppression There Is No Previous Edition Of This Checklist.
+
+B6. Comments Help to make this a better tool for evaluating management controls. Submit comments to HQDA, Office of the Provost Marshal General (DAPMMPDLE), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203102800.
+
+## Glossary Section I Abbreviations Afis Automated Fingerprint Identification System Cjis Criminal Justice Information Systems Cta Control Terminal Agency Fbi Federal Bureau Of Investigation Iafis Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System Ncic National Crime Information Center Nlets National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems Pmg Provost Marshal General Section Ii Terms
+
+Control terminal agency A State criminal justice agency on the NCIC system providing statewide service to criminal justice users with respect to NCIC data.
+
+Criminal history file Information collected by criminal justice agencies on individuals consisting of descriptions of an individual, notations of arrests, detentions, indictments on serious criminal charges, and any disposition. The term does not include identification information such as fingerprints.
+
+## Live Scan An Electronic Finger And/Or Palm Print Capturing System. National Crime Information Center A Nationwide Computerized Information System Established As A Service To All Criminal Justices Agencies.
+
+National Law Enforcement Telecommunications Systems Computer-controlled message switching network linking local, State, and Federal criminal justice agencies together for the purpose of information exchange.
+
+## Originating Agency Identifier An Identifier Assigned By The Fbi To An Agency Meeting The Criteria For Participation In The Ncic.
+
+User agreement A document describing operating policies and responsibilities between an installation provost marshal or Director, Emergency Services and a State control terminal agency.
+
+## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries. Usapd
+
+# Electronic Publishing System Onecol Formatter Win32 Version 227
+
+PIN:
+               002211000
+DATE:
+               11- 8-05
+TIME:
+               11:38:44
+PAGES SET:
+               14
+
+DATA FILE:
+             C:\wincomp\r190-27.fil
+DOCUMENT:
+             AR 19027
+
+SECURITY:
+UNCLASSIFIED
+DOC STATUS: REVISION

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+Criminal Investigation
+
+## Department Of The Army Polygraph Activities
+
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 21 April 2016
+
+## Summary Of Change
+
+AR 1956 Department of the Army Polygraph Activities This major revision, dated 21 April 2016--
+
+o Incorporates revised policy concerning the Army Intelligence Polygraph
+Program in accordance with AR 381-20(C) (throughout).
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 21 April 2016
+
+# Effective 21 May 2016
+
+## Criminal Investigation Department Of The Army Polygraph Activities
+
+identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).
+
+Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this regulation may modify chapters and policy of this regulation during mobilization.
+
+S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .  S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited witho u t  p r i o r  a p p r o v a l  f r o m  t h e  P r o v o s t M a r s h a l  G e n e r a l  ( D A P M - M P O - P S ) , 2 8 0 0  A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C 203102800.
+
+H i s t o r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i s  a  m a j o r revision.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Provost Mars h a l  G e n e r a l  ( D A P M - M P O - P S ) ,  2 8 0 0 A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C 203102800.
+
+Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels C and E for the Active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve and D for the Army National Guard of the United States.
+
+Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this regulation is the Provost Marshal General. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of the expected benefits and must include formal review by the activity's senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or senior leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through t h e i r  h i g h e r  h e a d q u a r t e r s  t o  t h e  p o l i c y proponent. Refer to AR 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+Summary. This regulation prescribes the policies and responsibilities for using the polygraph in the Department of the Army. It updates the preparation and submission of the polygraph request; the conduct of the polygraph examinations; the supervision and review of those examinations; polygraph examination reports; and procedures for routing and storing polygraph r e c o r d s .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  i m p l e m e n t s DODD 5210.48 and DODI 5210.91.
+
+Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 112 and Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l
+
+## Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1
+General, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1 Responsibilities - 14, page 1 Statutory authority - 15, page 1 Overall policies - 16, page 1 Polygraph examinations authorized by U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command - 17, page 2 Approval authorities - 18, page 2
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Chapter 2
+Polygraph Use, page 3
+Preparation and submission of polygraph examination requests - 21, page 3 Use of polygraph examinations conducted by agencies other than Federal agencies - 22, page 3 Conduct of polygraph examinations - 23, page 3 Polygraph examination rooms - 24, page 4 Supervision and review - 25, page 4 Polygraph examination report - 26, page 4 Procedures for routing and storing polygraph records - 27, page 5 Release of polygraph examination reports - 28, page 5 Polygraph equipment procurement - 29, page 5 Polygraph research and studies - 210, page 5 Waivers - 211, page 6 Chapter 3
+Selection, Training, and Supervision of Polygraph Examiners, page 6
+Selection - 31, page 6 Training - 32, page 6 Applications for training and certification of U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents - 33, page 6
+Retention of certification - 34, page 7 Revocation of certification - 35, page 7 Loss or damage of certificates - 36, page 7
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 8
+B.
+Internal Control Evaluation, page 9
+
+## Glossary
+
+11. Purpose This regulation contains policies, and procedures for using the polygraph in the Department of the Army (DA). It prescribes the authority for conducting polygraph examinations within DA. It delineates responsibility and authority between U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) and U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Policy regarding the intelligence polygraph program, including counterintelligence scope polygraph examinations, is covered in AR 38120(C).
+
+## 12. References See Appendix A. 13. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms See The Glossary. 14. Responsibilities
+
+a. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 will (1) Designate the Director, Army G2X to centralize technical control of the Army intelligence credibility assessment program and appoint the Army Intelligence Polygraph Program Manager for the Army.
+
+(2) Serve as the proponent for Army intelligence polygraph policy and procedures. (3) Ensure the Commander, INSCOM plans, programs, resources, and implements the Army intelligence polygraph program as specified in AR 38120(C).
+
+b. The Provost Marshal General will (1) Exercise overall Army staff responsibility for the DA Polygraph Program. (2) Ensure the execution of responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of the Army by DODD 5210.48 for support to the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA).
+
+(3) Provide Army staff policy guidance on using polygraph in criminal investigations. (4) Ensure the Commander, USACIDC is authorized to (a) Conduct USACIDC polygraph examinations and authorize USACIDC polygraph examinations. (b) Procure or possess polygraph equipment for USACIDC operational purposes. (c) Have assigned USACIDC polygraph examiners. (d) Certify, decertify, and recertify USACIDC polygraph examiners. (e) Conduct quality control of USACIDC polygraph examinations. ( f )  D e s i g n a t e  a  U S A C I D C  p o l y g r a p h  p r o g r a m  m a n a g e r  t o  o v e r s e e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  U S A C I D C  p o l y g r a p h
+examinations.
+
+(g) Designate members to the Department of Defense (DOD) Polygraph and the NCCA oversight committees. c. The Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command will (1) Execute Army responsibilities for the NCCA, as prescribed in DODD 5210.48 and DODI 5210.91. (2) Provide and maintain facilities for the NCCA. (3) Provide administrative, logistical, and special funding support to the NCCA. (4) Provide personnel to the NCCA for practical exercises and research, to include paid examinees from local universities and communities as clinical and research requirements dictate. 15. Statutory authority Titles 10 and 18, United States Code (10 USC and 18 USC), DODD 5210.48, and DODI 5210.91 are the statutory authorities. The Defense Authorization Act for FY04 is the statutory authority for the DOD Counterintelligence (CI) Polygraph Program. 16. Overall policies Army investigations depend on relevant evidence secured through skillful investigation and interrogations. The polygraph is a useful investigative aid to secure and verify evidence. It will be used only as an aid in support of other investigative means. Use of the polygraph is not necessarily the final action of an investigation.
+
+a. Questions asked will relate to the relevant issue under inquiry. b. Unless directly relevant to the inquiry, the following issues will not be covered: (1) Religious beliefs and lawful affiliations. (2) Beliefs and opinions regarding racial matters. (3) Political beliefs and affiliations of a non-subversive nature. (4) Opinions on the constitutionality of legislative policies.
+(5) Sexual orientation or preferences of subject. c. For criminal investigations, no adverse action will be taken against persons refusing or unwilling to be examined by polygraph. Other investigation, as appropriate, may continue following the person's refusal to be examined by polygraph.
+
+d. Army intelligence polygraph examinations, including counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examinations of persons with access to certain highly sensitive and classified programs, are governed by the provisions in AR 38120(C).
+
+e. DOD requests for polygraph examinations will be submitted to the Commander, USACIDC. For USACIDC
+polygraph examinations, the point of contact is Chief, Polygraph Division; U.S. Army Crime Records Center, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 221349998. For U.S. Army Intelligence (USAI) polygraph examinations, the point of contact is available at: [email protected]. The subject of a criminal investigation may request an exculpatory polygraph investigation, and an examination may be administered if considered essential by the polygraph approval/authorization authority to a just and equitable resolution of the matter under investigation.
+
+f. The polygraph may be used to examine the following: (1) U.S. military and civilian persons in connection with criminal investigations of offenses of military interest punishable under Federal law or Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by death or confinement of a term of 1 year or more. Investigation by other means must have been as thorough as circumstances permit, and developing information using a polygraph examination must be essential to conducting the investigation. In addition, the person being considered for examination must have been interviewed, and reasonable cause must exist to believe that they have knowledge of, or was involved in, the matter under investigation. Exceptions may be granted for exculpatory examinations.
+
+(2) Foreign military and civilian persons in connection with criminal investigation of offenses of U.S. military interest punishable under Federal law or UCMJ by death or confinement for a term of 1 year or more, unless prohibited by the laws of a specific foreign country. Exceptions may be granted for exculpatory examinations.
+
+g. Final administrative or judicial findings will not be based solely on polygraph results; however, the results of an analysis of the polygraph charts may be considered probative in administrative determinations.
+
+h. Polygraph results and the records of results are privileged data and will be released only as provided in paragraph
+28.
+
+i. A polygraph examination will be conducted following judicial arraignment of the potential examinee only when authorized by a court and when consistent with this regulation. The polygraph will not be used to verify or refute a judicial finding. Additionally, a polygraph examination is not normally appropriate for:
+(1) A convicted offender in connection with the offense for which they were convicted, as part of a post-trial review.
+
+(2) Witnesses who have failed to be believable during a trial resulting in a conviction to verify or refute their testimony. This does not preclude using the polygraph in perjury investigations.
+
+j. Polygraph instruments used will measure and record, as a minimum, respiration, galvanic skin response (or, conductance), blood volume, and heart rate. 17. Polygraph examinations authorized by U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Polygraph examinations will be authorized by the Commander, USACIDC. The following named positions are delegated this authority:
+
+a. The Deputy Commander, USACIDC. b. The Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center (USACRC). c. The Chief, Polygraph Division, USACRC. d. The Commanders of the 3d, 6th, and 701st Military Police Groups (Criminal Investigation Division (CID)) are
+authorized to approve the conduct of polygraph examinations within their respective areas of responsibility on an emergency basis. Examples are those instances in which the Deputy Commander, USACIDC; Director, USACRC; and the Chief, Polygraph Division, USACRC cannot be contacted within a two-hour time period and further delays in administering an examination would severely jeopardize the mission. Care must be taken to ensure emergency authority is appropriately applied and not used as a matter of convenience. The Director, USACRC, will be notified by the most expedient means available if this delegated authority is used.
+
+## 18. Approval Authorities See Ar 38120(C) For Army Intelligence Polygraph Approval Authorities.
+
+21. Preparation and submission of polygraph examination requests The investigative element requesting approval to conduct a polygraph examination will submit a completed DA Form 2805 (Polygraph Examination Authorization) (refer to http://www.apd.army.mil/ProductMaps/EForms/DAForms.aspx for further details) to the concerned person. This request will, at a minimum, identify the requestor, the individual(s) to be tested, and a summary detailing the basis for the request. This summary will provide sufficient information to allow the approving authority to ensure compliance with applicable regulatory and policy standards, as well as to determine if the testing issue is appropriate for application of the polygraph technique. Approvals will be obtained prior to the conduct of an examination. Telephonic requests, followed with written requests, may be used in emergencies. The requesting official will include the following data on every polygraph examination request:
+a. For criminal investigations (1) The offense which formed the basis of the investigation is punishable under Federal law or the UCMJ by death or confinement for a term of 1 year or more. Even though such an offense may be disposed of with a lesser penalty, the person may be given a polygraph examination to eliminate suspicion.
+
+(2) The person to be examined has been interviewed and there is reasonable cause to believe that the person has knowledge of, or was involved in, the matter under investigation.
+
+(3) Consistent with the circumstances, data to be obtained by polygraph examination are needed for further conduct of the investigation. Investigation by other means has been as thorough as circumstances permit.
+
+b. Polygraph support may be provided for non-DOD law enforcement agencies only when (1) The requesting non-DOD law enforcement agency is conducting a criminal investigation involving DOD
+personnel to be examined.
+
+(2) The investigation is of military interest. c. The use of the polygraph may be authorized for exculpation, provided that the request for such examination is initiated by the subject (or a person acting on the subject's behalf) of a criminal investigation, and administration of the examination is considered essential by the polygraph approval/authorization authority to a just and equitable resolution of the matter under investigation. 22. Use of polygraph examinations conducted by agencies other than Federal agencies Only polygraph examinations conducted by Federal agencies and conforming to DOD standards will be used in official DOD proceedings. On occasion, attorneys representing DOD-affiliated personnel contract for private commercial polygraph examinations on behalf of their clients, anticipating that the examinations will be used in official DOD proceedings. Since DOD cannot attest to the conditions under which the examinations were administered, DOD components will not accept nor use such examinations in any actions (such as courts or preliminary discussions before legal action, boards, or other judicial or administrative actions) instead of those conducted by Federal agencies.
+
+## 23. Conduct Of Polygraph Examinations
+
+a. Only certified polygraph examiners will conduct independent polygraph examinations. When appropriate, at least
+5 working days before a polygraph examination, the examiner will be furnished all investigative data on the person to be examined. These will include any prior polygraph examination results. Exception is permitted only for operational necessity.
+
+b. A certified examiner must supervise examiners serving their internships during examinations (see para 32b). c. The examination will not be given when, in the opinion of the examiner, a person is not suitable for any of the following conditions:
+
+(1) Mental or physical fatigue. (2) Apparent mental disorder. (3) Extreme emotional stress, intoxication, narcotics addiction, or excessive use of depressants, stimulants, tranquil-
+izers, or hallucinogens.
+
+(4) Physical discomfort. d. If any of the conditions listed in paragraph 23c are present, and if deemed necessary, polygraph supervisors from each respective polygraph office will decide what action to take. Examiners will not make any psychiatric or physical diagnoses.
+
+e. The examinee will not be subjected to prolonged interrogation immediately prior to the polygraph examination. f. Voluntary consent in writing on DA Form 2801 (Polygraph Examination Statement of Consent) must be obtained from the person being examined if connected with a criminal investigation ((refer to http://www.apd.army.mil/ ProductMaps/EForms/DAForms.aspx for further details)). A signed statement or refusal is not required.
+
+g. Examinees in criminal investigations must be advised of the following: (1) Date, time, and place of the examination.
+
+(2) Appropriate individual rights. (3) If classified matter is to be discussed, the examinee's lawyer must possess an appropriate security clearance. (4) Whether the testing area contains a two-way mirror or observation device. (5) If the proceedings are to be monitored or recorded, the examinee will be informed prior to the conduct of the examination.
+
+(6) Continued investigation by other means is not prohibited if the polygraph examination is refused. No adverse action will be taken for refusing to take the examination.
+
+h. The instrument, nature, and procedures of the examination will be explained to the examinee. i. All questions to be asked by the examiner during the instrument portion of the examination will be reviewed with the examinee prior to testing.
+
+j. Certified polygraph examiners will be officially identified as "polygraph examiners." Other titles will not be used.
+
+Clinical garments are not to be worn by polygraph examiners.
+
+k. Females accused or suspected of an offense must be tested in the presence of a female witness at all times, unless the examiner is female.
+
+l. Public showing of the mechanical operations of the polygraph and the physiological changes that take place during the emotional stimulation is not permitted. No unfounded claims of application or reliability are allowed. Only certified examiners will instruct, lecture, or demonstrate the polygraph.
+
+m. Opinions of truth or deception can be expressed only if each relevant question has been asked at least twice during a series and valid criteria exist for evaluation.
+
+n. For polygraph examinations found to be "inconclusive," another examination may be given. Approval need not be obtained for such additional examination.
+
+o. The examiner who conducted the examination interprets the polygraph charts.
+
+24. Polygraph examination rooms Rooms used regularly for polygraph examinations must be located away from distracting noises such as street and office traffic, telephones, or latrines. Examination rooms will not be located in basements or on ground floors of multistory buildings. They will also meet the following standards:
+
+a. Be about 12 feet by 12 feet, and large enough for polygraph equipment and required furniture. b. Be soundproofed. Tile with geometric design will be avoided. c. The floor will be carpeted to aid in soundproofing. d. Be equipped with an observation mirror or audio and/or visual equipment to monitor and record. e. Be air conditioned and heated. The air conditioner and heat source must operate at a low noise level. f. Have electrical outlets that contain a ground connection.
+25. Supervision and review Each polygraph examination must be reviewed by USACIDC technical supervisors of the polygraph examiner for initial quality control. The quality control element representing USACIDC conducts a final review.
+
+a. These quality control elements review all charts, reports of polygraph examinations and other investigative and operational data. These reviews are used to decide if the examination was satisfactory or if a repeat polygraph e x a m i n a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  c o n d u c t e d .  Q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  e x a m i n e r s  m a y  r e q u i r e  p o l y g r a p h  e x a m i n e r s  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e i r conclusions.
+
+b. Direct communication between polygraph examiners and quality control elements of USACIDC is authorized and encouraged.
+
+## 26. Polygraph Examination Report
+
+a. Polygraph examiners must complete a narrative report detailing the facts and circumstances surrounding each examination they conduct. This report is exempt from information control (see AR 33515). At a minimum, this report must
+(1) Contain the date the examination was authorized and conducted and the report number to which the examination pertains.
+
+(2) Identify the examinee by name, rank, social security number, unit of assignment or address, the offense under investigation, and the reason the test is being administered.
+
+(3) Contain a synopsis of the investigation and how the examinee relates to the testing issue. (4) Whether or not the examinee made any pre-test admissions. (5) The examination results. (6) Whether or not the examinee made any admissions after the test. (7) Whether or not the polygraph charts show unusual physiological responses. (8) Whether or not all parts of the examination were completed. (9) Name and serial number of the instrument or computer used.
+b. Copies of the polygraph examination report, which are attached as exhibits to reports of investigation, must be labeled: "Attached as Exhibit _____ is a Polygraph Examination Report. This exhibit will be destroyed not later than (enter date here, 3 months after the date of the report of investigation) (see AR 1956). The original, to include related polygraph records, is at the U.S. Army Crime Records Center, 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 221349998. Reproduction of this exhibit or its contents is prohibited."
+
+## 27. Procedures For Routing And Storing Polygraph Records
+
+a. Within three workdays after a USACIDC polygraph examination, the examiners will send the following documents electronically to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center (CICRPD), 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 221349998, for quality control review:
+
+(1) All polygrams collected. (2) A listing of all questions used during the examination. (3) A DA Form 2801. (4) Polygraph examination report in narrative format. (5) Polygraph examination request in memorandum or email format. (6) Polygraph examiner worksheet. b. An electronic message will be returned to the polygraph examiner of record providing the results of the quality
+control review. Upon a successful completion of the quality control review, the USACIDC examiner will provide a copy of the polygraph examination report to the supported Army element.
+
+c. When the polygraph examination is part of a USACIDC lead request, a copy of the polygraph examination report will be attached to the information report. These will be sent to the requesting USACIDC element.
+
+d. All law enforcement records that result from examinations for other agencies and are not part of the USACIDC
+report will be sent to the USACRC.
+
+e. Polygraph documents at the USACRC will be segregated from case investigative files and dossier material.
+
+## 28. Release Of Polygraph Examination Reports
+
+a. Release of polygraph results will be strictly controlled and comply with DODI 5210.91, DODD 5400.11, and DOD 5400.11R. Results of a polygraph examination apply to that data contained on the polygraph examination report. These include the following:
+
+(1) Synopsis of the examination. (2) Brief identification and background data. (3) Relevant questions asked and answered by the examinee. (4) Polygraph examiner conclusions. These concern determinations of truth or deception and any admissions made
+during the examination.
+
+b. All other records collected or connected with polygraph examinations that apply to pre-test preparations, examiner notes, polygraph worksheets, polygrams, and other technical details will not be sent outside the Army agency that conducts the examination, except as required by DODI 5210.91, DODD 5400.11, DOD 5400.11R, or a court order.
+
+c. Polygraph examination results may be released to the following: (1) The Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff, and their immediate advisers. (2) Army officials charged with (a) Counterintelligence and personnel security. (b) Law enforcement. (c) Administration of criminal justice. This includes legal counsel in judicial or administrative proceedings arising
+from the investigation.
+
+(3) DOD officials corresponding to those listed in paragraphs 28c(1) and 28c(2). (4) Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials when (a) An alleged violation of Federal or State law or a felony is shown in the results. (b) Approved for release by the Commander, USACIDC. (5) Legal counsel for the person examined, or to the person examined, on request (subject to safeguarding classified
+defense data).
+
+d. Requests for criminal investigation polygraph examination reports will be forwarded to the Director, U.S. Army Crime Records Center, USACIDC. Records will be maintained to include the date, nature, and purpose of disclosure and name and address of person or agency which received the disclosure.
+
+## 29. Polygraph Equipment Procurement Only Ncca Validated And Approved Polygraph Equipment And/Or Technologies Will Be Authorized For Operational Use. 210. Polygraph Research And Studies
+
+a. The Commander, USACIDC may request authorization from the Director of Operations, Defense Intelligence Agency to conduct research involving the use of the polygraph for criminal investigations. The following data must be provided in this request:
+
+(1) Name of agency or contractor selected to perform the research. (2) Qualification of agency or contractor. (3) Estimated cost of research. (4) Description of research and purpose. (5) Starting date and anticipated completion date. b. Routine statistics or analysis of the contents of polygraph materials or report do not constitute research for the
+purpose of this regulation.
+
+c. DA polygraph examiners may assist in authorized research and study programs.
+
+## 211. Waivers The Commander, Usacidc Authorizes Any Requests For Waivers On The Use Of The Polygraph And Examinations. Chapter 3 Selection, Training, And Supervision Of Polygraph Examiners 31. Selection
+
+a. For the position of polygraph examiner, each person must be (1) A U.S. citizen. (2) At least 25 years of age. (3) A graduate of an accredited college (or equivalent) with 2 years investigative experience (actual conduct of investigations). The experience must have been with a Government or other law enforcement agency.
+
+(4) Screened through a background or character investigation and must be found to be a sound and moral person. b. Service members must be in military occupational specialty (MOS) 311A. c. DOD civilians may be accepted by the USACIDC if eligible for accreditation as CID special agents. d. Candidate examiners are required to receive a CSP examination. This examination will be conducted by examiners of the agency quality control office or designee. This ensures that in subsequent tests on others, the candidate knows the impact and effect of the examination. The examinations will be given prior to the training courses.
+
+## 32. Training
+
+a. The basic polygraph examiners training course (7HSQIK\832ASIP9) as taught at NCCA will be the sole source of polygraph training for all applicants in accordance with DODD 5210.48.
+
+(1) Monitor the end product of intern examiners. (2) Make recommendations as to course content to the NCCA Advisory Committee. b. Each candidate will serve an internship under a certified examiner. This period will be for at least 6 months
+following the basic polygraph training course. During that period, each candidate is required to
+
+(1) Show proficiency in the use of the polygraph. (2) Conduct at least 25 examinations which have been directly supervised and monitored on site by a certified
+polygraph examiner.
+
+c. Coordinate with quality control officers to ensure that candidates enter their intern period following basic polygraph courses or at other appropriate times.
+
+d. Complete refresher or advance training at least every 2 years. e .  C o m p l e t e  8 0  h o u r s  o f  c o n t i n u i n g  e d u c a t i o n  t o  m a i n t a i n  F e d e r a l  c e r t i f i e d  p o l y g r a p h  e x a m i n e r  t r a i n i n g requirements.
+
+## 33. Applications For Training And Certification Of U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Special Agents
+
+a. The USACIDC special agents will apply for training in a memorandum. The memorandum will be routed through the applicant's chain of command to: Commander, USACIDC (CISPPEAC), 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 221349998. The applicants must meet the requirements listed in paragraph 31.
+
+(1) Special agents-in-charge and commanders will recommend approval or disapproval and give comment. Any reason(s) for disapproval will be specified.
+
+(2) Action will be taken by the Commander, USACIDC. A notification of approval or disapproval will be returned to the applicant through the chain of command.
+
+b. For certification as a polygraph examiner, applications will be prepared in a memorandum. The memorandum will be routed through the applicant's chain of command to: Commander, USACIDC (CICRPD), 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 221349998. Completion of a 6-month minimum internship during which 50 examinations were conducted is required. The examination results will have been reviewed by quality control persons at the USACRC. Evidence that the training period requirements listed in paragraph 32a have been met will also be included.
+
+(1) The Director, USACRC, as the polygraph program manager, will recommend approval or disapproval of all requests for certification. Reasons for disapproval will be given.
+
+(2) A DA Form 3833 (Polygraph Examiner Certificate) will be issued when approval is given by the Commander, USACIDC.
+
+## 34. Retention Of Certification
+
+a. Continued proficiency is required to retain certification. When an examiner is assigned other duties for more than
+6 months or does not comply with paragraph 34b, the following is required:
+(1) Completion of a refresher intern period of at least 2 months or a minimum of 15 examinations under supervision of a certified examiner.
+
+(2) Coordination with quality control prior to entry into this intern period. b. Certified examiners will conduct at least 18 polygraph examinations during a 6-month period. The following are exempt:
+(1) Examiners who direct or instruct polygraph training. (2) Polygraph quality control supervisors.
+
+## 35. Revocation Of Certification
+
+a. When a polygraph examiner's certificate is suspended or revoked, the certificate will be returned to the certifying official.
+
+b. A polygraph examiner's certificate may be suspended for failure to maintain prescribed proficiency standards. c. The following actions will be cause for withdrawal of the certification: (1) Loss of accreditation of MOS 311A. (2) Removal of military investigator badge and credentials. (3) Removal from the position or duty requirement to conduct polygraph examinations for a period of more than 6
+months.
+
+(4) Continued failure to maintain prescribed proficiency standards.
+
+36. Loss or damage of certificates Loss or damage of polygraph certificates will be handled in the same manner as prescribed for loss or damage of credential in AR 1953 and AR 38120(C).
+
+## Appendix A References Section I Required Publications Unless Otherwise Stated, Army Publications Are Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site At Http://Www. Apd.Army.Mil. Dod Publications Are Available At Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Whs/Directives/.
+
+AR 1953 Acceptance, Accreditation, and Release of United States Army Criminal Investigation Command Personnel (Cited in para 36.) AR 33515 Management Information Control System (Cited in para 26a.)
+
+## Ar 38120(C) The Army Counterintelligence Program (Cited In Para 11.)
+
+DOD 5400.11R Department of Defense Privacy Program (Cited in para 28a.) DODD 5210.48 Credibility Assessment (CA) Program (Cited in para 14b(2).) DODD 5400.11 DOD Privacy Program (Cited in para 28a.) DODI 5210.91 Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures (Cited in para 14c(1).)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications A Related Publication Is A Source Of Additional Information. The User Does Not Have To Read It To Understand The Publication. Ar 112 Managers' Internal Control Program Ar 2530 The Army Publishing Program National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2004 Public Law 108136 (Available At Http://Www.Gpo.Gov.) National Security Act Of 1947 Public Law 80253
+
+10 USC Armed Forces 18 USC Crimes and Criminal Procedure 32 USC National Guard
+
+## Section Iii Prescribed Forms Unless Otherwise Indicated, Da Forms Are Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site (Http://Www.Apd. Army.Mil).
+
+DA Form 2801 Polygraph Examination Statement of Consent (Prescribed in para 23f.)
+
+## Da Form 2805 Polygraph Examination Authorization (Prescribed In Para 21.)
+
+DA Form 3833 Polygraph Examiner Certificate (Prescribed in para 33b(2).) (Stocked and issued through USACIDC.)
+
+## Section Iv Referenced Forms Unless Otherwise Indicated, Da Forms Are Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site (Http://Www.Apd. Army.Mil).
+
+DA Form 112 Internal Control Evaluation Certification DA Form 2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
+
+## Da Form 3881 Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate Appendix B Internal Control Evaluation B1. Function The Function Covered By This Evaluation Is Da Polygraph Activities.
+
+B2. Purpose The purpose of this evaluation is to assist evidence handlers, evidence custodians, evidence room inspectors, leaders, and commanders in evaluating the key internal controls listed. It is intended as a guide and does not cover all controls. B3. Instructions Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 112 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).
+
+## B4. Test Questions
+
+a. Does an individual selected for polygraph examiner training meet the requirements as specified in paragraph 31? b. Is the NCCA the sole source of basic polygraph examiner training? c. Did the polygraph examiner complete a 6 month internship prior to certification? d. Did the polygraph examiner conduct at least 25 examinations under the supervision of a certified examiner during
+an internship?
+
+e. Did the polygraph examiner receive refresher or advanced polygraph training at least every 2 years? f. When assigned to other duties for more than 6 months, did the polygraph examiner complete a refresher internship
+period of at least 2 months when they returned to polygraph examiner duties?
+
+g. Are all polygraph examinations authorized in accordance with paragraph 21? h. Did the polygraph examiner evaluate each examinees for suitability prior to and during the pre-instrument phase? i. Are DA Forms 2801 (or the translation into English of the information documented within DA Form 2801) used
+by polygraph examiners to record the examinees' consent in criminal and counterintelligence investigations and exculpatory polygraph examinations?
+
+j. Did the polygraph examiner identify examination results as preliminary until completion of a satisfactory quality control review?
+
+k. Are polygraph reports provided to supported Army element only after completion of a satisfactory quality control?
+
+l. Are polygraph examination reports and documents dispatched to quality control within 3 workdays from the date of examination?
+
+m. Are only those officials identified in paragraph 28 provided polygraph examination results? n. Are non-record copies of the polygraph report attached as exhibits to the reports annotated with the appropriate destruction statement specified in paragraph 26?
+
+o. Are personnel security CI scope polygraph examinations of National Security Agency assignees authorized only after receipt of documentation verifying examinee employment, assignment, or detail to National Security Agency?
+
+p. Are personnel security CI scope DOD polygraph examinations authorized prior to testing? q. Are individuals who declined personnel security investigation polygraph examinations eligible for positions that have not been determined to require a polygraph examination?
+
+r. Do polygraph examiners advise examinees of their privilege against self-incrimination and right to legal counsel prior to the conduct of personnel security related polygraph examinations?
+
+s. Are examinees of unresolved deceptive personnel security CI scope polygraph examinations afforded the opportunity to undergo additional polygraph testing?
+
+t. Are the requirements set forth in AR 1956 met prior to denying an individual access to designated classified information based on unresolved deceptive personnel security CI scope polygraph examinations?
+
+u. Do all polygraph examinations receive a quality control review by the USACIDC or USAI polygraph quality control office?
+
+v. Is a "blind" analysis of the polygrams collected during an examination performed during the quality control review?
+
+w. Are polygraph test questions that are used during an examination reviewed and evaluated during the quality control review?
+
+x. Are polygraph examination documents reviewed to ensure proper polygraph technique was used? y. Are polygraph examination documents reviewed for administrative sufficiency? z. Is the use of DA Forms 2801 (when applicable) and the DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate) verified?
+
+aa. Are statistical records maintained on the performance of polygraph examiners?
+
+## B5. Supersession Not Applicable.
+
+B6. Comments Help make this a better tool for evaluating internal controls. Submit comments to the Provost Marshal General (DAPMMPOPS), 2800 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203102800.
+
+## Glossary Section I Abbreviations Ar Army Regulation Ci Counterintelligence Cid Criminal Investigation Division Csp Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph Da Department Of The Army Dod Department Of Defense Dodd Department Of Defense Directive Dodi Department Of Defense Instruction Inscom U.S. Army Intelligence And Security Command Mos Military Occupational Specialty Ncca National Center For Credibility Assessment Ucmj Uniform Code Of Military Justice Usacidc U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Usacrc U.S. Army Crime Records Center Usai U.S. Army Intelligence Usc United States Code Section Ii Terms
+
+Counterintelligence Those intelligence activities intended to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile intelligence collection, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person operating to the detriment of the Army.
+
+## Cryptologic Information Information Pertaining To The Production Of Signals Intelligence And Maintenance Of Communications Security. Foreign Intelligence Information Relating To The Capabilities, Intentions, And Activities Of Foreign Powers, Organizations, Or Persons. Foreign Nationals All Persons Who Are Neither Citizens, Nor Immigrant Aliens To The United States.
+
+Polygram Paper of any length from a polygraph instrument that reflects calibration procedures or physiological tracings of an examinee. Polygraph examination Questioning and other processing of an examinee before the actual use of the polygraph instrument; the use of the polygraph instrument with respect to such examinee; and any questioning or other processing involving the examinee after the use of the polygraph instrument. Specifically, examinations consist of three phases: pre-instrument portion, instrument portion, and post instrument portion. Polygraph examination results A synopsis of the polygraph examination that normally includes a brief identification and background information, the relevant questions asked, the examinee's answers, the examiner's opinions concerning the indication of truthfulness or deception, any admissions made by the examinee during the examination. Polygraph examination report The complete, detailed memorandum formatted report prepared by the polygraph examiner as prescribed by USACIDC and INSCOM including pre-instrument preparations, the examiner's notes, polygram, and other technical details of the polygraph examination. Polygraph instrument A diagnostic instrument capable of measuring and recording, as a minimum, respiration, electrodermal, blood volume, and heart rate response to verbal and or visual stimuli.
+
+## Relevant Question A Polygraph Question Pertaining Directly To The Matter Under Investigation For Which The Examinee Is Being Tested. Technical Question A Question That Refers To Any Other Question Asked By The Examiner During The Instrument Portion Of The Examination.
+
+Third Agency Limitation (Third Agency Rule) The governing rule that states that, except as provided in Section 102, National Security Act of 1947, classified information originating in one U.S. agency (for example, DOD) will not be disseminated by another agency to which the information has been made available without the consent of the originating agency.
+
+## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries.

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+## Security Communications Security Monitoring
+
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 23 December 2011
+
+## Summary Of Change Ar 38053 Communications Security Monitoring
+
+This major revision, dated 23 December 2011--
+
+o Renames Land Information Warfare Activity to 1st Information Operations
+Command (para 1-4e(3)).
+o Explains specific communications security monitoring activities (chap 2).
+o Identifies the new military occupational specialties for communications
+security monitoring (para 2-4h(2)).
+o Adds information operations Red Team activities (chap 3). o Removes the requirement to obtain permission from the Assistant Secretary of
+Defense for Networks and Information Integration to conduct communications security monitoring in the National Capital Region (throughout).
+o Makes administrative changes (throughout).
+
+## Security Communications Security Monitoring
+
+contained in this regulation may be modified by the proponent.
+
+S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .  S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 (DAMICDS), 1000 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203101000.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d B l a n k  F o r m s )  d i r e c t l y  t o  H e a d q u a r t e r s , Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of S t a f f ,  G - 2  ( D A M I - C D S ) ,  1 0 0 0  A r m y Pentagon, Washington, DC 203101000.
+
+H i s t o r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i s  a  m a j o r revision.
+
+S u m m a r y .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  p r e s c r i b e s U.S. Army policy for communications security monitoring. It implements NTISSD 600 and DODI 8560.01.
+
+Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a n d  t h e  U . S .  A r m y Reserve.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+
+The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a division chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s a n d m u s t i n c l u d e f o r m a l  r e v i e w  b y  t h e  a c t i v i t y ' s  s e n i o r legal officer. All waiver requests will be e n d o r s e d  b y  t h e  c o m m a n d e r  o r  s e n i o r leader of the requesting activity and forwarded through their higher headquarters t o  t h e  p o l i c y  p r o p o n e n t .  R e f e r  t o  A R 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix C).
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  a c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. During mobilization or national emergency, chapters and policies
+
+## Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
+Responsibilities - 14, page 1
+Chapter 2 Objectives and Requirements, page 2
+Introduction - 21, page 2
+Objectives - 22, page 3 Authorization to conduct communications security monitoring - 23, page 3
+Prerequisites - 24, page 3
+Training and standards for communications security monitoring - 25, page 4
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Certification of notification procedures - 26, page 5 Use of monitoring products - 27, page 5 Acquisition of signals during maintenance and testing - 28, page 7 Foreign language communications - 29, page 7 Conduct of communications security monitoring, information operations Red Team activities, and Computer Defense Assistance Program - 210, page 7
+Prohibitions on communications security monitoring, information operations Red Team, or penetration testing - 211, page 7
+Communications security monitoring operations - 212, page 7 Communications security monitoring working materials - 213, page 8
+Communications security monitoring reports - 214, page 9 Safeguarding communications security monitoring equipment - 215, page 9
+Chapter 3 Information Operations Red Team, page 10
+Explanation - 31, page 10
+Attributes of effective Red Team activities - 32, page 10
+Authorization to conduct red teaming - 33, page 10 Training and standards for Red Team activities - 34, page 10 Red Team operations - 35, page 11
+Red teaming reports - 36, page 12
+Chapter 4 Computer Defense Association Program, page 12
+Introduction - 41, page 12
+Objective - 42, page 12 Scope - 43, page 12 Authorization - 44, page 13 Computer Defense Association Program - 45, page 13
+Computer Defense Association Program network assistance visit - 46, page 14
+Penetration testing scope - 47, page 15 Computer Defense Assistance Program persistent penetration testing - 48, page 15
+Chapter 5 Reporting violations, page 16
+Oversight - 51, page 16 Reporting violations - 52, page 16
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 17
+B.
+Forms of Monitoring Notification, page 20
+C.
+Internal Control Evaluation, page 20
+
+## Figure List
+
+Figure 41: Program organization and structure, page 15
+
+## Glossary
+
+11. Purpose This regulation sets forth policies, responsibilities, and procedures for conducting communications security (COMSEC) monitoring, information operations (IO) Red Team activities, and Computer Defense Association Program (CDAP) activities within the Army and in support of Joint and combined operations and activities. This regulation implements Department of Defense instruction (DODI) 8560.01 and National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Directive (NTISSD) 600. The principles of this regulation apply to all forms of COMSEC monitoring conducted by Army elements.
+
+## 12. References Required And Related Publications And Prescribed And Referenced Forms Are Listed In Appendix A. 13. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms Abbreviations And Special Terms Used In This Regulation Are Explained In The Glossary.
+
+14. Responsibilities a. General Counsel. The GC will (1) Review Department of the Army COMSEC monitoring policy for compliance with public law and national and Department of Defense (DOD) policies and regulations.
+
+(2) Review and certify, in writing, biennially, that COMSEC monitoring notification procedures in effect are adequate throughout the Army.
+
+(3) Review and approve COMSEC monitoring results for court use, in the event such results must be used for criminal prosecution.
+
+(4) Review all requests for proposed COMSEC monitoring exercises, to include requests that are not based on an Army command (ACOM), Army service component command (ASCC), or direct reporting unit (DRU) request for approval (granted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 (DCS, G2)).
+
+b. The Judge Advocate General. TJAG will review all ACOM, ASCC, and DRU requests to conduct COMSEC
+monitoring exercises prior to DCS, G2 approval.
+
+c. The Inspector General. TIG will provide oversight of the Army's COMSEC monitoring program to ensure regulatory compliance.
+
+d. Deputy Chief of Staff, G2. As the Secretary of the Army's single designee for COMSEC monitoring, the DCS, G2 will
+(1) Develop, promulgate, and maintain Army COMSEC monitoring policy. (2) Grant waivers and exceptions to Army COMSEC monitoring policy after obtaining legal review from the GC
+and TJAG.
+
+(3) Review and approve biennial requests from ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs to perform COMSEC monitoring. (4) Certify the adequacy of Army COMSEC monitoring notification procedures of other DOD agencies when the Army monitoring elements operate jointly with DOD in support of Joint, combined, or multinational operations.
+
+(5) Represent and defend the Army's interests pertaining to COMSEC monitoring at national and DOD Service meetings and working groups.
+
+(6) Notify ACOM, ASCC, and DRU commanders before authorizing COMSEC monitoring that is not based on an ACOM, ASCC, or DRU request.
+
+e. Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. The CG, INSCOM will (1) Provide Army support to the Joint COMSEC monitoring activity according to the most current Joint COMSEC
+monitoring activity memorandum of agreement.
+
+(2) Develop and disseminate the Army's techniques for conducting COMSEC monitoring.
+
+(3) Through the commander, 1st Information Operations Command (1st IO CMD), develop and disseminate for the Army, techniques and procedures for conducting Information System (IS) security penetration and verification testing as it pertains to applicable phases of CDAP (see chap 4).
+
+f. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The CG, TRADOC will (1) Develop, produce, and maintain an exportable standardized COMSEC monitoring training package to address the provisions of this regulation.
+
+(2) Coordinate with the CG, INSCOM to incorporate results outlined in paragraphs 14e(2) and 14e(3) into the standardized training package.
+
+g. Chief Information Officer/G6. The CIO/G6 maintains overall responsibility and oversight for policy and management of the Army computer emergency response team (ACERT) program. The CIO/G6 will
+(1) Promulgate rules and procedures in AR 251 and AR 252, outlining system and network administrators'
+responsibilities (vulnerability analysis) to keep the Army's IS operational and secure.
+
+(2) Develop plans and policies to implement procedural and material protective measures and to validate requirements for protecting Army computers, communications, and command and control.
+
+(3) Act as the Army's focal point for command and control protect. h. Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The AASA (Director of Security Services) will
+(1) Act as the ACOM, ASCC, and DRU head to ensure Secretariat, Army Staff, and field operating agency COMSEC monitoring compliance.
+
+(2) Ensure COMSEC monitoring notification procedures are implemented and upheld (see paras 26 and 210). (3) Request authority to conduct COMSEC monitoring (see para 23). (4) Ensure personnel authorized to conduct COMSEC monitoring comply with the provisions of this regulation. (5) Ensure COMSEC monitoring products are used for their intended security purposes (see para 27). i. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7. The DCS, G3/5/7 will (1) Act as the Army Staff's operational focal point for IO.
+
+(2) Exercise operational tasking authority over the 1st IO CMD, to include prioritization and validation of requests for 1st IO CMD COMSEC monitoring support.
+
+j. Commanders of Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units. The commanders of ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs will
+(1) Ensure COMSEC monitoring notification procedures are implemented and upheld (see paras 26 and 210). (2) Request authority to conduct COMSEC monitoring (see para 23). (3) Ensure personnel authorized to conduct COMSEC monitoring comply with the provisions of this regulation (see para 210).
+
+(4) Ensure COMSEC monitoring products are used for their intended security purposes (see para 27). k. Commanders at all levels. The commanders will (1) Ensure COMSEC monitoring results are used only for their intended security purposes (see para 214). (2) Ensure a comprehensive and continuing COMSEC monitoring notification program is in effect (see paras 26
+and 27).
+
+(3) Ensure critical information is made available to COMSEC monitoring teams (see AR 5301). (4) Provide the necessary facilities and support (including security of COMSEC monitoring equipment and working materials) required by the monitoring element for the conduct of the mission.
+
+## Chapter 2 Objectives And Requirements
+
+21. Introduction a. DOD telecommunications systems are provided for official Government communications. When these systems are used by the Army components, they are subject to COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and penetration testing as explained in this regulation.
+
+b. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and penetration testing will be completed in a manner that satisfies the legitimate needs of the Army. Activities will be conducted to minimize the monitoring (purposely or inadvertently) of telecommunications not related to security objectives and will be performed in a manner that protects to the greatest degree possible the privacy and civil liberties of individuals whose telecommunications are subject to monitoring.
+
+c. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and penetration testing are vulnerability assessment techniques that provide essential information not available through other sources for evaluating security within the Army.
+
+d. COMSEC monitoring as discussed in this regulation does not pertain to the following: (1) The interception of wire and oral communications for law enforcement (LE) purposes as described in AR
+19053.
+
+(2) Operations center communications monitoring as described in AR 19030. (3) Electronic surveillance as described in AR 38110. (4) Technical surveillance countermeasures. (5) TEMPEST (see glossary, sec II) as described in AR 38027. (6) Counterintelligence (CI) investigations. (7) Radio communications monitoring by net control stations to enforce net discipline.
+
+(8) System and network administrators performing defensive IO functions to keep their own automated IS infrastructure operational and secure. This exemption is limited to performing vulnerability analysis of the operating systems of the IS directly under the control of the system and/or network administrators.
+
+(9) Use of intrusion detection systems on the IS when the intrusion detection system is only used to monitor communications protocols, systems control information, and specific command and control, or words associated with commonly accepted or known penetration techniques.
+
+(10) Research and evaluation development testing of the Army's telecommunications and IS, when such activities are performed in a lab environment using test-generated users or data.
+
+(11) Classification of information as described in AR 3805.
+
+22. Objectives COMSEC monitoring is undertaken to
+a. Collect operational signals needed to measure the degree of security being achieved by encryption, cryptographic equipment and devices, COMSEC techniques, and operations security (OPSEC) countermeasures.
+
+b. Provide a basis from which to assess the type and value of information subject to loss through intercept and exploitation of official Government telecommunications.
+
+c. Provide an empirical basis for improving the security of Army telecommunications against signals intelligence and other data exploitation.
+
+d. Assist in determining the effectiveness of electronic attack; electronic protect, cover, and deception actions;
+electronic warfare support; and OPSEC measures.
+
+e. Identify Army telecommunications signals that exhibit unique external signal parameters, signal structures, modulation schemes, radio fingerprints, and so forth that could provide adversaries the capability to identify specific targets for subsequent geopositioning and exploitation purposes.
+
+f. Provide empirical data to properly train users of Army telecommunications systems on COMSEC techniques and measures.
+
+g. Evaluate the effectiveness of Army COMSEC education and training programs. h. Support defensive IO by identifying, verifying, and evaluating Army telecommunications and IS to exploit, degrade, or neutralize susceptibilities attempts.
+
+23. Authorization to conduct communications security monitoring COMSEC monitoring operations may be performed under the provisions of this regulation at the commander's discretion throughout the 2year approval cycle, provided the GC has certified adequacy of the command's notification procedures and the DCS, G2 has granted the command the authority to conduct the monitoring (see para 26a(1)).
+
+24. Prerequisites The following must occur before COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and penetration testing can take place:
+a. Users of official DOD telecommunications will be given notice that (1) Passing classified information over nonsecure DOD telecommunications systems (other than protected distribution systems or automated information systems accredited for processing classified information) is prohibited.
+
+(2) Official DOD telecommunications systems are subject to monitoring at all times. (3) Use of official DOD telecommunications systems constitutes consent by the user to monitoring at any time.
+
+b. The GC has certified the adequacy of the notification procedures in effect, and the GC and TJAG have given favorable legal review of any proposed COMSEC monitoring that is not based on an ACOM, ASCC, or DRU request.
+
+c. The DCS, G2 has authorized monitoring to be conducted within the ACOM, ASCC, or DRU involved. d. Monitoring telecommunications systems of U.S. Government contractors at their own facilities require the express written approval of the chief executive officer or designee of the company. Requests for such monitoring will include a statement from the chief executive officer or designee outlining the notification procedures that have been implemented within the contractor's organization to afford notice to the contractor's employees (see para 24a). Such requests will be forwarded through command channels to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) for action. The DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) will obtain a legal review from TJAG and GC prior to taking any action. Requests must arrive at the DCS, G2 a minimum of 45 days prior to the date the monitoring is desired. The contractor's chief executive officer's approval is not required to monitor contractors who are performing duties in U.S. Government-controlled facilities.
+
+e. Monitoring will not be conducted by Army personnel (Soldiers, civilians, or contractors employed by the Army)
+on the telecommunications of another DOD component without the express written approval of the head (or designee) of that department or agency, unless the other DOD component is conducting the monitoring and Army personnel are serving only in a subordinate role.
+
+f. One ACOM, ASCC, or DRU will not monitor the telecommunications or conduct IS penetration testing of another ACOM, ASCC, or DRU without the consent of that ACOM, ASCC, or DRU. The exception to this restriction is when the activity is directed by the DCS, G2.
+
+g. Special attention will be provided to ensure monitoring operations avoid or filter out communications containing
+privileged doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and chaplain-petitioner information.
+h. Army COMSEC monitoring operations may be conducted only by the following personnel (Soldiers, civilians, or
+contractors):
+(1) Properly trained and certified personnel. (2) COMSEC monitoring personnel who possess the following military occupational specialties (MOS): (a) Enlisted Soldiers in career management field 35.
+(b) Warrant officers in MOS 350 or MOS 352. (c) Commissioned officers in career management field 35.
+(d) Personnel who have held MOS 05G or MOS 97G.
+(3) Civilian intelligence specialists (IA0132) and security specialists (IA0080) assigned to monitoring billets. (4) Contractors whose statement of work specifically addresses COMSEC monitoring. i. All personnel conducting the Army COMSEC monitoring operations will acquire and maintain a security clearance based on a single scope background investigation.
+25. Training and standards for communications security monitoring COMSEC monitoring and related activities will be conducted in strict compliance with this regulation. Each individual involved in the conduct (collection and analysis) of COMSEC monitoring will receive formal training before participating in monitoring or penetration operations. All personnel will be knowledgeable and able to implement the provisions set forth in the following paragraphs, as instructed by a senior COMSEC certified person.
+
+a. At a minimum, personnel will be trained on the following: (1) The provisions of this regulation, with particular emphasis on chapter 2. (2) The provisions of AR 38110. (3) The provisions of AR 38112. b. Formal training requirements to conduct monitoring operations may be fulfilled through either of the following: (1) Completion of a DOD COMSEC monitoring course. (2) Completion of an internal command training program using approved TRADOC course materials. The execution of command training programs will be approved by the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS).
+
+c. For monitoring operations, the first lieutenant colonel (O5) or civilian equivalent (GS14) in the individual's chain of command will certify, in writing, the individual has been trained. A copy of this certification will be maintained on file at the monitoring unit, available for inspection by any inspector general (IG), oversight officer, or command inspector. Copies of these certifications will be provided to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) upon request.
+
+d. When required, trained COMSEC monitoring mission supervisors may augment the COMSEC monitoring team's efforts with nontrained technical resources, provided
+(1) The mission supervisor informs all nontrained personnel on the restrictions applied to COMSEC monitoring operations.
+
+(2) All nontrained personnel work directly under a trained COMSEC monitoring supervisor. ( 3 )  T h e  u s e  o f  n o n t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l  i s  a p p r o v e d  o n  a  c a s e - b y - c a s e  b a s i s  b y  t h e  A C O M ,  A S C C ,  o r  D R U
+commander.
+
+e. Personnel participating in COMSEC monitoring will annually receive unit-level refresher training.
+
+f. All personnel will cooperate fully with the Army and DOD GCs, intelligence oversight officers, and IGs, and will allow them access to all information necessary to perform their oversight responsibilities.
+
+g. COMSEC monitoring equipment training will use signals that are subject to COMSEC monitoring, whenever possible. When those signals are not available, training in the use of COMSEC monitoring equipment may be conducted using those signals identified in paragraph 28a. When those signals identified in paragraph 28a are used to conduct COMSEC monitoring training, the following restrictions apply:
+(1) The signal acquisition will be limited in extent and duration necessary to train personnel in the use of the equipment.
+
+(2) No particular U.S. person's communications will be targeted without the specific written consent of that person. (3) The content of the telecommunications will be (a) Retained only when actually needed for training purposes.
+
+(b) Disseminated only to persons conducting or participating in the training, except as provided in paragraph 27. (c) Destroyed immediately upon completion of the training.
+
+h .  W a i v e r s  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  p a r a g r a p h  2 - 5  w i l l  b e  g r a n t e d  o n  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  b a s i s  b y  t h e  D C S ,  G - 2
+(DAMICDS).
+
+26. Certification of notification procedures ACOM, ASCC, and DRU commanders will implement procedures to ensure all personnel are aware of the provisions of this regulation. Commanders must verify that their notification procedures are adequate.
+
+a. Certification.
+
+(1) The ACOM, ASCC, and DRU commanders will submit requests for certification to Headquarters, Department of the Army, DCS, G2 (DAMICDS), 1000 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203101000. Requests will arrive no later than 15 July of each odd-numbered year. Approval periods will run from 1 October (of each odd-numbered year) or date of certification by the GC (whichever is later) through 30 September (of the next odd-numbered year) to correspond with the fiscal year. Requests will include a detailed description of the notification procedures within the ACOM, ASCC, or DRU including the following:
+(a) The exact wording of the warning notice on telephone directories. (b) The exact wording of the banner notice on IS. (c) The exact wording of the notice published quarterly in command bulletins, on command email (unclassified and classified), and similar publications and systems.
+
+(d) A statement that DD Form 2056 (Telephone Monitoring Notification Decal) has been applied to all telephones and facsimile machines.
+
+(e) A statement that command inprocessing includes a briefing that informs personnel that use of official telecommunications systems constitutes consent to monitoring.
+
+(f) The identification of any other notification procedures used. (2) The DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) will review all requests to verify the presence of required information. The requests will be consolidated and forwarded to the GC for legal certification.
+
+(3) Upon certification by the GC, the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) will grant approval for the ACOM, ASCC, or DRU
+to conduct COMSEC monitoring.
+
+b. Forms of notification.
+
+(1) Mandatory forms of notification. (a) Telephone or communications directory notice. Official Army telephone or communications directories, if published, will display the appropriate notice on the front cover or prominently within the general information section (see app B1).
+
+(b) DD Form 2056.
+
+1. The DD Form 2056 will be applied to the front of all telephones (except tactical, cellular telephones, and portable electronic devices) within the Army.
+
+2. The DD Form 2056 will also be applied to the front of all secure telephone equipment, and so forth; however, the banner at the top of the form containing the words "DO NOT DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION" will be removed or obliterated.
+
+3. The DD Form 2056 will be applied to the front of all data facsimile devices except those that are an internal part of another device (for example, a facsimile card in a personal computer). The DD Form 2056 will also be applied to the front of all secure data facsimile devices, but the words "DO NOT DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION" will be removed.
+
+(c) Computer logon, banner notice. See AR 252 for specific policy on the banner. (d) Periodic notices. Periodic notices will be published at least quarterly in command bulletins (see wording in app B1) via command unclassified and classified email and in similar publications and systems.
+
+(2) *Optional forms of notification.* Optional forms of notification include the following:
+(a) Periodic briefings and training classes for all assigned personnel. (b) Special memorandums from the commander or responsible senior staff officer to all personnel. (c) Local notification and consent procedures. ( d )  S t a t e m e n t s  i n  s t a n d i n g  o p e r a t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s ,  s i g n a l  o p e r a t i o n  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  a n d  s i m i l a r  p u b l i c a t i o n s  o r documents.
+
+(e) The statement in appendix B2 may be placed on facsimile cover sheets. (3) *Waiver of mandatory forms of notification.* Requests for waivers to the mandatory forms of notification will be forwarded to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) for action.
+
+27. Use of monitoring products Communications security monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP products will be used only in pursuit of security objectives, except that
+a. Information obtained either by COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, or CDAP may be used in connection with disciplinary or administrative action against Army personnel for knowing, willful, or negligent actions that result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information (see AR 3805). In this case, the COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element is authorized to release names and recorded media regarding the telecommunications involved to the supported commander or designated representative for use as evidence. Procedures will be strictly adhered to as follows:
+(1) The supported commander, after having consulted with the servicing judge advocate, will provide the COMSEC
+monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element with a written request, specifically identifying the telecommunications messages or communications required. The request will identify the servicing judge advocate consulted.
+
+(2) The COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element will obtain a signed receipt from the supported commander or designated representative for the requested materials. The receipt will include a statement that the commander or representative is familiar with, and will comply with, the security requirements and privacy restrictions applicable to the material.
+
+(3) The COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP unit commander will notify the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS), in writing, within 5 working days of providing the material to the supported command.
+
+b. Information may be obtained incidental to an authorized COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activity, or CDAP
+mission that relates directly to a serious crime such as sabotage or threats or plans to commit offenses that threaten a life or could cause significant damage to or loss of official U.S. Government property (this includes data on official U.S. Government IS). This information will be reported immediately by the senior member of the COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP team element present when the information is discovered.
+
+(1) The commander of the COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element releasing the recorded media containing suspected criminal activity will notify the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS), in writing, of the circumstances within 24 hours of release of the material. The DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) will subsequently notify the GC. Notification will include the following:
+(a) Nature of the suspected offense.
+
+(b) Identification of the material released. (c) Date, time, and location where information was obtained.
+
+(d) Anticipated action resulting from disclosure of the information.
+
+(e) Location, name, and telephone number of the responsible individual where the materials are being held.
+
+Note. Names or other data sufficient to identify any individuals who participated in the monitored communication will not be included in the report.
+
+(2) When evaluating or assessing the security of Army IS, the COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP
+element may detect computer anomalies that could potentially be unauthorized intrusions into and from Army IS. When COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP elements detect such anomalies, they must contact the systems administrator and/or information assurance security officer, or information assurance manager and regional computer emergency response team (RCERT) immediately. If the RCERT is not available then the systems administrator and/or network administrator, and/or information assurance security officer will contact the ACERT directly. In addition, report per local supervisory reporting policies in effect. The system administrator and/or RCERT will then follow the procedures of AR 252 for incident and intrusion reporting by taking measures to ascertain whether the anomaly is in fact an unauthorized intrusion, and by notifying CI and the criminal investigation division so that those organizations may conduct an investigation of the incident. The COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP elements will not investigate and must discontinue monitoring the suspected intrusion as soon as the system administrator or RCERT is notified.
+
+c. Whenever any information is officially reported to the commander under paragraphs 27a and 27b, above
+(1) Stop all COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, or CDAP testing of the frequency, circuit, network, node, and/or individual device (unless under the exception of para 27b(2)) over which the information was obtained. Monitoring will not resume until
+(a) All actions by the commander or LE agency related to the incident have been completed.
+
+(b) The party involved in the incident no longer has access to the circuit, frequency, or network. (c) The commander has authorized resumption of the mission.
+
+(2) The COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element team leader will immediately identify, mark as working papers, classify at a minimum of "Confidential," segregate, hold in suspense, and protect all recording media pertaining to the incident. If these materials are required for evidence, the following procedures will be used:
+(a) The investigating commander or LE agency will request the recorded media, in writing, after having consulted with the local servicing judge advocate.
+
+(b) COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP element leader will obtain a signed receipt from the supported commander or designated representative for the requested materials. The receipt will include a statement that the commander or representative is familiar with, and will comply with, security requirements and privacy restrictions.
+
+(c) The requesting agency will be informed that the recorded media will be returned to the monitoring element for final disposition when the materials are no longer required as evidence.
+
+(3) The results of COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP may not be used in a criminal prosecution without prior consultation with the GC and TJAG.
+
+28. Acquisition of signals during maintenance and testing
+Maintenance and calibration of COMSEC monitoring equipment may require the acquisition of signals by maintenance personnel.
+a. The following signals may be used without restriction: (1) Laboratory-generated signals. (2) Communications signals with the consent of all parties involved. (3) Commercial and public service broadcasts. (4) Noncommunication signals such as beacons, telemetry, and radar. b. Requests to use signals other than those listed above will be forwarded to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS) for action.
+29. Foreign language communications a. Translation of foreign language conversations, messages, or data files that are recorded on official U.S. Government-owned or U.S. Government-leased telecommunication systems under the authority of this regulation is authorized.
+
+b. Such communications may be translated by (1) A U.S. person with an appropriate U.S. security clearance. (2) A foreign national employee of the U.S. Armed Forces with a limited access authorization for this purpose (see AR 38067).
+
+c. Translation must be done under the direct supervision of COMSEC monitoring personnel. Recordings and other working materials, including translations, will not be released outside the monitoring element, except as provided in paragraph 27 of this regulation. Transcripts will be treated as COMSEC monitoring working materials.
+
+210. Conduct of communications security monitoring, information operations Red Team activities, and Computer Defense Assistance Program a. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP may be conducted only for certified ACOMs, ASCCs, or DRUs that have notification procedures in place and approved by the GC, and when authorized by the DCS, G2.
+
+b. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP will be conducted only in support of security objectives. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP will not be performed to support LE, criminal, or CI investigations.
+
+c. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP will be conducted in (1) The least-intrusive manner possible. (2) A way that minimizes the monitoring of communications not relevant to security objectives. (3) A manner that ensures maximum privacy consistent with monitoring objectives. d. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team activities, and CDAP conducted by Army elements in support of Joint or combined operations and activities will be conducted in accordance with Joint or combined COMSEC monitoring and information assurance procedures, as long as those procedures have been reviewed and approved by the appropriate legal counsel.
+
+211. Prohibitions on communications security monitoring, information operations Red Team, or penetration testing a. COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP activities, or the products of such activities, will not be used to enforce DOD policy limiting the use of official DOD telecommunications systems to the conduct of official business.
+
+b. The results of COMSEC monitoring, IO Red Team, or CDAP activities will not be used to produce foreign intelligence or CI, as defined in executive order 12333 (EO 12333).
+
+c. Credentialed CI and LE personnel are prohibited from performing or participating in COMSEC monitoring, IO
+Red Team, or CDAP activities. CI personnel filling technical surveillance countermeasures billets are exempted from this provision.
+
+212. Communications security monitoring operations COMSEC monitoring operations include monitoring and/or recording telecommunications as well as the analysis of the material obtained.
+
+a. COMSEC monitoring will be limited to official DOD telecommunications systems that are owned or leased by the U.S. Government for use by DOD personnel or the military departments.
+
+b. Communications conducted over DOD telecommunications systems are assumed to be official communications subject to monitoring. However, recorded telecommunications will not be retained for a period greater than 30 days or disseminated if telecommunications have no relation to COMSEC monitoring objectives (except related to a crime) (see paras 22 and 27b).
+
+c. COMSEC monitoring of wire line telephone systems will be conducted by bridging telephone lines before the point of connection between the DOD lines and the outside lines, as done at the main distribution frame. DOD
+telecommunications may not be monitored when combined, multiplexed, or otherwise mixed with non-DOD telecommunications in such a way that monitoring of the non-DOD telecommunications is likely.
+
+d. COMSEC monitoring of radio transmissions (other than those associated with cellular telephone systems) such as single channel voice radio, microwave, or similar means, will be limited to circuits dedicated only to DOD use and to transmissions that are sent and received by transmitting and receiving facilities dedicated to DOD use. No incidentally acquired non-DOD communication will be further monitored when it is determined that it is a non-DOD communication. A record of the inadvertently acquired information may be kept for signal identification and avoidance purposes; the record may describe the signal parameters (frequency, modulation, type, and timing) but will not identify the parties to the communication or contain any portion of the communication content between the parties.
+
+e. COMSEC monitoring of trunked circuits (in which communication devices share the same frequency, but are divided into channels at a central control point) must be conducted on those circuits exclusive to the requesting ACOM, ASCC, or DRU. If units other than the requesting unit are using the trunked radio system, the commander(s) of the other using unit(s) must grant permission, in writing, for the COMSEC monitoring on the trunked circuits. The written permission(s) will be attached to the initial request.
+
+f. COMSEC monitoring of other signals such as wireless computer networking devices, wireless voice over internet protocol, personal area network devices ("hands-free"), wireless peripheral devices, will be limited to circuits dedicated only to DOD use and to transmissions that are sent and received by transmitting and receiving facilities dedicated to DOD use.
+
+g. COMSEC monitoring of cellular telephone systems will employ signal collection equipment that incorporates special design features that allow for the targeting of specific command cellular telephone numbers. The equipment will be programmed by the user to activate only on calls made to and from command-owned or command-leased cellular telephones. At no time will cellular telephone transmissions be monitored or collected using techniques that do not allow for filtering of non-DA or non-DOD cellular phone signals.
+
+h. COMSEC monitoring of IS (for example, email and data transfer) will employ monitoring technologies designed to intercept network subscribers' incoming and outgoing messages or data. COMSEC monitoring will only be conducted on a network that originates or terminates on a DOD-owned or DOD-leased telecommunication. COMSEC monitoring of networks will not be performed with the intent to identify, track, or locate unauthorized users.
+
+i. Procedures for conducting automated information systems penetration testing will be developed and disseminated by 1st IO CMD. This may include, but is not limited to, the following:
+(1) Use of a wardialer or similar device to determine the presence of telephonic carrier devices connected to land line telephones being used by the monitored unit. COMSEC monitoring will be performed only on those telephone numbers positively identified as belonging to the unit being monitored. No other telephone numbers will be retained for any purpose.
+
+(2) A wardialer is defined as software or hardware designed to dial a specified set of telephone numbers to determine the presence of telephonic carrier devices. These devices include, but are not limited to, modems and facsimile machines.
+
+(3) Placing a network security monitor on the unit's network to perform searches of data traversing the system. Key word searches may be used as an analysis and time management tool. Selected key words may include standard terms associated with the identification of classified information and words directly relating to the supported unit's critical information list or other mission objectives.
+
+(4) Keystroke-capturing software or devices will only be used on the host computer. No keystroke capturing software or device will allow for remote access by outside computers.
+
+j. Telecommunications selected for analysis will not be routinely transcribed, except as provided for in paragraph
+27. When transcripts are made, they will not be included in interim or final COMSEC monitoring reports. Transcripts of communications (except those discussed in para 27) will be prepared and distributed as follows:
+(1) If the supported commander's review of interim or final reports indicates that a knowing, willful, or negligent disclosure of classified information may have occurred, the commander or designee may request and be provided with transcripts of the telecommunications. Initial transcripts will not include the names of participants in the conversations or other information that would identify the participants, except in an official capacity.
+
+(2) The data (for example, recordings, disks, or printouts) may be provided as specified in paragraph 27. k. Telecommunication data not related to the monitoring mission that are present on recordings will not be transcribed or otherwise annotated unless needed to support actions described in paragraph 27 and will be handled in accordance with paragraph 27 of this regulation.
+
+213. Communications security monitoring working materials a. Routine access to COMSEC monitoring working materials such as operator logs, operator or analyst notes, and recordings will be limited to those personnel specifically approved under paragraph 24. Working materials will not be released except as provided in paragraph 27. Working materials will be stored and maintained in a manner to ensure that the access restrictions are maintained in accordance with paragraph 214.
+
+(1) COMSEC monitoring working materials will be controlled as working papers under the provisions of AR 3805.
+
+A minimum classification of CONFIDENTIAL (or the classification of the information identified) will be assigned for all COMSEC working materials. The material in question will then be coordinated with the supported command and the appropriate classification determined.
+
+(2) All recording media will be marked with the highest classification of material recorded and will retain this classification until degaussed, purged, or destroyed.
+
+b. COMSEC monitoring working materials will be purged, destroyed or degaussed 30 calendar days after the final report is issued. An extension of up to 30 days may be granted in writing by the ACOM, ASCC, or DRU commander having operational control over the COMSEC monitoring element. Any extension beyond that must be submitted to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS).
+
+c. All written COMSEC monitoring working materials produced in the course of monitoring and analysis operations will be reviewed within 60 working days of the date produced to ensure that any information not pertinent to the monitoring mission is deleted. These written materials will be annotated with the name of the person conducting the review and the date the review was conducted.
+
+d. Access to COMSEC monitoring working materials may be granted to commanders and other personnel exercising direct management authority over the COMSEC monitoring element if
+(1) Such access is for the purpose of supervising, directing, and checking the efficiency, regulatory compliance, and mission effectiveness of COMSEC monitoring personnel.
+
+(2) All personnel concerned are advised of the limitations on the release of information derived from COMSEC
+monitoring (see para 27).
+
+e. When COMSEC monitoring is conducted as part of an OPSEC survey or other vulnerability assessment, results obtained from the monitoring may be shared with other elements of the team to ensure that a fully integrated and comprehensive assessment or survey is made.
+
+f. Working materials will be reviewed to ensure they are devoid of data extraneous to COMSEC monitoring objectives before the materials are released outside of the COMSEC monitoring element.
+
+214. Communications security monitoring reports The composition, format, and frequency of submission of COMSEC monitoring reports will be determined by the supported command after coordination with the team lead of the monitoring element. Interim reports may be requested on a daily or weekly basis. A final comprehensive mission report will be submitted to the command. Suspense and distribution of final reports will be determined through coordination with the supported command.
+
+a. COMSEC monitoring reports will contain information only on the monitoring mission, the adequacy of security procedures within the command monitored, and recommended countermeasures.
+
+(1) Report title pages and headers and footers of all pages of reports will prominently state, "COMSEC MONITOR-
+ING INFORMATION. CONFIDENTIAL (AR 38053)."
+(2) All reports, logs, and materials produced in the course of COMSEC monitoring will be afforded protection commensurate with the classification of the information and the sensitivity of the monitored activity. Reports or materials produced from COMSEC monitoring which identify security weaknesses of the monitored activity will be classified at least "CONFIDENTIAL" and downgraded to "UNCLASSIFIED" when security weaknesses are corrected (see NTISSD 600).
+
+(3) Descriptions or gists of information disclosed that are necessary to understand the nature of any weakness may be included in the final report.
+
+(4) Reports submitted under paragraph 27 are not considered COMSEC monitoring reports in the context of this paragraph.
+
+(5) When COMSEC monitoring is conducted as part of a vulnerability assessment effort, OPSEC survey, or other security support, a separate report of the results of the monitoring need not be prepared. Any report produced from COMSEC monitoring material must be marked and prepared according to this regulation.
+
+b. Reports and information acquired through COMSEC monitoring will not be disseminated outside the Army, except
+(1) In support of mutual OPSEC objectives and the goals of other military Services, Joint commands, and DOD
+agencies. This includes the exchange of technical information and reports (including working materials) within COMSEC monitoring channels.
+
+(2) When required by a court order and approved by the DOD GC. (3) For counterintelligence, LE, or criminal purposes (see para 27).
+
+215. Safeguarding communications security monitoring equipment Equipment designed specifically for COMSEC monitoring will be safeguarded to prevent unauthorized use. Required safeguards are as follows:
+a. Equipment installed in facilities or installations for COMSEC monitoring operations must be safeguarded by any of the following methods:
+
+(1) Lock and key.
+(2) Internal logon/logout security software. (3) Removal of a component that renders the equipment inoperative. b. Records will be maintained by each monitoring element that possesses equipment designed specifically for
+COMSEC monitoring. These records will include the following:
+(1) An inventory of the equipment on hand. (2) Location of each item in use. (3) Names of persons in charge of each item of equipment in use. c. Only those personnel assigned to COMSEC monitoring and/or maintenance duties will have access to COMSEC
+monitoring equipment in use.
+
+## Chapter 3 Information Operations Red Team The Procedures In This Chapter Apply To Io Red Team Activities On Official Dod Information Systems Within The Army.
+
+31. Explanation An IO Red Team is an independent, threat-based, simulated opposition force that uses passive, active, technical, and nontechnical capabilities on a formal, time-bounded basis to expose and identify the vulnerabilities of friendly forces from an IO threat perspective. Red Team operations expose an organization's vulnerabilities and challenge its readiness by focusing on the identification of critical and classified information.
+
+32. Attributes of effective Red Team activities For Red Team activities to most effectively challenge and assess an organization's IS, the following conditions must be established:
+a. Independence. Effective Red Team activities require that the Red Team act independently from the target organization for the duration of the assessment.
+
+b. Rules of engagement. A defined rules of engagement (ROE) (support agreement and charter) must be developed and signed prior to all Red Team assessments. The ROE must be signed by the Red Team lead and approved by the proper level of authority for the target organization through the use of a trusted agent (as defined in para 35b). The ROE must address the adversary threat level (as defined in para 35a) to be portrayed by the Red Team.
+
+33. Authorization to conduct red teaming Individual Red Team members must be Army penetration test certified and IO Red Team certified. Red Teams must be National Security Agency or United States Strategic Command certified. Certified Red Team members are only authorized to conduct Red Team activities as part of a certified Red Team sanctioned mission.
+
+a. Certification time period. Organizations may conduct Red Team activities for 3 years or until certification expires, whichever is sooner.
+
+b. Certification authority. The National Security Agency is the certification authority for all DOD Red Team activities.
+
+c. Certification eligibility. Army organizations seeking Red Team certification must have the capability to perform full spectrum Red Team vulnerability assessments. Full spectrum refers to the ability to portray an adversary from the perspectives of the 5 pillars of IO: operations security, electronic warfare, military deception, computer network operations, and psychological operations.
+
+d. Threat computer network operations teams. Threat computer network operations teams are authorized to conduct threat simulation in support of the Army and DOD acquisition testing certification process under the authority of the DCS, G2 (DAMIFIT). Authority is granted to employ threat testing techniques and procedures over open networks in support of Army acquisition, logistics, and technology test events. Computer network scans and attacks are authorized and may be employed to infiltrate, expose, and identify vulnerabilities of systems.
+
+34. Training and standards for Red Team activities Red Team activities and related activities will be conducted in strict compliance with this regulation.
+
+a. Knowledge of regulations, laws, and other guidance. In addition to team certification, each individual involved in the conduct of Red Team activities will receive formal training prior to participating in Red Team operations. At a minimum, personnel will be trained on the following:
+(1) The provisions of this regulation. (2) AR 252. (3) AR 2555. (4) AR 34021.
+
+(5) AR 38110.
+
+(6) EO 12333. (7) DODD 3600.01. (8) Section 2511, Title 18, United States Code (18 USC 2511). (9) Omnibus Crime & Safe Street Act of 1968. (10) Public Law 100235 (PL 100235). (11) PL 104106. (12) PL 107347. b. Training certifications. For Red Team operations, the first lieutenant colonel (O5) or civilian equivalent (GS14)
+in the individual's chain of command will verify in writing the individual has been trained in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 33 and 34a of this regulation. A copy of this certification will be maintained on file at the unit, available for inspection by any IG, oversight officer, or command inspector. Individual certification is valid for 3 years or until the certified individual is no longer involved in Red Team activities, whichever is sooner. Individual certification is held separate from unit certification and has no effect thereon.
+
+c. Nontrained personnel. When required, Red Team mission supervisors may augment the Red Team efforts with nontrained personnel, provided all nontrained personnel work under the direct supervision of trained and certified Red Team personnel.
+
+d. Refresher training. Personnel participating in Red Team activities will receive annual unit-level refresher training and are required to renew individual certification every 3 years.
+
+e. Violation reporting. Any information gathered as "data-at-rest" (DAR) or "data-in-motion" will be processed in accordance with paragraph 27b of this regulation.
+
+f. Access for oversight. All Red Team personnel will cooperate fully with the Army and DOD GCs, intelligence oversight officers, and IGs in performing their necessary oversight responsibilities.
+
+35. Red Team operations Red Team operations expose vulnerabilities by challenging an organization's readiness and ability to protect information. Red Team activities focus on identifying an organization's critical and classified information to show the operational impact of physical, information and operations security shortcomings.
+
+a. Threat-level replication. Red Team threat levels are categorized into 3 tiers.
+
+(1) *Tier 1: "Script Kiddy."* Tier 1 adversaries are individuals who use tools that are publicly available. Tier 1
+adversaries may not have a thorough understanding of the principles behind their actions, but are familiar enough with a tool to take hostile actions against a target.
+
+(2) *Tier 2: "Hacker for Hire."* Tier 2 adversaries are funded organizations with the capability of developing custom tools to use in conjunction with tools that are publicly available. Tier 2 adversaries have a deep understanding of the principles behind their actions and pose a serious threat to their target's information.
+
+(3) *Tier 3: "Nation State."* Tier 3 adversary is a government or organization with state sponsorship whose purpose is to gather information on foreign nations and adversely impact their operations.
+
+b. Trusted agents. A trusted agent is a member of the target organization who is knowledgeable of the operation and is responsible for assisting the Red Team in coordinating all requirements for the assessment. Trusted agents are required to keep the knowledge of Red Team operations restricted to only personnel read in on the operation. Additional persons may be made aware of Red Team operations after discussion with an authorization by the Red Team lead. The trusted agent is also responsible for deconflicting real world activities from Red Team activities during the assessment. All trusted agents must sign a trusted agent confidentiality agreement form, agreeing to the aforementioned responsibilities prior to being briefed on any Red Team operation.
+
+c. Information targeting. The ROE established prior to the assessment will determine the parameters for Red Team activities. A target or targets will be established between the Red Team leader and trusted agent as part of the planning phase of the assessment. The Red Team will use several support systems, each having a distinct methodology, to gather information guarded by the target and assess vulnerabilities in the target's established defense mechanisms. Red Team methods may include, but are not limited to the following:
+(1) *Close access.* Consists of testing target tactics, techniques, and procedures in the areas related to OPSEC and physical security in close proximity. Examples of methods used are "dumpster diving," physical penetration of facilities, social engineering and/or elicitation, passive observation and/or monitoring, photography, and creation, and use of, false credentials.
+
+(2) *Computer exploitation.* Employment of information assurance readiness testing (under DODI 8560.01, E2.9) and Red Team techniques consistent with computer network attacks to ensure adequate protection of critical and classified information. Methods include penetration testing, exploitation, reverse engineering, electronic reconnaissance, data analysis, privilege escalation, establishing a foothold through back doors, key loggers, Trojans, and Phishing. Red Team activities include monitoring data-in-motion and mining DAR.
+
+(3) *Wireless communications or networking.* Wireless communications or networking comprises employment of wireless network discovery and techniques consistent with information assurance and/or computer network defense
+(CND) to ensure adequate protection of critical and classified information is provided via the wireless spectrum. This includes the interception and exploitation of wireless communication signals.
+
+d. Additional constraints. All vulnerabilities introduced into an organization's IS will be removed prior to the end of the assessment to prevent an adversary from exploiting the assessed organization.
+
+e. Minimum deconfliction. To ensure that organizational resources are not diverted or distracted from handling real world issues in response to Red Team activities, the following deconfliction will be conducted.
+
+(1) When conducting operations that include activities on the LandWarNet (LWN), Red Teams will coordinate and deconflict with the ACERT and U.S. Army Cyber Command. Additionally, Red Teams will gain authority from ACERT. These organizations will be provided source Internet protocol addresses; target Internet protocol addresses; point of contact names; and contact information so that network defenders can differentiate between authorized Red Team activities and real world threat activity.
+
+(2) When conducting operations that may be reported as criminal acts or espionage on military installations, Red Teams will coordinate with the local provost marshal offices, CI detachments, criminal investigation divisions, and directorate of emergency services. Deconfliction is not necessary if these organizations are subject to the assessment; however, the Red Team will establish a trusted agent within each.
+
+f. Network operations. To replicate a true adversary, certified Red Teams have the authority to access .mil networks from public domains through the use of remote operations. Remote operations refer to the transmission of traffic across multiple domains or subdomains from origin to destination.
+
+36. Red teaming reports Red Team vulnerability assessment reports consist of the analysis of all key vulnerabilities found and recommendations for risk reduction control measures. Red Team findings are reportable only to the unit requesting the assessment. Distribution of the Red Team vulnerability assessment report to parties other than the requesting unit must be authorized by the requesting unit. The final Red Team vulnerability assessment report should be submitted within 30 days of the completion of the Red Team operation, unless directed otherwise by the requesting unit.
+
+## Chapter 4 Computer Defense Association Program
+
+41. Introduction
+The CDAP provides technical support for mitigating identified vulnerabilities to the following:
+a. Requesting individual units and activities. b. The DCS, G3/5/7 or CND service providers.
+42. Objective a. Evaluate the CND posture and CND response actions of the Army LWN resources by testing and attempting to circumvent Army networks by emulating the methods of hostile actors. Identified deficiencies will be evaluated to determine the depth and degree of potential compromise to provide the appropriate assistance in securing the LWN. This may include, but is not limited to, recommending modifications of methods, techniques and configuration modifications; training of users and system administrators, and/or providing subject matter experts to assist. The CDAP teams evaluate installations and leverage lessons learned to improve local organizations' abilities and influence CND operations across the Army.
+
+b. The major objectives are to (1) Confirm and demonstrate methods of intrusion and compromise that could be accomplished by unauthorized users.
+
+(2) Confirm and demonstrate the depth and degree of intrusion. (3) Assess the network's ability to detect and respond to intrusions. (4) Evaluate non-user data files such as system-level files, user identification, and login/logoff scripts. User data files (including email) will not be examined, read, modified, recorded, or deleted as part of the penetration testing effort.
+
+43. Scope The CDAP is executed to protect and defend all unclassified and classified information systems used to plan, direct, coordinate, control, and support Army forces operating on the Army LWN for active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and Army National Guard.
+
+44. Authorization a. CDAP missions are conducted in accordance with this regulation, AR 252, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01F, and are authorized by the service provider, consent and COMSEC exceptions to Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 USC 2511(2)(a)(i), 18 USC 2511(2)(c), and 18 USC 107(b)(1) of PL 99508, Section 107 (b)(1)), as well as PL 100235, and as amended by PL 104106.
+
+b. Headquarters, Department of the Army Computer Network Operations Standing EO 09608 authorizes 1st IO
+CMD to conduct persistent penetration testing (PPT).
+
+45. Computer Defense Association Program a. A program executed to evaluate the CND posture of Army LWN IS used to plan, direct, coordinate, control, and support Army forces (active Army and Reserve Components) across the full spectrum of conflict. Identified deficiencies (vulnerabilities) will be assessed to determine the depth and degree of potential compromise to provide the appropriate assistance in securing the LWN. This may include, but is not limited to, recommending modification of methods, techniques and configurations; and training of users and system administrators. CDAP missions can be requested by the unit commander or the designated approving authority. CDAP missions can also be directed by the DCS, G3/5/7 or CND service provider. The CDAP consists of multiple mission types based on requirements with recognition to the growing complexity of computer network operations and the ability to counter threat forces that are determined to undermine and compromise network operations. RCERTs, by using uniform procedures and required metrics, provide the computer Warfighters a consistent and uniform view of the network security posture. Required topics of the mission metrics are defined in the CDAP methodology.
+
+b. The CDAP consists of 3 mission types (1) *Network assistance visit.* A mission responding to an organization's request that a team of subject matter experts test and evaluate the CND posture of their network and network devices, and provide assistance to improve the organization's security posture. The goal is to prevent unauthorized access by emulating the methods of hostile entities to assess the target network. A network assistance visit (NAV) consists of the following phases:
+(a) Phase 1: Pre-coordination, ROE, and in brief. (b) Phase 2: Network survey, technical support, custom training and assistance, and organizational repairs. (c) Phase 3: Penetration testing and verification. (d) Phase 4: Executive summary, outbrief, and final report (on compact disk within 30 to 60 days). (2) *Network damage assessment.* The goal of an network damage assessment (NDA) is to validate suspected compromises and identify the depth of intrusions to gain knowledge for use in mitigation, recovery, and future prevention of possible compromises. NDAs are detailed examinations of installations initiated after a suspected or confirmed network compromise. NDAs are collaborative missions conducted by Network Enterprise Technology Command, 1st IO CMD, RCERTs, computer crime investigative units, the garrison commander, and the regional director, or any particular vendor associated with the systems being affected. The final report will be classified as required by findings and intended for general distribution and use by CND professionals.
+
+(3) *Persistent penetration testing.* DCS, G3/5/7 or 1st IO CMD directed missions (authorized by EO 09608, dated
+25 Jan 08) for execution of tactical overwatch operations and network surveillance of the LWN (and networked devices connected to the LWN) to conduct open network testing that can be launched from any location and at anytime. PPT missions are based on mission triggers (for example, sensor data, intelligence, and signal spillage or beaconing signals from an IS) that can be performed on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week basis to include, but not limited to, identifying the signal and shutting down the source; verifying network deficiencies by identifying potential weaknesses and circumventing the defensive posture to gain access onto the network; and recommending mitigating actions.
+
+c. CDAP missions are conducted by RCERTs that dispatch mission support teams comprised of subject matter experts and select units operating under 1st IO CMD memorandum of agreement.
+
+d. All IS contact with the target network may be from outside the target network as deemed appropriate by the CDAP team and in accordance with ROEs and regulations. Other methods such as Phishing, Web site hijacking, pretexting, and so forth, may also be used.
+
+e. During the penetration testing phase, the requesting unit or activity must explicitly give consent to the application of techniques and procedures specified in the ROE (unless the mission has been directed by the DCS, G3/5/7, in which case, consent is not required).
+
+f. The CDAP team will cease activity if an unauthorized intrusion is detected during any phase of the program. The CDAP team will follow established procedures for notifying the unit and protecting the affected network. The CDAP team's efforts on the affected network will not continue until authorization is received by the ACERT and/or the RCERT.
+
+g. The CDAP team does not have the authority to investigate criminal or foreign intelligence service involvement. h. Only personnel with a current top secret security clearance will conduct the network penetration testing. i. Network penetration testing and PPT is conducted by Army certified penetration testing technicians. j. All CDAP team members will be trained and certified in accordance with the requirements of this regulation, AR
+252, and 1st IO CMD CDAP methodology.
+
+k. When conducting support in accordance with paragraph 210 of this regulation, records of all penetration testing
+(type, time, and duration) against Army IS will be maintained as required for statistical purposes.
+
+46. Computer Defense Association Program network assistance visit a. When preparing for a CDAP NAV, the following procedures will be adhered to: (1) The ACERT and/or RCERTs will organize and manage the NAV team, as directed by the program manager under the authorization of the commander, 1st IO CMD.
+
+(2) The CDAP manager or designee will (a) Coordinate with the requesting unit's or activity's designated point of contact to obtain mission overview and necessary requirements.
+
+(b) Ensure training, certification, and qualification of all team members. (3) The requesting unit or activity will (a) Be responsible for all information systems within the target network (unless directed by the DCS, G3/5/7 or the CIO/G6).
+
+(b) Request support via memo (available at ACERT home page https://www.acert.1stiocmd.army.mil/index.jsp), signed by the commander or chief of staff (unless directed by the DCS, G3/5/7 or the CIO/G6).
+
+(c) Appoint a point of contact to work all requests, requirements, and issues.
+
+b. The following program organization and structure will be adhered to (see fig 41): (1) *Phase 1 - Request/authorization.* Provides authorization and information about the target IS network and establishes the "operating and mission parameters" or ROE. The CDAP team provides a pre-brief to unit commander and support staff on details of each phase, expected outcomes, schedule, and limitations.
+
+(2) *Phase 2 - Network survey.* Obtains information about the design and implementation of the target network and discovers (scans for) information about devices on the network and its possible weaknesses. This information is used to compare differences between design and implementation and evaluates the network's susceptibility to intrusion.
+
+(3) *Phase 3 - Network penetration testing.* This phase examines the degree and depth of information compromise which could be obtained by potential intruders; evaluates the ability of the targeted network to detect the presence of an intruder; and acts as threat "actors" attempting to circumvent the targeted networks defenses by several means
+(a) Wireless communication. Wireless networking, cellular communication detection, personal area network device paging and other such portable electronic devices.
+
+(b) Social engineering (for example, Phishing, Web site hijacking, pretexting, and so forth) defense. The CDAP
+Team will provide verification of suspected vulnerabilities, analysis of network protection capabilities, to include user awareness, and technical support to assist in remediation procedures. All findings and activities will be documented.
+
+(4) *Phase 4 - Final Report.* The requesting unit or activity will receive an executive summary outlining impacts and recommendations for securing the target network. The full report will provide detailed information on impacts, risk assessments, and recommended fixes to secure the target network or subnet. This report is sensitive and dissemination of the information will be controlled by 1st IO CMD.
+
+47. Penetration testing scope Security testing, as defined by Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 4009, in which evaluators attempt to circumvent the security features of an IS based on their understanding of the system design and implementation. Its purpose is to confirm and demonstrate through penetration testing techniques and procedures the degree of IS defensive postures, vulnerabilities, and mitigating processes.
+
+48. Computer Defense Assistance Program persistent penetration testing The execution of tactical overwatch operations and network surveillance of Army networks and networked devices connected to the LWN that may be performed on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week basis.
+
+a. The PPT is a command-directed or mission-triggered (for example, sensor data, intelligence, spillage, or beaconing signals from an IS) activity.
+
+b. The persistent presence force consists of subject matter experts that are certified penetration testing technicians drawn from 1st IO CMD (DetachmentB and RCERTs). They conduct testing of the LWN and they can be launched from any location at anytime for example
+(1) Identify spillage or beaconing signals from an IS. (2) Track the signal and shut down the source.
+
+(3) Verify network deficiencies by identifying potential weaknesses.
+(4) Circumvent those weaknesses. (5) Recommend mitigating actions c. A unit's or activity's explicit consent to monitor during PPT is not required in accordance with AR 252.
+
+## Chapter 5 Reporting Violations
+
+51. Oversight All activities, materials, and records covered in this regulation are subject to IG, intelligence, and security oversight inspections at any time.
+
+52. Reporting violations Individuals who discover a violation of the activities described in this regulation will promptly report the violation to the unit commander, IG, intelligence oversight officer, or the command security manager.
+
+a. The commander, IG, or intelligence oversight officer will ensure that a competent inquiry or investigation into the reported violation is conducted. They will ensure that the circumstances of the violation are reported within 5 working days, through command channels to the DCS, G2 (DAMICDS), with information copies to GC and TIG. Reports will contain the following:
+(1) Nature of the violation (for example, unauthorized monitoring). (2) Dates and times of the incident. (3) Location (name of installation or activity) where the incident occurred. (4) Individuals (last name, first name, middle initial) involved in the incident. (5) Brief summary of the incident. (6) Corrective actions taken. (7) Current status of the inquiry. b. Questionable activity and information relating to violations of Federal law as addressed in AR 38110 will be reported under the provisions of AR 38110.
+
+c. The DCS, G2 (DAMICDS); GC; TJAG; and TIG will work together to ensure appropriate action is taken to correct the violation and to prevent future occurrences of the same violation.
+
+d. Within 5 working days of discovery of the incident, the GC, in coordination with TIG, will send a copy of the initial report and the proposed corrective actions to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration.
+
+## Appendix A References Section I Required Publications
+
+AR 252
+Information Assurance (Cited in paras 14g(1), 26b(1)(c), 27b(2), 34a(2), 44b, 45j, and 48c.)
+AR 2555
+The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program (Cited in para 34a(3).)
+AR 254002
+The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS) (Cited in para C4d.)
+AR 19030
+Military Police Investigations (Cited in para 21d(2).)
+AR 19053
+Interception of Wire and Oral Communications for Law Enforcement Purposes (Cited in para 21d(1).)
+AR 34021
+The Army Privacy Program (Cited in para 34a(4).)
+AR 3805
+Department of the Army Information Security Program (Cited in paras 21d(11), 27a, and 213a(1).)
+AR 38027
+Control of Compromising Emanations (FOUO)( (Cited in para 21d(5).)
+AR 38067
+The Department of the Army Personnel Security Program (Cited in para 29b(2).)
+AR 38110
+U.S. Army Intelligence Activities (Cited in paras 21d(3), 25a(2), 34a(5), and 52b.)
+AR 38112
+Threat Awareness and Reporting Program (Cited in para 25a(3).)
+AR 5301
+Operations Security (OPSEC) (Cited in para 14k(3).)
+DODI 8560.01
+Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring and Information Assurance (IA) Readiness Testing (Cited in paras 11, 35c(2).) (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/.)
+NTISSD 600
+Communications Security (COMSEC) Monitoring (Cited in paras 11, 214a(2).) (Available at http://www.cnss.gov/.)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications A Related Publication Is A Source Of Additional Information. The User Does Not Have To Read It To Understand This Regulation.
+
+AR 251
+Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology AR 38114
+Technical Counterintelligence (TCI) (U)
+
+## Ar 38120 (S/Nf) The U.S. Army Counterintelligence Program (U) Ar 381143 Nonstandard Material Policies And Procedures (U)
+
+CJCSI 6510.01F
+Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND) (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/ cjcs_directives/.)
+
+## Cnssi 4009 National Information Assurance (Ia) Glossary (Available At Http://Www.Cnss.Gov/.) Dodd 3600.01 Information Operations (Io) (Available At Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Whs/Directives/.) Eo 09608 Project Labor Agreements (Available At Http://Www.Gpoaccess.Gov/Uscode.)
+
+EO 12333
+United States intelligence activities (Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode.)
+
+## Pl 90351 Law Enforcement Assistance (Available At Http://Thomas.Loc.Gov/Bss/.) Pl 99508 Electronic Communications Privacy Act Of 1986 (Available At Http://Thomas.Loc.Gov/Bss/.) Pl 100235 Federal Computer System Security Training (Available At Http://Thomas.Loc.Gov/Bss/.) Pl 104106 National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996 (Available At Http://Thomas.Loc.Gov/Bss/.) Pl 107347 EGovernment Act Of 2002 (Available At Http://Thomas.Loc.Gov/Bss/.) 18 Usc(B)(1) Crimes And Criminal Procedure (Available At Http://Www.Gpoaccess.Gov/Uscode.)
+
+18 USC 107
+Intelligence activities: intercept encrypted or other official communications of United States executive branch entities or United States Government contractors for communications security purposes (Available at http://www.gpoaccess. gov/uscode.)
+18 USC 2511
+Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited (Available at http://www.gpoaccess. gov/uscode.)
+18 USC Chapter 119
+Wire and electronic communications interception and interception of oral communications, definitions (Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode.)
+Section III Prescribed Forms Except where otherwise indicated below, the following forms are available as follows: DA Forms are available on the APD Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil); DD Forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).
+
+DD Form 2056
+Telephone Monitoring Notification Decal (Cited in paras 26a(1)(d), 26b(1)(b)1, 26b(1)(b)2, and 26b(1)(b)3.)
+Section IV Referenced Forms Except where otherwise indicated below, the following forms are available as follows: DA Forms are available on the APD Web site (http://www.apd.army.mil); DD Forms are available on the Office of the Secretary of Defense Web site (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/formsprogram.htm).
+
+DA Form 112
+Internal Control Evaluation Certification DA Form 2028
+Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
+
+## Appendix B Forms Of Monitoring Notification This Appendix Provides Guidance For Application Of Banners Concerning Information Systems Security Monitoring Certification Notifications, Standard Mandatory Notice And Consent Provisions, And Facsimile Cover Sheets.
+
+B1. Telephone or communications directory notice ATTENTION! DO NOT PROCESS, STORE, OR TRANSMIT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON NONSECURE TELECOMMU- NICATIONS SYSTEMS. OFFICIAL DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS - INCLUDING TELEPHONES, FACSIMILE MACHINES, COMPUTER NETWORKS, AND MODEMS - ARE SUBJECT TO MONITORING FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY PURPOSES AT ALL TIMES. USE OF OFFICIAL DOD TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS MONITORING.
+
+B2. Facsimile cover sheet ATTENTION! DO NOT PROCESS, STORE, OR TRANSMIT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON UNSECURED TELECOMMU- NICATIONS SYSTEMS, INCLUDING FACSIMILE MACHINES, ARE SUBJECT TO MONITORING FOR INFOR- MATION SYSTEMS SECURITY MONITORING AT ALL TIMES. USE OF THIS SYSTEM CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY MONITORING.
+
+## Appendix C Internal Control Evaluation C1. Function The Function Covered By This Evaluation Is For Comsec Monitoring.
+
+C2. Purpose The purpose of the evaluation is to assist unit commanders in evaluating key internal controls. It is not intended to cover all controls.
+
+C3. Instructions Answers must be based on actual testing of the key internal controls such as document analysis, direct observation, interviewing, sampling, and simulation. Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action indicated in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 112 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).
+
+C4. Test questions a. Are key management controls identified in the governing Army regulation? (Headquarters, Department of the Army functional proponent only.)
+b. Are required publications, as shown in AR 38053, appendix A, available to COMSEC monitoring personnel?
+
+(They do not have to be maintained on hand.)
+c. Have discrepancies noted in the most recent COMSEC monitoring audit/inspection or command COMSEC
+monitoring inspection been corrected?
+
+d. Are records created and managed in accordance with AR 254002? e. Are procedures in place to ensure all personnel, including contractors, are aware of the provisions of this publication?
+
+f. Does the command have a COMSEC monitoring certification request approved by the DCS, G2 on file? g. Have all personnel involved in the conduct (collection and analysis) of COMSEC monitoring received formal training and formally certified in accordance with this publication?
+
+h. Have appropriate security personnel (for example, information assurance security officers) been appointed? i. Are all personnel participating in COMSEC monitoring receiving annual refresher training? j. Are incidents and violations reported properly?
+
+## C5. Supersession Not Applicable.
+
+C6. Comments Help make this a better tool for evaluating internal controls. Submit comments to Headquarters, Department of the Army, DCS, G2 (DAMICDS), 1000 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203101000.
+
+## Glossary Section I Abbreviations 1St Io Cmd 1St Information Operations Command
+
+AASA
+Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
+
+## Acert Army Computer Emergency Response Team
+
+ACOM
+Army command ASCC
+Army service component command CDAP
+Computer Defense Association Program CG
+Commanding General CI
+counterintelligence CIO/G6
+Chief Information Officer, G6
+CND
+computer network defense CNSSI
+Committee on National Security Systems Instruction COMSEC
+communications security DAR
+data-at-rest DCS, G2
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
+DCS, G3/5/7
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7
+DOD
+Department of Defense
+
+## Dodi Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+DRU
+direct reporting unit EO
+executive order GC
+General Counsel GS
+general schedule IG
+inspector general IO
+information operations
+
+## Inscom U.S. Army Intelligence And Security Command
+
+IS
+Information System LE
+law enforcement LWN
+LandWarNet MOS
+military occupational specialty NAV
+network assistance visit NDA
+network damage assessment
+
+## Ntissd National Telecommunications And Information Systems Security Directive
+
+O5
+LTC lieutenant colonel OPSEC
+operations security PL
+public law PPT
+persistent penetration testing RCERT
+regional computer emergency response team ROE
+rules of engagement TIG
+The Inspector General TJAG
+The Judge Advocate General
+
+## Section Ii Terms
+
+Communications security monitoring The act of listening to, copying, or recording transmissions of one's own official telecommunications to provide material for analysis to determine the degree of security being provided to those transmissions.
+
+Computer Defense Association Program
+Conducted by the ACERT to ensure the overall security of the LWN. The program consists of the following 3 mission types:
+a. Network assistance visits. Identify and provide remediation for computer network security weaknesses. b. Network damage analysis. Identify, remediate, and recommend countermeasures to LWN compromises.
+c. Persistent penetration testing. Tactical overwatch of the LWN under the order of the DCS, G3/5/7 or the 1st IO
+CMD.
+Consent An agreement by a person to permit DOD communications security components to monitor official communications. Consent may be oral, written, or implied. Consent is implied when adequate notice is given that the use of official Government communications carries with it the presumption of consent.
+
+Content The data contained in a telecommunications message, computer folder, or file. Telecommunication messages include, but are not limited to, telephone (both cellular and conventional), radio, pager, and computer network traffic.
+
+Data-at-rest All data stored on hard drives, thumb drives, digital video disks, compact disks, floppy diskettes, and other similar storage media.
+
+Data-in-motion Data that transverses a network either internally or externally, and is not in a state of storage, such as DAR. This includes active communications via telephone (both cellular and conventional), radio, and pager, as well as computer traffic that is transmitted between any network nodes.
+
+Electronic surveillance The acquisition of the contents of nonpublic communication by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to the communication, but not including the use of radio direction finding equipment solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
+
+Government telecommunications Telecommunications of an employee, officer, contractor, or other entity of the U.S. Government which concern an official purpose of U.S. Government and which are transmitted over a telecommunications system owned or leased by the U.S. Government or a U.S. Government contractor.
+
+Information operations Red Team (IO Red Team)
+An independent, threat-based, and threat-simulated opposition force that uses passive, active, technical, and nontechnical capabilities on a formal, time-bound basis to expose and exploit the vulnerabilities of friendly forces from an IO threat perspective.
+
+Keystroke monitoring A specialized form of audit trail software or specially designed device (tool) that records every keystroke struck by a user and every character of the response that the IS returns to the user. Keystroke monitoring on the Army's LWN is only authorized by RCERTS, certified Red Team members, and other official activities operating in official capacities.
+
+## Mission Support Teams A Set Or Ad Hoc Team Of Subject Matter Experts Who Conduct Various Missions (To Include Cdap). Penetration Testing Security Testing In Which Evaluators Attempt To Circumvent The Security Features Of An Is Based On The Evaluators
+
+understanding of the system design and implementation. Its purpose is to confirm and demonstrate through penetration testing techniques and procedures the degree of IS defensive postures, vulnerabilities, and procedures.
+
+Persistent penetration testing A directed mission based on mission triggers (for example, sensor data, intelligence, and signal spillage or beaconing signals from an IS) that can be performed on a 24 hours a day/7 days a week basis to include, but not limited to, identifying the signal and deactivating the source, verifying network deficiencies by identifying potential weaknesses and circumventing the defensive posture to gain access onto the network, and recommending mitigating actions.
+
+TEMPEST
+A name referring to the investigation, study, and control of compromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information systems equipment (see CNSSI 4009).
+
+## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries. Usapd
+
+# Electronic Publishing System Onecol Formatter Win32 Version 274
+
+PIN:
+               004092000
+DATE:
+               12-23-11
+TIME:
+               13:37:41
+PAGES SET:
+               29
+
+DATA FILE:
+             C:\Wincomp\r380-53.fil
+DOCUMENT:
+             AR 38053
+
+SECURITY:
+UNCLASSIFIED
+DOC STATUS: REVISION

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+Security
+
+## Classification Of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical And Biological Defense, And Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Contamination Survivability Information
+
+                     Headquarters
+                     Department of the Army
+                     Washington, DC
+                     22 June 2005
+UNCLASSIFIED
+
+## Summary Of Change
+
+AR 38086 Classification of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical and Biological Defense, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability Information This rapid action revision, dated 22 June 2005--
+
+o Changes classification reasons and durations (para 5b and table 1, para 4d). o Clarifies what stocks are referred to (table 1) and the type of stock
+mentioned (table 1, para 5b).
+o Clarifies the type of binary component (table 1, paras 1b(2) and 2b). o Clarifies types of agents (table 1, para 5b(2)(d)) and the movement of agents
+(table 1, para 5b(2)(e).
+o Clarifies the term "nontraditional agent" (glossary). o Makes administrative changes throughout.
+This rapid action revision, dated 1 February 2005--
+
+o Changes the systematic review date for information classified under the
+purview of this regulation (para 5f).
+o Updates the Executive Order governing this regulation (throughout
+publication).
+o Adds paragraph incorporating guidance for nontraditional agents (table 1,
+para 4).
+o Adds nontraditional agents to ensure guidance is provided under operational
+requirements (table 1, para 5).
+o Changes classification reason and duration (table 1, para 5b). o Adds definition for nontraditional agents to terms (glossary).
+This revision, dated 15 March 2002--
+
+o Corrects paragraph entitled "Proponent and exception authority." o Corrects "Supplementation" paragraph. o Corrects "Suggested improvements" paragraph. o Removes"CBDCOM" and inserts "SBCCOM" throughout the document. o Removes "The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans" and
+inserts "Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8", throughout the document.
+o This revision dated 7 May 2001 - o This revision corrects the classification guidance in table 1, paragraph
+5a(1) and (2) from CONFIDENTIAL-Exemption 2 to UNCLASSIFIED.
+o Adds paragraph 6e(4) to table 1.
+Washington, DC 22 June 2005
+
+## Security Classification Of Former Chemical Warfare, Chemical And Biological Defense, And Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Contamination Survivability Information
+
+Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.
+
+History. This publication is a rapid action
+r e v i s i o n .  T h e  p o r t i o n s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h i s
+r a p i d  a c t i o n  r e v i s i o n  a r e  l i s t e d  i n  t h e
+summary of change.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+The proponent of this regulation is the
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G8. The Deputy
+Chief of Staff, G8 has the authority to
+approve exceptions or waivers to this reg-
+ulation that are consistent with controlling
+law and regulations. The Deputy Chief of
+Staff, G8 may delegate this approval au-
+t h o r i t y ,  i n  w r i t i n g ,  t o  a  d i v i s i o n  c h i e f
+within the proponent agency or a direct
+reporting unit or field operating agency of
+the proponent agency in the grade of colo-
+nel or the civilian equivalent. Activities
+may request a waiver to this regulation by
+providing justification that includes a full
+analysis of the expected benefits and must
+i n c l u d e f o r m a l r e v i e w b y t h e a c t i v i t y ' s
+senior legal officer. All waiver requests
+will be endorsed by the commander or
+s e n i o r  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  r e q u e s t i n g  a c t i v i t y
+and forwarded through higher headquar-
+ters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR
+25-30 for specific guidance.
+
+Summary. This regulation on the classification of chemical warfare and chemical a n d  b i o l o g i c a l  d e f e n s e  i n f o r m a t i o n  h a s been revised. This revision incorporates the classification of nontraditional agents.
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l Army management control process.
+
+This regulation contains management control provisions, but does not identify key
+
+Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)
+Purpose - 1, page 1
+References - 2, page 1
+Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 3, page 1
+Responsibilities - 4, page 1
+Policies - 5, page 1
+
+## Appendix A. References, Page 7 Glossary
+
+# Effective 22 July 2005
+
+m a n a g e m e n t  c o n t r o l s  t h a t  m u s t  b e evaluated.
+
+S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .  S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f
+this regulation and establishment of com-
+mand and local forms are prohibited with-
+out prior approval from the Deputy Chief
+of Staff, G8 (DAPR-ZA), Washington,
+DC 203100700.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are
+invited to send comments and suggested
+improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recom-
+m e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d
+B l a n k  F o r m s )  d i r e c t l y  t o  H Q D A
+( D A P R - F D B ) ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D C
+203100700.
+
+Distribution. This publication is availa-
+ble in electronic media only and is in-
+tended for command levels C and D for
+t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l
+Guard of the United States, and the U.S.
+Army Reserve.
+
+1. Purpose This regulation
+a. Provides guidance for classification of U.S. Army former chemical warfare materiel, chemical and biological defense, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) contamination survivability information within the framework of criteria set forth in AR 3805 and Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended.
+
+b. Concerns research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTE), and the procurement of chemical and biological defense materiel for the purposes not prohibited by the chemical and biological weapons arms control agreements. The movement and storage of former chemical warfare agents or munitions, chemical and biological defense materiel and designs/materiel for NBC contamination survivability are also addressed. Classification guidance for riot control agents, herbicides, conventional munitions and weapons, and smoke and incendiary agents or munitions are not included. These classes of materiel are not categorized as chemical warfare materiel.
+
+c. Provides guidance for classification of programs and plans for which the Army is responsible as executive agent for the chemical and biological defense program.
+
+## 2. References Required And Related Publications And Prescribed And Referenced Forms Are Listed In Appendix A. 3. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms Abbreviations And Special Terms Used In This Regulation Are Explained In The Glossary.
+
+4. Responsibilities a. Principal officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army, will apply the policies and procedures of this regulation to programs and actions within their staff responsibility.
+
+b. Major Army commanders, major subordinate commanders, installation commanders, and operational commanders who deal with former offensive chemical warfare programs, chemical and biological defense, and NBC contamination avoidance/survivability information will apply the policies and procedures of this regulation to programs and actions within their command responsibility.
+
+c. Program or project managers for programs who include former offensive chemical warfare programs, chemical and biological defense, and NBC contamination avoidance/survivability information will use the policies and procedures of this regulation for classification purposes.
+
+d. Systems managers for systems that include former offensive chemical warfare programs, chemical and biological defense, and NBC contamination avoidance/survivability information. These individuals will use the policies and procedures of this regulation for classification purposes.
+
+5. Policies a. Information under the purview of this regulation, unless special circumstances require otherwise (see para 5c), will be classified at the recommended level and duration consistent with national security (see tables 1, 2 and 3). Originators of documents classified by this regulation and other sources (marked "multiple sources") will consider the duration of classification when computing the declassification date specified from
+(1) The proper section of tables 1, 2, or 3. (2) Declassification instructions appearing on other source documents. This regulation will be listed as one of the sources of classification on the record copy of the document (see AR 3805).
+
+b. Documents and information classified before 27 September 2003 will be processed for systematic review as set forth in AR 3805, para 39. Extensions of classifications are not automatic. Exceptions to the above include classified information which, in the judgment of the holder, continues to merit security classification and that meets the criteria of AR 3805. This information will be promptly processed for systematic review as prescribed by AR 3805, chapter 3, section II. This original classification authority may extend the classification; see paragraph 5e.
+
+c. This regulation does not limit the responsibility of originators to classify or declassify information or assign a higher classification when, in their judgment, the circumstances warrant such action. If the originators of the information have the requisite original classification authority, they may classify the information at the higher level. If the originators do not have the requisite original classification authority, they may proceed as required by AR 3805. However, information may not be reclassified after it has been declassified and released to the public under proper authority. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 will provide help in establishing proper levels of classification.
+
+d. A program security classification guide will be developed for each system and equipment development program that involves RDTE of technical information. Initial basic classification guidance applicable to technical characteristics of the system or equipment will be developed and submitted for each new program identified in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). A detailed classification guide will be developed and issued as soon as possible after the approval of the POM. Approval of classification guides for U.S. Army research, development, and acquisition activities will be integrated into the materiel acquisition and decision process under AR 701.
+
+e. Original classification may be extended only
+(1) In accordance with the standards set forth in this guide, by the official with requisite original classification authority for this guide.
+
+(2) For successive periods not to exceed 10 years each. (3) If all known holders of information can be notified of such action before the date or event previously set for declassification.
+
+f. Information containing permanent historical value that is 25 years or older will be subject to EO 12958, as amended, section 3.4(b).
+
+g. In any compilation of information, if at least three specific pieces of unclassified information would lead a reasonable and prudent person to deduct that this information (if made available to adversaries) would probably cause serious damage to the national security if released, then this compilation should be classified SECRET.
+
+## Classification Guidance For Chemical Warfare And Chemical Defense Information Information Classification
+
+1. RDTE data on lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and munitions (including binary chemical agents, munitions, and simulants).
+
+a. Data. Vulnerability data revealing significant materiel or operational deficiencies in U.S. total defense training and readiness.
+
+SECRETExemption 2.
+
+b. Agents.
+
+(1) The chemical formulas and scientific names for standardized agents in the V, G, and Hseries and for incapacitating agent BZ.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+(2) The chemical formula for a standardized agent (as listed above) being evaluated for defensive and protective purposes as well as human or animal toxicity, pharmacological, or physiological effects data when associated with either the chemical formula or its nondescriptive code. (See note 3.)
+(3) Toxicity, pharmacological, and physiological effects data in relation to humans and animals using agent nondescriptive code for standard agents.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+| (4) Militarily effective doses for humans.                     | CONFIDENTIALDeclassify 15   |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
+| years from original date of clas-                              |                              |
+| sificationExemption 2. (Does                                  |                              |
+| not preclude assignment of higher                              |                              |
+| classification if warranted under                              |                              |
+| standards of AR 3805, chap 2.                                 |                              |
+| See para 5                                                     |                              |
+| c                                                              |                              |
+| of this regulation.)                                           |                              |
+| c                                                              |                              |
+| . Simulants.                                                   |                              |
+| (1) The chemical formulas and scientific names.                | UNCLASSIFIED.                |
+| (2) Toxicity, pharmacological, and physiological effects data. | UNCLASSIFIED.                |
+| (3) Details of production processes.                           | UNCLASSIFIED.                |
+
+2. RDTE data on binary chemical agents (in addition to para 1 of this table). Classification of information for binary chemical agents and munitions will follow the guidance provided in paragraph 1 of this table and in a through e below. Subjects not specifically addressed will be UNCLASSIFIED unless special circumstances warrant classification. (See para 5c.)
+a. Use of the name or formula of all agents with reference to binary munitions.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+b. Use of the chemical name or formula or any binary ingredients in connection with U.S. Type-
+Classified binary agents or concepts.
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+c. Chemical reaction data when applied to a specific munition design other than VX or GB. (See
+note 1.)
+CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.
+d. Conjunctive use of nondescriptive codes and chemical names or formulas for binary reactants.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+e. Toxicological data being evaluated for defensive or protective purposes.
+CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.
+3. Former agent production and munition filling such as lethal and incapacitating agents (including binary chemical agents and munitions).
+a. Locations of former production and filling facilities.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+b. Facility capacities for agent production and munitions filling.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+c. Total quantity of agents or munitions produced or filled (per facility and total programs).
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+d. Data on total and partial procurement programs associated with acquisition objectives.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+e. Facility design and operating capability.
+UNCLASSIFIED. UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+4. Nontraditional agents (NTA) and simulants a. The use of generic terms such as NTA in generic descriptions of chemical defense work provided the term is not associated with specific chemical compounds, any specific nation, or any nonstate actor.
+
+b. Indication that an NTA is generic term for potential threat agents developed by foreign entities
+(not further identified).
+
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+c. The identification of the structure, formula, synthesis, production process, or significant physical
+properties of any NTA.
+SECRETDuration: A date 25 years from event or date of document (reason: EO 12958, as amended, sec. 1.4(h)).
+
+## Table 1 Classification Guidance For Chemical Warfare And Chemical Defense InformationContinued Information Classification
+
+d. The identification (for example, formulas, chemical names, and technical data, and so on) of any
+compound as a simulant for any NTA.
+SECRETDuration: A date 25 years from event or date of document (reason: EO 12958, as amended, sec. 1.4(h)).
+5. Operational requirements, movement and storage of defensive materiel, lethal and incapacitating agents and munitions .from the declared stockpile, and toxic agents prepared and shipped for RDTE purposes.
+a. Defensive materiel. (Consumption rates, stockage requirements, inventory levels, and movement.)
+UNCLASSIFIED. However, may require classification if presented in context with specific theaters or OPLANS. May also require classification under item 5c.
+b. Agents and munitions.
+(1) Overall chemical stockpile inventory/types/amounts.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(2) Movement. (a) Movement into or out of areas not under U.S. jurisdiction.
+UNCLASSIFIED. Operations Security (OPSEC) SENSITIVE. (See AR 5301.)
+(b) Movement within areas under U.S. jurisdiction.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(c) Quantities of material involved in inter- or intra-installation movements.
+UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI-
+TIVE. (See AR 5301.)
+(d) Movement of former type-classified toxic agents for defense RDTE purpose.
+UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI-
+TIVE. (See AR 5301.)
+(e) Movement of nontraditional agents or other toxic compounds for defensive RDTE purposes.
+Normally Unclassified OPSEC
+SENSITIVE (see AR 5301) but may be up to SECRET (see para 5c of this regulation.
+(3) Storage of obsolete stockpiles.
+(a) Identity of storage sites in U.S. territory, continental United States (CONUS), and outside continental United States (OCONUS).
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(b) Identity of storage sites not in U.S. territory.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(c) Identity of Formerly Utilized Disposal sites not in U.S. territory (not previously declassified
+through diplomatic channels).
+CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.
+(4) Storage within the United States, Johnston Island, and sites not in U.S. territory. (a) Total stocks of agents and munitions in the U.S. stockpile.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(b) Total stocks of agents at one installation or site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(c) Total stocks of agents at more than one installation site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(d) Total stocks of a single agent at one installation or site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(e) Total stocks of a single agent at more than one installation or site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(f) Total stocks of a single-filled munition (such as projectile, 155mm, GB) at one installation or
+site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(g) Total stocks of a single-filled munition at more than one installation or site.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(h) Quantities of obsolete materiel or materiel maintained solely for RDTE or training.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(5) Demilitarization or disposal programs.
+(a) Quantities of agents or munitions identified in proposed or planned demilitarization or disposal
+programs.
+UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI- TIVE. (See AR 530-1.)
+(b) Quantities of agents or munitions identified in approved demilitarization or disposal program.
+UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI- TIVE. (See AR 5301.) SECRETExemptions 2 and 4.
+6. Chemical defense, protection, prophylaxis, and therapy (including RDTE data).
+a. Chemical defense and protection.
+(1) Detection levels required for defense against chemical agents.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(2) Protection levels required for chemical defense equipment.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+(3) Contamination avoidance or decontamination measures.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+b..Information on new, unique, or significant chemical defense principles whose revelation would
+be of substantial value to a potential enemy.
+SECRETDuration: 25 years from the date of the original decision (reason: EO 12958, as amended, sec. 1.4(g)).
+c. Information revealing significant materiel and/or operational deficiencies in the overall U.S. chemical defense posture, training, and readiness, when revelation would be of substantial value to a potential enemy.
+
+d. Field formulation information on prophylaxis and therapy.
+
+Normally UNCLASSIFIED. However, may require classification if the information represents a technological breakthrough of military significance, when revelation would be of substantial value to a potential enemyExemption 2. (See para 5c of this regulation.)
+
+## Table 1 Classification Guidance For Chemical Warfare And Chemical Defense InformationContinued
+
+| Information                                                                                              | Classification                        |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
+| f.                                                                                                       |                                       |
+| Threat data and analysis.                                                                                |                                       |
+| (1) Intelligence based threat information.                                                               | As classified by appropriate intelli- |
+| gence activity.                                                                                          |                                       |
+| (2) Locally generated threat data.                                                                       | Classified in accordance with ap-     |
+| propriate classification guide.                                                                          |                                       |
+| g                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Critical vulnerabilities. (See note 2.)                                                                | SECRETExemption 2.                   |
+| h                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Key scheduling dates.                                                                                  |                                       |
+| (1) Army readiness date, initial operational capability date, and initial deployment.                    | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| (2) Release for production.                                                                              | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| (3) Type classification standard.                                                                        | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| (4) Complete system test schedule date.                                                                  | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| 7. Site security measures (including physical security plans and related documents).                     |                                       |
+| a                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Facilities.                                                                                            | Normally UNCLASSIFIED. How-           |
+| ever, may require classification if                                                                      |                                       |
+| sufficient compilation of informa-                                                                       |                                       |
+| tion in these subparagraphs al-                                                                          |                                       |
+| lows identification of critical vul-                                                                     |                                       |
+| nerabilitiesExemption 2.                                                                                |                                       |
+| (1) Name and mission of facility.                                                                        |                                       |
+| (2) Purpose and objective of plans or documents.                                                         |                                       |
+| (3) Identification of restricted areas.                                                                  |                                       |
+| (4) Perimeter barriers.                                                                                  |                                       |
+| (5) Security lighting.                                                                                   |                                       |
+| (6) Communications.                                                                                      |                                       |
+| (7) Lock and key control, personnel, vehicle, and material access controls.                              |                                       |
+| (8) Emergency support coordination with other Army, military, governmental, or civilian organiza-        |                                       |
+| tions.                                                                                                   |                                       |
+| b                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Threat data and analysis.                                                                              |                                       |
+| (1) Threat information.                                                                                  | Classified in accordance with ap-     |
+| propriate classification guide.                                                                          |                                       |
+| (2) Locally generated threat data.                                                                       | Classified in accordance with ap-     |
+| propriate classification guide.                                                                          |                                       |
+| c                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Critical vulnerabilities. (See note 2.)                                                                | CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.             |
+| d                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Protection priorities.                                                                                 | UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI-            |
+| TIVE. (See AR 5301.)                                                                                    |                                       |
+| e                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Intrusion detection system (IDS).                                                                      |                                       |
+| (1) Numbers, types, and exact locations of IDS sensors installed on a storage structure or in con-       |                                       |
+| junction with a perimeter barrier.                                                                       |                                       |
+| UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI-                                                                               |                                       |
+| TIVE. (See AR 5301.)                                                                                    |                                       |
+| (2) Existence of line supervision employed on IDS circuits.                                              | UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI-            |
+| TIVE. (See AR 5301.)                                                                                    |                                       |
+| (3) Details of methods of line supervision employed on IDS circuits when the information would           |                                       |
+| disclose techniques for circumvention.                                                                   |                                       |
+| CONFIDENTIALDeclassify                                                                                  |                                       |
+| upon deactivation of the IDS sys-                                                                        |                                       |
+| tems or change in the type of su-                                                                        |                                       |
+| pervision employed.                                                                                      |                                       |
+| (4) Detailed drawings and wiring diagrams. For example, drawings and diagrams indicating which           |                                       |
+| sensors are installed and showing color coded interconnections between each sensor and the con-          |                                       |
+| trol unit. System options (alarm option, length of time delay, and signal transmission option) indicated |                                       |
+| on diagrams.                                                                                             |                                       |
+| CONFIDENTIALReview for                                                                                  |                                       |
+| declassification 25 years from                                                                           |                                       |
+| original date of classification or                                                                       |                                       |
+| upon reconfiguration of the IDS                                                                         |                                       |
+| Exemption 2. Regrade to UN-                                                                              |                                       |
+| CLASSIFIED in the case of mate-                                                                          |                                       |
+| riel maintained in limited quanti-                                                                       |                                       |
+| ties for training.                                                                                       |                                       |
+| (5) Location of IDS control units and cable terminal boxes (when not observable from outside the         |                                       |
+| chemical exclusion area).                                                                                |                                       |
+| CONFIDENTIALReview for                                                                                  |                                       |
+| declassification 25 years from                                                                           |                                       |
+| original date of classification or                                                                       |                                       |
+| upon reconfiguration of the IDS                                                                         |                                       |
+| Exemption 2.                                                                                             |                                       |
+| (6) Visual or electro-optical surveillance.                                                              |                                       |
+| (a) Use of visual or electro-optical surveillance.                                                       | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| (b) Types and locations of system or systems used.                                                       | UNCLASSIFIED.                         |
+| (c) Exploitable weaknesses or shortfalls of the system or systems as employed in the area.               | CONFIDENTIALDeclassify               |
+| upon elimination of the weakness                                                                         |                                       |
+| from all sites or inactivation of the                                                                    |                                       |
+| site(s).                                                                                                 |                                       |
+| f                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Duress codes.                                                                                          | CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.             |
+| g                                                                                                        |                                       |
+| . Security forces.                                                                                       |                                       |
+| (1) Augmentation force deployment.                                                                       | CONFIDENTIALExemptions 2             |
+| and 4.                                                                                                   |                                       |
+
+## Table 1 Classification Guidance For Chemical Warfare And Chemical Defense InformationContinued
+
+| Information                                                                                    | Classification             |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
+| (2) Tactical defense plan.                                                                     | CONFIDENTIALDeclassify    |
+| upon deactivation of all sites with                                                            |                            |
+| similar defense plans.                                                                         |                            |
+| (3) All other information including weapons, ammunition, patrols and strength.                 | UNCLASSIFIED. OPSEC SENSI- |
+| TIVE. (See AR 5301.)                                                                          |                            |
+| 8. Past doctrinal field manuals and documents describing U.S. offensive employment of chemical |                            |
+| agents.                                                                                        |                            |
+| CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.                                                                      |                            |
+
+Notes:
+1 This becomes UNCLASSIFIED when the information is officially released to (a) the Russian Federation, under the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Soviet Union and the U.S. regarding the Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (signed 23 September 1989), or (b) the Chemical Weapons Convention, unless higher classification is warranted under the standards of AR 3805, chap II. See para 5c of this regulation. Notification by DA of official exchange date will be provided.
+
+2 The term critical vulnerabilities applies to those vulnerabilities which, if known by hostiles, would provide an avenue by which hostiles could breach security and reasonably be expected to gain physical access to chemical agents.
+
+3 The testing and evaluation of materiel furnished by intelligence agencies, or studies on, or experimental evaluation of the vulnerability of specific facilities may require classification. (See para 5c.)
+
+## Classification Guidance For Biological Defense Information
+
+| Information                                                                        | Classification                                       |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1. Information revealing significant total systems or operational deficiencies and |                                                      |
+| capabilities in U.S. biological defense posture, training, and readiness.          |                                                      |
+| SECRETExemptions 2 and 4.                                                         |                                                      |
+| 2. Biological defense RDTE.                                                        |                                                      |
+| a                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . The identity of micro-organisms and toxins being studied, their characteris-     |                                                      |
+| tics, and the consequences of their administration to appropriate hosts.           |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED.                                                                      |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED (refer to SBCCOM protection special-                                  |                                                      |
+| ists).                                                                             |                                                      |
+| b                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Testing and evaluation of filters and other means of protection from             |                                                      |
+| microbial aerosols, and of materiel and procedures for decontamination. (See       |                                                      |
+| note.)                                                                             |                                                      |
+| SECRETExemption 2.                                                                |                                                      |
+| c                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Results of testing and evaluation of materiel/systems which demonstrate          |                                                      |
+| vulnerabilities/major operational deficiencies of specific defense systems, com-   |                                                      |
+| ponents, or materials.                                                             |                                                      |
+| d                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . General medical research and procedures for protecting personnel against         |                                                      |
+| biological agents.                                                                 |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED (see para 1 if higher classification is                               |                                                      |
+| appropriate).                                                                      |                                                      |
+| e                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Results of medical research revealing operational deficiencies/vul-              |                                                      |
+| nerabilities in biological defense.                                                |                                                      |
+| SECRETExemption 2.                                                                |                                                      |
+| f                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Storage of biological materials.                                                 |                                                      |
+| (1) Inventories and listings of seed stocks and toxins (unless source re-          |                                                      |
+| stricted).                                                                         |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED.                                                                      |                                                      |
+| (2) Listings of strains and quantities of a biological material (unless source re- |                                                      |
+| stricted).                                                                         |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED.                                                                      |                                                      |
+| g                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Medical doctrine for the protection of personnel against biological agents.      | UNCLASSIFIED (see para 1 if higher classification is |
+| appropriate).                                                                      |                                                      |
+| 3. Biological defense systems.                                                     |                                                      |
+| a                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Complete systems design in enough detail to suggest applying counter-            |                                                      |
+| measures.                                                                          |                                                      |
+| SECRET (see para 1).                                                               |                                                      |
+| b                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . System performance determining criteria.                                         | SECRET (see para 1).                                 |
+| c                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Deployment plans.                                                                | SECRETExemption 4.                                  |
+| d                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Formal patterns of detection and warning system deployment.                      | SECRET (see para 1).                                 |
+| e                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Quantity and location of vaccine and antiserum other than at operational         |                                                      |
+| level.                                                                             |                                                      |
+| UNCLASSIFIED.                                                                      |                                                      |
+| f                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Recipients of specific vaccines for other than operational purposes.             | UNCLASSIFIED.                                        |
+| g                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Information revealing planning for defensive measures against terrorist use      |                                                      |
+| of biological materiel.                                                            |                                                      |
+| SECRET (see para 1).                                                               |                                                      |
+| h                                                                                  |                                                      |
+| . Biological defense doctrine.                                                     | UNCLASSIFIED (Becomes classified if it contains in-  |
+| formation revealing significant total systems or opera-                            |                                                      |
+| tional deficiencies and capabilities as stated in para 1).                         |                                                      |
+
+Notes: The testing and evaluation of materiel furnished by intelligence agencies, or studies on, or experimental evaluation of the vulnerability of specific facilities may require classification. (See para 5c.)
+
+## Classification Guidance For Nuclear, Biological And Chemical (Nbc) Contamination Survivability Information Information Classification
+
+CONFIDENTIALExemptions 2 and 3.
+1. NBC contamination survivability/vulnerability testing and evaluation.
+a. Specific hardness vulnerability to NBC agents that could cause the system
+to either fail or significantly reduce its ability to perform its mission critical functions.
+CONFIDENTIALExemption 2.
+b. Specific compatibility vulnerability that could prevent a soldier in MOPP 4
+from performing a mission critical task.
+CONFIDENTIALDeclassify when vulnerability no longer exists.
+c. Specific decontaminability vulnerability that could result in more than a negligible risk to unprotected personnel following decontamination with standard decontaminants and procedures. 2. Specific criteria for NBC contamination survivability without reference to a system's assessed vulnerability to these criteria.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+3. Identification of materials/components affected by NBC decontaminants.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+4. Identification of materials/components not affected by NBC contaminants and decontaminants.
+UNCLASSIFIED.
+
+## Appendix A References Section I
+
+AR 701
+Army Acquisition Policy. (Cited in para 5d.)
+AR 3805
+Department of the Army Information Security Program. (Cited in paras 1a; 5a(2), 5b, and 5c, and table 1.)
+AR 5301
+Operations Security (OPSEC). (Cited in table 1.)
+EO 12958
+Classified National Security Information. (Cited in paras 1a and 5f and table 1.) (Available at www.archive.gov/
+index.html.)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iii Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iv Referenced Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Glossary Section I Abbreviations Ar Army Regulation
+
+BZ
+3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate
+
+## Conus Continental United States
+
+DA
+Department of the Army DCS, G8
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
+EO
+Executive Order GB
+Sarin (GB): O-Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate
+
+## Hqda Headquarters, Department Of The Army Ids Intrusion Detection System Mopp Mission Oriented Protective Posture
+
+NBC
+nuclear, biological, chemical OCONUS
+outside continental United States OPLANS
+operations plans OPSEC
+operations security POM
+Program Objective Memorandum RDTE
+research, development, test, and evaluation
+
+## Sbccom U.S. Soldier And Biological Chemical Command
+
+U.S.
+
+United States O-Ethyl S-Diisopropylaminoethyl Methylphosphonothiolate
+
+## Section Ii Terms Agent Nondescriptive Code An Arbitrary Abbreviated Designation For An Agent (For Example, Vx).
+
+biological defense research A generic term applied to all research efforts and materiel development related to protecting and defending U.S. forces against an adversary's employment of biological agents, munitions, or weapon systems.
+
+binary chemical munition A munition designed to use two relatively nontoxic chemicals which combine during functioning of the weapon system to produce a toxic chemical agent for release on target.
+
+chemical agent A chemical substance intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans through its chemical properties. Excluded from consideration are riot control agents, smoke, and incendiary agents.
+
+chemical warfare A generic term applied to all efforts and materiel related to lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and munitions or weapon systems. This term also applies to protecting and defending U.S. forces against an adversary's employment of such agents or munitions or weapon systems.
+
+mission-oriented protective posture 4 (MOPP4)
+A level established by the commander depending on the risk of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. These levels give guidance on wearing of the MOPP gear.
+
+## Munition An Item Of Materiel Used To Disseminate An Agent.
+
+nontraditional agent A generic term for chemical or biochemical materiel that is not U.S. type-classified as a chemical agent but assessed to be in development by foreign threat elements and that could emerge as a threat agent.
+
+simulant A substance or material that is used in place of toxic agent (chemical or biological) in training, research, testing, or evaluation.
+
+## Toxin A Poisonous Chemical By-Product Of Micro-Organisms, Animals, Or Plants. Type Classification Identification By Army Materiel Status Record Action Of An Item Or Component To Indicate Its Adoption For Service Use. Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries. Usapd
+
+# Electronic Publishing System Onecol Formatter Win32 Version 222
+
+PIN:
+004097000
+DATE:
+06-23-05
+TIME:
+10:36:30
+PAGES SET:
+14
+DATA FILE:
+C:\wincomp\r380-86.fil DOCUMENT:
+AR 38086
+SECURITY:
+UNCLASSIFIED
+DOC STATUS: REVISION

markdown/army/ar525-15.md

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+Military Operations
+
+## Software Reprogramming For Cyber Electromagnetic Activities
+
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 19 February 2016
+
+## Summary Of Change Ar 52515 Software Reprogramming For Cyber Electromagnetic Activities
+
+This major revision, dated 19 February 2016--
+
+o Changes the title from Software Reprogramming for Electronic Warfare and
+Target Sensing Systems to Software Reprogramming for Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (cover).
+o Introduces expanded scope for software reprogramming support to cyber
+electromagnetic activities (chap 1).
+o Adds responsibilities for Headquarters, Department of the Army, commands, and
+direct reporting units to provide support for electronic warfare reprogramming mission requirements (chap 2).
+o Establishes cyber electromagnetic activities software reprogramming
+integration and interoperability implementation strategy (chap 3).
+
+## Military Operations Software Reprogramming For Cyber Electromagnetic Activities
+
+Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to all proponent agencies involved in research and development, acquisition, life cycle supp o r t ,  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  p l a n n i n g  a n d  i n t e g r a - tion, and operations activities of electronic w a r f a r e  a n d  t a r g e t  s e n s i n g  s y s t e m s requirements.
+
+H i s t o r y .  T h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i s  a  m a j o r revision.
+
+S u m m a r y .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  s e t s  f o r t h Army policy for software reprogramming for electronic warfare and target sensing s y s t e m s .  I t  c o v e r s  m a n a g e r i a l  r e q u i r e - ments necessary to implement electronic warfare and target sensing systems operations and training oversight for actions in peacetime and wartime, to include U.S. wartime reserve modes in order to administer counter threat changes. It establishes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  A r m y  c o u n t e r - t h r e a t - change capabilities.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+
+The proponent of this regulation is Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7. The propon e n t  h a s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a p p r o v e exceptions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a  d i v i s i o n  c h i e f  w i t h i n  t h e  p r o p o n e n t agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by prov i d i n g  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  a  f u l l analysis of the expected benefits and must i n c l u d e f o r m a l r e v i e w b y t h e a c t i v i t y ' s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or s e n i o r  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  r e q u e s t i n g  a c t i v i t y and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l
+
+## Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
+Responsibilities - 14, page 1 Program objectives - 15, page 1
+
+## Chapter 2 Responsibilities, Page 2 Assistant Secretary Of The Army (Acquisition, Logistics And Technology) - 21, Page 2
+
+Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 112 and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).
+
+S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .  S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 (DAMOODE), Washington, DC 203103200.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 (DAMOODE), Washington, DC 203103200.
+
+Distribution. This regulation is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/ A r m y  N a t i o n a l  G u a r d  o f  t h e  U n i t e d States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Chief Information Officer/G6 - 22, page 2 Chief, National Guard Bureau - 24, page 2 Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 - 25, page 2 Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 - 26, page 3 Deputy Chief of Staff, G4 - 27, page 4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 - 28, page 4 Chief, Army Reserve - 29, page 4
+Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command - 210, page 4
+Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command - 211, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command - 212, page 5 Commanders, Army service component commands - 213, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command - 214, page 6 Commanding General, Second Army - 215, page 6 Commanding General, U.S. Army Cyber Command - 216, page 6 Commanders of Army service component commands serving geographic combatant commands and Joint task forces
+- 217, page 6
+Chapter 3 Counter-Threat-Change Strategic Overview, page 6
+New and changed threats - 31, page 6 Rapid software reprogramming strategy - 32, page 7 Evolving Army practices - 33, page 7 Commander's response to changes in threat-system electromagnetic parameters, procedures and modes of operation
+- 34, page 7
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 8
+B.
+Internal Control Evaluation, page 9
+
+## Glossary
+
+11. Purpose This regulation establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides strategy for integration and interoperability of cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA). CEMA consist of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations. This policy emphasizes CEMA EW systems conducting electronic attack (EA), electronic warfare support (ES), and electronic protection (EP) through rapid software reprogramming (RSR). It is the Army policy for CEMA EW mission software products (MSPs) and Mission Enabling Software (MES). MSP include aviation survivability equipment software, mission data sets, and ground-based counter-improvised explosive device software, known as threat load sets, and nonmission software products such as the Army Reprogramming Analysis Team (ARAT) survivability software loader development and distribution. It describes the operation of Army capability to identify and counter changes to threat system composition, capabilities and signatures within the electromagnetic s p e c t r u m  ( E M S )  a n d  c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  s p e c t r u m  m a n a g e m e n t  o p e r a t i o n s .  M E S  e n c o m p a s s e s  a l l  o t h e r  A r m y Reprogramming Analysis TeamProgram Office (ARATPO) products, for example, computer based training, system software support and maintenance, pattern developments, and CEMA threat verification and validation. The Army creates effective countermeasures to hostile introduction of new CEMA threat systems and changes that impact the Army's ability to detect, classify, declare, and counter the threat. The development of these countermeasures enhances security and preservation of friendly forces and equipment. This policy gives the Army a process which enables soldiers a reach-back RSR capability that will assist commanders to attain tactical superiority, achieve surprise, gain and retain the initiative, maintain awareness of new and emerging threats, and obtain decisive results while maintaining vigilant data collection efforts to detect introduction of new threat signals or changes to existing threats through the RSR of CEMA systems.
+
+## 12. References See Appendix A. 13. Explanation Of Abbreviations And Terms See Glossary. 14. Responsibilities Responsibilities Are Listed In Chapter 2.
+
+15. Program objectives The principal objective of providing EW operational software programming support is to detect, classify, and declare new and changed cyber electromagnetic threats, and to support mitigation of these changes in order to allow commanders to conduct missions as required. There is special emphasis on reducing ambiguity because of the covert nature of new and changing threats. Failure to respond to these changes in threat composition or signature may disrupt operations and negatively impact mission accomplishment and force preservation. RSR for post-production software support (PPSS) includes ground and air EA, ES, and EP software and firmware including radar warning receivers, radar jammers, missile warning receivers, radar frequency interferometry systems, laser detection systems, integrated radio frequency, infrared countermeasures, electro-optical systems, countermeasure dispensing systems, counter radiocontrolled improvised explosive devices, radio frequency jammers, communications jammers, the EW Planning and Management Tool, and future Army reprogrammable CEMA systems. The following activities will contribute to the Army's principal EW RSR objective above:
+a. Field Army EW sensors, and smart weapon systems that are software configurable at the application level and/or hardware modular in order to adapt to hostile introduction of new and changed threats.
+
+b. Exercise cyber security process and procedures in the development of mission software for EW systems. c. Field Army capabilities that incorporate configurable software and firmware to counter threat changes. d. Update threat reprogrammable EW mission software product content, (that is, threat library, operational flight program, filtering parameters, and geolocational parameters), via secure network to EW officers (EWOs) and aviation mission survivability officers (AMSOs) in Army service component commands (ASCCs).
+
+e. Operate a sustained program that is software programmer accessible to collect and evaluate employment, deployment, and signature information for systems operating in the EMS. This program will be essential for providing friendly EA, ES, and EP and to successfully engage or defeat hostile or potentially hostile systems.
+
+f. Maintain essential data about the U.S., allied forces, and coalition partners' RSR and their counters to enemy capabilities while ensuring effectiveness of capabilities through thorough testing and evaluation.
+
+g. Support U.S. forces and others with RSR as required and consistent with security guidelines regarding the dissemination of threat and/or counter-threat information to non-U.S. forces.
+
+h. Reduce or eliminate the effects of new and changed enemy-introduced threats.
+
+i. Increase friendly RSR effectiveness during operations.
+
+j. Reduce the susceptibility of U.S. systems to new and changed threats through increased situational awareness and improved EW capabilities to detect them. Support situational awareness capability.
+
+k. Maintain the ARATPO rapid reprogramming infrastructure for Army EW software sustainment and tactical CEMA that supports the ASCC commander's ability to quickly respond to the combatant commander's missions across the full range of military operations as an Army core capability. ARATPO is chartered by U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) as the responsible official for EW Post Production Software Support under AMC-U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) Software Engineering Center (SEC).
+
+## Chapter 2 Responsibilities
+
+21. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
+The ASA (ALT) will
+a. Ensure that sensor-based weapons and CEMA systems are developed using software reprogrammable signature detection, classification, and response capabilities that can be responsive and enabling to EW, spectrum management and cyber operations.
+
+b. Coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 (DCS, G2) and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 (DCS, G3/
+5/7) to support the direction and control of requirements development for the data production and database capabilities needed to support signature software reprogramming.
+
+c. Provide staff coordination with the DCS, G2, the DCS, G3/5/7 and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 (DCS, G8)
+(DAPRFDI) for the development of essential EW systems and RSR capabilities identified through the Research, Development, and Acquisition Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. Coordinate with U.S. AMC, within the scope of the National Disclosure Policy1 (NDP1), to encourage allied incorporation of friendly RSR capabilities into appropriate foreign military sales (FMS) systems.
+
+d. Ensure all program managers (PMs) with software reprogrammable EW systems include integrated logistics assessments for EW systems and RSR in coordination with the CECOM SEC ARATPO. Ensure the requisite information technology infrastructure is established and maintained to support effective RSR functions.
+
+e. Ensure PMs assess impact of RSR changes regarding system safety where the change to the reprogrammable software impacts the interface control document with the host platform or as appropriate.
+
+22. Chief Information Officer/G6
+The CIO/G6 will
+a. Serve as the liaison to relevant Army and Joint technical and user groups served by ARATPO for EW, and RSR
+to ensure proper bandwidth and priority.
+
+b. Designate EW RSR as a tactical support element to combatant commanders using the EMS to identify threats, affect targets, and protect soldiers, on a non-interference basis with friendly communications and considered separate from standard information systems.
+
+c. Ensure and support secure and classified communications, information management, and information technology capability for RSR functions.
+
+d. Coordinate RSR information management and information technology hardware, infrastructure, and access requirements with Second Army, combatant commands (CCMDs), ASCCs, and the ARATPO as required preventing a mission gap.
+
+e. Ensure that policies and doctrine do not cause an ASCC mission gap in performance of a Combatant Commander mission for the RSR infrastructure for CEMA systems (for example, spectrum management operations).
+
+f. Ensure, through policy, EW EA systems deconfliction within the EMS. Provide spectrum management necessary to protect communications while permitting essential EA operations.
+
+24. Chief, National Guard Bureau The CNGB will
+a. Coordinate with Commander, AMC and CECOM for ARAT staff assistance visits to support unit cyber, EW, and/or RSR training and deployments as necessary.
+
+b. Provide the necessary resources for EW and/or CEMA RSR requirements specific to U.S. Army National Guard unit EW readiness.
+
+## 25. Deputy Chief Of Staff, G2 The Dcs, G2 Will
+
+a. Coordinate with the CIO/G6, the DCS, G3/5/7, DCS, G8, and the CG, AMC to ensure that EW reprogramming requirements for collection, intelligence production, database maintenance, and related research and development are identified and integrated in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5250.01.
+
+b. In coordination with the DCS, G3/5/7, represent the Army Staff in Joint intelligence forums that discuss changes to threat system composition, capabilities, and signatures, and the means to counter those changes.
+
+c. Ensure that scientific and technical intelligence centers, for example, National Ground Intelligence Center, are capable of vetting EW parametric data in support of RSR and maintaining vetted threat data to Army ground and airborne systems.
+
+d. Support the integration of Title 50 (50 USC) intelligence products for use in mission software and products utilized by Army EW and CEMA systems.
+
+e. The CG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command will (1) In coordination with the DCS, G2 and DCS, G8, budget for and provide EW threat, signature, electronic intelligence, and applicable all-source data necessary to identify changes in the threat composition or operation to the ARATPO for rapid reprogramming of EW system capabilities based on requirements provided to the intelligence community by ARATPO, PEO and/or PM, and ASA (ALT).
+
+( 2 )  D e v e l o p  a n d  m a i n t a i n  t h r e a t  t o o l s  a n d  p a r a m e t r i c  d a t a b a s e s  t o  s u p p o r t  c u r r e n t  a n d  f u t u r e  E W  s y s t e m requirements.
+
+(3) Provide required Army contribution to EW and measurement and signal intelligence reprogramming databases, as appropriate.
+
+(4) In coordination with CECOM, SEC, and/or ARATPO and the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), review and validate input from ASCCs. Review and approve ASCC-recommended procedures for receiving new and changed threat data from CCMD.
+
+(5) Review ARATPO mission software production requirements and provide updated EW databases for air and ground EW and/or CEMA systems.
+
+(6) Execute policy for 50 USC intelligence products utilized in developing or reprogramming EW mission software and products.
+
+(7) In coordination with the DIA Intelligence Mission Data Center (IMDC), ensure that future Life Cycle Mission Data Plan requirements are evaluated during the early system acquisition cycle as a factor to proceed past a Milestone B decision.
+
+26. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7
+The DCS, G3/5/7 will
+a. Validate the Army's EW operational support infrastructure efforts to ensure that timely and effective mission software reprogramming is available to meet mission requirements.
+
+b. Ensure Army EW requirements, to include RSR, are represented, as required, within relevant PEG: General Purpose Forces, Information Management (Sustaining), Intelligence, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, Modernization, Supply and Maintenance, and School and Institutional Training.
+
+c. Coordinate with the appropriate EW organization within Army Commands, ASCCs, Direct Reporting Units, and the Joint community to ensure the ARATPO EW and RSR operations are integrated, as applicable.
+
+d. Develop RSR policy, programs, and force requirements for Regular Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
+
+e. In coordination with AMC, ASA (ALT), and TRADOC, ensure EW and RSR are addressed in system requirements documents.
+
+f. Coordinate RSR matters with the other military Services and allies as permitted by disclosure and security classification directives.
+
+g. Oversee the Army's contribution to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Emitter Database and U.S. Electromagnetic System (USELMS) Database.
+
+h. In coordination with the DCS, G2, represent the Army Staff in Joint intelligence forums that consider counterthreat-change matters and advise other counterparts.
+
+i. Headquarters, Department of the Army staff proponent and ARATPO contact for EW RSR policy actions within the Army, and ARAT support to other Services, Department of Defense, and other government agencies. This includes support to homeland defense requirements per Army policy and direction.
+
+j. Develop and integrate EW training policy that includes RSR as a standing objective in major Army training exercises.
+
+k. Establish the Implementation Authority for mission software implementation consistent with Army and Joint policies.
+
+27. Deputy Chief of Staff, G4
+The DCS, G4 will
+a. Ensure that logistical policies support the capability to perform software installation and RSR at the platform or weapon level.
+
+b. Support the AMC, CECOM, ARATPO with the necessary logistical sustaining resources to ensure a robust, efficient, and rapid software reprogramming infrastructure and PPSS across the CEMA portfolio of systems.
+
+c. Represent ARATPO sustainment requirements in the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation System.
+
+d. In conjunction with the DCS, G2, ensure the ARATPO is involved in the development, delivery, and maintenance of any EW RSR capability provided under FMS.
+
+28. Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
+The DCS, G8 will
+a. Coordinate with AMC (ARATPO) for review and validation of requirements for EW RSR developmental efforts to compete for resources during the program objective memorandum and program budget review process.
+
+b. Plan and program resources for ARATPO research, development, test, and evaluation activities. c. Ensure that CEMA systems transitioning to sustainment from ASA (ALT) PEOs and/or PMs ensure efficient use of existing Government organic core sustainment infrastructure (that is, PPSS) in support of new system acquisition.
+
+29. Chief, Army Reserve The CAR will
+a. Coordinate with Commander, AMC and CECOM for ARAT staff assistance visits to support unit cyber, EW, and/or RSR training and deployments, as necessary.
+
+b. Ensure Army Reserve training requirements for EW and RSR are included in the USAR training PEG. c. Ensure the requisite operational and logistical resources are available at the unit level to support ARATPO staff assistance visits.
+
+210. Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command The CG, AMC will
+a. Designate the ARATPO via charter as the Army responsible official for (1) EW PPSS mission software reprogramming infrastructure and EW support to CEMA, as required. (2) RSR capability assessment office for operational CEMA (EW and cyber) equipment. b. Provide the ARATPO with the resources and facilities necessary to provide timely EW software reprogramming compliant with 10 USC 2460 definition of depot-level maintenance and repair which includes RSR support to meet current operational mission requirements and ensure adequate infrastructure to meet anticipated and/or future requirements no later than 4 years after initial operational capability.
+
+c. Coordinate with and provide DCS, G2 and the ARATPO with threat system intelligence support necessary to continuously conduct system engineering evaluations. Ensure the ARATPO coordinates with acquisition PEOs and/or PMs developing and fielding systems operating in the EMS so the effects of CEMA PPSS are adequately represented in order to support leader decisions centered on organizing, equipping, and employing ground forces.
+
+d. In coordination with TRADOC organizations (TRADOC capability managers (TCMs), Centers of Excellence, and Schools) provide continuous review from a software engineering and system capability perspective and evaluation of methods, models, and tools, doctrinal publications, EW software engineering reprogramming training, and other training as directed.
+
+e. Ensure and incorporate reprogrammable memory for all EW and applicable cyber systems operating in the EMS
+while observing operations security guidance.
+
+f. Direct and provide resources to ARATPO to support the software requirement for all EW systems to be reprogrammable at the organizational maintenance or operator level.
+
+g. Coordinate with the DCS, G4 and DCS, G8, to ensure Army EW PPSS requirements are incorporated in appropriate budgetary requirements.
+
+h. Ensure EMS deconfliction strategies and capabilities necessary to protect communications while still permitting essential EA operations to be incorporated into all EA, ES, and EP systems associated with RSR.
+
+i. Coordinate with the CIO/G6 to ensure a classified communications capability to provide EW mission data sets directly to the field commanders.
+
+j. Require ARATPO support to Joint and Army exercises as required, life cycle sustainment of EW and/or cyber systems, crisis response teams including Army explosive ordnance disposal and other government agencies in support of Homeland Defense.
+
+k. Provide direct support to FMS case management requiring PPSS services such as software development, threat analysis, equipment, and training support to meet U.S. Army Security Assistance Command requirements that include installation and test as well as RSR designs that provide for Joint and allied interoperability.
+
+l. Ensure development of MES products for example, computer-based training, system software support and maintenance, pattern developments, threat verification and validation, and future cyber products, as needed.
+
+211. Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command The CG, FORSCOM will
+a. Prepare, inspect, and ensure assigned forces are maintained at the highest possible readiness level to conduct EW
+operations, receive, and process EW mission software products for all reprogrammable equipment.
+
+b. Establish and execute a CEMA readiness evaluation strategy similar to current aviation resource management survey for both air and ground Army organizations.
+
+c. Establish and maintain in coordination with ARATPO a RSR support and assistance program to familiarize and assist unit missions and deployments.
+
+d. Coordinate with U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to provide for required conduct and programming of operational (troop) tests of EW systems and software.
+
+e. Ensure those forces postured in Tier 1 readiness have current EW mission software products to support required deployments and are exercised in their use.
+
+212. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command The CG, TRADOC will
+a. Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in support of Army EW software reprogramming by theater, operational area, or mission and provide guidance for the planning, execution, and evaluation of RSR activities in operations and training.
+
+b. Identify gaps affecting EW PPSS across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities and provide potential solutions to the deficiencies determined during capabilities based analysis process.
+
+c. Ensure that the principles of the RSR process and ARATPO processes for download and/or upload of EW
+systems mission software are included in the instructional POI at Army institutions as appropriate.
+
+d. Ensure TRADOC representation and support of the EW configuration control board for EW RSR. e. Submit priority intelligence requirements to CG, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command using prescribed procedures and methods. Submit requests for materiel support for counter-threat capability development in accordance with AR 38111.
+
+f. Ensure EMS requirements and impacts for CEMA are considered in capabilities-based assessments. g. Ensure the representation of EW RSR during the Capabilities Based Analysis Process including the priority requirement for EM threat information.
+
+h. Integrate RSR capabilities into doctrinal and training publications. i. Coordinate with AMC to provide qualified ARATPO instructors on EW RSR procedures and equipment to EWOs and AMSOs at appropriate TRADOC centers of excellence and as required.
+
+j. Coordinate with ARATPO for experiments with EW systems and EW RSR at appropriate network integration evaluations.
+
+213. Commanders, Army service component commands The Commanders, ASCCs will
+a. Ensure Army CEMA representatives to the CCMD staff are trained on counter-threat-change capabilities and ARATPO infrastructure and activities.
+
+b. Ensure deploying units and crews receive training on the current software and TTP for all EW systems required for military operations.
+
+c. Develop procedures for implementing TRADOC's stated TTP, training, doctrine, and other responses to enemy introduction of new or modified existing threats.
+
+d. Exercise established procedures to exchange data electronically with Joint Services for EW reprogramming, operations, and tactics.
+
+e. Exercise RSR procedures in accordance with respective command authorities. f. Include RSR objectives in exercises and training events. g. Ensure that counter-threat-change objectives are planned and coordinated with appropriate Service operations and intelligence organizations.
+
+h. Support Army and Joint Services reprogramming exercises and requirements as directed by DCS, G3/5/7 or geographical CCMD.
+
+i. The Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command will coordinate with ARATPO for required RSR
+support and provide necessary funding for that support.
+
+214. Commanding General, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command The CG, ATEC will
+a. Ensure that system evaluation plans incorporate direct and indirect EW roles in the evaluation process. b. Ensure that event design plans include testing of systems in an environment that represents the hostile EW threat to the extent possible.
+
+c. In conjunction with ARAT-PO, ensure comprehensive threat load testing of EW systems during appropriate system tests and for related EW tests at the network integration evaluations.
+
+215. Commanding General, Second Army The CG, 2nd Army will
+a. In coordination with ARCYBER, develop and test information assurance or as applicable the cybersecurity on Army systems, and recommend to CG, TRADOC, organizational and operational concepts, and doctrine pertaining to the employment of EW to support Army operations in the Army's portion of the DOD information networks. In coordination with ARCYBER, integrate requirements and procedures for countering hostile EW threats in combat developments and training activities. Use AMC-developed system threat assessment report for related EW threats.
+
+b. Coordinate with AMC, CECOM, SEC, and ARATPO on the needs for secure distribution of EW and CEMA
+mission data sets as networks evolve.
+
+c. In coordination with CG, AMC and ARATPO, ensure EW RSR messaging is continuously available and with sufficient priority to accomplish directly to forces in the CCMD areas of operation via secret internet protocol router network, and coordinate planned adjustments or revisions to network policy with ARATPO to assure continuous support.
+
+d. Assist ARATPO in the development of over-the-air delivery of mission software directly to EW systems and hosting auxiliary mission software on the networks for combat requirements, as needed and as networks mature.
+
+216. Commanding General, U.S. Army Cyber Command
+The CG, ARCYBER will
+a. Coordinate with AMC, CECOM, SEC, and ARATPO in all matters of CEMA operations. b. Provide a representative to the CEMA configuration control board in support of CEMA RSR. c. Ensure that ARATPO has operational priority in the task order waiver approval process. d. Ensure ARATPO infrastructure connectivity in support of Army EW operations. e. Integrate EW RSR into CEMA at appropriate tactical echelons in coordination with ARATPO, the EW TCM,
+and appropriate commands and staffs.
+f. Authorize direct liaison with the cyber Center of Excellence for EW RSR integration and coordination with the
+EMS and cyber activities and operations, where appropriate.
+g. In accordance with the Second Army, assist in the development and implementation of automated dissemination
+of EW mission software products and the hosting of alternative EW mission software products as the network system evolves with AMC, CECOM, SEC, and ARATPO.
+217. Commanders of Army service component commands serving geographic combatant commands and Joint task forces The Commanders, ASCCs serving geographic combatant commands and Joint task forces will
+a. Direct the use of friendly wartime reserve mode (WARM) as dictated by the threat environment or as directed by the geographic combatant commander. This authority may not be delegated.
+
+b. Notify EW coordination centers and ARATPO when U.S. WARM capabilities must be executed. c. Consult and exercise established procedures identified in ATP 313.10 to exchange data electronically with other Services for EW reprogramming, operations, and tactics.
+
+d. Ensure standing operating procedures for reporting requirements include notification of ARATPO when EW
+mission software products have been uploaded to operational EW systems.
+
+## Chapter 3 Counter-Threat-Change Strategic Overview
+
+31. New and changed threats a. Adversaries are expected to employ both high and low technology systems with constantly changing TTPs. EW
+requires RSR capability to adapt to or forestall these changes.
+
+b. The largest volume of new and changed threats will most likely be employed at the beginning of hostilities. This
+creates the following problems for Army forces:
+(1) Detecting new and existing threats. (2) Identifying the type of threat. (3) Validating and verifying the threat change to be creditable. (4) Determining how to counter the threat changes. (5) Implementing appropriate friendly force changes to counter the new or changed threat.
+32. Rapid software reprogramming strategy The ARATPO RSR strategy focuses on the following four functional components to achieve success:
+a. Detect the change. Perform continuous analysis of collected intelligence to identify when new threats, or modifications to existing threats, are introduced that may affect EW system performance or TTP.
+
+b. Assess the change. Make use of automated tools and software models to identify or flag when changes may adversely impact EW system performance, either globally or regionally.
+
+c. Develop the response. Use threat parametric, signature, and employment information to rapidly develop, test, and accept a response to the change. Responses may be software updates, hardware modifications, changes in TTP, or a combination of all three.
+
+d. Implement the change. Transmit and implement the change (hardware, software, and TTP) to the system at the operator level. See ATP 313.10 for additional information on RSR processes.
+
+33. Evolving Army practices a. Warfare is rapidly moving into a new domain: cyberspace. This will affect warfighting in all domains, and the Army will take measures to adapt to the cyberspace environment. As doctrine and tactics evolve, so will practices for reprogramming EW and CEMA systems to make them more responsive to the Soldier. This increased responsiveness demands shortened timelines to combat enemy threats as they adapt to new technology and to new methods of employment. RSR will be required to become even more adaptive, automated, and integrated with weapons systems operating in the EMS. A vigorous research and development approach to provide timely mission software to the field with on-call data sets hosted on the network are required for use by the EWOs and AMSOs to counter anticipated threats. The intelligence community will be required to provide validated and verified threat information to the ARATPO more rapidly than in the past for specific regions of the world. Priorities for software updates will have to be identified by the TCM as early as possible to create and adjust mission data sets for users. The integration and cooperation required will demand attention by the entire CEMA community as part of a combined arms team in support of CEMA operations.
+
+b. New EW and CEMA systems now in development will require continuous attention to detail and involvement of every command in the acquisition of new systems in an era of scarce resources to achieve the efficiencies required. Upfront involvement of sustainers in the early phases of the development cycle and acquisition decisionmaking will be of critical importance to achieve required goals in this environment.
+
+c. Those EW and CEMA systems supported by RSR must be maintained whether they are in operational use or in depot storage. Current mission software products are readily accessible through ARATPO accounts on the secure internet protocol router network.
+
+d. Under the CEMA tactical organizational construct, there is a CEMA element at all levels (corps through battalion) that serves as the commander's staff group for planning. The CEMA element is led by the unit EWO. The EWO serves as the commander's designated staff officer for the planning, integration, and synchronization of CEMA and uses other elements of the staff to integrate CEMA into the commander's scheme of maneuver in addition to the existing responsibilities for coordinating and implementing ongoing EW activities (see FM 338).
+
+## 34. Commander's Response To Changes In Threat-System Electromagnetic Parameters, Procedures And Modes Of Operation See Chairman Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction 3210.04A For Guidance On This Topic. Appendix A References Section I Required Publications The Following Publication Is Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site (Http://Www.Apd.Army.Mil).
+
+AR 38111
+Intelligence Support to Capability Development (Cited in para 212e.)
+
+## Section Ii Related Publications A Related Publication Is A Source Of Additional Information. The User Does Not Have To Read It To Understand This Publication. Ar 112 Managers' Internal Control Program
+
+AR 2530
+The Army Publishing Program AR 701
+Army Acquisition Policy AR 719
+Warfighting Capabilities Determination AR 951
+Flight Operations AR 3805
+Department of the Army Information Security Program AR 52522
+U.S. Army Electronic Warfare AR 5301
+Operations Security (OPSEC)
+AR 7501
+Army Materiel Maintenance Policy ATP 313.10
+EW Reprogramming Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reprogramming Electronic Warefare (EW) Systems
+
+## Cjcsi 3121.01B (S) Standing Rules Of Engagement For U.S. Forces (U) (Available On Siprnet.) Cjcsi 3210.04A (S) Joint Electronic Warfare Reprogramming Policy (U) (Available On Siprnet.)
+
+CJCSI 3320.01D
+Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations CJCSM 3212.02D
+Performing Electronic Attack in the United States and Canada for Testing, Training, and Exercises CJCSM 3212.03
+Performing Tests, Training, and Exercises Impacting the Global Positioning System (GPS) in the United States and Canada CJCSM 3320.01D
+Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations in the Electromagnetic Operational Environment CJCSM 3320.02D
+Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures CJCSM 3320.04
+Electromagnetic Warfare in Support of Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations DODD 3222.04
+Electronic Warfare (EW) Policy (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.)
+DODD 5250.01
+Management of Signature Support within the Department of Defense (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.)
+FM 338
+Cyber Electromagnetic Activities NDP1
+National Disclosure Policy (NDP1, 1 Oct 1988) (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/523011p. pdf.)
+10 USC 2460
+Definition of depot-level maintenance and repair (Available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text.)
+50 USC
+War and National Defense (Available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text.)
+
+## Section Iii Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iv Referenced Forms Da Forms Are Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site (Http://Www.Apd.Army.Mil). Da Form 112 Internal Control Evaluation Certification
+
+DA Form 2028
+Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
+
+## Appendix B Internal Control Evaluation B1. Function The Function Covered By This Evaluation Is Software Reprogramming For Ew Systems.
+
+B2. Purpose The purpose of this evaluation is to assist the organizations designated in chapter 2 in evaluating the key internal controls listed. It is not intended to cover all controls.
+
+B3. Instructions Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, and so forth). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in the supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 112 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).
+
+B4. Test questions
+a. Are sensor-based weapons and EW systems developed using reprogrammable software? (ASA (ALT) only) b. Are policies and procedures in place to enable RSR across the Army, Services, Joint community, and allies, as
+necessary? (All-ASCCs address inside their command only.)
+
+## B5. Supersession Not Applicable.
+
+B6. Comments Help make this a better tool for evaluating internal controls. Submit comments to Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 (DAMOODE), Washington, DC 203103200
+
+## Glossary Section I Abbreviations
+
+AMC
+U.S. Army Materiel Command AMSO
+Aviation Mission Survivability Officer ARAT
+Army Reprogramming Analysis Team ARATPO
+Army Reprogramming Analysis Team-Program Office ARCYBER
+U.S. Army Cyber Command ASA (ALT)
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
+ASCC
+Army service component command ATEC
+U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command CAR
+Chief, Army Reserve CCMD
+combatant command CECOM
+Communications-Electronic Command CEMA
+cyber electromagnetic activities CG
+Commanding General CIO/G6
+Chief Information Officer/G6
+CNGB
+Chief National Guard Bureau DCS, G2
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
+DCS, G3/5/7
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7
+DCS, G4
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G4
+DCS, G8
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
+EA
+electronic attack EMS
+electromagnetic spectrum EP
+electronic protection ES
+electronic warfare support EW
+electronic warfare EWO
+electronic warfare officer
+
+## Forscom U.S. Army Forces Command Inscom U.S. Army Security And Intelligence Command Mes Mission Enabling Software Msp Mission Software Program (Or Product) Ndp1 National Disclosure Policy1 Peo Program Executive Officer
+
+PM
+program manager
+
+## Ppss Post-Production Software Support Rsr Rapid Software Reprogramming
+
+SEC
+Software Engineering Center
+
+## Tcm Tradoc Capabilities Manager Tradoc U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Ttp Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures Warm Wartime Reserve Mode Section Ii Terms
+
+Cyber electromagnetic activities Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the EMS, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system.
+
+Electromagnetic spectrum The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands.
+
+Electronic attack Division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires.
+
+Electronic protection Division of EW involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the EMS that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.
+
+Electronic warfare EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy. EW consists of three divisions: EA, EP, and ES.
+
+Electronic warfare support Division of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations.
+
+Electronic warfare mission software EW mission software is the element contained in an equipment software operating program to enable the detection of hostile threats while performing EA, EP, and electronic support functions. Specifically, EW mission software may contain a data library and operational profile of threat system operations. For example, the threat load set in an EW radio-controlled improvised explosive devices protection system will contain regional or area of operations specific threat parametric data in the library and platform operational ground profile characteristics of the system such as speed of travel, and on-board communications.
+
+Mission Enabling Software MES encompasses all other ARATPO products, for example, computer based training, system software support and maintenance, pattern developments, CEMA threat verification and validation, and future cyber products.
+
+Mission software product MSP include aviation survivability equipment software, mission data sets, and ground-based counter improvised explosive device software, known as threat load sets, and nonmission software products such as the ARAT survivability software loader development and distribution.
+
+Operational flight program The software program of an embedded computer system (that is, the Electronic Control Unit of the Common Missile Warning System) which enables that system to perform its interactive tasks as designed.
+
+Operations security A process of analyzing friendly action attendant to military operations and other activities to (1) Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; (2) Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be intercepted and pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries;(3) Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to the adversary exploitation.
+
+Rapid software reprogramming Rapid software reprogramming is the deliberate alteration or modification of EW systems, or the tactics and procedures that employ them, in response to validated changes in equipment, tactics, or the electromagnetic environment. These changes may be the result of deliberate actions on part of friendly, adversary or third parties; or may be brought about by electromagnetic interference or other inadvertent phenomena. The purpose of EW reprogramming is to maintain or enhance the effectiveness of EW system equipment. EW reprogramming includes changes to self-defense systems, offensive weapon systems, and intelligence collection systems.
+
+Wartime reserve mode WARM are characteristics and operating procedures of sensor, communications, navigation aids, threat recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that will contribute to military effectiveness if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing commanders before they are used, but could be exploited or neutralized if known in advance. WARM are deliberately held in reserve for wartime or emergency use and seldom, if ever, applied or intercepted prior to such use.
+
+## Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries.

markdown/army/ar525-30.md

@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+Military Operations
+
+# Army Strategic Readiness
+
+Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 3 June 2014
+
+## Summary Ar 52530 Army Strategic Readiness
+
+This new Department of the Army regulation, dated 3 June 2014--
+
+o Institutionalizes the fundamentals of Army Strategic Readiness (throughout). o Contains extensive information regarding Army Strategic Readiness and how it
+is reported, prepared, reviewed, and submitted (throughout).
+
+## Military Operations Army Strategic Readiness
+
+Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e  A c t i v e  A r m y ,  t h e  A r m y  N a t i o n a l Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to Department of the Army civilians.
+
+History. This is a new Department of the Army regulation.
+
+Proponent and exception authority.
+
+The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this regulation that a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c o n t r o l l i n g l a w a n d regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a d i v i s i o n  c h i e f  w i t h i n  t h e  p r o p o n e n t agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by prov i d i n g  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  f u l l analysis of the expected benefits and must i n c l u d e f o r m a l r e v i e w b y t h e a c t i v i t y ' s senior legal officer. All waiver requests will be endorsed by the commander or s e n i o r  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  r e q u e s t i n g  a c t i v i t y and forwarded through their higher headquarters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR 2530 for specific guidance.
+
+Summary. This regulation prescribes the purpose, policies, procedures, and responsibilities for planning, preparing, executi n g ,  a n d  a s s e s s i n g  A r m y  S t r a t e g i c Readiness. It describes both existing and maturing concepts, responsibilities, policies, and implementing procedures and is i n t e n d e d  t o  e v o l v e  a s  A r m y  S t r a t e g i c R e a d i n e s s  m a t u r e s .  T h i s  r e g u l a t i o n  e s - tablishes the basis for coordinated Army Strategic Readiness Assessment execution w i t h i n  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  t h e  A r m y  t o support national objectives.
+
+Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provisions in accordance with AR 112 and
+
+## Contents (Listed By Paragraph And Page Number)
+
+Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1
+Purpose - 11, page 1 References - 12, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms - 13, page 1
+Responsibilities - 14, page 1 Statutory authorities - 15, page 1 Background - 16, page 1
+
+## Chapter 2 Roles And Responsibilities, Page 3 Assistant Secretaries Of The Army - 21, Page 3
+
+identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix B).
+
+S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .  S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f this regulation and establishment of command and local forms are prohibited without prior approval from the Deputy Chief o f  S t a f f ,  G - 3 / 5 / 7  ( D A M O - O D R ) ,  4 0 0
+A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n  D C 203100400.
+
+Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recomm e n d e d  C h a n g e s  t o  P u b l i c a t i o n s  a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief o f  S t a f f ,  G - 3 / 5 / 7  ( D A M O - O D R ) ,  4 0 0 A r m y  P e n t a g o n ,  W a s h i n g t o n  D C 203100400.
+
+Distribution. This publication is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  a n d  t h e  U . S .  A r m y Reserve.
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) - 22, page 4 Chief Information Officer/G6 - 23, page 4 Chief, National Guard Bureau - 24, page 4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G1 - 25, page 4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 - 26, page 4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7 - 27, page 4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G4 - 28, page 5 Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 - 29, page 5 Chief, U.S. Army Reserve - 210, page 5 Chief of Engineers - 211, page 5
+The Surgeon General - 212, page 5
+Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management - 213, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command - 214, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command - 215, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command - 216, page 5 Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command - 217, page 5
+Chapter 3 Terminology, page 6
+General - 31, page 6 Key terminology and lexicon - 32, page 6
+Chapter 4 Concepts, page 7
+General - 41, page 7
+Process - 42, page 7
+Chapter 5 Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process, page 8
+Introduction - 51, page 8
+Organization input - 52, page 9 Measures and indicators - 53, page 9
+Primary and supporting strategic readiness tenet proponents. - 54, page 10
+Proponent analysis - 55, page 10
+Strategic Readiness Assessment Group - 56, page 10
+The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment - 57, page 10
+Chapter 6 Future Readiness, page 11
+General - 61, page 11 Predictive analysis of Army readiness - 62, page 11
+Chapter 7 Resourcing and Strategic Levers, page 11
+General - 71, page 11 Resourcing - 72, page 11
+Strategic levers - 73, page 12 Manning strategic levers - 74, page 12
+Training strategic levers - 75, page 12 Capacities and Capabilities strategic levers - 76, page 12 77. Equipping strategic levers - 77, page 12 Sustaining strategic levers - 78, page 12 Installation strategic levers - 79, page 13 Budgetary and/or programming strategic levers - 710, page 13
+Conclusion - 711, page 13
+
+## ContentsContinued
+
+Chapter 8 Army Strategic Readiness Reviews, page 13
+General - 81, page 13
+Strategic Readiness Update - 82, page 13
+Joint Force Readiness Review - 83, page 13 Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress - 84, page 13
+
+## Appendixes
+
+A.
+References, page 15
+B.
+Internal Control Evaluation, page 16
+
+## Table List
+
+Table 51: Army Strategic Readiness tenet proponents and/or supporting proponents, page 10
+
+## Figure List
+
+Figure 11: Comparison of AR 2201 with this regulation, page 2 Figure 11: Army Strategic Readiness concept, page 3
+Figure 41: Army Strategic Readiness concept model, page 8 Figure 51: Army Strategic Readiness Assessment, page 9
+Figure 71: Leading indicators and strategic levers, page 12
+
+## Glossary Chapter 1 Introduction 11. Purpose This Regulation Establishes The Army Strategic Readiness Process And Provides Responsibilities For Its Execution. 12. References Required And Related Publications And Referenced Forms Are Listed In Appendix A.
+
+13. Explanation of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary. Chapter 3 explains the terminology and lexicon used in this regulation.
+
+## 14. Responsibilities Responsibilities Are Listed In Chapter 2.
+
+15. Statutory authorities Statutory requirements from this regulation originate from Title 10, United States Code (USC), as well as 32 USC, which provides the statutory requirements for the National Guard while operating under the command and control of the respective States.
+
+a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01 establishes the functions of the Department of Defense (DOD)
+and all of its components.
+
+b. Department of the Army General Order 201201 establishes the Secretary of the Army's expectations for the functioning of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) and assigns major functions and responsibilities to the Principal Officials of HQDA to assist the Secretary of the Army in the operation and functioning of the Army.
+
+16. Background a. Senior leaders. Department of the Army senior leaders recognize the need for a comprehensive readiness assessment of the Army at the strategic level. In the past, Army senior leaders directed formal efforts and studies to develop a strategic readiness process. These efforts mostly focused on technological systems and, in some cases, pushed readiness assessments to lower echeloned units. Even though these efforts moved the Army in the right direction, they did not satisfy the intent of Army senior leaders.
+
+b. Unit readiness measures. Unit readiness measures, codified in Army Regulation (AR) 2201, would become input into a strategic readiness assessment. AR 2201 focuses at the operational and tactical levels; is unit centric (primarily company, battalion, and group and/or brigade levels); and features quantitative measures of current resources and training. AR 2201 satisfies the needs of the Army concerning unit status reporting. Figure 11 compares AR 2201 with this regulation.
+
+c. Army Strategic Readiness. Army Strategic Readiness focuses on the readiness of the Army as an institution to provide sufficient, capable units to support the national military strategy (NMS). This regulation enables Army senior leaders to obtain an integrated view of current and future strategic readiness, by creating a process to assess the status of the strategic readiness tenets (SRTs); review the leading indicators that drive particular trends in readiness; and, ultimately, provide a strategic level assessment of the Army's near-term (02 years) and future readiness (26 years). These assessments will allow the Army to report on strategic readiness and provide information to Army senior leaders to inform critical resource decisions necessary to address and mitigate shortfalls in Army readiness. Army readiness assessments consider readiness trends and the analysis of the impacts of events and decisions on current and future readiness.
+
+d. Strategic levers. The analysis process identifies leading indicators that drive particular trends and provides Army senior leaders actionable adjustments to mitigate strategic readiness shortfalls. Using these actions, Army senior leaders can mitigate or eliminate Army strategic shortfalls by changes in policy, strategy adjustments, or other actions. Strategic levers, for use by Army senior leaders, range from changes in force structure, program funding, adjustments in training, and equipping outputs beyond the unit level.
+
+e. Developing the Army Strategic Readiness concept. The current Army Strategic Readiness concept, figure 12, provides Army senior leaders the ability to look across the Army to identify the status of current readiness and forecast future readiness. The concept was originally developed to answer the following questions: 1) "What can Army senior leaders do to prevent a hollow force while drawing down post Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom?" and 2) "Can the Army build a process that provides a view of future readiness?" While the concept was created to address these questions, it is meant to be an enduring process for assessing Army Strategic Readiness.
+
+(1) *Objective and subjective analysis.* The concept in figure 12 is analytic, relying on clear, objective measures.
+
+Thus, the process begins with the analysis of measured areas submitted from organizations across the Army, identifying both current levels and respective indicators that may signal a change in future readiness.
+
+(2) *Strategic readiness tenets.* The SRTs are Manning; Training; Capacities and Capabilities; Equipping; Sustaining;
+and Installations. The following chapters will explain the use of these tenets in determining the Army's Strategic Readiness. Within these tenets, leading indicators and strategic options are identifiable.
+
+f. Existing readiness processes and procedures, outlined in AR 2201, coupled with the Army Strategic Readiness concept (see fig 12), form the Army Strategic Readiness process. Subsequent chapters in the regulation explain Army Strategic Readiness and emerging processes in detail.
+
+## Chapter 2 Roles And Responsibilities
+
+21. Assistant Secretaries of the Army The ASAs will work with the appropriate Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCSs) and ensure effective coordination within the Department of the Army on strategic readiness policies and programs in their assigned functional areas of responsibility and provide independent advice to the Secretary of the Army on Army Strategic Readiness. Each responsible ASA will assign members of their staff responsibilities to work with and assist the DCS, G3/5/7 in the development of the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment and procedures for using strategic readiness data to improve the readiness status of the Army. Additionally, each ASA will coordinate with the appropriate DCS(s) to ensure that data is accurate, holistic, and provides the necessary information to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army. Additionally, each ASA will review and provide advice on the Strategic Readiness Update (SRU), the Joint Forces Readiness Review (JFRR), The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) and other documents relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.
+
+22. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
+The ASA (M&RA) will
+a. Supervise the development and ensure the execution of policies and programs pertaining to Total Army readiness and training.
+
+b. Set strategic direction and provide oversight for ensuring Army policies, plans, and programs for personnel; force structure; manpower management; training; military and civilian personnel readiness; and reserve affairs are executed consistent with law, regulation, and policy.
+
+c. Serve as the Secretary of the Army's senior policy advisor for the strategic readiness of the Total Force. d. Provide oversight of the Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Group (SRAG) and strategic readiness reporting. e. Reviews the SRU, the JFRR, the QRRC, and other documents relevant to Army Strategic Readiness. f. Serve as the Army's lead for the Manning, Training, and Capacities and Capabilities SRTs.
+
+23. Chief Information Officer/G6
+The CIO/G6 will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an action officer (AO) as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators in support of information technology and the Army's network.
+
+24. Chief, National Guard Bureau The CNGB will ensure that the Director, Army National Guard
+a. Provides each SRT proponent the information necessary to measure the Army as a Total Force. b. Assigns Army National Guard (ARNG) members, on a quarterly basis, as members of the SRAG, to assist the DCS, G3/5/7 in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.
+
+25. Deputy Chief of Staff, G1
+The DCS, G1 will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an action officer (AO) as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Manning SRT.
+
+26. Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
+The DCS, G2 will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations in support of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and the area of battle space awareness within the Capacities and Capabilities SRT.
+
+27. Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7
+The DCS, G3/5/7 will
+a. Oversee Army Strategic Readiness reporting and reporting the Army's status to provide an accurate readiness picture for prioritization and resourcing decisions.
+
+b. Develop policies, standards, and procedures to assess and measure Total Force strategic readiness. c. Ensure required reports are submitted to the proponents of the SRTs in a timely manner. d. Plan, develop and manage the SRAG. e. Process and distribute strategic readiness assessment information and data in a usable format to, upon request, appropriate Department of the Army agencies, commands, Joint Staff, and Government agencies.
+
+f. Develop and issue guidance for the use of strategic readiness information. g. Task ARSTAF agencies and the responsible ACOM, ASCC, DRU, and/or the CNGB, when applicable, to provide supplemental information and data for analyzing strategic readiness, analysis of strategic readiness status information and data, and recommendations for improving the Army's overall Strategic Readiness.
+
+h. Collect, compile and staff the SRU, JFRR, QRRC, and any other forum relevant to Army Strategic Readiness. i. Provide information in support of the JFRR, QRRC, SRU, and any other forum relevant to Army Strategic Readiness.
+
+j. Provide an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations for the Training SRT. k. Provide an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations for the Capacities and Capabilities SRT.
+
+l. Ensure the policies and procedures established in this regulation undergo review and revision no later than 2 years after the release date and every 2 years henceforth.
+
+28. Deputy Chief of Staff, G4
+The DCS, G4, in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA (ALT)), will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Sustaining SRT.
+
+c. Work directly with ASA (ALT) in measuring and analyzing the Sustaining SRT.
+
+29. Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
+The DCS, G8 will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations, within the Equipping SRT. (With ASA (ALT), provide readiness assessment of Army equipment modernization plans.)
+c. Coordinate programmatic decisions with projected readiness impacts across the program objective memorandum
+(POM). Work in concert with relevant HQDA officials to ensure impacts are calculated and senior officials are informed of impacts and include those assessments in POM development. Update decision briefings to Army senior leaders as part of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.
+
+d. Provide future programmatic force readiness assessments to Army senior leaders as part of both the Army SRU
+process and the PPBE process, including as a special topic in the annual POM executive summary.
+
+210. Chief, U.S. Army Reserve The CAR will
+a. Provide each Army SRT proponent the information necessary to measure the Army as a Total Force. b. Assign U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) members, on a quarterly basis, as members of the SRAG to assist in properly assessing the overall strategic readiness of the Total Force.
+
+211. Chief of Engineers The COE will ensure that the CG, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as stipulated in AR 1087, identifies strategies and resources for engineer training consistent with requirements synchronized and coordinated with the Joint engineer. This includes the identification of facility requirements supporting unit and system training, sustainment, and deployment.
+
+212. The Surgeon General TSG will ensure that the CG, U.S. Army Medical Command will support to the DCS, G1 in the analysis of the Manning SRT. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 1087.
+
+213. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management The ACSIM will
+a. Assist the DCS, G3/5/7 by providing an AO as a participating member in the SRAG. b. Provide the DCS, G3/5/7 an overall analysis of the measures and indicators from all Army organizations within the Installations SRT.
+
+214. Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command The CG, USASOC will provide support to the DCS, G3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness for Army Special Operations, across all of the SRT on matters concerning Special Operations Forces. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 1087.
+
+215. Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Command The CG, FORSCOM will provide support to the DCS, G3/5/7 in the analysis of the Capacities and Capabilities and Training SRTs. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 1087.
+
+216. Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command The CG, TRADOC will provide support to the DCS, G3/5/7 in the analysis of strategic readiness, concerning the Training and Capacities and Capabilities SRTs. This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 1087.
+
+## 217. Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command The Cg, Amc Will Provide Support To The Dcs, G4; Dcs, G8; And Acsim In The Analysis Of The Equipping,
+
+Installations, and Sustaining SRTs. As the Army's lead materiel integrator, AMC will synchronize the distribution and redistribution of materiel to achieve the highest level of readiness for equipping for the near-term (02 years). This support should include, but is not limited to, areas listed in AR 1087 and AR 52529.
+
+## Chapter 3 Terminology
+
+31. General The terminology and lexicon used in this policy will help facilitate clear, effective and consistent internal and external communications regarding the Army's strategic readiness assessment process and procedures. (Note: Some terms do not translate universally across the DOD or the Joint Staff; some terms are expressly used by the Army and for the purposes of this publication).
+
+32. Key terminology and lexicon a. Army Strategic Readiness. Army Strategic Readiness is the Army's ability to provide adequate forces to meet the demands of the NMS. The NMS provides the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring national interests as articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and to accomplish the defense objectives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
+
+b. Total Army. The Total Army refers to the service in its entirety, encompassing all activities, organizations (AC, ARNG, and USAR), personnel (military and civilians), contractors and contract services, installations, and so on, which support and carryout the Army's Title 10 functions.
+
+c. Operating forces. Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof (see AR 2201).
+
+d. Generating force. The generating force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by Joint force commanders (see AR 2201).
+
+e. Future readiness. Future readiness is an assessment of the Army's strategic readiness levels in the mid- term (26
+years). This projection is based primarily on assumptions made about future requirements, funding and resourcing; as well as anticipation of possible emergent events that could adversely affect the expected or desired readiness status of the Army (Capacities and Capabilities).
+
+f. Strategic levers. These are measures the Army can take, upon direction to mitigate possible readiness shortfalls.
+
+Descriptions of strategic levers are further described in chapter 7. Such actions include, but are not limited to, changes to policy, resourcing, and funding.
+
+g. Strategic readiness tenets. The Army SRTs are Manning; Training; Capacities and Capabilities; Equipping;
+Sustaining; and Installations. Each readiness tenet contains a number of measureable objective and qualitative indicators which provide leading indicators of future changes in readiness.
+
+(1) Manning - the Total Force's ability to provide authorized personnel by grade and skill. (2) Training - the Total Force's ability to conduct unit collective training, institutional training (initial entry training, leader development, professional development, functional training), and officer commissioning sources,(United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School).
+
+(3) Capacities and Capabilities (Organizing) - the Total Force's ability to provide the trained and ready forces to meet current demands, projected demand and surge demands to meet the NMS.
+
+(4) Equipping - the Total Force's ability to provide equipment to units for meeting current demands, projected demand and surge demands to meet the NMS.
+
+(5) Sustaining - the Total Force's ability for sustaining operations. This includes strategic mobility, Army war reserve stocks, industrial preparedness, central supply, internal operations of Army depots and arsenals, procurement of secondary item Army war reserves transportation and depot materiel maintenance. Sustainment of the force also includes measures to assure the quality and timeliness of sustainment resources and to deploy, sustain and redeploy Army operating forces, develop and maintain strategic logistics systems, manage weapon systems, provide security assistance and conduct logistics long-range planning. Sustainment additionally includes the overseeing, operation, performance, and security of the supply chain.
+
+(6) Installations - the Total Force's ability to provide excellence through streamlined processes, strategic partnerships, and good stewardship of resources that address Army priorities and meet the mission requirements of Senior Commanders. This translates into the ability to provide a growing and transforming Army with the infrastructure and support services it needs to remain a highly effective, expeditionary and campaign-quality force, today and in the future. This includes the measures which capture data across all Army land-holding organizations for Active, ARNG, and USAR.
+
+h. Strategic readiness tenet proponents. These are the key participating staff sections in the SRAG. SRT proponents are assigned specific roles and responsibilities (see chap 2). The proponents are the subject matter experts in their respective tenet areas as depicted in table 51.
+
+## Chapter 4 Concepts
+
+41. General Army strategic readiness is a process that assesses the ability of the Total Force-AC, ARNG, USAR, as well as the operating and generating force-to execute its role to meet the demands of the NMS.
+
+a. The Strategic Readiness Assessment is an ongoing process with a quarterly report to Army senior leaders. This process combines both objective and subjective measures that look at the elements of the Army's readiness to define whether the Army is ready and will continue to be so at different time horizons.
+
+b. The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA) provides a comprehensive assessment that informs senior leader decisions, actions, and other requirements; reports to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman's Readiness System, projections of future Army readiness; and efforts to mitigate potential problems in Army readiness.
+
+42. Process Using the SRTs as a starting point, the SRT proponents will work with the ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, and the USAR (fig 41) to identify key measures and indicators that influence the overall readiness of the Army. The organizations then provide their findings for each measure and indicator to the HQDA proponent for the relevant SRT (see para 54). The Army Strategic Readiness process is not exclusive to those ARSTAF sections that are proponents of a particular SRT. In order to obtain an accurate measure of the Army, at the strategic level, all primary ARSTAF must participate in the SRAG at all levels; the AO, colonel, and general officer (GO)/senior executive service. Other agencies outside of the primary staff may participate in the SRAG, as deemed necessary by the DCS, G3/5/7.
+
+a. HQDA proponents are then responsible for aggregating the results of each of the measures and indicators, determining the effects on the overall readiness of the Army and developing an analysis of those impacts from the perspective of their tenet. Each SRT will then provide their analysis to the SRAG.
+
+(1) Upon receiving each HQDA proponent's input, the SRAG provides an overall assessment of Army strategic readiness considering each of the six SRTs together, any other data, trends, or indicators from other ARSTAF sections and any other source needed to render an overall strategic assessment of the Army. From this analysis, combined with military judgment, the SRAG develops an overall ASRA.
+
+(2) The ASRA provides Army senior leaders with a holistic view of readiness across the Army. This allows Army senior leaders to address readiness concerns by employing appropriate strategisc levers to influence changes in policy and budgeting in order to address problems in Army Strategic Readiness.
+
+b. Indicators and measures. (1) *Indicators.* A trend or objective measure that indicates the state or level of organizational readiness. Organizations in the ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, USAR, and ARNG must identify the tenet driven key indicators of readiness that depict a positive or negative trend for use as a tool to determine future readiness. The key indicators provided must remain consistent, every reporting period, in order to develop trends that facilitate the analysis.
+
+(2) *Measures.* A status assessment calculated from authoritative data that is highly objective. ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, USAR, and ARNG have established measures within their organizations that provide their status on each indicator.
+
+c. SRAG. (1) Led by the Operations Directorate, G3/5/7. (2) Comprised of representatives at the AO, colonel, and GO levels from each of the HQDA proponents listed in paragraph 54 and any additional members deemed appropriate by the DCS, G3/5/7.
+
+## Chapter 5 Army Strategic Readiness Assessment Process
+
+51. Introduction The ASRA process is a HQDA process that relies on inputs from the Total Army to assess the Army's Total Force readiness (see fig 51). This process produces a strategic assessment of readiness across the Total Force. Vetted through the SRAG, it produces a collaborative and comprehensive strategic assessment of current and future readiness. The ASRA process accomplishes this by analyzing and assessing key strategic level measures and indicators. Army organizations, utilizing existing respective systems and processes, identify macro level measures and indicators that influence current and future readiness then submit these measures and indicators to the proponents of the SRTs for further analysis. The SRT proponents, upon completion of their analysis, convene the SRAG, led by the DCS, G3/5/7, Army Readiness Division, as depicted in figure 51.
+
+52. Organization input Organizations across the Total Army are responsible for determining their respective readiness, by assessing their SRT driven key measures and indicators. Organizations can accomplish this by using existing systems and processes. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts on the current and future readiness of the organization, by any of the six strategic readiness tenets. Reporting organizations then submit their strategic level input to the respective readiness tenet proponent on the ARSTAF (see table 51).
+
+53. Measures and indicators The measures and indicators can reflect any of the following characteristics: objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective. The measures and indicators must reflect impacts on readiness at a strategic level. They must closely relate to the six SRTs. Submissions from organizations may relate to one or many SRTs. Organizations will submit information for consideration that may not fit perfectly within the tenets, but is of key strategic concern to the respective organization. SRT proponents and the SRAG will collaborate with the submitting organizations to ensure clarity of information in order to complete the analysis. The SRT proponents and SRAG, over time, will refine and standardize the measures and indicators for all ACOMs and agencies.
+
+| Readiness Tenets                         | ARSTAF Proponent                 | Supporting Proponent                   |
+|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
+| Manning                                  | DCS, G1                         | CAR, ARNG, U.S. Army Medical Command   |
+| Training                                 | DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOTR)           | TRADOC, ARNG, CAR, FORSCOM             |
+| Capacities and Capabilities              | DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOODR, DAMOSS, |                                        |
+| DAMOFM)                                 |                                  |                                        |
+| DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOFM and DAMOSS),      |                                  |                                        |
+| FORSCOM, CAR, ARNG                       |                                  |                                        |
+| Equipping                                | DCS, G8                         | AMC, CAR, ARNG                         |
+| Sustaining                               | DCS, G4                         | AMC, CAR, ARNG                         |
+| Installations                            | ACSIM                            | U.S. Army Installation Management Com- |
+| mand, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, CAR, |                                  |                                        |
+| ARNG, AMC, DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOFM),       |                                  |                                        |
+| CIO/G6                                  |                                  |                                        |
+
+54. Primary and supporting strategic readiness tenet proponents.
+
+The primary SRT proponents are representatives from the ARSTAF as depicted in table 51. The ARSTAF proponents are responsible for the collection, reviewing, processing, and adjudication of the submitted strategic measures and indicators. The proponents will conduct their respective analysis and prepare a preliminary assessment for review and discussion at the AO level SRAG. Supporting SRT proponents, in the development of the ASRA, are organizations external to the ARSTAF that are tasked to support the ARSTAF in matters pertaining to strategic readiness. Table 51 reflects the alignment of these supporting agencies with the ARSTAF proponents and the associated tenet. The efforts and collaboration between the primary and supporting SRT proponents will enhance the overall development of the ASRA.
+
+55. Proponent analysis The proponent analysis conducted at the strategic level informs the determination of current and future impacts on readiness. The preliminary assessment will include the following: a problem statement, impacts on readiness (near-, mid-, and far-terms), courses of action, recommendations, and way ahead.
+
+56. Strategic Readiness Assessment Group a. The SRAG is the forum for the formal analysis, review, development, and presentation of the approved ASRA.
+
+As previously stated, the SRAG convenes at three levels: AO, council of colonels, and a GO steering committee. The AO level develops the formal assessment for presentation to the council of colonels for additional guidance, input, and approval consensus. After approval by the council of colonels, the staff prepares the formal assessment for presentation to the General Officer Steering Committee.
+
+b. The DCS, G3/5/7, Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate (DAMOOD) is the proponent for the SRAG forum. The Army Readiness Division is responsible for the coordination, facilitation, and presentation for all levels of the SRAG. The Director of DAMOOD serves as the host for the SRAG General Officer Steering Committee. The permanent members of the SRAG will consist of two representatives (primary and alternate) of the SRT proponents and other invited stakeholders from the ARSTAF, identified by the SRAG, on a case by case basis.
+
+57. The Army Strategic Readiness Assessment a. The ASRA is a quarterly comprehensive analysis of the strategic readiness levels across the Total Force. This assessment combines the strategic measures and indicator assessments from the SRTs and any other strategic information. The intent of this assessment is to portray a holistic view of current, future, and projected readiness, expressed in the near-, mid-, and far-terms.
+
+b. The ASRA is narrative in format and submitted with supporting data. It extends the current view with a future and projected outlook. The ASRA combines objective, quantitative, empirical, qualitative, and subjective data and information.
+
+c. The utility of the ASRA is broader in scope than any current process. Not only does it provide the strategic readiness view of the Total Force for Army senior leaders, but it also informs external audiences and specific statutory requirements.
+
+61. General Predictive analysis support resourcing decisions in order to maintain readiness thresholds, provide input into the Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA), support the Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA), support COCOM operational requirements, and enduring Army activities.
+
+62. Predictive analysis of Army readiness a. The purpose of predictive analysis is to determine the impact of resourcing decisions, alternatives, changes to strategy, and demand for forces, on Army readiness. Impacts must be assessed over the near- and mid-term. These assessments understandably have varying levels of accuracy. Unforeseen changes in funding, demand for forces, or other factors have varying degrees of impact on current projections. These assessments support Senior Leader decisionmaking processes across a range of DOD forums.
+
+b. Predictive analysis allow HQDA to forecast future readiness. Predictive analysis must be informed by tactical and operational readiness reporting, combined with information from the measures and indicators from the SRTs. These assessments will be used to support strategic execution, risk assessments and resourcing decisions.
+
+c. ARSTAF elements conduct detailed analysis and prediction of relevant readiness measures associated with the six SRTs. This analysis will encompass current and historical trends ranging from tactical unit readiness (that is, unit status reporting trends) to aggregated analysis and prediction of critical elements supporting the six SRTs.
+
+d. Predictive readiness analysis provide critical input into several recurring processes and forums within DOD. Some examples are:
+(1) The annual CJA and CRA. Both of these assessments are informed by the Army's tactical, operational, and strategic readiness processes. The CJA and CRA are developed by including all measures of Army readiness.
+
+(2) Budgetary/POM submissions, which are based on an intensive review of strategy, risk and operational demands in order to establish budgetary priorities.
+
+(3) Joint Combat Capability Assessment, JFRR, and QRRC. Quarterly, ACOMs, ASCCs, DRUs, ARNG, and USAR
+provide readiness projections of designated assigned forces.
+
+e. Predictive readiness analysis assist planners to forecast future readiness that will provide operational readiness levels for allocation and apportionment planning as outlined in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. These projections are intended to be the result of staff estimates from organizations and not additional reporting burdens passed to tactical unit commanders. All ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, USAR, and FORSCOM will provide a 12-month readiness estimation of forces assigned or service retained in support of the JFRR submission process. Those ASCCs with limited assigned forces will work in coordination with the force provider to gain situational awareness for planning consideration of Army forces apportioned for planning.
+
+## Chapter 7 Resourcing And Strategic Levers
+
+71. General The Army can mitigate strategic readiness shortfalls through various policy or strategy adjustments across the six SRTs identified in chapter 4, as well as by other executable decisions implemented by Army senior leaders. Following an assessment by the Army SRAG Army senior leaders may re-prioritize or re-program resources to mitigate readiness shortfalls. Additional strategic levers, from changes in force structure and program funding, to adjustments in training and equipping outputs beyond the unit level, are potential mitigation actions available for use to improve the Army's readiness in key areas.
+
+72. Resourcing a. At the strategic level, the Army often addresses or rectifies readiness deficiencies through the following: The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Campaign Support Plan (ACSP) are the most notable examples through which the Army can effect readiness over the near- and mid-terms. The ACSP addresses the shaping of the future Army. Army modernization is a subset of the ACSP. The ACSP also addresses concerns from across all six SRTs for the near-, mid-, and long-term planning.
+
+b. The ASRA also provides analyses of projected readiness trends informed by concurrent leading indicators across the SRTs. Each readiness tenet contains a number of measurably objective and qualitative indicators which forecast changes in readiness. For each of these measures, there are actions the Army can take to adjust and mitigate potential readiness shortfalls (see fig 71).
+
+73. Strategic levers Strategic levers serve to influence or mitigate the risks posed by readiness deficiencies at the strategic level. While financial resources represent one type of strategic response, Army senior leaders and other decision-making authorities possess a range of other mechanisms at their disposal to effect readiness. The foregoing actions are the primary tools available to the SRAG and are commensurate with the six SRTs discussed in chapter 4. While budgetary and programming activities are not one of the six SRTs, the impact of its reach warrants inclusion as a strategic response.
+
+74. Manning strategic levers a. Readiness impacts to personnel end strength and health of the force are affected through accessions, retention and separations policies, as well as adjustments to medical policies, Soldier programs, and training strategies.
+
+b. Senior Army leader input to the Total Army analysis process and resulting adjustments to force structure are reflected in the Army structure and force design updates.
+
+c. Changes and adjustments to the Army's future force generation model effect readiness across manning, training, and equipping functional areas at various "aim points" along the force generation cycle that produce trained and ready Army units to meet COCOM operational requirements.
+
+75. Training strategic levers Army training proficiency levels including its inventory of trained and experienced leaders and Soldiers, in both operational units and the generating force, are indicators of Army Strategic Readiness. Impacts to training readiness are effected through various adjustments to training strategies, promotion and professional military education policies, as well as training aim points along the force generation cycle.
+
+76. Capacities and Capabilities strategic levers Readiness impacts to meet COCOM and operational requirements are affected through adjustments to force structure (for example, high demand, low density units), AC/RC capabilities mix, and training strategies. The Army's ability to meet COCOM requirements are assessed by its risk in fulfilling the NMS and the Defense Planning Guidance.
+
+77. 77. Equipping strategic levers Army impacts to equipment readiness are effected through adjustments to the Army modernization and equipment distribution strategies, strategic mobility enabling programs, and fleet management program, Additional actions include equipment shelf life extensions, equipment redistributions, and programmed replacements. The Lead Materiel Integrator can perform strategic risk assessments of various combinations of strategic levers involving varying equipping levels.
+
+78. Sustaining strategic levers Strategic Impacts to sustainment readiness are effected through adjustments in the depot workloads, war reserves stock, ammunition program, and an organic industrial base.
+
+79. Installation strategic levers Strategic impacts to Army facilities and Soldier quality of life are effected through adjustments to the Ready and Resilient Campaign Plan family readiness programs, facility standards and space utilization, and installation modernization enhancements.
+
+710. Budgetary and/or programming strategic levers As discussed in paragraph 72, the Army's PPBE process provides many opportunities to adjust resourcing to impact future Army readiness. Budget execution decisions, programmatic guidance and funding adjustments reflected in the Army POM effect readiness across the Army's Title 10 functions within the program evaluation groups over the futureyears defense program and PPBE cycle.
+
+711. Conclusion Prescriptive approaches to readiness deficiencies are often cross-cutting and interdependent, requiring approval authority beyond the unit, proponent, or organizational levels. Impacts to one SRT often affect another, in which case, the ARSTAF at HQDA (G3/5/7) serves as proponent for strategic level implementation. Risk mitigation strategies and resourcing actions must also conform to statutory and regulatory provisions. While the Army is afforded the flexibility to implement various risk reduction measures or commit/reduce resources across the SRTs, policy changes at the strategic level will require Army Secretariat and/or Congressional action.
+
+## Chapter 8 Army Strategic Readiness Reviews
+
+81. General Continuous assessments of the current and future strategic readiness environment shape the Army's ability to execute its' mission requirements within the NMS. In general, the SRU, JFRR and QRRC are outputs informed by the ASRA (see chapter 4). Each requires and integrates assessments from ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the ARSTAF that feed into the ASRA process. Army senior leaders then provide direction, additional guidance and prioritize efforts that ultimately shape desirable outcomes of Army missions in support of the NMS. Applying broader strategic guidance assists in focusing, guiding and influencing a more definitive end state in the execution of Army objectives.
+
+82. Strategic Readiness Update The SRU is the forum that allows Army senior leaders to provide clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction (monthly) between ASCCs, ACOMs, DRUs, ARNG, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the ARSTAF. This interaction promotes an early, shared understanding of the strategic readiness of Army units; resourcing, policy, or employment decisions; risks; and other key guidance factors. Command updates and focus topics presented by select ACOM, ASCC, DRU, USAR, ARNG, and key ARSTAF elements are intended to provide updates to Army senior leaders on additional key components of Army readiness that may impact unit readiness. This enables specified commands or staff elements to present findings from their own analysis and elevate concerns to Army senior leaders.
+
+83. Joint Force Readiness Review The JFRR is governed under Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01E. The JFRR is a quarterly principal assessment to the Chairman's Readiness System that combines and analyzes unit and COCOM, Service, and Combat Support Agency readiness assessments. The Army JFRR process evaluates changes in strategic readiness through measurements of the Army's SRTs (see chapter 5). The SRT leading indicators are assessed in order to validate and project the Army's overall readiness assessment level. Certain assessment indicators act as triggers that assist Army senior leaders in determining the decisions necessary in order to revise policy, program resources or choose an alternate course of action. The Army's input to the JFRR is briefed to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and/or the Chief of Staff of the Army for approval on a quarterly basis. Continuous parallel planning and coordination with the Joint Staff ensures that Army input to the JFRR clearly articulates applicable readiness concerns across the SRTs.
+
+84. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress The QRRC is a comprehensive report governed by 10 U.S.C. 482. Prepared by OSD for Congress, the QRRC outlines the DOD's ability to fulfill its statutory requirements. The QRRC consists of three components: Summary of the JFRR; Combatant Commander Assessments, and Unit Readiness Levels, to include Service Operational Overviews; and Expanded QRRC Readiness Indicators. In conjunction with the completion of the JFRR input in the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System, the Joint Staff provides a text summary of the JFRR to OSD as required for inclusion in the QRRC to Congress. The summary includes an overall readiness assessment of the DOD's ability to execute the NMS. Army input to the QRRC includes the following readiness indicators: Personnel Strength; Personnel Turbulence; Other Personnel Matters; Training (to include Unit Readiness and Proficiency); Logistics (Equipment Fill, Equipment Maintenance, and Supply); and Readiness of National Guard to Perform Civil Support Missions.
+
+## Appendix A References Section I Required Publications
+
+AR 2201
+Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration - Consolidated Policies (Cited in paras 16b, 16f, 32d, and 32c.)
+Section II Related Publications A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to understand this publication. DOD publications are available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/. USC is available at http://www.gpo. gov/fdsys/search/home.action.
+
+AR 1087
+Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units AR 112
+Managers' Internal Control Program AR 2530
+The Army Publishing Program AR 7132
+Force Development and Documentation AR 52529
+Army Force Generation Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.01E
+Joint Combat Capability Assessment (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cjcs/instructions.htm.)
+
+## Department Of The Army General Order 201201 Assignment Of Functions And Responsibilities Within Headquarters, Department Of The Army
+
+DODD 5100.01
+Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components DODD 5149.02
+Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC)
+DODD 7730.65
+Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
+JP 102
+Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ dod_dictionary/.)
+
+## National Defense Authorization Act (Current Fiscal Year) (Available At Http://Www.Gpo.Gov/Fdsys/Search/Home.Action.)
+
+10 USC
+Armed Forces
+10 USC 221
+Future-years defense program: submission to Congress; consistency in budgeting
+
+## 10 Usc 482 Quarterly Reports: Personnel And Unit Readiness 32 Usc National Guard Section Iii Prescribed Forms This Section Contains No Entries. Section Iv Referenced Forms Unless Otherwise Indicated, Da Forms Are Available On The Army Publishing Directorate Web Site (Http://Www.Apd. Army.Mil). Da Form 112 Internal Control Evaluation Certification Da Form 2028 Recommended Changes To Publications And Blank Forms Appendix B Internal Control Evaluation B1. Function The Function Covered By This Evaluation Is Army Strategic Readiness.
+
+B2. Purpose The purpose of this evaluation is to assist the DCS, G3/5/7 in evaluating the key internal controls listed below. It is intended as a guide and does not cover all controls.
+
+B3. Instructions Answers must be based on the actual testing of key internal controls (for example, document analysis, direct observation, sampling, simulation, or other). Answers that indicate deficiencies must be explained and the corrective action identified in supporting documentation. These internal controls must be evaluated at least once every 5 years. Certification that the evaluation has been conducted must be accomplished on DA Form 112 (Internal Control Evaluation Certification).
+
+B4. Test questions a. Is this regulation reviewed at least once every 2 years and updated as necessary?
+
+b. Are the officials responsible for Army Strategic Readiness oversight knowledgeable regarding the provisions of this regulation and is this regulation and other required references available and in use?
+
+c. If applicable, were any published instructions that supplement the provisions of this regulation coordinated with and/or approved by the DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOODR) in accordance with this regulation?
+
+d. Do the processes developed to produce the ASRA adequately provide the framework for SRT proponents to strategically measure their respective tenet(s)?
+
+## B5. Supersession Not Applicable.
+
+B6. Comments Help make this a better tool for evaluation of internal controls. Submit comments to the DCS, G3/5/7 (DAMOODR), 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 203100400.
+
+## Glossary Section I Abbreviations
+
+AO
+action officer AC
+active component ACOM
+Army command ACSIM
+Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management ACSP
+Army Campaign Support Plan AMC
+U.S. Army Materiel Command AR
+Army regulation ARNG
+Army National Guard ARSTAF
+Army Staff ASA
+Assistant Secretary of the Army ASA (ALT)
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)
+ASA (M&RA)
+Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
+ASCC
+Army Service Component Command ASRA
+Army Strategic Readiness Assessment CAR
+Chief, U.S. Army Reserve CIO/G6
+Chief Information Officer, G6
+CJA
+Comprehensive Joint Assessment COCOM
+Combatant Command COE
+Chief of Engineers
+
+## Compo Component Cra Chairman's Risk Assessment Dcs Deputy Chief Of Staff
+
+DCS, G1
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G1
+DCS, G2
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G2
+DCS, G3/5/7
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7
+DCS, G4
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G4
+DCS, G8
+Deputy Chief of Staff, G8
+
+## Dod Department Of Defense Dodd Department Of Defense Directive Dru Direct Reporting Unit Forscom U.S. Army Forces Command
+
+GO
+general officer HQDA
+Headquarters, Department of the Army
+
+## Jfrr Joint Force Readiness Review
+
+JP
+Joint publication METL
+mission-essential task list
+
+## Ndaa National Defense Authorization Act
+
+CNGB
+Chief, National Guard Bureau
+
+## Nms National Military Strategy Osd Office Of The Secretary Of Defense Pom Program Objective Memorandum Ppbe Planning, Programming, Budgeting, And Execution Qrrc Quarterly Readiness Report To Congress Rc Reserve Component Srag Strategic Readiness Assessment Group Srt Strategic Readiness Tenet Sru Strategic Readiness Update Tradoc U.S. Army Training And Doctrine Command Tsg The Surgeon General Usar U.S. Army Reserve Usasoc U.S. Army Special Operations Command
+
+USC
+United States Code
+
+## Section Ii Terms
+
+Army command An Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army, performing multiple Army Title 10 functions across multiple disciplines. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with administrative control.
+
+Army force generation A structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of regional combatant commander requirements (see AR 52529).
+
+Army National Guard As used in this regulation, ARNG describes Army units under the control of the individual States and Territories that become a component of the Army when in the service of the United States. Also, those Army organizations designated as force structure component (COMPO) 2.
+
+Army National Guard of the United States As used in this regulation, the Army National Guard of the United States describes federally recognized Army units consisting of members of the ARNG who have been mobilized and come under the control of Federal authorities.
+
+Army Service Component Command An Army force designated by the Secretary of the Army, composed primarily of operational organizations serving as the Army component for a combatant commander. If designated by the combatant commander, it serves as a Joint Force Land Component Command or Joint task force. Command responsibilities are those established by the Secretary and normally associated with operational control and administrative control (see AR 1087).
+
+## Army Service Component Headquarters An Army Headquarters Designated By The Secretary Of The Army To Support Subunified Commands See Ar 1087). Assigned Mission An Operational Requirement That A Unit Is Formally Assigned To A Plan For, Prepare For, Or To Execute.
+
+Assigned mission level The assigned mission level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit's ability to accomplish its primary assigned mission. The assigned mission levels are further explained in AR 2201.
+
+Category level The category level is an overall readiness assessment that reflects the unit's ability to accomplish/provide core functions/designed capabilities and to execute decisive action as represented in its mission-essential task list (METL). This overall assessment is derived by considering the current status of four measured areas-personnel, equipment-onhand, equipment readiness/serviceability and training-that indicate the availability status of resources (personnel and equipment) and unit training proficiency measured against the requirements and capabilities established by the unit's modification table of organization and equipment.
+
+Civil support DOD support to civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities (DODD 3025.18 and Joint Publication (JP) 102).
+
+Combatant command A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments. The organization is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command (see JP 102).
+
+Command authority The authority over a subordinate unit/element that enables the higher unit to task organize and direct that subordinate unit/element for operations in accordance with the Army command relationships defined in Army doctrine (that is, organic, attached, and operational control).
+
+Critical dual use equipment items Critical dual use equipment items are those equipment items that support both the operational requirements of Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and that are necessary to enable Army units (COMPO 1, COMPO 2, and COMPO 3) and personnel to assist civil authorities in responses to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other m a n - m a d e  d i s a s t e r s  a s  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  s c e n a r i o s  ( t h a t  i s ,  f a c i l i t a t e  d e f e n s e  s u p p o r t  t o  c i v i l i a n authorities).
+
+Direct reporting unit An Army organization composed of one or more units with institutional or operational functions; designated by the Secretary of the Army; providing broad general support to the Army in a normally single, unique discipline not otherwise available elsewhere in the Army. Direct reporting units report directly to a HQDA principal and/or ACOM and operate under authorities established by the Secretary of the Army (see AR 1087).
+
+Equipment readiness and/or serviceability A logistic indicator that portrays the combined impact of equipment shortages and maintenance shortfalls in a unit's ability to meet wartime requirements. (Note: the term "equipment serviceability" is used at the Joint level).
+
+Future-Years Defense Program A requirement under 10 USC 221 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress each year, at or about the time that the President's budget is submitted to Congress, a future-years defense program (including associated annexes) reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs, projects, and activities of the DOD included in that budget. Any such future-years defense program will cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is submitted and at least the four succeeding fiscal years (for a total of 5 years).
+
+Generating force The generating force mans, trains, equips, deploys, and ensures the readiness of all Army forces. The generating force consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operating forces of the Army. The generating force is also the Army's principal interface with the commercial sector. Our Nation's industrial base provides equipment and sustainment for the Army, which is managed by the various headquarters of the generating force.
+
+## Major Headquarters An Army Headquarters Higher Than Battalion Level. Major Unit An Army Unit Larger Than Battalion Size. Measurement A Status Assessment That Is Highly Objective Because It Is Calculated From Authoritative Data.
+
+Mission The task together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military organizations, a duty assigned to an individual or organization; a task (see JP 102).
+
+Mission-essential task list A compilation of collective mission essential tasks, which must be successfully performed if an organization is to accomplish its wartime mission. Also see standardized METL.
+
+Modification table of organization and equipment An authorized document that prescribes the modification of a basic table of organization and equipment necessary to adapt it to the needs of the specific unit or type of unit (see AR 7132).
+
+Operating forces Operating forces consist of units organized, trained, and equipped to deploy and fight. They include about two-thirds of the Active Army, and three-fourths of the Army's Total Force.
+
+Readiness The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct, but interrelated levels: unit readiness and Joint readiness. Unit readiness is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. Joint readiness is the combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute their assigned missions (see AR 2201).
+
+Reporting unit AC and RC units and key installations (includes both operating forces and generating force) that are registered in the Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System-Army database and that are required to submit a unit status report in accordance with the provisions of AR 2201 to meet either internal or externally-directed requirements.
+
+Special Operations Forces Groups, Regiments, and Commands Active and reserve special forces groups, psychological operations groups, special operations aviation regiments, ranger regiments, and civil affairs commands.
+
+Standardized mission-essential task list A set of essential standardized tasks for like units that reflect their designed capabilities. The standardized METL will be developed or prescribed in accordance with Army doctrine established by TRADOC and will be approved by the DCS, G3/5/7.
+
+State adjutant general An individual appointed by the governor of a State to administer the military affairs of the State. A State adjutant general may be federally recognized as a general officer of the line provided he or she meets the prescribed requirements and qualifications. However, they may be federally recognized as a general officer, Adjutant General Corps, for tenure of office.
+
+## Task A Clearly Defined And Measurable Activity Accomplished By Individuals And Organizations.
+
+Training level The overall unit training level indicating the degree of unit training proficiency in the wartime tasks for which the unit was organized and designed. The T-level is measured against the unit's all-inclusive training requirements to achieve or sustain full METL proficiency. It incorporates the unit's pre-mobilization training requirements and nuclear, biological, chemical training requirements, if applicable.
+
+Unified command A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander, composed of significant assigned components or two or more Military Departments, and established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see JP 102).
+
+## Unit Readiness The Ability Of A Unit To Perform As Designed. Unit Status The Measured Resource And/Or Status Levels In A Unit At A Specific Point In Time. Section Iii Special Abbreviations And Terms This Section Contains No Entries.

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+## Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures November 2011
+
+DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
+
+## Headquarters, Department Of The Army
+
+         This publication is available at
+Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
+General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
+     Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).
+
+
+
+## Army Tactical Standard Operating Procedures Contents
+
+Page
+
+PREFACE........ ii
+Chapter 1
+STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES .... 1-1
+Collaborative Technology for SOP Development ........ 1-1 Doctrine and Policy to Support Standardization and Recordkeeping ........ 1-1 Doctrine and Policy for Coordinating Operating Procedures With Partners ...... 1-3
+Chapter 2
+EFFECTIVE OPERATING PROCEDURE INSTRUCTIONS ........ 2-1
+Developing SOPs as Instructional Materials ........ 2-1 Writing Instructions Effectively ........ 2-4
+Chapter 3
+THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE PORTAL ........ 3-1
+Adhering to Information Security Requirements ........ 3-1 Logging in to the Portal ........ 3-1 Becoming Familiar with the milWiki ........ 3-2 Using the SOP Portal Home Page for Collaboration ........ 3-2
+
+GLOSSARY ........ Glossary-1
+
+REFERENCES ........ References-1
+
+INDEX ........ Index-1
+
+## Tables
+
+Table 1-1. Department of the Army recordkeeping guidance ........ 1-2 Table 2-1. Stages of standard operating procedure development ........ 2-2 Table 2-2. Sample initial authoring questions ........ 2-2 Table 3-1. List of attachments and responsible staff officers ........ 3-4
+
+## Preface Purpose
+
+Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.90 facilitates development of standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to enhance efficiency and adaptability across the force. ATP 3-90.90 achieves this purpose through linking to a milWiki portal under the milSuite uniform resource locator (URL) containing guidance for tactical SOPs and unclassified examples of SOPs for reference. The SOP portal provides a baseline for developing new SOPs quickly and a forum for improving existing SOPs. The portal presents best practices consistent with doctrinal principles.
+
+## Special Considerations For Use Of This Manual
+
+The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate established the SOP portal in 2009. The authors attempted to align the original information with pertinent doctrine and regulations. Where the portal's contents differ from current doctrine and regulations, the latter take precedence. The information in the SOP portal is not authoritative doctrine. The examples in the portal do not provide ready-to-use SOPs for Army units. Soldiers developing SOPs for their units are encouraged to apply critical thinking while referring to the models and other resources to aid their own content development. At a minimum, portal users must be familiar with this ATP, Field Manuals (FMs) 5-0 and 6-99.2; Army Regulations (ARs) 25-1, 34-4, and 380-5; and Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 25-403. Soldiers are encouraged to use the portal to collaborate, to improve the portal's contents, and to upload new SOP examples. The SOP portal is secure and requires an Army Knowledge Online or Defense Knowledge Online login. The portal's contents are unclassified. Neither this manual nor the SOP portal is intended to regulate the appearance or content of unit SOPs. This ATP uses joint terms where applicable. When formal military terms are identified in the text of this ATP, the terms are italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition. The glossary lists acronyms used. See the references for a listing of publications cited. A *standard operating procedure* is a set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise (JP 3-31). A SOP is both standing and standard: it instructs how to perform a prescribed and accepted process established for completing a task. Features of operations that lend themselves to standardization are common and usually detailed processes performed often and requiring minimal variation each time. Well-written and properly used unit tactical SOPs enhance effective execution of tasks; the benefits of SOPs are numerous. They reduce training time, the loss of unwritten information, the commission of errors, the omission of essential steps or processes, and the time required for completion of tasks. This does not mean, however, that carrying out SOPs never requires thought or that SOPs should never change. Indeed, tactical units must change some operating procedures as rapidly as operational environments and missions change. The SOP portal helps units avoid an unnecessary loss of effectiveness that could occur by maintaining unthinking dependence on outdated written procedures. The portal also helps units avoid a loss of effectiveness that could occur when units delay writing down processes that need to become standardized.
+Note. In June 2010, JP 3-31 changed standing operating procedure to standard operating procedure. The meaning is unchanged.
+
+## Scope
+
+The doctrine in this manual provides techniques for developing unit tactical SOPs. Units throughout the Army can take advantage of technology to obtain guidance, collaborate in real time, and find information quickly. This manual and the SOP portal are intended to enhance operational adaptability Army-wide. In the short term, the information in the SOP portal will help units establish or improve SOPs more rapidly. In the long term, the intention is that more and more units will build SOPs using the portal and the doctrine in this manual. Ideally, SOPs throughout the Army should increase in similarity as the combination of doctrinal guidance and
+Army-wide milWiki collaboration facilitates consensus. This will help units communicate and coordinate with one another more easily. Reassigned Soldiers and units will become familiar with SOPs in their new assignments more quickly. Chapter 1 of this ATP discusses resources for integrating SOP development with collaborative technology, doctrine, and policy. Chapter 2 discusses a process to help authors develop effective SOPs. Chapter 3 provides the SOP portal's URL and detailed instructions on how to use the portal. To enhance standardization of tactical SOPs, the SOP portal provides tactical SOP guidance organized according to the Army operation plan and order format. For the reader's convenience, chapter 3 of this manual shows a list of attachments and responsible staff officers as table 3-1 (pages 3-4 to 3-7). Table 3-1 serves as an approximate table of contents for the information under the portal's tactical SOP guidance tab. Because the volume and variability of material in the portal, providing a fixed listing of the portal's contents in this ATP is not practical. Unit SOP examples are organized under the portal's categories tab (described in chapter 3). The general categories used for SOP examples are nondoctrinal and variable; they will expand or change as Soldiers modify them.
+
+## Applicability
+
+The principal audience for ATP 3-90.90 is Army leaders and staffs at tactical headquarters. This manual can also be used as a reference by joint and multinational commands and other Services. This manual does not apply to organizations developing official departmental publications. ATP 3-90.90 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
+
+## Security Measures For Milwiki Collaboration
+
+The milSuite and milWiki information security procedures ensure that the SOP portal is secure. The SOP portal is consistent with Department of the Army information security policies and procedures. SOP portal users must adhere to AR 380-5. SOP portals users must not post classified information to the portal. To develop unit SOPs, users must download and develop information on unit hardware with the appropriate classification. The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate milWiki program manager, SOP portal content managers, and the milSuite security network enterprise managers monitor input to the portal. Managers or doctrine proponents may modify or remove content. Posts are traceable to their originator.
+
+## Information Security Caution
+
+SOP portal users must comply with AR 380-5. Do not enter any classified information about friendly or enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures in use for current operations. Develop classified unit SOPs on classified unit hardware.
+
+## Administrative Information
+
+Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ATP 3-90.90), 300 McPherson Avenue (Building 463), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; or by e-mail to: [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+
+## Chapter 1 Standard Operating Procedure Development Resources
+
+This chapter introduces using collaborative technology to enhance standard operating procedure content development. Then it discusses Army doctrine and policy in support of standard operating procedure content development. Finally, it briefly discusses resources related to coordinating operating procedures with partners.
+
+## Collaborative Technology For Sop Development
+
+1-1. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.90 is distinct from traditional doctrinal literature in that it links to an online portal containing guidance for developing tactical standard operating procedures (SOPs), along with examples of unit SOPs. The portal serves as a forum for discussion, updates, and improvements. Soldiers may use the portal as a resource when developing unit SOPs in support of command post operations. Soldiers can refer to ATP 3-90.90 and the SOP portal to improve processes for establishing and revising SOPs and for discussing best practices in general.
+1-2. The SOP portal harnesses collaborative technology to accelerate the creation and sharing of knowledge related to unit SOPs. The portal makes it easy for Soldiers to preserve, share, and adopt lessons learned among units throughout the Army. The portal's guidance and examples are not doctrinal or authoritative and, therefore, are not subject to the time-consuming staffing requirements of doctrine development. Additionally, the models do not present classified tactics, techniques, and procedures used in current operations. Chapter 3 discusses practical aspects of how to use the SOP portal.
+
+## Doctrine And Policy To Support Standardization And Recordkeeping
+
+1-3. While Army units may draw on material in the SOP portal to accelerate SOP development, they also must consider pertinent Army doctrine and regulations. Additionally, commanders and staffs analyze their operational environment and their mission to determine what SOPs are needed and how to employ them. Commanders and staffs employ SOPs to further mission command (see Field Manual (FM) 6-0 for more information about mission command). Paragraphs 1-4 to 1-7 introduce Army doctrine and policy publications to support SOP standardization and recordkeeping.
+
+Note. Appendix A of FM 5-0 describes the types of SOPs needed for conducting command post operations.
+
+## The Army Universal Task List
+
+1-4. FM 7-15 outlines Army tactical task 5.2.1.3, Establish or revise standard [or standing] operating procedures:
+Create or modify a set of instructions covering those tasks and functions that lend themselves to a definite or standing procedure without a loss of effectiveness; the standing operating procedures is effective unless ordered otherwise to meet altered conditions.
+FM 7-15
+Per FM 7-15, the overall goal for SOPs is to facilitate mission accomplishment and warfighting functions integration.
+
+## U.S. Army Report And Message Formats
+
+1-5. FM 6-99.2 prescribes Army report and message formats. Unit SOPs must use voice and digital report and message formats from FM 6-99.2. Only unit commanders may authorize modifications. For occasions that FM 6-99.2 does not provide necessary branch-specific technical reports and messages, units still must use doctrinally established formats. Refer to Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 25-30 online to find doctrinal publications containing branch-specific formats; go to http://armypubs.army.mil.
+
+## Department Of The Army Recordkeeping Guidance
+
+1-6. Leaders ensure units adhere to Department of the Army (DA) recordkeeping guidance when preparing and using SOPs. The SOP portal does not alter or substitute for these requirements. SOPs are a type of operational record (see table 12-1, DA Pam 25-40). DA Pam 25-40 provides guidance and procedures for collecting, preparing, transferring, and preserving operational records. Army Regulation (AR) 25-1 establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for managing information resources and information technology, including recordkeeping. AR 25-400-2 governs maintenance and disposition of Army information and implements policy on recordkeeping requirements (see www.arims.army.mil). DA
+Pam 25-403 provides operational procedures and guidelines for Army recordkeeping. AR 380-5 discusses Army information security policy. DA Pam 600-67 discusses how to apply the Army writing standard. Units use the Army writing standard to ensure SOPs and other operational records are concise and easy to read. (Chapter 2 of this ATP discusses the Army writing standard in more detail.) Table 1-1 summarizes these recordkeeping authorities.
+
+AR 25-1, Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology.
+AR 25-400-2, The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS).
+AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program.
+DA Pam 25-40, Army Publishing: Action Officers Guide.
+DA Pam 25-403, Guide to Recordkeeping in the Army.
+DA Pam 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders.
+
+## Army Standardization Policy
+
+1-7. Authors of unit SOPs ensure alignment with higher-level SOPs and standardization documents as appropriate to support the goals of Army standardization policy. AR 34-4 defines *standardization* as the management principle which fosters the development and sustainment of a high state of proficiency and readiness among Soldiers and units throughout an organization. This definition emphasizes procedures that
+
+
+Sustain proficiency and readiness among Soldiers and Army units.
+
+Reduce adverse effects of personnel turbulence following reassignment of Soldiers.
+
+Eliminate local modification to approved standardized practices and procedures.
+Standardization throughout an organization reduces operational turbulence and confusion between units when force tailoring occurs.
+
+## Doctrine And Policy For Coordinating Operating Procedures With Partners
+
+1-8. Leaders consider whether unit SOPs can enhance coordination with military and nonmilitary partners. Army leaders incorporate interoperability requirements when establishing and revising SOPs, particularly regarding mission command systems. Paragraphs 1-9 to 1-14 briefly discuss doctrine and policy related to coordinating Army tactical unit operating procedures with partners.
+
+## Coordination With Joint Partners
+
+1-9. Army standardization efforts related to operating procedures sometimes include joint partners. Joint doctrine expands standardization principles to include the Department of Defense as a whole. According to Joint Publication (JP) 4-02, standardization is
+The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.
+
+JP 4-02
+To facilitate coordination during joint operations, other Services and other partners may refer to the SOP portal.
+1-10. JP 3-0 discusses considerations related to interoperability of operating procedures during joint operations. JP 6-0 discusses interoperability considerations for communications during joint operations.
+
+Unit leaders consider whether unit SOPs should incorporate coordination with joint partners, consistent with joint and Army doctrine.
+
+## Multinational Force Compatibility
+
+1-11. Standardization efforts related to operating procedures sometimes include multinational partners.
+
+AR 34-1 establishes DA policy for enhancing multinational force compatibility through international military standardization and other Army security cooperation activities. AR 34-1 requires United States Army Training and Doctrine Command to integrate multinational force compatibility where appropriate in all assigned doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
+(DOTMLPF) development activities. AR 34-1 also lists additional publications related to standardization for multinational operations. For information security policy related to sharing information with multinational partners, see AR 380-5 and AR 380-10. See JP 3-16 for joint doctrine related to interoperability with multinational partners. Unit leaders consider whether unit SOPs should incorporate coordination with multinational partners.
+
+## Foreign Disclosure Caution
+
+SOPs that support standardization for multinational operations must comply with foreign disclosure policies and procedures described in AR 380-10.
+
+
+## Support For Unified Action
+
+1-12. Unit SOPs can support unified action, which is vital to the success of stability and defense support of civil authorities operations. *Unified action* is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort
+(JP 1).
+1-13. Military forces conduct stability operations in coordination with diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Army forces synchronize, coordinate, and integrate their activities with other entities to achieve common goals. FM 3-07 provides the doctrinal foundation for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for stability operations. Appendix B of FM 3-07 discusses civilmilitary cooperation, including governmental and international partners.
+
+1-14. Military forces conduct defense support of civil authorities operations in coordination with other Services; local, state, and federal government agencies; private sector organizations; and both state National Guard and federal military forces. FM 3-28 discusses Army coordination with unified action partners for defense support of civil authorities operations. See chapter 2 of FM 3-28 for a detailed description of the comprehensive national approach for this coordination. See JP 3-08 for joint doctrine related to coordinating military operations with nonmilitary partners. Unit leaders consider how unit SOPs can support unified action for stability and defense support of civil authorities operations.
+
+
+
+## Chapter 2 Effective Operating Procedure Instructions
+
+This chapter presents a general process for developing standard operating procedures as instructional materials. It briefly discusses how to prepare effective written instructions by applying the Army writing standard.
+
+## Developing Sops As Instructional Materials
+
+2-1. An operating procedure is the approved process to complete a complex, recurring task. A procedure consists of a series of detailed stepsor subordinate tasksand carrying out those steps ensures a desired result. A standard operating procedure (SOP) provides the instructions for performing an operating procedure. (See the glossary for the full definitions of the terms *procedures* and standard operating procedure.) Writing down instructions for operating procedures is essential for units to achieve the desired result easily and repeatedly.
+2-2. Paragraphs 2-3 to 2-12 introduce a flexible developmental process for creating SOPs. This process is general enough to apply across a broad range of activities. As developers of instructional materials, SOP
+authors must follow a process that ensures effective instructions as well as effective procedures.
+
+## Stages Of Sop Development
+
+2-3. SOP authoring involves three general stages of development. In the first stage, the SOP author determines the optimal product expected from establishing or revising a procedure. This becomes the objectiveit could be anything from a rapidly assembled piece of equipment, to synchronization of schedules, to a complex intelligence product. Sometimes the commander supplies this information, or an author conducts assessments to establish or refine the objective. Then, after concisely stating the procedure's objective, the author articulates the purpose of the SOP. The purpose expresses what its users should be able to do by reading and following the SOP.
+2-4. In the second stage, the SOP author establishes an optimal process for achieving the objective. This becomes the operating procedure. This hands-on stage normally involves research, collaboration, and synthesis. The author finds out the stepsincluding subordinate tasksthat should be performed, along with their sequence, resources and conditions needed, and considerations for safety, security, and coordination. In some cases, an author need only develop instructions for a predetermined operating procedure. In other cases, the steps of the procedure itself must be revised or established before developing the instructions. For developing detailed steps of operating procedures, SOP authors use methods appropriate to their activity.
+
+2-5. In the third stage, the SOP author explains in writing how to carry out the operating procedure, usually in a computer-generated document. The commander's approval makes this document a SOP. This stage involves formulating and writing down instructions consistent with appropriate writing processes and style requirements. This stage usually includes creating additional instructional materials not limited to paper documents. Authors determine subordinate SOP development taskssuch as research, testing, and staffing requirementsdepending on the activity, the nature of the procedure, and operational requirements.
+
+
+2-6. SOP authors gather as much relevant information as possible from all appropriate sources they can find. The SOP portal aids their research. However, authors need not limit their research to the Internet.
+
+Authors focus on establishing and writing down a process that will consistently produce the desired result. Authors use critical thinking skills when assessing potential resource material, such as old or borrowed SOPs.
+2-7. Table 2-1 summarizes the stages SOP development and their results. The process is flexible, and authors may revisit earlier stages. For example, developing instructions during stage 3 sometimes leads to additional refinement of the operating procedure.
+
+| Stage                                                |
+|------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1. Determine optimal product a procedure should      |
+| deliver                                              |
+| The objective                                        |
+| 2. Establish an optimal process for achieving the    |
+| objective                                            |
+| The operating procedure                              |
+| 3. Explain in writing how to carry out the operating |
+| procedure                                            |
+| The standard operating procedure (the instructions)  |
+
+## How To Get Started Developing The Sop
+
+2-8. To help SOP authors get started, table 2-2 (pages 2-2 to 2-3) lists sample initial questions for authors to ask themselves. Authors answer questions such as these *in writing* to help plan their projects and complete them efficiently. This list is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive. Additionally, for complex projects, authors must keep a journal or project record showing their time line, milestones, progress made, contacts made, sources used, lessons learned, and issues that arise.
+
+## Table 2-2. Sample Initial Authoring Questions
+
+What is the objective of the procedure to be established or revised (what will be the product of the procedure)?
+
+What is the commander's guidance about the procedure and its product? What is the instructional purpose of the SOP document (what will its users be able to do)? Who will read the document, and who will use the procedure? What background knowledge do SOP users have? To develop the procedure thoroughly and accurately, what information must be gathered and from what sources?
+What sources are considered authoritative or informative for this procedure? How can the SOP portal be used to facilitate developing the SOP? If a procedure already existed for achieving the objective, what were its strengths and weaknesses? If there is already a consensus for the optimal way to achieve the objective, what is the general statement of that method?
+
+Whose assistance and what additional resources will be needed to complete the SOP? Who must agree on the procedure? Who will sign to approve the SOP? By what methodology should the procedure be developed or improved? How should the new or revised SOP be vetted (both the procedure and the instructions)? With what existing documents, resources, organizations, or partners must the SOP align (regulations,
+policies, equipment, doctrinal or training literature, other)?
+
+
+What will be the recordkeeping requirements related to the SOP? What safety considerations are pertinent to the procedure that will be established or revised? What security requirements must be observed in relation to the SOP? What conditions, equipment, materials, or technology are pertinent to the procedure that will be established or revised?
+
+How many drafts should it take to arrive at a final version of the SOP? What is the subject of the SOP document? What major subtopics should the SOP include? What topics should the SOP avoid? How should the SOP be organizedwhat is the preliminary topic outline? What are the best media (paper, digital, visual, 3D, audio, video, combination, other) for the SOP and for supporting instructional materials?
+
+How should the SOP be made available to intended users? Who should teach others to use the procedure? How should the procedure be tested, and how often? Who will update the SOP, and when? Who will ensure compliance with the SOP? Considering the work to be done and the commander's guidance, what is a reasonable time line for completing the SOP?
+
+Legend: SOP: standard operating procedure
+
+## How To Draft The Sop
+
+2-9. Authors prepare a series of drafts and integrate input from stakeholders into each revision of the document. This helps ensure the final instructions accurately explain the procedure. Early in SOP development, authors identify stakeholders who will review the drafts and provide input. Stakeholders include any person or group with a direct interest or involvement related to the SOP, especially Soldiers. Authors must solicit input from Soldiers. Additionally, authors must keep in mind that stakeholders sometimes include other military or nonmilitary partners.
+2-10. In the context of authoring, drafting refers to writing preliminary and developmental versions of a document. Initially, authors approach drafting using whatever techniques best suit their personal learning style. Some begin by brainstorming, making lists, or drawing maps or flow charts on a white board. Drafting is usually collaborative. The number of drafts needed depends on the complexity of the procedure, the number of stakeholders, and the time available for completing the SOP. Authors normally begin drafting the instructions for a procedure while establishing the procedure itself. Authors use rational methods appropriate to their discipline and activity for devising and testing tactical operating procedures.
+
+## How To Package The Sop
+
+2-11. SOP authors use the format required by their command, which must be consistent with appropriate military doctrine and regulations (see chapter 1). Unit SOPs normally contain the following categories of information:
+
+
+Name of the SOP, activity, unit, and classification.
+
+Subject of the SOP (this is the overall topic).
+
+References pertinent to the procedure. Citations must be accurate and thoroughtitle, type,
+number, and date of publication (for formal publications); online links if appropriate; and identifying information for correspondence or meetings.
+
+Purpose of the SOP (to ensure result X by giving instructions for performing task Y).
+
+Short summary of the SOP (a few sentences, placed near the beginning but composed last).
+
+Scope (to whom the SOP applies, and possibly under what conditions or circumstances).
+
+Definitions (sometimes needed to explain terms new to readers or to interpret acronyms).
+
+Responsibilities (brief, descriptive sentences telling exactly who is responsible to ensure what outcomes or provide what resources).
+
+Detailed instructions for the procedure, explaining
+
+Who performs exactly what tasks.
+
+When to perform the tasks: such as under what conditions, in what sequence, how often or
+how many times, at what time of day, and before or after what other event or procedure.
+
+How to perform the tasks: such as using what equipment or supplies, alone or together with
+whom, to whom or upon what, according to what security and safety requirements, and in what manner or at what pace.
+
+A reason to perform the tasks (if this information aids comprehension, execution, or
+compliance).
+
+What the result will be as each subordinate task is completed (if this information is concrete
+and factual, and it aids comprehension, execution, or compliance).
+
+Alternating actions to take in likely changes of circumstances.
+
+How or to whom Soldiers report completion of the procedure.
+
+Recordkeeping requirements.
+
+Enclosures.
+2-12. SOPs usually become electronic and paper documents prepared in word processing programs. As instructional media, they may include digital, audio, or visual components. The authors normally prepare a memorandum containing the SOP, for the commander's signature. They prepare supporting instructional materials and applications to facilitate use of the SOP.
+
+## Writing Instructions Effectively
+
+2-13. SOP authors staff a series of drafts (see paragraphs 2-9 to 2-10) to ensure the final SOP is accurate.
+
+SOP authors also ensure their instructions are easy to read and follow. To write effective instructions, SOP
+authors
+
+
+Focus on the objective.
+
+Carefully observe and analyze the tasks to be explained.
+
+Consider the characteristics of the intended audience.
+
+Incorporate appropriate media (such as illustrations or videos).
+
+Use appropriate design (such as white space, color, diagrams, and sequencing).
+
+Limit the use of acronyms and abbreviations and interpret those used.
+
+Apply the Army writing standard: comprehensible in a single, rapid reading and generally free of errors in grammar, mechanics, and usage.
+The test of good writing is that a junior enlisted Soldier should have no trouble understanding exactly what to do after reading the instructions one time. AR 25-50 and DA PAM 600-67 describe good Army writing as concise, organized, and right to the point.
+
+## Concise Writing For Sops
+
+2-14. Concise writing expresses the writer's point with the fewest words possible. Concise writing for SOPs avoids
+
+
+Passive sentences.
+
+Fancy (bureaucratic) words and long sentences.
+
+Unnecessary repetition.
+Effective writers avoid passive sentences when possible because they tend to slow or impair reading comprehension (see examples in paragraph 2-17). Passives make a document longer than necessary because they tend to be wordy. They make readers search for the main point of a sentence by moving it
+toward the middle. Additionally, they make readers decipher who performs an action by moving the subject toward the end or by omitting the subject. Precision and conciseness go hand in hand. Short, commonly used wordsbased on their dictionary definitionsand short sentences usually communicate most effectively. Conciseness does not mean that repetition is never appropriate. SOP authors consider whether instructions should repeat critical information. Authors avoid *unnecessary* repetition by carefully organizing SOP content.
+
+## Organized Writing For Sops
+
+2-15. Organized writing always starts with a purpose. Organized writing for SOPs presents
+
+
+More important ideas before less important ideas.
+
+Closely related ideas together.
+
+Subordinate ideas under main ideas.
+
+The steps of a process in chronological order.
+
+Authors achieve organization through planning and outlining. (See paragraphs 2-3 to 2-10 and table 2-2 for planning guidance.) Outlining consists of making a list of topics and arranging the topics in relation to one another. Authors prepare topic outlines before drafting any other text. Collaboration and hands-on techniques, such as drawing topic maps on whiteboards, facilitate topic outlining.
+
+## To-The-Point Writing For Sops
+
+2-16. To-the-point writing is direct. It states the main point at the beginning. A reader should not have to surmise the main point or wait until the end to discover it. In addition, to-the-point writing for SOPs avoids
+
+
+Indirect or vague language.
+
+Jargon (specialized and unofficial words, usually understood by only a few).
+
+Unnecessary components (such as cartoons or humorous anecdotes, quotations, lengthy historical backgrounds, or irrelevant references to other publications).
+These sample sentences illustrate indirect, ineffective writing for SOPs:
+
+Due to the fact that smoking is a fire hazard, it is essential that you turn off the engine prior to
+commencing to smoke.
+
+In accordance with aforementioned authorities, you must perform the task which is required.
+
+Avoid snafus by getting up-to-speed with required info on recordkeeping asap.
+These sample sentences illustrate straightforward, to-the-point writing:
+
+Turn off the engine before lighting a cigarette.
+
+This task is mandatory.
+
+Read Army Regulation 25-400-2 before disposing of any operational records.
+Authors use plain English wherever possible. They use formal military terminology accurately and precisely. When composing instructions, they assume most readers are pressed for time.
+2-17. Finally, SOPs give to-the-point instructions using a mix of strong, imperative sentences and active, descriptive sentences. Imperative sentences do not require a subjectthey tell a person to perform an action. Strong imperative sentences start with strong verbs. The document still must state explicitly who performs each action, especially when the instructions address more than one person. Instructions do not need to use words such as "must" or "should." The following sentences provide more examples of passive, imperative, and descriptive sentences.
+
+
+Example of passive sentences (ineffective):
+
+The engine is to be turned off.
+
+The aforementioned task is always completed at the beginning.
+
+Smoking is prohibited.
+
+Examples of imperative sentences (effective if the document makes clear who performs the action):
+
+Turn off the engine.
+
+First, turn off the engine.
+
+Do not smoke in or near the equipment room.
+
+Examples of descriptive sentences (effective when they clarify imperative sentences):
+
+Turning off the engine helps conserve fuel and reduce the risk of fire.
+
+The shift supervisor records the time the engine is shut down in the log book.
+Finally, refer to the SOP portal for many examples of effectively written unit SOPs.
+
+
+## Chapter 3 The Standard Operating Procedure Portal
+
+This chapter begins by emphasizing information security policy in relation to using the standard operating procedure portal. Then it explains how to log in to the milSuite to access the portal. It briefly introduces how to become familiar with the milWiki. Finally, it discusses practical aspects of navigating and using the standard operating procedure portal for collaboration.
+
+## Adhering To Information Security Requirements
+
+3-1. Standard operation procedure (SOP) portal users must comply with information security policies and procedures. They must not enter classified tactics, techniques, and procedures currently in use for military operations. It is the responsibility of the command to classify SOPswhen in development and when approvedconsistent with Army Regulation (AR) 380-5.
+
+## Information Security Caution
+
+SOP portal users must comply with AR 380-5 regarding information security policies and procedures. Do not enter any classified information about friendly or enemy unit tactics, techniques, and procedures in use for current operations. Develop classified unit SOPs on classified unit hardware.
+
+3-2. When beginning development of SOPs, units must download information from the portal. They must develop unit SOPs on unit hardware with the appropriate classification. The models on the SOP portal are unclassified examples only, intended to illustrate best practices. In addition, it is the command's responsibility to ensure compliance with AR 380-10 for foreign disclosure.
+
+## Foreign Disclosure Caution
+
+For SOPs that support multinational operations, SOP portal users must comply with AR 380-10 regarding foreign disclosure policies and procedures.
+
+## Logging In To The Portal
+
+3-3. The milSuite Web site provides social media capabilities for enhancing collaboration and efficiency within the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) communities. Access to milSuite requires AKO or DKO credentials or a registered common access card (CAC).
+3-4. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center, hosts the SOP
+portal. Users may click on the following hyperlink or paste it into a Web browser:
+https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal:Standard_Operating_Procedures. This takes users directly to the SOP
+portal, by way of a milSuite login page.
+
+
+3-5. The milSuite login page that users see initially provides user consent and terms of use information for the milSuite. Before logging in the first time, SOP portal users must read the information displayed under the "Standard Mandatory Notice and Consent Banner" and the "Terms of Use/Terms of Service" link. Upon logging in, users see the SOP portal home page. SOP portal users
+
+
+Consent to the "Terms Of Use/Terms Of Service" for milSuite.
+
+Ensure all posts to the SOP portal are unclassified.
+
+Align SOP development with the doctrinal guidance in Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.90.
+
+Understand that posts are monitored and are not anonymous.
+
+Read and adhere to the milWiki rules of conduct (found by clicking on the "Rules of Conduct" link at the bottom of the SOP portal home page).
+
+Read and follow the milWiki guidelines (found by clicking on the "Guidelines" link under the "Support" heading along the left side of the SOP portal home page).
+
+## Becoming Familiar With The Milwiki
+
+3-6. The milWiki provides numerous articles to familiarize users with using site. In the SOP portal home page, users will see links to articles, videos, frequently asked questions, and wiki templates pertinent to preparing SOPs. Additionally, users are encouraged to become familiar with the information at the milWiki links appearing on the left side of the SOP home page (visible after logging in). The milWiki information categories displayed on the left side of the page are
+
+
+Navigation.
+
+Support.
+
+MilSuite.
+
+Tools.
+
+Toolbox.
+3-7. The milWiki home page, at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Main_Page, (also reached by clicking on the milWiki logo at the upper left-hand side of the SOP home page) links to tutorials, examples, article blueprints, and community links, under the heading "Getting Started." Users may also navigate to an informative milWiki help page at https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Help:Contents.
+
+## Using The Sop Portal Home Page For Collaboration
+
+3-8. Users should become familiar with how to use the milWiki before attempting to enter or modify content in the SOP portal (see paragraphs 3-6 to 3-7). This ATP provides a very limited description because the portal's structure and content are developmental and subject to frequent change.
+3-9. Users see the words "Portal: Standard Operating Procedures" near the top of the SOP portal home page. The SOP portal home page displays three tabs:
+
+
+Main page tab (of the SOP portal home page).
+
+SOP resources tab.
+
+Categories tab.
+Users may navigate the site by clicking on the tabs, described in paragraphs 3-10 to 3-17.
+
+## Sop Portal Home Page, Main Page Tab
+
+3-10. The main page tab on the SOP portal home page displays a welcome message. This page offers a variety of resources. Users should not modify the content appearing in the welcome message.
+
+
+## Sop Portal Home Page, Sop Reources Tab
+
+3-11. Clicking on the SOP resources tab (the second of the three tabs displayed on the SOP portal's home page) takes users to the SOP resources page. Users see the words "Portal: Standard Operating Procedures/SOP Resources" near the top of the SOP resources page. Four tabs on the SOP resources page are
+
+
+Main page tab (of the SOP resources page).
+
+Army regulations tab.
+
+Tactical SOP guidance tab.
+
+SOP categories tab (for uploading unit SOP examples).
+
+## Sop Resources Page, Main Page Tab
+
+3-12. At the SOP resources page, users first see a main page tab. This tab displays a welcome message and a variety of helpful resources. Users may upload additional resources. Resources shown at this tab are for the convenience of usersresources may not be authoritative.
+
+## Sop Resources Page, Army Regulations Tab
+
+3-13. At the Army regulations tab, users see copies of several ARs pertinent to the SOP portal. These are provided for the convenience of portal users. The official repository for Army administrative publications is http://www.apd.army.mil/AdminPubs/Pubs_home.asp.
+
+## Sop Resources Page, Tactical Sop Guidance Tab
+
+3-14. To view or modify the portal's tactical SOP guidance, users click on the tactical SOP guidance tab in the SOP resources page, and then on the appropriate chapter. The chapters listed under the tactical SOP "contents" are variable. They are named and organized based on the Army operation plan and order format (ATTP 5-0.1 is the doctrinal proponent). For the reader's convenience, table 3-1 (pages 3-4 to 3-7) lists the attachments and responsible staff officers. This serves as an approximate table of contents. Differences between table 3-1 and the portal's contents are due to the site's remaining under development. Users submitting content should keep the mode of organization as consistent as possible with table 3-1. Users should keep in mind that the contents within the tactical SOP guidance are not authoritative doctrine. Additionally, SOP portal users may find some chapters with the message "contents pending." Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate encourages Soldiers to submit text for missing chapters and to submit comments and recommendations for improving others. Users must observe information security policies and procedures described in this chapter.
+
+## Sop Resources Page, Sop Categories Tab
+
+3-15. The SOP categories tab displayed on the SOP resources page and the "categories" tab displayed on the SOP portal home page provide two ways to navigate to one location containing unit SOP examples. To view or upload unit SOPs, users click on either tab. Paragraphs 3-16 and 3-17 further describe using the categories.
+
+## Sop Portal Home Page, Categories Tab
+
+3-16. The portal's examples of unit SOPs are organized by general, nondoctrinal categories. Tactical units are encouraged to upload unclassified SOPs to the portalas examples of best practices to share with other unitsaccording to information security policies and procedures described in this chapter. To upload unit SOPs, users follow the instructions for the milWiki (see paragraphs 3-6 and 3-7). Users may create new categories or reorganize existing categories for their unit SOPs.
+
+3-17. To adopt text from the portal into unit SOPs, users select the desired text, copy it, and paste it into their own document, using unit hardware with the appropriate classification and following unit procedures. They modify or omit portions as needed. They must comply with AR 380-5. Chapter 2 provides additional guidance on developing effective SOPs.
+
+## Annex A - Task Organization (G-5 Or G-3 [S-3]) Annex B - Intelligence (G-2 [S-2])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Intelligence Estimate
+
+
+Tab A - Terrain (Engineer Officer)
+
+
+Tab B - Weather (Staff Weather Officer)
+
+
+Tab C - Civil Considerations
+
+
+Tab D - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Products
+
+Appendix 2 - Counterintelligence
+
+Appendix 3 - Signals Intelligence
+
+Appendix 4 - Human Intelligence
+
+Appendix 5 - Geospatial Intelligence
+
+Appendix 6 - Measurement and Signature Intelligence
+
+Appendix 7 - Open Source Intelligence
+
+## Annex C - Operations (G-5 Or G-3 [S-3])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Design Concept
+
+Appendix 2 - Operation Overlay
+
+Appendix 3 - Decision Support Products
+
+
+Tab A - Execution Matrix
+
+
+Tab B - Decision Support Template and Matrix
+
+Appendix 4 - Gap Crossing Operations
+
+
+Tab A - Traffic Control Overlay
+
+Appendix 5 - Air Assault Operations
+
+
+Tab A - Pickup Zone Diagram
+
+
+Tab B - Air Movement Table
+
+
+Tab C - Landing Zone Diagram
+
+Appendix 6 - Airborne Operations
+
+
+Tab A - Marshalling Plan
+
+
+Tab B - Air Movement Plan
+
+
+Tab C - Drop Zone/Extraction Zone Diagram
+
+Appendix 7 - Amphibious Operations
+
+
+Tab A - Advance Force Operations
+
+
+Tab B - Embarkation Plan
+
+
+Tab C - Landing Plan
+
+
+Tab D - Rehearsal Plan
+
+Appendix 8 - Special Operations (G-3 [S-3])
+
+Appendix 9 - Battlefield Obscuration (CBRN Officer)
+
+Appendix 10 - Airspace Command and Control (G-3 [S-3] or Airspace Command and Control Officer)
+
+
+Tab A - Air Traffic Services
+
+Appendix 11 - Rules of Engagement (Staff Judge Advocate)
+
+
+Tab A - No Strike List
+
+
+Tab B - Restricted Target List (G-3 [S-3] with Staff Judge Advocate)
+
+Appendix 12 - Law and Order Operations (Provost Marshal)
+
+
+Tab A - Police Engagement
+
+
+Tab B - Law Enforcement
+
+Appendix 13 - Internment and Resettlement Operations (Provost Marshal)
+
+## Annex D - Fires (Chief Of Fires/Fire Support Officer)
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Fire Support Overlay
+
+Appendix 2 - Fire Support Execution Matrix
+
+Appendix 3 - Targeting
+
+
+Tab A - Target Selection Standards
+
+
+Tab B - Target Synchronization Matrix
+
+
+Tab C - Attack Guidance Matrix
+
+
+Tab D - Target List Worksheets
+
+
+Tab E - Battle Damage Assessment (G-2 [S-2])
+
+Appendix 4 - Field Artillery Support
+
+Appendix 5 - Air Support
+
+Appendix 6 - Naval Fire Support
+
+Appendix 7 - Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities (Electronic Warfare Officer)
+
+
+Tab A - Electronic Warfare
+
+
+Tab B - Computer Network Operations
+
+
+Tab C - Computer Network Attack
+
+
+Tab D - Computer Network Exploitation
+
+## Annex E - Protection (Chief Of Protection/Protection Officer As Designated By The Commander)
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Air and Missile Defense (Air and Missile Defense Officer)
+
+
+Tab A - Enemy Air Avenues of Approach
+
+
+Tab B - Enemy Air Order of Battle
+
+
+Tab C - Enemy Theater Ballistic Missile Overlay
+
+
+Tab D - Air and Missile Defense Protection Overlay
+
+
+Tab E - Critical Asset List/Defended Asset List
+
+Appendix 2 - Personnel Recovery (Personnel Recovery Officer)
+
+Appendix 3 - Fratricide Avoidance (Safety Officer)
+
+Appendix 4 - Operational Area Security (Provost Marshal)
+
+Appendix 5 - Antiterrorism (Antiterrorism Officer)
+
+Appendix 6 - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense (CBRN Officer)
+
+Appendix 7 - Safety (Safety Officer)
+
+Appendix 8 - Operations Security (Operations Security Officer)
+
+Appendix 9 - Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer)
+
+Appendix 10 - Force Health Protection (Surgeon)
+
+## Annex F - Sustainment (Chief Of Sustainment [S-4])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Logistics (G-4 [S-4])
+
+Appendix 2 - Personnel Services Support (G-1 [S-1])
+
+Appendix 3 - Army Heath System Support (Surgeon)
+
+## Annex G - Engineer (Engineer Officer)
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Mobility/Countermobility
+
+Appendix 2 - Survivability (Engineer Officer)
+
+Appendix 3 - General Engineering
+
+Appendix 4 - Geospatial Engineering
+
+Appendix 5 - Engineer Task Organization and Execution Matrix
+
+Appendix 6 - Environmental Considerations
+
+## Annex H - Signal (G-6 [S-6])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Information Assurance
+
+Appendix 2 - Voice and Data Network Diagrams
+
+Appendix 3 - Satellite Communications
+
+Appendix 4 - Foreign Data Exchanges
+
+Appendix 5 - Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations
+
+ANNEX I - Not Used
+
+## Annex J - Inform And Influence Activities (G-7 [S-7])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Public Affairs (Public Affairs Officer)
+
+Appendix 2 - Military Deception (Military Deception Officer)
+
+Appendix 3 - Military Information Support Operations (Military Information Support Officer)
+
+Appendix 4 - Soldier and Leader Engagement
+
+## Annex K - Civil Affairs Operations (G-9 [S-9])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Execution Matrix
+
+Appendix 2 - Populace and Resources Control Plan
+
+Appendix 3 - Civil Information Management Plan
+
+## Annex L - Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (G-3 [S-3])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - ISR Overlay
+
+Appendix 2 - ISR Tasking Matrix
+
+## Annex M - Assessment (G-5 [S-5] Or G-3 [S-3])
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Nesting of Assessment Efforts
+
+Appendix 2 - Assessment Framework
+
+Appendix 3 - Assessment Working Group
+
+## Annex N - Space Operations (Space Operations Officer)
+
+ANNEX O - Not Used
+
+## Annex P - Host-Nation Support (G-4 [S-4])
+
+ANNEX Q - Spare ANNEX R - REPORTS (G-3 [S-3], G-5 [S-5], G-7 and Knowledge Management Officer) ANNEX S - SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS (Special Technical Operations Officer)
+
+
+Appendix 1 - Special Technical Operations Capabilities Integration Matrix
+
+Appendix 2 - Functional Area I Program and Objectives
+
+Appendix 3 - Functional Area II Program and Objectives
+
+ANNEX T - Spare ANNEX U - INSPECTOR GENERAL (Inspector General)
+
+ANNEX W - Spare ANNEX X - Spare ANNEX Y - Spare ANNEX Z - DISTRIBUTION (G-3 [S-3] and Knowledge Management Officer)
+
+Legend:
+G-1, assistant chief of staff, personnel
+G-2, assistant chief of staff, intelligence
+G-3, assistant chief of staff, operations
+G-4, assistant chief of staff, logistics
+G-5, assistant chief of staff, plans
+G-6, assistant chief of staff, signal
+G-7, assistant chief of staff, inform and influence activities
+G-9, assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
+
+S-1, personnel staff officer
+S-2, intelligence staff officer
+S-3, operations staff officer
+S-4, logistics staff officer
+S-5, plans staff officer
+S-6, signal staff officer
+S-7, inform and influence activities staff officer
+S-9, civil affairs operations staff officer
+
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+
+## Glossary Section I - Acronyms And Abbreviations
+
+AR
+Army regulation
+ATP
+Army techniques publication
+ATTP
+Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
+CJCSI
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
+
+DA Pam
+Department of the Army pamphlet
+FM
+field manual
+JP
+joint publication
+SOP
+standard operating procedure
+
+## Section Ii - Terms Procedures Standard, Detailed Steps That Prescribe How To Perform Specific Tasks. (Cjcsi 5120.02B)
+
+standard operating procedure A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. (JP 3-31)
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+
+## References
+
+REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
+These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
+
+JP 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 8 November 2010.
+FM 1-02. *Operational Terms and Graphics,* 21 September 2004.
+
+## Related Publications These Documents Contain Relevant Supplemental Information.
+
+JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
+Find Joint and Department of Defense Publications at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/doctrine.htm.
+
+CJCSI 5120.02B. *Joint Doctrine Development System,* 4 December 2009.
+JP 1. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,*14 May 2007.
+JP 3-0. *Joint Operations,* 17 September 2006.
+
+JP 3-08. *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations,* 24 June 2011.
+
+JP 3-16. *Multinational Operations,* 7 March 2007. JP 3-31. *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations,* 29 June 2010.
+
+JP 4-02. *Health Service Support,* 31 October 2006.
+
+JP 6-0. *Joint Communications Systems,* 10 June 2010.
+
+ARMY PUBLICATIONS
+Find Army publications at https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/.
+
+AR 25-1. *Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology,* 4 December 2008.
+
+AR 25-50. *Preparing and Managing Correspondence,* 3 June 2002. AR 25-400-2. *The Army Records Information Management System (ARIMS),* 2 October 2007. AR 34-1. *Multinational Force Compatibility,* 6 January 2004.
+
+AR 34-4. *Army Standardization Policy,*15 March 1984.
+
+AR 380-5. *Department of the Army Information Security Program,* 29 September 2000.
+
+AR 380-10. *Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives,* 22 June 2005. ATTP 5-0.1. *Commander and Staff Officer Guide*. 14 September 2011.
+
+DA Pam 25-30. Consolidated Index of Army Publications and Blank Forms {online}.
+
+https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/2530.html.
+
+DA Pam 25-40. *Army Publishing: Action Officers Guide,* 7 November 2006.
+
+DA Pam 25-403. *Guide to Recordkeeping in the Army,* 11 August 2008.
+
+DA Pam 600-67. *Effective Writing for Army Leaders,* 2 June 1986.
+
+FM 3-07. *Stability Operations*, 6 October 2008.
+
+FM 3-28. *Civil Support Operations,* 20 August 2010.
+
+FM 5-0. *The Operations Process,* 26 March 2010.
+
+FM 6-0. *Mission Command,* 13 September 2011.
+
+FM 6-99.2. *U.S. Army Report and Message Formats,* 30 April 2007.
+
+FM 7-15. *The Army Universal Task List,* 27 February 2009.
+
+References
+
+## Prescribed Forms None.
+
+REFERENCED FORMS
+DA Form 2028. *Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.*
+
+## Index
+
+
+Entries are by paragraph number unless specified otherwise.
+
+## EJ
+
+effective writing,
+conciseness and, 2-14 organization and, 2-15 directness and, 2-162-17
+information security
+requirements, the SOP portal and, 3-13-2
+initial SOP authoring questions,
+table 2-2
+joint partners, SOPs and, 1-9
+1-10
+AB
+Army recordkeeping guidance,
+1-6, table 1-1
+Army report and message
+formats, 1-5
+Army standardization policy,
+1-7
+Army universal task list, 1-4 Army writing standard, 1-6,
+2-132-17
+becoming familiar with milWiki,
+3-6
+
+## CD
+
+collaboration, SOP portal home
+page and, 3-83-17
+collaborative technology,  SOP
+development and, 1-11-2
+conciseness, effective SOP
+writing and, 2-14
+coordinating procedures with
+partners, doctrine and policy for, 1-81-14
+coordination with joint partners,
+1-91-10
+developing SOPs, 2-32-10,
+tables 2-1 and 2-2
+developing SOPs as
+instructional materials, 2-1 2-12
+directness, effective SOP
+writing and, 2-162-17
+doctrine and policy for
+coordinating SOPs with partners, 1-81-14
+
+SW
+SOP development, stages of,
+2-32-7, table 2-1
+SOP drafts, preparation of,
+2-92-10
+SOP packaging, 2-112-12 SOP portal,
+information security and,
+3-13-2
+logging in to, 3-33-5 navigation of, 3-83-17
+SOP portal home page for collaboration, 3-83-17
+SOPs and multinational force compatibility, 1-11
+SOPs and unified action, 1-12
+1-14
+stages of SOP development,
+2-32-7, table 2-1
+standardization and recordkeeping, doctrine and policy for, 1-31-14
+starting SOP development, 2-8, table 2-2
+to-the-point writing for effective SOPs, 2-162-17
+unified action, SOPs and,
+1-121-14
+writing effectively, 2-132-17
+
+
+
+LP
+logging in to the SOP portal,
+3-33-5
+milWiki, becoming familiar with,
+3-6
+multinational force
+compatibility, SOPs and, 1-11
+navigating the SOP portal, 3-8
+3-17
+organization, effective SOP
+writing and, 2-15
+packaging SOPs, 2-112-12 planning SOP development,
+2-8, table 2-2
+preparing SOP drafts, 2-92-10
+
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
+
+                                                RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
+                                               General, United States Army
+                                                    Chief of Staff
+Official:
+
+   JOYCE E. MORROW
+Administrative Assistant to the
+   Secretary of the Army
+        1115911
+
+
+## Distribution:
+
+Army, the Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve: Not to be distributed; electronic media only.

markdown/army/atp3_18x16ph.md

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Atp 3-18.16 (U)
+
+To access this document please contact:
+Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, USAJFKSWCS
+ATTN: AOJK-SFD
+3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A
+Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610
+Proponent:
+U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence
+(USAJFKSWCS)
+910-432-5759
+910-432-3416